51.
MACAPAGAL VS REMORIN
FACTS:
A 105-square meter parcel of land located at Quezon City, denoted as Lots 24
and 25, were registered in the name of Candido Caluza. Purificacion Arce-Caluza
(Purificacion) is his second wife. Corazon Caluza-Bamrungcheep (Corazon) is his
legally adopted daughter during his first marriage. After Candido died, Corazon and
Purificacion executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement adjudicating between
themselves the properties of Candido, as the latter’s surviving heirs. Lots 24 and 25,
together with Lot 23 which was registered in Candido’s name, were adjudicated to
Corazon.
When Corazon left for Thailand, Purificacion was entrusted with the
administration of the property. She then obtained Titles in her name by claiming to be
the sole heir of her deceased husband and to have lost her TCTs. Purification sold the
property of Corazon to Catalina Remorin. Catalina mortgaged the property to L & R
Lending Corporation for P200k and then to Laurelia Caluza-Valenciano for P295k to pay
off the former mortgage.
Civil Suit was filed by Corazon for reconveyance and damages against
Purificacion and Catalina before the RTC, alleging that the two defendants connived in
transferring three lots in their names through simulated sales. Catalina executed a Deed
of Transfer, signed by Purificacion as witness, admitting the wrong they did in illegally
transferring the lots in their names and acknowledging Corazon to be the rightful owner
under the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement. Corazon, Purificacion, Catalina, and
Laurelia executed a Memorandum of Agreement to settle the case. Before the
agreement could be implemented, Purificacion died on July 28, 1988. Consequently,
another compromise agreement was executed.
Corazon sold the subject Lot 5 to Laurelia by virtue of a deed entitled "Sale of
Unsegregated Portion of Land." Catalina sold the same lot to herein petitioner Mariquita
Macapagal claiming to be authorized under the Compromise Agreement. Laurelia
demanded that petitioner and her family vacate the premises, but to no avail. Laurelia
filed an ejectment suit against petitioner before the MTC. In turn, petitioner filed a
complaint for nullification of contract and damages with prayer for a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction against Catalina,
Corazon and Laurelia before the RTC.
RTC ruled in favor of petitioner Macapagal. CA reversed the decision in favor of
Corazon and Laurelia. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale made by Corazon to Laurelia was valid.
RULING:
Yes. The sale made by Corazon to Laurelia was valid. Corazon was the
registered owner of the disputed lot at the time the two sales were executed. The owner
has the right to enjoy and to dispose the property and to exclude any person from such
enjoyment and disposal. A waiver may not be casually attributed when the terms thereof
do not explicitly and clearly prove an intent to abandon the right.
The Compromise Agreement is not a waiver of Corazon’s authority to sell
because the agreement merely provided that Catalina pay off her mortgage obligation
and incidental expenses from the proceeds of the sale. It was not expressly stated that
Catalina herself be the one to directly sell the property. Authority to sell must be
couched in clear and unmistakable language.
Article 1878 (5) of the Civil Code states that a special power of attorney is
necessary for an agent to enter into any contract by which the ownership of an
immovable property is transmitted or acquired either gratuitously or for valid
consideration. In double sales of real property, ownership passes to the vendee who, in
good faith, first recorded it in the Registry of Property. Petitioner Macapagal cannot be
considered a buyer in good faith because she did not buy the disputed lot from its
registered owner.
Corazon sold her property to mortgagor Laurelia. Although the contract did not
accurately reflect the actual purchase price of the property, it remains valid because it is
only a relative simulation which does not affect the validity of the contract but does
require its reformation. It cannot be declared null and void since it does not fall under
the category of an absolutely simulated or fictitious contract.
