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Progress in Disaster Science: Benjamin M. Vallejo JR Rodrigo Angelo C. Ong

This article examines the Philippine government's responses to the COVID-19 pandemic from January to April 2020. It discusses two policy questions: when to lift quarantine restrictions and how to prepare for future pandemics. It reviews the context of uncertainties in the Philippines and proposes establishing a permanent science advisory body to provide expertise during emergencies.
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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
149 views7 pages

Progress in Disaster Science: Benjamin M. Vallejo JR Rodrigo Angelo C. Ong

This article examines the Philippine government's responses to the COVID-19 pandemic from January to April 2020. It discusses two policy questions: when to lift quarantine restrictions and how to prepare for future pandemics. It reviews the context of uncertainties in the Philippines and proposes establishing a permanent science advisory body to provide expertise during emergencies.
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Progress in Disaster Science 7 (2020) 100115

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Progress in Disaster Science


journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/pdisas

Regular Article

Policy responses and government science advice for the COVID 19 pandemic
in the Philippines: January to April 2020

Benjamin M. Vallejo Jr a,b,d, , Rodrigo Angelo C. Ong a,b,c,d
a
Institute of Environmental Science and Meteorology, University of the Philippines Diliman, Philippines
b
Science and Society Program, University of the Philippines Diliman, Philippines
c
College of Medicine, University of the Philippines Manila, Philippines
d
International Network for Government Science Advice-Asia, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Article history: In this paper we examine two policy questions about the COVID 19 pandemic in the Philippines. These are science in-
Received 29 April 2020 formed policy questions that will have to take into consideration a large degree of uncertainties in outcomes. The first
Received in revised form 14 June 2020 question is on when to lift the Enhanced Community Quarantine (ECQ) as informed by epidemiological modelling. The
Accepted 15 June 2020
second deals on how the Philippines can respond to a future pandemic crisis. We review the Philippine government's
Available online 18 June 2020
responses and introduce the complicating scientific, social, and political contexts for both questions and address pro-
Keywords:
posals for strengthening the science advisory structures. We propose a permanent science advisory body for emergen-
Government science advice cies with the widest source of expertise as needed.
Pandemic
Uncertainty
Complexity
Public health
Crisis
Postnormal science

1. Introduction While COVID 19 can be considered a “black swan” event with its low
probability of occurrence but with a high impact [7], this is disputed
Since the WHO declared the COVID 19 as a pandemic on March 11, since SARS in 2002, a coronavirus outbreak was deemed very possible
2020, the global science community has demonstrated that science can re- [8] but with very uncertain consequences. The history of the COVID 19
spond quickly with advanced techniques, technologies and the immediate pandemic has been reviewed as of March 2020 and details the responses
dissemination of research results in a largely transparent and focused sci- of the WHO and national health ministries worldwide [9,10]. The interna-
ence research effort. For example it is no surprise that the SARS COV 19 tional response is more transparent and coordinated than in previous WHO
viral genome was made public within two weeks [1]. Rapid communica- declared pandemics. Even then the control of COVID 19 is full of uncer-
tion and publication has allowed the global public to cognize the serious- tainties even if curves can be flattened and because it involves many factors
ness of COVID 19. and players as evidenced by research gaps [11]. And the uncertainties are
This is due to the increased capability of the data sciences to model magnified in a post truth world with misinformation on COVID 19 taking
epidemic trajectories [2,3] and to show the statistical models as proba- on infectious behavior similar to the virus itself [12].
bility distributions a.k.a. curves. Filipino data scientists initially did The Philippines has an estimated population of 106.7 million as of
this as citizen scientists with the aim of providing the initial basis for 2018. Fifty one (51%) of the population lives in cities and in high densities.
policy decisions [4]. Their efforts have made one phrase that has en- The population is estimated to increase to 145 million by 2045 based on a
tered the Filipino's lexicon, “flattening the curve” [5,6]. These efforts 1.4% per annum growth rate [13]. By 2040, 14 million Filipinos will belong
while it has resulted in a positive outcome in suppressing COVID 19 in- to the senior citizen demographic (>60 years). While the percentage of an
fections reveal gaps in the channeling of science advice to government aging population will increase it is not as fast as in industrialized countries.
especially in crisis and the need for a more coordinated science policy Nevertheless it will put an added stress to the health care system. The
structure for emergencies. Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) estimates that in 2020, six million

⁎ Corresponding author at: Institute of Environmental Science and Meteorology, University of the Philippines Diliman, Philippines.
E-mail address: bmvallejo1@up.edu.ph. (B.M. Vallejo).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pdisas.2020.100115
2590-0617/©2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.
0/).
B.M. Vallejo Jr, R.A.C. Ong / Progress in Disaster Science 7 (2020) 100115

Filipinos are senior citizens. As this demographic is at most risk from severe The question for the government is “What are the risks of a second wave
COVID 19 [14], it is in the country's interest to suppress the pandemic. of COVID 19 infections?”
With collation and content analysis of policy responses and their narra- The problem is that we do not exactly know. It is uncertain. Uncer-
tives, the purpose of this paper to review the COVID 19 pandemic response tainty can be metaphorically called a “monster” [30]. How do we deal
in the Philippines in light of the inevitability of relaxing quarantine proto- with COVID 19 monster? We exorcise the monster by implementing
cols. We take off from two initial questions, “When can the ECQ be lifted?” purely science based policy decisions. We can train or adapt the monster
and “How can we foresee and be better prepared for the next pandemic?” by reducing the uncertainty, but it can only get us as far if the situation is
and to identify policy options with their complicating social and political not complex. We can embrace the monster by recklessly playing the risks
contexts in light of the epidemiological science outcomes which informs in the complex situation with a single objective in mind. Or we can as-
policy decisions. We also propose formalizing government science advice similate the monster in this complex situation by recognizing the deci-
by developing more permanent science advisory structures with the widest sion options and the uncertainty and risks. We could stop demanding a
expertise available. single understanding of risk and live with a multitude of risks that we
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 gives the background and have to consensually manage in an atmosphere of transparency in
rationale. Section 2. introduces the reality of the virus in order to contextu- what is called a postnormal science approach [31]. But it has its difficul-
alize uncertainty. Section 3. Is the context of uncertainties in the ties such as getting experts from the disciplines to come up with a con-
Philippines, Section 4. Narrates the Philippine government's policy and in- sensus on risk assessments. There is also a need to have extended peer
tervention responses in quarantine, Section 5 is about the recommendation communities to review the science and identify positive outcomes in
to institute a science advisory group for emergencies and Section 6 is our consensus. Is what Versluis considers as “wicked questions” which
conclusion. often appears in crisis situations [32]. We shall consider the “wicked
problems and questions” first by recalling the narrative for policy re-
sponse after the World Health Organization (WHO) first notified the in-
2. The reality of the virus
ternational community of the disease.
It is unlikely that the SARS -CoV2, the virus that causes COVID 19
will be eradicated from the human population in the absence of a vac-
4. The Philippine government's COVID 19 policy response
cine. Even with a vaccine, only smallpox has to date the only viral infec-
tion been globally eradicated [15]. Poliomyelitis was expected to have
4.1. Timeline of the government's response
been eradicated by the first decade of the 21st century [16,17] but
new cases have emerged [17–19]. Thus it is unlikely that coronaviruses
When WHO on 31 Dec 2019 was notified by its China office of a poten-
or any viral pathogen will be eliminated as there is genomic diversity in
tially infectious pneumonia of unknown origin in Wuhan City [33], this be-
the taxon and in its animal hosts [20–23]. Thus we can expect more
came a matter of global public health concern that necessitated government
coronaviruses and viral zoonotic outbreaks. The WHO will alert on a 5
public health policy response. The next day, on 1 Jan 2020 the WHO insti-
to 10 year time frame, based on the frequencies of pandemics in the
tuted an IMST (Incident Management Support Team) across the three levels
last 30 years [24,25]. Previous studies have specifically identified Met-
of the organization: headquarters, regional headquarters and country level
ropolitan Manila, together with Dhaka, Bangladesh and Kibera, Kenya
(WHO website). On 8 Jan 2020, the WHO said the increasing number of
as nightmare scenarios in the management of emergent pandemic dis-
cases in Wuhan could be due to a coronavirus. The first death in China
eases due to the lack of sanitation, high population density and poor
was reported on January 11.
health care delivery systems [25].
In the Philippines, WHO notifications are relayed to its Southeast Asia
Given the nature of and etiology of SARS COV 19 and COVID 19, the
regional office in Manila and then to the Philippines Department of Health
present crisis revealed that Philippine infrastructure and manpower capa-
(DOH). As news of the outbreak reached Filipino audiences through social,
bility for pandemics is very limited and this adds much uncertainty in
print and broadcast media, the DOH reported no confirmed COVID19 cases
predicting the outcomes.
in the Philippines but were closely monitoring twenty two (22) persons
under investigation for the disease by Jan 28. Two days later on Jan 30,
3. Dealing with uncertainty and managing risks the case of a 38 year old female Chinese national arriving from Wuhan
via Hong Kong admitted to a government hospital showing pneumonia
The consensus by the Filipino epidemiological and data scientists is the symptoms was made public. This was reported to the DOH Interagency
curve had been flattened, the question of whether to lift or relax the ECQ Task Force on Emerging Infectious Diseases. On the same day the WHO de-
has to be decided. The statistical estimates of the epidemiologists and clared a Public Health Emergency of International Concern but stopped
data scientists do not immediately translate to a qualified estimate of short of declaring a pandemic.
risks. Decisions will entail risks. The question is what the risks are and The first policy decision of the Philippine government was to impose
can they be managed even with the “uncomfortable facts” especially in rap- selective quarantine. It did so on 2 Feb 2020 for returning OFW, but was
idly urbanizing countries like the Philippines [26]. For COVID 19, the un- still open to international air travel. On 7 Mar 2020, the first local trans-
comfortable fact is death. mission was reported by the DOH of a patient who had no travel history
COVID 19 is a life and death risk. Those who came from travel abroad and had comorbidities. The Department of Health raised the alert level
have greater risks of being infecting other people or being infected [27] to Red sublevel 1 to anticipate the increase of COVID19 cases locally
and so have to undergo 14 day quarantine and monitor their health condi- [34]. Upon the recommendation of the Health Secretary, President
tion. The stay at home orders are also to minimize risk, but not totally elim- Rodrigo R Duterte issued Proclamation 922 on March 8, declaring a
inate it. Washing hands with soap and water for 20 s, wearing masks, social state of national emergency due to the threat of COVID 19. Under this
distancing, using alcohol and hand sanitizers, keeping your environment proclamation, all agencies are required to render full assistance in the
clean are other ways to even lower risks [28]. These recommendations response to COVID 19. The Secretary of Health as the head of the
need long term positive behavioral reinforcement [29]. Inter-agency Task Force for Emerging Infectious Diseases (IATF-EID)
Risks becomes complex when whole communities have to resume their may call upon law enforcement agencies to assist in the implementation
lives. People have to go back work, students have to go back to school. En- of quarantine and other measures to address the spread of disease. IATF-
trepreneurs and employees produce services and commodities that enable EID through Resolution No. 16 created a technical working group
an economy to function. When people have a way to make a living, they (TWG) consisting of representatives from the government departments
can invest for their future, like education and health care as examples. and the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

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B.M. Vallejo Jr, R.A.C. Ong / Progress in Disaster Science 7 (2020) 100115

4.2. Declaration of a state of national emergency than the R0 (2.2) initially reported for Wuhan City in China within the
first month of the outbreak [36].
The first evidence of community transmission or when there were no The wide degree of R0 estimates makes risk informed policy decisions
traceable origins of the virus to a particular person was reported on more complicated and the purely science based approach may not be appli-
March 12. Subsequently, Alert Code Red Sublevel 2 was then declared cable However spatial patterns can be discerned and one of these is the
by the President upon the recommendations of the IATF-EID. Strict quaran- Luzon provinces that are closest to the NCR have R0 greater than 1.10.
tine and travel ban measures in the community, municipal and provincial Reopening the country for business may cause a spike in new infections es-
levels will be instituted under this alert level. timated from 10,000 to 80,000 and deaths from 680 to 3800 by 31 May
2020. This also highlights the need for mass testing. This is the central sci-
4.3. Implementation of Enhanced Community Quarantine (ECQ) and travel ence information for David et al. [35] recommendations.
restrictions Increasing mass testing capability will reveal the true extent of infec-
tions and the proportion of asymptomatic carriers which remain as the
On 13 March 2020 a quarantine was announced and was initially greatest source of epidemiological uncertainty [37]. Resolving this will be
limited to the National Capital Region (NCR) but as more cases of com- the science informed basis for contact tracing. While several developers of
munity transmission were recorded from the nearby provinces, a Luzon mobile phone apps have launched contact tracing apps such as the
island wide quarantine was implemented by the President effective Philippine Red Cross, data collection and reporting infrastructure will
March 17. Under this expanded quarantine, land, sea and air transporta- have to be there for this to be achieved. The University of the Philippines
tion was banned. Only transportation for essential services as allowed. is in the process of a centralized data collection and portal for COVID 19 re-
The ECQ exempted medical personnel and goods, sanitation operations sponse management called endcov.ph (Fig. 2.) The DOH has Covid Tracker
and emergency cases from mobility restrictions. People were advised to (Fig. 3.) https://www.doh.gov.ph/2019-nCoV which has information for
work from home and use online communications and business transac- clinicians and epidemiologists who wish to download case data with the
tions to avoid gathering in offices. This quarantine period expired on data drop option. (See Fig. 1.)
14 Apr 2020 but upon recommendation of the IATF to the President of The required information will have to include highly granular baseline
the Philippines based on epidemiological models of the UP COVID 19 data, data collected from previous crises, decision support tools and stan-
task force, it was extended to 30 Apr 2020. dardized tools for rapid data collections. These will inform modelling ap-
proaches, forecasts and confirm previous related research. There should
4.4. Social amelioration initiatives be protocols on data security and data privacy. There is a need to further de-
velop these data integrations in a national infectious disease database. This
Republic Act 11469 or the Bayanihan to Heal as One Act (BAHO) was could assist in spatial analysis approaches that could aid decision making
signed into law by. given that the situation is urgent.
by President Duterte on March 24, 2020. It mandates application of While the Philippines has started to address the above needs, there is a
WHO recommendations to Philippine pandemic health management and need for open data and freedom of information guarantees for scientific
policy. It grants special powers to the executive department to provide pub- data. DOH has a data portal for analysis and the University of the
lic and private hospitals with additional support such as procurement of ad- Philippines has the endcov.ph portal which present data summaries and vi-
ditional equipment and to engage temporary human resources such as sualizations. Endcov.ph and Covid Tracker can integrated and be the basis
additional doctors and staff. It also directs hospitals and health care facili- for a single government science portal on COVID 19.
ties to function as COVID 19 hospitals or quarantine facilities, provides
prompt testing for patients, provides compensation insurance for front 5.1.2. The economic context
line health workers. It also provides social amelioration financial assistance The epidemiological outcome informs all aspects of COVID 19 re-
to low income household as well as enforce laws on profiteering and price sponses even in the economy. While the Philippine economy is not ex-
manipulation. pected to slide into recession, the 2020 GDP growth rate is expected at
2% [38]. The ECQ lockdown has had negative economic consequences
5. Policy decision questions but is necessary from the epidemiological viewpoint. The lockdown en-
sured the viability of the public health delivery system, forestalling its
5.1. When can the Enhanced Community Quarantine (ECQ) be lifted? collapse because the health delivery system was inadequate prior to the
pandemic. The UP School of Economics has recommended the sequential
5.1.1. The epidemiological context lifting of the ECQ in all local government units starting with the
Because the COVID 19 has impacted all facets of life in the Philippines barangay, within cities, between cities and between regions [39]. This
and has effectively ground the economy to a halt, the question of reopening will be informed by public health indicators and how quickly could pub-
the economy especially in the National Capital Region (NCR) by lifting ECQ lic and development funds can be downloaded to the Local government
restrictions is a very important concern and also the assessment of risks. Ep-
idemiological models are an important source of science information and
for a policy decision where R0 estimates are considered.. The latest assess-
ment as of April 27, 2020 [35], suggests that the Luzon wide ECQ has had
the intended effect of reducing the R0 statistic to 0.87 in the NCR, with sim-
ilar estimates for Rizal (0.89), Batangas (0.84). Cavite, Laguna and Quezon
have R0 estimates greater than 1.1, and this means that the pandemic is still
spreading (Fig. 1). Central Luzon provinces have similar trends with some
provinces, Bataan, Tarlac and Nueva Ecija having R0 estimates below 1.0
but Zambales, Pampanga and Bulacan having R0 greater than 1.0.
In Northern Luzon Ilocos region and Cagayan Valley provinces the
pandemic appears to have been controlled with no new cases reported
and Benguet reporting the lowest R0 at 0.54. With the exception of
Albay in the Bicol region R0 = 1.33, all provinces in Bicol and
MIMAROPA have no longer reported new cases. In the Visayas and Min- Fig. 1. Epidemiological trajectories in the Philippine COVID 19 pandemic March to
danao, Cebu has an alarmingly high R0 of 5.09, which is much higher April 2020 (from David et al. [35]) R is on the Y axis.

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B.M. Vallejo Jr, R.A.C. Ong / Progress in Disaster Science 7 (2020) 100115

Fig. 2. The University of the Philippines COVID 19 portal. Endcov.ph.

Fig. 3. The Department of Health COVID Tracker.

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B.M. Vallejo Jr, R.A.C. Ong / Progress in Disaster Science 7 (2020) 100115

units. The economists suggested that the government provide food and which has members from government departments and seeks the science
not cash to the poorest communities. They also recommend the sequen- input of the University of the Philippines COVID 19 task force as well as
tial lifting on the basis of how strategic and essential the business/indus- from other universities.
try sector is. There will be industries and services that can operate on However even under normal circumstances and more so in crisis situa-
work from home arrangements. Underlining all of these is effective test- tion most science advice is informal and unsolicited [45]. As informal ad-
ing and contact tracing protocols to be implemented by local government vice, their effectiveness depends on how they are taken by the
units. The crisis according to the UP economists has “laid bare down the government agency or elected representative concerned. The IATF-EID
weaknesses in the public health system, the fabrication and logistics ca- was formed to propose policy interventions and cannot be expected to be
pabilities, the research and development sectors, social safety nets and able to synthesize science inputs in a short response timeframe. However
capacity foresights and implementation in the public sector” [40]. To in crisis, immediate synthesis of scientific information is critical.
the latter we will add the effective structures for government science There is a need to have formal structures in the Philippine science ad-
advice which underpins all policy options. vice ecosystem to synthesize scientific information in the government agen-
The UP School of Economics recommendations are within an cies and in academe. These are not as ad hoc task forces but science advice
epidemiologic- economic health risk paradigm informed by the precaution- bodies that will do horizon scanning for future and expected crises and
ary principle [41]. Based on the recommendations, the IATF-EID has rec- should actively engage scientists giving informal advice even from advo-
ommended the relaxing of ECQ to General Community Quarantine (CGQ) cacies which often have political agendas [46] which consists the bulk of
which would allow the full opening of essential services and utilities, se- science advice to government [45].
lected retail businesses, but still banning cultural, religious, sports, business The institutionalizing of reflexive modes of science advice for govern-
and political mass gatherings. ment which largely includes informal science advice in a crisis has been
reflected upon after the Fukushima nuclear meltdown in March 2011
5.2. How can we foresee and be better prepared for the next pandemic? [47,48]. Prior to the great earthquake, science advice was largely formal
and directive within the bureaucracy, rather than reflexive. After the disas-
5.2.1. Improving health diagnostics and infrastructure ter the Science Council of Japan (SCJ) assumed a greater public role in sci-
The pandemic also revealed serious weakness in health diagnostics. ence advice. While the SCJ was created by an act of the Diet, it is fiscally
Health workers were being infected due to the critical shortage of personal, autonomous. The disaster is also the main impetus for the development of
protective equipment (PPE) and not all can be rapidly tested. The COVID 19 international science advice and capacitation structures with the creation
pandemic also demonstrated that there are few trained and qualified tech- of the International Network for Government Science Advice (INGSA) [49].
nical workers that can run molecular medical facilities such the qPCR ma- In a crisis, the protocols and timescales of conducting research differ
chines. We need medical technologists who have enough training in from the usual practice of science. The usual deliberative, iterative and col-
applied molecular biology and molecular medicine. As for qPCRs, a few re- laborative practices of science may not be suitable for the rapid, decisive
search and diagnostic laboratories. The few qPCRs are used for research and compressed time frames in crisis. The positive outcomes in in a situa-
and the people who are trained to use them are usually not qualified as tion is measured by lives saved, injuries reduced, ecosystem and infrastruc-
medical technologists. ture services restored, speed of recovery, and development of mitigation
To improve our capacity for molecular medical research and clinical di- tools for future disasters [50]. However, questions posed by uncertainty re-
agnosis also for the training of medical technologists, we have to rapidly de- main, even more so. More efficient and responsive science advice structures
velop a MD-PhD program. This complements the ramped up development and processes are needed which in a crisis may mean focused and rapid
of molecular medical laboratories. At present we only have UP Manila offer- science advice from the widest range of science expertise available.
ing a MD-PhD program.. Similar programs will have to be offered in other The United Kingdom is the first country to establish a science advice sys-
medical schools. This will allow a closely articulated basic science and clin- tem wherein there are scientific advisors to the cabinet departments and to
ical science response to emerging pandemic diseases. One identified re- the Prime Minister, a chief science advisor. This model with modifications
search priority are the management of clinical manifestations of the has been followed by several Commonwealth countries, namely New
disease [42], reinfection, and vaccine development. The latter was identi- Zealand, Malaysia and Canada. In the case of crisis, there is a Science Advi-
fied by President Duterte as an immediate priority. sory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) whose membership depends on the na-
The more scientific knowledge, the better is the chance Filipino society ture of the emergency as drawn from the horizon scanning science advisory
can live with COVID 19 as normally as possible. The capacitated research groups as proposed in Section 2. It is chaired by the UK chief science
and diagnostic facilities will strengthen the national as well as the global advisor.
health security system [25]. SAGE works with the UK COBR (Cabinet Office Briefing Room) and is
composed of the country's leading scientists and experts from the natural
5.2.2. Institutionalizing a science advisory group for crisis and emergencies and social sciences. SAGE advice is provided to cabinet via COBR. The job
The Philippines has a formal science advisory system through The of SAGE is to respond to COBR questions. SAGE advice is not considered
National Academy of Science and Technology (NAST) [43]. NAST is by government policy unless the Executive makes it so. It is responsible for co-
presidential Executive Order 818 is the science advisor to the President of ordinated science advice is made available to decision makers in the Exec-
the Philippines. The Philippines adopted as a model the role of the National utive at the soonest possible time. It is independent of academic bodies but
Academy of Science (NAS) in the United States [44]. The NAST advises by closely works with them. SAGE holds closed door meetings to focus on syn-
publishing position papers and sponsoring forums on matters of national in- thesizing scientific information and to outline risk options in the shortest
terest requiring science advice. Other science academies such as the possible time [51].
Philippine American Academy of Science and Engineering (PAASE) on an We propose a SAGE like entity which will provide formal science advice
informal and at times on a formal capacity provide advice. The charter of not only for pandemics but other kinds of crisis and may identify important
University of the Philippines mandates it to provide formal and informal institutional developmental needs such as a Philippine Center for Disease
science advice as a public service university. Control. A Philippine version of SAGE may enhance the present policies
Science advice passes through ad hoc task forces (TF) or technical work- for DRRM and is in line with the 2015 Sendai Framework [52]. Philippine
ing groups (TWG). While TF advice is formal and requested, their effective- SAGE can be immediately convened in a crisis and meets at regular inter-
ness is constrained by their mandate and level in the bureaucracy. The vals under normal circumstances as it will have institutional support from
government is not obliged to take in all of their advice. However as knowl- the Executive. The Chair of the SAGE will be the President's chief science
edge synthesizers they provide the basis for consensus building. For COVID advisor. A Philippine SAGE will provide timely science advice to the Presi-
19, science advice to the government is synthesized by the IATF-EID TWG dent of the Philippines as it will be under the Office of the President in

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B.M. Vallejo Jr, R.A.C. Ong / Progress in Disaster Science 7 (2020) 100115

support of cabinet functions. A Philippine SAGE is not a TWG for it will not These approaches may be overtly intrusive and may result in surveillance
be ad hoc but exist under a presidential Executive Order or could be legis- regime which the state may use for other purposes [67,68].
lated by Congress. In the Philippines, there have been reports that basic civil liberties have
SAGE in the UK has been criticized for holding closed door meetings been violated in the enforcement of BAHO. The various local government
to focus in outline risk options in the shortest possible time [51]. SAGE units and police application of ECQ enforcement has been criticized as
members have defended this as to insulate themselves from political too harsh and violative of constitutional rights and reports have been sent
pressure and focus on the science. This criticism is valid since science ad- to the Philippine Commission on Human Rights [69]. The Philippine
visory structures are expected to be transparent [53]. In response to this National Police has taken notice and has reminded its officers to respect
criticism, the UK government has made public SAGE COVID 19 tran- human rights [70]. Filipino political culture historically tends towards au-
scripts [54]. It is in COBR that various decision contexts political, eco- thoritarianism [71], the COVID 19 pandemic generates a serious concern
nomic and social are discussed and dissenting opinions heard. SAGE for human rights and privacy protections which will linger after the pan-
focuses option choices to achieve COBR consensus. If the SAGE model demic has passed.
is adopted for the Philippines, this will likely be criticized for lack of
transparency in the science advisory process. However the public can
6. Conclusion
be assured by regular and even daily briefings by the relevant cabinet
secretary as has been done by IATF-EID for COVID 19.
In this paper we have narrated how the Philippine government
Our proposal for institutionalizing crisis science advice in the
responded to the COVID 19 pandemic at all levels, including the inclusion
Philippines is reflexive. It will utilize formal science advice from NAST,
of science advice and its consideration of science information. We illus-
PAASE and other government agencies. This will necessitate the services
trated the various contexts of formulating a policy informed by epidemio-
of social scientists who in the past have been largely ignored [55]. Scientific
logical models. And while David et al. [35] recommends the extension of
expertise in the government science bureaucracy have been biased for the
ECQ and GCQ beyond April 30, 2020, the uncertainties remain, the ques-
natural sciences and economics [56]. The role of the social scientist is to as-
tions associated with crisis which we hope will be addressed by developing
sess that science advice is effective as it courses through different expertise
science advisory systems and structures for crises and emergencies taking
communities with their different sociologies, as well the sociology of the
into consideration social, economic and human rights contexts.
public which will allow policy makers to rethink their options [57]. They
In the COVID 19 crisis the Philippine government and its public has im-
also can manage the discourse in extended peer communities in postnormal
mediately recognized the importance of the role of scientists providing sci-
science terms. Such an evolving role defines the role of social scientists in
ence information in economic and political life. This present an opportunity
the USA. In Nigeria, a developing economy, the evaluation of science advice
never before in the history of the Philippines, to locate science and technol-
required the social scientists to link science outcomes with social develop-
ogy as essential to responsive government and governance.
ment goals [58].

5.3. Science communication needs Funding source

Science during crisis is about mobilizing scientific expertise in knowl- This work was supported by development of policy for institutional de-
edge generation, data analysis, data storage and archiving, and communi- velopment grant of the Science and Society Program, University of the
cating [50]. Thus science communication cannot be separated from a Philippines.
science informed government policy. If effective science advisory systems
are in place, a major focus of effort is science communication and education Declaration of Competing Interest
especially at the community level keeping in mind cultural sensitivities. A
key aspect of this effort is to develop ethical standards for crisis response. The authors declare that they have no known competing financial inter-
A negative outcome of poor communication and engagement related with ests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the
poor science advisory structures is when people have had enough of experts work reported in this paper.
[59]. In mobilizing scientific expertise there is a need to mobilize social
media players and to build trust to reduce misinformation that will nega- References
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