THE CONTEMPT OF LAW- JURISDICNIJUTION AND

PROCEEDINGS – A DETAILED STUDY

FL 42 – PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL

ACCOUNTING SYSTEM

ANIJU A NAIR

(REG. NO. 62954)

MOUNT ZION LAW COLLEGE

KADAMANITTA

JULY, 2019
 ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Dissertation submitted partial fulfillment of the requirements for F.L 42 Professional Ethics
And Professional Accounting System, VIIth Semester B.Com LLB (Hons) (2015 - 2020)
batch of the Mahatma Gandhi University.

ANIJU A NAIR

(REG. NO. 62954)

MOUNT ZION LAW COLLEGE

KADAMANITTA

JULY, 2019
This is certifying that this dissertation Titled “THE CONTEMPT LAW- JURISDICNIJUTION
AND PROCEEDINGS – A DETAILED STUDY” is a bonafide work done by ANIJU A NAIR
( Register No: 62954 ) for FL 42 – Professional Ethics And Professional Accounting System,
VIIth Semester B.Com LLB (Hons) (2015 - 2020) batch, carried out under my supervision and
guidance.

Kadamanitta

July 2019

Signature: Signature:

Principal Faculty in Charge

 CONTENTS

PAGE NO.

1. PREFACE
2. ABBRIVATIONS
3. TABLE OF CASES
4. INTRODUCTION
5. CHAPTER 1 :CONTEMPT LAW NATURE AND
6. CLASSIFICATION
7. CHAPTER 2 :ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF

THE LAW OF CONTEMT IN ENGLAND

8. CHAPTER 3 : CONTEMPT OF COURT BY VARIOUS

OFFICIALS AND AUTHORITIES

9. CHAPTER 4 : THE CONTEMPT OF COURT’S ACT, 1971

10. CHAPTER 5 :IMPORTANT DECISIONS ON

CONTEMPT OF COURT

11. CONCLUSION
12. BIBILIOGRAPHY
 PREFACE

The origin and development of laws relating to contempt of court and of Parliament are from
same principles viz. The prerogatives and the perfections attributed to King by common law.
However as the society developed, appreciating law of contempt on the basis of authority of
King underwent substantial changes. Thus ever since the first reported case in England, the
English contempt law had undergone considerable changes and modifications to cope with
the changing needs of the society. Whatever be the theory behind contempt power, at present,
the purpose behind contempt law is based on the principle that a civil society is founded on
respect for law and if every citizen chooses to break law, we will have no society at all, at
least not a civil one . To answer this question we have to look into whether the contempt laws
available in our country are apt to ensure respect for law and due administration of justice on
one hand and whether the restrictions are in tune with the value system of the country on the
other Thus retaining confidence of public in administration of justice mechanism may be
through indigenous methods, taking into account the constitutional values and aspirations of
the people. A blind continuation of English law regarding contempt of court which is based
on an entirely different system may not be suitable to India.

First of all, praise to almighty god, who bestowed upon me the potential and ability to
accomplish the task of the work. I would like to thank our Principal Mr. Paul Gomez for his
strenuous effort in guidance us throughout the completion of the dissertation. I wish to
express deep since of gratitude to Mrs. Reshmi S. Nair, Asst. Professor of Law for her
valuable supervision and helpful suggestion in the completion of this work, without which I
couldn’t have been finished this work in its exact form and contempt. In truth, without her, it
would be much more difficult to complete this dissertation. I express my sincere gratitude to
other faculties Mrs. Chandini G. Krishna, Miss. Chesha P. Chellapan, Mr. Padmajan .S,
Mr. Sandeep Chandhrasekhar, Mr. Mohammad Khan and other teachers for their
guidance and support. I would like thank my family for their support that helps me
throughout the work. Last but not least, it’s my strong supporting team, my friend, whose
kind co-operation and motivation which put up with me had made thin possible. Finally,
without the blessings of God, the Almighty, this work would have never been completed.

ABBREVIATIONS

1. AIBC :All India Bar Committee

2. AIBE :All India Bar Examination
3. AIR :All India Reporter
4. Anr :Another
5. All :Allahabad
6. AP :Andhra Pradesh
7. BCI :Bar Council of India
8. Cal. :Calcutta
9. CCA :Contempt of Court’s Act
10. CJ :Chief Justice
11. CJM :Chief Judicial Magistrate
12. CLS :Criminal Law Journal
13. C. M :Chief Minister
14. Co :Company
15. CPC :Civil Procedure Code
16. Cri LJ :Criminal Law Journal Of India
17. Cr PC :Criminal Procedure Code
18. Dec. :December
19. Dist. :District
20. Edn. :Edition
21. Gov. :Government
22. Guj. :Gujarat
23. HC :High Court
24. Harv. :Harward
25. ICC :International Criminal Court
26. ID :Ibid
27. IPC :Indian Penal Code
28. LLB :Legum Baccalaureus (Latin) Bachelor of Law/Laws (English)
29. LR :Law Report
30. LT :Legal Term
31. Ltd :Limited
32. M. P. :Madhya Pradesh
33. Mohd. :Mohammed
34. P. :Page
35. Pat. :Patna
36. Punj. :Punjab
37. Ors :Others
38. SBS :State Bar Council
39. SC :Supreme Court
40. SCC :Supreme Court Cases
41. SCR :Supreme Court Report
42. Supp. :Supplement
43. UOI : Union of India
44. USA : United States Of America
 TABLE OF CASES

Page No:

1. A G v. Times News Paper Ltd; 12

2. A G v. Waltham Stow (1875) 18
3. A.I.A.D.M.K v. L.K Tripathi and Ots: (2009) 48
4. Aligarh Muncipal Board v. Ekka Jongu Mazdoor Union, 1970 06
5. Arunava Ghosh v. Bar Council of West Bengal and Ots: 29
6. Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin,1979 07
7. Barad Kant Mishra v. Bhinisen Dixit, 1973 33
8. Bar Association Library, Morabad v. Kothari, S.D.M, 1966 33
9. Barton v. Field (1843) 4. P. C 273 11
10. Batnagar and Co: Ltd v. Union of India, 1957 8
11. Birch v. Walsh 10, irish Eq. R. p. 93, 1886 16
12. B.K Khar v. Chief Justice of India 35
13. Brata Kanta v. Registrar Orissa H.C, 1886 04
14. British Motor Trade Association v.Hewitt,1951 18
15. Chintamani Pillai v. State A.I.R 1952 Ori: 167 35
16. Common Case v. Union of India, 1995 16
17. Court on its motion v. H.C of Punjab and Haryana, 1995 28
18. Court on its motion v. Milkhi Ram 1992. 10
19. Court on its motion v. N.S Kumar, 1995 19
20. Davis v. Rhagoder Granite Quarries Ltd: 18
21. Deen Dayal v. H.C of Andra Pradesh, 1997 43
22. Delhi Judicial Service Association v. State of Gujarat and others, 1991 09
23. Dhamayanti G Chandhiramani v. S. Vaney, 1966 13
24. D.J Shield v. Ramesam, AIR 1955 Andra. 156 16
25. Dodington v. Hudson, (1824) 8 moore 510 17
26. Donglus JMC Comb. V. Jakson Ville Paper Co: 05
27. Dr. (mrs) Roshan Sam Joyce v. S.R Cotton Mill Ltd., 1990 08
28. East India Commercial v. The Collector Customs Co. Ltd, 1962 33
29. Emperor v. Surendra Mohsn Maitra and Ots. 30
30. E.M.S Namboodiripad v. T.N Nambiar,1970 45
31. Ex-Capt. Harish Upal v. Union of India 2003 AIR SCW 43 31
32. Gulam Mohd. V. Sharif Baig, 1960 34
33. Harkusum Sing v. Chhotan Muhton and Ots., 1951 34
34. Harvey v. Harvey (1884) 26 ch. D 654 17
35. Home + Naveed Yar Khan v. State of U.P, 1992 41
36. In re Ajay Kumar Pandey, Advocate, AIR, 1992 28
37. In re Nandlal Balwani AIR 1999 SC 1300 29
38. In re S.K Sundharam, AIR 2001, SC 2374 10
39. In re Thusar Kanti Ghosh, AIR 1935 Cal. 419 11
40. In re Vinayachandra Mishra, 1995 28
41. In Spokes v. Ban Bury Board of Health (1865) L.R Eq.42 18
42. J.R Parashar v. Prashant Bhusani, 2001 12
43. King v. Almon 1765 Wimont 243 19
44. King v. Clements 1876, 46 L.J Ch. 375 19
45. Maruti Udyog Ltd. V. Mahindra C Mwhta,2008 07
46. M. B Sanghi Advocate v. H.C of Punjab and Haryana,1991 28
47. Miller v. Knox (1878) 4 Bing N.C 574 17
48. Minglan v. Whetley (1851) 6 Ex 88 17
49. Mohd. Aslam v. Union of India, 1995 35
50. Mohd. Shafi Advocate v. Choudry Quadir Baksh 1949 33
51. Narain Sing v. Hardayal Sing, 1958 36
52. Omesh Saigal v. R. K Dalmia, 1969 13
53. ‘O’ Shea v. ‘O’ Shea and Parnel, 1890 26
54. Phnographic Performance Ltd. V. Amusment Caters (peck name) Ltd. 1963 18
55. Plating Co. V. Forquharson, 1881 25
56. Pritam Pal v. H.C of M.P, 1992 28
57. Queen v. Grew, AIR 2006 SCC 54 14
58. R v. Davies, 1906 26
59. R v. Parke, (1903) 2 K.B. p.432 24
60. R v. Payne (1896) 1 Q.B p.580 23
61. R v. Tibbits and Windust (1902) 1 K.B p.77 26
62. Rajendra Sail v. MP H.C Bar Asso; , 2005 23
63. Read and Huggmson v. Garyan 1742 26
64. Reo Cannor Cheshur v. Stsus, 1896 27
65. Roach v. Garvan (1742) 2 Atk p.471 23
66. Scott v. Scott (1913) A.C 417 18
67. Sward v. Paterson, 1897 04
68. Shamsher Sing Bedi v. H.C of Punjab and Haryana 1974 28
69. Shoppe v. Nandhan and Co. (1892) L.Q.R 245 18
70. S.N Banarjee v. Kuchwar Lime Stones Co. Ltd. 1938 28
71. Stan Court v. Thrw Bridge Urbun District Council 1910, 26 T.L.R 407 17
72. State Bank Of Patiyala v. Vinesh Kumar Bhasin 05
73. State of Bihar v. Shree Kubar Nandh Kishore Sing, 1986 03
74. St. James Evening Post Case, 1942 2 Atk. 1469 12
75. State v. P.C Mall, 1973 33
76. Sukumar Mukho Padhya v. T.D Karam Chandumi, 1995 07
77. Sulthan Ali Nanghiara v. Nur Hussain Thandhumi, 1995 06
78. State of Rajasthan v. Pasrkash Chandh, 1998 47
79. S.C Bar Asso. v. Union of India, 1998 42
80. Tarim Mohan v. Pleaders , AIR 1923 Cal. 212 29
81. T.R Dhananjaya v. J Vasudevan, 1996 18
82. Vidhya Sagar v. Third Addl: District Judge Dehradun,1991 05
83. Vishram Sing Raghubaush v. State of U.P, 2001 13
84. Woodward v. Cincohn (1674) 3 Swan 626 18
THE CONTEMPT OF LAW - JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDINGS - A
DETAILED STUDY

INTRODUCTION

Contempt of court, often referred to simply as "contempt", is the offense of being disobedient
to or disrespectful toward a court of law and its officers in the form of behavior that opposes
or defies the authority, justice and dignity of the court.
There are broadly two categories of contempt: being disrespectful to legal authorities in the
courtroom, or willfully failing to obey a court order. Contempt proceedings are especially
used to enforce equitable remedies, such as injunctions. In some jurisdictions, the refusal to
respond to subpoena, to testify, to fulfill the obligations of a juror, or to provide certain
information can constitute contempt of the court.

Contempt may be defined as any act which derogates the dignity and authority of courts.
Oswald, in his celebrated treatise-‘Contempt of Court’ says that ‘Contempt of Court is so
manifold in its aspects that it is difficult to lay down any exact definition of the offence’. The
word has been defined in the Chamber’s Twentieth Century Dictionary as scorn, disgrace
(law), disregard of the rule, or an offence against the dignity of a court (with, of, for). Thus,
any act which significantly derogates the dignity and authority of the court or which tends to
impede or frustrate the administration of Justice, may be Contempt of Court.

When a court decides that an action constitutes contempt of court, it can issue an order that in
the context of a court trial or hearing declares a person or organization to have disobeyed or
been disrespectful of the court's authority, called "found" or "held" in contempt. That is the
judge's strongest power to impose sanctions for acts that disrupt the court's normal process.
A finding of being in contempt of court may result from a failure to obey a lawful order of a
court, showing disrespect for the judge, disruption of the proceedings through poor behavior,
or publication of material or non-disclosure of material, which in doing so is deemed likely to
jeopardize a fair trial. A judge may impose sanctions such as a fine or jail for someone found
guilty of contempt of court, which makes contempt of court a process crime. Judges in
1
common law systems usually have more extensive power to declare someone in contempt
than judges in civil law systems.

Early man was free to act in any manner he liked and his will to do an act depended upon the
strength of his limbs strengthened by the use of his arms which he developed day by day. The
society was formed by our first ancestors to bring peace without which no development is
possible. If a man is in constant fear of losing his limb, life or livelihood, the creative spirit in
him remains dormant.

Therefore it was agreed that individual liberties be curtailed to some extent and disputes
between warring groups be settled by an independent agency. This agency came to be known
as the king. It was for the king to decide disputes arising between men who chose him to be
the king. The King formulated certain guidelines which were termed laws. Everyone in the
society was expected to act in such a manner as not to come in conflict with these laws. In
those times, the flouting of the authority of a ruler or King or the disrespect was never
tolerated and such acts were visited with barbarous and sometimes inhuman punishments.

As the society expanded, disputes increased in number. It was not possible for the king to
personally to settle all the disputes. He therefore, appointed persons to perform his duties.
This is how courts came into existence. Most of the disputes were settled by the courts on the
basis of guidelines, given by the king. Still the king retained his right to hear any dispute
himself.

2
 CHAPTER 1

CONTEMPT OF COURT

I. MEANING AND NATURE

The Contempt of Court Act 1971 defines “Contempt of Court for the first time before it, there
was no statutory definition of the concept, “Contempt of Court.” Even the definition of
Contempt of Court given in the Contempt of Court Act 1971 is not a definition, but only the
classification or categories of contempt of courts. Actually it is very difficult to define the
contempt. Contempt of Courts. Actually it is very difficult to define the concept contempt of
court. What would offend the dignity of the court and lower the courts prestige is a matter for
the court to determine and it cannot be confined within the four walls of a definition1.

In the opinion of Oswald contempt of court may be said to be constituted by any conduct that
tends to bring the authority and administration of law into disrespect or disregard or to
interfere with or prejudice parties’. Litigation or their witnesses during the litigation.

According to Halsbury “ Any act done or writing Published which is calculated to bring a
court or judge into disrepute or to lower his authority or to interfere with the due course of the
justice or the lawful process of the court is contempt of court.

As Section 2(a) of the contempt of court Act 1971 contempt or criminal contempt. Section
2(b) of the Act provides, that ‘civil contempt’ means with act disobedience to any judgment.
Decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or willful breach of an undertaking
given to a court. Section 2(c) of the Act provides that “criminal contempt” means the
publication (whether by words, spoken or written or by signs or by visible representation or
otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which-

a. Scandalizes or tends to scandalize or towers or tends to lower, the authority of, any
court: or
1
1.State of Bihar v Sri KubarMandh Kishore Singh, 1986.
3
 b. Prejudices or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial
proceeding or
c. Interferes or tends to interfere with or obstruct the administration of justice in any
other manner.

The main forms of contempt of courts are insult to judges, attacks upon them comment on
pending proceedings with a tendency to officers of the court, witnesses or the parties, abusing
the process of the court, breach of duty by officers connected with the court and scandalizing
the judges or the courts.

The concept “contempt of court” should be defined having this fact in mind that contempt
proceedings are always with reference to the administration of justice. Actually the whole set
up of a court is for the purpose of administration of justice and, there for, any act or omission
which interferes or tends to interfere with the administration of justice must be prevented and
punished. In the determining whether or not the act or omission complained of amounts to
contempt of court, the test which is applied and should be applied is calculated to obstruct or
interfere or tends to obstruct or interface with the administration of justice.

The Supreme court has made it clear that the courts of justice in a state from the highest to
the lowest are by their constitution entrusted with functions directly connected with the
administration of justice and it is the expectation and confidence of all those who have or are
likely to have business there in that the courts perform all their functions on a high level of
rectitude without fear or favour, affection or ill – will2.

If a person Induces or abets the other person to interfere in the administration of justice, he
will be held liable for contempt of court3. To constitute contempt it is not necessary to find
that there has been actual interference with the administration of justice

If the act complained of is calculated to or tends to cause such interference, it may be taken as
contempt of court. However the contempt power is a special power and therefore it should
not be exercised unless there is a substantial interference with the administration of justice.
2
2.Bratakanta v. Registrar Orissa HC AIR 1974 SC 710.
3
3.Seaward V. Paterson (1897) I CH 545. The liability to along or obeying contempt has been discussed in
chapter VI under the he along parties to the contempt proceeding their liability. It the act complained of is
calculated to or tends to cause such interference, it may be taken as contempt power is a special not be exercised
unless there is a substantial interference with the administration of justice.
4
In State Bank of Patiala v Vinesh Kumar Bhasin 4the Supreme Court has held that before
issuing any interim direction in contempt proceedings or causing to hold any anyone guilty of
contempt, the High Court should at least satisfy itself that person to whom the notice is issued
is the person responsible to implement the order.

II. CLASSIFICATION OF CONTEMPT OF COURTS

Section 2 (a) of the contempt of courts Act, 1971, provides that contempt of court means civil
contempt or criminal contempt. The willful disobedience to the order of court is considered
civil contempt. Which the scandalizing or lowering the authority of the court in the public eye
is considered criminal contempt. The classification or categorization of contempt of court
into civil and criminal are not closed. There are several contempt’s which do not tall in any of
them.

CIVIL CONTEMPT

Civil contempt’s are taken as acts and omissions in procedure involving a private injury by
the disobedience of the judgment, order or other process of the court.

According to Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 “Civil contempt of means
willful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction order, writ or other process of a court
or willful breach of under the thing given to a court. For civil contempt there must be
disobedience to the order, etc...of the court or breach of undertaking given to the court and
the disobedience or breach must be Willful. To constitute “civil contempt both these elements
must be proved. Civil contempt may be taken as a failure to obey the order of the court issued
for the benefit of the opposite party. The purpose of the proceeding for the civil contempt is

4
4. AIR 2010 SC 1542.
5
not only to punish the contemnor but also to exercise enforcement and obedience to the order
of the court5.

It provides an instant and quick remedy to get the order passed by the court implement 6. It is
a sanction to enforce compliance with the order of court or to compensate for losses or
damages or to compensate for losses or noncompliance 7. Civil contempt, atonally, serves dual
purpose ---

a. Vindication of the public interest by punishment of contempt nous conterminous.

b. Coercion to compel the contemnor to do what the court requires of him8.

To constitute “civil contempt” the followings required to be provided.

a. There is disobedience of the order, decree, etc... of the court or breach of undertaking
given to the court : and
b. The disobedience or breach is willful.

Disobedience of the order, decree, etc. of the court: or breach of undertaking given to the
court: for civil contempt it is necessary that order which has been disobeyed must have been
passed by the court having jurisdiction, it is not binding on the party against which it has been
passed and, therefore, the disobedience of such order will not amount to contempt of court 9.
Further, the burden to prove that the court which has passed the order had no jurisdiction to
pass it or the proceeding in which the undertaking was given was without jurisdiction lies on
the person who all eyes it.

In courts on its own motion v. N.S Kumar10, it was held that usually the order should be
served on the person against whom it has been passed. However, where it is proved to the
5
5. VidyaSagar v. Third Additional District Judge, Dehradun, 1994 Cr Lj. 2286 (all)
6
6. Jain G. R, Law of Contempt, 1996 Cr Lj. 90 Page 91.
7
7. Douglas J Mc, Comb. v. Jackson Ville Paper Co. 336 US 187.
8
8. Aligarh Muncipal Board v. EkkaTonguMazdoor Union, AIR 1970 SC 1767 Page1970.
9
9. Sulthan Ali Nanghiara v. Nar Hussain, AIR 1949 Lah. 131.
10
10. 1995 Cr. Lj. 1261.
6
satisfaction of the court that the person against whom the order was passed had actual
knowledge or the order, he cannot escape liability for copy of the order has not been formally
served on him. Once an order is made by the court and a person is charged with the allegation
of non-compliance of that order, he cannot plead that he was waiting for instruction to
comply with the courts order can possibly content that he is to seek instructions from his
superiors before he could carry out his obligation of complying with the court’s order.

The breach of undertaking given to the court is also taken as contempt, if it willful. Where a
person is committed for contempt for breach of undertaking given, the undertaking must be
given by party to another is not sufficient for this purpose. An undertaking may be given by
the party himself or by any other person on his behalf provided in the later case the person
giving the undertaking has authority to give such undertaking. This an under talking may be
given by an advocate on behalf of his client provided he had authority on behalf of his client
to give such under talking11.

The basis for following the breach of under talking as contempt of court is that the contemn
or by making a false representation to the court obtains a benefit for himself and it the fails to
honor the under talking, he plays a serious fraud on the court itself and there by obstructs the
course of justice and brings into disrepute the judicial institution12.

Any person appearing before the court can give an under talking in two ways:

a. that he files an application or an affidavit clearly selling out the undertaking given by
him to the court; or
b. By a clear and express oral under talking given by the contemnor and incorporated by
the court in its order.

It any of the aforesaid conditions are satisfied, then a willful breach of the undertaking would,
doubtless, amount to an offence under the Act. It none of the above conditions is satisfied,
there will be no under talking for this purpose and, there for, the question of breach of such
under talking does not arise.

11
11. SukumarMukhopadhayay v. T.D. KaramChandramani, 1995 Cr Lt. 1610 @ Page. 1612.
12
12. Babu Ram Gupta v. SadhirBhasin, AIR 1979 SC 1528 @ 1532.
7
The Supreme Court has made it clear that the breach of undertaking recorded or forming part
of a compromise decree, would not amount contempt of court13. The court has observed that
there is clear cut classification between a compromises arrived at between the parties or a
consent order passed by the court at the instance of the parties and a clear and categorical
undertaking given by any of the parties. In the former, It there is a violations of the
compromise or the order no question of contempt of court arises, but the party has a right to
enforce the order or the compromise by their executing the order or getting an injunction
from the court.

THE UNDERTAKINGMUST BE UNCONDITIONAL, UNQUALIFIED AND

EXPRESS.

It is not open to the court to assume an implied undertaking when there is none on the
record14. No doubt, it is the duty of the court to punish a person who tries to obstruct the
course of justice or brings into disrepute the institution of judiciary but this power has to be
exercised not casually or lightly, but with great care and circumspection and only in such
cases where it is necessary to punish the contemnor in order to uphold the majesty of law and
dignity of the courts15. However it the party gives the undertaking to the court on the basis the
certain implications or assumptions which are false to his knowledge, he will be guilty of
misconduct amounting to “Contempt of court”16. Thus, where a tenant company knowing
fully that the chairman of the company was already a lawful sub-tenant of certain premises
prayed for grant of time to vacate the premises and time was granted on his written
undertaking that it would not part with the possession of the premises or great third party
interest therein and the time was granted having faith in the undertaking. It was held guilty of
contempt of court. It misled the court grant of time. The undertaking was based on the
assumption that it was able to hand over the possession of the company was already a lawful
sub-tenant of the premises and therefore the assumption was false and it was false to the
13
13. MaruthiUdyog Ltd. v. V. Mahinder C, Mehta, AIR 2008 SC 309.
14
. Batnagar and Co. Ltd v Union of India, AIR 1957 SC478 @ Page 481-482
15
. Ibid
16
. Dr. (Mrs) Roshan Sam Joyce v SR Cotton Mills Ltd. AIR 1990 SC 1881.
8
knowledge of the company. Consequently the company was held guilty of contempt of
court17. What is required to avoid the contempt proceeding is the substantial compliance with
the order of the court. No Court including the court of contempt is entitled to take frivolities
and trivialities into amount while finding fall with the contempt of the person against whom
contempt proceeding is taken18. It the order is substantially complied with, the contempt will
not lie19.

CRIMINAL CONTEMPT

A criminal contempt has been defined as a contempt that is directed against the dignity and
authority of the Court or a Judge acting judicially. It is an action obstructing the
administration of justice which leads to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect20.

Section 2 (c) Criminal Contempt means the publication (whether by words, spoken or
written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of
any other at whatsoever which-

a. Scandalizes or tends to scandalize, or lowers or tends to lower, the authority of any

court; or
b. Prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with the due court of any judicial
Proceedings;
c. Interferes or tends to interferes with, or obstructs, or tends to obstruct, the
administration of justice in any other manner.

However, the Superior Courts being Courts of record have interest power not only to punish
for the criminal contempt but also to determine what amounts to Criminal Contempt.

17
. ibid
18
. SukumarMukhopadhayay v T.D.Karamchandan, 1995 Cr. Lj 1610 @ Page 1612
19
. See also Section 13 of the Contempt of Court Act 1971
20
. Contempt of Court, IIIrd edition: Page 196.
9
The definition of Criminal Contempt is wide enough to include any at of a person which
would tend to interfere with the administration of justice or which would lower the authority
of the court21.

The scope of the criminal contempt has been made very wide so as to empower the court to
preserve the majesty of law which is an indispensable condition for the rule of two.

ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS OF CRIMINAL CONTEMPT.

i. Publication or other Act.

Publication or doing of any other at which has resulted in any or all of the consequences
specified in section 2 (c), (i), (ii) and (iii) will amount to criminal contempt of court. Thus the
publication or at will be taken as criminal contempt if it has resulted or likely to result in any
of the following consequences.

a. Scandalizes or tends to scandalize or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any

court;
b. Prejudices or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial
proceedings; or
c. Interferes or tends to interfere with or obstructs or tends to obstruct the administration
of justice in any other manner. To constitute criminal contempt, thus, first, there must
be publications or doing of any other at and secondly, such publication or doing of the
at has resulted in any or all of the consequences specified in section 2(c)(i),(ii) and
(iii) doing of any other alt refers to something other than publication. For example,
hurling shoe at the judge22or throwing eggs at the judge23would be included within the
meaning of the words doing of any other at”.
21
. Delhi Judicial Service Association v State of Gujarat & Ors. (1991) 4 SCC 406, @ Pgae 456.
22
22 . Courts on its own motion v. MilkhiRam, 1992 Cr. Lj 2130 (HP)
23
23 . Re. Cosgrave, (1877) Times, 17th March quoted in Borrie and Lowe, Law of Contempt, Page 15(3rd ed).
10
In a case24 the court has observed that the criminal contempt has been vivisected into two
categories;

a. Publication of any matter which scandalizes or tends to scandalize the authority of

any Court, etc.
b. Second is the doing of any at whatsoever which scandalize the authority of any court
etc.

If an act is not a criminal at merely because there was no publication, such act would
automatically fall within the purview of the other category because the latter consists of the
doing of any other at whatsoever; the latter category is thus a residuary category so while
enough from which no act of criminal contempt can possibly escape. The common
denominator for both is that if scandalizes or tends to scandalize etc… etc… any court.

ii. Scandalizing or lowering the authority of the court or interfering with judicial
proceeding or administration of justice.

It is as much a contempt of court to say that the judiciary has lost its independence by reason
of something it is alleged to have done out of court, as to say that a result of a case it has
decided, it is clear that it has no independence or has lost what it had. Where the article
complained of stated:

“It is so unfortunate and regrettable that at the present day the chief justice and the judges
find a peculiar delight in hobnobbing with the executive with the result that the judiciary is
robbed of its independence which at one time attracted the administration of the whole
country. The old order of things has vanished away. The court held that it was a clear case of
contempt of court25.

24
24 . In Re. S. K Sundaram, AIR 2001 SC 2374.
25
25. In Re. ThusarKanti Ghosh, AIR 1935 Cal. 419.
11
In a case26, the prosecution witness made statement in public that in murder trial the judge
had disposition to acquit the accused. The judge about to retire was available for sale and that
the judgment was rubbish and deserves to be thrown in dustbin. This comment made by the
witness was published in newspaper. The court held that it amounts to gross contempt of
court.

iii. Prejudice to or Interference with, the due course of any judicial proceeding
(Media Trial):

The publications which prejudices or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of
any judicial proceeding is taken as contempt of court. Actually, media trial or trial by
newspaper is not considered proper because it affects the fairness of trial and is likely to
cause prejudice or likely to interfere with, due administration of justice in the particular case.
Even in England and America and trial by newspaper is considered wrong and taken is
contempt of court.

In A.G.v. Times Newspaper Ltd, Lord Reid has made it clear that there has been and there still
is in England a strong and generally held feeling that trial by newspaper: is wrong and should
be prevented. Thus whenever the publication or any other at unduly influences the result of
litigation, it is treated criminal contempt of court and is punished there for. The power to
punish the contempt of court is the means by which the legal system protects itself from the
publication which may unduly influence the result of litigation.

iv. Interference or obstruction with administration of justice in any other manner.

This clause is a residuary clause and it covers the cases of the criminal contempt not
expressly covered by Sub clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act,
1971. Thus the publication or doing of any other at which interferes or tends to interfere with
or obstructs or tends to obstruct the administration of justice in a manner otherwise than by

26
26. Rajendra Sail v. M.P HC Bar Assoc., 2005 AIR SCW 2443
12
scandalizing the court or lowering the authority of the court or by causing prejudice or by
interfering with due course of any judicial proceeding would tall with in the ambit of thus
sub-clause and, thus would amount criminal contempt under thus sub- clause.

In a case27, the Supreme Court held that holding a dragon by itself may not amount to
contempt of court. But it by holding a Dharna access to the courts is hindered and the officers
of the court and members of the police are not allowed tree ingress and egress or the
proceedings in court are otherwise disrupted, disturbed or hampered, the Dharna may amount
to contempt because the administration of justice would be obstructed.

An advocate is an officer of the court and therefore undue interference with the advocate in
the discharge of his professional functions amount to contempt of court. A counsel or legal
practitioner is not nearly agent of the parties but he is an officer of the court. His duty is to
inform the court as to the law and fats of the case and to aid it do justice by arriving at correct
conclusion. Interference with counsel may amount to contempt of court.

The Courts jurisdiction in contempt is not exercised out of any more notion of the dignity of
judicial office but is exercised for the purpose of preventing interference with due course of
justice and it is quite possible to interfere with the due course of justice by making comments
upon an advocate in the way of his profession. The acts or words complained of may amount
to contempt of court, if it interference or tends to interfere with the course of justice.

Thus, casting aspersions on counsel which tends to deter him from discharge any his duties
amounts to contempt of court. Similarly, where a party threatens the advocate of other party
to prosecute him in court or where a solicitor assault the opposing solicitor outside the court
or where a person demands the counsel not do undertake defense of the accused, it will
amount to contempt of court28.

III. OBJECT OF THE CONTEMPT OF LAW.

27
27. J.R. Parashar v. PrashantBhushani, AIR 2001 SC 3395.
28
28. Damayanthi. G. Chandiramani v. S. Vaney, AIR 1966 Born 19.
13
Object of the contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and dignity of the law of courts 29.
The image of such majesty in the minds of the public cannot be allowed to be distorted.
Action for contempt is not for the purpose of placing judges in a position of immunity from
criticism but is aimed at protection of the freedom of individuals and the orderly and equal
administration of law30

Under “the Statement of Objects and Reasons” of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, it has been
made clear that the law relating to contempt of courts is uncertain, undefined and
unsatisfactory in the country. While punishing for contempt, the courts have to balance the
constitutional rights of life to personal liberty and right to freedom of expression of the
citizen with those of the necessity to punish the offender for the contempt of court.

The Sanyal Committee comprehensively examined the law and problems relating to contempt
of the court in the light of the legal position available in our country as well as in other
democratic countries of the world. In balancing the constitutional rights of the citizens
relating to the right of life and personal liberty and right to freedom of expression, the need
for safeguarding the status and dignity of the courts and the interest of administration of
justice cannot be ignored.

“The recommendations of the committee have been generally accepted by government after
considering the views expressed on those recommendations by the state government, union
Territory Administrations, the supreme court and high court and the judicial commissioners.
The bill seeks to give effect to the accepted recommendations of the Sanyal Committee”.

However the object of contempt of law is to uphold the dignity and majesty of rule of law in
the country. The contempt law empowers the judges to punish contempt to keep the course of
justice flow spontaneously.

The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 extends to whole of India, provided that it shall not apply
to the state of Jammu & Kashmir except to the extent to which the provisions of this Act
related to contempt of the Supreme Court.

29
29. Vishram Singh Raghubaush v. State of UP, AIR 2011 SC 2275.
30
30. Omeshsaigal v. R.K Dalmia, AIR 1969, Del. Page 214.
14
The act is the existing law on “contempt of courts” but is not an exhaustive code. Section 22
of the Act has made clear that the provisions of thus Act shall be in additional to and not in
derogation of provision of any expression “Contempt of Courts”.

In a case31, the Supreme Court has held that the Rule of Law is a foundational feature of the
constitution and the right to obtain judicial redress is a feature of basic structure of the
constitution. It is through the courts that the Rule of Law reveals its meaningful content.
Protection of the administration of justice is, therefore as imperative us its existence for the
other civilized functioning of any free an egalitarian social order. The law of contempt
secures public respected and the confidence in the judicial process and provides the sanction
for any or couldn’t which is likely to destroy or impair such respect or confidence.

31
31. State of Haryana v. Bhajanlal, AIR 1992 SC 604.
15
 CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The law of contempt is branch of law which originated and developed in a manner quite
different from other laws. Kings created the contempt jurisdiction and claimed it was a
natural adjust to their adjudicating work. A law which began as a convenient method to
enforce their orders was subsequently used to extract respect from the challenges of the press.
‘Phillimore Committee’ while discussed historical aspect of law of contempt in the following
words.

“The law relating to contempt of court has developed over the centuries as a means
where by the court may at to prevent or punish contempt which tends to obstruct,
prejudice or abuse the Administration of Justice either in relation to particular case or
generally32”.

I. ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTEMPT IN ENGLAND

The phrase contempt of court (contemptuous curie) has been in use in England Law of Eight
centuries. The law conferred the power to enforce discipline with its precincts and punish
those who fail to comply with its orders33.

The idea of contempt of the King is referred to as on offence in the laws set forth in the first
half of the twelfth century. Contempt of the King’s writ was mentioned in the Laws of King
Henry I. In the same laws there was mention of pecuniary penalty for contempt or disregard
of orders. Thus in England before the end of the twelfth century contempt of court was a
recognized expression and applied to the defaults and wrongful acts of suitors.

32
. Report of the committee on contempt of court, 2(1974)
33
. Joseph H. Beale’s Contempt of Court and Criminal and Civil 1908, 21 Harv. L.R.P. 161
16
After making a study of cases in the thirteen century John Charles Fox, concluded that there
was no indication of trial of contempt out of court otherwise than in the ordinary course of
the law and many cases of contempt in court were trial by indictment and not by a summary
process. It the contempt is confessed there was no need for trial by jury and such cases of
contempt were disposed of by sentence upon confession. The earlier form of procedure was
followed, unless the accused confessed. Later the Star Chamber practice of attachment and
examination without jury was substituted for the procedure by bill34.

From fourteenth century onwards the jurisdiction of the King’s justices to punish contempts
of a criminal nature summarily was limited to offences not heinous, committed in court in the
actual view of the justices. The summary jurisdiction was held to extend to all contempt
whether committed in or out of court35.

II. KINDS OF CONTEMPT UNDER ENGLISH LAW

Many jurists and judges tried to classify contempt. The definition of contempt of court given
in the leading case. Birch v. Walsh36, has been accepted by the Supreme Court of India.

In D.J. Shield v. Ramesam37, here the court gave three categories of Contempt:

i. Contempt in respect of the order of courts.

ii. Contempt by letters or pamphlets addressed to the judge who is to decide the case
with the intention either by threats or flattery of bribery to influence his decisions:-
and
iii. Constructive contempt depending upon inference of an intention to obstruct the
course of justice.

With the passage of lime, the Law of Contempt identified; two types of Contempt, Civil and
Criminal:

34
. John Charles Fox, The Nature of Contempt of Court 1921, 37 L.Q.R, Page 191
35
. John Charles Fox, The Summary process to punish contempt, 1909, 25 L.Q.R. 238
36
. 10 Irish EQ. R. Page 93, 1886
37
. AIR 1955 Andhra 156
17
1. Civil contempt

Civil Contempt appears to have originated in the seventeenth century from the practice of the
Court of Chancery38. Civil Contempt of court provides for punishment of a person who
refused to company with the orders of a court. Consequential sanction will be committed to
prison or fine. Disobedience to orders or judgment direction a person to do any at (other than
the payment of money) or to abstain from doing anything can be enforced by attachment or
committal39.

In Harvey V. Harvey40, the court of chancery held that attachment and committed are
alternate remedies whether the order to be enforced is mandatory or prohibitory. In Spokes V.
Bun Bury Board of Health41. It was held that the power to order attachment has to be
exercised with greatest care. It a party willfully disobeyed an order of injunction, committal is
appropriate.

The orders of court it willfully disobeyed do constitute contempt. The commonly consists in a
party’s doing otherwise than he is enjoined to do, or not doing what he is commanded or
required to do by the process, order or decree of the court42. In Minglan V. Wheatley43 a writ
of attachment was granted against a county for trying an action after a certiorari had been
issued, but the contempt no being willful, that attachment was ordered to lie in office for a
month so that the judge may have the opportunity of complying with a second certiorari.

Oswald says44 an order must be implicitly observed but disobedience if it is to be punishable

as contempt must be willful. Before an attachment can be ordered the disobedience must be
proved to have been willful45. In other words it is intended to exclude casual, accidental or

38
. Report of the committee on Contempt of Court, 10 (1974)
39
. Callow v. Young, (1887) 56 L.J Ch. 690
40
. (1884) 26 Ch. D 654
41
. (1865) LR Eq.42
42
. Miller v. Knox (1878) 4 Bing N.C. 574
43
. (1851) 6 Ex. 88
44
. Oswald James F. Contempt of Court: Committal, Attachment and Arrest upon Civil Process.3rd Edition,
Butterworths London. 1910 P.102.
45
. Dodington v. Hudson (1824) 8 Moore 510.
18
unintentional acts of disobedience46. The Privy Council in Barton v.. Field 47
held that the
failure of the judge of the Vice-admiralty Court at Gibraltar to comply with their monition
was contempt, but the penal consequences of attachment did not follow for the following
reasons according to their lordships.

“We are of opinion that it is not sufficient, for the purpose of visiting him with the penal
consequences which it has been endeavored to attach upon him, that he may have committed
an error of judgment. We think it must be proved to our satisfaction not only that there was
error, but that in addition to there being an error, it was willful error and proceeded from
contempt or improper motives”.

In Davis v. Rhayoder Granite Quarries Ltd48.It was held that the contempt by disobedience to
an order of court must be willful. It is no good if it is casual, accidental and unintentional. If it
is repeated it will be actionable. Intention is of no consequence in the matter of contempt by
disobedience to courts order49. In shoppe V Nathan and Co50: It was held that where the
disobedience is not willful but unintended it is not punishable by imprisonment.

In such a case the respondent may be ordered to pay the costs of the application 51. On the
ground it is only technical contempt in theory. Orders even it improperly obtained must be
obeyed. The party disobeying it will be liable in contempt. His proper remedy will be to
apply to the court for relief52.

In Scott V. Scott53 Viscount Haldane, Lord Chancellor, observed that appellants were not
guilty of contempt because the order disobeyed was illegal was not in fat can versed in the
arguments in the case and the other Lords based their judgment on other grounds. So the
principle enunciated above54, is still good law that a party has to obey also illegal orders
unless he has them corrected through Court.
46
. Stan Court v. Trow Bridge Urban District Council 1910, 26 T.L.R 407
47
. (1843) 4 P.C 273
48
. (1911)131 LTJ 79
49
. A.G.Walthamstow v. D.C (1895) 11 LTR. 533
50
. (1892) L.Q.B .245
51
. Halsbury’s Laws Of England, 3rd Edition Vol.8.P.20
52
. Woodward v. Lincohn (1674) 3 swan 626.
53
. (1913) A.C .417
54
. Woodward v Lincohn (1674) 3 Swan 626
19
In Phonographic Performance Ltd V.Amusement Cateres (peck ham) Ltd 55, the court held that
in case of civil contempt of court involving willful disobedient to an order of the court, there
is power in court to impose a fine instead of committal or sequestration.

As is pointed out in Halsbury’s laws of England, 56 cross, J state that where there has been
willful disobedience to an order of the court and a measure of contumacy on the part of the
defendants, then civil contempt, what is called contempt in procedure, bears a two merely a
right to exercise and liability to submit to a form of civil execution, but as between the party
in default and the state, a penal or disciplinary jurisdiction to be exercised by the court in the
public interest”.

In British Motor Association V. Hewitt57 the court has exercised the power to line instead of
committing the defendants to prison. Cross J. was of the opinion that if there was
contumacious behavior the court must have the power to impose also the penalty of fine.

From the above discussion it is clear that civil contempt of court involves willful
disobedience to an order of the court. In civil contempt the court has exercised the power to
line instead of committing the defendants to prison.

2. Criminal Contempt

Criminal contempt is considered as misdemeanor on indictment. The penalty is line or

imprisonment or by order to give security for good behavior. It includes any kind of
interruption or interference in the administration of justice in or out of court was punished in
the sixteenth century, by common law, only after trial in the ordinary courts and not by any
summary process58. A distinction was made between contempt in court and out of court in the
case of strangers. Contempt by strangers out by court was tried by information or by
attachment and examination in the common law courts. Thus practice continued through the
eighteenth century and the procedure by attachment and examination was confirmed by the
55
. (1963) 3 All E.R 493.
56
. 3rd Edition Vol.8 T.20 Para 38.
57
. (1951) I.C.L.C 1726
58
John Charles Fox, The nature of Contempt Of Court, 1921, 37 L.Q.R , P. 191
20
opinion of chief justice Wilmot in King V Almon59 case and finally established as law by
Justice Holrayed in the King v. Clements60

According to the Halsbury’s Laws of England 61 the following are the main characteristics of
the criminal contempt;

a. Privilege is not allowed thereunder:

b. There is no appeal from the order of committal or attachment:
c. It is open to the sheriff to break open un outer door (this can be even on a Sunday)
d. There can be an order of discharge from custody conditional on payment of costs…
e. The prerogative of the crown to remit sentence for criminal contempt.
f. According to the Halsbary’s laws of England62 criminal contempt may be classified.

i. Contempt in face of the court.

It includes any at which interferes with the administration of justice such as:
a. Throwing missiles at judges
b. Insulting any person in court
c. Impeding the passage into or to court

By those who have business there business there and the like.

ii. Speeches or writing lending to detent the ends of justice:

a. Contempt out of court by speech or writing

b. Attack upon judges.

c. Comment on pending proceedings

d. Newspaper articles, photographs

e. Interference with fair trial

f. Reflection on parties.

59
(1765) Wilmont 243
60
(1876) 46 L.J Ch. 375
61
3rd edition , Lexis Nexis Butterwoods, London , vol. 8, p. 4
62

21
 g. Publication of pleadings, report etc.

iii. Obstruction of persons officially connected with the court or proceedings.

a. Obstructing officers of court

b. Obstructing process – servers

c. Obstructing solicitors

d. Obstructing receivers, liquidators, sequestrates

e. Obstructing sheriffs, Admiralty Marshal

f. Privilege from arrest

g. Obstructing witness

h. Personating or interfering with the jury.

iv. Obstructing parties: abusing the process of court:

a. Obstructing parties to Proceedings

b. Interfering to the prejudice of an infant who is a ward of court.

c. Interfering with a person of unsound mind.

d. Abuse of process

v. Breach of duty by persons officially connected with court or proceedings.

a. Contempt by Solicitors

b. Contempt by receivers

c. Contempt by sheriffs and bailiffs

22
 d. Contempt by jurors

e. Contempt by gaolers

f. Contempt by judges of interior Courts.

vi. Interior Courts

a. Contempt of interiors Courts

b. Indictment for disobedience to Justices orders

It is important to point out that the art of printing and publishing brought into prominence
another form of criminal contempt known as indirect criminal contempt or constructive
contempt. The issue is again aggravated with the invention of Television, Telephone,
Computer, Internet and other electronic gadgets. The origin of indirect contempt is traceable
from the opinion expressed by Lord Hardwike Lord Chancellor in St. James evening Post63
case.

His Lordship expressed that there are three different sorts of contempt. One kind of contempt
is scandalizing the court itself. There may likewise be contempt of this court in a busing the
parties who are concerned in causes here. There may also be contempt in court in prejudicing
mankind against person before the cause is heard. Scandalizing mankind against persons
before the cause is heard are instances of indirect criminal contempt.

Further extension of the law of constructive contempt could be seen in the opinion of Wilmot
J. In King V. Almon’s64case. The Opinion States as follows: “The power which the courts in
west minister Hall have of vindicating their own authority is coeval with their first
foundation and instillation, it is a necessary incident to every court of justice, Whether of
record or not to fine and imprison for a contempt to the court, acted in the face of it and the
issuing of attachments by the supreme courts of justice in West Minister Hall, for contempt
out of court, stands upon the same immemorial usage as support the whole fabric of the
common law. But when the nature of the offence of libeling judges for what they do in their

63
. (1742) 2 Art . 469.
64
. (1765) Wilmont 243
23
judicial capacities, either in court or out of court, comes to be considered, it does, in my
opinion become more proper for an attachment than any other case whatsoever”.

III.PROCEDURE IN CONTEMPT UNDER ENGILISH LAW

The Kings Bench in R.V. Tibbits and Windust65 observed that contempt is punishable just like
other crimes by the process of indictment at the assizes. There can also be an injunction
obtained restraining the repetition of the offending publication66. Then there is the quick
summary method which is at once punitive and preventive.

In Reo Connor Cheshur V. Straus67 Act was held that any party to an action civil and criminal
can move by a petition with an affidavit detailing all the circumstances for a rule nisi for
attachment. It the court feels that a fair trial will be made absolute. This applies to a cause,
witness, third person, editor, printer and publisher of the newspaper, etc… The letter cannot
plead ignorance or want of knowledge that the offending matter was at all published in their
paper.

On the day fixed in the rule nisi the contemnor can appear, file affidavits and explain his
conduct, justifying his acts or asking for pardon by an adequate for his conduct. The court can
then accept the apology or refuse to accept it. It can make the rule absolute and impose a fine
or imprisonment or both or merely direct payment of Costs in case of contempt of technical
nature.

In R.V. Davis Bench68 held that the motion for contempt has to be made in the court where the
contempt was committed. In respect of actions in chancery and probate Divorce and
Admiralty Divisions, application for a rule nisi is made to a single judge. But the kings Bench
Division it is dealt by a Divisional Court usually of three judges. The letter court also deals
will all applications for attachment for contempt with reference to criminal prosecutions.
These include proceedings before the justices in petty serious or commitment for trials to the

65
(1902) 1 K.B P.77
66
R.v. Wealstone News, (1925) 41 T.L.R p.508
67
(1896) 12 T.L.R p. 291
68
(1906) 1 K.B p.32
24
assizes or quarter sessions, and all applications relating to contempt of interior courts. e.g.,
County Courts, Courts Martial and Consistory Courts.

IV. NATURE OF CONTEMPT UNDER ENGLISH LAW

Lord Hardwicke in Read and Hngyonson Peach V.Guryun69 said : “Nothing more is
incumbent upon the courts of justice than to preserve their proceedings from being
misrepresented: nor is there anything of more pernicious consequences than to prejudice the
minds of the public against persons consequences than to prejudice the minds of the public
against persons concerned us parties in causes, before the cause is finally heard. There cannot
be anything of greater consequence than to keep the streams of justice clear and pure, that
parties may proceed may proceed with safety both to themselves and their characters”.

Oswald says, “All publication which offend against the dignity of court or are calculated to
prejudice the course of justice will constitute contempt. Offences of this nature are of three
kinds, namely, those which.

1. Scandalize the court or

2. Abuse the parties to the causes concerned there or(1742) 26 E.R. p. 683
3. Under the first head fall libels on the integrity of the courts, its judges, officers or
proceedings. Under the second and third head anything which tends to excite
prejudice against the parties or their litigation, while it is pending. For example, attack
on or abuse of a party, his witness or solicitor constitute contempt, though a mere libel
on a party, not amounting to an interference with the course of justice, does not, the
party being left to his remedy by action.”
It is clear from above that mere attacks or abuse of a party, his witnesses or solicitors do not
amount to contempt, it they do not interfere with the course of justice. The parties in such
case are deft to remedy by appropriate action. In R.V. Parke40 wills J, posited: “the reason
why the publication of articles like those with which we have to deal is treated as contempt of
court is because their tendency and sometimes their object is to deprive the court of the power
of doing that which is the end for which it exists –namely, to administer justice duly,

69
(1742) 26 E.R. p. 683
25
impartially and with reference solely to the fats judicially brought before it. Their tendency os
to reduce the court which has to try the case to impotence, so for as the effectual elimination
of prejudice and prepossession is concerned. It is difficult to conceive of an chapter
description of such conduct than is conveyed by the expression “contempt of court”.

In Plating Co. v. Furzuharson” an injunction was granted restraining the defendants in that
suit from infringing a patent for nickel plating which they had notice of appeal. The inserted
an appeal by way of advertisement in a newspaper calling upon the trade to subscribe
forwards expenses of appeal. An advertisement was made offering a reward for procuring
documentary evidence that nickel planting was done before 1869. The plaintiff moved the
court for contempt action against the defendants. It was held merely calling for aid to finance
the appeal was not objectionable. The offer for procuring documentary evidence through not
ethical was inoffensive and could not prejudice the fair hearing of the appeal.

The Libel Act, 1888 was passed and it permitted fair and accurate reports of judicial
proceedings. But in R.V. Parke42, it was held that contempt proceedings. The county Courts
Act, 1959 provided for punishment to any person who willfully insulted the judge of the
county courts, Jurors, witnesses or any officer of the court including courts other than court
of record. In 1974 a committee on contempt of court chaired by Justice Phillimore had laid
down the basic test for deciding contempt by publication.

The test of contempt is whether the publication complained of creates a risk that the court of
justice will be seriously impeded or prejudiced. The committee recommended that a defence
on the line of general public discussion should be created by statute. At the same time the
committee recommended that public benefit should not be made as a defence. These
recommendations of the committee found a place in the contempt of Court Act, 198143, The
Act is the result of the report filled by Philimore committee and also the decision of the
European Court of Human Rights.

On a reaching of the Act it is clear that it mainly deals with the strict liability rule and its
application to publications which affect the judicial proceedings. However uncertain its
definition and scope may be in some respects contempt of court is undoubted one of the great

26
contributions the common law has made to the civilized behavior of a large part of the world
beyond the continent of Europe where the instillation was unknown.

V. DISTINCTION BETWEEN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CONTEMPT UNDER

ENGLISH LAW.

The distinction between civil and Criminal, Contempt was scanned in

In ‘O’ shea V. ‘O’ and Parnell, one James Thushy had Published in a newspaper an article
commenting on the conduct of captain O’ the petitioner in a divorce said against his wife for
dissolution of marriage on account of her alleged adulating with Parnell James Thushy was
fined 100 and he appealed to the court of appeal. The question was whether the matter was a
criminal matter in respect of which there could be no appeal by reason of section 47 of the
supreme court of judicature Act, 1872. It was argued that impugned order was made in a civil
cause and was but was also he headed.

Cotton L.J. held that no doubt the notice of motion is so entitled in the divorce suit, but it is
entitled in the matter of an application against Thushy, and the essential part of the motion is
the application to commit Thushy, and the essential part of the motion is the application to
commit Thushy for contempt.

It is convenient that the notice should be entitled in the cause to show to what matter, the
motion to commit refers; but what gives the court the power to at is the fact that the appellant
has done something to prevent the course of justice by preventing the divorce said from being
properly tried. This is clearly a contempt of court of a criminal nature. It is conceded that it
was a wrongful act: otherwise there could be no fine or imprisonment. And when you
conceded that it is a wrongful act, you find that, although it is headed in the divorce action, it
is not a proceeding in the action—not a proceeding for the purpose of obtaining anything in
the action, but an application to punish an attempt to induce the jury not to try the case
properly, which is as much a criminal act, as an attack upon the judge himself.

In Rouch V. Garvan, Lord Harwick’s devided contempt into three types.

27
 1) Scandalizing the court itself
2) Abusing parties concerned in causes.
3) Prejudicing mankind against persons before the cause is heard.

The Second Variety has in modern times merged into the third in so far as printed
publications are Concerned Lord Russel, C.J., said in R.V Payne, “Every libel on a person
about to be tried is not necessarily a contempt of court but the applicant must show that
something has been published which either is clearly intended or at least is calculated to
prejudice that trial which is pending. “A write is issued in civil causes while in criminal
causes arrest of the accused or summons against the defendant starts the proceedings
prejudicing fair trials is indeed contempt.

28
 CHAPTER –3

CONTEMPT OF COURT BY VARIOUS OFFICIALS AND

AUTHORITIES

Law Contempt jurisdiction is very wide. The court has power to punish every person, body or
authority found guilty of the contempt of court. However, the liability of the law years,
Judges, state and corporate bodies is of the special importance and therefore, their liability
has been discussed under separate headings.

1. CONTEMPT BY LAWYERS

On account of the nature of duties to be discharged by the law years and judges they may get
into heated dialogue which may result in contempt of court. There are several instances of the
misconduct. Which have been taken as contempt of court, e.g. using insulting language
against a judge70: making scandalous allegations against a judge,71

Suppressing the facts to obtain favorable order hurling shoe at the judge 72Imputation of
partiality73 and unfairness against the judge74 etc... A Counsel who advises his client to
disobey the order of the court is also held liable for contempt of court. Attacking the judiciary
in a Bar Council Election Manifests is taken as contempt of court. It a counsel refuses to
answer the questions of the court is also liable for contempt of court.75

70
. M.B Sanghi, Advocate V. High Court of Punjab and Haryana, AIR 1991 SC 1834: In re Vinay Chandra
Mishra, AIR 1995 SC 2348

71
. Paritam Pal v. High Court of M.P, AIR 1992 SC 904
72
. The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Smt. Annatte Remond Uttanwala 1987 Cr. LJ 1038
73
. Court on its motion v. H.C of Punjab and Haryana, AIR 1995 SC 1974
74
. Shamsher Sing Bedi v. H.C of Punjab and Haryana, AIR 1995 SC 1974
75
. In re Vinay Chandra Mishra , AIR 1995 SC 2348
29
In a case76 the Supreme Court has held that advocate using intemperate language and casting
unwarranted aspersions on various judicial officers and attributing motives to them while
discharging their judicial functions would be held guilty of gross contempt of court. In this

case such advocate was sentenced to four months simple imprisonment and fine of one
thousand rupees. The court has observed that it is most unbefitting for an advocate to make
imputations get the expected result, which according to him is the fair and reasonable result
available to him77.

Judges cannot be intimated to seek favorable orders. Only be because a law year appears as
party in person, he does not get a license to commit contempt of the court by intimidating the
judges or scandalizing the courts.

An Advocates cannot use language, either in the pleading or during arguments which is either
intemperate or unparliamentarily and which has the tendency to interfere in the
administration of justice and undermine the dignity of the court and the majority of law78.

To recent the question asked by a judge, to be disrespected to him, to question his authority to
ask the question, to shout at him to threaten him with transfer and impeachment to use
insulting language and abuse him to dictate the order that he should pass, to create scenes in
the court and to address him by losing temper are all acts calculated to interfere with and
obstruct, the course of justice79.

Where an advocate shouted slogans in the open court and hurled his shoe towards the court
and thereby interrupted the court proceedings, his action both by his words and deeds in the
presence of the court taken as gross criminal contempt of court proceedings, his action both
by his words and deeds in the presence of the court taken as gross Criminal Contempt of
court and he was punished for contempt of court. His apology was not accepted as it was not
genuine and bona fide and made only to, escape punishment80.

76
. In re Ajay Kumar Pandey, Advocate, AIR 1998 SC 3299
77
. In re Ajay Kumar Mishra, Advocate, AIR 1998 SC 3299
78
. In re Ajay Kumar Pandey, Advocate, AIR 1998 SC 3299
79
. In re Ajay Kumar Pandey, Advocate, AIR 1995 SC 2348, at p. 2365
80
. In re NandlalBalwani, AIR 1999 S.C 1300.
30
An important issue is whether boycott of court or strike by lawyers amounts to contempt of
court. In a case81 the court has held that the Bar council has no power to call a strike of
lawyers and such a call will amount to contempt of court, In a case 82 the court has observed
that in boycotting a court, the advocate violates his duties not only towards the client but also
towards the court83. It has been held that it is not proper for a pleader to boycott the court in
pursuance of the resolution of the Bar Association and refrain retrain appearing in the court
without first obtaining the consent of his client 84. However, the pleader is not guilty of any
misconduct if he remains. Absent from the court on the day of a strike in the town and it is
not shown that he is engaged in any case fixed on that day85.

In Common Cause V. Union of India86 a committee was constituted to suggest steps to be

taken to prevent boycott or strike the committee suggested that instead of the court going into
the wider question, interim arrangements be made to see whether it would be workable. On
the basis of the suggestions given by this committee, the court has issued the following
interim directions.

a. In the rare instance where any association of lawyers including statutory Bar councils
considers it imperative to call upon /or advise members of the legal profession to
abstain from appearing in courts on any occasion, it must be left open to any
individual member / members of that association to be free to appears without let, fear
or hindrance or any other coercive steps.
b. No such member who appears in court or otherwise practices his legal profession
shall be visited with any adverse or penal consequences whatever, by any association
of lawyers and shall not suffer any expulsion or threat of expulsion therefrom.
c. The above will not preclude other forms of protest by practicing lawyers in courts
such as, for instance, wearing of arm bands and other forms of protest which in no
way interrupt or disrupt the court proceedings or adversely affect the interest of the

81
. Arunava Gosh v. Bar Council of West Bengal and others dated 26.09.1995 (unreported).
82
. Tarini Mohan v. Pleaders, AIR 1923 Cal. 212.
83
. Tarini Mohan v. Pleaders AIR 1993 Cal. 212.
84
. In re matter of a Pleader, AIR 1924 Rangoon 320
85
. Emperor v. Surendra Mohan Maitra and others, 35 C.W.N 349
86
. 1995(1) Scale 61: 1995 AIR SCW 1505
31
 litigant. Any such form of protest shall not however, be derogatory to the court or to
the profession.
d. Office – bearers of a Bar Association(Including Bar Council) responsible for taking
decisions mentioned in clause (1) above shall ensure that such decisions are
implemented in the spirit of what is stated in clause (1),(2) and (3) above.”

In Ex - Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India 87, the supreme court has made it clear that
lawyers have no right to go on strike or give a call for boycott, not even on a taken strike a
call for boycott, not even on a taken strike No lawyer can be visited with any adverse
consequences by the association or the Bar Council and no threat or coercion of any nature
including that of expulsion can be held out. The Court held further that only in the rarest of
rule cases where the dignify, integrity and independence of the Bar and / or the Bench.
Therefore, in such cases the president of the Bar must first consultant the chief justice or the
district judge before advocates decide to absent themselves from court. The decision of the
chief justice or the District Judge would be final and have to be abided by the Bar. The courts
are under no obligation to adjourn the matters because the lawyers are on strike. On the
contrary it is the duty of all court to go on with matters on their boards even in the absence of
lawyers. Thus courts must not be privy to strikes or calls for boycotts. It a lawyer holding
vakalat of a client abstains from attending court due to strike call, he shall be personally
liable to pay costs which shall be addition to damages which he might have to pay to his
client for loss suffered by him.

It is the duty of every advocate who has accepted a brief to attend trial, even though it may go
on day – to-day and for a prolonged period. A lawyer who has accepted a brief cannot refuse
to attend court because a boycott call is given by the Bar association. It is unprofessional and
unbecoming for a lawyer who has accepted brief to refuse to attend court even in pursuance
of a call for strike or boycott by the Bar Association or the Bar Council. The Courts are under
obligation to hear and decide cases brought before it and cannot adjourn matters merely
because lawyers are on strike. It is a settled law that it a resolution is passed by the Bar
Associations expressing want of confidence in judicial officers it would amount to

87
. 2003 AIR SCW 43
32
scandalizing the courts to undermine its authority and thereby the advocates will have
committed contempt of court.

The Court has held that the Bar Associations may be separate bodies but all Advocates who
are members of such Association are under disciplinary jurisdiction of the Bar Councils and
thus Bar Councils can always control their conduct. Even in respect of disciplinary
jurisdiction the final appellate authority is, by virtue of sections, the Supreme Court.

It is the duty of the Bar Councils to ensure that there is no unprofessional and/ or unbecoming
conduct. This being their duty no Bar Council can even consider giving a call for strike or a
call for boycott. It follows that the Bar councils and Bar Associations can never consider or
take seriously any requisition calling for a meeting to consider a call for a strike or a call for a
strike or a call for boycott. In case any Association call for a strike or call for boycott the
concerned state Bar Council and their failure. The Bar Council of India must immediately
take disciplinary action against the advocates who give a calling of a meeting for such
purpose against the committee members.

The court has further observed that if the Bar councils do not perform their duties by talking
disciplinary action on compliant from a client against an advocate for non – appearance by
reason of a call for strike or boycott, on an appeal under section 38 the Supreme Court can
and will88.

II. CONTEMPT BY JUDGES, MAGISTRATES OR OTHER PERSONS ACTING

JUDICIALLY

Section 16 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 makes Judges, Magistrate and other persons
liable for the contempt of courts. It provides that subject to the provisions of any law for the
time being in force a judge magistrate or other person acting judicially shall also be liable for
contempt of his own court or of any other court in the same manner as any other individual is
liable and the provisions of this Act shall so far as may be, apply accordingly 89. However it

88
. Ex Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India 2003 AIR SCW 43
89
. Contempt of Court Act, 1971, section 16(1)
33
also makes it clear that nothing in this section shall apply to any observations or remarks
made by a judge, magistrate or other person acting judicially regarding a subordinate court in
an appeal or revision pending before such judge, magistrate or other person against the order
or judgment of the subordinate court90

Actually the Contempt of Court is punished not to protect the judge personally but to
safeguard the dignity of the seat of justice so that people’s faith in the judicial administration
may not be shaken. It the seat of justice abuses that confidence and an impression is created
in the public mind that the judge is excitable indecorous and insulting to party or counsel then
the confidence of the public in shaken in the administration of justice and it requires
immediate redress91. If the judge uses indecorous words and indulges in unseemly and
indecent language, then the impression concept of the seat of justice is attended against even
by its occupant in bringing into disrepute the administration of justice and he court. For
example : In Mohammed shafi, Advocate V. ChoudryQuadirBaksh92First class magistrate,
Lahore, on the date of hearing the counsel pleaded that his client had obtained an ad interim
injunction in the sub-judges court against the petitioner from prosecuting the proceedings fill
the disposal of the suit.

The Object of the competent law is not to safeguard the judge personally, but to safeguard the
seat of justice and it the seat of justice is brought into disrepute in the eyes of public by the
judge himself he will be held liable for the contempt of his own court. Any person who
interferes with the administration of justice is held liable for the contempt of court and it
makes no difference whether he is a Judge, Lawyer, Minister - or a Common man. A Judge
thus may be held guilty of the contempt of his own court, it he himself interferes with the
administration of justice. A lawyer is an officer of the court and therefore he can ordered to
leave the court - hall only when he commits am offence or behaves in such an unruly manner
as to involve a law and order situation. It a judge orders a counsel to leave the court hall
without reason it would amount to contempt of his own court and for this he may be held

90
. Contempt of Courts Act,1971, section 16(2)
91
. Rex v. Almon, (1765) Wilmot’s Notes 243
92
. AIR 1949 Lah. 270
34
liable93. A magistrate who delivered a reserve any reasonable cause was held guilty of
contempt of court94.

It the interior or subordinate court does not follow the law laid down by the superior court, it
will amount to contempt of court95. Refused by the interior court to follow the law laid down
by the superior court Will No doubt, result in the serious interference with the administration
of justice. It will also bring the seat of justice into disrepute in the eyes of public. Article 141
makes it. Clear that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts
within the territory of India. Article 227 provides that every High Court shall have
superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which if
exercises jurisdiction. It is well established that the subordinate courts must follow the rulings
of the High Court, unless there is a ruling of the Supreme Court contrary to that of the High
Court96

The High Court’s decision is finding on the subordinate courts even when the decision is
subjudice before the Supreme Court97. They binding nature of the High Court decision does
not disappear merely because a leave to appeal petition is filed98. It the High Court’s decision
or ruling is willfully disobeyed by the subordinate court it will amount to contempt of court,
unless the decision or ruling rendered by the High Court is distinguishable. Thus if a judge of
the subordinate court deliberately avoids to follow the decision of the High Court by giving
wrong and illegitimate reason, he will be held liable for contempt of court 99. The plea that
there is no express provision in the constitution making the High Court’s decision binding on
the subordinate courts cannot be accepted100. It is implicit in the power of supervision
conferred on a superior tribunal that all the tribunals subjects to the supervision should
conform to the law laid down by it. Such obedience would also be conductive to their smooth
working, otherwise there would be confusion in the administration of law and respect for law
would irretrievably suffer. Actually it is implicit in the power of supervision conferred on a
93
. Bar Association Library, Moradabad v. Kothari S.D.M, and 1966 All. WR (HC) 197
94
. State v. P.C Mall (1973) 39 Cal. LR 358
95
. Barad Kant Mishra v. Bhanisen Dixit (1973) 1 SCC 446
96
. Barand Kant Mishra v. Bhinishen Dixit (1973) 1 SCC 446
97
. Ibid.
98
. Ibid.
99
. Ibid.
100
. East India commercial Co. Ltd. V. The Collector customs, AIR 1962 SC 1893
35
superior court that all the courts and tribunals subject to its supervision should conform to the
law laid down by it101. Such obedience is necessary for their smooth working otherwise there
would be confusion in the administration of law102.

It the superior court has passed the stay order, the subordinate court cannot as the superior
court to state the law under which the order has been passed 103. It the subordinate court
disobeyed the order passed by the superior court on the ground of want of jurisdiction of the
superior court, it will be liable in contempt. The subordinate court should presence that the
order passed by the superior court is within its jurisdiction, unless the contrary appears104.

A judge of the Subordinate court is held liable in the Contempt for disobeying the order of
the High Court only when the disobedience is deliberate and willful105. For this purpose the
existence of the order of the High Court and the knowledge of the same are require to be
proved106.

Where the magistrate did not receive the stay order in time and passed the order which was
found violation of the order of the High Court, he was not held guilty of contempt because
the disobedience was not deliberate and willful107. The court108 has made it clear that where
the order of the superior court may be construed in two ways and the subordinate court
construes it in one of those ways but in a way different from that intended by the superior
court, It cannot be said that the disobedience of the order by the subordinate court is
deliberate and willful, and therefore, the subordinate court cannot be held guilty of contempt
of court.

101
. East India Commercial Co. Ltd. V. The Collector of customs AIR 1963 SC 1893: Barad Kant Mishra v.
Bhimsen Dixit, (1973) 1 SCC 446
102
. Ibid.
103
. GulamMuhammed v. Sharif Baig, AIR 1960 Ori. 218
104
. Ibid.
105
. Harkusum Sing v. ChotanMahton& others, AIR 1951. Pat. 494. B.K Kar v. Chief Justice of Orissa AIR 1961
SC 1367
106
. Ibid.
107
. ChintamaniPillai v. State, AIR 1952 Ori. 167
108
. B.K Kar v. Chief Justice of Orissa AIR 1961 SC 1367
36
III.CONTEMPT LIABILITY OF STATE, CORPORATE BODIES AND THEIR
OFFICERS.

In India it is now well settled that the state is not immune from the contempt liability and
therefore it may be held liable for contempt of court109

In Mohd.AslamV.union of India110, the Chief Minister of a U.P. Mr. Kalyan sing had given
the undertaking to the court for protecting the Babrimusjid in his personal capacity as well as
in his official capacity. He was found guilty willfully committing breach of undertaking and
therefore the court sentenced him to one day’s taken imprisonment and a fine of Rs.2000. A
minister or officer of Government is also either in his official capacity or it there is a personal
element contributing to contempt in his personal element contributing to contempt in his
personal capacity, liable in contempt. There is no immunity of any authority for any authority
of Government it a personal element is shown in the act of disobedience of the order of the
court from the consequence of order of the court. Even in England where the maxim “crown
can do no wrong” has its influence, a distinction is made between the Crown as such and the
executive.

In T.R. Dhananjaya v. J. Vasudevan,111 a responsible secretary of the government department

was held guilty of the contempt of court for not implementing the order of the court relating
to promotion of the petitioner as the chief executive engineer even though when he was not
eligible for promotion under rules. The petitioner’s claim was accepted by the High Court
and the decision of the High Court was accepted by this Supreme Court. The fact that the
petitioner was not eligible under relevant rules for promotion as the engineer was not brought
to the notice of the court. The government did not promote him as he was not eligible for
promotion under the relevant rules. The Supreme Court took the view that refused to comply
with orders amounted to contempt of court. The court took view that when the order has been
passed by the court the government or authority or person to whom the order. Has been
served has no option but to give effect to the order passed by the court.

109
. Mohammed Aslam v. Union of India, AIR 1995 SC 548
110
. Ibid
111
. AIR 1996 SC 302
37
The court pointed out that if there was any doubt, a clarification could have been sought from
the court. Since it order was floated the secretary of the government was declared guilty of
contempt of court.

IV. CONTEMPT OF COURT COMMITTED BY CORPORATE BODIES.

Clause (4) and clause (5) of section 12 of the contempt of courts Act, 1971 provide for
contempt by a corporate body like company. Company in turn, is meant as anybody corporate
and includes a firm or other association of individuals. The contempt may relate to any
undertaking given to a court. Clause(4) specifically says that where a person found guilty of
contempt of court in respect of any undertaking given to a court is a company (1) every
person who at the time the contempt was committed was in charge of and ii) was responsible
to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, iii) as well as the company,
shall be deemed to be guilty of the contempt.

The punishment may be enforced, with the leave of the court, by the detention in civil prison
of each person.112

Exception No person shall be liable to such punishment of he proved that;

i) the contempt was committed without his knowledge or

ii) That he exercised all due diligence to prevent is commission113.

V. CONTEMPT BY DIRECTORS, MANEGERS, SECRETARY etc…

Clause (5) of section, 12 makes clear that if the contempt is committed by a company and it is
proved that the contempt has been committed with the consent or connivance of or is
attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director manager, secretary or other officer of
the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer of the punishment may be

112
. Section, 12(4)
113
. Proviso to section 12(4)
38
enforced, with the leave of the court, by the detention in civil prison of such director,
secretary or other officer. Director means a partner of the firm in relation to a firm.

In Narain Sing V.S. Hardayal Sing114. It was held that it a order is made against a corporation
itself and the officer or agent of the corporation acting for the corporation knowingly
disobeys the order of the court. He will be held liable for the contempt. In S.N. Banerjee v.
Kuchwar time stones Co. Ltd115., Privy Council pointed out that knowledge of order is enough
for holding an officer of the company liable for contempt and it is not necessary that he
should be party to the suit or order is served on him.

114
. AIR 1958 Punj. 180
115
. AIR 1938 P.C 295
39
 CHAPTER 4

THE CONTEMPT OF COURT ACT, 1971

The origin of the law of contempt in India can be traced from the English law. In England
law superior courts of record have from early times, exercised the power to commit for
contempt persons who scandalized the court or the judges. The right of the Indian High
Courts to punish for contempt was in the first institute recognized by the judicial committee
of the Privy Council which observed that the offence of the contempt of court and the powers
of the High Courts to punish it are the same in such court as in the Supreme Court in
England. It also observed that the three chartered contempt. Almost all the high courts have
exercised the jurisdiction inherent in a court of record from the very nature of the court itself.
It has been judicially accepted throughout India that the jurisdiction was a special one
inherent in the very nature of the court.

The first Indian stature on the law of contempt ie; the contempt of courts Act was passed in
1926. It was enacted to define and limit the powers of certain courts in punishing contempt of
courts. When the contempt of courts act, 1926 (XII of 1926) was in existence in British India,
various Indian states also had their corresponding enactment. These states were Hyderabad,
Madhya Bharat, Mysore, Peps, Rajasthan, Travancore – Cochin and Saurashra. State
enactments of the Indian states and the contempt of courts Act, 1926 were replaced by the
contempt of courts act, 1952 (32 of 1952).

An attempt was made in April, 1960 to introduce in the Loksabha a Bill to consolidate and
amend the law relating to contempt of courts. On an examination of the Bill, government
appears to have felt that the law relating to contempt of courts in uncertain, undefined and
unsatisfactory and that in the light of the constitutional changes which have taken place in the
country, it would be advisable to have the entire law on the subject scrutinized by a special
committee set up for the purpose. In pursuance to that decision a committee was set upon 29 th
July, 1961 and February, 1963 to define and limit the powers of certain courts in punishing
contempt of courts and to regulate there procedure in relation thereto.

40
I. HISTORY OF THE ACT

English authors trace the history or the origin of the law of contempt of court to kingship and
sovereignty as the judges administering justice derived the authority from the king and sat in
the courts to administer justice in king’s name. Thus disgrace or disregard of the rule of law
or offence against the dignity of a court or a judge commonly known as contempt of court
was considered an insult to the king himself.

From the year 1250 onwards, the rolls and Year Books contain references to contempt of
court. These usually relate to some disturbance or hostile reaction in or near the court
affecting its business or to some violent or insulting reaction to service of the courts process.

It appears to have been recognized at an early stage that contempt could consist merely of
words. It was contempt to insult a judge in open court or in the presence of has follow judges
as they were going to hold pleas or abuse of judiciary, even publication of out of court of
matter scandalizing the court was contempt. In 1344 John de Northampton, an attorney
confessed that he had written a letter to one of the king’s council reflecting in the judges of
the King’s Bench. It was adjudged by that court that the letter was a scandal upon the court
and john was committed to the Marshal before sureties was found for his good behavior.

II. OBJECTIVES OF THE ACT

The purpose of the law of contempt is to protect the machinery of justice and the interests of
the public. It provides a mechanism to prevent interference in the course of justice and
maintain the authority of the law, but it is a weapon that must be used sparingly. The object
of contempt personally from criticism but to protect the public by preserving the authority of
the court and the administration of justice from undue attack: however, judges cannot use it to
wreck personal vengeance. In the case of contempt which is not committed in the face of the
court, which may be described as constructive contempt, and which, depends upon the
interference of an intimation to obstruct the course of justice, guidelines for the exercise of
the jurisdiction to commit for contempt have been laid down as follow.

41
Economical use of jurisdiction is desirable. Harmonization between tree criticism and
judiciary should be the goat. Confusion between the personal protection of a libeled judge
and the prevention of obstruction of public justice should be avoided.

The press should be given tree play within responsible limits, even when the focus of its
critical attention is the court.

Judges should not the hyper sensitive, even where distortions and criticism overstep the
limits.

If after taking into account all these considerations, the courts finds contempt of court
beyond condonable limits, then the strong arm of the law must be used in the name of Public
interest and public justice.

On 1st April, 1960, Sri BibhutiBhushan Das Gupta introduced in the LokSabha a bill to
consolidate and amend the law relating to contempt of courts act. The Government after
examining the bill realized the need to reform existing act, and set up a special committee for
scrutinizing the Act. The Sanyal Committee submitted its report on the 28 th of February,
1963. The Contempt of Courts act, 1971 is mainly based on the recommendations on the
Sanyal Committee.

The committee was set up in 1961 under the chairmanship of late. Shri H.N Sanyal. The then
additional solicitor general, The committee made a comprehensive study of the law and the
problems relating to contempt of courts in the light of the position obtaining in our own
country and various countries. The recommendations took note of the importance give to
freedom of speech in the constitution and of the need for safeguarding the status and dignity
of courts and interests of administration of justice. Sanyal Committee went into almost every
aspect and examined various judgments of the High Courts and also of foreign courts, on the
subject.

The recommendations which of the importance given to freedom of speech in the constitution
and of the need for safeguarding the status and dignity of courts and the interests of
administrations of justice. The recommendations of that committee were generally accepted
by Government, after considering the views expressed on those recommendations by the state
Governments, union Territory Administrations, the Supreme Court, the High Courts and the

42
judicial commissioners Government brought the contempt of court bill to replace and repeal
the act of 1952.

The objects and reasons of the bill is it is generally felt that the existing law relating to
contempt of courts is somewhat uncertain, undefined and unsatisfactory. The jurisdiction to
punish for contempt touches upon two important fundamental rights of the citizens, namely,
the right to personal liberty and the right to freedom of expression.

It was, therefore, considered advisable to have the entire law on the subject scrutinized by a
special committee. The contempt of courts act, 1971 (70 of 1971) is the product of the report
of that committee.

The act of 1971 effected significant changes in procedure as well as in application of the
enactment. “Contempt of Court” has been segregated into ‘civil’ and criminal contempt with
their respective definitions, which the old act did not contain. Though the old act could not be
held ineffective in the absence of the definition of the term ‘contempt’. Thus act modified the
definition of ‘contempt’ to a considerable extent.

Instances of publishing and distributing any matter, interfering or tending to interfere with or
obstructing or tending to obstruct the course of justice during pending of the proceedings, it
there are reasonable grounds for believing that the proceeding were pending fair and accurate
reporting of a judicial proceedings, fair criticism on merits of any case which has been heard
and finally decided complaint or statement made in good faith against the presiding officer
fair and accurate report of judicial proceedings held in chambers or in a camera, have been
excluded from the definition.

III.PROCEDURE WHERE CONTEMPT IS IN THE FACE OF THE SUPREME

COURT OR A HIGH COURT.

When it is alleged, or appears to the supreme court or the High Court upon its own view, that
a person has been guilty of contempt committed in its presence or hearing the court may
cause such person to be detained in custody, and at any time before the rising of the court, on
the same day, or as early as possible there after shall when it is alleged, or appears to the
43
supreme court or the High Court upon its own view, that a person has been guilty of contempt
committed in its presence or hearing, the court may cause such person to be detained in
custody, and at any time before the rising of the court, on the same day, or as early as
possible thereafter, shall116. Cause him to be informed in writing of the contempt with which
he is charge117

Afford him an opportunity to make has defence to the charge 118; after taking such evidence
as may be necessary or as may be offered by such person and after hearing him, proceed
either fore with or after adjournment, to determine the matter of the charge 119; and make such
order for the punishment or discharge of such person as may be just120.

No withstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where a person charged with

contempt under that sub-section applies, whether orally or in writing, to have the charge
against him tried by some judge other than the judge or judges in whose presence or hearing
the offence is alleged to have been committed, and the court is of opinion that it is practicable
to do so and that in the interests of proper administration of justice the application should be
allowed, it shall cause the matter to be placed, together with a statement of the fats of the
case, before the chief justice for such directions as he may think fit to issue as respects the
trial thereof121.

Notwithstanding anything contained in any other two, in any trial of a person charged with
contempt under sub – section (1) which is held, in pursuance of a direction given under
sub - section (2), by a judge other them a judge or judges in whose presence or hearing the
offence is alleged to have been committedit shall not be necessary for the judge or judges in
whose presence or hearing the offence is alleged to have been committed to appear as a
witness and the statement placed before the chief justice under subsection (2) shall be treated
as evidence in the case122.

116
. Section 14(1) in the contempt of courts act, 1971

117
. Section 14(1) (a) in the contempt of courts act,1971
118
. Section 14(1) (b) in the contempt of courts act,1971
119
. Section 14(1) (c) in the contempt of courts act,1971
120
. Section 14(1) (d) in the contempt of courts act, 1971
121
. Section 14(2) in the contempt of courts act ,1971
122
. Section 14(3) in the contempt of courts act, 1971
44
Pending the determination of the charge, the court may direct that a person charged with
contempt under this section shall be detained in such custody as it may specify, provided that
he shall be released on bail, it a bound for such sum of money as the court thinks sufficient is
executed with or without sureties conditional that the person charged shall attend at the time
and place mentioned in the bond and shall continue to so attend until otherwise directed by
the court: provided further that the court may, if it thinks fit, instead of talking bail from such
person, discharge him on his executing a bond without sureties for his attendance as
aforesaid123.

IV. PUNISHMENT FOR CONTEMPT OF COURT124

High Court and Supreme Court are bestowed with the power to punish for the contempt of
the court.

Under section 12 of the Contempt Of Court Act 1971, a contempt of court can be punished
with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with time which
may extend to two thousand rupees, or with both.

However, in civil cases if the court considers that a fine will not meet the ends of justice and
that a sentence of imprisonment is necessary shall. Instead of sentencing him to simple
imprisonment, direct that the he be detained in a civil prison for such period not exceeding
six months as it may think fit.

Save as otherwise expressly provided in this act or in any other law contempt of court may be
punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine
which may extend to two thousand rupees or with both save as otherwise expressly provided
in this act or in any other law, a contempt of court may be punished with simple
imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to
Two thousand rupees or with both. Provided that the accused may be discharged or the
punishment awarded may be remitted on apology being made to the satisfaction of the

123
. Section 14(4) in the contempt of courts act, 1971
124
. Section 12 in the contempt of courts act, 1971
45
court125. Explanation - an apology shall not be rejected merely on the ground that it is
qualified or conditional if the accused makes it bonafide.

Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no court
shall impose a. sentence in excess of that specified in sub – section (1) for any contempt
either in respect of itself or of a court subordinate to it126.

Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, where a person is found guilty of a civil
contempt, the court, if it considers that a fine will not meet the ends of justice and that a
sentence of imprisonment is necessary shall, instead of sentencing him to simple
imprisonment, direct that he be detained in a civil prison for such period not exceeding six
months as it may think fit127.

Where the person found guilty of contempt of court in respect of any undertaking given to a
court is a company, every person who at the time the contempt was committed was in charge
of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of business of the company, as well as
the company shall be deemed to be guilty of the contempt and the punishment may be
enforced, with the leave of the court, by the detention in civil prison of each such person,
provided that nothing contained in thus Sub - section shall render any such person liable to
such punishment if he proves that the contempt was committed without his knowledge or that
he exercised all due diligence to prevent its commission128.

Notwithstanding anything contained in sub section (4), where the contempt of court referred
to therein has been committed by a company and. It is proved that the contempt has been
committed with the consent or connivance of or is attributable to any neglect on the part of
any director, manager, secreting or other officer129.

For the purposes of sub – sections (4) and (5)

a. “company” means anybody corporate and includes a firm or other association of

individuals: and

125
. Section 12(1) in the contempt of courts act, 1971
126
. Section 12(2) in the contempt of courts act,1971
127
Section 12(3) in the contempt of courts act, 1971
128
Section 12(4) in the contempt of courts act, 1971
129
Section 12(5) in the contempt of courts act, 1971
46
b. “Director” in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm.

47
 CHAPTER 5

IMPORTANT DECISIONS ONCONTEMPT OF COURT

1. MOHAMMAD ASLAM v. UNION OF INDIA130.

In this case relating to protection of Babri Masjid, the chief minister Kalyan Sing of the state
of U.P. had given an undertaking to the Supreme Court for protecting the Babri Masjid in the
personal capacity as well as in his official capacity. The chief minister had also given a
solemn assurance to the National Integration Council and permitted the terms of that
assurance to be incorporated as his own undertaking to the Supreme Court and allowed an
order to the passed on those terms. But the order was not obeyed. The Supreme Court
observed that he could not be absolved himself of the responsibility for the disobedience of
the order. Unless he placed before the court sufficient material which would justify that he
had taken all reasonable steps and Precautious to prevent the occurrence.
These petitions raise certain important issues as to the amenability of the state and of its
minister to be proceeded against in contempt for failure ofobedience to the judicial
pronouncement. These proceedings have the echo of the disastrous event that ended in the
demolition on the 6 – 12 – 1992 of the disputed structure of Ram JanmaBhoomi – Babri
Masjid in Ayodhya. Thousands of innocent lives of citizens were lost, extensive damage to
property caused and more than all damage to the image of this great land as one fostering
great traditions of tolerance, faith, and brother hood amongst the various communities
inhabiting the land was impaired in the international scene. Though the proceedings for
SuoMota contempt against the then chief minister of the state of utter Pradesh and its officers
in relation to the happening of 6 – 12 – 1992 were initiated those are pending and shall be
dealt with independently.
The subject -matter of the present contempt proceedings, however, arises out of certain
antecedent events that occurred during the month under which certain property in Faizabad
close to Rum JanmaBhumi – Babri Masjid complex has been notified for acquisition for the
purpose of development of pilgrimate and providing amenities to them at Ayodhya.

130
. AIR 1995 SC 548
48
The court further said; In the meantime, as we have been told at the Bar, there was a meeting
at the national level of the Integration council and the chief minister of the state as it appears
from the affidavit of the Home + NaveedYar khan V.state of U131, secretary of the respondent
- state dated 13-11-1991 made certain statements to the council. These have been extracted in
paragraph 3 of the affidavit and road thus: “the chief minister has made several statements at
the national integration council meeting on 2-11-1991. On the basis of the statements, the
resolution of National Integration Council was passed on 2-11-1991. The resolution itself
states.

“The council noted the following assurances given by the chief minister of utter Pradesh. Of
July 1992 in relation to any extent of 2.77 acres of land in Ayodhya which was acquired by
the state government pursuant to a notification dated 7-10-1991 2. The acquisition was
ostensibly for the purpose of developing the acquired land as an amenity for pilgrims at
Ayodhya. The acquisition proceedings were challenged both before the high court and this
court. In these proceedings three interlocutory orders came to be made – two by the High
Court and one by this court. In order to put the complaint of willful disobedience of these
orders by the state of Uttar Pradesh and its chief minister, shri. Kalian Sing, it is necessary to
advert to two of these orders.

The petitioners have approached this court by way of these petitions under Article 323 of the
constitution as public interest litigation challenging the acquisition covered by two
notifications dated 7-10-1991 and 10-101991 made under section 4(1) of the land acquisition
act, 1894.

i. All efforts will be made to find an amicable resolution of the issue.

ii. Pending a final solution, the government of U.P. will hold itself fully responsible
for the Ram Janma Bhumi – Babri masjid structures:
iii. Orders of the court in regard to the land acquisition proceedings will be fully
implemented: and
iv. Judgment of the Allahabad H.C. in the cases pending before it will not be
violated”.

131
. 1992 SUPP 2 SCCN 221
49
2. SUPREME COURT v. UNION OF INDIA BAR ASSOCIATION

In the above case of Vinay Chandra Mishra, the Supreme Court held that the license of an
advocate to practice legal profession may be suspended or cancelled by the exercise of
contempt jurisdiction under Article 129 6132 read with Article 42. However, the said decision
of the Supreme Court has been over ruled by in the case of the Supreme Court bar
association V. union of India133.

The facts and circumstances of the present case justify our invoking the power under article
129 read with article 142 of the constitution to award to the contemnor a suspended sentence
of imprisonment together with suspension of his practice as and advocate in the manner
directed herein. We accordingly sentence the contemnor for his conviction for the offence of
the criminal contempt as under:

The contemnor Vinay Chandra Mishra is hereby sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment
for a period of six months. However, in the circumstances of the case, the sentence will
remain suspended for a period of four years and may be activated in case the contemnor is
convicted for any other offence of contempt of court within the said period and.

The contemnor shall stand suspended from practicing as an advocate for a period of three
years from today with the consequence that all held by him in his capacity as an advocate
shall stand vacated by him forth with.

Aggrieved by the direction that the “contemnor shall stand suspended from practicing as an
Advocate for a period of three years” issued by this court by invoking powers under Articles
129 and 142 of the constitution, the S.C. Bar Association, through its Honorary Secretary, has
filed this petition under Article 32 of the constitution of India seeking following relief.

Issue and appropriate writ, direction or declaration, decelerating that the disciplinary
committees of the Bar councils set UP under the Advocates Act, 1961 alone have exclusive

132
. Supreme Court to be a court of record- The S C shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of a
court including the power to punish for contempt of itself
133
. AIR 1998 8 SC 1895
50
jurisdiction to inquire into and suspended or debar an advocate from practicing law for
professional or other misconduct, arising out of punishment imposed for contempt of court or
otherwise and further declare that the supreme court of India or any High Court in exercise of
its inherent jurisdiction has no such original jurisdiction. Power or authority in that regard
notwithstanding the contrary view held by this Hon’ble court in contempt petition.

The question which arises is whether the supreme court of India can while dealing with
contempt proceedings exercise power under Article 129 of constitution or under article 142
of the constitution can debar a practicing lawyer from carrying on his profession as a lawyer
for any period whatsoever, we direct notice to issue on the attorney general of India and on
the respondents herein. Notice will also issue on the application for interim stay. Having
regarding to the importance of the aforesaid question we further direct that this petition be
placed before a constitution bench of this court.

The court repelled the arguments advanced on behalf of the contemnor, the U.P Bar Ass: and
the U.P Bar council, that the court while publishing the contemnor with any of the
“traditional” or “accepted” punishments for contempt also suspend his license to practice an
advocate. Since that power is specify entrusted by the advocates act, 1961 to the disciplinary
committees of the state bar council and / or Bar Council of India.

3. T .DEEN DAYAL v. .H. C OF ANDRA PRADESH134

This is an appeal under section 19(1)(b) of the contempt of courts Act, 1971 against the
judgment of the Division Bench of the A.P. High Court, by which after finding the appellant
guilty of contempt of court, he was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of
three months.

Brief facts of the case are that the appellant contested elections to Rajyasabha held in 1984.
He lost the election and in consequence thereof, he fields an election petition No. 1/84 in the
A.P High Court. The election petition was listed before Mr. Justice UpendraLalWaghray and
during the louse of hearing of the said election petition, the appellant field 3 miscellaneous

134
. AIR 1997 SC 3451
51
application No. 16572/85 requesting the Honorable Chief Justice of the A.P High Court to
withdraw the said election petition from the court of Mr. Justice UpendraLalwarghray and
transfer the same to some other learned judge.

Before the High Court the appellant argued person and the learned Advocate general
Appeared for prosecuting the case. The learned advocate general submitted before the High
court that having regard to the that the contemnor made baseless allegation against the
learned judge in the transfer application and adding scurrilous allegation in the counter
affidavit in the contempt application aggravating the offence, he should be dealt with
severely.

The appellant appearing in person before High Court challenged the jurisdiction of the
learned judge to indicate proceedings under the act as, accordingly to him, the learned judge
was acting only an authority as contemplated by Article 329 (b) of the constitution of India.
He further contended that the imitation of proceedings by the learned judge was in violation
section 13 of the act. His third contention was that by reason of the order dated 1-7-86 passed
by P.A. Chandary, J. the order dated 14-06-85 passed by Upendra Waghry J. “was defeated”.
He next contended that the proceedings were barred by limitation provides in section 20 of
the Act. His fifth contention was that the learned judge while making an order of 16-4-85
partially denied the allegations and thereby indirect by admitted the order part of allegation
made by him. The last contention was that while passing the order on 25-4-1885 the learned
judge has discharged him and there after the question of continuing the contempt proceedings
will not arise.

The High Court rejecting the first contention held Article 329(b) cannot be constructed as
precluding the parliament from conferring the jurisdiction to try am election petition, upon a
court of a High Court and the expression ‘authority’ is not defined either in Articles 366 of
the constitution on in the general clauses act, 1897. On that basis the learned judges rejected
the first contention and held that it was permissible for the parliament to designate a court,
namely, the High Courts, to try election petitions. On the second contention based on para4.
Of the counter affidavit, the learned judges, after observing that averment in that paragraph
was extremely scandalous, and compound the gravity of the allegations, held that the
contention was neither a legal contention nor a factual one against the charge leveled against
him. Likewise, leading with the third contention it was held that the order dated 1-7-86
52
passed by Mr. Justice P.A. chondhary reffering the contempt case to be heard by Division
Bench, will not defeated the order dated 16-4-85 of Mr. Justice upendralal waghray. On the
point of limitation based on section 20 of the Act, the learned Judges held that section 20
provides for limitation. Initiation, but not for conclusion of contempt proceedings. While
rejecting the fifth contention as irrelevant which could not be entertained the learned judges
held that a contemnor cannot expect as learned judge of the court to reply to every one of his
reckless allegations. As regards the last contention based on the order dated 25-4-85 of the
learned single judge, the High Court found that contention was based on a misreading of the
order dated 25-4-85 and from the material placed before the court it was clear that the
respondent was put on clear notice of the charge he was no meet and that the proceedings
were not proceedings under section 14 but under section 15135.

4. EMS NAMBOODIRI PAD v. T. N. NAMBIAR136

The fact of the case is, in this case appellant E.M.S Namboodiri pad, who was the chief
minister of Kerala, had held a press conference in Thiruvananthapuram, gave is famous
“judicially as an instrument of oppression” speech based on teaching of Marx and Engels and
made various critical remarks relating to the judiciary which inter alia was described by him
as “dominated by class hatred, class prejudices” “instinctively” favoring the rich against the
poor. He also stated that as part of the ruling classes the judiciary “works against workers,
peasants and other sections of the working classes” and “the law and the system of judiciary
essentially served the exploiting classes” Based on reportage of the event in Indian Express,
an advocate of the High Court of Kerala commenced proceedings.

E.M.S. Namboodiri pad tiled an affidavit explain has press conference, stating that he did not
offend the majesty of law undermine the dignity of courts or obstruct the administration of
justice. By a Majority judgment of High Court, the appellant was convicted for contempt of
court justice Raman Nair and Justice Krishna Moorthy 1 year convicted and sentenced
E.M.S. for a fine amount ofRs. 1000/- or simple imprisonment for one month. He moved this
court by an appeal. He contended that the law of contempt must be read without encroaching
135
. Contempt Of Courts Act,1971
136
. AIR 1970 SC 2015
53
 upon the expression under the constitution 137. And that the intention of the appellant in
making his remarks at the press conference should be examined in the light of his political
views which light of his political views which he was at liberty to put before the people.
Under the certificate granted as per Article 134(1) (c) of the constitution, the matter reached
the doors of the Supreme Court. A bench comprising justice Hidayatallah, Justice ,Mitter and
Justice A.N Ray138, in a very interesting judgment held that, E.M.S understanding of Marx,
Engels and Lenin was incorrect and that he stood ‘misguided’ and ‘misunderstood’. Then the
Supreme Court also convicted him, however reduced the amount of fine to Rs. 50/-.

In this case E.M.S. Namboodiripad, the chief minister said that the statement was and that he
had no intention to criticize any particular judge. The Supreme Court rejected the submission
and said that the allegations drew a very distorted and poor picture of judiciary. I was a attack
upon judges minds of the people a general dissatisfaction with the distrust of all judicial
decisions and undetermined the authority of law courts. The S.C. said that the fact that the
chief minister did not intend any such result would be relevant in considering the sentence to
be imposed but could not serve to justify his conduct.

There is a similar case Queen V. grew139 where an Article of abuse of a judge in has case
character of a judge was published in a newspaper. This journalist said that he had not
deliberately intended to discredit the judge in questions and that the article was the outcome
of hid strong feelings. He apologized to court held him guilty and punished with a fine and
imprisonment.

The section 2 (c) the Act140, defines criminal contempt. The publication (whether by words,
spoken or written or by slogans, by visible representation or otherwise) of any matter or the
doing of any other at whosever which

i) Scandalizes or tends to scandalizes or lower or tend to lower the authority of any courts, or
ii) Prejudices or interferences or tends to interfere with, the due cause of any judicial
proceedings or

137
. Article 19 (1) (a)
138
. 1970.
139
. AIR 2006 SCC 54
140
. Section 2(c) of Contempt Of Court Act, 1971
54
iii) Interfere or tends to interfere with or obstructs or tends to obstruct the administration of
justice in any other manner.
So the court holds that the statements of the chief minister E.M.S. Namboodiri Pad had effect
of lowering the prestige of the judges and the courts in the eyes of the people and therefore
amounted to contempt of courts.

5. STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. PARKASH CHANDH141

This is an unusual case. The observations, comments and allegations made and order passed
by a learned single judge of Rajasthan High Court, Mr. Justice Shetna, in relation to disposed
of writ petition, by sending for its record in a totally unrelated and unconnected criminal
revision petition. Which have been put in issue in the appeal touch not only upon the
discipline of the High Court and the powers of the chief justice to assign cases and allot
benches but also the larger issue of judicial property the order directing issuance of notice of
contempt to the chief justice of High Court and the powers of chief justice to assign cases and
allot benches but also the larger issue of judicial property.

The order directing issuance of notice of contempt to the chief justice of the High Court
raises a fundamental question about the jurisdiction of a single judge to issue such a notice in
the established fats of the case. It is not individual but the prestige of the institution which is
at stake in this case. The manner in which “allegations” have been made against the chief
justice of the High Court, the Division Bench of the High Court which had disposed of the
writ petition and the some of the former chief justice of the Rajasthan High Court, including
the present chief justice of India, Mr. Justice J.S Varma, has caused us much to deal with a
case like this but we shall be singularly failing in our duties to the institution, it we do not
deal with the matter and take it to its logical conclusion.

First, some salient, write petition No. 2949 of 1996 was field, as a public interest litigation,
on 9-9-1996 in the High Court of Rajasthan at Jodhpur by an advocate of the court, inter alia
seeking directions to provide suitable accommodation to the judges of the Rajasthan High
Court and for certain other benefits for the judges. During the proceedings of the writ petition

141
. AIR 1998 SC 1344
55
certain interim orders came to be made by Shethna, J. from time to time. On 29-4-1997
Shethna J. directed the writ petition to be treated of learned counsel for parties.

6. A.I.A.D.M.K. v. L.K TRIPATI AND OTHERS142

In this case the opponent bid to pressurize the central government to expedite.
Implementation of Sethu Samundrum project Democratic progressive alliance comprising
Dravida Munetra Kazhagam, Indian National Congress, Communist Party of India,
Communist party of India (Marxist) and PattazhiMakkal passed a resolution on 27-9-2007 to
resort to total cessation of work and closure of shop on 1-10-2007 and to conduct a general
meeting of leaders of all parties on 30-9-2007 of Chennai.

The petitioner challenged the affirmation resolution in writ petition (No: 31435 of 2007) tiled
before madras High Court and prayed that the petition under article 129 of the constitution of
India read with the 1971 Act, and prayed that the respondents be punished of violation and
disobediences of the Courts order dated 30-9-2007. Along with writ petition the petitioner
field two miscellaneous petitions with prayer that direction should be issued Dravida
Munnetra Kazhagam represented by its president M. Karunanidhi to deposited a sum of Rs.
100 Crore with the chief secretary government of Tamilnadu on or before 28-9-2007 which
could be utilized to compensate the damages caused to general public and five political
parties be restrained from proceeding with the call for Bandh in the state in terms of
resolution dated 24-9-2007.

In contempt petition, it has been averred that several workmen of Dravid Manneta Kazhagam
party moved in various vantage areas of the state with leally and lethal weapons to ensure that
no business or commercial activity was done on (1-10-2007) and above over opened the shop
was forced to down the shutter. It has been further averred that in Chennai a restaurant at
Arterial Mount roads was attached and tooted and many shops and restaurants were
ransacked and eatables were thrown out and both were broken. But the police remained mute
spectators.

142
. AIR 2009 SC 1314
56
Dealing with the issue the learned beau discussed ordinarily with court as well as court
retrain from passing an interim order the effect of which would be grating the main relief in
the present case a part from state of Tamilnadu, out of the political parties namely Dravida
Mannetta Kuzhaga, INC, CPI(M), CPI, and Patali Makkal Kakshi only DMK after takings
into consideration the entire matter prima facie court call given by the aforesaid political
parties is called for bandh and not strike or Hartal accordingly the court have no option but to
issue notices to the non -appearing respondent and pass Interim order.

The court order was officially communicated to respondent NUSI on the someday. i.e; (30-9-
2007) at about 10:30 pm by tax. The letter immediately forward to respondent No:2 directed
the concern police officer that the steps should be taken for facilitating unobstructed
movement of public transport and maintenance of essential services and production to be
given to central government officers ie: court, bus stand, railway station, banks, market shop,
include trial establishments etc…

These direction where conveyed to 20nd inspector general of police and commissioners of
police by additional general of police which fats dated 1-10-2007 which was sent between
11:28 pm on (30-9-2007) and (1-10-2007) 6:30

The secretary to government whom the petitioner on 3-10-2007 filed the petition under article
129 of the constitution of India read with the 197 at and prayed that the respondents be
punished for violation and disobedience of the court under dated 30-9-2007.

The learned bench observed he who asserts must prove as new application in the matter proof
of allegations said to be constituted the act of contempt as regard the standard of proof noted
that the proceeding under the extraordinary – jurisdiction of the court in terms of provision in
the contempt of court at is Quasi criminal and as such. The standard proof requires is that of
criminal proceeding and breach shall have to be established beyond reasonable doubts. An
analysis of section 2(b) shows that willful disobedience to any judgment, degree, direction
order writ or other process of a court or willful breach of an undertaking given to a court
constitutes civil contempt.

Dr. A.M Singvi learned senior counsel appearing for respondents No: 3 and 5 argued that the
concerned minister and secretary had made genuine efforts to ensure that operation of basses
by the state corporations is not jeopardized due to call given by the Democratic Progressive
57
Alliance for cessation of work or for hunger strike there are no evidence so fur respondent 4
has directly or indirectly encouraged the members of his parties to out force call for cessation
of work. In so for as respondent judiciary in general and of the Courts order which is
telecasted in Jaya T.V which respondent six speeches in public.

The Supreme Court observed that the prohibitive injunction contained therein was explicitly
directed against the political parties and not against respondents No.1 to 3. This was so
because the court could not have presumed that the restraint order passed by it will be
disregarded or flouted by the political parties. Therefore respondents No. 1 to 3 cannot per, se
be held guilty of disobeying or violating the court’s order, dated 30 th September, 2007 and
punished for committing contempt of court as defined in section 2(b) of the 1971 Act.The
contemnor which is respondent No: 4&6 shall pay a sum of Rs.21, 00,000 through a demand
draft to the Bar Council of India within one week.

CONCLUSION

58
Legal education has changed drastically from past 10 years but still reforms are needed to
make it effective and justice oriented. There are some issues which need to be looked into for
repairing holes in our current legal system such as emphasis should be laid on research and
publication activities, need to reform curriculum at the earnest, trained faculty, imparting
training based education, introduction of law subjects at school level as to ensure basic
knowledge of law to students of all stream etc. This will help in growth and development of
legal education with increase in reputation of the profession to meet the challenges of the
field and to grow and contribute by providing fullest opportunity to law aspirants for the
progress of the country. The study thus examined how far the present contempt law which is
basically common law origin and based on the authority of the King is apt in a country like
rights of freedom of speech and expression and follows high respect to procedure established
by law.

The study shows that due to the protozoan nature of contempt power, a definition covering all
aspects of contempt of court is rather difficult. It may also be noted that though the Contempt
of Courts Act, 1971, defines the term “contempt of court”, the definition which is inclusive in
nature is unsatisfactory arid meaning of the term is even now governed by common law. It is
found that a definition covering all aspects of contempt of court is rather difficult and such a
definition is yet to develop. It is found that the contempt power of courts and contempt power
of legislatures are having the same origin and same features. In the U S, the social contract
theory is considered as the very basis of the rationale behind contempt power. The basis of
contempt power in England is based on the divine right of King to rule the country. These
differences in approach regarding contempt power had tremendous impact in the
development of contempt laws in those countries. In India, no such theoretical sanctity is
given to contempt power. The power vested in Indian courts to deal with contempt is not
based on any divine concept. Thus the general nature and the rationale behind contempt
power in India is based on the simple concept of public interest in due administration of
justice coupled with the authority of courts to administer justice without interference from
any quarters. Thus no sound theoretical basis to justify the contempt power of courts other
than necessity and convenience is applicable to India.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

59
BOOKS

1. Dr. J.P.S Sirohi, Professional Ethics, Accountancy for lawyers and Bar- Bench
Relations, Allahabad Law Agency, New Delhi, 6th Edition, 2014
2. Dr. Kailash Rai, Accountancy for Lawyers and Bar Bench Relations, Central Law
Agency, Allahabad, 11th Edition, 2015
3. Dr. S.R. Myneni, Professional Ethics, Accountancy for Lawyers and Bar- Bench
Relations, Asia Law House, Hyderabad, 1st Edition Reprint, 2015
4. Prof. Anirudh Prasad & Chandra Sen Pratap Singh, Legal Education & the Ethics of
Legal Profession in India,1st Edition Reprint 2018
5. S.P. Gupta, Professional Ethics, Accountancy for Lawyers and Bar- Bench Relation,
Central Law Agency, Alahabad, 5th Edition.

LEGISLATIONS

1. Advocates Act, 1961

2. The Bar Council of India Rules.
3. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872
4. Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987
5. Contempt of Court Act,1971

WEBSITES

1. http://legalserviceindia.com// last visited on 25 August 2019

2. http://lawcommisionofindia.com// last visited on 14 July 2019
3. http://juducualreforms.org// last visited on 28 July 2019

60