INTRODUCTION:

Competition is the act of the sellers individually seeking to acquire patronage of buyers in
order to achieve profits or market share. The Competition Act, 2002  replaced the
Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969, as the same had become obsolete on
account of international economic developments relating more particularly to competition
laws and a need was felt to focus on competition. The Central Government to serve this need
set up a High Level Committee on Competition Policy and Law to study the competition
regime in the nation and prepare a report recommending modifications to the MRTP Act.
This ultimately led to the repeal of the Act and a new Act namely, the Competition Act,
2002  was enacted by the Government. One of the essential elements of the New Law was
establishment of the Competition Commission of India (CCI/the Commission).

Object of the Act: 

The object of the Act was to establish a Commission to:

 Prevent practices having adverse effect on competition

 Promote and sustain competition in markets
 Protect interests of consumers
 Ensure freedom of trade carried on by other participants

Subsequent amendments to the Competition Act– The Competition Act was amended in

2007 vide the Competition (Amendment) Bill, 2007 in view of economic developments and
liberalization which required the Indian economy to allow domestic as well as international
competition in the market. The amendment inter alia provides for the following:

 CCI to function as a regulator for preventing and regulating anti-competitive

practices in the country in accordance with the Act;
 Notice to be given to the CCI in case of any merger or combination within 30 days
and imposition of penalty in case of failure to give notice to CCI;
  Establishment of Competition Appellate Tribunal, to be headed by a three-member
quasi-judicial body headed by a Chairman who is Judge of Supreme Court or
Chief Justice of a High Court;

The Act was further amended in 2009 vide the Competition (Amendment) Act, 2009, which
transferred the cases pending with Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission
to the Competition Appellate Tribunal and National Consumer Commission.

COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA

Chapter III of the Competition Act provides for establishment of the Competition
Commission of India. According to the Act, the Commission shall comprise of Chairperson
and not less than two and not more than six other members to be appointed by the Central
Government. The statutory provision further entails that the Chairperson and other members
of the Commission shall possess special knowledge and professional experience of not less
than 15 years in international trade, economics, business, commerce, law, finance,
accountancy etc.

Under the provisions of the Act, the Chairperson and other Members shall be selected in the
manner and in accordance to the Rules prescribed by the Central Government.

Duties and Functions of the Commission:

 To eliminate practices having adverse effect on competition, promote and sustain

competition, protect interests of consumers and ensure freedom of trade by other
participants
 Inquire into certain agreements and dominant position of enterprise– It provides
that the Commission may either suo moto or on receipt of any information of
alleged contravention of Section 3 (prohibits anti-competitive agreements) may
inquire into the same.
 Inquiry into combinations– Section 20 entrusts the Commission with the power to
inquire into any information relating to acquisition and determine whether such an
acquisition have an appreciable adverse effect on competition (AAEC).
  Reference of an issue by a statutory authority to the Commission– Section 21 of
the Act enumerates that in the course of a proceeding if any issue is raised that any
decision of a statutory authority will be in conflict with the provisions of the
Competition Act, 2002, the statutory authority shall make a reference in this regard
to the Commission.
 Reference by Commission– Section 21A of the Act provides that if in the course of
proceeding an issue is raised by any party that any decision taken by the
Commission is in contravention of the provisions of Competition Act, whose
authority is entrusted to a statutory authority then the Commission may make a
reference in respect of the issue to the statutory authority.
 Power to issue interim order– Section 33 of the Act empowers the Commission to
issue interim orders in cases of anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominant
position, thereby temporarily restraining any party from carrying on such an act.
 Competition Advocacy– Section 49 of the Act provides for competition advocacy
and enumerates that the Central or the State Government may while formulating
any policy on Competition or any other matter may make reference to the
Commission for its opinion on possible effect of such policy on Competition.
However, the opinion given by the Commission is not binding on the Central
Government.

PROCESS OF INQUIRY BY THE COMMISSION

Procedure of inquiry under Section 19 of the Act i.e. inquiry in cases of certain agreements
alleged to be in contravention of the Act or information alleging abuse of dominant position
by an enterprise is conducted by the Commission.

ANTI- COMPETITIVE AGREEMENTS

The Act under Section 3(1) prevents any enterprise or association from entering into any
agreement which causes or is likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition
(AAEC) within India. The Act clearly envisages that an agreement which is contravention of
Section 3(1) shall be void.
How to determine AAEC?
  The Act provides that any agreement including cartels, which-
  Directly or indirectly determines purchase or sale prices;
 Limits production, supply, technical development or provision of services in
market;
 Results in bid rigging or collusive bidding
Shall be presumed to have an appreciable adverse effect on competition in India
Proviso to Section 3 provides that the aforesaid criteria shall not apply to joint ventures
entered with the aim to increase efficiency in production, supply, distribution, acquisition and
control of goods or services.
Anti-competitive agreements are further classified into Horizontal agreements and Vertical
agreements:

HORIZONTAL AGREEMENTS- Horizontal agreements are arrangements between

enterprises at the same stage of production. Section 3(3) of the Competition Act,
2002 provides that such agreements includes cartels, engaged in identical or similar trade of
goods or provision of services, which-

1. Directly or indirectly determines purchase or sale prices

2. Limits or controls production, supply
3. Shares the market or source of production
4. Directly or indirectly results in bid rigging or collusive bidding

 Under the Act horizontal agreements are placed in a special category and are subject to the
adverse presumption of being anti-competitive. This is also known as ‘per se’ rule. This
implies that if there exists a horizontal agreement under Section 3(3) of the Act, then it will
be presumed that such an agreement is anti-competitive and has an appreciable adverse effect
on competition.

In re: Alleged Cartelization by Cement Manufacturers1

MRTP Commission took suo-motu cognizance of this matter, and was later transferred to
Competition Commission under section 66(6). CCI found the act and conduct of the cement
companies to be a ‘Cartel’ as the cement companies were acting together to limit, control and
also attempted to control the production and price of cement in the market in India  Penalty

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30 July, 2012
of Rs. 6307 crore was imposed on the 11 cement companies and their associations, fixed at
50 per cent of their profits during 2009 -10 and 2010 -11.

In re: Aluminium Phosphide Tablets Manufacturers2

The Commission examined the allegation of anti-competitive acts and conduct in the tender
for procurement of Aluminium Phosphide Tablets required for preservation of central pool
food grains by Food Corporation of India. In this case, the Commission inter alia noted that
the identical bid price is not possible unless there is some sort of prior understanding.  The
Commission found the collective action of identical bids, common entry in the premises of
FCI before submission of bids as indicative of ‘plus’ factors in support of existence of an
understanding among the parties. The Commission apart from issuing a cease and desist order
imposed a penalty upon each of the contravening party @ 9% of the average turnover of the
company.  The matter was challenged in appeal before the Appellate Tribunal which upheld
the order of CCI, however, the penalty amount was reduced by applying the principle of
“relevant turnover”. The Supreme Court upheld the order of CCI.

VERTICAL AGREEMENTS- Vertical agreements are those agreements which are entered

into between two or more enterprises operating at different levels of production. For instance
between suppliers and dealers. The ‘per se’ rule as applicable for horizontal agreements does
not apply for vertical agreements. Hence, a vertical agreement is not per se anti-competitive
or does not have an appreciable adverse effect on competition.

The Act under Section 3 also prohibits any agreement amongst enterprises which materialize
in:

 Tie-in arrangement– According to the Statute it includes any agreement requiring

purchaser of goods, as a condition of purchase, to purchase some other goods. In
the case of Sonam Sharma v. Apple & Ors., the CCI stated that in order to have a
tying arrangement, the following ingredients must be present:

1. There must be two products that the seller can tie together. Further, there must
be a sale or an agreement to sell one product or service on the condition that the
buyer purchases the other product or service. In other words, the requirement is
2
Suo Motu Case No. 02 of 2011
 that purchase of a commodity is conditioned upon the purchase of another
commodity.
2. The seller must have sufficient market power with respect to the tying product
to appreciably restrain free competition in the market for the tied product. That is,
the seller has to have such power in the market for the tying product that it can
force the buyer to purchase the tied product; and

 The tying arrangement must affect a “not insubstantial” amount of

commerce. Tying arrangements are generally not perceived as being anti-
competitive when substantial portion of market is not affected.
 Exclusive supply agreement- The Act defines such agreements to include any
agreement restricting in any manner the purchaser in the course of his trade from
acquiring or otherwise dealing in any goods other than those of the seller or any
other person.
 Exclusive distribution agreement- This includes any agreement to limit, restrict
or withhold the output or supply of any goods or allocate any area or market for
the disposal or sale of goods.
 Refusal to deal- The Act states that this criteria includes agreement which restricts
by any method the persons or classes of persons to whom the goods are sold or
from whom goods are bought.

In the case of Shri Shamsher Kataria v. Honda Siel Cars India Ltd. & Ors. 3, the concept of
vertical agreements including exclusive supply agreements, exclusive distribution agreements
and refusal to deal were deliberated by the Commission. The informant in the case had
alleged anti-competitive practices on part of the Opposite Parties (OPs) whereby the genuine
spare parts of automobiles manufactured by some of the OPs were not made freely available
in the open market and most of the OEMs (original equipment suppliers) and the authorized
dealers had clauses in their agreements requiring the authorized dealers to source spare parts
only from the OEMs and their authorized vendors only. The Commission held that such
agreements were in the nature of exclusive supply, exclusive distribution agreements and
refusal to deal under Section 3(4) of the Act and hence the Commission had to determine
whether such agreements would have an AAEC in India.

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25 August, 2014
HELD: The Commission held the impugned agreements in contravention of Section 3 of the
Act and remarked that the network of such agreements allowed the OEMs to become
monopolistic players in the aftermarkets for their model of cars, create entry barriers and
foreclose competition from the independent service providers. The Commission further stated
that such a distribution structure allowed the OEMs to seek exploitative prices from their
locked-in consumers, enhance revenue margin form the sale of auto component parts as
compared to the automobiles themselves besides having potential long term anti-competitive
structural effects on the automobile market in India.

 Resale price maintenance- It includes any agreement to sell goods on condition

that the prices be charged on the resale by the purchaser shall be the prices
stipulated by the seller unless it is clearly stated that prices lower than those prices
may be charged.

In the case, Fx Enterprise Solutions India Pvt. Ltd. v. Hyundai Motor India Limited, the
Informant had alleged that according to the agreement with Hyundai, dealers were mandated
to procure all automobile parts and accessories from Hyundai or through their vendors only.
While collaborating on alleged anti-competitive practices of Hyundai, the Informant stated
that Hyundai imposed a “Discount Control Mechanism”, whereby dealers were only
permitted to provide a maximum permissible discount and dealers were also not authorized to
give discount beyond a recommended range, thereby amounting to “resale price
maintenance” in contravention of Section 3(4)(e) of the Act. The CCI in the case observed
that Hyundai through exclusive agreements and arrangements contravened provisions of
Section 3(4)(e) read with Section 3(1) of the Act through arrangements which resulted
into Resale Price Maintenance. HELD: The CCI while imposing penalty of INR 87 Crore
on Hyundai noted that the infringing anti-competitive conduct of Hyundai in the case
included putting in place arrangements, which resulted into Resale Price Maintenance by way
of monitoring maximum permissible discount level through a Discount Control Mechanism
and also a penalty mechanism for non-compliance of the discount scheme.

ANTI-COMPETITIVE AGREEMENTS AND IPR EXEMPTION UNDER SECTION

3(5) OF THE ACT
Section 3(5) of the Competition Act envisages that nothing contained in Section 3
(prohibiting anti-competitive agreements) shall restrict the right of any person to prevent
infringement or imposing of reasonable conditions that may be necessary for protecting
his/her intellectual property rights i.e. copyright, trademark, patent, designs and geographical
indications.

In the aforesaid context, CCI states that any ‘reasonable condition’ imposed for protection of
IPR would not attract Section 3, however, imposition of ‘unreasonable condition’ to protect
IPR would contravene Section 3 of the Act. The CCI provides an illustrative list of
practices/agreements which though entered into for protection of IPR may contravene Section
3 of the Act. Such practices/agreements are:

 Patent pooling- may be a restrictive practice if pooling firms decide not to grant

license to third parties;
 Tie-in arrangement– If under the tying arrangement, licensee is required to
acquire particular goods solely from the patentee then it may be a restrictive
practice;
 Agreement to continue payment of royalty even after the patent has expired;
 Clause restricting competition in R & D;
 Licensee may be subjected to a condition not to challenge the validity of IPR in
question.
 Licensor fixes the price at which the licensee should sell.
 A licensee may be coerced by the licensor to take several licenses in intellectual
property even though the Licensee may not need all of them.
 Condition imposing quality control on the licensed patented product beyond those
necessary.
 Restricting licensee’s right to sell the product of the licensed know-how to persons
other than those designated by the licensor.
 Undue restriction on licensee’s business could be anticompetitive.
 Limiting the maximum amount of use the licensee may make of the patented
invention may affect competition.
 Condition imposed on the licensee to employ or use staff designated by the
licensor.
Shamsher Kataria’s case elaborately dealt with the exemption provision under Section 3(5)
of the Act. In the case the OPs had claimed IPR exemption under Section 3(5) of the Act and
stated that the restrictions imposed upon the OESs (original equipment suppliers) from
undertaking sales of their proprietary parts to third parties without seeking prior consent
would fall within the ambit of reasonable condition to prevent infringements of their IPRs.
The Commission observed that in order to determine whether an exemption under section
3(5) of the Act is available or not, it was necessary to consider:

1. a) Whether the right which is put forward is correctly characterized as protecting

an intellectual property?
2. b) Whether the requirements of the law granting the IPRs are in fact being
satisfied? 

The CCI in view of the facts and circumstances prevailing in the case held that the exemption
enshrined under section 3(5) of the Act was not available to those OEMs (original equipment
manufacturers) who had failed to submit the relevant documents evidencing grant of the
applicable IPRs in India, with respect to the various spare parts.

The CCI also stated that the OEMs had failed to show that the impugned restrictions
amounted to imposition of reasonable conditions, as may be necessary for protection any of
their rights.

The CCI in the case also rendered the clarification that though registration of an IPR does not
automatically entitle a company to seek exemption under section 3(5)(i) of the Act and the
essential criteria for determining whether the exemption under section 3(5)(i) is available or
not is to assess whether the condition imposed by the IPR holder can be termed as
“imposition of a reasonable conditions, as may be necessary for the protection of any of
his rights”. 

ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION

Section 4 of the Act prevents any enterprise or group from abusing its dominant position. The
Act also provides circumstances under which there is abuse of dominant position. Section
4(2) prevents following acts resulting in abuse of dominant position:
 1. Impose unfair or discriminatory condition or price in sale and purchase of goods or
services;
2. Limit or restrict;

 Production of goods or services

1. Technical or scientific development relating to goods or services to the prejudice

of consumers;

 Indulges in practice resulting in denial of market access;

1. Make conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by other parties;

2. Use its dominant position in one market to enter into other relevant market;

The Act also defines the concepts of dominant position and predatory pricing.

According to the Act, dominant position means a position of strength, enjoyed by an

enterprise in the relevant market in India which enables it to:

1. Operate independently of competitive forces in relevant market

2. Affect competitors, consumers or relevant market in its favour

Predatory price means sale of goods or services at a price which is below the cost as may be
with the view to reduce competition or eliminate competitors.

The term abuse of dominant position refers to anticompetitive business practices in which a

dominant firm may engage in order to maintain or increase its position in the market.

Judicial Dicta 

What does dominant position imply?

In the case of, Shri Neeraj Malhotra, Advocates v. North Delhi Power Ltd., the CCI
observed that Section 4 of the Act does not prohibit an enterprise from holding a
dominant position in a market, it does place a special responsibility on such enterprises,
in requiring them not to abuse their dominant position. The CCI further held that Section
4 does not contain an exhaustive list of activities that would amount to contravention of its
provisions. The actions, practices and conduct of an enterprise in a dominant position have to
be examined in view of the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether or not
the same constitutes an abuse of dominance in terms of section 4 of the Act.

In substance, `dominant position’ means the position of strength enjoyed by an enterprise that
enables it to act independently of competitive forces prevailing in the relevant market. Such
an enterprise will be in a position to disregard market forces and unilaterally impose trading
conditions, fix prices, etc. The abuse may result in the restriction of competition, or the
elimination of effective competition.

How to examine dominant position of an enterprise?

In a recent case, the CCI while determining whether the OP (OLA) held a dominant position
in relevant market or not remarked that abuse of dominant position under Section 4 would be
attracted only when the entity under scrutiny holds a dominant position in the relevant
market. CCI also elaborated on the concept of dominant position and stated dominant
position as a position of economic strength enjoyed by the enterprise in the relevant
market, which enables it to operate independently of competitive forces prevailing in the
relevant market or affect its competitor or consumer or the relevant market in its
favour. Such ability of the enterprise to behave independently of competitive forces needs
to be assessed in light of all relevant circumstances and the factors enlisted under Section
19(4) of the Act. The CCI in the case while determining dominance of OLA took the
following factors into consideration:

 Market shares of OLA;

 Its competitors in relevant markrt;
 Annual and monthly number of trips in the relevant market during the period of
investigation;

What is relevant market? 

While discussing the concept of dominant position, one of the most intriguing questions
which lingers our minds what does relevant market connote? ‘Relevant market’ is one of the
primary concerns while determining dominant position as well as abuse of dominant position
by an enterprise.

Section 2(r) of the Act renders an exclusive definition for the term ‘relevant market’. It states
that it means the market which may be determined by the Commission with reference to the
relevant product market or the relevant geographic market or with reference to both markets.

Relevant product market is defined as a market comprising all those products or services
which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of
characteristics of the products or services, their prices and intended use.

Relevant geographic market refers to a market comprising the area in which the conditions
of competition for supply of goods or provision of services or demand of goods or services
are distinctly homogenous and can be distinguished from the conditions prevailing in the
neighboring areas.

M/s Saint Gobain Glass India Ltd. v. M/s Gujrat Gas Company Limited[12]– In this case,
the CCI in order to determine the ‘relevant market’ took note of factors to be considered
while determining relevant product market and relevant geographic market. The CCI stated
that to determine the “relevant product market”, the Commission is to have due regard to
all or any of the following factors viz., physical characteristics or end-use of goods, price of
goods or service, consumer preferences, exclusion of in-house production, existence of
specialized producers and classification of industrial products, in terms of the provisions
contained in section 19(7) of the Act.

To determine the “relevant geographic market”, the Commission shall have due regard to
all or any of the following factors viz., regulatory trade barriers, local specification
requirements, national procurement policies, adequate distribution facilities, transport costs,
language, consumer preferences and need for secure or regular supplies or rapid after-sales
services, in terms of the provisions contained in section 19(6) of the Act.

Section 19(6) enlists the factors to be considered by CCI while determining ‘relevant
geographic market’:
 1. Regulatory trade barriers;
2. Local specification requirements;

 National procedure policies;

1. Adequate distribution facilities;

2. Transport costs;

 Language;
 Consumer preferences;
 Need for secure or regular supplies

Section 19(7) of the Act enlists the factors to be considered by the CCI while determining
‘relevant product market’:

1. Physical characteristics or end-use of goods;

2. Price of goods or services;

 Consumer preferences;

1. Exclusion of in-house production;

2. Existence of specialized producers;

 Classification of industrial products;

When does an enterprise engage in an abusive conduct or abuse its dominant position?

An undertaking in a dominant position is entitled also to pursue its own interests. However,
such an undertaking engages in abusive conduct when it makes use of the opportunities
arising out of its dominant position in such a way as to reap trading benefits which it
would not have reaped if there had been normal and sufficiently effective
competition. For the purposes of this section, the conduct of a party would be tested on the
basis of the end effect i.e. whether access to a market has been denied not. In other words, the
same conduct by different parties may attract provisions of section 4(2) (c) of the Act
depending on whether the conduct of the parties results into denial of market access in any
manner. As per section 4(2) (c) of the Act, there shall be an abuse of dominant position if any
enterprise indulges in a practice resulting in denial of market access in any manner.

In the case of Jupiter Gaming Solutions case, the CCI while determining alleged abuse of
dominance by Government of Goa stated that dominance per se is not bad, but its abuse is
bad in Competition Law in India. CCI further opined that abuse is said to occur when an
enterprise uses its dominant position in the relevant market in an exclusionary or /and an
exploitative manner.  In the case the Government’s tender bid of lottery contained certain
conditions which apparently restricted the size of bidders such as, minimum gross turnover of
the participating entity, participating entity should have experience of at least three years. The
CCI held that the Government of Goa by imposing such conditions abused its dominant
position denial/restriction of market access to the other parties in the relevant market.

The limits so provided under section 5 of the Act have been explained below: (a) In case of
acquisition of share, voting rights or acquiring the control: The person acquiring the shares
and the enterprise whose shares, assets or voting rights are being acquired jointly have:

(i) Assets in India: - More than 1000 crores Turnover: - More than 3000 crores

(ii) Aggregate assets in India or Outside India: - More than 500 million dollars including at
least 500 crores in India. Turnover: - More than 1500 million dollars including at least 1500
crores in India.

In case of acquisition by group, the joint assets and such acquiring group should be:

(i) Assets in India: - More than 4000 crores Turnover: - More than 12000 crores
(ii) Aggregate assets in India and outside India: - more than 2 billion dollars,
including at least 500 crores in India.
Turnover: - More than 6 billion dollars, including at least 1500 hundred crores
in India.

In case of merger or amalgamation, the remaining enterprise after merger or the enterprise so
created after amalgamation should have:

(i) Assets in India: More than 1000 crores Turnover: - More than 3000 crores
 (ii) (ii) Aggregate assets outside India: 500 million dollars, including at least 500
crores in India, or
Turnover: - More than 1500 million dollars, including at least 1500 hundred
crores in India.

If the enterprise so created after amalgamation or remained after merger belongs to a group,
then such group should have:

(i) Assets in India: - More than 4000 crores Turnover: - more than 12000 crores.
(ii) (ii) Aggregate assets in India and outside India: - 2 billion US dollars
Turnover: - more than 6 billion US dollars, including at least 1500 crores in India.

Further, Section 6 of the Act deals with the provisions of regulations of Combinations. It
provides for a compulsory notice of details of proposed combination to the Commission
along with prescribed fees within 30 days of execution of any document of acquisition or
approval of the proposal of amalgamation or merger by the board of Directors. The time
period prescribed for the combination to take effect is 210 days after giving of notice to the
commission or the date on which any order has been passed by the commission with regard to
that notice, whichever is earlier. However, exception has been provided in favour of public
financial institution, foreign institutional investors, bank or venture capital fund in case of
any covenant of loan agreement or an investment agreement.

IMPORTANT JUDGMENTS:

FICCI – Multiplex Association of India Federation House v/s United Producers/

Distributors & Ors. (“FICCI – Multiplex Association of India”)4

The informant FICCI-Multiplex Association of India had alleged that the respondents namely

United Producers/Distributors Forum (UPDF), The Association of Motion Pictures and TV

Programme Producers (AMPTPP) and the Film and Television Producers Gild of India Ltd.

(FTPGI) were behaving like a cartel. The Informant alleged that UPDF is an association of

film producers and distributors which includes both corporate houses and individuals

independent film producers and distributors. The AMPTPP and FTPGI were the members of
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25 May 2011
UPDF. It was further alleged that UPDF, AMPTPP and FTPGI produce and distribute almost

100% of the Hindi Films produced/supplied/distributed in India and thereby exercise almost

complete control over the Indian Film Industry.

It had been further alleged that UPDF vide their notice dated 27.03.2009 had instructed all

producers and distributors including those who are not the members of UPDF, not to release

any new film to the members of the informant for the purposes of exhibition at the

multiplexes operated by the members of the informant. It had been further informed that

being aggrieved by the decision of UPDF various members have approached the informant

and sought its assistance.

HELD: The CCI after considering the contentions of the opposite parties on merit and after

elaborate discussion ruled that Opposite Parties had contravened the provisions of Section

3(3) (a) and 3(3) (b) of the Competition Act. The CCI imposed a penalty of Rs. 1, 00,000 on

each of the 27 opposite parties.

MCX Stock Exchange Ltd. Vs. National Stock Exchange of India Ltd., Dot Ex International

Ltd. and Omnesys Technologies Pvt. Ltd (NSE Case) 5

MCX Stock Exchange Ltd. (MCX-SX), a public limited company and a recognized stock

exchange for trading in Currency Derivatives (CD) segment filed the information Under

Section 19(1)(a) of the Act against the National Stock Exchange India Ltd. (NSE), Dot Ex

International Ltd. (Dot Ex) and Omnesys Technologies Pvt. Ltd. (Omnesys), alleging abuse

of dominant position in the market for stock exchange services in India Under Section 4 of

the Competition Act.

It was alleged by the informant that NSE had waived transaction fees, the principal source of

revenue for stock exchanges, in its Currency Derivatives segment. Further, it was alleged that

NSE had employed other subsidizing activities in the Currency Derivatives segment. CCI
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23 June, 2011
concluded that there was a clear intention on the part of NSE to eliminate competitors in the

relevant market and also considering the fact that Competition Act is a new legislation, it

would suffice if penalty at the rate of 5% of the average turnover was levied. The CCI

imposed a penalty of Rs. 55.5 Crores within 30 days of the date of receipt of the order which

is 5% of the average of its 3 years’ annual turnover.

Belaire Owner’s Association v/s. DLF Limited Haryana Urban Development Authority

Department of Town and Country Planning, State of Haryana (“DLF” Case)6

Belaire Owners’ Association filed this complaint against three Respondents namely, DLF

Limited, HUDA and the Department of Town and Country Planning, Haryana. The

informants alleged that DLF Ltd had abused its dominant position by imposing highly

arbitrary, unfair and unreasonable conditions on the apartment allottees of the Housing

Complex ‘the Belaire’, which has serious adverse effects and ramifications on the rights of

the allottees. The CCI concluded that DLF Ltd. was in contravention of Section 4(2)(a) (i) of

the Competition Act in particular on account of the size and resources that DLF Ltd. had and

the duration for which the abuse had continued leading to great advantages for DLF Ltd. and

immense disadvantages to consumers. The CCI imposed a penalty at the rate of 7% of the

average of the turnover for the last three preceding financial years on DLF Ltd.

Google Inc. & Ors vs Competition Commission Of India7

The three appellants Google Inc., California, United States of America (USA), Google
Ireland Ltd., Dublin 4, Ireland and  Google India Pvt. Ltd. Bangalore  filed the writ petition
questioning:
a) the order of the respondent CCI under Section 26(1) of the Competition Act directing
investigation by DG, CCI into the Case No.06/2014 filed by the respondent No.2,
b) the order dated 31 st July 2014 of the respondent No.1 CCI dismissing the application filed
by the appellants for the recall of the order dated 15th April 2014 as not maintainable

6
Comp. LR 0239 (CCI)
7
27 April 2015
 c) for restraining the respondent No.1 CCI from carrying out any further proceedings against
the appellants pursuant to the order dated 15th April 2014.
HELD: The Delhi Court held that CCI can recall or review its order subjected to certain
restriction and the same should be done frugally and not in every case where the inquiry has
been ordered without an appropriate hearing.

Mohit Manglani v. M/s Flipkart India Pvt. Ltd. & Ors8

 Mr. Mohit Manglani had filed a complaint u/s 19(1) (a) of the Competition Act, 2002 against
various e-commerce/portal companies for their alleged contravention of the provisions of
Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002.
This was alleged by the Informant that these e-commerce websites have been involved in
anti-competitive practice with the seller of goods/services in nature of “exclusive
agreements”. According to the Informant owed to such practices, the consumer doesn't have
any option with regards to terms and price of the goods and services and was guaranteed to
purchase the product as per the terms of the website or not to purchase the product entirety.
This can be considered as a move which might have consequences towards the creation of
transparency and accountability in the legal system, fair trade regulations. Competition
Commission of India (CCI) is searching whether resale prices arrangements between
manufacturer and e-retailers violates any competition norms. 

M/s Fast Track Call Cab Private Limited v. M/s ANI Technologies Pvt. Ltd.9
The Informant has primarily prayed for an order from the Commission directing M/s ANI
Technologies Pvt. Ltd to restrain from indulging in the alleged practice of predatory pricing.
The CCI was in a view that destructive pricing which provides additional incentives and
discounts to customers and drivers compared to the revenue received in throwing the existing
players out of the markets and created barrier entry for the potential players contrary to
provisions of Section 4 of the Act. Also, a number of resources and the requirement of the
consumers in the applicable market with no substitutes are significant factors to consider
when looking for acts in violation of Section 49.

9
19 July 2017
Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India Ltd.10
Supreme Court held:
Order of Competition Commission taking a prima facie view and issuing direction to Director
General for investigation not appealable.
No statutory duty on Competition Commission nor any party can claim right to notice and/or
hearing at stage of formation of prima facie opinion under Section 26(1).
The power to issue interim orders has to be exercised by the Commission sparingly and under
compelling and exceptional circumstances.
The Commission is expected to record at least some reason(s) even while forming a prima
facie view.
Commission to pass speaking orders while passing directions and orders dealing with the
rights of the parties in its adjudicatory and determinative capacity

CCI vs. Excel Crop Care Ltd11

The criteria of ‘relevant turnover’ is to be adopted for the purpose of imposition of penalty
under S. 27(b) of the Act. Definition of the term “relevant turnover” is entity’s turnover
pertaining to products and services that have been affected by such conduct. JURISDICTION
OF DG/ CCI WHILE INVESTIGATING AND ENQUIRING THE MATTERS:
The SC held that the while carrying out DG investigation, if other facts reveals that even
other parties have entered into an agreement that is prohibited by S. 3, the DG would be well
within his powers to include those as well in his report.

10
(2010) 10 SCC 744
11
2017