I.

Garcia vs Salvador, G.R. 168512, March 20, 2007

Facts Respondent Ranida started working as a trainee in a certain company. As a requirement for
regular employment, she underwent a medical examination at Community Diagnostic Center
(CDC). Petitioner Garcia, a medical technologist conducted the test. The results indicated that
she has Hepatitis B. Due to this she was terminated by the company. When Ranida informed her
father of the test result, his father suffered a heart attack and was confined at Bataan Doctors
Hospital. Ranida took several tests which indicated a negative result for hepatitis. The CDC
issued a certification correcting the initial result. Ranida was then rehired. Ranida and her father
filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Garcia and the patholigist at CDC claiming that,
by reason of the erroneous interpretation of the results of Ranida’s examination, she lost her job
and suffered serious mental anxiety, trauma and sleepless nights, while Ramon was hospitalized
and lost business opportunities.
The trial court dismissed the complaint. The appellate court reversed and found Garcia liable for
damages for negligently issuing an erroneous result.

Issue: Whether or not Garcia is liable for damages for issuing the incorrect result

Ruling: Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another person
that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand.For health
care providers, the test of the existence of negligence is: did the health care provider either fail to
do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he or she
did something that a reasonably prudent health care provider would not have done; and that
failure or action caused injury to the patient;
The elements of an actionable conduct are: 1) duty, 2) breach, 3) injury, and 4) proximate
causation. All the elements are present in the case at bar owners and operators of clinical
laboratories have the duty to comply with statutes, as well as rules and regulations, purposely
promulgated to protect and promote the health of the people. Thus, violation of a statutory duty
is negligence. RA 4688 provides: Sec. 2. It shall be unlawful for any person to be professionally
in-charge of a registered clinical laboratory unless he is a licensed physician duly qualified in
laboratory medicine and authorized by the Secretary of Health Sections 9(9.1)(1), 11 and
25(25.1)(1) of the DOH Administrative Order No. 49-B Series of 1988 likewise provides: "For
all categories of clinical laboratories, the head shall be a licensed physician certified by the
Philippine Board of Pathology in either Anatomic or Clinical Pathology"
We find that petitioner Garcia failed to comply with these standards. First, CDC is not
administered, directed and supervised by a licensed physician as required by law, but by Ma.
Ruby C. Calderon, a licensed Medical Technologist. Garcia may not have intended to cause the
consequences which followed after the release of the HBsAG test result. However, his failure to
comply with the laws and rules promulgated and issued for the protection of public safety and
interest is failure to observe that care which a reasonably prudent health care provider would
observe. Thus, his act or omission constitutes a breach of duty. Article 20 of the New Civil Code
provides: Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58668 dated February 27, 2004 finding petitioner Orlando D.
Garcia, Jr. guilty of gross negligence and liable to pay to respondents ₱50,000.00 as
moraldamages, ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages, and ₱25,000.00 as attorney’s fees, is
AFFIRMED.

II.
OCEAN BUILDERS CONSTRUCTION CORP., and/or DENNIS HAO, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES ANTONIO and ANICIA CUBACUB, Respondents.

FACTS: Bladimir was employed as a maintenance man by Ocean Builders in its office in
Caloocan. When he got afflicted w chickenpox, he was avdised by general manager Hao to rest
for 3 days. After 3 days, he intended to rest in his house in Tarlac but Hao ordered that he be
brought to a nearby hospital where he was confined. The following day, he was transferred to the
ICU of QCGH after his parents arrived, where he died the following day. Death cert stated
causes of death as cardiac arrest, multiple organ system failure, septicemia and chicken pox.

Upon a complaint for damages, RTC Tarlac ruled that Hao was not guilty of negligence. It ruled
that Hao was not under any obligation to bring Bladimir to better tertiary hospitals, and that
Bladimir’s death if indeed due to chickenpox cannot be attributed to Hao.

CA reversed the RTC decision and held that Hao’s failure to bring Bladimir to a better-equipped
hospital is in violation of Article 161 of the Labor Code.

ISSUE: WON there was a breach in the duty of Ocean Builders to provide adequate medical
assistance to Hao under Art. 161 of the Labor Code

RULING: NO. The actions taken by Hao when Bladimir became ill amounted to the "necessary
assistance" to ensure "adequate and immediate medical . . . attendance" to Bladimir as required
under Art. 161 of the Labor Code.

Hao’s advice for Bladimir to take a 3-day rest and to later have him brought to the nearest
hospital constituted such "adequate and immediate medical" attendance.
 IV.
Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc. vs Court of Appeals and Lydia Geronimo,
G.R. 110295 October 18, 1993
 V.
L.G. FOODS CORPORATION and VICTORINO GABOR, Vice-President and General
Manager, petitioners,
vs.
HON. PHILADELFA B. PAGAPONG-AGRAVIADOR, in her capacity as Presiding Judge
of Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Bacolod City, and SPS. FLORENTINO and
THERESA VALLEJERA, respondents.
G.R. No. 158995 September 26, 2006
Facts: Charles Vallereja, a 7-year old son of the spouses Vallejera, was hit by a Ford Fiera van
owned by L.G Foods and driven by their employee, Vincent Ferrer. Charles died as a result of
the accident.
Respondent: An Information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide was filed against
the driver. Unfortunately, before the trial could be concluded, the accused driver committed
suicide, bothered by conscience and remorse.
The spouses Vallejera filed a complaint for damages against the L.G Foods as employers of the
deceased driver, alleging that they failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and
supervision of their employees.
Petitioner: L.G. Foods as defendants denied liability for the death of the Charles, claiming that
they had exercised the required due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees,
including the deceased driver.
L.G. Foods filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the complaint is a "claim for subsidiary
liability against an employer" under the provision of Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
They contend that there must first be a judgment of conviction against their driver as a condition
essential to hold them liable and since the driver died during the pendency of the criminal action,
the condition for their subsidiary liability was not fulfilled, hence there is lack of cause of action
on the part of the Vallejeras.
They argue that since the plaintiffs did not make a reservation to institute a separate action for
damages when the criminal case was filed, the damage suit in question is deemed instituted with
the criminal action which was already dismissed.
RTC: denied the Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit and set the case for pre-trial. Also, their
motion for consideration was denied.
CA: It is clear that the complaint neither represents nor implies that the responsibility charged
was the petitioner's subsidiary liability under Art. 103, Revised Penal Code. As pointed out [by
the trial court] the complaint does not even allege the basic elements for such a liability, like the
conviction of the accused employee and his insolvency. A civil action to enforce subsidiary
liability separate and distinct from the criminal action is even unnecessary.
Issue: Whether or not L.G. Foods shall be subsidiarily liable for the death of Charles caused by
their employee’s negligence
Ruling: No, L.G. Foods is not subsidiarily liable because the action against them is for quasi-
delict hence they are liable for the negligent act of its employee.
As pointed out by RTC, nothing in the allegations suggests that the L.G. Foods are being made to
account for their subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, the complaint
did not even aver the basic elements for the subsidiary liability of an employer under Article 103
of the Revised Penal Code, such as the prior conviction of the driver in the criminal case filed
against him nor his insolvency. The complaint did not explicitly state that Vallejeras were suing
the defendant petitioners for damages based on quasi-delict. However, from the allegations of the
complaint that quasi-delict was their choice of remedy against the L.G. Foods.
In the present case, the spouses alleged in their complaint gross fault and negligence on the part
of the driver and the failure of the L.G. Foods, as employers, to exercise due diligence in the
selection and supervision of their employees. The spouses further alleged that the L.G. Foods are
civilly liable for the negligence/imprudence of their driver since they failed to exercise the
necessary diligence required of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of
their employees, which diligence, if exercised, could have prevented the vehicular accident that
resulted to the death of their 7-year old son.
Here, the action chosen is for quasi-delict, the spouses may hold the employer liable for the
negligent act of its employee, subject to the employer's defense of exercise of the diligence of a
good father of the family. On the other hand, if the action chosen is for culpa criminal, the
plaintiff can hold the employer subsidiarily liable only upon proof of prior conviction of its
employee.
Had the respondent spouses elected to sue the petitioners based on Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code, they would have alleged that the guilt of the driver had been proven beyond
reasonable doubt;
1. that such accused driver is insolvent;
2. that it is the subsidiary liability of the defendant petitioners as employers to pay for the
damage done by their employee (driver) based on the principle that every person
criminally liable is also civilly liable
Since there was no conviction in the criminal case against the driver, precisely because death
intervened prior to the termination of the criminal proceedings, the spouses' recourse was,
therefore, to sue the petitioners for their direct and primary liability based on quasi-delict.
The circumstance that no reservation to institute a separate civil action for damages was made
when the criminal case was filed is of no moment because the criminal case was dismissed
without any pronouncement having been made therein. In reality, therefore, it is as if there was
no criminal case to speak of in the first place. And for the petitioners to insist for the conviction
of their driver as a condition sine qua non to hold them liable for damages is to ask for the
impossible.
Basis:
1. An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil
liabilities on the part of the offender,
a. civil liability ex delicto; and
b. independent civil liabilities, such as those
(a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as felony (e.g., culpa
contractual or obligations arising from law; the intentional torts; and culpa
aquiliana
(b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct
from the criminal action.
2. Section 2, Rule 2, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines cause of action as the "act
or omission by which a party violates the right of another."
3. Victims of negligence or their heirs have a choice between an action to enforce the civil
liability arising from culpa criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and an
action for quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana) under Articles 2176 to 2194 of the Civil Code.
4. Article 2177 provides for the alternative remedies the plaintiff may choose from in case
the obligation has the possibility of arising indirectly from the delict/crime or directly
from quasi-delict/tort.
5. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the liability of the employer is direct or immediate.
It is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior
showing of insolvency of such employee.
 VII.
FGU Insurance Corporation v. G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation
G.R. No. 141910 | 2002-08-06

FACTS:
G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation (GPS) undertook to deliver thirty (30) units of Condura
refrigerators aboard one of its truck, driven by Lambert Eroles, from Concepcion Industries in
Alabang to Dagupan City. While the truck was along McArthur highway in Tarlac, it collided
with an unidentified truck, causing it to fall into a deep canal, resulting in damage to the cargoes.

FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU), an insurer of the shipment, paid to Concepcion Industries,
Inc., the value of the covered cargoes in the sum of P204,450. FGU, in turn, sought
reimbursement from GPS, but the latter failed to heed the claim. FGU then filed a complaint for
damages and breach of contract of carriage against GPS and its driver Lambert Eroles with the
RTC.

In its answer, GPS asserted that it was the exclusive hauler only of Concepcion Industries, Inc.,
and it was not so engaged in business as a common carrier. GPS further claimed that the cause of
damage was purely accidental.

After FGU presented its evidence, GPS filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that petitioner FGU had failed to prove that GPS was a common carrier. The trial court granted
the motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the trial court's decision. The CA
found that GPS is a private carrier. Hence, the present appeal.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not respondent GPS may be considered as a common carrier as defined under
the law and existing jurisprudence
2) Whether or not respondent GPS, either as a common carrier or a private carrier, may be
presumed to have been negligent when the goods it undertook to transport safely were
subsequently damaged while in its protective custody and possession.

HELD:
1) No, respondent GPS is not a common carrier, but a private one.

Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of
carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for hire or
compensation, offering their services to the public, whether to the public in general or to a
limited clientele in particular, but never on an exclusive basis. The true test of a common
carrier is the carriage of passengers or goods, providing space for those who opt to avail
themselves of its transportation service for a fee.
GPS, being an exclusive contractor and hauler of Concepcion Industries, Inc., rendering or
offering its services to no other individual or entity, cannot be considered a common carrier.

2) Yes, the respondent GPS may be presumed to have been negligent on the basis of breach of
contract of carriage, which is an example of culpa contractual.

In culpa contractual, the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure of its
compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. The law, recognizing the
obligatory force of contracts, will not permit a party to be set free from liability for any kind of
misperformance of the contractual undertaking or a contravention of the tenor thereof.

GPS recognizes the existence of a contract of carriage between it and Concepcion Industries, Inc.
and admits that the cargoes it has assumed to deliver have been lost or damaged while in its
custody. In such a situation, a default on, or failure of compliance with, the obligation in this
case gives rise to a presumption of lack of care and corresponding liability on the part of the
contractual obligor the burden being on him to establish otherwise.

On the other hand, the driver, not being privy to the contract of carriage, may not be held liable
for its breach. Without concrete proof of his negligence or fault, the driver may not be ordered to
pay FGU. A contract can only bind the parties who have entered into it or their successors who
have assumed their personality or their juridical position.

FGU's civil action against the driver can only be based on culpa aquiliana, which, unlike culpa
contractual, would require the claimant for damages to prove negligence or fault on the part of
the defendant.

WHEREFORE, the order of the Regional Trial Court and the decision of the Court of Appeals,
are AFFIRMED only insofar as respondent Lambert M. Eroles is concerned, but said assailed
order of the trial court and decision of the appellate court are REVERSED as regards G.P.
Sarmiento Trucking Corporation which, instead, is hereby ordered to pay FGU Insurance
Corporation the value of the damaged and lost cargoes in the amount of P204,450.00.
 VIII.
Calalas v. CA
Facts:
One morning, private respondent Eliza G. Sunga took a passenger jeepney owned and
operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was already full, the conductor allowed
her to sit in an extension seat which is a wooden stool placed at the back of the door at the rear
end of the vehicle. Along the way, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. Sunga gave way to
the outgoing passenger when an Isuzu truck owned by Francisco Salva and driven by Iglecerio
Verena bumped the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. Sunga filed a complaint against
Calalas for violation of contract of carriage. On the other hand, Calalas filed a third-party
complaint against Salva. The trial court held Salva liable and absolved Calalas of his liability,
taking cognizance of another civil case for quasi-delict wherein Salva and Verena were held
liable to Calalas. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision and held Calalas liable to
Sunga for violation of contract of carriage.
Hence, this petition. The petitioner contends that it is the negligence of Verena which is
the proximate cause of the accident which in turn negates his liability.
Issue:
Whether or not a ruling on quasi-delict negates the liability of petitioner Calalas in this
case involving breach of contract of carriage.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The civil case where Verena and Salva were
held liable for the damages arising from the accident is one based on quasi-delict which is
different from this case which involves a complaint based on breach of contract on the part of the
petitioner.
Quasi-delict has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor whereas in breach of
contract, it is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation. In the
former, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action,
whereas in the latter, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the
contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his
passenger safely to his destination. Lastly, the doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only to
the former but not to the latter. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where
there is no relation between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by
law itself. In case of contracts, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the
function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created.
 In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they
prove that they observed extraordinary diligence. It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the
collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver.
In this case, there is no showing of such extraordinary diligence. First, the jeepney was
not properly parked, its rear portion being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of
the highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. Second, it is undisputed
that petitioner's driver took in more passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney.
The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than that to
which the other passengers were exposed.
 IX.
Orient Freight Int’l., Inc vs Keihin-Everett Forwarding Co., G.R. 191937, August 9, 2017

Facts:
On October 16, 2001, Keihin-Everett entered into a Trucking Service Agreement with
Matsushita. Under the Trucking Service Agreement, Keihin-Everett would provide services for
Matsushita's trucking requirements. These services were subcontracted by Keihin-Everett to
Orient Freight, through their own Trucking Service Agreement executed on the same day.
When the Trucking Service Agreement between Keihin-Everett and Matsushita expired on
December 31, 2001, Keihin-Everett executed an In-House Brokerage Service Agreement for
Matsushita's Philippine Economic Zone Authority export operations. Keihin-Everett continued to
retain the services of Orient Freight, which sub-contracted its work to Schmitz Transport and
Brokerage Corporation.
In April 2002, Matsushita called Keihin-Everett, about a column in the April 19, 2002 issue of
the tabloid newspaper Tempo. This news narrated the April 17, 2002 interception by Caloocan
City police of a stolen truck filled with shipment of video monitors and CCTV systems owned by
Matsushita.
When contacted by Keihin-Everett about this news, Orient Freight stated that the tabloid report
had blown the incident out of proportion. They claimed that the incident simply involved the
breakdown and towing of the truck, which was driven by Cudas, with truck helper, Aquino. The
truck was promptly released and did not miss the closing time of the vessel intended for the
shipment
Keihin-Everett directed Orient Freight to investigate the matter. During its April 20, 2002
meeting with Keihin-Everett and Matsushita, as well as in its April 22, 2002 letter addressed to
Matsushita, Orient Freight reiterated that the truck merely broke down and had to be towed.
Keihin-Everett independently investigated the incident. During its investigation, it obtained a
police report from the Caloocan City Police Station. The report stated, among others, that at
around 2:00 p.m. on April 17, 2002, somewhere in Plaza Dilao, Paco Street, Manila, Cudas told
Aquino to report engine trouble to Orient Freight. After Aquino made the phone call, he
informed Orient Freight that the truck had gone missing. When the truck was intercepted by the
police along C3 Road near the corner of Dagat-Dagatan Avenue in Caloocan City, Cudas
escaped and became the subject of a manhunt

When confronted with Keihin-Everett's findings, Orient Freight wrote back on May 15, 2002 to
admit that its previous report was erroneous and that pilferage was apparently proven.

In its June 6, 2002 letter, Matsushita terminated its In-House Brokerage Service Agreement with
Keihin-Everett, effective July 1, 2002. Matsushita cited loss of confidence for terminating the
contract, stating that Keihin-Everett's way of handling the April 17, 2002 incident and its
nondisclosure of this incident's relevant facts "amounted to fraud and signified an utter disregard
of the rule of law."

Keihin-Everett, by counsel, sent a letter dated September 16, 2002 to Orient Freight, demanding
P2,500,000.00 as indemnity for lost income. It argued that Orient Freight's mishandling of the
situation caused the termination of Keihin-Everett's contract with Matsushita.

When Orient Freight refused to pay, Keihin-Everett filed a complaint dated October 24, 2002 for
damages with Branch 10, Regional Trial Court, Manila. In its complaint, Keihin-Everett alleged
that Orient Freight's "misrepresentation, malice, negligence and fraud" caused the termination of
its In-House Brokerage Service Agreement with Matsushita. Keihin-Everett prayed for
compensation for lost income, with legal interest, exemplary damages, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses, and the costs of the suit.

The Regional Trial Court rendered its February 27, 2008 Decision, in favor of Keihin-Everett. It
found that Orient Freight was "negligent in failing to investigate properly the incident and make
a factual report to Keihin-Everett and Matsushita," despite having enough time to properly
investigate the incident. The CA affirmed this decision.

Issue:

Whether Article 2176 is applicable in this case

Ruling:

Articles 1170, 1172, and 1173 of the Civil Code on negligence in the performance of an
obligation should apply.

Negligence may either result in culpa aquiliana or culpa contractual. Culpa aquiliana is the "the
wrongful or negligent act or omission which creates vinculum juris and gives rise to an
obligation between two persons not formally bound by any other obligation," and is governed by
Article 2176 of the Civil Code:

Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter. Actions based on contractual negligence and actions based on quasi-
delict differ in terms of conditions, defenses, and proof. They generally cannot co-exist. Once a
breach of contract is proved the defendant is presumed negligent and must prove not being at
fault. In a quasi-delict, the complaining party has burden of proving the other party’s negligence.
However, there are instances when Article 2176 may apply even when there is a pre-existing
contractual relation. A party may still commit a tort or quasi-delict against another, despite the
existence of a co tract between them.
Negligence in culpa contractual, on the other hand, is "the fault or negligence incident in the
performance of an obligation which already-existed, and which increases the liability from such
already existing obligation." This is governed by Articles 1170 to 1174 of the Civil Code.

Here, petitioner denies that it was obliged to disclose the facts regarding the hijacking incident
since this was not among the provisions of its Trucking Service Agreement with respondent.
There being no contractual obligation, respondent had no cause of action against petitioner.

The obligation to report what happened during the hijacking incident, admittedly, does not
appear on the plain text of the Trucking Service Agreement. Petitioner argues that it is nowhere
in the agreement. Respondent does not dispute this claim. Neither the Regional Trial Court nor
the Court of Appeals relied on the provisions of the Trucking Service Agreement to arrive at
their respective conclusions. Breach of the Trucking Service Agreement was neither alleged nor
proved.

While petitioner and respondent were contractually bound under the Trucking Service
Agreement and the events at the crux of this controversy occurred during the performance of this
contract, it is apparent that the duty to investigate and report arose subsequent to the Trucking
Service Agreement. When respondent discovered the news report on the hijacking incident, it
contacted petitioner, requesting information on the incident. Respondent then requested petitioner
to investigate and report on the veracity of the news report. Pursuant to respondent's request,
petitioner met with respondent and Matsushita on April 20, 2002 and issued a letter dated April
22, 2002, addressed to Matsushita. Respondent's claim was based on petitioner's negligent
conduct when it was required to investigate and report on the incident.

Both the Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals erred in finding petitioner's negligence of its
obligation to report to be an action based on a quasi-delict Petitioner's negligence did not create
the vinculum juris or legal relationship with the respondent, which would have otherwise given
rise to a quasi-delict. Petitioner's duty to respondent existed prior to its negligent act. When
respondent contacted petitioner regarding the news report and asked it to investigate the incident,
petitioner's obligation was created. Thereafter, petitioner was alleged to have performed its
obligation negligently, causing damage to respondent.

The doctrine "the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort," on which the lower courts
relied, is inapplicable here. Petitioner's negligence, arising as it does from its performance of its
obligation to respondent, is dependent on this obligation. Neither do the facts show that Article
21 of the Civil Code applies, there being no finding that petitioner's act was a conscious one to
cause harm, or be of such a degree as to approximate fraud or bad faith.
 X.
B.F. METAL CORPORATION vs.
SPS. ROLANDO M. LOMOTAN and LINAFLOR LOMOTAN And RICO UMUYON
G.R. No. 170813             April 16, 2008

FACTS:
In the morning of 03 May 1989, respondent Rico Umuyon ("Umuyon") was driving the
owner-type jeep owned by respondents, Spouses Lomotan. The jeep was cruising along Felix
Avenue in Cainta, Rizal at a moderate speed of 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. Suddenly, at the
opposite lane, the speeding ten-wheeler truck driven by Onofre Rivera overtook a car by
invading the lane being traversed by the jeep and rammed into the jeep. The jeep was a total
wreck while Umuyon suffered "blunt thoracic injury with multiple rib fracture, fractured scapula
(L), with pneumohemothorax," which entailed his hospitalization for 19 days. Also in view of
the injuries he sustained, Umuyon could no longer drive, reducing his daily income from
P150.00 to P100.00.

Respondents instituted a separate and independent civil action for damages

against petitioner BF Metal Corporation and Rivera. The complaint essentially alleged that
defendant Rivera’s gross negligence and recklessness was the immediate and proximate cause of
the vehicular accident and that petitioner failed to exercise the required diligence in the selection
and supervision of Rivera. In the Answer, petitioner and Rivera denied the allegations in the
complaint and averred that respondents were not the proper parties-in-interest to prosecute the
action, not being the registered owner of the jeep; that the sole and proximate cause of the
accident was the fault and negligence of Umuyon; and that petitioner exercised due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees.

The trial court rendered its judgment holding the petitioners liable for
damages and attorney's Fees, and finding Rivera negligent when he failed to determine with
certainty that the opposite lane was clear before overtaking the vehicle in front of the truck he
was driving. It also found petitioner negligent in the selection and supervision of its employees
when it failed to prove the proper dissemination of safety driving instructions to its drivers. CA
affirmed the trial court’s finding of Rivera’s negligence, and that petitioner was liable under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE: WON Umuyon and the spouses Lomotan are entitled to damages and attorney's fees

HELD: Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate

compensation
only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is
referred to as actual or compensatory damages. To justify an award of actual damages, there
must be competent proof of the actual amount of loss. Credence can be given only to claims,
which are duly supported by receipts.

In the instant case, no evidence was submitted to show the amount actually spent for the repair or
replacement of the wrecked jeep. Spouses Lomotan presented two different cost estimatesto
prove the alleged actual damage of the wrecked jeep. Following the case of Viron, neither
estimate is competent to prove actual damages. Courts cannot simply rely on
speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages. Petitioner
also questions the award of moral and exemplary damages in favor of Spouses Lomotan. It
argues that the award of moral damages was premised on the resulting physical injuries arising
from the quasi-delict; since only respondent Umuyon suffered physical injuries, the award
should pertain solely to him. Correspondingly, the award of exemplary damages should pertain
only to respondent Umuyon since only the latter is entitled to moral damages, petitioner adds. In
culpa aquiliana, or quasi-delict, (a) when an act or omission causes physical injuries, or (b)
where the defendant is guilty of intentional tort, moral damages may aptly be recovered. This
rule also applies, as aforestated, to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or
in bad faith. In culpa criminal, moral damages could be lawfully due when the accused is found
guilty of physical injuries, lascivious acts, adultery or concubinage, illegal or arbitrary detention,
illegal arrest, illegal search, or defamation. Undoubtedly, petitioner is liable for the moral
damages suffered by respondent Umuyon. Its liability is based on a quasi-delict or on its
negligence in the supervision and selection of its driver, causing the vehicular accident and
physical injuries to respondent Umuyon. Rivera is also liable for moral damages to respondent
Umuyon based on either culpa criminal or quasi-delict. Since the decision in the criminal case,
which found Rivera guilty of criminal negligence, did not award moral damages, the same may
be awarded in the instant civil action for damages.

However, there is no legal basis in awarding moral damages to Spouses Lomotan whether
arising from the criminal negligence committed by Rivera or based on the negligence of
petitioner under Article 2180. Article 2219 speaks of recovery of moral damages in case of a
criminal offense resulting in physical injuries or quasi-delicts causing physical injuries, the two
instances where Rivera and petitioner are liable for moral damages to respondent Umuyon.
Article 2220 does speak of awarding moral damages where there is injury to property, but the
injury must be willful and the circumstances show that such damages are justly due. There being
no proof that the accident was willful, Article 2220 does not apply. Exemplary or corrective
damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. While the amount of the exemplary damages
need not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or
compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary
damages should be awarded. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Spouses Lomotan
have shown that they are entitled to compensatory damages while respondent Umuyon can
recover both compensatory and moral damages. Because exemplary damages are awarded,
attorney’s fees may also be awarded in consonance with Article 2208.
 XI.
Huang vs. Philippine Hoteliers, Inc. (2012)
G.R. No. 180440 | 2012-12-05
Facts:
A complaint for damages was filed by petitioner Genevieve Huang against respondents
Philippine Hoteliers (PHI) and Dusit Thani Public Co. (DTPCI), as owners of Dusit Thani Hotel,
and First Lepanto Taisho insurance, as insurer of the hotel. The complaint was premised on the
alleged negligence of respondents PHI and DTPCI's staff, in the untimely putting off of all the
lights within the hotel's swimming pool area, as well as the locking of the main entrance door of
the area, prompting petitioner to grope for a way out. While doing so, a folding wooden counter
top fell on her head causing her serious brain injury. The negligence was allegedly compounded
by respondents PHI and DTPCI's failure to render prompt and adequate medical assistance.
When petitioner decided to consult a neurologist, the MRI procedure showed that her head was
bruised and had a serious brain injury.
Despite repeated demands for money representing loss of earnings on her remaining life span,
the respondents did not heed petitioner. She continued to seek medical attention from numerous
doctors here and abroad. Respondents denied the allegations of the petitioner.
The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The trial court found that petitioner
failed to present any evidence to substantiate her allegation that the lights in the hotel's
swimming pool area were shut off at the time of the incident. It ruled that petitioner would not
have met the accident had she only acted with care and caution. Because the immediate and
proximate cause of her injury was her own negligence, she was not able to recover damages.
With regard to respondent First Lepanto's liability, the trial court ruled that under the contract of
insurance, absent any cause for any liability against respondents PHI and DTPCI, respondent
First Lepanto cannot be made liable thereon.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. Hence, the petitioner went before
the Supreme Court.

Held:
Errors of Fact cannot be Reviewed by the Supreme Court especially when both the Trial Court
and Court of Appeals are in consonance with such

1. Only errors of law and not of facts are reviewable by this Court in a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
2. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and it is beyond its function to reexamine and weigh
anew the respective evidence of the parties. The Court adheres to the long standing doctrine that
the factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
conclusive on the parties and the Supreme Court.
The Fact that the Judge who Heard the Case and Penned the Decision are Different does not
warrant the Review of Factual Findings of the Trial Court
3. The Supreme Court Court will not review the factual findings of the trial court simply because
the judge who heard and tried the case was not the same judge who penned the decision. This
fact alone does not diminish the veracity and correctness of the factual findings of the trial court.
4. The efficacy of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that its writer only took over
from a colleague who had earlier presided at the trial, unless there is showing of grave abuse of
discretion in the factual findings reached by him.
5. There is a disputable presumption that the trial court's decision is rendered by the judge in the
regular performance of his official duties.
The Allegations of the Petitioner in her Complaint Shows that the Cause of Action is based on
Quasi-Delict
6. A perusal of petitioner's Complaint evidently shows that her cause of action was based solely
on quasi-delict, which under the New Civil Code is defined as an act, or omission which causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence.
7. It is evident from petitioner's Complaint and from her open court testimony that the reliance
was on the alleged tortious acts committed against her by respondents PHI and DTPCI, through
their management and staff.
8. Petitioner's belated reliance on breach of contract as her cause of action cannot be sanctioned
by this Court. Well-settled is the rule that a party is not allowed to change the theory of the case
or the cause of action on appeal.
Requisites to be Proven if the Cause of Action is Based on Quasi-Delict
9. As petitioner's cause of action is based on quasi-delict, it is incumbent upon her to prove the
presence of the following requisites before respondents PHI and DTPCI can be held liable.
10. Petitioner must be able to prove (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence
of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of
cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by
the plaintiff. Further, since petitioner's case is for quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be
clearly established as it is the basis of her action.
11. If the plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he was damaged because of the negligent acts of
the defendant, he has the burden of proving such negligence. It is even presumed that a person
takes ordinary care of his concerns. The quantum of proof required is preponderance of evidence.
Petitioner Failed to Prove the Alleged Negligence
12. As found by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, petitioner utterly failed to
prove the alleged negligence of respondents PHI and DTPCI. Other than petitioner's self-serving
testimony, no other evidence was presented to substantiate the same.
13. As observed by the trial court, respondents PHI and DTPCI, indeed, extended medical
assistance to petitioner but it was petitioner who refused the same.
The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur is not Applicable in the Case
14. Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means "the thing or the transaction speaks
for itself." It relates to the fact of an injury that sets out an inference to the cause thereof or
establishes the plaintiff's prima facie case. Hence, if there is sufficient proof showing the
conditions and circumstances under which the injury occurred, then the creative reason for the
said doctrine disappears.
15. Even granting that respondents PHI and DTPCI's staff negligently turned off the lights and
locked the door, the folding wooden counter top would still not fall on petitioner's head had she
not lifted the same. Records showed that petitioner lifted the said folding wooden counter top
that eventually fell and hit her head.
The Doctrine of Respondeat Superior is not Applicable in the Case
16. The doctrine of respondeat superior finds no application in the absence of any showing that
the employees of respondents PHI and DTPCI were negligent.
17. Since in this case, the trial court and the appellate court found no negligence on the part of
the employees of respondents PHI and DTPCI, thus, the latter cannot also be held liable for
negligence and be made to pay the millions of pesos damages prayed for by petitioner.