Evaluation of Banking Sector's Development in Bangladesh in Light of Financial Reform
Evaluation of Banking Sector's Development in Bangladesh in Light of Financial Reform
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ISSN 2224-607X (Paper) ISSN 2225-0565 (Online)
Vol.4, No.22, 2014
Abstract
Historically, the performance of the banking sector has been weak, characterized by weak asset quality,
inadequate provisioning, and negative capitalization of state-owned banks. To overcome these problems, the
initial phase of banking reform (1980-1990) focused on the promotion of private ownership and
denationalization of nationalized commercial banks (SCBs). During the second phase of reform, Financial
Sector Reform Project (FSRP) of World Bank was launched in 1990 with the focus on gradual deregulations of
the interest rate structure, providing market-oriented incentives for priority sector lending and improvement in
the
debt recovery environment. Moreover, a large number of private commercial banks were granted licenses during
the second phase of reforms. Bangladesh Bank adopted Basel-I norms in 1996 and Basel-II during
2010. Moreover, the Central Bank Strengthening Project initiated in 2003 focused on effective regulatory and
supervisory system, particularly strengthening the legal framework of banking sector. This study evaluates how
successfully the banking sector of Bangladesh has evolved over the past decades in light of financial reform
measures undertaken to strengthen this sector.
Keywords: Financial Reform, PCB, SCB, FCB, DFI, Bangladesh
1. Introduction
The financial sector in Bangladesh comprises the money and capital markets, insurance and pensions, and
microfinance. In addition to the Bangladesh Bank the central bank of Bangladesh-there are four state-owned
commercial banks (SCBs), four state-owned specialized banks (DFIs) dedicated to agricultural and industrial
lending, thirty domestic private commercial banks (PCBs), nine foreign commercial banks (FCBs), and thirty
one non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs). Bangladesh Bank has regulatory and supervisory jurisdiction over
the entire banking sub-sector as well as the NBFIs. Most of the institutions in the financial sector are
characterized by a mix of public and private ownership. During the first decade of independence, financial
system of Bangladesh has been suffering from deep crises. Historically, the performance of the banking sector of
Bangladesh has been weak due to weak asset quality, inadequate provisioning, negative capitalization in
systemically important state banks and constrained profitability. State banks were at times used to lend to
politically important economic sectors and institutions as well as politically linked persons. Similarly, the private
banks lacked sufficient checks and balances in the form of effective standards of corporate governance,
resulting in high levels of related party lending. However, these trends have started to reverse in more recent
times, with significant efforts made to restructure ailing state banks, improve standards of risk management,
corporate governance and bank supervision and cope with international best practice standards. Following the
global financial crisis of 2008 the role of financial sector regulators came under sharp scrutiny worldwide,
however the banking sector of Bangladesh remain largely unaffected by the crisis. With the revamp of financial
sector regulatory and supervisory frameworks with sharper focus on risk and systemic stability in line with post-
global crisis and revisions of international best practice standards, the importance of conducting study on the
performance evaluation of banking sector is interminable. Therefore, the aim of this study is to evaluate how
successfully banking industry of Bangladesh has evolved over the past decades with regards to financial reform
measures undertaken to strengthen this sector.
4. Research Methodology
The financial sector of a country comprises a variety of financial institutions, markets, and products. The World
Bank’s Global Financial Development Database developed a comprehensive yet relatively simple conceptual
framework to measure financial development of two major components in the financial sector, namely the
financial institutions and financial markets. According to this framework a financial sector’s development
should be evaluated in terms of financial depth, access, efficiency, and stability (Beck, Asli and Ross 2000).
These four dimensions are measured by using some proxy indicators stated in the framework. Therefore, this
study evaluates the development of banking sector of Bangladesh by using the framework given in the following
Table 1.
350 328.35
273.05
300 252.47 267.77 274.63
259.03 263.33
250
200
150
100
50
7.04 6.98 7.01 7.04 7.08 7.28 7.53 7.85
0
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Demographic penetration indicates that number of bank branches per 100,000 population increased
from 7.04 to 7.85 over the period of 2004 to 2011, reporting an increment of 11.5% and number of bank
accounts per 1000 population also increased by 49% over the same period. Trend in demographic penetration
indicates that access to banking services has increased overtime in Bangladesh. Bangladesh government has
been pursuing banks and financial institutions to follow Bangladesh Bank’s financial inclusion initiatives to
engage themselves in increased lending to the under-served or un-served economic sectors and population
segments, including micro and SME entrepreneurs, agricultural and other rural and urban farm and non-farm
productive activities for broadening access to financial services. Furthermore, in issuing new branch licenses to
banks, Bangladesh Bank has been following a policy of requiring at least one in every five new branches to be
in rural locations; with a view to pushing banking services physically closer to the rural population (Financial
Stability Report, Bangladesh Bank).
5.3 Efficiency
The proponents of financial reform argue that efficient operation of financial institution is prerequisite
to financial sector development. Following framework of World Bank, indicators which are evaluated in this
study to examine operational efficiency of banking sector of Bangladesh are profitability and competitiveness
within the sector.
5.3.1. Profitability
Table 3 presents profitability indicator ROA for sub-sector of banks over the period 1998 to 2011. As it is
observed from the Table 3, ROA differ largely by banking sub-sectors even after the reform measures. The ROA
of the SCBs were found to be nil during the period 1998 to 2000, which were even worst (negative) in case of
the DFIs, -3.7%. The huge loss of the DFI’s in 2000 was mainly due to making of provisions by debiting ‘loss’
in their book of accounts. During 2011, ROA of SCB and DFI have been 1.3% and less than 0.1% respectively.
PCB’s ROA is found to have a positive but inconsistent trend, whereas the FCB’s showed a
consistently better trend over the last 14 years. The superior performance of foreign banks might be due to their
technological advantage and product differentiation capabilities which might have been eroded to an extent by
the local private banks in recent years. The ROA of PCBs and FCBs were strong, 2.1% and 2.9% respectively,
in 2010 implying a growing competition between them after the reform measures. Despite benefiting from high
interest spread, profitability has been modest for sub-sector of banks due to high operating cost resulting from
low level of automation and over-staffing in state-owned banks and inability to increase fee based income and
in most recent years mostly due to increased provisioning requirement of Bangladesh Bank.
5.3.2. Competitiveness within the Sector: Boone Indicator
Recently, a new approach to measuring competition has been introduced by Boone (Boone, 2008), which is a
measure of degree of competition based on profit-efficiency of the banking sector. It is calculated as
the elasticity of profits to marginal costs. The rationale behind the indicator is that higher profits are achieved by
more-efficient banks.
0
-0.01 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
-0.02
-0.0240916
-0.03
-0.04
-0.05
-0.0616354
-0.06 -0.0663758
-0.0640303 -0.066174
-0.07 -0.0715051 -0.0731693 -0.077719
-0.0678639
-0.0750756
-0.0798925
-0.08
-0.0823391
-0.0825262
-0.09
Chart 2: Boone Indicator Index
Source: Economic Research
An increase in the Boone indicator implies a deterioration of the competitive behavior of financial
intermediaries. Hence, the more negative the Boone indicator, the higher the degree of competition within a
sector. In Chart 2, higher negative boon indicator over the period of 1999 to 2011 indicates growing competitive
market behavior of the banking industry.
5.4 Stability
Following the framework of World Bank, the stability of banking sector is evaluated in terms of Z score, Asset
Quality and Capitalization condition of banking sub-sectors.
5.4.1. Z- Score
Z-score is a widely used indicator of financial stability in the recent studies. It captures the probability of default
of a country's banking system, calculated as a weighted average of the Z-scores of a country's individual banks,
where the weights are based on the individual banks' total assets. Z-score compares a bank's buffers,
i.e. capitalization and returns, with the volatility of those returns. Intuitively, Z-score can be considered as an
inverse measure of insolvency risk, that is, the threat for a bank to be forced out of business because of a lack in
capital to compensate for a decline in the value of its’ assets (Roy, 1952). A higher Z-score implies a lower
probability of insolvency and a greater financial stability.
10
8.51622 8.66009
8 7.091914
6
5.409904
4
2.973001
2.22405 2.373586 2.779462
2 0.3597535 2.392439
1.929848 2.371433
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
-2
-1.509809
-4
Chart 3 reports the average Z-scores at the bank-year level over the period of 1999 to 2011. The average
Z-score across all banks during 2011 is about 8.7, indicating that on an average, profits (ROA) have to fall by 8.7
times their standard deviation to deplete bank’s equity. The analysis suggests a modest improvement in financial
stability of the banking sector since 2007. Hence, this indicates that banking reforms occurring in terms
privatization of state banks and establishment of prudential regulation and supervision led to banks having better
opportunity to explore economies of scope and scale and thereby create more stable revenue.
5.4.2 Asset Quality
Asset quality indicated by nonperforming loan to total loan ratio has persistently been weak in Bangladeshi
banks with nearly one third of the loan portfolio being classified as non-performing loans (NPLs) for the
systemically important state-banks and DFIs. At end of 2011, the reported gross NPL to total loan ratios in Table
4 for the SCBs and DFIs were 11.3% and 24.6%, respectively, whereas they were more acceptable at 2.9% for
PCBs and FCBs. Meanwhile, the reported banking system gross NPL ratio of 6.1% during 2011 is much
improved compared to the highest 41% posted in 1999. The high level of NPLs at SCBs and DFIs is largely
attributed to politically directed lending extended on non‐market terms as well as lending under government‐
directed schemes. This position is also worsened by the limited credit appraisal, post-disbursement credit
monitoring and risk management skills in these institutions. Furthermore, some banks are reluctant to write-off
historically bad loans because of the poor quality of underlying collateral and therefore to avoid the recognition
of hefty losses on their income statement as well as the legal impediments in recovering loans that are written-
off.
Bank 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Type
SCBs 36.6 40.4 45.6 38.6 37.0 33.7 29.0 25.3 21.4 22.9 29.9 25.4 21.4 15.7 11.3
DFIs 65.7 66.7 65.0 62.6 61.8 56.2 47.4 42.9 34.9 33.7 28.6 25.5 25.9 24.2 24.6
PCBs 31.4 32.7 27.1 22.0 17.0 16.4 12.4 8.5 5.6 5.5 5.0 4.4 3.9 3.2 2.9
FCBs 3.6 4.1 3.8 3.4 3.3 2.6 2.7 1.5 1.3 0.8 1.4 1.9 2.3 3.0 2.9
All 37.5 40.7 41.1 34.9 31.5 28.0 22.1 17.6 13.6 13.2 13.2 10.8 9.2 7.3 6.1
Banks
Table 4: Gross NPL to Total Loan Ratio % (without adjustment for actual provision and interest
suspense)
Source: Annual Report, Bangladesh Bank
The decline in the NPL to Total Loan Ratio from 2001 to 2011 was aided by a reduction in absolute
NPLs, while in more recent years it was influenced by higher loan growth. Some reduction from the absolute
NPL base was also made possible due to write-off of long overdue NPLs, in keeping with guidelines issued by
Bangladesh Bank. With nearly 80% of all classified loans in the loss category, the reduction of NPLs through
recoveries seems remote hence write-offs appear to be the likely outcome. Asset quality is likely to come under
pressure with recoveries becoming tougher, therefore to wipe out unnecessarily and artificially inflated size of
balance sheet, uniform guidelines of write-off have been introduced in 2003. According to the policy, banks may,
at any time, classify write-off loans as bad or loss. Those loans, which have been classified as bad or loss for the
last five years and above and loans for which 100% provisions have been kept, should be written off
immediately. Besides loan loss provisioning and write-offs, stronger regulation, enhanced legal powers of the
banks to collect problem loans through the Money Loan Court and better screening of new loans facilitated by
the Credit Information Bureau have also improved the NPL ratio. The government made progress in this regard
by improving the legal framework for debt recovery by enacting and amending Acts from time to time. The
government strategy, which is being implemented by the Bangladesh Bank with assistance from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, includes limiting the annual credit portfolio growth of SCBs to 5%.
However, in response to the global financial crisis, the Government in March 2009 doubled the lending limits of
the SCBs to 10% to boost domestic investment. Banking sub-sector structural reform is well under way with the
assistance of the current Enterprise Growth and Bank Modernization Project and the Poverty Reduction and
Growth Facility. These initiatives aim to bring about a competitive private banking system by reforming the
SCBs through (Recent Reform Initiatives, 2012).
5.4.3 Capitalization
Capital adequacy focuses on the total position of banks' capital and the protection of depositors and other
creditors from the potential shocks of losses that a bank might incur. It helps absorbing all possible financial
risks like credit risk, market risk, operational risk, residual risk, core risks, credit concentration risk, interest rate
risk, liquidity risk, reputation risk, settlement risk, strategic risk, environmental and climate change risk etc.
Bangladesh Bank adopted BASEL-I norms in 1996 and it was followed till the end of 2009. Following BASEL-
I principles, banks were required to keep Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) of not less than 9.00 percent of their
risk- weighted assets with at least 4.5 percent in core capital or Taka 1.00 billion whichever is higher. Table 5
shows that aggregate capital adequacy ratio of the banking sector showed a downward trend since 1997 and
declined to
5.6% in 2005. However, in 2009, the ratio rose to 11.6%, the highest during the last 13 years. The SCBs could
not attain the required level till 2009 and DFIs failed to maintain required CAR except for the year 2004. FCBs
have the CAR much above the required standard over the stated period.
20
Bank 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Type
SCBs 6.6 5.2 5.3 4.4 4.2 4.1 4.3 4.1 -0.4 1.1 7.9 6.9 9.0 8.9 11.7
DFIs 6.0 6.9 5.8 3.2 3.9 6.9 7.7 9.1 -7.5 -6.7 -5.5 -5.3 0.4 -7.3 -4.5
PCBs 8.3 9.2 11.0 10.9 9.9 9.7 10.5 10.3 9.1 9.8 10.6 11.4 12.1 10.1 11.5
FCBs 16.7 17.1 15.8 18.4 16.8 21.4 22.9 24.2 26.0 22.7 22.7 24.0 28.1 15.6 21.0
Total 7.5 7.3 7.4 6.7 6.7 7.5 8.4 8.7 5.6 6.7 9.6 10.1 11.6 9.3 11.4
Table 5: Capital Adequacy Ratio % (CAR)
Source: Annual Report, Bangladesh Bank
Banking sector of Bangladesh is in a healthy state since capital adequacy related BASEL-II norm has
been adopted fully in 2010. Capital adequacy ratio of all banks was 11.4% in 2011 and 9.3% in 2010 as against
required CAR level of greater than or equal to 10% as described in BASEL-II accord. Table 5 shows that on 31
December 2011, in aggregate the SCBs, DFIs, PCBs and FCBs maintained CAR of 11.7%, -4.5%, 11.5% and
21.0% respectively. But individually, three PCBs and two DFIs did not maintain the minimum required CAR
whereas, all PCBs and FCBs complied with the minimum required capital. Bank’s having CAR below the
regulatory requirement are categorized as ‘problem banks’ and are asked to make-up for the shortfall
by increasing their paid-up capital. Until recent development in CAR ratio, capitalization levels of banks were
poor and affected by weak capitalization in state banks as well as marginal capitalization in some private banks.
The weak capitalization levels and inadequate provisioning on a high NPL base resulted in an extremely weak
CAR ratio over the stated period. Improvement in CAR ratio that is visible from 2007 was largely enabled
by a
‘valuation adjustment’ made during the conversion of three SCBs (Agrani, Janata and Sonali Bank) into limited
liability companies. Clearly, the capital base of the banking sector has tremendously expanded especially during
the last four years. This has been possible due to the transfer of a sizeable portion of banks’ profits into capital.
As a result, the base of banking system has become much stronger. At present, Bangladesh Bank is preparing to
adopt and implement the BASEL-III principles in near future. While capitalization could further improve in
future, due to the enhanced minimum capital requirements, sustaining such improvements would depend on the
ability of the banks to ensure their equity base is not affected by operational losses, especially in a challenging
environment with renewed pressure on asset quality (Financial Stability Report, Bangladesh Bank).
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