THIRD DIVISION Marinduque.
At the base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and
Makalupnit rivers. It appears that Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the
[ G.R. NO. 152644, February 10, 2006 ] tunnel's end. On 24 March 1994, tailings gushed out of or near the tunnel's end. In
JOHN ERIC LONEY, STEVEN PAUL REID AND PEDRO B. HERNANDEZ, PETITIONERS, a few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had discharged millions of tons of tailings into the
VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT. Boac and Makalupnit rivers.
DECISION In August 1996, the Department of Justice separately charged petitioners in the
Municipal Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque ("MTC") with violation of Article 91(B),
[4]
sub-paragraphs 5 and 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1067 or the Water Code of the
CARPIO, J.: Philippines ("PD 1067"),[5] Section 8[6] of Presidential Decree No. 984 or the National
Pollution Control Decree of 1976 ("PD 984"), [7] Section 108[8] of Republic Act No.
7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 ("RA 7942"), [9] and Article 365[10] of the
The Case
Revised Penal Code ("RPC") for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property.[11]
This is a petition for review[1] of the Decision[2] dated 5 November 2001 and the
Resolution dated 14 March 2002 of the Court of Appeals. The 5 November 2001 Petitioners moved to quash the Informations on the following grounds: (1) the
Decision affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court, Boac, Marinduque, Branch Informations were "duplicitous" as the Department of Justice charged more than
94, in a suit to quash Informations filed against petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven one offense for a single act; (2) petitioners John Eric Loney and Steven Paul Reid
Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez ("petitioners"). The 14 March 2002 Resolution were not yet officers of Marcopper when the incident subject of the Informations
denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration. took place; and (3) the Informations contain allegations which constitute legal
excuse or justification.
The Facts
The Ruling of the MTC
Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez are the
President and Chief Executive Officer, Senior Manager, and Resident Manager for In its Joint Order of 16 January 1997 ("Joint Order"), the MTC [12] initially deferred
Mining Operations, respectively, of Marcopper Mining Corporation ("Marcopper"), a ruling on petitioners' motion for lack of "indubitable ground for the quashing of the
corporation engaged in mining in the province of Marinduque [I]nformations x x x." The MTC scheduled petitioners' arraignment in February 1997.
However, on petitioners' motion, the MTC issued a Consolidated Order on 28 April
Marcopper had been storing tailings[3] from its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian, 1997 ("Consolidated Order"), granting partial reconsideration to its Joint Order and
quashing the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. The MTC maintained
1
the Informations for violation of RA 7942 and Article 365 of the RPC. The MTC Anti-Pollution Law x x x are hereby DISMISSED or QUASHED and Criminal Case[] Nos.
held: 96-50, 96-51 and 96-52 for [v]iolation of the Philippine Mining Act are hereby
retained to be tried on the merits.
[T]he 12 Informations have common allegations of pollutants pointing to "mine
tailings" which were precipitately discharged into the Makulapnit and Boac Rivers The Information for [v]iolation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code should also
due to breach caused on the Tapian drainage/tunnel due to negligence or failure to be maintained and heard in a full blown trial because the common accusation
institute adequate measures to prevent pollution and siltation of the Makulapnit therein is reckless imprudence resulting to [sic] damage to property. It is the
and Boac River systems, the very term and condition required to be undertaken damage to property which the law punishes not the negligent act of polluting the
under the Environmental Compliance Certificate issued on April 1, 1990. water system. The prosecution for the [v]iolation of Philippine Mining Act is not a
bar to the prosecution for reckless imprudence resulting to [sic] damage to
The allegations in the informations point to same set [sic] of evidence required to property.[13]
prove the single fact of pollution constituting violation of the Water Code and the
Pollution Law which are the same set of evidence necessary to prove the same The MTC re-scheduled petitioners' arraignment on the remaining charges on 28 and
single fact of pollution, in proving the elements constituting violation of the 29 May 1997. In the hearing of 28 May 1997, petitioners manifested that they were
conditions of ECC, issued pursuant to the Philippine Mining Act. In both instances, willing to be arraigned on the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC but not
the terms and conditions of the Environmental Compliance Certificate were on the charge for violation of RA 7942 as they intended to appeal the Consolidated
allegedly violated. In other words, the same set of evidence is required in proving Order in so far as it maintained the Informations for that offense. After making of
violations of the three (3) special laws. record petitioners' manifestation, the MTC proceeded with the arraignment and
ordered the entry of "not guilty" pleas on the charges for violation of RA 7942 and
After carefully analyzing and weighing the contending arguments of the parties and Article 365 of the RPC.
after taking into consideration the applicable laws and jurisprudence, the Court is
convinced that as far as the three (3) aforesaid laws are concerned, only the Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court,
Information for [v]iolation of Philippine Mining Act should be maintained. In other Boac, Marinduque, assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order maintaining the
words, the Informations for [v]iolation of Anti-Pollution Law (PD 984) and the Water Informations for violation of RA 7942. Petitioners' petition was raffled to Branch 94.
Code (PD 1067) should be dismissed/quashed because the elements constituting the For its part, public respondent filed an ordinary appeal with the same court assailing
aforesaid violations are absorbed by the same elements which constitute violation that portion of the Consolidated Order quashing the Informations for violation of PD
of the Philippine Mining Act (RA 7942). 1067 and PD 984. Public respondent's appeal was raffled to Branch 38. On public
respondent's motion, Branch 38 ordered public respondent's appeal consolidated
Therefore, x x x Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-44, 96-45 and 96-46 for [v]iolation of the with petitioners' petition in Branch 94.
Water Code; and Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-47, 96-48 and 96-49 for [v]iolation of the
The Ruling of Branch 94
2
thru dumping of mine tailings" and (2) the duplicitous nature of the Informations
[14]
In its Resolution of 20 March 1998, Branch 94 granted public respondent's appeal contravenes the ruling in People v. Relova.[16] Petitioners further contended that
but denied petitioners' petition. Branch 94 set aside the Consolidated Order in so far since the acts complained of in the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA
as it quashed the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984 and ordered 7942 are "the very same acts complained of" in the charge for violation of Article
those charges reinstated. Branch 94 affirmed the Consolidated Order in all other 365 of the RPC, the latter absorbs the former. Hence, petitioners should only be
respects. Branch 94 held: prosecuted for violation of Article 365 of the RPC. [17]
After a careful perusal of the laws concerned, this court is of the opinion that there The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
can be no absorption by one offense of the three other offenses, as [the] acts
penalized by these laws are separate and distinct from each other. The elements of
In its Decision of 5 November 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed Branch 94's
proving each violation are not the same with each other. Concededly, the single act
of dumping mine tailings which resulted in the pollution of the Makulapnit and Boac ruling. The appellate court held:
rivers was the basis for the information[s] filed against the accused each charging a The records of the case disclose that petitioners filed a motion to quash the
distinct offense. But it is also a well-established rule in this jurisdiction that – aforementioned Informations for being duplicitous in nature. Section 3 of Rule 117
of the Revised Rules of Court specifically provides the grounds upon which an
"A single act may offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated
provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or information may be quashed. x x x
element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the
information under one does not bar prosecution under the other. x x x." x x x x
x x x x [D]uplicity of Informations is not among those included in x x x [Section 3, Rule 117].
[T]he different laws involve cannot absorb one another as the elements of each x x x x
crime are different from one another. Each of these laws require [sic] proof of an
additional fact or element which the other does not although they stemmed from a We now go to petitioners' claim that the resolution of the public respondent
contravened the doctrine laid down in People vs. Relova for being violative of their
single act.[15]
right against multiple prosecutions.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging that
Branch 94 acted with grave abuse of discretion because (1) the Informations for In the said case, the Supreme Court found the People's argument with respect to
violation of PD 1067, PD 984, RA 7942 and the Article 365 of the RPC "proceed from the variances in the mens rea of the two offenses being charged to be correct. The
and are based on a single act or incident of polluting the Boac and Makalupnit rivers Court, however, decided the case in the context of the second sentence of Article IV
3
(22) of the 1973 Constitution (now under Section 21 of Article III of the 1987 I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A R[E]VERSIBLE ERROR IN
Constitution), rather than the first sentence of the same section. x x x MAINTAINING THE CHARGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE PHILIPPINE MINING
ACT (R.A. 7942) AND REINSTATING THE CHARGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE
x x x x WATER CODE (P.D. 1067) AND POLLUTION CONTROL LAW (P.D. 984),
CONSIDERING THAT:
[T]he doctrine laid down in the Relova case does not squarely apply to the case at
Bench since the Informations filed against the petitioners are for violation of four A. THE INFORMATIONS FOR VIOLATION OF THE WATER CODE (P.D.
1067), THE POLLUTION CONTROL LAW (P.D. 984), THE PHILIPPINE
separate and distinct laws which are national in character.
MINING ACT (R.A. 7942) AND ARTICLE 365 OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE PROCEED FROM AND ARE BASED ON A SINGLE ACT OR
xxxx
INCIDENT OF POLLUTING THE BOAC AND MAKULAPNIT RIVERS
THRU DUMPING OF MINE TAILINGS.
This Court firmly agrees in the public respondent's understanding that the laws by
which the petitioners have been [charged] could not possibly absorb one another as B. THE PROSECUTION OF PETITIONERS FOR DUPLICITOUS AND
the elements of each crime are different. Each of these laws require [sic] proof of MULTIPLE CHARGES CONTRAVENES THE DOCTRINE LAID DOWN
an additional fact or element which the other does not, although they stemmed IN PEOPLE VS. RELOVA, 148 SCRA 292 [1986] THAT "AN ACCUSED
from a single act. x x x SHOULD NOT BE HARASSED BY MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS FOR
OFFENSES WHICH THOUGH DIFFERENT FROM ONE ANOTHER ARE
xxxx NONETHELESS EACH CONSTITUTED BY A COMMON SET OR
OVERLAPPING SETS OF TECHNICAL ELEMENTS."
[T]his Court finds that there is not even the slightest indicia of evidence that would
give rise to any suspicion that public respondent acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in reversing the Municipal Trial
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT
Court's quashal of the Informations against the petitioners for violation of P.D. 1067
THE ELEMENT OF LACK OF NECESSARY OR ADEQUATE PRECAUTION,
and P.D. 984. This Court equally finds no error in the trial court's denial of the
NEGLIGENCE, RECKLESSNESS AND IMPRUDENCE UNDER ARTICLE 356 [sic]
petitioner's motion to quash R.A. 7942 and Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. [18]
OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE AMBIT OF ANY
Petitioners sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied their motion in OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE WATER CODE,
its Resolution of 14 March 2002. POLLUTION CONTROL LAW AND PHILIPPINE MINING ACT CHARGED
AGAINST PETITIONERS[.][19]
Petitioners raise the following alleged errors of the Court of Appeals:
The Issues
4
The petition raises these issues: Under Section 3(e), Rule 117[22] of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, duplicity of
offenses in a single information is a ground to quash the Information. The Rules
prohibit the filing of such Information to avoid confusing the accused in preparing
(1) Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be his defense.[23] Here, however, the prosecution charged each petitioner with four
quashed for duplicity of charges and only the charge for Reckless offenses, with each Information charging only one offense. Thus, petitioners
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property should stand; and erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the Informations. On
this score alone, the petition deserves outright denial.
The Filing of Several Charges is Proper
(2) Whether Branch 94's ruling, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
contravenes People v. Relova.
Petitioners contend that they should be charged with one offense only — Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property — because (1) all the charges filed
The Ruling of the Court against them "proceed from and are based on a single act or incident of polluting
the Boac and Makalupnit rivers thru dumping of mine tailings" and (2) the charge
for violation of Article 365 of the RPC "absorbs" the other charges since the element
The petition has no merit. of "ack of necessary or adequate protection, negligence, recklessness and
imprudence" is common among them.
No Duplicity of Charges in the Present Case
The contention has no merit.
Duplicity of charges simply means a single complaint or information charges more
than one offense, as Section 13 of Rule 110 [20] of the 1985 Rules of Criminal As early as the start of the last century, this Court had ruled that a single act or
Procedure clearly states: incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions
of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than one offense.
Duplicity of offense. – A complaint or information must charge but one offense, [24]
The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be
except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for twice put in jeopardy of punishment for "the same offense."[25] In People v.
various offenses. Doriquez,[26] we held that two (or more) offenses arising from the same act are not
"the same" —
In short, there is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information
charges more than one offense.[21]
5
x x x if one provision [of law] requires proof of an additional fact or element which In R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act), the additional fact that must be established is
the other does not, x x x. Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the willful violation and gross neglect on the part of the accused to abide by the
the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to terms and conditions of the Environmental Compliance Certificate, particularly that
a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each the Marcopper should ensure the containment of run-off and silt materials from
crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other. reaching the Mogpog and Boac Rivers. If there was no violation or neglect, and that
[27]
(Emphasis supplied) the accused satisfactorily proved [sic] that Marcopper had done everything to
ensure containment of the run-off and silt materials, they will not be liable. It does
Here, double jeopardy is not at issue because not all of its elements are present.
[28]
not follow, however, that they cannot be prosecuted under the Water Code, Anti-
However, for the limited purpose of controverting petitioners' claim that they Pollution Law and the Revised Penal Code because violation of the Environmental
should be charged with one offense only, we quote with approval Branch 94's Compliance Certificate is not an essential element of these laws.
comparative analysis of PD 1067, PD 984, RA 7942, and Article 365 of the RPC
showing that in each of these laws on which petitioners were charged, there is one On the other hand, the additional element that must be established in Art. 365 of
essential element not required of the others, thus: the Revised Penal Code is the lack of necessary or adequate precaution, negligence,
In P.D. 1067 (Philippines Water Code), the additional element to be established is recklessness and imprudence on the part of the accused to prevent damage to
the dumping of mine tailings into the Makulapnit River and the entire Boac River property. This element is not required under the previous laws. Unquestionably, it
System without prior permit from the authorities concerned. The gravamen of the is different from dumping of mine tailings without permit, or causing pollution to
offense here is the absence of the proper permit to dump said mine tailings. This the Boac river system, much more from violation or neglect to abide by the terms of
element is not indispensable in the prosecution for violation of PD 984 (Anti- the Environmental Compliance Certificate. Moreover, the offenses punished by
Pollution Law), [RA] 7942 (Philippine Mining Act) and Art. 365 of the Revised Penal special law are mal[a] prohibita in contrast with those punished by the Revised
Code. One can be validly prosecuted for violating the Water Code even in the Penal Code which are mala in se.[29]
absence of actual pollution, or even [if] it has complied with the terms of its Consequently, the filing of the multiple charges against petitioners, although based
Environmental Compliance Certificate, or further, even [if] it did take the necessary on the same incident, is consistent with settled doctrine.
precautions to prevent damage to property.
On petitioners' claim that the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC
In P.D. 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), the additional fact that must be proved is the "absorbs" the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942, suffice it to say
existence of actual pollution. The gravamen is the pollution itself. In the absence of that a mala in se felony (such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
any pollution, the accused must be exonerated under this law although there was Property) cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes (such as those violating PD 1067, PD
unauthorized dumping of mine tailings or lack of precaution on its part to prevent 984, and RA 7942). What makes the former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or
damage to property.
6
negligence (culpa); what makes the latter crimes are the special laws enacting second offense is not necessarily included in the offense charged in the first
them. information."
People v. Relova not in Point The above argument[ ] made by the petitioner [is] of course correct. This is clear
both from the express terms of the constitutional provision involved – which reads
Petitioners reiterate their contention in the Court of Appeals that their prosecution as follows:
contravenes this Court's ruling in People v. Relova. In particular, petitioners cite the
Court's statement in Relova that the law seeks to prevent harassment of the "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an
accused by "multiple prosecutions for offenses which though different from one act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act." x x x
technical elements."
and from our case law on this point. The basic difficulty with the petitioner's
This contention is also without merit. position is that it must be examined, not under the terms of the first sentence of
Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution, but rather under the second sentence of
The issue in Relova is whether the act of the Batangas Acting City Fiscal in charging the same section. The first sentence of Article IV (22) sets forth the general rule: the
one Manuel Opulencia ("Opulencia") with theft of electric power under the RPC, constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available where the second
after the latter had been acquitted of violating a City Ordinance penalizing the prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or
unauthorized installation of electrical wiring, violated Opulencia's right against prior prosecution, although both the first and second offenses may be based upon
double jeopardy. We held that it did, not because the offenses punished by those the same act or set of acts. The second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an
two laws were the same but because the act giving rise to the charges was punished exception to the general proposition: the constitutional protection, against double
by an ordinance and a national statute, thus falling within the proscription against jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be
multiple prosecutions for the same act under the second sentence in Section 22, different from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, now Section 21, Article III of the 1987 the Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or
Constitution. We held: set of acts. x x x[30] (Italicization in the original; boldfacing supplied)
Thus, Relova is no authority for petitioners' claim against multiple prosecutions
The petitioner concludes that: based on a single act not only because the question of double jeopardy is not at
"The unauthorized installation punished by the ordinance [of Batangas City] is not issue here, but also because, as the Court of Appeals held, petitioners are being
the same as theft of electricity [under the Revised Penal Code]; that the second prosecuted for an act or incident punished by four national statutes and not by an
offense is not an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof and that the ordinance and a national statute. In short, petitioners, if ever, fall under the first
7
sentence of Section 21, Article III which prohibits multiple prosecution for the same
offense, and not, as in Relova, for offenses arising from the same incident.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 5 November
2001 and the Resolution dated 14 March 2002 of the Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.
