URBANO v PEOPLE
G.R. No. 182750 | January 20, 2009
TICKLER: Hot headed victim
DOCTRINE: When the law speaks of provocation either as a mitigating circumstance or as an essential
element of self-defense, the reference is to an unjust or improper conduct of the offended party capable of
exciting, inciting, or irritating anyone; it is not enough that the provocative act be unreasonable or
annoying; the provocation must be sufficient to excite one to commit the wrongful act and should
immediately precede the act.
FACTS:
Victim Brigido Tomelden and petitioner were at the compound of the Lingayen Water District
(LIWAD) where they drank beer in a restaurant. While inside the compound, the two had a heated
altercation in the course of which Tomelden hurled insulting remarks at petitioner. Reacting, petitioner
asked why Tomelden, when drunk, has the penchant of insulting petitioner.
The exchange of words led to an exchange of blows. Cooler heads succeeded in breaking up the
fight, but only for a brief moment as the protagonists refused to be pacified and continued throwing fist
blows at each other. Then petitioner delivered a "lucky punch ," on Tomelden’s face, which made
Tomelden topple down. Tomelden was on the verge of hitting his head on the ground had their
companions not caught him and prevented the fall. The blow, however, caused Tomelden’s nose to bleed
and rendered him unconscious.
Petitioner and his other co-workers brought Tomelden to the office of the LIWAD general manager
where he spent the night. He remained in the compound the following day. Upon arriving home, Tomelden
informed his wife, Rosario, of the fight the previous night and of his having been rendered unconscious. He
complained of pain in his nape, head, and ear which impelled Rosario to immediately bring him to the
Lingayen Community Hospital where Dr. Daisy Arellano examined him and treated his lacerated left index
finger, contusions, and hematoma at the right cerebrum.
On October 2 and 7, 1993, Tomelden went back to the hospital complaining of dizziness,
headache, and other pains. The attending doctors observed the patient to be in a state of drowsiness and
frequent vomiting. On October 8, 1993, Rosario brought Tomelden to the Sison Memorial Provincial
Hospital in Dagupan City, where the attending physician, Dr. Ramon Ramos, diagnosed Tomelden
suffering from "brain injury, secondary to mauling to consider cerebral hemorrhage."
Tomelden again complained of extreme head pain, prompting his wife to bring him back to the
Lingayen Community Hospital where Dr. Arellano again attended to him. This time, things turned for the
worst, the doctor noting that Tomelden appeared to be semi-conscious, sleepy, uncooperative, and not
responding to any stimulant. Tomelden died at 9:00 p.m. of that day due, per Dr. Arellano, to "cardio-
respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral concussion with resultant cerebral hemorrhage due to mauling
incident."
The defense presented petitioner who denied having any intention to kill, asserting that
hypertension, for which Tomelden was receiving treatment, was the cause of the latter’s death.
Crime charged: HOMICIDE
RTC: GUILTY of HOMICIDE
CA: AFFIRMED RTC. The appellate court held that the commission by petitioner of the crime of homicide,
as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), had been proved beyond
moral certainty of doubt, pointing to the lucky punch as the proximate cause of Tomelden’s hospitalization
and ultimately his death.
And like the RTC, the CA found no qualifying circumstance to increase or lower the penalty.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstances of sufficient
provocation on the part of the victim and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong in favor of the petitioner.
RULING:
When the law speaks of provocation either as a mitigating circumstance or as an essential element
of self-defense, the reference is to an unjust or improper conduct of the offended party capable of exciting,
inciting, or irritating anyone; it is not enough that the provocative act be unreasonable or annoying; the
provocation must be sufficient to excite one to commit the wrongful act and should immediately precede
the act. This third requisite of self-defense is present: (1) when no provocation at all was given to the
aggressor; (2) when, even if provocation was given, it was not sufficient; (3) when even if the provocation
was sufficient, it was not given by the person defending himself; or (4) when even if a provocation was
given by the person defending himself, it was not proximate and immediate to the act of aggression.
I n the instant case, Tomelden’s insulting remarks directed at petitioner and uttered immediately
before the fist fight constituted sufficient provocation. This is not to mention other irritating statements
made by the deceased while they were having beer in Bugallon. Petitioner was the one provoked and
challenged to a fist fight.
Moreover, the mitigating circumstance that petitioner had no intention to commit so grave a
wrong as that committed should also be appreciated in his favor. While intent to kill may be presumed
from the fact of the death of the victim, this mitigating factor may still be considered when attendant facts
and circumstances so warrant, as in the instant case.
Consider: Petitioner tried to avoid the fight, being very much smaller than Tomelden. He tried to
parry the blows of Tomelden, albeit he was able, during the scuffle, to connect a lucky punch that ended
the fight. And lest it be overlooked, petitioner helped carry his unconscious co-worker to the office of the
LIWAD’s general manager. Surely, such gesture cannot reasonably be expected from, and would be
unbecoming of, one intending to commit so grave a wrong as killing the victim. A bare-knuckle fight as a
means to parry the challenge issued by Tomelden was commensurate to the potential violence petitioner
was facing. It was just unfortunate that Tomelden died from that lucky punch, an eventuality that could
have possibly been averted had he had the financial means to get the proper medical attention.
Thus, it is clear that the mitigating circumstance of "no intention to commit so grave a wrong as
that committed" must also be appreciated in favor of petitioner while finding him guilty of homicide. That
petitioner landed a lucky punch at Tomelden’s face while their co-workers were trying to separate them is a
compelling indicium that he never intended so grave a wrong as to kill the victim.
The prescribed penalty for homicide under Art. 249 of the RPC is reclusion temporal or from 12
years and one day to 20 years. With the appreciation of two mitigating circumstances of no intention to
commit so grave a wrong as that committed and of sufficient provocation from the victim, and the
application of par. 5 of Art. 64, RPC, the imposable penalty would, thus, be the next lower penalty
prescribed for homicide and this should be prision mayor or from six years and one day to 12 years.
Consequently, with the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner ought to be incarcerated
from prision correccional as minimum and prision mayor as maximum. In view of the circumstances of the
case, considering that the petitioner never meant or intended to kill the victim, a prison term of eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum period is proper while the period of two (2) years and
four (4) months of prision correccional as minimum period is reasonable.
PEOPLE vs JUNE IGNAS
G.R. No. 140514-15 | September 30, 2003
TICKLER: Paramour/ Bakery-Benguet
DOCTRINE: The established rule is that there can be no immediate vindication of a grave offense when
the accused had sufficient time to recover his serenity. Thus, in this case, we hold that the mitigating
circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense cannot be considered in appellants favor.
FACTS:
Appellant is an elementary school graduate. He resided at Cruz, La Trinidad, Benguet, where he
operated a bakery. He is married to Wilma Grace Ignas, by whom he has a son of minor age. Wilma Grace
used to be the cashier of Windfield Enterprise, which is owned by Pauline Gumpic. Pauline had a brother,
Nemesio Lopate. It was he
whom appellant fatally shot.
Sometime in September 1995, appellants wife, Wilma Grace Ignas, confided to her close friend,
Romenda Foyagao, that she was having an affair with Nemesio
Lopate. On the evening of October 16, 1995, Wilma Grace, Romenda, and Nemesio
went to Manila. Romenda and Nemesio were sending off Wilma Grace at the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport as she was leaving for Taiwan to work as a domestic
helper. Upon arrival in Manila, the trio checked at Dangwa Inn, with Nemesio and Wilma
Grace sharing a room. All three of them stayed at the inn until October 18, 1995, when Wilma Grace left for
Taiwan.
Thereafter, Romenda received from Taiwan four letters written by Wilma Grace
on various dates. Although all the letters were addressed to Romenda, two of them were meant by Wilma
Grace to be read by her paramour, Nemesio. In the other two letters, Wilma Grace instructed Romenda to
reveal to appellant her affair with Nemesio. It was only sometime late in February 1996 that Romenda,
following her bosom friends written instructions, informed appellant about the extramarital affair between
Wilma Grace and Nemesio. Appellant became furious. He declared Addan to aldaw na dayta nga
Nemesio, patayek dayta nga Nemesio (There will be a day for that Nemesio. I will kill that Nemesio).
Appellant then got all the letters of Wilma Grace from Romenda.
At around 10:00 p.m. of March 10, 1996, according to another prosecution witness, Annie
Bayanes, a trader in vegetables, she was at the Trading Post, La Trinidad, Benguet. Witness Bayanes said
she was at the unloading area (bagsakan), conversing with another dealer at the latters booth, when
suddenly two gunshots shattered the quiet evening.
Bayanes turned towards the place where the sound of the gunshots came from. She testified that
she saw a person falling to the ground. Standing behind the fallen individual, some 16 inches away, was
another person who tucked a handgun into his waistband and casually walked away.
Initially, she only saw the gunmans profile, but when he turned, she caught a glimpse of his face.
She immediately recognized him as the appellant June Ignas. She said she was familiar with him as he
was her townmate and had known him for several years.
Also at the bagsakan area that night was prosecution witness Marlon Manis. He testified that on
hearing gunshots from the Trading Post entrance, he immediately looked at the place where the gunfire
came from. He saw people converging on a spot where a bloodied figure was lying on the ground. Witness
Manis saw that the fallen victim was Nemesio Lopate. Manis then saw another person, some 25 meters
away, hastily walking away from the scene. He could not see the persons face very well, but from his gait
and build, he identified the latter as his close friend and neighbor, June Ignas.
Prosecution witness Mona Barredo, a bakery worker, testified that she knew appellant. She said
they were co-workers formerly at the Annaliza Bakery. Barredo declared that at around 10:30 p.m. of
March 10, 1996, appellant came to her residence at Pico, La Trinidad. After being served refreshments,
appellant took out a handgun from his jacket and removed the empty shells from the chamber. Appellant
then told her to throw the empty cartridges out of the window. Because of nervousness she complied.
Barredo also said that appellant disclosed to her that he had just shot his wifes paramour. According to
witness on the scene, responding policemen immediately brought the victim, Nemesio Lopate, to the
Benguet General Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
On March 14, 1996, police investigators accompanied by one of appellants brother as well as
prosecution witness Julio Bayacsan, a friend of appellant, went to Kayapa, Nueva Vizcaya, to invite
appellant to shed light on the slaying of Nemesio. Witness Bayacsan testified that shortly after they arrived
from Kayapa, he had an opportunity to talk with appellant at the La Trinidad Police Station. There,
appellant disclosed to this witness that he shot and killed Nemesio. Prosecution witness Pauline Gumpic,
the victim’s sister, testified that she and appellant had a private talk, while the latter was in police custody,
and appellant admitted to her that he killed her brother. Gumpic declared that appellant revealed to her that
he shot Nemesio for having illicit relations with appellants wife and failing to ask for his forgiveness.
SPO4 Arthur Bomagao of the La Trinidad police, who headed the team that investigated the fatal
shooting of Nemesio, declared on the stand that appellant voluntarily admitted to him that he shot the
victim with a .38 caliber handgun. Bomagao further testified that appellant surrendered to him the letters of
Wilma Grace, wherein the latter admitted her affair with Nemesio.
Appellant interposed the defense of alibi. Sometime during the last week of February 1996, he
said, he entered into a partnership with a friend and fellow baker, Ben Anoma, to operate a bakery in
Kayapa, Nueva Vizcaya. Appellant claimed that he was having a hard time operating his bakeshop in La
Trinidad as he had no helpers. When Anoma proposed a business arrangement, he added, he immediately
seized the opportunity. He averred that he was baking bread with Anoma in Kayapa on the night Nemesio
was killed. Defense witness Ben Anoma corroborated appellants alibi. The trial court disbelieved
appellants defense and sustained the prosecutions version.
CRIME CHARGED: Murder aggravated especially by the use of an unlicensed firearm.
RTC: Murder and considering the aggravating circumstances of treachery, nighttime and the special
aggravating circumstance of the use of an unlicensed firearm,
ISSUE: Whether there are mitigating circumstances, which could modify the penalty
RULING:
NO. Appellant, firstly contends that assuming without admitting that he is guilty, the lower court should
have considered at least the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense as well as
that of passion and obfuscation. Secondly, appellant points out that the trial court failed to consider his
voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance.
According to the OSG, for the mitigating circumstance of vindication of a grave offense to apply, the
vindication must be immediate. This view is not entirely accurate. The word immediate in the English text is
not the correct translation of the controlling Spanish text of the Revised Penal Code, which uses the word
proxima. The Spanish text, on this point, allows a lapse of time between the grave offense and the actual
vindication. Thus, in an earlier case involving the infidelity of a wife, the killing of her paramour prompted
proximately though not immediately by the desire to avenge the wrong done, was considered an
extenuating circumstance in favor of the accused. The time elapsed between the offense and the
suspected cause for vindication, however, involved only hours and minutes, not days. Hence, we agree
with the Solicitor General that the lapse of two (2) weeks between his discovery of his wife’s infidelity and
the killing of her supposed paramour could no longer be considered proximate. The passage of a fortnight
is more than sufficient time for appellant to have recovered his composure and assuaged the unease in his
mind. The established rule is that there can be no immediate vindication of a grave offense when the
accused had sufficient time to recover his serenity. Thus, in this case, we hold that the mitigating
circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense cannot be considered in appellants favor.
The rule is that the mitigating circumstances of vindication of a grave offense and passion and
obfuscation cannot be claimed at the same time, if they arise from the same facts or motive. In other
words, if appellant attacked his victim in proximate vindication of a grave offense, he could no longer claim
in the same breath that passion and obfuscation also blinded him. Moreover, for passion and obfuscation
to be well founded, the following requisites must concur: (1) there should be an act both unlawful and
sufficient to produce such condition of mind; and (2) the act which produced the obfuscation was not far
removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator
might recover his moral equanimity. To repeat, the period of two (2) weeks which spanned the discovery of
his wife’s extramarital dalliance and the killing of her lover was sufficient time for appellant to reflect and
cool off.
Appellant further argues that the lower court erred in failing to consider voluntary surrender as a
mitigating circumstance. On this point, the following requirements must be satisfied: (1) the offender has
not actually been arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (3) the
surrender was voluntary. Records show, however, that leaflets and posters were circulated for information
to bring the killer of Nemesio to justice. A team of police investigators from La Trinidad, Benguet then went
to Kayapa, Nueva Vizcaya to invite appellant for questioning. Only then did he return to Benguet. But he
denied the charge of killing the victim. Clearly, appellants claimed surrender was neither spontaneous nor
voluntary.
Appellant June Ignas y Sanggino is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
HOMICIDE as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance.
BONGALON V PEOPLE
G.R. No. 169533 | March 20, 2013
TICKLER: Evening procession. “Sissy.” Struck at the back, slapped the other.
DOCTRINE: Passion or obfuscation may lawfully arise from causes existing only in the honest belief of the
accused. It is relevant to mention, that in passion or obfuscation, the offender suffers a diminution of
intelligence and intent.
FACTS:
The Prosecution showed that on May 11, 2002, Jayson and Roldan, his older brother, both
minors, joined the evening procession for the Santo Niño at Oro Site in Legazpi City. When the procession
passed in front of the Bongalon’s house, the latter’s daughter Mary Ann Rose, also a minor, threw stones
at Jayson and called him a "sissy". Bongalon then confronted Jayson and Roldan and called them names
like "strangers" and "animals” and then struck Jayson at the back with his hand, and slapped Jayson on
the face. Bongalon then went to the house of the 2 brothers and challenged Rolando, their father, to a
fight, but the latter just ignored Bongalon.
Rolando later brought Jayson to the Legazpi City Police Station and reported the incident. Jayson
also underwent medical treatment at the Bicol Regional Training and Teaching Hospital wherein the
doctors who examined Jayson issued two medical certificates attesting that Jayson suffered several
contusions on his head and required five to seven days of medical attention.
On his part, Bongalon denied having physically abused or maltreated Jayson. He explained that
he only talked with Jayson and Roldan after Mary Ann Rose and Cherrylyn, his minor daughters, had told
him about Jayson and Roldan’s throwing stones at them and about Jayson’s burning Cherrylyn’s hair. He
denied shouting invectives at and challenging Rolando to a fight, insisting that he only told Rolando to
restrain his sons from harming his daughters.
Crime Charged: Child Abuse, in violation of Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610
RTC: Guilty of Child Abuse
CA: Affirmed RTC’s Decision, but modified the penalty
ISSUE:
1. Whether the accused is guilty of child abuse?
2. Whether petitioner’s liability should be mitigated because he merely acted to protect her two minor
daughters?
RULING:
No, the Court said that Bongalon was not liable for child abuse but is instead liable for slight physical
injuries under Article 266 (1) of the RPC. The records did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that his
laying of hands on Jayson had been intended to debase the "intrinsic worth and dignity" of Jayson as a
human being, or that he had thereby intended to humiliate or embarrass Jayson. The records showed the
laying of hands on Jayson to have been done at the spur of the moment and in anger, indicative of his
being then overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the personal safety of his own minor daughters who
had just suffered harm at the hands of Jayson and Roldan. With the loss of his self-control, he lacked that
specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being
that was so essential in the crime of child abuse.
2. Yes, the Court considered the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation under Article 13 (6) of
the Revised Penal Code, because Bongalon lost his reason and self-control, thereby diminishing the
exercise of his will power. Passion or obfuscation may lawfully arise from causes existing only in the
honest belief of the accused. It is relevant to mention, too, that in passion or obfuscation, the offender
suffers a diminution of intelligence and intent. With his having acted under the belief that Jayson and
Roldan had thrown stones at his two minor daughters, and that Jayson had burned Cherrlyn’s hair,
Bongalon was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion.
NIZURTADO vs SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 107383 | December 7, 1994
TICKLER: Brgy. Captain in Malabon. Barangay Livelihood.
DOCTRINE: Voluntary Surrender (Article 13 par 7) may be treated as modifying circumstance
independent and apart from restitution of the questioned funds by petitioner (Article 13, par 10) which is
any other circumstance which is similar in nature from the first to ninth paragraph. Restitution- voluntary
returned the public funds, is akin to voluntary surrender.
FACTS:
An Information was filed accusing Nizurtado of having committed complex crime of
malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents. Nizurtado was Brgy. Captain
of Barangay Panghulo of Malabon. Under the program of Barangay Livelihood, each barangay could avail
loans worth 10,000 pesos to finance viable livelihood projects provided that Barangay Council would
identify certain program. The check was received by Nizurtado, however a resolution approved by
Barangay Council duly submitted to Secretariat is needed in order to encash the check. Thereafter session
was held, among proposals was that of Barangay Service Center to be establish, however the meeting
ended without agreeing on any livelihood project.
Nizurtado asked Romel, councilman, to sign an unaccomplished resolution/ blank resolution
believing that Nizurtado was just in hurry and that the blank space would be filled by the proposed project
which is Barangay Service Center. The same resolution was unanimously approved, then the application
for loan was also approved. However, it was stated therein that the purpose of such is T-Shirt
Manufacturing of round neck shirts of various sizes and colors.
Thereafter, Nizurtado encashed the check and re-lent the cash proceeds to councilmen except
Romel and Gomez. When the acting Barangay Captain, Sandel, asked payment for the loan extended by
the Barangay through Nizurtado to Romel and Gomez, the latter denied that they borrowed money. It was
found out that Nizurtado falsified the resolution.
Sandiganbayan: Convicted Nizurtado of complex crime of malversation of public funds committed through
falsification of public document, and appreciated two mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
and restitution (complete restitution of amount malversed). Filed MR but was denied.
Solicitor General: Agrees in all respects with Sandiganbayan, malversation of public funds except of the
crime of falsification of public document.
ISSUE:
• WON Nizurtado is guilty of the crime charged
• WON two mitigating circumstances be appreciated in his favor
RULING:
1. YES, Nizurtado is guilty of malversation of public funds through falsification of public document.
The Sandiganbayan gave credence to Romero and Gomez who testified that no meeting had
actually taken place. Nizurtado had induced Romel and Gomez to sign the blank resolution in the
representation that Romero's proposal would be indicated in the resolution.
2. YES, but not only voluntary surrender and restitution be appreciated in his favor, but also no
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed.
Certification from Deputy Clerk of Court certified that Nizurtado voluntarily surrendered on January
17, 1989. More so, Voluntary Surrender (Article 13 par 7) may be treated as modifying circumstance
independent and apart from restitution of the
questioned funds by petitioner (Article 13, par 10). Restitution- voluntary returned the public funds, is akin
to voluntary surrender.
With respect to penalty in the presence of MC:
The actual attendance of two separate mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and
restitution, entitles the accused to the penalty of next lower in degree. The presence of third mitigating
circumstance of praeter intentionem would result in imposing a period the court may deem possible.
Considering, however that the penalty has to be imposed in maximum period, the only effect of additional
mitigating circumstance is to impose only the minimum portion of that maximum period.
