Channeling Black Insurgency: Elite Patronage and Professional Social Movement

Organizations in the Development of the Black Movement

Author(s): J. Craig Jenkins and Craig M. Eckert
Source: American Sociological Review, Vol. 51, No. 6 (Dec., 1986), pp. 812-829
Published by: American Sociological Association
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2095369
Accessed: 27-08-2020 23:21 UTC

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms

American Sociological Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and

extend access to American Sociological Review

This content downloaded from 132.174.250.76 on Thu, 27 Aug 2020 23:21:25 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 CHANNELING BLACK INSURGENCY:
ELITE PATRONAGE AND PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENT
ORGANIZATIONS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE BLACK MOVEMENT*

J. CRAIG JENKINS CRAIG M. ECKERT

Ohio State University University of Eastern Illinois

This paper critically evaluates the theory of patronage and professional social'
movement organizations (SMOs) advanced by McCarthy and Zald (1973, 1975, 1977)
and the social control theory advanced by their critics (McAdam, 1982; Wilson, 1983;
Haines 1984a, 1984b) in interpreting the development of black insurgency. Drawing
on time-series analysis of the patronage of private foundations, structural facilitators,
and the changing goals, organization and forms of black insurgency between
1953-1980, we find support for the social control theory insofar as: 1) the black
movement was an indigenous challenge with professional SMOs playing a secondary
role; 2) elite patronage was reactive and directed at moderate classical SMOs and
professional SMOs; 3) this patronage professionalized the movement, strengthening the
staff in classical SMOs and creating new professional SMOs; and 4) these processes
did not generate movement growth and may have accelerated movement decay. Yet,
contrary to the social control theory, we also found that: 1) movement decay had
multiple sources, professionalization being secondary to partial success and strategic
problems; and 2) professionalization may have weakened the challenge but did not
transform movement goals or tactics. "Channeling " may be a more apt metaphor than
"control" for analyzing the effects of patronage and professionalization on social
movement development.

Resource mobilization theory has rejuvenated derivative, stemming from the mobilization of
the study of social movements, providing new classical or indigenous movements and elite
insights into their emergence, organization and attempts to control the turbulence of these
outcomes. In their provocative formulation, challenges (Perrow 1979; McAdam 1982;
McCarthy and Zald (1973, 1975, 1977) argued Wilson 1983; Jenkins 1983). Others argued
that the general upsurge of social protest during that patronage professionalized the SMOs and
the 1960s and early 1970s was due to the rise of channeled them toward moderate goals and
a new form of social movement organization: institutionalized tactics, diffusing the possibili-
the professional social movement organization. ties of radical dissent (Piven and Cloward 1977;
In contrast with "classical" or mass-based Helfgot 1981; McAdam 1982; Haines 1984a,
SMOs, professional SMOs had outside leaders, 1984b; Marger 1984). Yet others were gener-
full-time paid staff, non-existent or "paper" ally supportive of the McCarthy-Zald theory.
memberships, mobilized their resources from Some argued that disorganized powerless groups,
external or "conscience" constituencies, and such as consumers, the general public, the poor
attempted to "speak for" rather than mobilize and children, would otherwise be unrepresented
direct beneficiaries. Almost immediately this (Lipsky 1971; Bailis 1974; Berry 1977;
interpretation of the new social movements Vogel 1978; Mitchell 1985). Others pointed to
came under attack. Critics argued that external the technical functions of professional SMOs in
support and the new professional SMOs were legal advocacy and policy research (Carden
1977; Gelb and Palley 1982). And, most
significant, several argued that favorable elite
* Direct all correspondence to J. Craig Jenkins, Dept. intervention was essential for social movement
of Sociology, 300 Bricker Hall, 190 North Oval Mall, success, providing the legitimacy and leverage
Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210. for critical victories (Jenkins and Perrow 1977;
The research for this paper was supported by the Aveni 1978; Barkan 1984).
National Endowment for the Humanities (RS-001 19-79- This discussion remains inconclusive. The
1315), the Russell Sage Foundation and the Program on
critics (McAdam 1982; Haines 1984a, 1984b)
Non-Profit Organizations, Yale University. David Ross
have focused largely on the origins and impact
provided invaluable research assistance and Doug
McAdam and Bill Kelly generously provided some of the
of elite patronage, missing the central concern in
time-series data. We also benefitted greatly by the the McCarthy-Zald theory: the rise and impact
comments of Paul DiMaggio, Mayer Zald, and two of the professional SMOs. Nor have these critics
anonymous referees of the ASR. distinguished between two versions of the social

812 American Sociological Review, 1986, Vol. 51 (December:812-829)

This content downloaded from 132.174.250.76 on Thu, 27 Aug 2020 23:21:25 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 CHANNELING BLACK INSURGENCY 813

control thesis: control as the intention of patrons "professionalization of reform," McCarthy and
vs. control as the consequence of patronage. Zald advanced on entrepreneurial/structural fa-
Meanwhile, the students of the professional cilitation interpretation of the rise of this new
SMOs (Berry 1977; Vogel 1978; Pertchuk form of SMO. Professional SMOs emerged
1982) have largely ignored the social control because of an expanding supply of resources,
argument. And, while we have rich case studies chiefly political entrepreneurs and discretionary
of organizational transformation (Helfgot 1981; resources. The growth of the welfare state
Marger 1984), no one has assessed the impact created favorable niches for a growing cadre of
of professionalization on an entire social move- critical intellectuals advocating the extension of
ment. There are also methodological problems. social welfare programs for the poor and
No one has fully tapped the complex range of excluded. Professionalization and the expansion
motives and interests that enter into patronage of higher education created a growing pool of
for social movements. And most of these studies transitory activists with discretionary time-
have not dealt with temporal processes, relying schedules and income. Economic affluence
instead on cross-sectional data. provided social welfare organizations such as
We attempt to fill these gaps by offering a foundations, universities, churches and govern-
systematic analysis of the role of elite patronage ment agencies with discretionary resources to
and professional SMOs in the rise and develop- invest in professional SMOs. A permeable mass
ment of the black movement. In making this media and new mobilization techniques such as
application, we assume that the McCarthy-Zald direct-mail fundraising and grassroots lobbying
theory should encompass post-WW II black gave these entrepreneurs new tools to publicize
insurgency. Unfortunately, McCarthy and Zald ideal-real gaps and mobilize otherwise dispersed
never clearly specified the particular movements sympathizers.
to which their theory applied, asserting simply Although aware that support for professional
that: "The professional social movement is the SMOs might "diffus(e) the radical possibilities
common form of recent social movements" of dissent . . . by applying large amounts of
(1973, p. 20, emphasis added). Although it is resources . . . in ameliorative directions"
possible that the black movement was atypical (1973, p. 26), McCarthy and Zald's general
of the 1960s/70s movements, it spawned a wide emphasis upon resources implied that profes-
range of movement activity and probably was sional SMOs would contribute to social move-
the most successful challenge of the stormy ment development. Although issue-attention
sixties. Any theory purporting to provide a cycles might create instability for specific
general interpretation of the social movements SMOs, the professional SMOs would flourish as
of the 1960s/70s should be able to interpret the long as the structural supply of entrepreneurs
central movement of this period. and discretionary resources persisted.
The McCarthy-Zald theory, then, rested on
five major propositions. (1) The historical tend
ELITE PATRONAGE AND THE THEORY
is towards the dominance of professional SMOs.
OF PROFESSIONAL SMOS
The new social movements of the 1960s/70s
The crux of McCarthy and Zald's theory is the were centered around professional SMOs which,
contrast between "classical" or indigenous in turn, were the major actors behind the general
SMOs mobilizing resources from direct benefi- wave of social protests. (2) The primary motive
ciaries, and professional SMOs "which direct or interest behind the patronage of outsiders was
resource appeals primarily toward conscience that of "conscience" or philanthropic concern
adherents and utilize few constituents for about the plight of the deprived. Direct or
organizational labor" (McCarthy and Zald particularistic interests such as social control
1977, p. 1223). Classical SMOs depend largely were not primary concerns. (3) Patronage
on the volunteer labor of direct beneficiaries; contributed to social movement development,
professional SMOs, on cadre activities sup- launching new professional SMOs and furnish-
ported by outside donations. 1 ing technical resources. (4) This "bureaucratiza-
Drawing on entrepreneurial theories of orga- tion of social discontent" stemmed from
nizational formation (Olson 1965; Salisbury facilitative structural trends (the growth of the
1969) and Moynihan's (1969) thesis of a welfare state, professionalization, accessible
mass media and increasing discretionary re-
sources) and the efforts of the new political
1 We use McCarthy and Zald's inclusive definition of
entrepreneurs. (5) The professional SMOs had a
a social movement as "a set of opinions and beliefs in a
net beneficial impact on social movement
population which represents preferences for changing
some element of the social structure and/or reward development, performing critical technical func-
distribution of a society" (1977, pp. 1217-18). SMOs, tions and insuring the "representation of the
then, are formal organizations attempting to realize these unrepresented. "
goals. Each of these theses has come under critical

This content downloaded from 132.174.250.76 on Thu, 27 Aug 2020 23:21:25 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 814 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

challenge (see Table 1). The major controversy white liberal sympathizers of the civil rights
has centered on the trend argument. The critics movement and Lipsky's (1971) theory of protest
argued that the new social movements were to argue that patronage stemmed from universal-
indigenous challenges organized around classi- istic public-regarding values or "conscience"
cal SMOs. Morris (1981, 1984) and McAdam pricked by images of social injustice. Con-
(1982) argued that the civil rights movement science constituents were outsiders or third
was launched by indigenous leadership and parties who "did not stand to benefit directly
primarily mobilized the southern black commu- from (the movement's) success" (McCarthy and
nity. Jenkins (1983; forthcoming) generalized Zald 1977, p. 1222). In contrast, McAdam
the argument to the entire wave of new argued that social control was the paramount
movements. Although professional SMOs like consideration for external support: "elite involve-
the NAACP-Legal Defense Fund and the ment would seem to occur only as a response to
Environmental Defense Fund did become more the threat posed by the generation of a
prominent, these SMOs were neither central mass-based social movement" (1982, p. 26). In
initiators nor the major organizational vehicles support of this contention, the critics could point
for the challenges. While professional cadres to notable cases, such as the Kennedy
supported by patrons were critical in initiating administration's solicitation of foundation spon-
the student and women's movements, they sorship for the voter registration campaigns
quickly turned towards indigenous organizing (Meier and Rudwick 1973, pp. 172-76), which
(Sale 1973; Carden 1974; Freeman 1975). was explicitly aimed at channeling disruptive
Several professional SMOs were also created in "direct actions" into more institutionalized
later stages of movement development as actions.
specialized staff auxiliaries of classical SMOs Inferring the interests behind patronage is,
(Costain 1981; Kleidman 1984). In fact, the however, hazardous. Since most patronage is
strongest case for the initiatory role of profes- probably reactive to movement actions, we
sional SMOs has been in movements pursuing cannot rely (as McAdam [1982] did) solely on
collective goods for the general public lacking a its timing. At the same time, open declarations
natural community basis for mobilization, such of intent, typically framed in philanthropic
as consumer rights and environmental protection terms, are inherently suspect. Haines' (1984a,
(in which, strictly speaking, there is no 1984b) solution was to analyze the types of
conscience constituency; all citizens are purport- patrons and the goals of sponsored organiza-
edly direct beneficiaries), and challenges advanc- tions, showing that elite patrons (private
ing the interests of the most disorganized and foundations and government agencies) sup-
deprived groups (e.g. the Citizens Crusade ported the moderate civil right organizations in
Against Poverty and the Children's Defense response to the "radical flank" threat of the
Fund). militants, while non-elites (churches, unions and
The second point of contention has been the small individual donors) spread their support
interests behind social movement patronage, evenly. Yet Haines did not specifically single
especially that of elites. McCarthy and Zald out the professional SMOs for analysis. Nor did
borrowed on Harrington's (1968) portrait of the he provide direct evidence on the motives of

Table 1. Main Theses on Patronage and Professional SMOs

Dimensions McCarthy & Zald Their Critics

1. The modal organization of the Professional SMOs Indigenous movements w/classical

1960s/70s movements: SMOs
2. The sources of patronage: Conscience and discretionary Social control
resources
3. The impact of patronage: Promotion of social movement Professionalization and channeling
growth towards moderate goals & institu-
tional tactics
4. Sources of the emergence of Structural facilitation Political instability created by
professional SMOs: Entrepreneurship indigenous movements
a. radicalization
b. unruliness
5. The impact of professional SMOs Favorable: Unfavorable:
a. technical functions a. moderate goals
b. represent the unrepresented b. institutional tactics
c. movement growth c. movement decay

This content downloaded from 132.174.250.76 on Thu, 27 Aug 2020 23:21:25 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 CHANNELING BLACK INSURGENCY 815

patrons. Although we rely primarily upon the the political interest system in a neo-corporatist
same method here, namely, the timing and direction.
distribution of patronage, it is important to The final2 point of contention has been the
recognize the indirect nature of this evidence as emergence of the professional SMOs. Although
a basis for imputing motives. In line with this all agree that patronage and entrepreneurship are
social control argument, we would expect the critical to the emergence of professional SMOs,
primary recipients of elite patronage to be the critics have challenged the McCarthy and
professional SMOs, with secondary support Zald thesis by advancing a political interpreta-
going to classical SMOs with moderate goals tion of patronage. The rise of indigenous
and institutionalized tactics. If elites are prima- movements generates political pressures that
rily concerned with social control, this patron- threaten elites, thereby giving rise to sponsor-
age should be stimulated by rapid growth in ship for professional SMOs (McAdam 1982).
unruliness and radical demands. Finally, we Or, in a more benign formulation, indigenous
should also entertain the possibility that patrons movements create professional SMOs as tempo-
have multiple or complex interests. The Kennedy rary organizational fronts to perform specialized
administration's interventions on behalf of the technical and coalitional functions (Kleidman
civil rights movement were rooted in at least 1984). At critical junctures, elites invest in these
two concerns: controlling volatile protests, and projects to reestablish political stability.
securing black votes. Non-elite concerns have
been even more complex. Jewish support for the
THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE
civil rights movement reflected both universalis-
BLACK MOVEMENT
tic concerns about civil liberties and particular-
istic concerns about racial discrimination (Pinckney The bus boycotts in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, in
1968; Marx and Useem 1971). The United Auto June 1953 and Montgomery, Alabama, in
Worker Union's sponsored civil rights activists, 1955-56 were the opening moves in the
SDS and the National Organization for Women development of the first sustained challenge to
out of the staff's ideological commitments as white supremacy in the South since the
well as a political stake in the left-labor political installation of Jim Crow in the late 19th century
coalition. (Sitkoff 1981; McAdam 1982, ch. 5; Morris
How has elite patronage shaped social move- 1984, ch. 2). Over the next five years, the black
ment development? Although McCarthy and insurgency spread rapidly throughout the South,
Zald recognized the possibility of social control setting off consumer boycotts and attempts to
effects, their general emphasis on resources is capitalize on the Brown vs. the Board of
suggested. The critics have raised three major Education victory. Throughout, indigenous sup-
points. First, patronage may be detrimental to port was central, patronage minimal, and the
the indigenous mobilization of classical SMOs. professional SMOs played a secondary support
McAdam (1982, pp. 167-68) argued that elite role. "Local movement centers" (Morris 1981)
support for the civil rights movement diverted furnished the major impetus: an informal
leaders from indigenous organizing and exacer- network of local churches, student groups and
bated inter-organizational rivalries, thereby pro- black social clubs.
moting movement decay (see also Marger The second phase began on February 1, 1960
1985). Second, elites will restructure profes- with a student sit-in at a Woolworth's lunch
sional SMOs that become embroiled in protest. counter in Greensboro, North Carolina, sparking
Helfgot's (1981) analysis of the Mobilization for a lightning wave of sit-ins that spread through-
Youth Project on New York's Lower East Side out the South, and culminated in the violently-
attacked freedom rides and the multi-faceted
and Rose's (1976) assessment of the Commu-
mass action campaigns in Albany, Georgia,
nity Action Projects showed that elite sponsors
Birmingham and Selma, Alabama, the March
transformed professional SMOs into innocuous
on Washington in April 1963, and the Missis-
service agencies as soon as they moved towards
sippi Freedom campaign in the summer of 1964.
indigenous organizing. Third, and most broadly,
These campaigns eventually cracked the Jim
several critics have argued that elite sponsorship
Crow system, pressuring federal courts to
of professional SMOs has restructured the
desegregate public facilities and inter-state
general system for representing political inter- transportation and Congress to pass the Civil
ests (Wolfe 1977, pp. 148-49; Handler 1978; Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965. By 1964,
and Wilson 1983). Although the U.S. is a
relatively unfavorable context for a fully devel-
oped neo-corporatist system, sustained elite-
2 Mitchell (1985) levelled a fourth criticism, chall
sponsorship of professional SMOs does provide ing the thesis of an "issue attention cycle" by pointing to
control over the representation of excluded and the stable funding of the major environmental organiza-
marginal groups, and might be seen as moving tions by isolated adherents.

This content downloaded from 132.174.250.76 on Thu, 27 Aug 2020 23:21:25 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 816 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

insurgency spread into the small town backwa- conquest of political and economic power. This
ters of the deep South with voter registration new "northern strategy," however, presented
campaigns, the launching of the Mississippi major mobilization obstacles. The black urban
Freedom Democratic Party and, in response to underclass possessed much weaker community
white economic retaliation, a new set of institutions. Any serious attack on black power-
community economic development projects such lessness ultimately required a comprehensive
as the Mississippi Quilting Coop and the redistribution of social power, and hence
Federation of Southern Cooperatives. White required a sustained attack on the most powerful
patronage came in several forms, from founda- and entrenched institutions in the nation-the
tion support of the Voter Education Project, large corporations, the national political parties,
small direct-mail donations, to a massive influx the big city urban machines, and, not least; the
of white clergy and student volunteers. While white majority.
this outpouring grew steadily, the movement The strategic shift also weakened the major
remained indigenous, restructuring around the SMOs. The "direct action" cadre or organiza-
classical SMOs: the SCLC, NAACP, CORE tions-CORE and the SNCC-were the most
and SNCC.3 Professional SMOs, most notably seriously affected, shrinking into small cliques
the NAACP-Legal Defense and Education Fund of dedicated militants. Adopting a black nation-
and the Southern Regional Council, provided alist rhetoric, the leadership purged whites from
legal representation and negotiated with south- the professional staff and spurned patronage,
ern elites. Yet the impetus remained in the precipitating an organizational collapse (Meier
hands of the indigenous groups and classical and Rudwick 1973; Carson 1981). Although
SMOs, professional SMOs playing a strictly the SCLC persisted, the Chicago campaigns of
supportive role. 1967 failed to generate clear victories, King's
These struggles also marked the movement's outspoken criticisms of the Vietnam war alien-
apogee. While the movement's decline had ated former white patrons and, after King's
multiple sources, virtually all observers agree assassination, the organization atrophied amid
that three interrelated developments were criti- internal disputes (Oates 1981). In the NAACP,
cal: partial victories that demobilized the a rump caucus of dissident students and adult
moderates; the militant's shift to a new chapter leaders disrupted the 1968 convention,
"northern strategy"; and a white backlash that pressing for a shift from litigation to "direct
created a restrictive political environment. action" and a focus on the black underclass
The passage of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 (Rudwick and Meier 1970). Shortly afterwards,
and 1965 provided the moderate wing of the dissident staff in the NAACP-Legal Defense
movement with major victories, signalling that Fund were forced to resign after protesting the
the black civil rights would now be protected by constraints of working through the courts.4 Yet,
the federal government. For many of the as we see, the moderate SMOs emerged with
moderates, insurgency was no longer necessary vastly expanded organizational resources, largely
and, in fact, might prove counter-productive by attributable to a major increase in elite patronage
provoking a white backlash. In this view, the and political recognition (Aveni 1978; Haines
movement should shift "from protest to poli- 1984a).
tics" (Rustin 1965) by focusing on the Militancy and radical demands also provoked
implementation of these gains and using institu- a political backlash, eventually culminating in a
tional tactics, especially Congressional lobbying restrictive political environment that discour-
and electoral support of the Democratic Party. aged insurgency. Former allies backed away and
Simultaneously, militant leaders adopted a the federal government launched a campaign of
new "northern strategy," redefining the social repression, ranging from the violent suppression
base of the movement as the black underclass of of the urban riots to the infiltration and sabotage
the northern ghettoes and the major target as the of the COINTEL and Operation Chaos Pro-
"tangled web of urban racism." In place of grams (Marx 1979). By the end of the decade,
non-violent "direct actions" carried out by the political environment had become restric-
disciplined cadres, the militants advocated mass tive.
protests, the spread of the urban riots and Despite the decline, the movement succeeded
occasional urban guerilla activity. By adopting in institutionalizing significant gains during the
the rhetoric of "black power," these leaders early 1970s. Blacks became an important voter
signalled their shift from integration and civil bloc, participating at higher rates than whites of
rights goals to black nationalism and the the same socioeconomic status and the number
of black office holders rose rapidly (Orum 1966;
Lawson 1976). Although the socioeconomic
3 We have treated CORE and SNCC as classical SMOs
despite their reliance on cadre labor and external support
because they relied primarily on indigenous support. 4 January 13, 1969, New York Times.

This content downloaded from 132.174.250.76 on Thu, 27 Aug 2020 23:21:25 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 CHANNELING BLACK INSURGENCY 817

gap between blacks and whites remained 1953-80 broken down by type and name of
glaringly wide, significant progress against the SMO; and 4) indicators of McCarthy-Zald's
most overt forms of racial discrimination in structural facilitation and entrepreneurial fac-
education and employment gradually became tors. The major propositions can be evaluated by
evident (Farley 1977; Burstein 1985). Paradox- simply inspecting annualized time-series on
ically, these incremental gains may well have these dimensions. Where the precise temporal
accelerated the insurgent decline, encouraging development is central, we used correlation
moderates to believe that insider methods would techniques with time-lags. If, for example,
be more effective. McCarthy and Zald are correct that patronage
What role, then, did elite patronage and stimulated movement growth, this should be
professional SMOs play in these processes? Past evident from the lead of patronage over
researchers (McAdam 1982; Haines 1984a, movement actions. Or if the critics are correct
1984b) have shown that elite patrons invested that the threat of indigenous protest spurred the
overwhelmingly in the moderate SMOs, strength- growth in patronage, the reverse should hold.
ening their technical capacities. Since the staff Similarly, if professional SMOs were the
was primarily involved in litigation, lobbying by-product of elite patronage, patronage should
and policy research, this should have strength- lead actions of professional SMOs.
ened the focus on institutionalized tactics. A We constructed the major data series by
new series of professional SMOs also blos- content analysis. The movement action series
somed: Kenneth Clark's Metropolitan Research rested on content analysis of the abstracts of
Corporation (MARC); the Joint Center for news stories recorded in The New York Times
Political Studies; Suburban Action; the Martin Annual Index.5 Only movement-initiated events
Luther King Center; the Interreligious Founda- were coded. In other words, movement reac-
tion for Community Organization; and the tions to the controls of local police or courts
National Urban Coalition. The political impact were not coded unless the movement responded
of these new professional SMOs, however, proactively. Each event was coded in terms of
remains unanalyzed. In fact, aside from Burstein the organization of the acting unit and the major
(1985), there has been little research on the issue involved. We distinguished five types of
black movement during the 1970s, the period in actors: individuals unaffiliated with formal
which the facilitation of the social control movement groups; crowds; local community
effects of patronage and professional SMOs organizations (church and student groups, local
should have become fully visible. chapters of national groups and ad-hoc groups);
classical SMOs; and professional SMOs. We
METHOD AND DATA included proto-movement groups, such as the
Congressional Black Caucus and the Black
The major arguments about the rise and impact Catholics Association as professional SMOs,
of elite patronage and the professional SMOs although their status is inherently ambiguous.
center on historical changes in the relationships Our primary concerns in defining a movement
between the movement actors and their patrons. group were that it not be an institutionalized
What roles did indigenous groups, classical political actor and its goals concur with the
SMOs and professional SMOs play in the rise general objectives of the black struggle. In this
of the movement? What spurred the growth in sense, the proto-movement groups should be
elite patronage? What kinds of SMOs were the viewed as part of the black struggle and their
primary recipients? What SMOs received closest organizational surrogate is the profes-
patronage during the decline? What role did sional SMOs. Our primary contrast is between
different actors play in the decay of the indigenous groups (the first four categories) and
movement? In short, we need to know the role the professional SMOs. Although cadre organi-
of these actors in the different phases of the zations like CORE and SNCC might appear
black movement: the rise of the movement ambiguous since they initially depended on
(1953-1960); the period of organizational expan- cadre labor, we have treated them as classical
sion and mass mobilization (1961-65); the shift SMOs because their primary mobilization focus
in strategy and early decline (1966-70); and the for the study period was the black community.
period in which social control effects should In coding issues, we emphasized the strategic
have become evident (1971-1980).
To answer these questions, we constructed
four sets of annualized time-series: 1) the trends I Doug McAdam (1982, 1984) generously provided
counts of movement actions for 1947-1970 from his
in movement actions, specifically the incidence,
research. We coded 1971-80 following his basic coding
goals, organization and tactics of black move-
format. An inter-coder reliability cut-off of 90%
ment actors during 1948-80; 2) the incidence of agreement between independent coders was used for both
black urban riots; 3) the trends in foundation series. McAdam used naive coders; we coded the
grants supporting the civil rights movement for remaining years.

This content downloaded from 132.174.250.76 on Thu, 27 Aug 2020 23:21:25 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 818 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

shift from the integration struggle to the attack interpreting the kinds of processes with which
on black powerlessness by distinguishing: 1) we are concerned, this adds additional confi-
demands for integration (public accommoda- dence to our series. The New York Times
tions, schools, and housing); 2) demands for coverage was also compared against other
black power, ranging from voting rights and newspapers and proved a more comprehensive
affirmative action to black nationalism; 3) source of news reportage.
contests against white racism, including police Our second series charts the incidence of
brutality and lack of due process; 4) scoring the black urban riots. We used the series compiled
general plight of black Americans; and 5) by Isaac and Kelly (1981, 1983) by supplement-
internal dissent.6 ing the Lemberg Center files with the reportage
There are, of course, methodological limita- of The New York Times and various regional
tions to newspaper-derived collective action newspapers.7 The reliability should be quite
data. As critics have pointed out (Molotch and high, greater than for the general movement
Lester 1974; Danzger 1975; Snyder and Kelly action series since the events are "hard" and the
1977), news reportage does not perfectly series constructed from the cross-checking of
"mirror" social reality. Reporters have their multiple news sources.
own interpretive frames. There is an "issue- The most significant and politically intriguing
attention" cycle by which events seen at one form of elite patronage has been the grants of
point as highly newsworthy are later redefined private foundations going to social movement
as insignificant. Yet we think that the content projects (cf. Goulden 1971; Nielsen 1972;
analysis of newspapers provides an adequate Filer Commission 1977; Mclhlany 1980; Silk
map of the macro-processes of social movement and Silk 1980, ch. 4). As part of a broader
development (Gurr, 1972). Significantly, we study of foundation support for social move-
code events, not the interpretations of these ments (Jenkins 1985a), we content analyzed the
events. In other words, we are not concerned annual grants of 142 private foundations that
with the coloration or interpretations put on contributed to social movement efforts during
movement events by the reporters or their the years 1953-80. We constructed the sample
placement in the newspaper. What is important of foundations from the directory of the National
is that the events occurred and can be reliably Network of Grant Makers (Shellow 1981), a
coded. The major methodological concern, consortium of foundations promoting social
then, is the representativeness of the coverage. change philanthropy, and extensive snowball
Although Danzger (1975) has documented a interviewing by the senior author. We content
bias in news-derived data towards locations with analyzed the annual reports and, where unavail-
news wire offices and variable sensitivity to able, the IRS 990 forms for these foundations,
different types of events, we think this problem searching for SMOs and their church and social
relatively minor given our purposes. As he agency allies. The annual reports provided
noted, there is an automatic corrective process ample description of grants to code the type of
built into the competition among the news recipient organization and its objectives. As a
services. Once a movement has become politi- further reliability check, we constructed a
cally significant, its actions will be covered. In master index of SMOs from The Encyclopedia
other words, we should expect some underreport-of Associations, Public Citizens' Directory of
age during the initial "take-off" of the Public Interest Organizations, the Council on
movement and the tail of its decline. In Economic Priorities' Public Interest Directory
addition, we would expect professional SMOs and the Public Affairs Council's Public Interest
to be more adept at manipulating the media Profiles.
since this is central to their mobilization. If Foundation grants to social movements were
anything, these two biases should work against coded in terms of: 1) the major social
the conclusions that we draw below about the constituency targeted; 2) the type of organiza-
indigenous bases of the movement and the role tion; and 3) the major issues involved in the
of professionalization in movement decay by movement project. Although the full study deals
overstating the role of professional SMOs. In with twenty-three movement constituencies, the
addition, Snyder and Kelly (1977) demonstrated following analysis is restricted to grants directed
that "hard" events, like national conferences, at black Americans, which represented 17.4
marches and riots, are reliably covered, while percent of the total amount of the grants and 18
"soft" events, like occasional speeches and percent of the grant items. Recipient organiza-
internal disputes, receive less consistent cover- tions were coded as classical SMOs, profes-
age. Insofar as the former are more central in

7 William Kelly generously provided the annualized

6 We tried to code the rise of black separatism
riotbut
series from his research with Larry Isaac (1981,
found it impossible to reliably identify. 1983).

This content downloaded from 132.174.250.76 on Thu, 27 Aug 2020 23:21:25 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 CHANNELING BLACK INSURGENCY 819

sional SMOs, or institutionalized actors such as upsurge. And, extending Haines' (1984a, 1984b)
churches and social agencies. Since one of our observations, patronage was largely directed at
major objectives was to test the McCarthy-Zald the moderate classical SMOs, especially the
thesis that foundation patronage initiated the NAACP, and the professional SMOs. Although
new movements, we annualized all grants in this does not prove that the motives were social
which fiscal years departed from calendar years control, it does conform to the critics' prediction
by classifying them as the earlier year. In other of a reactive response directed at moderate and
words, grants reported in a June 1979-July 1980 professional SMOs. Private foundations are,
fiscal year were recorded as 1979 grants. In that after all, institutionalized agencies of the
way, the McCarthy-Zald theory, of which we capitalist class and, as such, will generally be
were a priori skeptical, received the benefit of politically cautious in their support for social
the doubt. To correct for inflation, we adjusted reform. At the minimum, their conscience
all financial estimates by a consumer-price donations will typically be socially circum-
index deflator. All reported financial figures are scribed by their class interests in political
based on these deflated estimates. stability and the preservation of capitalist
As indicators of the McCarthy-Zald structural institutions. The net impact of patronage and
facilitation and entrepreneurship factors, we professional SMOs is more complex but, if we
used annual measures of: 1) total giving of take the incidence of movement activity as a
private foundations to all recipients according to general index of the health of insurgency, the
the American Association of Fund-Raising rise of patronage and professional SMOs did not
Counsel's Giving USA (1981); 2) changes in sustain the movement and may actually have
personal disposable income (Dept. of Com- accelerated movement decay.
merce 1984, p. 149); and 3) the number of Figure 1 and Table 2 chart the organization of
professional-technical workers in the national movement actors by indigenous groups (individ-
labor force (Bureau of Labor Statistics 1982). uals, crowds, local groups and classical SMOs)
Changes in foundation contributions8 and dispos- and professional SMOs. Our four periods of
able income should tap structural facilitators of movement development are quite visible. The
professional SMOs. Although professional- civil rights movement initially emerged around
technical workers are not the only source of local church and student groups, shifted to
political entrepreneurs, McCarthy and Zald classical SMOs in the early 1960s, began
(1975) see them as the major pool of "critical declining in the late 1960s, and, by the 1970s,
intellectuals" behind the professional SMOs. If had become centered around one classical
the McCarthy-Zald theory is correct, these SMO-the NAACP-and a new set of profes-
should have increased in the years leading up to sional SMOs. Overall, the civil rights move-
the rise of the challenge and dropped during the ment has been indigenously based, individuals,
movement decline. crowds, local groups and classical SMOs
making up 6 percent, 26 percent, 18 percent and
34 percent respectively of movement actions.9
RESULTS
Professional SMOs did not become significant
The McCarthy-Zald theory is largely under- actors until the late 1960s and, even during the
mined by these data. Professional SMOs were relatively quiescent 1970s, peaked at only 27
not the modal actors at any point in the civil percent of movement actions. Professional
rights movement. Nor did they initiate the SMOs have clearly been secondary actors.
challenge, their efforts coming on the heels of How has this been linked to foundation
indigenous actions. As Morris (1984) has patronage? The foundations have been over-
argued, the challenge was initiated by the whelmingly reactive, lagging considerably be-
grassroots groups, especially the churches and hind the movement. Figure 2 traces the
student groups. By the early 1960s, the major incidence of movement actions and riots, the
classical SMOs-the SCLC, CORE, SNCC and number of foundation grants and the amount of
NAACP-had become the dominant actors. The this patronage (in deflated $ millions). Founda-
professional SMOs became prominent only after tion patronage did not become significant until
the decline of the late 1960s and even then 1961-62, five years after the 1956 take-off of
constituted no more than 27 percent of move- the movement around the Birmingham bus
ment actions in any one year. As McAdam boycott. Significantly, the peak of foundation
(1982) argued, elite patronage was overwhelm-
ingly reactive, spurred by the indigenous
9 These figures undercount the indigenous base during
1955-70. McAdam's coding did not distinguish classical
from professional SMOs. We have therefore used his
8 Measures of foundation assets would be more "other SMO" category as an estimate of the professional
accurate but were unavailable so we relied on these SMO actions even though it contains some classical
giving totals. SMOs.

This content downloaded from 132.174.250.76 on Thu, 27 Aug 2020 23:21:25 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 820 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

Figure 1. Indigenous Groups and Professional SMOs in the Black Movement, 1947-80

600

c500
0

I ndigRngus \
400 1 159

0
300
0

-~200
E

100 Professional
; SM0?;1

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980

Year

patronage came in 1972-73, seven to eight years -.027 to .261 for 0 to 4 years), and no lag for
behind the peak in movement action and three to the riots (r2 = .120 vs. -.043 to .040 for 1 to
four years after the 1968 riot peak. Although the 7 years). The Durbin-Watson statistic also
significant growth in foundation support in the indicated serious auto-correlated disturbances
early 1960s undercuts a simplistic social control for the weaker regressions. In interviews,
thesis centering solely on the urban riots, it is foundation executives confirmed that it typically
clear that the patronage was overwhelmingly took two to three years before initial moves
reactive, 59.5 percent of the total funding being turned into grants, supporting the interpretation
concentrated in the eight years between 1967 that the foundations were responding to move-
and 1974. As a confirmation of this, we ran ment initiatives. Clearly, elite patronage did not
regressions between movement actions, protests initiate the civil rights movement. Although
and riots and the amount and number of increasing political opportunities (e.g. favorable
foundation grants with various time-lags. The Supreme Court decisions, White House and
optimal fit was a five- to seven-year lag for Congressional civil rights bills) did facilitate the
movement actions (r2 = .410 to .539 compared rise of the movement, these were opportunities,
to - .035 to .269 for 0 to 4-year lags), five to not direct patronage. On rise of the movement,
six years for protests (r2 = .396 to .321 vs. McCarthy and Zald are clearly wrong. Both elite

Table 2. Type of Actors in the Black Movement, 1955-80

1955-60 1961-65 1966-70 1971-80 Total

Indigenous Groups %(N) %(N) %(N) %(N) %(N)

Individuals 2 (18) 4 (77) 7 (110) 10 (131) 6 (336)
Crowds 22 (165) 33 (720) 31 (481) 12 (158) 26 (1524)
Local Groups 51 (375) 13 (295) 8 (127) 17 (223) 18 (1020)
National SMOs 22 (162) 43 (938) 36 (549) 34 (447) 36 (2096)
Professional SMOs
3 (23) 8 (169) 18 (270) 27 (355) 14 (817)

Total 100 (743) 101 (2199) 100 (1537) 100 (1314) 100 (5793)

This content downloaded from 132.174.250.76 on Thu, 27 Aug 2020 23:21:25 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 CHANNELING BLACK INSURGENCY 821

Figure 2. Black Insurgency and Foundation G

700 150 4
Grants 4XJ!.:~ 140
600 1~ 30 .

500 Movement ~~~~~~~~~~~~120

0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ A
s4 00 0A 1 9 3
Movementg#GrntyP 100
o 7Q0 ~~~~~~~~~O.:25
0 6~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0 t r

42 200 S-1
O E~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

E 200 Li~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~2
4.~~~~~4

0. 15 10 0

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980

Year

patronage and professional SMOs were second- only 6.6 percent, 2.5 percent and .004 percent
ary derivative forces. respectively of foundation grants. In contrast,
Why did the foundations become involved in the NAACP (excluding local chapters) shunned
the civil rights movement? The data provide "direct action" and conducted only 11.6
general support for the social control thesis. Not percent of social movement actions during the
only were the grants reactive but, confirming 1960s yet received an impressive 14.9 percent
Haines' (1984a, 1984b) thesis of a "radical of all grants. This became even more pro-
flank" effect, they went overwhelmingly to the nounced during the 1970s, the NAACP conduct-
professional SMOs and the NAACP. The ing only 15.5 percent of movement actions yet
strategic shift in the mid-1960s also spurred the receiving 26.3 percent of all foundation support,
grants. The professional SMOs, which initiated making it second only to the NAACP Legal
only 14.1 percent of all movement actions, Defense Fund in its patronage.
received 57.2 percent of the grants, while This "radical flank" effect is further visible
classical SMOs, which carried out 36.2 percent from the actions and grants of particular SMOs
of the actions, garnered only 31.9 percent of the (Figures 3-5). In general, the strategic turn
grants. 10 Over time, the distribution became even spurred a massive outpouring of foundation
more skewed towards the professional SMOs. patronage for moderate NAACP and the profes-
During the 1960s, the classical SMOs received sional SMOs in the late 1960s (Figures 3 and 4).
51.5 percent of all grants and the professional This strategic turn rested on three interrelated
SMOs only 24.7 percent; by the 1970s, the developments: the general upsurge in movement
classical SMOs garnered only 24.7 percent and
activity (Figure 1); the explosion of unruliness,
the professional SMOs, 69.3 percent. The
especially the protest peak in 1965 and the riot
foundations also made keen discriminations
pinnacle of 1967-69 (Figure 5); and the move
among the classical SMOs, the "direct action"
towards "black power" issues that peaked at 42
SMOs-SCLC, CORE and SNCC-generating
percent of movement actions in 1965 and held
12.0 percent, 8.3 percent, and 3.8 percent
steadily through the 1970s (Figure 6). By the
respectively of movement actions during the
late 1960s, national elites had concluded that
peak of their activity (1961-1970) yet receiving
they confronted a "social cataclysm" that
necessitated major and profound social reforms
10 These figures underestimate professional SMO
(Moynihan, 1973, p. 103). This perception
patronage insofar as we excluded foundation support for
stemmed, at least in part, from the development
the National Urban League. The Urban League was
originally a social service agency, not an SMO; but, since of black insurgency: the general upsurge in
it began to function like a professional SMO in the late actions; the growing militancy, especially the
1960s, it could have been included. urban riots; and the emergence of a political

This content downloaded from 132.174.250.76 on Thu, 27 Aug 2020 23:21:25 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 822 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

Figure 3. Foundation Grants to the Classical Civil Rights SMOs, 1948-80

1.2

1.1

1.0
NAACP
0.9

0.8
C

.0.70

0.6

0.51

0.4 ~~~~~SCLC CR~~

2 0.3

0.21

0. 1 SNCC

0 /~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980

Year

o. 4
Figure 4. Foundation Grants to Professional SMOs, 1953-80
1.6

1.5

1.3 NAACP:.LDF
1..2

0.9-
0.8 LCDC

:0.7
.0 06 NCDHR

0.3 VEP: v

0.1

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980

Year
(VEP = Voter Education Project; NCDH = National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing; LCDC
Lawyers Committee in Defense of the Constitution; LSCR = Law Students Civil Rights Research Council)

This content downloaded from 132.174.250.76 on Thu, 27 Aug 2020 23:21:25 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 CHANNELING BLACK INSURGENCY 823

rhetoric of empowerment. As Katznelson (1981, rights movement could be seen as an extension

p. 3) described the situation: of these views.
What about the factors identified by Mc-
The very expressive, often anomic character Carthy and Zald: structural facilitation and
of the daily challenges to the daily fabric- entrepreneurship? Their impact on the move-
including attacks on property and police- ment as a whole does not appear to have been
created a mood of despair at the top of the particularly direct or consistent. Figure 8 charts
social order that mirrored the heightened annual fluctuations in the rate of change in the
expectations of those at the bottom. The three major indices: total foundation grants,
responses that were fashioned ranged from personal disposable income, and the number of
overt repression to attempts at appeasement. professional-technical workers. There were fa-
In response, the foundations loosened their vorable trends in the late 1950s, especially in
purse strings to the NAACP and the professional discretionary resources, which possibly facili-
SMOs. tated the patronage of the early 1960s. But the
There is one point, however, that does not relationship to the rise and decline in movement
bear out the social control interpretation. actions is not close or consistent. However,
Although the grants were reactive for all other time-lagged regression analysis using absolute
SMOs, those to the SCLC moved in tandem values did reveal consistent links to the activity
with SCLC actions. The curves in Figures 3 and of professional SMOs: disposable income ranged
7 indicate that SCLC patrons responded imme- from r2 = .323 to .544 for a zero- to five-year
diately to its protest campaigns, helping to fuel lag; foundation contributions, from .495 to
them, while those for the other organizations .401; and professional employment, from .328
typically lagged three to four years behind. to .504. In other words, the structural facilita-
Lagged regression analysis confirmed this, no tors did not shape the movement as a whole but
lag creating the best fit for the SCLC (r2 = did contribute to the professional SMOs. In
.556) while the others were either non- general, political processes were more critical
significant (CORE and SNCC) or significant for the indigenous challenge and structural
only with a 2-3 year lag (NAACP; r2 = .351 facilitators for professionalization.
and .376). We think this suggests a more What then was the net impact of patronage
complex set of interests than social control, and professionalization on the movement?
including a universalistic commitment to the Judging by the capacity of the movement to
battle against racial discrimination. In fact, we sustain a high level collective action, patronage
think it absurd to argue that the elite donors to and the professional SMOs did not prevent the
the major "direct action" organizations (SCLC, decline of the challenge and may well have
CORE and SNCC), which represented $2.17 accelerated movement decay. In either case, the
million or 12.6 percent of all foundation grants McCarthy-Zald theory fares poorly. As we
between 1961 and 1970, contributed out of the argued, the decay of the movement had multiple
expectation that this would "control" or tame sources, the most important being the demobili-
the militancy of these organizations or their zation of the moderates, the obstacles confront-
leaders. These patrons must have been sincerely ing the "northern strategy" and the white
committed to the cause that Martin Luther King backlash. In the short run this new strategy
and the early leaders of CORE and the SNCC so provoked a massive outpouring of elite patron-
eloquently proclaimed, in the case of the SCLC age for the NAACP and the new professional
responding immediately to protests with finan- SMOs. Yet the greatest increases in this
cial support. In short, this patronage appears to patronage coincided with the steepest descent in
fit McCarthy and Zald's conscience constitu- movement activity. By the end of the decade,
the classical SMOs had collapsed or become
ency. Their error lay in assuming that this was
moribund. The NAACP dropped below 425,000
the dominant pattern, rather than an exception.
members, maintaining its political visibility
We also think this support stemmed partially
only by virtue of the massive infusion of elite
from the particularistic interests of a Jewish
patronage that boosted the professional staff
segment of the capitalist class concerned about
(Marger, 1984). The major indigenous success
racial discrimination. While we cannot prove
was Jesse Jackson's PUSH, a direct extension of
the case, it is suggestive that 23 percent of the
King's Chicago campaign in the late 1960s.
principal donors to the foundations in our
Signnificantly, PUSH fused an externally funded
sample were of Jewish backgrounds. This professional staff with a base in the urban black
Jewish upper class has long supported liberal church. Movement action plunged from an
reforms, especially those targeted on removing average of 265 actions per year during the 1960s
racial barriers to individual participation in the to 83 per year in the 1970s. After 1973,
broader society (Zweigenhaft and Domhoff indigenous actors shrank to 73.5 percent of
1982). Philanthropic support for the early civil movement activity, compared to 93 percent

This content downloaded from 132.174.250.76 on Thu, 27 Aug 2020 23:21:25 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 824 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

Figure 5. Black Unruliness, 1955-80

300

280 Riots
260

240 1 I

o 220 l
o 200+

t~180\. i
L...160a60
~.9 140 9
.~120
100

Yea

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980

Year

Figure 6. Major Issues in the Black Movement, 1955-80

30g// Inte~~~~rdtion /J\ W /til l~3

? AL; n r t

90

80

4-)5 lc oe
0

5-

30 Integration

1955 1960 1951970 1975 1980

Years

This content downloaded from 132.174.250.76 on Thu, 27 Aug 2020 23:21:25 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 CHANNELING BLACK INSURGENCY 825

Figure 7. Actions by Classical SMOs, 1961-80

120,

110 SCLC.~:

100-

90

801 Da
o 70 pre-1961

60 -NAACP
4-

0 50 1
-oY40

E~~~~~~CR

20 -/
SNCC~4

0,

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 19 5 1980

Year

during the growth phase of the movement 1985). Yet there were no great institutional
(1955-65). Likewise, crowds fell from 30.5 innovations on the scale of the Civil Rights Acts
percent to only 12 percent of movement actions, of 1964 and 1965 or even the statutory
rioting halted, and protests fell from over 200 strengthening of the Equal Employment Oppor-
per year to 10-20 (Figure 5). tunity Act in 1972. In fact, the reversal of some
Yet the social control argument also has of these gains in the early 1980s is eloquent
problems in explaining the persistence of black testimony to the dangers of social movement
power issues and unruliness. The professional professionalization and patronage. An excluded
SMOs apparently took their cue from the group cannot count on professional SMOs and
indigenous challenge. The shift to empower- elite patrons to protect and advance its interests
ment demands held through the 1970s. 34.9 against powerful opponents without sustained
percent of all movement actions focused on the indigenous mobilization. If anything, this illus-
older integration concerns while 30 percent trates the central importance of indigenous
addressed the new problems of powerlessness, organizing in creating elite patronage and
32.2 percent dealt with white racism, and 19.4 initiating social reforms.
percent with the general black condition (Figure The greatest irony was the impact of move-
7). Nor did the patronage blunt militancy. ment decay on the patronage for the professional
Although rioting disappeared, this was due SMOs. Between the funding peak in 1973 and
largely to repression and ameliorative reforms. 1980, foundation support dropped from over
Protests dropped but they remained 23.6 percent $3.8 million to $1.4 million, a 62 percent
of movement actions, virtually identical to the decline. Although the shrinkage in foundation
25.8 percent of the tumultous 1960s. In other assets undoubtedly played a role, total founda-
words, patronage may have accelerated the tion grants falling by 36 percent from 1970 to
overall decline, but it did not restructure the 1980, almost all the reduction came after 1975,
movement's agenda or tactics. suggesting that the major factor was the decline
Although the movement continued to score in indigenous actions. Ironically, the major
victories in school integration and employment losers were the professional SMOs, which
discrimination cases, these were primarily a dropped from $2.87 million in 1973 to $1.14
question of implementing prior victories, a set million in 1980. Over the same period,
of tasks for which the professional SMOs were institutionalized organizations such as churches
well suited. Black conditions did gradually and universities, which had previously repre-
improve during the 1970s (Farley 1976; Burstein sented no more than 10 percent of movement

This content downloaded from 132.174.250.76 on Thu, 27 Aug 2020 23:21:25 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 826 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

Figure 8. Facilitators of Professionalization, 1947

0.6

0.5 Foandation
rants>

0.4

0.3-

Professional

0.2

. 9 0 4.*wo

-0.1 Disposable Income

-0.? 2 | ~ , '5 1 ' 5 I * 15 ' 1 1 1 * * * 1 I 51 , , , I , ,? , I

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 19 0
Year

funding, rose to 20 percent of this shrinking groups probably come closest to the McCarthy-
pool. With the decay of the indigenous Zald theory. Significantly, the theory was
movement, elites no longer saw fit to support correct about structural facilitators of
the NAACP or the professional SMOs, gradu- professionalization. Yet, in general, indigenous
ally tapering their financial commitments. resources and political processes were more
Despite these trends, insurgency did not central to the black challenge.
collapse entirely. The challenge hit a low point These trends might be fruitfully compared to
in 1973-74, stabilized in the mid-1970s, and the regulation of urban protest through the
underwent a renewal in 1980. Although it is not expansion of welfare spending in the 1960s
clear what generated the renewal, it is clear that (Piven and Cloward 1971, 1977; Button 1978;
patronage and professionalization did not com- Jennings 1979; Isaac and Kelly 1981, 1983;
pletely snuff out the challenge. And, as we have Griffin et al. 1981). Many of our foundations
seen, the black power demands and unruliness were centrally involved in the formulation of
persisted despite a general reduction in move- national social policy and responded to elite
ment activity. concerns about the riots. However, movement
Might the experience of black insurgency patronage differed from welfare spending. The
constitute a unique and therefore unrepresenta-
riots did not apparently shape the amount of
tive case for evaluating theories of the social
patronage, but rather its allocation to profes-
movements of the 1960s/70s? We think not,
sional SMOs. In general, the foundations
although the McCarthy-Zald theory would
appeared more responsive to protests while
probably fare better by other challenges. In
governmental elites responded to riots. The
general, the social movements of the 1960s/70s
closer parallel was the Community Action
were indigenous challenges (Jenkins 1983;
Program, which used Federal grants to represent
forthcoming). Any theory purporting to stand as
a general interpretation of contemporary social the poor, eventually siphoning off local activists
movements should be able to deal with such and creating a "symbolic representation of the
major challenges as the black, student, and poor" (Helfgot 1981). Yet, contrary to the
women's movements. SMOs confronting the regulation thesis, movement patronage did not
most severe collective goods problems and deflect the movement from its basic goals or
representing the most deprived and disorganized completely snuff out insurgency.

This content downloaded from 132.174.250.76 on Thu, 27 Aug 2020 23:21:25 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 CHANNELING BLACK INSURGENCY 827

THE LIMITS OF PROFESSIONALIZATION community in the absence of strong constitu-

ency ties is, to say the least, ambiguous.
Professional SMOs have clearly grown in Although they have followed up on the goals
prominence and yet they have hardly supplanted defined by the movement, their attack has
indigenous groups. Contemporary movements centered on measures-school integration, affir-
are still rooted in groups who stand to directly mative action and welfare programs-that have
benefit by movement successes. Although contributed little to solving problems of the
professional SMOs have become more promi- black underclass. More important, their political
nent with the movement decline of the late victories have been seriously blunted by their
1970s, their roots still lie largely in the lack of constituency ties, making implementa-
indigenous movements and the challenge they tion problematic and the gains transitory. The
pose to elites. In the case of black insurgency apparent reversal of these gains in the early
elite patronage did not become a major resource 1980s could probably not have been carried out
until the early 1970s, and even then it had the indigenous black movement still been
represented only one resource-financial-that mobilized at the same pitch as during the 1960s.
was far more critical to the professional SMOs In short, professional SMOs cannot compensate
than to any other section. While McCarthy and for the power of an indigenous movement.
Zald correctly pointed to the facilitative effect of Insofar as professional SMOs promote symbols
discretionary resources on the rise of profes- of reform without the substance, they may work
sional SMOs, this investment was spurred by against the development of powerful indigenous
the indigenous challenge. challenges.
Elite patronage had multiple mainsprings, but Professional SMOs are not, however, inevita-
the primary one appears to have been the bly counterproductive. Contrary to the social
challenge of an indigenous movement. Patron- control theorists, they do not inevitably defuse
age was reactive and directed primarily at the protests. In the civil rights experience, the
moderate NAACP and the professional SMOs. professional SMOs have frequently played an
While this does not directly demonstrate the effective role by following up on the victories of
elite intentions, it conforms to the social control the indigenous movement. As the women's and
interpretation. And, if we are correct about the environmental movements have demonstrated,
Jewish backgrounds of the elite patrons who litigation, close monitoring of government
responded to the SCLC protests, even con- agencies and professionalized lobbying can be
science was heavily shaped by the particularistic quite effective if allied with an indigenous
concerns of a minority group. movement and if there is a clear statutory and
The professional SMOs are complex political administrative basis for implementation (Han-
actors. Future research needs to distinguish dler 1978; Gelb and Palley 1982; Mitchell
between professional SMOs that are initiated by 1985).
indigenous movements and those prompted by But if the goal is bringing an excluded group
elite patrons and political entrepreneurs without into the polity, a mass movement is necessary.
movement roots. The former are more likely to Antagonists are probably politically entrenched
perceive their role as providing technical and will use their access to block organizing.
support for indigenous challenges, while the The state is an inherently conservative institu-
latter will likely see themselves as proxies for tion, committed to the maintenance of social
powerless groups. The legal office of the order. Even neutral bystanders who might
NAACP that was eventually spun off as the benefit from the entry of new groups will
NAACP-Legal Defense Fund was originally oppose the challenge simply because of the
launched in 1935 with a grant by the Rosenwald spectre of restructuring the polity rules (Tilly
foundation (Kluger 1975) and yet through the 1978, pp. 125-26; McAdam 1982, pp. 28,
early 1960s it depended largely on the NAACP 41-43; Jenkins 1985a). Well-funded profes-
membership. During this period, the Legal sional SMOs are simply no match for an
Defense Fund provided technical support to the entrenched antagonist.
indigenous challenge. Several of the other Of course, if the alternative is no representa-
professional SMOs, however, have been inde- tion, most groups are probably better off with
pendent, launched by non-movement entrepre- professional SMOs. No doubt, some groups are
neurs and elite patronage. Because they owe sufficiently powerless that there is little alterna-
tive to professional representation. Yet, for
little to the civil rights movement or the black
community, these professional SMOs have those with some bases for independent mobili-
frequently pursued agendas that conflict with zation that can secure gains short of a
those of local black groups and civil rights comprehensive redistribution of social power,
leaders (Shields and Spector 1972; Danielson indigenous mobilization holds far more promise.
1976 pp. 124-3 1; Orfield 1978, pp. 268-9). Professional SMOs are, after all, agencies of
their supporters. Insofar as they are based on
Their representation of the interests of the black

This content downloaded from 132.174.250.76 on Thu, 27 Aug 2020 23:21:25 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 828 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

elite patronage, they are not likely to become Bailis, Lawrence. 1974. Bread or Justice. Lexington,
unruly or make broad demands. And, if the ex- MA: D. C. Heath.
Barkan, Stephen. 1984. "Legal Control of the Southern
perience of the civil rights movement is indica-
Civil Rights Movement." American Sociological
tive, their survival depends on the pressures gen-
Review 48:552-67.
erated by the protests of the indigenous groups.
Berry, Jeffrey. 1977. Lobbying for the People. Princeton,
We have generally supported the social NJ: Princeton University Press.
control theory, yet we not supported the thesis Bureau of Labor Statistics. 1982. "Labor Force Statistics
that elite patronage and professionalization from the Current Population Survey." Bulletin #2046.
snuffed out the potential for radical dissent. The Washington, DC: GPO.
crisis and decline of the civil rights movement Burstein, Paul. 1985. Discrimination, Jobs and Politics.
was largely internal, rooted in the strategic Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Button, Jeffrey. 1978. Black Violence. Princeton, NJ:
weaknesses and political obstacles to attacking
Princeton University Press.
the problems of the black underclass. Patronage
Carden, Maureen. 1974. The New Feminist Movement.
and professionalization did not divert the
New York: Russell Sage.
movement from attacking the problems of . 1977. Feminism in the Mid-1970s. New York:
poverty, cultural subordination and political Ford Foundation.
exclusion. Nor did they extinguish protests. In Carson, Claybourn. 1981. In Struggle. Cambridge, MA:
fact, the challenge showed remarkable resil- Harvard University Press.
ience, reviving at the end of the period. Costain, Anne N. 1981. "Representing Women: The
The social control effects of patronage, then, Transition from Social Movement to Interest Group."
Western Political Quarterly 34:476-91.
are more subtle and indirect than a simple cooptation
Danielson, Michael N. 1976. The Politics of Exclusion.
thesis would assume. Cooptation arguments have
New York: Columbia University Press.
traditionally been posed in terms of the transfor-
Danzger, M. Herbert. 1975. "Validating Conflict Data."
mation of goals and tactics in exchange for po- American Sociological Review 40:570-84.
litical incorporation. Our evidence, however, in- Farley, Reynolds. 1977. "Trends in Racial Inequali-
dicates no significant change in goals or tactics, ties." American Sociological Review 42:189-208.
but rather a general decline and reorganization Filer Commission. 1977. Research Papers of the
around professional SMOs. Patronage may well Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs
have accelerated this decline by diverting leaders (Filer Commission). Washington, DC: GPO.
Freeman, Jo. 1975. The Politics of Women's Liberation.
from indigenous organizing, exacerbating rival-
New York: Longman.
ries and creating symbolic gains. Quite clearly, it
Gamson, William. 1975. The Strategy of Social Protest.
channeled the movement into professionalization Homewood, IL: Dorsey.
forms. But it did not divert the movement from Gelb, Joyce and Marian Leif Palley. 1982. Women and
the black power agenda or unruliness. The most Public Policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
dramatic strategic change was the halt of rioting, Press.
but government repression and ameliorative pro- Goulden, Joseph. 1971. The Money Givers. New York:
grams were probably more critical than elite pa- Random House.

tronage. Overall, we think "channeling" is a Griffin, Larry, Joel Devine and Michael Wallace. 1983.
"On the Economic and Political Determinants of
more apt metaphor for analyzing the impact of
Welfare Spending." Politics and Society 3:331-72.
elite patronage on social movements than the met-
Gurr, Ted R. 1972. "The Calculus of Civil Conflict."
aphor of "controlling" or "coopting." Journal of Social Issues 28:27-47.
If the rejuvenation of indigenous protest Haines, Herbert H. 1984a. "Black Radicalization and the
evident in 1980 is indicative, the possibility may Funding of Civil Rights." Social Problems 32:31-43.
exist for renewed insurgency. We have seen this . 1984b. Crisis and Elite Support of Social
as evidence of a renewed black challenge, most Movements." Unpublished paper, Dept. of Sociology,
visibly manifest in the recent anti-apartheid SUNY Cortland, New York.
campaign and Jesse Jackson's presidential Handler, Joel. 1978. Social Movements and the Legal
System. New York: Academic.
campaign in 1984. Although elite patronage and
Harrington, Michael. 1968. Towards a Democratic Left.
professional SMOs may play a supportive role,
New York: Macmillan.
its eventual success will largely depend on
Helfgot, Joseph. 1981. Professional Reforming. Lexington,
indigenous organizing and forming alliances
MA: Lexington Books.
with polity members that provide the leverage to
Isaac, Larry and William Kelly. 1981. "Racial Insur-
institutionalize significant reforms.
gency, the State and Welfare Expansion." American
Journal of Sociology 86:1348-86.
REFERENCES . 1983. "The Rise and Fall of Urban Racial

American Association of Fund-Raising Counsel. 1980. Violence in the U.S.: 1948-1979." Research in Social

Giving USA. New York: American Association of Movements, Conflicts and Change. V:125-43.
Fund-Raising Counsel. Jenkins, J. Craig. 1983. "Resource Mobilization Theory
Aveni, Andrain. 1978. "Organizational Linkages and and the Study of Social Movements." Annual Review
Resource Mobilization." Sociological Quarterly of Sociology 9:527-53.
19:185-202. . 1985a. "Foundation Funding of Progressive

This content downloaded from 132.174.250.76 on Thu, 27 Aug 2020 23:21:25 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 CHANNELING BLACK INSURGENCY 829

Social Movements. " Pp. 7-17 in The Grant Seekers . 1973. The Politics of a Guaranteed Income.
Guide (2nd ed), edited by J. Shellow. Nyack, NY: New York: Free Press.
Glenmeade. Nielsen, Waldemar. 1972. The Big Foundations. New
. 1985b. The Politics of Insurgency. New York: York: Columbia University Press.
Columbia University Press. Oates, Stephen. 1981. Let the Trumpet Sound. New
_____.. Forthcoming. "Interpreting the Stormy Sixties." York: Random House.
Research in Political Sociology. Olson, Marcur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action.
Jenkins, J. Craig and Charles Perrow. 1977. "Insurgency Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
of the Powerless." American Sociological Review Orfield, Gray. 1978. Must We Bus? Washington, DC:
42:249-68. Brookings Institution.
Jennings, Edward T. 1979. "Urban Riots and Welfare Perrow, Charles. 1979. "The Sixties Observed." Pp.
Policy Change." Pp. 125-57 in Why Policies Succeed 192-211 in The Dynamics of Social Movements, edited
or Fail, edited by H. Ingram and D. Mann. Beverly by M. Zald and J. McCarthy. Cambridge, MA:
Hills, CA: Sage. Winthrop.
Katznelson, Ira. 1981. City Trenches. Chicago: Univer- Pertschuk, Michael. 1982. Revolt Against Regulation.
sity of Chicago Press. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Kleidman, Robert. 1984. "The American Peace Move- Pinckney, Alphonso. 1968. The Committed. New Haven,
ment and Professionalization." Unpublished paper, CT: College & University Press.
University of Wisconsin, Dept. of Sociology. Piven, Francis Fox and Richard Cloward. 1971.
Kluger, Richard. 1975. Simple Justice. New York: Regulating the Poor. New York: Pantheon.
Random House. . 1977. Poor People's Movements. New York:
Lawson, Steven. 1976. Black Ballots. New York: Pantheon.
Columbia University Press. Rose, Stephen. 1976. Betrayal of the Poor. Cambridge,
Lipsky, Michael. 1971. Protest in the City. Englewood MA: Schenkman.
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Rudwick, Elliott and August Meier. 1970. "Organiza-
Marger, Martin. 1984. "Social Movement Organization tional Structure and Goal Succession." Social Science
and Response to Environmental Change." Social Quarterly 51:9-24.
Problems 32:16-30. Rustin, Bayard. 1965. "From Protest to Politics: The
Marx, Gary. 1979. "External Efforts to Damage or Future of the Civil Rights Movement." Commentary
Facilitate Social Movements." Pp. 94-125 in The 39:25-31.
Dynamics of Social Movements edited by M. Zald and Sale, Kirkpatrick. 1973. SDS. New York: Vintage.
J. McCarthy. Cambridge, MA: Winthrop. Salisbury, Robert. 1969. "An Exchange Theory of
Marx, Gary and Michael Useem. 1971. "Majority Interest Groups." Midwest Journal of Political Science
Involvement in Minority Movements." Journal of 13:1-32.
Social Issues 27:81-104. Orum, Anthony. 1966. "A Reappraisal of the Social and
McAdam, Douglas. 1982. Political Process and the Political Participation of Negroes." American Journal
Development of Black Insurgency. Chicago: University of Sociology 72:32-46.
of Chicago Press. Shellow, Jill (ed.). 1981. The Grant-Seekers Guide (1st
. 1984. "Tactical Innovation and the Pace of edition). Nyack, NY: Glenmeade.
Insurgency." American Sociological Review 48:735-53. Shields, Geoffrey and Sanford Spector. 1972. "Opening
McCarthy, John and Mayer Zald. 1973. The Trend of up the Suburbs." Yale Review of Law and Social Order
Social Movements. Morristown, NJ: General Learning. 2:299-375.
1975. "Organizational Intellectuals and the Criti- Silk, Leonard and Mark Silk. 1980. The American
cism of Society." Social Service Review 49:344-62. Establishment. New York: Basic.
. 1977. "Resource Mobilization and Social Sitkoff, Harvard. 1981. The Struggle for Black Equality.
Movements." American Journal of Sociology New York: Hill & Wang.
82:1212-41. Snyder, David and William Kelly. 1977. "Conflict
McIhlany, William H., Jr. 1980. The Tax-Exempt Intensity, Media Sensitivity and the Validity of
Foundations. Westport, CT: Arlington House. Newspaper Data." American Sociological Review
Meier, August and Elliott Rudwick. 1973. CORE. New 42:105-23.

York: Oxford University Press. Tilly, Charles. 1978. From Mobilization to Revolution.
Reading. MA: Addison-Wesley.
Mitchell Robert. 1985. "From Conservation to Environ-
U.S. Department of Commerce. 1984. Handbook of
mental Movement." Unpublished paper. Washington,
Cyclical Indicators. Washington, DC: GPO.
DC: Resources for the Future.
Vogel, David. 1978. Lobbying the Corporation. New
Molotch, Harvey and Marilyn Lester. 1974. "News as
York: Basic.
Purposive Behavior." American Sociological Review
Wilson, John. 1983. "Corporatism and the Professionaliza-
38:101-12.
tion of Reform." Journal of Political and Military
Morris, Aldon. 1981. "The Black Southern Sit-in Sociology 11:53-68.
Movement." American Sociological Review 46:744-67. Wolfe, Alan. 1977. The Limits of Legitimacy. New York:
. 1984. The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement. Free Press.
New York: Free Press. Zweigenhaft, Richard and G. William Domhoff. 1982.
Moynihan, Daniel. 1969. Maximum Feasible Misunder- Jews in the Protestant Establishment. Englewood
standing. New York: Free Press. Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

This content downloaded from 132.174.250.76 on Thu, 27 Aug 2020 23:21:25 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms