Dy Buncio v Ong Guan Can                                                                    The judgment appealed from is therefore affirmed. Costs against appellants.
So
G.R. No. L-40681 | October 2, 1934 | Hull, J. | Group 2                                     ordered.
Plaintiff-appellee: DY BUNCIO & COMPANY, INC.
Defendants: ONG GUAN CAN, ET AL.
Appellants: JUAN TONG and PUA GIOK ENG
Topic: Modes of Extinguishing Agency; Revocation coupled with an interest
Facts
        This is a suit over a rice mill and camarin situated at Dao, Province of Capiz.
        Plaintiff claims that the property belongs to its judgment debtor, Ong Guan
         Can
        Defendants Juan Tong and Pua Giok Eng claim as owner and lessee of the
         owner by virtue of a deed dated July 31, 1931, by Ong Guan Can, Jr.
        After trial, the Court of First Instance of Capiz held that the deed was invalid
         and that the property was subject to the execution which has been levied on
         said properties by the judgment creditor of the owner.
        Defendants Juan Tong and Pua Giok bring this appeal and insist that the
         deed of the 31st of July, 1931, is valid.
Issue W/N the deed dated July 31, 1931 is valid NO
Held
        The first recital of the deed is that Ong Guan Can, Jr., as agent of Ong Guan
         Can, the proprietor of the commercial firm of Ong Guan Can & Sons, sells
         the rice-mill and camarin for P13,000 and gives as his authority the power of
         attorney dated the 23rd of May, 1928, a copy of this public instrument being
         attached to the deed and recorded with the deed in the office of the register
         of deeds of Capiz.
        The receipt of the money acknowledged in the deed was to the agent, and
         the deed was signed by the agent in his own name and without any words
         indicating that he was signing it for the principal.
        Leaving aside the irregularities of the deed and coming to the power of
         attorney referred to in the deed and registered therewith, it is at once seen
         that it is not a general power of attorney but a limited one and does not give
         the express power to alienate the properties in question. (Article 1713 CC)
        Appellants claim that this defect is cured by Exhibit 1, which purports to be a
         general power of attorney given to the same agent in 1920.
        Art 1732 of the Civil Code is silent over the partial termination of an agency.
        The making and accepting of a new power of attorney, whether it
         enlarges or decreases the power of the agent under a prior power of
         attorney, must be held to supplant and revoke the latter when the two
         are inconsistent.
              o If the new appointment with limited powers does not revoke the
                     general power of attorney, the execution of the second power of
                     attorney would be a mere futile gesture.
        The title of Ong Guan Can not having been divested by the so-called
         deed of July 31, 1931, his properties are subject to attachment and
         execution.