PLOTINUS

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY

A. H. AEMSTRONG
EMEBTCTTS FBOFKSSOB OT 6KQEE
UNIVIiBSITY or UVBBPOOI.

IN SEVEN VOLUMES

V
BNNEADS
V. 1-9

OAMBEIDGB MASSACHUSETTS
HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS
LONDON
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LTD
MCMLXXXIV
© The President and Fellows of Harvard College, 1984

CONTENTS
PAGi:

PBEPACE . . . . '............................................................................ vii

sionA........................................................................................................................ ix

OBDO ENNBADVM and ORDO CHBOKOI.OOICVS ... X

EOTTBAD V.
1. ON TEE TEBEE FBmABY EYPOSTASES ... 5
2. OE TEE OBIOIE AND OBDEB OF TEE BEIKOS
American ISBN 0-674-99489-2 WECCE COME AFTER TEE FIRST .... 55
British ISBN 0 434 99444 8 3. ON TEE KNOWmO EYPOSTASES AND TEAT WEICE
IS BEYOND........................................................................ 67
4. BOW TEAT WEICE IS AFTER TEE FIRST COMES
FROM TEE FIRST, AND ON THE ONE . . . 137
5. TEAT TEE INTELLIGIBLES ARE NOT OUTSIDE TEE
intbuect, and on tee good .... 151
6. ON TEE FACT TEAT TEAT WEICE IS BEYOND
BBINO DOES NOT THINK, AND ON WHAT IS THE
PRIMARY AND WHAT THE SECONDARY THINKING
PRINCIPIE..................................................................... 199
7. ON THE QUESTION WHETHER THEBE ARE IDEAS
OF PARTICULARS.................................................... 219
8. ON THE INTEIilQIBEE BEAUTY........................... 233
9. ON INTELLECT, THE FORMS, AND BEING . . 283

Printed in Great Britain

V
 PREFACE
TO LOEB PLOTINUS IV-V
The text of these volumes, except in a few places,
is that of the second volume of the revised editio
minor of Henry and Schwyzer, Plotini Opera II Oxford
Classical Texts, 1977. TTie editors, translator, and
publishers have agreed that somewhat fuller critical
notes should be appended to the Greek text than in
the first three volumes of the Loeb Plotinus. These
critical notes show clearly all places where the printed
text departs from the manuscripts and all places
where the text of these volumes differs from that of
the Oxford Plotinus (H-S*): as a result of the exten­
sive critical revision of the text of their first edition
which the editors undertook in the preparation of the
Oxford text, and in which the translator to a modest
degree participated (hence the use of the first person
plural in the notes where the changes are agreed by
all), these latter are very few (26 in the Fourth
Ennead, 7 in the Fifth). A number of them are
corrections adopted by the editors after the pub­
lication of the Oxford Plotinus II and recorded in
Addenda et Corrigenda ad Textum et Apparatum
Lectionum in III (1982) pp. 304r-325.
A word of explanation and apology is due to the
reader for the long interval between the publication
of the first three volumes and that of these two.
The translator’s work was completed (except for
 PREFACE
minor corrections and revisions) in 1976: but as the
result of the agreement between the Oxford Univer­ SIGLA
sity Press and. the Loeb Classics the volumes could
not have been published with the Greek text before A = Laurentianus 87, 3.
1979. The subsequent delay was due to the financial A*- = Codicis A primus corrector.
stringencies which beset all academic publishing at E = Parisinus Gr. 1976.
the present time. B = Laurentianus 85, 15.
R = Vatioanus Reginensis Gr. 97.
A. H. Armstrong. J = Parisinus Gr. 2082.
U = Yaticanus Urbinas Gr. 62.
S = Berolinensis Gr. 375.
N = Monacensis Gr. 215.
M = Marcianus Gr. 240.
C = Monacensis Gr. 449.
V = Vindobonensis philosophicus Gr. 226.
Q = Marcianus Gr. 242.
L = Ambrosianus Gr. 667.
D = Marcianus Gr. 209.
w = AE
X = BRJ
y = USM
z = QL
Enn.» = wxUC
Enn.*> = A'™'xUC
mg = m margme
ac = ante correctionem
pc = post correctionem
* = consensus editorum sequentium cum editore
nominate
ital. = cod. vel ed. Eusebii
H-S ^ = Henry-Schwyzer, editio maior
H-S * = Henry-Schwyzer, editio minor (= OCT)
B-T = Beutler-Theiler
Dodds = CQ 28 (1934) 47-53
IX
 ORDO ENNEADVM COMPARATVR
CVM ORDINE CHRONOLOGICO
Enn. chron. Enn. chron. Enn. chron.
I 1 S3 II 1 40 Ill 1 3
I 2 19 II 2 14 III 2 47
I 3 20 II 3 52 III 3 48
I 4 46 II 4 12 III 4 IS
I 6 36 II 5 25 III 5 SO
I 6 1 II 6 17 III 6 26
I 7 54 II 7 37 III 7 46
I 8 51 II 8 35 III 8 30
I 9 16 n 9 33 III 9 13
Enn. chron. Enn. chron.
PLOTINUS
Enn. chron.
rv 1 21 V 1 10 VI 1 42 ENNEAD V
rv 2 4 V 2 11 VI 2 43
rv 3 27 V 3 49 VI 3 44
IV 4 28 V 4 7 VI 4 22
rv 6 29 V 5 32 VI 5 23
rv 6 41 V 6 24 VI 6 34
rv 7 2 V 7 18 VI 7 38
rv 8 6 V 8 31 VI 8 39
IV 9 8 V 9 5 VI 9 9

ORDO CHRONOLOGICVS COMPARATVR

CVM ORDINE ENNEADVM
chron. Enn. chron. Enn. chron. Enn.
1 I 6 19 I 2 37 n 7
2 IV 7 20 I 3 38 VI 7
3 III 1 21 IV 1 39 VI 8
4 IV 2 22 VI 4 40 II 1
6 V 9 23 VI 5 41 IV 6
6 rv 8 24 V 6 42 VI 1
7 V 4 25 II 5 43 VI 2
8 IV 9 26 III 6 44 VI 3
9 VI 9 27 IV 3 45 in 7
10 V 1 28 IV 4 46 I 4
11 V 2 29 IV 6 47 III 2
12 II 4 30 III 8 48 ni 3
13 III 9 31 V 8 49 V 3
14 II 2 32 V 6 50 III 6
16 III 4 33 n 9 51 1 8
16 I 9 34 VI 6 62 II 3
17 n 6 35 II 8 53 I 1
18 V 7 36 I 5 64 I 7
 SVMMARIVM

TaSe eveari TIXcotIvov ^i\oa6<j>ov ewedSps irefMmjs

V. 1 Af' Hepl rwv rpiwv dpxiKWV vnoardaecov.

V. 2 Xrj' Ilepi yevearecas Kal rd^ecos tojv pLerd to
•np&Tov.
V. 3 X9' Ilept rd)V yvoipiCTTiKCiiv xmoardaeoiv Kal tov
iireKeiva.
V. 4 p/ IIc/jI too tt&s dm rov irpoirov to perd to
TTpwrov Kal irepl tov evds-
V. 5 pa' Ilepi tov oti ovk e$o) tov vov t(x vo-qpaTa
Kal mpl Tayadov.
V. 6 p^' ri€/)t TOV TO ineKeiva tov ovtos pT} voeiv Kal
tL to 'irpwTOis voovv Kal tL to Sevrepcjs.
V. 7 py' ric/ai TOV el Kal tujv KaO' eKaard elaiv ISeai.
V. 8 jiiS' Ile/si TOW V01JT0W KaXXovs.
V. 9 pe' Ile/sl TOV vov Kal tcov ISediv Kal tov ovtos.

3
ENNEAD V. 1
 V. 1. ON THE THREE PRIMARY
HYPOSTASES

ItUrodudory Note
This treatise is the tenth in Porphyry’s chronological
order, in which the first great treatise on the One 9)
is the ninth. It is a fine example of the way in which
metaphysical refiection and peraonal spiritual ^e are
always indissolubly united in Plotinus. The treatise does
indeed, as its title indicates, give an account of the “ three
primary hypostases ”, the three great realities of Plotinus’s
world, in ascending order. Soul, Intellect, and the One,
and argues vigorously, if sometunes obscurely, for Ploti­
nus’s distinctive views of their differences and derivations
one £mm the other. But it is not a text-book exposition
of an abstract metaphysical system which does not involve
or commit writer or reader, but an “ ascent of the mind to
God ” which recalls man to an understanding of his true
nature and dignity and guides him on his way to his
ultimate goal. The first two chapters give a vivid picture
of the soul’s alienation and self-forgetfulness here below
and remind it of its true nature in language of a power
unsurpassed in the Entiecids; then we are shown how,
having returned to an understanding of our true nature
as soul, we find transcending it Intellect and the One or
Good, and are brought to see how the Good must transcend
and generate Intellect. After a doxographical digression
in Chapters 8 and 9 designed mainly to show (probably
against contemporary objections) that what Plotinus is
expounding is the true doctrine of Plato, we return in the
last three chapters to a reminder of how we, being soul,
can find Intellect and the One within us, and a final
7
 ON THE THREE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES ON THE THREE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES

exhortation not to be distracted by our superficial mundane Plato, and of Parmenides, at least as improved by Plato
consciousness but to turn inwards and “ listen to the (oh. 8). Anaxagoras, Heraclitus and Empedocles also
voices £rom on high agree in essentials, but Aristotle, though he makes the
first principle separate and intelligible, makes the mistake
Synopsis of thinking it a self-knowing intellect and introduces
incoherence into the intelligible world by his doctrine of
The souls of men have forgotten their Father and their the plurality of unmoved movers (ch. 9). How we find
true nature in their desire to belong to themselves -which Soul, Intellect, and the One within ourselves (chs. 10-11).
has led them into self-alienation and self-contempt and Final exhortation to turn inwards and concentrate our
an ignorant admiration of material things. Two wa^ to attention so that we hear the voices from on high (oh. 12).
convert them and lead them back up to Gfod: one is to
show how contemptible material things are, the other,
better one, is to remind the soul of its high birth and value.
Soul must know itself to know whether it is capable of
knowing higher things (oh. 1). Every soul must remember
that it made the whole universe: if it ficees itself firom
illusion and attains to true peace it will see the great soul
to which it is akin gi-ving life and light and beauty to the
world which is dead and worthless without it, keeping the
heavens in motion and giving divinity to the sun and other
heavenly bodies (ch. 2). When you have understood the
nature of soul, go on to the next stage on the way to God,
and grasp Intellect, the soul’s upper neighbour, and s^
how soul is an image of Intellect and depends on it and is
perfected by it (ch. 3). Intellect is the archetype of this
"visible universe, containing all that is in it in the eternal
fulness of which Kronos is a symbol. How its eternal
living reality is properly expressed in the categories of
Plato’s Sophist (ch. 4). Where does Intellect come from?
The One. Number is posterior to and produced by the
One and it is number (and so in another way the One)
which gives Intellect its structure (ch. 6). How the One
produces Intellect without movement or turning away firom
itself, as an eternal radiation from its perfection, and how
Intellect determines itself as the perfect unity-in-diversity
■ u:l
of the intelligible world by its return to the One, and in
its turn produces Soul, as all that is perfect must produce
(chs. 6-7). Confirmation that this is the true doctrine of
8 9
 V. 1. (10) nEPI TON TPION V. 1. ON THE THREE PRIMARY
APXIKON TnOSTASEON HYPOSTASES
1. Ti' ■n-ore apa eari ro irenoLrjKos ras ifivxas 1. What is it, then, which has made the souls
TTOLTpos Oeov eTTiXadeadai, km px)(,pas eK€i9ev^ forget their father, God, and be ignorant of them­
ovaas KM oXcjs eKeivov ayvoijaM km iavras^ km selves and him, even though they are parts which
eKeivov; apxh 1^^'' KaKov rj roXfia come from his higher world and altogether belong to
it ? The beginning of evil for them was audacity ^
5 KM 1} yevems km ri irpoyn] ereporqs km to
and coming to birth and the first otherness and the
^ovX-qeijvM 8e iavTcHv elvM. rw 8^j ain-e^ovMw
wishing to belong to themselves. Since they were
CTTCiSijTrep e<f>dvr]aa.v rjcrdetaM, ttoAAo) tw KivelaOM clearly delighted with their own independence, and
Trap' avTcov KexprjtJ^evM, tj)v havrlav Spa/xouoai made great use of self-movement, running the oppo­
KM -nXelxrrqv dmaracnv ireTTOif]pivM, ijyvorjaav site course and getting as far away as possible, they
KoX iavrds eKeXdev elvM- axmep iraiSes evOvs were ignorant even that they themselves came from
0 dirocnraGdevres dm irarepoiv km ttoAw xpo^°\ that world; just as children who are immediately
TToppco rpa<l>evres dyvoovai km eavrou? km tom from their parents and brought up far away do
■naripas. ovt ouv Iti eKiivov ovre iainds opw- not know who they themselves or their parents are.
OM, dripAoMiM lavras dyvoLa rod^ y^ovs, Since they do not any more see their father or
rip.'qaaoM rdXXa km irdvra p.dXXov rj eavras themselves, they despise themselves through ig­
norance of their birth and honour other things,
admiring everything rather than themselves, and,
1 ToAua was a Neopythagorean name for the Indefoute to Intellect’s coming into separate existence at VI. 9. 5. 29
Dyad (for which see below ch. 5) “ 'because it separated itself (where the word roXfvqaas is used); cp. III. 8. 8. 32—6. And
from the One cp. Plutarch De laide et Osinde 76, 381 F; the passage here about the toA/xo of soul is closely parallel
lambliohus Theologoumena Arithmeticae. 7. 19 and 9, 0 de in thought to that on the origin of time in III. 7. 11 (the word
Falco (quoting Anatolius, the third-century Aristotelmn pro­ ToAfta is not used there, but op. dpx«r avrijs /SouAofWvTjs koX
fessor at Alexandria who became a Christian bishop). Plotinus €tv(u avT^s lines 15-16, with to PovXi]Brjvai iamSiv ttvai here.
several times in the Enneads takes up this Pythagorean idea See further Naguib Baladi La Pensde de Plotin (Paris 1970),
and sees the root of all multiplicity, that is of all reahty other which is entirely concerned with the theme of audacity in
than and inferior to the One or good, in an audacious act ol Plotinus, and my discussion in the Cambridge History of Later
self-assertion, a will to independent existence. This is applied Creek arid Early Mediaeval Philosophy 242-5.
II
10
 ON THE THREE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES
PLOTINUS; ENNEAD V. 1.
astonished and delighted by and dependent on these
6avfjA<jaaai Kal irpos avroL e/CTrAaycwjai koi
[earthly] things, they broke themselves loose as far
16 dyaaOeiaai Kal i^rjprrjfievai rovrcDy, direpprjiav as they could in contempt of that from which they
<I)S dtov TC iavrds c5v d'neaTpd<lyrjaav dnpAaaaav turned away; so that their honour for these things
ware cTW/ijSaiVei rrjs iravreXovs dyvoLas eKeivov 17 here and their contempt for themselves is the cause
TiSvSe Tifirj /cat ij eavrwv dnp.la etvai airia. of their utter ignorance of God. For what pursues
dfia yap SiwKerai, dXXo Kal davpAl^erai,, /cat to
and admires something else admits at the same time
its own inferiority; but by making itself inferior to ^
davpiA^ov Kod BUokov dptoXoyeZ yeipov etvai' things which come into being and perish and con­
20 x^tpov 8e avrd ridepievov yiyvopAvwv Kal drroX- sidering itself the most contemptible and the most
Xvp.h>wv drifJMrarov re Kal ffvjjrorarov irdvrwv cSv liable to death of all the things which it admires ^
TtjLta VTToXapipdvov ovre deov <j>vaiv ovre Bvvapiiv it could not possibly have any idea of the nature and
dv TTore ev dvfxw jSoAotro. 8to 8et Sirrov yiyveaOai power of God. One must therefore speak in two
ways to men who are in this state of mind, if one is
Tov Xoyov irpos rovs ovrw SiaKeip-evovs, eiirep ns going to turn them round to what lies in the opposite
emarpeijtei avrovs els rd evavrla /cat rd irpwra Kal direction and is primary, and to lead them up to
26 dvdyoi jaej^p't rov dKpordrov Kal evds Kal irpwrov. that which is highest, one, and first. What, then,
rls oSv eKorepos; d p.ev SeiKvvs r^v drifilav rwv are these two ways ? One shows how contemptible
vvv npxapievwv, ov ev dXXois Siifiev emirXeov, are the things now honoured by the soul, and this
we shall develop more amply elsewhere,® but the
d Se SiSdaKwv Kal dva/upivijaKwv t^v ffn>xfjv otov other teaches and reminds the soul how high its
rov yevovs /cat rrjs d^las, os irpdrepds eariv birth and value are, and this is prior to the other one
eKeivov Kol aaxfrqviaOels /cd/cetvov BrjXwaei. irepi and when it is clarified will also make the other
30 o5 vvi' XeKreov eyyvs ydp oSros rov ^rjrovfievov obvious. This is what we must speak about now;
Kal TTpd epyov irpds eKeivov. rd ydp ^ijTot/i/ eari
it is close to the subject of our investigation and will
be useful for that other discourse. For that which
tirvxrj, Kal rl ov l^ryTei yvwareov avr^, Iva avrrjv investigates is the soul, and it should know what it
this fuller treatment is to be found, and it seems better to
^ Plotinus seems to have in mind the sort of melancholy suppose with Harder that Plotinus may never have carried
commonplace, contrasting the transitoriness of human life out his plan for a full-scale discourse on contempt of this
with the ceaseless self-renewal of non-human nature, which world, at any rate in writing—^perhaps because he found it
found its finest expressions in the Latin poetry of the first very hard really to despise our world of sense, though he
century B.C., e.g. Catullus 6, Horace Odes IV. 7; cp. [Moschus] sometimes felt he ought to do so, and when challenged by
Elegy on Bion 99-104 (which may have inspired Catullus). people who really despised and hated it (the Gnostics) he
• Editors disagree on where, if anjrwhere, in the Enneads defended its beauty and goodness passionately (cp. II. 9).
13
12
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 1. ON THE THEEE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES

TTporepov p-dd^, el Svvapiv e;^ei tov tol roiavra is as an investigating soul, so that it may learn first
Crp-eiv, Kai el oppa toiovtov ex^i, otov I8eiv, Kal el about itself, whether it has the power to investigate
irpocrqKei ^Tjrelv. el pev yap dXkorpia, ri Sei; el things of this kind, and if it has an eye of the right
35 8e aifyyevrj, Kal vpoa'qKeL Kal Svvarai evpelv.
kind to see them, and if the investigation is suitable
for it. For if the obj ects are alien, what is the point ?
2. '^vBvpeLaOco roiwv Trp&rov eKeivo rraaa But if they are akin, the investigation is suitable and
ipvxi^, d)s avTTj pev foia eTrolrjae irdvra ep-nvevaaaa
discovery is possible.
avrois ^co'qv, a re yrj rpe^ei a re ddXaaaa a re ev 2. Let every soul, then, first consider this, that it
depi a re ev ovpavcp darpa Beta, avrr] 8e rjXiov, made all hving things itself, breathing life into them,
5 avrri 8e rov peyav rovrov ovpavov, Kal avrrj those that the earth feeds and those that are nourished
eKoapTjaev, avrr] 8e ev rd^ei nepidyei ^vais oSaa by the sea, and the divine stars in the sky; it made
the sun itself, and this great heaven, and adorned it
erepa tSv KoapeZ Kal Sv KiveZ Kal a ^rjv rroieZ' Kai
rovroiv dvdyK-q elvai ripioirepav, yiyvopevcvv
itself, and drives it round itself, in orderly movement;
it is a nature other than the things which it adorns
rovrcvv Kal <f>Beipopevo)v, orav avrd drroXelrT'p and moves and makes live; and it must necessarily
T] X^PVYT} o-dr^ Se ovaa del r<p prj drro- be more honourable than they, for they come into
10 Xeirreiv eavrr]V. rls S17 rporros rrjs X°PVY^°'^ being or pass away when the soul leaves them or
^rjv ev re rip avpvavri ev re roZs eKdarois, <S8e grants hfe to them, but soul itself exists for ever
XoyiCeaBoj. aKorrelaBu) 8e rr]V peydXrjv ^XW because “ it does not depart from itself This is
dXXr] tfivx'^ ov apiKpd d^la rov oKorreZv yevopevt] how soul should reason about the manner in which it
grants life in the whole universe and in individual
drraXXayeZaa dvdrrjs Kal rdiv yeyorjreVKorajv rds things. Let it look at the great soul, being itself
dXXas rjavx<p rrj Karacrrdaei. rjavxov Se avrrj another soul which is no small one, which has become
16 earco prj povov to rtepiKeipevov acipa Kal 6 rov worthy to look by being freed from deceit and the
act)paros kXvScov, dAAd Kal rrav ro rrepiexov things that have bewitched the other souls, and is
rjavxos pev yrj, rjavyos §€ BdXaaaa Kal drjp Kal established in quietude. Let not only its encom­
passing body and the body’s raging sea be quiet, but
^ This phrase is taken from Plato Phaedrus 245C9. The
all its environment: the earth quiet, and the sea
whole acooimt of soul’s cosmic activity here is inspired by and air quiet, and the heaven itself at peace.* Into
Phaedrus 245C6ff. and Laws X 895A5£f.
’ This passage made a deep impression on both St. Basil the spiritual experience which he shared with his mother at
(Horn. XV de fide II 131o-d Gamier=PG 31, 465A-B; Be Ostia is deservedly famous {Confessions IX 10. 26ff.). The
Spiritu I 320C-322A Garnier=PG 29, 768B-772B—Basil is atuparos kAuSou' may be inspired by Plato Tinupus 43B5; for
here making extensive use of the whole passage 1. 29-3. 10) the metaphor cp. the oracle of Apollo on Plotinus (Porphyry
and St. Augustine, whose adaptation of it in his account of Life 22. 25-6 and 30-4).
14 IS
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 1. ON THE THREE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES
avros ovpavos aKT^fuav.^ voeLroi 8e -ndvroBev els this heaven at rest let it imagine soul as if flowing in
avTov eoTwaa e^codev otov elapeovaav Kal from outside, pouring in and entering it everywhere
etcr)(vBeiaa,v /cat -ndvrodev elcriovaav /cat elcrXdpiTOV- and illuminating it; as the rays of the sun light up
20 aav otov OKoreivov vi(f>os rjXlov ^oXal ^ioriaaaai a dark cloud, and make it shine and give it a golden
Xdpireiv TTOiovai xpvaoei87j o<!nv SiSovoai, ovrto rot look, so soul entering into the body of heaven gives
/cat i/njxrj iXdovaa els ocopa ovpavov eScoKe phf it life and gives it immortality and wakes what lies
l^oirpr, eSca/c6 Se affavaalav, r^eipe Se Kelpevov. inert. And heaven, moved with an everlasting mo­
6 8e KiVTjdels Kivrjaiv dlBiov vtto ^XVS ep<f>p6v(os tion by the wise guidance of soul, becomes a “ for­
25 dyovcrr/s ^(pov evSaipov eyevero, eaye re d^tW tunate living being ” and gains its value by the in­
ovpavos ^xfjs elaoiKiadeiayjs d>v vpo >ffvxy\s crcS/xa dwelling of soul; before soul it was a dead body,
veKpov, yi] Kal v8wp, pioXXov Se okotos vXrjs Kal earth and water, or rather the darkness of matter
pri ov Kal o arvyeovaiv ol deoC, (fyrjal ns. and non-existence, and “ what the gods hate ”, as
yevoiro 8’ dv <f>avepcorepa avrrjs /cat ivapyearepa ij a poet says.*- The power and nature of soul will
Svvapts Kal ij (f>vais, €t ns evravOa SiavorfBeirj, become still clearer and more obvious if one considers
30 OTTO/s ‘irepiexei Kal dyei rais avr^s fiovXijoeca rov here how it encompasses the heaven and drives it by
ovpavov. Travrl ph> yap rep peyedei rovrep, oaos its own acts of will. For soul has given itself to the
earlv, eScoKev eatn^v Kal irav Sidonfpa Kal peya whole magnitude of heaven, as far as it extends, and
Kal piKpov eiftvx<^ai, aXXov pev aXXrj Keipevov rov every stretch of space, both great and small, is
adparos, Kal rov pev eoSl, rov Se wSl ovros, Kal ensouled; one body lies in one place and one in
rwv pev ei evavrlas, rwv Se dXXrjv andpr^env dw’ another, and one is here and another there; some
36 dAA'^Acot' exdvTCOV. dXX’ ovy 17 ou8e are separated by being in opposite parts of the
p4pei avrrjs eKdarep KoraKeppanoBeZaa [popl<p universe, and others in other ways. But soul is
'I’vxfjs^ * C'iJ*' iToiet, dXXd rd trdvra Cfj rp 0A77, /cat not like this and it is not by being cut up that it
irdpean ‘iraaa -rravraxov rd yewiqaavn rrarpl gives life, by a part of itself for each individual thing,
opoiovpevrj Kal Kara ro ev Kal Kara ro 'rrdvrr). but all things live by the whole, and all soul is present
Kal iroXvs dv d ovpavos Kal dXXos dXXrj ev eon rfj everywhere, made like to the father who begat it in
40 ravrrjs Swdpei Kal Beds eon Sid ravrrjv d Koapos its unity and its universality. And by its power the
heaven is one, though it is multiple with one part in
^ atcqpMiv (silms) Schwyzer (Mus, Hdv. 37, 1980): dfuivwv one place and one in another, and our universe is a
ARJP®: dfiMtvoj ERJ*®UC.
‘ om. Basilius: delevimus, ut glossam ad fitpu avrijs- * The phrase is used of Hades in Iliad 20. 65.
l6 17
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 1. ON THE THREE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES

00€. €GTl 0€/cat rjAlOS' t7€09, OTt €fltfWXO$, /Cttt god by the agency of this soul. And the sun also
TO. aAAa doTpa, Kal ’qp.eZs, ehrep ri, Sid tovto"
is a god because it is ensouled, and the other heavenly
bodies, and we, if we are in any way divine, are so
veKves ydp Koirpioiv iK^XrjTorepoi. rrjv Se for this reason: for “ corpses are more throwable
deois alnav rov Oeois etvai dvdyK-q irpecxPvTepav away than dung But that which is for the gods
Oeov avTcbv elvai. opioeiS^s Se Kal -q •qp.eripa, Kal the cause of their being gods must necessarily be a
divinity senior to them. But our soul is of the same
45 orav dvev tcHv 'TrpoaeXdovrwv aKOTrrjs Xa^div
kind, and when you look at it without its accretions
KeKadappLevTjv, evpqaeis to ai5ro rLp,iov, o and take it in its purified state you will find that very
^vxq, Kal Tip,ia>repov TTavrds rov o dv auinariKov same honourable thing which [we said] was soul,
yrj ydp ndvra' kSv mSp Se ^,'ri dv etr] to more honourable than everything which is body.
For all bodily things are earth; and even if they are
Kaiov avTOv; Kal daa Ik rovroiv avvdera, kov fire, what would its burning principle be [but soul] ?
vScop avTOis TTpocrdfjs kov depa. el S’ ori efufwxov And the same is true of all things compounded of
50 SicuKTov ecrrai, rl vapels ri eavrdv dXXov SicoKei; these, even if you add water to them, and air as well.
TT]v Se ev dXX(p ifrvxqv dydyievos aeavrdv dyaaai. But if the bodily is worth pursuing because it is
ensouled, why does one let oneself go and pursue
3. OvTO) Sq rifilov Kcd deiov ovros xp^j/iaTOS rqs another ? But by admiring the soul in another, you
<pvx7}s, marevaas qSq rw roiovrcp Oeov pierievai admire yourself.
fierd TOiavTTjs airlas dvd^aive ■upds e/cetvov 3. Since the soul is so honourable and divine a
irdvrais ttov ov iroppco jSaAeis" ouSe woAAa rd thing, be sure already that you can attain God by
reason of its being of this kind, and with this as your
5 p,era^v. XdpL^ave rolwv rd rov deiov rovrov motive ascend to him: in all certainty you will not
deiorepov rd <j/vxqs npds rd dvco yeirovqpia, p,e6’ look far; and the stages between are not many.
o Kal oxf)' oS ij •pvxq- Kainep ydp ovaa xPVf^^ Grasp then the soul’s upper neighbour,* more divine
otov eSei^ev 6 Xoyos, elKcov ris ecrri vov’ otov than this divine thing, after which and from which
Aoyoy o ev irpo^op^ Aoyou rov ev 'jrvx^, ovrco rot the soul comes. For, although it is a thing of the
kind which our discussion has shown it to be, it is
an image of Intellect; just as a thought in its
^ Heraclitus, Diels B 96. utterance is an image of the thought in soul, so soul
’ Plotinus has perhaps remembered the unusual word itself is the expressed thought of Intellect,® and its
yeiTovrjiia from Plato Laws IV 705A4, but if so he has for­
gotten the singularly inappropriate context—the sea in Plato ® The distinction here made between the Adyos ivSioBeros
would be a “ bitter and briny neighbour ’’ to the city for (the thought in the mind) and the Adyos nfxxjiopiKos (the thought
which a site is being considered. expressed) first appears in Stoic logic: cp. SVF II 135.
l8 19
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 1. ON THE THREE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES
Kal avTTi Xoyos vov Kal irdoa evepyeia Kal whole activity, and the hfe which it sends out to
10 TTpoterai ^uy}]v els dXXov VTToaracriv oXov mpos to
establish another reality; as fire has the heat which
remains with it and the heat which it gives. But
rj avvovaa depporrjs, 17 Se ■^v Trapix^i. Set 8e one must understand that the activity on the level
Xa^eZv €K€t OVK eKpeovaav, dXXa p,ivovaav pev tt]v of Intellect does not flow out of it, but the external
activity comes into existence as something distinct.
iv avr<p, rrjv 8e dXX.7]v v^iarapevTjv. oSaa oSv Since then its existence derives from Intellect soul
dno vov voepd iari, Kal iv Xoyiapxns d vovs avrijs is intellectual, and its intellect is in disemsive reason­
ings, and its perfection comes from Intellect, like a
Kal rj reXeUoais wn avrov naXiv otov irarpos father who brings to maturity a son whom he begat
16 iKOpii/iavTos, ov ov reXeiov ws irpos avrov iyevvr]- imperfect in comparison with himself. Soul’s estab­
lishment in reality, then, comes from Intellect and
arev. Tj re oSv v-ndaraais avrf\ dwo vov o re its thought becomes actual in its seeing of Intellect.
evepyeia Xoyos vov avrfj dpcopevov. orav yap For when it looks into Intellect, it has within it and
as its own what it thinks in its active actuahty. And
evlSr] els vovv, evBoOev exec Kal ot/ceia a voet Kal we should call these alone activities of the soul, all
evepyet. Kal ravras povas Set Xeyecv evepyeias it does intellectually and which spring from its own
home; its inferior activities come from elsewhere
c/ivxjjs, daa voepdis Kal oaa ocKodev rd 8e x^^P^
and belong to a soul of this inferior kind. Intellect
20 aXXodev Kal TraOrj ’jtvx'fjs rijs roiavrqs. vovs ovv therefore makes soul still more divine by being its
enl paXXov Oecorepav irocec Kal rep •narijp elvai Kal father and by being present to it; for there is
nothing between but the fact that they are different,^
rw irapeivar ov8ev yap p^ra^v ^ rd erepois elvai, soul as next in order and as the recipient. Intellect
U)S i(l>e$ijs pivroi Kal d)s ro 8exdpevov, ro 8e ws as the form; and even the matter of Intellect is
beautiful, since it has the form of Intellect and is
el8os' KaXfj Se Kal 17 vov vXrj voo€i8rjs oSaa Kal simple. But what Intellect is like is clear from this
anXi}. oTov 8e d vovs, Kal ravrw pev rovrw very fact that it is superior to soul which is of such
great excellence.
25 8'fjXov, on Kpeirrov roiacr8e ovcrrjs. 4. But one might see this also from what follows:
4. ”I8ot 8’ dv ns Kal e/c rwv8e' Koapov aladrjrdv if someone admires this perceptible universe, ob­
serving its size and beauty and the order of its ever-
rdv8e ei Tts davpd^ei ets re rd peyedos koI rd
KoXXos Kal rrjv rd^iv rijs ^opds rrjs diStow ^ Cp. V. 8. 7. 13, where the phrase ovSeyos Si fiera^i ovros
is used of the intelligible and material universes.
20 21
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 1. ON THE THEEE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES
aTTo^Xeircov Kat Oeovs tovs ev avrw, tovs [ih> lasting course, and the gods in it, some of whom are
6 opcofievovs, TOVS Se Kal d<j)aveis ovras, Kal
seen and some are invisible, and the spirits, and all
animals and plants, let him aseend to its archetypal
SaljMvas Kal f<3a (f>vrd re irdvra, em to dp^ertmov and truer reality and there see them all intelligible
avTov Kat TO dXrjOivuyrepov dva^ds KdKsi Ttavra and eternal in it, in its own understanding and life;
ISeTCo vojyrd Kat nap’ avrcp diSia ev olKela and let him see pure Intellect presiding over them,
and immense -wisdom,' and the true life of Kronos, a
crweaei Kat fcojj, koI tovtcov tov dK'qpaTov vovv god who is fulness and intellect.^ For he encompasses
npocrraTrjV, Kat ao<l>lav dp/q)(avov, koI tov cos’ in himself all things immortal, every intellect, every
10 dXrjOws ent K/)oi/ou pU)v deov Kopov Kat vov god, every soul, all for ever unmoving. For why should
it seek to change when all is well -with it? Where
ovTos. ndvra yap iv avrw to dOdvaTa nepieyei, should it seek to go away to when it has everything
vovv ndvra, deov ndvra, ipvy^v ndaav, eoTCora del. in itself? But it does not even seek to increase,
tI yap ^Tjrei pera^dXXetv eS ex^vv; nov Se since it is most perfect. Therefore all things in it
are perfect, that it may be altogether perfect,
fiereXdetv ndvra nap’ avr<p eyoiv; dXX’ oo8e
having nothing which is not so, having nothing in
av^eiv l^rjTet reXeidraros u>v. Sio Kat rd nap’ itself which does not think; but it thinks not by
15 avrw ndvra reXeia, tva ndvTT) ^ reXeios ovSev seeking but by having. Its blessedness is not some­
eyayv o ri pn) roiovrov, ovSev eycvv ev avrcp o thing acquired, but all.things are in eternity, and the
true eternity, which time copies, running round the
pr] voeT' voec Se ov C^rdiv, dXX’ eycov. Kat ro soul, letting some things go and attending to others.
paKdpiov avrcp ovk enhcrrp'ov, dXX’ ev alcovi For around Soul things come one after another; now
ndvra, Kat 6 ovrcos alcLv, ov pipeirai ^^pwos Socrates, now a horse, always some one particular
reality; but Intellect is all tWngs. It has therefore
nepideoiv cpvy^v rd pev napiels, rois Se eni^dXXcov. everything at rest in the same place, and it only is,
20 Kat ydp dXXa Kat oAAa av nept ilivy'^v' nore ydp and its " is ” is for ever, and there is no place for
JjcvKpdrrjs, nore Se tnnos, h> ri dei rcdv ovrcov 6 Se the future for then too it is—or for the past—for
vovs ndvra. eyei odv [ev rw adry] ^ ndvra earwra
nothing there has passed away—^but all things remain
stationary for ever, since they are the same, as if
ev rep avrcp, Kat ecrri povov, Kat rd "ecjriv” del, ^ The quaint etymology of Plato Graiylua 396B6-7 is in
Kat ovSapov rd peeXXov—ecrri ydp Kat rare—ovSe rd Plotinus’ mind here: but there Kopos signifies to KaSapov avrov
icat aicjpaTov tov vov. For Plotinus, here and else-where, the
napeXr]Xv96s—ov ydp ri eKei napeXiqXvdev—dAA’ word Kopos is applied to Intellect or Soul in its two meanings
of “satiety” (signifying the plenitude of intelligible being)
26 evecmjKev del are rd avrd ovra otov dyanedvra and “ boy ” (the son of the Father, the One): cp. ch. 7 below
and III..8. 11; V. 8. 12-13.
^ del. Harder. 23
 PLOTINUS; ENNEAD V. 1. ON THE THKEE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES
eavTO. OVTOJS e^ovra. tKaarov 8e avrcov vovs Kal ov they were satisfied with themselves for being so.^
eoTt Kal TO ovfjiiTav iras vovs Kal ttSv ov, 6 fiev vovs But each of them is Intellect and Being, and the
whole is universal Intellect and Being, Intellect
Kara to voeZv v<f>iaras to ov, to Se ov tco voetadai making Being exist in thinking it, and Being giving
t<3 vu) SiSov TO voelv Kal to etvai. tov Se voecv Intellect thinking and existence by being thought.
30 aiTtov dXAo, o Kal tw ovti' dfi^oTeptvv oSv dfta But the cause of thinking is sometldng else, which is
aiTiov dX\o. d[ia fxev yap CKelva Kal avvvirdpxei also cause of being; they both therefore have a /
cause other than themselves. For they are simul­
Kal ovK aTToXevnei ciAAijAa, dAAd Svo ovra tovto to taneous and exist together and one does not abandon
ev o/iov vovs Kal ov Kal voovv Kal voovpLevov, 6 p,ev the other, but this one is two things. Intellect and
Being and thinking and thought. Intellect as thinking
vovs /card, to voeZv, to Se ov koto, to voovpxvov.
and Being as thought. For there could not be
ov yap dv yevoiTO to voelv eTeporijTOS pvfj ovarjs Kal thinking without otherness, and also sameness.
35 TavTOTrjTOS Se. ylveTai oSv to, Trp&ra vovs, ov, These then are primary. Intellect, Being, Otherness,
eTepoTTjs, TavTOT7]S‘ SeZ Se Kal Kivrjorcv Xa^elv Sameness; but one must also include Motion and
Rest. One must include movement if there is
Kal OTaaiv. koX KivT]aiv p.ev, el voel, OTacnv Se, thought, and rest that it may think the same; and
iva TO avTo. Ttjv Se eTepOTrjTa, tv' voovv Kal otherness, that there may be thinker and thought;
voovfievov. Tj edv d(j)eX‘r]s rtp/ eTepor^Ta, ev yev6p,e- or else, if you take away otherness, it will become
one and keep silent; and the objects of thought,
vov atcoTT^oeTttf SeZ Se Kal toZs voTjdeZcnv eTepois also, must have otherness in relation to each other.
40 Ttpos dXXrjXa etvai. Tavrov Se, enel ev eavrw, Kal But one must include sameness, because it is one
Koivov Se Ti ev ndar Kal r] Siaifiopd eTepoTtjs. with itself, and all have some common unity; and
TavTa Se nXelw yevopieva dpi6p,6v Kal to TToadv
the distinctive quality of each is otherness. The
fact that there are several'of these primaries makes
iToieZ- Kal TO iToiov Se ij eKoarov tovtcvv tSiorqs, number and quantity; and the particularity of each
e^ J)v <I)s dpxdiv TdXXa. makes quality, and from these as principles every­
thing else comes.
^ Plotinus is here paraphrasing what Plato says about
eternal intelligible being in Timaeus 37E6^8B3 (though it is categories ” of Sophist 254D£f. to Intellect he has to introduce
not certain whether Plato was thinking like Plotinus of KCvr/ms, the motion of thought, into it (lines 36—7); and he
timeless eternity and not rather of changeless duration). sometimes goes much further than here in introducing the
Plotinus follows the Timaeus here in insisting that all things movement which seems inseparable from our concepts of life
in Intellect are stationary, but when he turns, as he so often and thought into the intelligible world: cp. V. 8. 3-4 and VI.
does, later in the chapter (lines 36£F.) to apply the “ Platonic 7. 13.
24 25
 PLOTINUS; ENNEAD V. 1. ON THE THREE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES

5. IIoAu? ovv oStos 6 deos im Trj ifivx^' Tfj 8c 5. This god, then, which is over the soul, is multi­
ple; and soul exists among the intelhgible reahties
VTrdpx^i’ ey rovrois elvai awa^Oeiarj, el (jurj aTTOcrra- in close unity with them, unless it wills to desert
reTv eOeXoi. TieXdaaaa oSv avrco Kal olov ev them. When it has come near then to him and, in
a way, become one with him, it hves for ever. Who
yevofjievr] ^fj del?- rls odv 6 tovtov yewqaas; 6 is it, then, who begat this god? The simple god,
6 dvXovs Kal 6 irpo roio-vrov TrX-qOovs, 6 atrtos’ rov Kal the one who is prior to this kind of multiplicity, the
cause of this one’s existence and multiphcity, the
elvai Kal voX-uv elvai tovtov, 6 tov dpi6p,6v Troioiv. maker of number. For number is not primary: the
6 yap dpiOpios ov Trpcoros' Kal yap npo SvdSos to
One is prior to the dyad, but the dyad is secondary
and, originating from the One, has it as deliner, but
ev, 8e-UTepov 8c 8ua? Kal Trapd tov evos yeyevrjp,evr} is itself of its own nature indefinite; but when it is
€Keivo opiar^v eyei, avrrj * 8e dopicjTOV Trap' avTijs" defined, it is already a number, but a number as
substance; and soul too is a number.^- For masses
OTav 8e opiadfj, dpidpios ySrj- dpi6p,6s 8e cos o-vala' and magnitudes are not primary: these things which
have thickness come afterwards, and sense-perception
10 dpi6p,6s 8e Kal Tj 4’^Xl- Y^P oy'<o‘- ™ Trpuna
thinks they are realities. Even in seeds it is not the
ov8e pieyeOr]- to. yap Trayda Tavra varepa, a ovra moisture which is honourable, but what is unseen:
and this is number and rational principle. Therefore
Tj aiadr^ais oieTai. ovSe ev aireppxiai 8e to vypov what is called number in the intelligible world and
TO Tipiiov, dXXd TO pir) dpcopievov tovto 8c dpiOpios the dyad are rational principles and Intellect; but
the dyad is indefinite when one forms an idea of it
Kal Xoyos. d oSv e/ceZ Xeydpevos dpi9p,6s Kal rj by what may be called the substrate, but each and
Svds Xdyoi Kal vovs' dXXd ddpicrros piev rj Svds tco
with the aopujTos Svds; and for a fuller exposition of this
16 olov vnoKeifievo) Xap,^avop,evr}, d Se dpidpids d e^ very important doctrine VI. 7. 16-17 and V. 3. 11. 1-12;
cp. also the account of “ intelligible matter ” in II. 4. 1—5.
1 Seidel, et testatur Theol. VIII. 129: Cufrcl Enn.* defendunt I'or the dyad as toV“ Chapter 1, n. 1. For Plotinus’s full
Henry (Etats 196) et Cileuto. treatment of the Platonic doctrine of Ideal Numbers, briefly
• Fioinus: ovn; Enn. and obscmrely referred to in this chapter, see VI. 6 On
Numbers. For the doctrine of the Ideal Numbers and their
generation from the One and the Indefinite Dyad in Plato
^ The “ dyeid ” here is the indefinite life or sight which is (as reported by Aristotle) and the Old Academy see, in the
the first moment in the timeless formation of Intellect by first instance, P. Merlan in The Cambridge History of Later
procession from and return upon the One. See V. 4. 2. 4—10, Greek and Early Mediaeval Philosophy (Cambridge 1970) Part
where the dopioros oi/iis of Intellect is explicitly identified I, Chapter 2, and the references there given.
26 27

I
 PLOTINUS; ENNEAD V. 1. ON THE THREE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES

avrijs /cat rov evos el8os eKaaros, otov fxop<f>cod€VTOs every number which comes from it and the One is
a form, as if Intellect was shaped by the numbers
Tots yevofievois etSeaiv ev avrw‘ pLop^vrai Sc
which came to exist in it; but it is shaped in one
oAAov fi€V rpoTTov Trapa rov evos*, aAAov oe irap way by the One and in another by itself, like sight
avToO, otov oxfns r) kot evepyeiav eon yap ij vot)- in its actuaUty; for intellection is seeing sight, and
ais opaais opwaa a/x^co tc ^ ev. both are one.
6. How then does it see, and whom does it see ?
6. no)? o5v opa KoX rlva, koX iruts oXcos vnean] And how did it come into existence at all and arise
Kol SKeivov yeyovev, Iva Kat opa; vuv /tev yap from the One so as to be able to see ? For the souk
Trpf avdyKrp/ tov etvai ravra ij ®X^*» crnTTO^ei now knows that these things must be, but longs
to answer the question repeatedly discussed also by
Sc TO OpvXXovpievov Srj tovto koI Trapa rots ttoAoi
the ancient philosophers, how from the One, if it is
6 ao<f>oZs, TTWS c^ evo? roiovrov ovros', otov Xeyop^v to such as we say it is, anything else, whether a multi-
ev etvai, irroaraaiv ecrj^ev ortofJv etTC TrXijdos eire pUcity or a dyad or a number, came into existence,
8vds ciTC dpiOpLos, dXX' ovK ep,eivev e/ceivo e^’ and why it did not on the contrary remain by itself,
but such a great multiplicity flowed from it as that
eavTov, ToaovTov 8e TrXrjdos e^eppvrj, o opdrai p^v
which is seen to exist in beings, but which we think
ev Tois oSaiv, dvdyeiv Se avro trpos e/cctvo d^iovpev. it right to refer back to the One. Let us speak of
cSSc o5v Xeyeado) 6eov avrov eiriKaXeaapevois ov it in this way, first invoking God himself, not in
10 Xoycp yeywvw, dXXd Trj ilwxfj e/CTetvacrtv eamovs ci? spoken words, but stretching ourselves out with our
eix^v Trpos eKetvov, evy^odai tovtov tov rporrov
soul into prayer to him, able in this way to pray alone
to him alone.^ The contemplator, then, since God
8wapevovs pAvovs Trpos povov. Set rolwv ffea-rijv, exists by himself as if inside the temple, remaining
eKeivov ev rw eiao) otov veip e<f>’ eavrov ovros, quiet beyond all things, must contemplate what cor­
pAvovros Tjavyov eTre/cetva aTrdvroyv, rd otov Trpos respond to the images already standing outside the
TO. eict) 17S1J dydXp^Ta earwra, paXXov Se dyaXpa temple, or rather that one image which appeared
16 TO TrpwTOV eK<j>avev dedadai TTe<j>rp>6s tovtov tov first; and this is the way in which it appeared:
everything which is moved must have some end to
rpoTTOv TravTi rep Kivovpevcp Set Tt etvai, Trpos which it moves. The One has no such end, so we
o Kiveirar pr] ovros Se eKeivcp p'q8ev6s pri ri- must not consider that it moves. If anything comes
6<apeda avro KiveiaOai, oAA’ ei ri per' avro
^ The only explicit reference to genuine prayer in Plotinus
t a/t^cu TC (et and)0 Ficinus) Sleeman, et> testatur Theol. VIU. (though his whole philosophy is prayer in this sense). Prayer
135: Sfuj><o TO Enn., Pema, Creuzer: d/x^2 to Kirchhoff, Mliller: to lesser deities for material needs is for him a magical activity:
afiifxa TO Volkmann *. see IV. 4. 30-39.
28 29
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 1. ON THE THREE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES

yiVerai, emarpa^ivTos del eKeivov vpos avro into being after it, we must think that it necessarily
does so while the One remains continually turned
dvayKoiov eari yeyoveuai. e/CTToStov 8e r]p,iv ecrrto towards itself. When we are discussing eternal
20 yevecns ij ev yp6v<p t6v Xoyov Ttepi Tcjv aei ovTiov realities we must not let coming into being in time
TTOiovpLevois" Tcp Se Aoyw t^v yeveoiv iTpoaairTOV- be an obstacle to our thought; in the discussion we
apply the word “ becoming ” to them in attributing
ras avTois <d7ToSd<rei> ^ airias Kat rdiecas [auTor? to them causal connection and order, and must
d7ToSc6or€i] ^ TO oSv yiv6p.€Vov eKeidev ov Kivt]Bevros therefore state that what comes into being from the
(jiareov yiyveaOar el yap Kivqdevros avroO ri One does so without the One being moved; for if
anything came into being as a result of the One’s
ylyvoiro, rpLrov dn' eKelvov to yiyvop-evov p,era
being moved, it would be the third starting from the
26 ttjv Kunjaiv dv ylyvoiro Kai ov Sevrepov. Set ow One, not the second, since it would come after the
dKivTjTOV ovros, et ri Sevrepov p.er avro, ov movement.^ So if there is a second after the One
it must have come to be without the One moving at
TTpoavevaavros ovSe ^ovXrjdevros ovSe oXois kivtj-
all, without any inclination or act of will or any sort
devros vTTOcrrijvai avro. nrcos odv Kai ri Set voffaai of activity on its part. How did it come to be then,
trepl eKeivo pievov; irepiXapvpiv e^ avrov [lev, e^ and what are we to think of as surrounding the One
in its repose ? It must be a radiation from it while
avTov 8e pievovros, otov rjXiov ro irepl avro Xap-irpov it remains unchanged, like the bright light of the
30 d>airep irepiBeov, e^ avrov del yewcofievov (jievovTos. sun which, so to speak, runs round it, springing from
Kai TTavra rd ovra, ecvs p.evei, eK rijs avrciiv ovaias it continually while it remains unchanged. All
things which exist, as long as they remain in being,
dvayKalav rrjv Trepl avrd irpos ro e^cj avrcuv eK tt]s necessarily produce from their own substances, in
irapovcrrjs Swap-ecvs SlScoaiv avroiv e^TjprrjixevTjv dependence on their present power, a surrounding
VTToaraaiv, elKova oSaav otov dpy'erviTcvv <Sv e^e(f>v reahty directed to what is outside them, a kind of
image of the archetypes from which it was produced:
35 TTvp p.ev rrjv Trap' avrov depp,6rrfra‘ Kai yiwv ovk lire produces the heat which comes from it; snow
etoco px>vov ro ifivypov Kareyei' paXiara 8e oaa does not only keep its cold inside itself. Perfumed
things show this particularly clearly. As long as
evcoSr] ixaprvpe? rovro- ecos yap ecrri, irpoeiai ri they exist, something is diffused from themselves
e^ avrcov irepl avrd, <!)v diroXavei viroaravriov o around them, and what is near them enjoys their
^ airoSoaa transposuimus, alrtas genetivus (testatur Theo-
logia): avTois anoZdiaei (-Sdact cod. Ottobonianus: -StoGCtv 1 Cp. what is said about the unnecessary multiplication of
H-S *■’) delevimus; distinctio ante to tollenda. hypostases in II. 9. I.
31
3°
 PLOTINUS; ENNEAD V. 1. ON THE THKEE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES

ttAtjo-iov.Kal TTOvra Se oaa •^817 reXeia yewa- to existence.^ And all things when they come to per­
8e del reXeiov dei Kal diBiov yewa- Kal eXarrov Se fection produce; the One is always perfect and
therefore produces everlastingly; and its product is
40 iavTov yewa. ri oSv ypfj irept tov reXeioTaTOV
less than itself. What then must we say about the
Xeyeiv; p/qSev dir’ avrov rd fieyiara /xer’ avrov. most perfect? Nothing can come from it except
fieyiarov Se fier avrov vovs Kal Sevrepov Kal yap that which is next greatest after it. Intellect is
opa 6 vov£ CKeivov Kal SeTrai avrov p,6vov eKeivos next to it in greatness and second to it; for Intellect
sees it and needs it alone; but it has no need of
8e rovrov ovSev Kal rd yewdipxvov dnd Kpeirrovos Intellect; and that which derives from something
vov vovv etvai, Kal Kpelrrcov dirdvrwv vovs, on greater than Intellect is intellect, which is greater
46 rdAAa p,er avrov otov Kal ij Xoyos vov Kal than all things, because the other things come after
evepyeid ns, uxnrep avrds eKeivov. dAAd >lnrxfis it: as Soul is an expression and a kind of activity of
Intellect, just as Intellect is of the One. But soul’s
p,ev dfjLvSpds d Adyoj—cos ydp eiSaiXov vov—ravrrj expression is obscure—^for it is a ghost of Intellect—•
Kal els vovv ^Xe-neiv Set' vovs Se coaravrcos npos and for this reason it has to look to Intellect; but
eKeivov, tva jj vovs. dpa 8e avrov od ywpiadeLs, Intellect in the same way has to look to that god,
dAA’ on p,er avrov Kal piera^v ovSev, cos ovSe in order to be Intellect. But it sees him, not as
separated from him, but because it comes next after
SO tlw)(fjs Kal vov. TToOet Se vdv rd yewrjaav koI rovro
him, and there is nothing between, as also there is
dyaira, Kal pAXiara drav tSoi piovoi rd yewrjaav not anything between soul and Intellect. Every­
Kal rd yeyewqpAvov orav Se Kal rd dpiarov ^ to thing longs for its parent and loves it, especially
yew^aav, e^ dvdyKtjs avveanv avrco, cos rfj when parent and offspring are alone; but when the
parent is the highest good, the offspring is necessarily
ereporryn piovov Keycopladai. with him and separate from him only in otherness.
7. Ei/cdva Se eKeivov Xeyopiev etvai rdv vovv Sei 7. But we say that Intellect is an image of that
ydp aa<f>earepov Xeyeiv rrporrov p.ev, on Set rrcos Good; for we must speak more plainly; first of all
etvai CKeivo rd yevopievov Kal drroacp^eiv rroXXd we must say that what has come into being must be
avrov Koi etvai 6p,oi6rr)ra rrpds avro, cdarrep Kal
in a way that Good, and retain much of it and be a
likeness of it, as light is of the sun. But Intellect
5 rd <f>d)s rov rjXlov. dAA’ ov vovs e/cetvo. rrcos is not that Good. How then does it generate
oSv vovv yewa; r; on rfj emarpocfrfj rrpds avrd Intellect ? Because by its return to it it sees; and

^ A striking example of the often misunderstood metaphor Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Mediaeval Philo­
of “ emanation **, on which see my contribution to The sophy Part III, Chapter 15, 239-41.
32 33
 PLOTINUS; ENNEAD V. 1. ON THE THREE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES
€U>pa' rj Se opaais avrr] vovs. to yap KaraXap,- this seeing is Intellect.^ For that which apprehends
something else is either sense-perception or intellect;
Pdvov dXXo rj ataOrjais ^ vovs' cuaBrjaiv ypap,- (sense-perception is a line etc.) * but the circle is of
a kind which can be divided; but this [intellectual
p,rjv Kal rd aAAa- aAA’ o kvkXos toiovtos otos apprehension] is not so. There is One here also,
but the One is the productive power of all things.
pepi^eaOai' tovto Se ovy ovtojs. ^ Kat evravda The things, then, of which it is the productive power
are those which Intellect observes, in a way cutting
10 ev pUv, dAAd TO Iv Svvapis irdvTwv. cov ovv iari itself oif from the power; otherwise it would not be
Intellect. For Intellect also has of itself a kind of
Svvapis, ravra otto t^s Swd/neco? olov ayillopLlvr] ij
intimate perception of its power, that it has power to
voTjats KaOopd' ^ ovk dv ijv vovs- iirel Kal -Trap' produce substantial reality. Intellect, certainly, by
its own means even defines its being for itself by the
avTOV eyei ySrj otov awataOrfoiv Tfjs Bwdpetos, power which comes from the One, and because its
substance is a kind of single part of what belongs to
or dvvariai ovaiav. ainos yovv 8i’ avrov Kal opC^ei the One and comes from the One, it is strengthened

TO elvai avTw t^ Trap' CKeivov Svvdpei Kal on otov separation from itself or multiplicity in the One. The de­
velopment of one side of his thought about this ultimate
16 pepos ev n rwv eKelvov Kal CKelvov ij ovala, koX
and mysterious relationship, on the line which appears to have
been followed by Porphyry, might lead to a conclusion some­
thing like this. But I do not think it should be read back
paiwvrai Trap' eKelvov Kal reXeiovrai els ovaiav into Plotinus himself without better evidence than the present
ambiguous passage supplies. I therefore, with Cilento, Igal
and others, suppose an abrupt change of subject (by no means
* Several scholars have thought that the subject of iwpa unprecedented in Plotinus) and take avro as non-refiexive
in this sentence is the One or Good, which is certainly the (“it”, not “itself”) and understand that Plotinus is ex­
subject of ycvvS. in the preceding sentence. Henry and pounding his normal doctrine that Intellect constitutes itself
Schwyzer now accept this view (see their Addenda-ad Textum by returning in vision or contemplation upon the One (op.
in Plotini Opera III. p. 397). The sentence would then mean oh. 5, n. 1).
“The One by its return to itself sees: and this seeing is * We need not suppose any corruption of the text here if,
Intellect.” But this simple identification of Intellect with with Igal, we assume that Plotinus is briefly reminding his
the self-vision of the One does not agree with anything else readers of an analogy which would be familiar to them, in
which is said about the relationship of the two hypostases in which sense-perception is comj>ared to a line, intellect to a
the Enneads; and it seems to me most unlikely that Plotinus circle, and the One to the centre of the circle. (These early
would ever have spoken of the One as “ returning ” upon treatises were written for circulation only to a few intimate
itself and seeing itself as the unity-in-multiplicity which is associates, for whom this sort of summary reminder would
Intellect: for in his thought there can be absolutely no be sufficient: cp. Porphyry Life ch. 4.)
34 35
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 1. ON THE THREE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES

Trap’ eKeivov Kal eKeivov. opd Se avrw CKetOev, by the One and made perfect in substantial existence
by and from it. But Intellect sees, by means of
otov [lepiOTW dpcpLcrrov, Kal to fijv Kal to
itself, like something divided proceeding from the
voeiv Kal irdvra, ori €K€ivos p.rj8ev twv irdvTwv undivided, that life and thought and all things come
20 ravrrj yap irdvra eKeivov, dri pvq rivi pMpffyfj from the One, because that God is not one of all
Karelyero CKeivos' povov yap ev eKeivo' Kol et^ things; for this is how all things come from him,
because he is not confined by any shape; that One
pev irdvra, ev rots oScnv dv -Ijv. 8id rovro eKetvo is one alone: if he was all things, he would be
ov8ev pev rdiv ev rw vw, e^ avrov Se irdvra [ev numbered among beings. For this reason that One
rots ovaiv dv tJv].* 8i6 Kal ovalai ravra- wpiarai is none of the things in Intellect, but all things
come from him. This is why they are substances;
yap rj8i) Kal otov pop<fyrjv eKaarov eyei. ro 8e ov .for they are already defined and each has a kind of
26 Set OVK ev doplarcp otov alcopetadai, dAA’ opw shape. Being must not fluctuate, so to speak, in
ireirrjxSa.1 Kal ardaer ardais 8e rots vorjrots the indefinite, but must be fixed by limit and sta-
bihty; and stability in the intelligible world is
opiapos Kal poprjyq, ots Kal 717v vir6araai,v Xap^dvei. limitation and shape, and it is by these that it receives
ravrrjs roi yeveds d vovs oSros di^las ® vov rov existence. “ Of this lineage ” ^ is this Intellect of
Kadapairdrov pij dXXodev fj e/c rrjs irpwrrjs dpxrjs
which we are speaking, a lineage worthy of the purest
Intellect, that it should spring from nowhere else
<l>vvai, yevopxvov Se ijSij rd ovra Travra avv avrtp but the first principle, and when it has come into
30 yevvrjaai,, irdv pev ro rwv iSeeov KdXXos, irdvras Sk existence should generate all realities along with
itself, all the beauty of the Ideas and all the intelli­
Beovs vorjrovs' irXqpi) Se ovra <Sv eyewiqae Kal
gible gods; and it is full of the beings which it has
d>airep Karamdvra irdXiv r^ ev avr& /^’jSe generated and as it were swallows them up again, by
eKireaetv els vXrjv pi]Se rpa<fdjvai irapd rfj 'Pea, keeping them in itself and because they do not fall
out into matter and are not brought up in the house
d)S rd pvarripia koX ol pvBoi ol irepl dediv aivlr- of Rhea; as the mysteries and the myths about the
rovrat Kpovov pev dedv ao<fxlyrarov irpd rov Ala gods say riddlingly that Kronos, the wisest god,
36 yeveadai d yewa irdXiv ev eavrip ft before the birth of Zeus took back and kept within
himself all that he begat, and in this way is full and
* Harder: d vel 0 Enn.
* del. Eirehhoff, Volkmaim •, Harder (qui mvra quoque del.), * A phrase from Iliad 6. 211, applied by Plato (Bepvblic
iteratum e lin. 21. VIII. 647A4-5) to the birth of civil strife in his ideal state—
* Igal {Emerita 39,1971,157): aiios Enn.: a^ior 8i Harder, anotW curious case of Plotinus remembering Plato’s words
H-S 1. but, apparently, forgetting their context (op. ch. 3, n.2, p. 19).
36 37
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 1. ON THE THREE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES

vX-qprjs Kai vovs ev Kopct>- [jL€Ta 8e ravrd (j>a(n Ata is Intellect in satiety; and after this they say he
yewdv Kopov T]8r] ovra- <l)vxfjv yap yewa vovs, begat Zeus who is then his Koros [that is, boy and
vovs d>v reXeios. Kal yap reXeiov ovra yewdv eSei, satiety] ^; for Intellect generates soul, since it is
Kat p/Tj Svvapcv ovcrav rocravrrjv dyovov etvai. perfect Intellect. For since it was perfect it had
Kpetrrov Se ovy oTov re ^v etvai ovS’ evravda to
to generate, and not be without offspring when it
40 yewdpevov, dAA’ eXarrov ov eiSa>Xov etvai avTov,
dopiOTOV pev waavrws, opi^opevov 8e vtto rov yev-
was so great a power. But its offspring could not
VT^aavTOS Kal otov eiSonoiovpevov. vov 8e yewrjpa be better than it (this is not so even here below) but
Xoyos ns Kai VTrocrraais, to 8iavoovpevov tovto 8’ had to be a lesser image of it,* and in the same way
earl to irepl vovv Kivovpevov Kal vov (j>a>s Kal indefinite, but defined by its parent and, so to speak,
tX^'os e^-qpnjpevov eKelvov, Kara Odrepa pev given a form. And the offspring of Intellect is a
45 avvrjypevov eKelvcp Kal ravrr] aTTompTrXdpevov Kal rational form and an existing being, that which thinks
dvoXavov Kal peraXap^dvov avrov Kal voovv, Kara
discursively; it is this which moves round Intellect
Bdrepa 8e eifiaTTTopevov rd>v per avro, pdXXov 8e
and is light and trace of Intellect and dependent on
yewGiv Kal avro, a >pvx^s dvdyKrf etvai x^tpova-
rrepl &v varepov XeKreov. Kal p^XP'- Tovroiv rd it, united to it on one side and so filled with it and
Beta. enjoying it and sharing in it and thinking, but, on
8. Koi 8id rovTO Kal rd nAaTWVoj rpirrd rd the other side, in touch with the things which came
•ndvra rrepl rov rrdvroiv jSao’iAea—(jyqal ydp after it, or rather itself generating what must neces­
irpayra—kox 8evrepov rrepl rd 8evrepa Kal sarily be worse than soul; about these we must
rrepl rd rplra rpirov. Xeyei 8e Kal rov speak later.® This is as far as the divine reahties
5 alrLov etvai rrarepa airiov pev rov vovv Xeycvv
8r]piovpyds ydp 6 vovs avrqi' rovrov 8e (f>r)ai rrjv extend.
i/rvx'^v rroieiv ev rep Kparrjpi eKe'ivcp. rov airiov 8e 8. This is the reason why Plato says that all things
are threefold “ about the king of all ”—he means
the primary realities—and “ the second about the
* For this interpretation of the myth and play on Kpovny—
Kopos op. oh. 4 and n. 1 there. second and the third about the third ”. But he also
‘ Plotinus’s invariable assumption that the product or ofiF- says that there is a “ father of the cause ”, meaning
spring must be inferior to the producer or parent, which he
rather strangely asserts here, is home out by our experience Intellect by “ the cause”: for Intellect is his crafts­
in this world. Did he consider himself inferior to his parents?
» Cp. oh. 1, n. 2, p. 13.
man ; and he says that it makes Soul in that “ mixing-
38 39
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 1. ON THE THKEE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES

vov ovTos irarepa (fyrjal rdyadov Kal to iircKeiva bowl ” he speaks of.^ And the father of Intellect
vov Kal €TT€Keiva ovalas. tToXSaxov 8e to ov which is the cause he calls the Good and that which
Kal Tov vovv TrjV tSeov Xeyei- toorre IIAoTCova etSevai is beyond Intellect and “ beyond being And
he also often calls Being and Intellect Idea: so
10 e/f fiev rdyadov tov vovv, e/c 8e rov vov Trjv t/ivx^^v. Plato knew that Intellect comes from the Good and
Kal etvai rovs Xoyovs rovahc ixrj Kaivovs firjSe vvv, Soul from Intellect. And [it follows] that these
dXXd vdXai [ji,€v elprjaOai /X17 dvaTTeTrrafievcJS, rovs statements of ours are not new; they do not belong
Se vvv Xoyovs e^rjyrjrds eKecvcvv yeyovevai [xaprv- to the present time, but were made long ago, not
plois marcoaapievovs rds So^as ravras iraXaids explicitly, and what we have said in this discussion
has been an interpretation of them, relying on Plato’s
etvai rois avrov rov nAaTCOvo? ypdppaaiv. own writings for evidence that these views are
16 rjirrero pev odv Kal Happevidrjs irporepov rrjs ancient.® And Parmenides also, before Plato,
roiavTTjs 86^r]s Kadoaov els ravro crvvrjyev ov Kal touched on a view like this, in that he identified
vovv, Kal rd ov ovk ev rots alodrjroZs eridero Being and Intellect and that it was not among things
"to yap avrd voelv earl re Kal elvai” Xeycvv.
perceived by the senses that he placed Being, when
he said “ TWnking and Being are the same And
Kal dKivvjrov Se Xeyei rovro—Kalroi npoaridels he says that this Being is unmoved-—^though he does
TO voeiv—aaipariKTiv irdoav Klvrjaiv e^alpevv drr' attach thinking to it—taking all bodily movement
20 avrov, iva pdvrj (Laavrais, Kal oyKip a<f>alpas from it that it may remain always in the same
direiKaCoiv, on irdvra eyei TrepieiXrjppeva Kal on state, and likening it to “ the mass of a sphere ”,
because it holds all things in its circumference and
rd voeiv ovK e^oi, oAA’ ev eavrw. ev Se Xeycvv ev because its thinking is not external, but in itself.*
rots eavrov crvyypdppaaiv atrlav etxev iLs rov But when he said it was one, in his own works, he
evds rovTov noXXd evpiaKopUvov. o Se •napd IIAa- was open to criticism because this one of his was
25 Tcovi UappevlSrfs dKpi^earepov Xeycvv Siaipet dv' discovered to be many. But Parmenides in Plato
speaks more accurately, and distinguishes from each
1 Plotinus begins his demonstration that his doctrine of the * Another very favourite passage from Plato Republic VI
Three Hypostases is the true doctrine of Plato with a favourite 609B8-10.
text from the Platonic Letter II 312E1-4, which he also cites ’ The belief that the true doctrines are present, but often
in I. 8. 2 and VI. 7. 42 and alludes to in III. 6. 8. He goes not explicit, in the writings regarded as traditionally authori­
on to refer to supporting texts from Letter VI 323D2-5 and tative is, for ob-vious reasons, essential for pagan and Christian
Titnaeus 34B£f. and 41D4-6. Plotinus always identifies traditionalists of the first centuries a.d. (and for Christian
Plato’s craftsman with his own Intellect, never with Soul, traditionalists later): cp. Origen De Principiis I 3.
whose function in making the physical universe he sees as * The references are to Parmenides Diels B 3 (cited also at
subordinate and instrumental: op. V. 8. 7. I. 4.10. 6 and III. 8. 8. 8) and B 8, 26 and 43.
40 41
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 1. ON THE THREE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES
dAA'JjAaJV TO rrp&Tov ev, o Kvpicorepov ev, Kal Sevre- other the first One, whieh is more properly called
pov ev TToAAd Xeyojv, /cat rplrov ev /cat iroXXd. One, and the second which he calls “ (3ne-Many ”
Kai avp^wvos ovroj^ /cat avros eari rais <j>vae(n and the third, “ One and Many In this way he
raZg rpialv. too agrees with the doctrine of the three natures.
9. ’Ava^ayopas 8e vovv Kadapov Kal dp,iyrj Xeycov 9. And Anaxagoras also, when he says that In­
aTrXovv Kal avros rlOerai to -npotrov Kal yojpiarov tellect is pure and unmixed, posits that the first
TO ev, TO 8’ OLKpi^es St’ dpyai6Tt]Ta TraprjKe. /cat principle is simple and that the One is separate,
Hpa/cAetTOs Se to ev olSev diSiov Kal vorjrov rd
but he neglects to give an accurate account because
of his antiquity. Heraclitus also knows that the
5 yap adipara ylyverai del Kal peovra. r(p Se ’E/t7re- One is eternal and intelligible: for bodies are always
So/cAet TO vet/CO? /tev Staipet, rj Se (fnXla to ev— coming into being and flowing away. And for
aaotp-arov Se Kal avros rovro—rd Se aroiyeia cos Empedocles Strife divides, but Love is the One—^he
vXt], ’ApcaroreXrjs Se varepov ycvpiarov p,ev to too makes it incorporeal—and the elements serve
vpdirov Kal voTjrov, voeZv Se avro eavro Xeycov as matter.^ Later, Aristotle makes the first principle
TTctAtv av ov ro irpcorov rroiel- vroAAd Se /cat dAAa separate and intelligible, but when he says that it
10 vorjrd ttoicov Kal roaavra, omaai ev ovpavcp a<j>aZpai, knows itself, he goes back again and does not make
tv’ eKaarov eKdarrjv Kivrj, dXXov rpoirov Aeyet rd ev it the first principle; and by making many other
rois vorjTOLS rj IIAdTa/v, to evXoyov ovk eyov dv- intelligible reahties, as many as the heavenly spheres,
dyKTjv TiOepLevos. emcrr'jaeie S’ dv ns, el /cat ei5- that each particular intelUgible may move one par­
ticular sphere, he describes the intelhgible world in
Xoycos' evXoycorepov ydp irdoas irpos pUav avvra^iv
a different way from Plato, making a probable
16 avvreXovaas TTpds ev /cat to TrpcoTov jSAeTretv. assumption which has no philosophical necessity.
^Tjrqaeie 8’ dv ns rd iroXXd vorjrd el ef evos ecrnv But one might doubt whether it i^ even probable;
avrcp rod rrpcorov, rj rroXXal ai ev rots vorjrots for it would be more probable that all the spheres,
contributing their several movements to a single
system, should look to one principle, the first. And
^ Plato Parmenides 137C-142A, 144E3 and 155E5. The one might enquire whether Aristotle thinks that the
interpretation of the Parmenides adopted here may be Neo-
pythagorean: see E. R. Dodds “ The Parmenides of Plato many intelligibles derive from one, the first, or
and the Origin of the Neoplatonic ‘ One ’ ”, C.Q. 22 (1928) whether there are many primary principles in the
129-42. Note the sharp distinction made between the his­
torical Parmenides and Plato’s Parmenides. Plotinus always (as Parmenides here), confused or obscure (cp. the remark
cites the Pre-Socratics (including Pythagoras) to provide about Anaxagoras at the beginning of the next chapter).
supplementary corroboration of the doctrines which he finds ® The references are to Anaxagoras Diels B 12, Empedocles
in Plato. He does not regard them as traditional authorities B 26, 5-6, and the sort of general account of the teachings
on the same level as Plato, and often thinks they are wrong of Heraclitus given in Diogenes Laertius IX 8 (=Diels A 1).
42
43
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 1. ON THE THREE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES
intelligible world; and if they derive from one, the
ap\ai' Kal el jLicv e$ ei'os, avdXoyov SrjXovori situation will clearly be analogous to that of the
e^ei ws ev rots alaOrp-dis at a<f>aipai aXX-qs dXXijv heavenly spheres in the sense-world, where each
Trepie-)(ov(j7js, pias Se rrjs e^(o Kparovarjs' c5ore contains the other and one, the outermost, dominates;
20 TTepiexoi dv KOLKet to irpuyrov Kal Koapos vcnyros so that there too the first would contain the others
and there will be an intelligible universe; and, just
earai- Kal dxnrep evravSa at a<f>atpat ov Kevai, as here in the sense-world the spheres are not empty,
oAAd pearr] aarpcov ri ■npoyn), at Se exovatv axtrpa, but the first is full of heavenly bodies and the others
ovTW KOLKet TO, KivovvTa voXXd ev avrots e^ei Kal have heavenly bodies in them, so there also the
ra dXr]deaTepa e/cei. ei Se e/caorov dpxT^, Kara moving principles will have many realities in them,
and the realities there will be truer. But if each is
awTVxlav at dpxal eaovraf Kal Sid rt aweaovrat primary principle, the primary principles will be a
26 Kal TTpos ev epyov Tqv rov iravTos ovpavov avp<^vi- random assembly; and why will they be a community
av opovo-qaet; irws Se laa npos ra vorp'd Kal and in agreement on one work, the harmony of the
whole universe ? And how can the perceptible beings
Kivovvra rd ev ovpavip aladr}Td ; ■utos Se Kal TToXXd
in heaven be equal in number to the intelligible
ovTtos dadipara ovra vXrjs ov x<^piiovar]s; tvare movers ? And how can the intelligibles even be
Tutv dpxaiwv ot paXiara awraaaopevot aS rots many, when they are incorporeal, as they are, and
Iluffayopov Kal rwv per' avrdv Kal (^epeKvSovs matter does not divide them ^ ? For these reasons
30 Se irepl rav-njv pev eaxov rrjv ^vaiv dXX’ ol pev those of the ancient philosophers who took up -posi­
tions closest to those of Pythagoras and his successors
e^eipYdaavTO ev avrots avrcHv Xoyois, ot Se ovk (and Pherecydes) * held closely to this nature; but
ev Xoyots, dXX’ ev dypd<f>ots eSeiKwov avvovatats some of them worked out the idea fully in their o-wn
iq oXq)s d^etaav. writings, others did not do so in -written works but
in unwritten group discussions,® or left it altogether
iU. Uri 0€ ovTio xpnq vofX(^€t,v ex^iv, cos ecrrt fX€V
alone.
ro eireKewa ovros ro ev, oXov "qOeXev 6 Xoyos Sewc- 10. It has been shown that we ought to think that
vvvat (VS otov re -^v nepl rovroiv evSetKwaOat, this is how things are, that there is the One beyond
eart Se e<f>e^7js ro ov Kal vovs, rptrq Se ij rr\s ^vx'tjs being, of such a kind as our argument wanted to
show, so far as demonstration was possible in these
* This criticism of the doctrine of the Unmoved Mover(s) matters, and next in order there is Being and
expounded by Aristotle in Metaphysics A looks rather like a
Platonie development of that made by Theophrastus Meta­ * Cp. Pherecydes Diels A 29.
physics II 7-9 Boss-Fobes; but the resemblance is not close * This may possibly be a reference to Plotinus’s master
enough for us to assume that Plotinus had read Theophrastus. Ammonius: op. Longinus in Porphyry Life oh. 20.

44 45
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 1. ON THE THREE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES
5 <f>vais, rjSr] SeSeiKrai.
^avep Se iv Trj <f>vaei, rpirra Intellect, and the nature of Soul in the third place.
ravrd eari rd elpTjpeva, ovtcd \prj vopi^eiv Kal And just as in nature there are these three of which
we have spoken, so we ought to think that they are
Trap’ ripM> ravra etvai. Xeyo) Sc ovk iv rois
present also in ourselves. I do not mean in [our­
aladrjTois—^;^co/)icrTa yap ravra—oAA’ ini rois selves as] beings of the sense-world—^for these three
„*_/D ^ \ ^ t
aiaorjrcjv egco, /cat rov avrov rponov ro cgw
\ (Ctf> >>
are separate [from the things of sense]—but in
wanep KaKeiva rov navros ovpavov e^w ovrco Kal
[ourselves as] beings outside the realm of sense-
perception; “outside” here is used in the same
10 rd rov dvdpdmov, olov Xeyei HXd,ra)v rov etaco sense as those realities are also said to be “ outside ’’
dvOpconov. ecrrt. rolvvv Kal rj r/peripa ipvx^ the whole universe: so the corresponding realities
deiov ri Kal <f>vaea)s dXXrjs, dnola ndaa <pvxfjs in man are said to be “ outside ”, as Plato speaks of
the “ inner man Our soul then also is a divine
(f>vais' reXeia Se r/ vovv eyovaa' vovs Se o pev thing and of a nature different [from the things of
Xoyi^opevos, d Sc Xoyi^eaOai napiycov. rd dr/ sense], like the universal nature of soul; and the
XoyiCdpevov rovro ri^s i^vyrjs ovSevds npds rd hmnan soul is perfect when it has intellect; and
intellect is of two kinds, the one which reasons and
15 Xoyl^eadai Seopevov acopariKov dpydvov, r^v Se
the one which makes it possible to reason. Now this
ivipyeiav iavrov iv KaOaptp eyov, Iva Kal Xoyi^eadai reasoning part of the soul, which needs no bodily
Kadapcds dtov re f), ycvpiardv Kal ov KCKpapevov instrument for its reasoning, but preserves its activity
crcdpari iv rtp npcdrcp vorjra) ns nBepevos ovk dv in purity in order that it may be able to engage in
pure reasoning, one could without mistake place, as
a<f>dXXoLro. ov ydp ronov ^Tjrrjreov oS ISpvaopev, separate and unmixed with body, in the primary
dXX e^io ronov navrds noi-qreov. ovrco ydp rd intelligible realm. For we should not look for a
20 Kad' avrd Kal rd e^co Kal rd dvXov, orav povov place in which to put it, but make it exist outside
all place. For this is how it is by itself and outside
ovSev eyov napd rrjs adoparos <f>vcrecos. Sta and immaterial, when it is alone and retains nothing
rovro Kal eri e^coOiv <f>r]aiv ini rov navrds rr/v from the nature of body. This is the reason why
TTcptejSaAev ivdeucvvpevos rrjs ‘pvy'fjs rd iv Plato says of the universe also that the craftsman
wrapped the soul round it “ from outside ”, indicating
rw voT]rcp pevov ini Se 'qpcdv iniKpvnrcov^ in’ the part of the soul which remains in the intelhgible;
^ Heintz apud Harder: ert kpvtttojv {-tov E) Enn. and he said obscurely about us that the soul is " on
whole chapter shows clearly Plotinus’s sense of the inade­
^ The phrase comes from Plato Republic IX 587A7. Ploti­ quacy of spatial metaphors and the need of using them
nus uses it again at I. 1. 10. 16 (see my note there). This consciously and critically.
46 47
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 1. ON THE THREE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES

aKpa €ipT]Ke Trj koX ^ TrapaKeXevais 8e top in the head And his exhortation to separate
26 rov ov roTTCp Aeyerat-—rovro yap <j>vaei ourselves is not meant in a spatial sense—this
KeyaipiapAvov eartv—dAAa p,^ vevaei Kal raZs [higher part] of soul is naturally separated—^but
^ <f>ainaaiais Kal rfj aAAorptdnjTi rfj irpos to refers to our not inclining to the body, and to our
aiopa, ei ircas Kal ro Aoittov ’Jivx'^S ethos dvaydyoi not having mental images, and our alienation from
ns Kal cruveviyKai irpos to dvco Kal to evTavOa the body *—if by any chance one could make the
30 avTrjs ihpvpevov, o povov earl awpxvros 8r]pi- remaining form of soul ascend, and take along with
us to the heights that of it which is established here
ovpyov Kal TrXaariKov Kal Trp> irpaypaTeiav irepl below, which alone is the craftsman and modeller
TOVTO eyov. of the body and is actively concerned with it.
11. Ovarjs oSv <pvxris Trjs XoyiCopevrjs trepl SiKai- 11. Since, then, there exists soul which reasons
u)v Kal KaXoiv Kal Xoyiapov t^rp-ovvros el tovto Si- about what is right and good, and discursive reasoning
Koiov Kol el TOVTO KoXov, dvdyKij etvai koI earois which enquires about the rightness and goodness of
n SiVaiov, d^’ oS Kal 6 Xoyiapos irepl this or that particular thing, there must be some
5 ylyveTai. rj irws dv XoyiaaiTO; Kal el ore pev further permanent rightness from which arises the
Xoyl^eTai irepl tovtcov >fivx^, ore 8e /xij, 8et tov discursive reasoning in the realm of soul. Or how
else would it manage to reason ? And if soul some­
K.priy ^ Xoyi^opevov, oAA’ dei eyovTa to hiKaiov
vovv ev •qptv etvai, etvai 8e Kal TTjv vov dpx^v Kol times reasons about the right and good and some­
times does not, there must be in us Intellect which
alnav Kal deov—ov pepioTov eKeivov ovros, oAAd does not reason discursively but always possesses
pevovTOS eKeivov, Kal ovk ev tottio p^ovros—ev the right, and there must be also the principle and
10 TToXXoZs aS Oewpeiodai Kad' eKoarov tcov hvvapevwv cause and God of Intellect.® He is not divided, but
* Page, collate III. 6. 6. 23. abides, and as he does not abide in place he is con­
’ Tox <;i^> Bodda (Select Passages 62): supra riv ser. A* templated in many beings, in each and every one of
(jion Ficinus): <ji^> tox Creuzer *. those capable of receiving him as another self,* just
* The exhortation to separation is probably Plato Phaedo
' The references are to Plato Timaeua 36F3 and 90A6 (op. 67C-D. Plotinus always interprets this text, as he does here,
44D-E). Plotinus probably uses the word imKpJm-mr (an as referring to inner detachment, not spatial separation: op.
emendation, but a convincing one), which suggests ddiberaU III. 6. 6.
obscurity, because he did not believe, and therefore did not ® A striking affirmation of the transcendence of the One
think that Plato believed, that the soul, or any part of it, over Intellect. (For the problem involved see the beginning
was actually located in any part of the body. For his ex­ of the first chapter of V. 2 and n. 1 there.)
planation of the Platonic texts in terms of the activation of * Is Plotinus remembering here Aristotle’s use of the same
the brain and other organs by powers of the omnipresent soul striking phrase for a friend, tori yap 6 (l>iXos oAAoj outos
see IV. 3. 23. {Nicomachean Ethics IX 4. 1166a31-2; op. 1169b6-7, 1170b6)?
48 49
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 1. ON THE THREE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES
8e)^ea6ai oTov aAAov avrov, wanep Kal to Kevrpov as the centre of a circle exists by itself, but every
e<j>' eavrov earcv, exec Se Kal eKaarov rwv iv tw one of the radii in the circle has its point in the centre
kvkXco arjpcecov ev avTW, Kal al ypapcpcal to ISiov and the lines bring their individuality to it.^ For it
is with something of this sort in ourselves that we
TTpoa<j>epovac -npos rovro. T<p yap roiovrcp rcoy ey
are in contact with god and are with him and depend
ripcy Kal rfpcecs e<j>aTTr6pce6a Kal crvveapcey Kal dv7]p- upon him; and those of us who converge towards
16 T^pceda' eycSpvpeda 8e oc ay avyyevcopcey €Kec. him are firmly established in him.
12. IltS? ovy eyoyres rd TrjXiKavra ovk dyrc- 12. Why then, when we have such great posses­
XapL^ayopeda, dAA’ dpyovpey rats rocavracs h/ep- sions, do we not consciously grasp them, but are
mostly inactive in these ways, and some of us are
yelais to. TToXXd, oi Se ovS’ dAo»? eyepyovacy; eKeiya
never active at all? They are always occupied in
pcey earcy ey rats avTciy eyepyeiats dec, vovs Koi to their own activities. Intellect, and that which is
5 npo yov del ey eavrco, Kal tfwxf] 8e—to dec- before Intellect, always in itself, and soul, which is
Kivrjroy—ovrcas. ov yap vdy, o ey c/ivyj}, ijStj in this sense “ ever-moving ”. For not everything
aladrp-oy, dAAd epyerac els rapids, orav els ataOrjacy which is in the soul is immediately perceptible, hut
it reaches us when it enters into perception; but
cry dray 8e eyepyovy eKaaroy pr/ peraSiSw rep when a particular active power does not give a share
aladayopevcp, ovttcj 8i’ oXt)s ‘f’vxfjs eX-qXvdey. in its aetivity to the perceiving power, that activity
ovTTOi offy ycyyaiaKopey are perd rov aladryrcKov has not yet pervaded the whole soul.^ We do not
10 ovres Kal ov popcoy <ln>xrjs dXX' aTraaa ifivyri therefore yet know it, since we are accompanied by
ovres. Kal ere eKOxjToy rdiy tlivycKcoy fcDv 1 del the perceptive power and are not a part of soul but
the whole soul. And further, each soul-part, since
eyepyet del Ka6' avrd to avrov' to 8e yywpt-
it is always hving, always exercises its own activity
Ceiy, oray perdSoms yevrjrac koI dyrcXTjtjics. Set by itself; but the discovery of it comes when sharing
Toeyvy, el Tcuy ovrcu Trapovreoy dc'rlXrjtJtcs earac, Kal with the perceptive power and conscious awareness
TO dyTcXap^ayopeyoy els rd ecaco em(JTpe<f>eiy, KdKet takes place. If then there is to be conscious appre­
hension of the powers which are present in this way,
1 ^smg (quamdiu vixit Picinus), Creuzer *: ^tpwv A“EBxUC. we must turn our power of apprehension inwards,
^ The metaphor of circle, centre and radii, referred to in presence and transcendent separateness which Plotinus sees
ch. 7 (see n. 2) and often used elsewhere in the Enneads when he is trying to describe the relationship of a relatively
(op. e.g. IV. 2. 1. 24-9, where it is used of the relationship of complex and multiple derived reality to its simpler and more
immaterial indivisible being to the divisible material quasi- unified somce.
reality of the sense-world). It can be used at any level of * For the doctrine of consciousness mentioned here see
the hierarchy to describe the combination of immanent IV. 3. 30 and n. 1 there.
5° 51
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 1. ON THE THREE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES
16 TToietv Trjv TTysoao^v e^eiv. cacnrep €i
tis aKovaai and make it attend to what is there. It is as if
avafievwv fp> e6eXei <j)U)vijv, rcov aXXcov ^covwv someone was expecting to hear a voice which he
amoaras to ovs iyeipoi irpos to dpeivov tu)v o.kov- wanted to hear and withdrew from other sounds and
OTWV, oTTore CKelvo irpoaiXBoi, ovrco toi ko.1 roused his power of hearing to catch what, when it
evravda Sei rdj pev atadTjTas aKovoeis dj>evTa, el comes, is the best of all sounds which can be heard;
pr/ KoBoaov dvdyKt}, Tr)v rr\s '’"® dvri-
so here also we must let perceptible sounds go
20 XapPdveadai hvvapiv <j>vXd,TTeiv Kadapdv Kal erot-
(except in so far as we must listen to them) and keep
the soul’s power of apprehension pure and ready to
pov aKoveiv ^ddyyoiv tcov dvw. hear the voices from on high.

52
ENNEAD V. 2
 THE BEINGS AFTER THE FIRST
higher soul generates its own image, the sensitive and
vegetative life-principle which extends as far as plants
(ch. 1). The different levels of soul; a difficulty about the
plant-soul: what happens to it when a piece of the plant
is cut off? Again, all things are the One and not the
V. 2. ON THE ORIGIN AND ORDER OF THE One: it is all like one long continuous life (ch. 2).
BEINGS WHICH COME AFTER THE FIRST
IrUrodudtyry Note
This very short treatise, the eleventh in Porphyry’s
chronological order, is by no means a mere fragment or
sketch. It is a brief but carefully considered statement
of the basic doctrine of the Three Hypostases, distinguished
by a particular emphasis on their continuity. There is
one life extending unbroken through all the descending
stages from the One to the soul or life-prinoiple in plants.
At the beginning Plotinus shows himself vividly aware of
the great diflSoulty which inevitably arises when any
attempt is made to state a doctrine of the Transcendent
Absolute in discursive philosophical language: how can
we sufiSciently emphasise the transcendence of the source
of reality without cutting it off altogether from the reality
of which it is the source? A rather disproportionate
amount of the treatise (the last lines of the &st of its two
chapters and nearly the whole of the second) seems to be
devoted to the lowest stage in the expansion of the one
life, the “ nature ” or life-principle in plants. But, as
Br6hier saw (see his introductory Notice, Vol. V, pp. 31-2
of his edition), this is because Plotinus thought that it was
at this point that objections to his doctrine of continuity
might most easily arise because of the apparent discon­
tinuity and fragmentation of soul at this level.

Synopsis
The One is all things and none of them. How Intellect
comes from the One and Soul from Intellect, and how 57
56
 V. 2. (11) nEPI PENESEOS KAI V. 2. ON THE ORIGIN AND ORDER OF
TASEQN TQN META TO HPOTON THE BEINGS WHICH COME AFTER
THE FIRST
1. To ey Travra Kal ovSe ev dp^fj ydp ndv- 1. The One is all things and not a single one of
rcov, ov •jravra, dAA’ eKelvais Travra- eKeZ -ydp olov them : it is the principle of all things, not all
things, but all things have that other kind of trans­
iveSpap-e- pM^kov 8e outtco eariv, dAA’ earai. -ndis cendent existence; for in a way they do occur in
odv wttXov ivds ovSepias iv ravrcp <f>aivopLdvrjs the One; or rather they are not there yet, but they
will be. How then do all things come from the
6 TTOiKiXCas, oil SnrXorjs ovrivos drovovv; rj on One, which is simple and has in it no diverse variety,
ovSev -ijv ev avr(p, Sid rovro e^ avrov Travra, Kal or any sort of doubleness ? It is because there is
nothing in it that all things come from it: in order
Iva rd ov jj, 8id rovro avrds ovk ov, -yewrj-rrjs 8e that being may exist, the One is not being, but the
avrov- Kal Trp<xi-r~q olov -yewr]ais av-rr)- ov -ydp re'X-
generator of being. This, we may say, is the first
act of generation: the One, perfect because it seeks
eiov rip prjSev !^-f]reiv prfSe eyeiv prjSe Seiadai olov nothing, has nothing, and needs nothing, overflows,
as it were, and its superabundance makes something
v-rrepeppvT] Kal rd vTrepTrXrjpes avrov ireTroi-ijKev other than itself. This, when it has come into
10 dXXo- rd 8e -yevopevov els avrd eTrearpd<f>T) Kal being, turns back upon the One and is filled, and
becomes Intellect by looking towards it. Its halt
e-irXrjpaidrj Kal i-yevero -rrpds avrd ^Xe-rrov Kal vovs and turning towards the One constitutes being, its
oSros. Kal -q pev -rrpds eKeivo ardais avrov rd ov gaze upon the One, Intellect. Since it halts and
turns towards the. One that it may see, it becomes at
eTTolr/crev, -fi Se -rrpds avrd 6ea rdv vovv. e-rrel oSv once Intellect and being. Resembling the One thus.
Intellect produces in the same way, pouring forth
eanj -rrpds avrd, ?va tSrj, dpxiv vovs -yiyverai Kal ov. a multiple power—^this is a likeness of it—just as
oSros ovv djv olov eKeivos rd dpxna rroiei Svvapiv
16 -npoyeas -rroXX-qv—elSos Se Kal rovro avrov— ^ Cp. Plato Parmenides 160B2-3.
59
58
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 2. THE BEINGS AFTER THE FIRST
woTTep ad to avrov vporepov Ttpoe^ee- Kal avTTj that which was before it poured it forth. This
c/c Trjs ovalas evepyeia ijfuxr}s rovro p4vovros activity springing from the substance of Intellect
is Soul, which comes to be this while Intellect abides
€Kelvov yevop-hn]' Kal yap 6 vovs pevovros rov unchanged: for Intellect too comes into being while
TTpo avTov eyivf.ro. -q Se ov pivovaa rroiel, aAAd that which is before it abides unchanged. But Soul
KiVTjdeiaa iyewa elScoXov. e/cei pev odv ^XeTrovaa,
does not abide unchanged when it produces: it is
moved and so brings forth an image. It looks to its
20 odev eyivero, irX'qpovrai, TipoeXOovaa Se els Kivqmv source and is filled, and going forth to another
aXXqv Kol evavrlav yewa effitoAov avrrjs atadqcnv opposed movement generates its own image, which
is sensation and the principle of growth in plants.^
Kal ^vaiv TTjv ev tols <f>vrois. ovSev 8e rov Ttpo Nothing is separated or cut off from that which is
avrov dmjpnjrai ovS’ dnorerpqrai' Sio Kal SoKet before it. For this reason the higher soul seems to
reach as far as plants; and in a way. it does reach so
Kal q dvw ^ ifivyri peypi (f>vr<dv <f>6dveiv rpoirov yap
far, for-the life-principle in plants belongs to it; it
rwa <f)ddvei, on avrrjs ro ev (frvrois' ov pqv rrdaa is certainly not all in plants, but it has come to be in
plants in the sense that it has extended itself down
oAAd yiyvopevrj ev <f>r)rois ovrcos eariv,
26 iv <l>vrois,
to their level, and produced another degree of being
on enl rooovrov rpoePq els ro Karw virocrraaiv by that extension, in desire of its inferior. The part
dXXqv troiqaapievrj rfj TrpooSw Kal Trpodvpia rov before this, which is immediately dependent on
Intellect, leaves Intellect alone, abiding in itself.
yelpovos' eTrel Kal ro vpo rovrov ro vov e^qprq-
2. So it goes on from the beginning to the last
pevov peveiv rov vovv etf)’ eavrov ea. and lowest, each [generator] remaining behind in its
2. IIpdeiCTiv odv dw’ dpxqs els eayarov KaraXei- own place,* and that which is generated taking
another, lower, rank; and yet each becomes the
TTopevov del eKaorov ev rq olKelp eSpa, rov Se same as that upon which it follows, as long as it does
yewcvpivov aWqv rd^iv Xap^dvovros rqv yelpova' continue to follow upon it. When therefore soul
comes to exist in a plant, what is in the plant is a
eKaorov pevroi ravrov ylverai cp dv eniotrrp-ai, ecos kind of different part of it, the most audacious and
6 dv erfreTrrp-ai. orav oSv ifivyTj iv (fivrtp ylvryrat, dAAo stupid part of it and the one which has proceeded
eorlv oTov pepos ro ev (frvrrp ro roXpqporarov koI ' For the relationship of this immanent principle of life
d^poveararov Kal npoeXqXvOos pixP'' toctowtow
and growth, or “ nature ”, to higher soul see III. 8. 1-6; for
its relationship to body see IV. 4. 18-20.
• Cp. IV. 8. 10 (the phrase was perhaps suggested by
^ Harder: di'dpcuTTcuvBnn., Perna—^Volkmann: del. Brdhier. Plato Timaeua 42E5-^).
6o 6l
 PLOTINUS; ENNEAD V. 2. THE BEINGS AFTER THE FIRST
orav S’ iv dXoyco, rj tov alaOdveadai Swajus Kpa- this far; when it comes to exist in an irrational
rqcraaa Tjyayev orav Se els dvOpconov, t) oXws iv animal, the power of sense-perception has prevailed
and brought it there ^: but when it comes to a man,
XoyiK& Tj Korqais, y] dno vov cos vovv oIksTov either the movement is wholly in the soul’s reasoning
10 iyovarjs Kal Trap’ avT^s ^ovXrjaiv
tov voeiv rj oXcos
part or it comes from Intellect, since the soul has an
intellect of its own and a self-originated will to think,
KivecaOai. yraXiv St] avaarpi^xapev orav ^vtov or in general to be in motion. Now let us go back
^ ra Trapacj)v6peva rj /cXdScov dvcu ns reprj,^ [to plant-souE]; when someone cuts off either the
rjiv TOVTCp >fivx^ TTOV drreXrjXvOev; rj oOev ov yap
side-shoots or the tops of the branches, where has
the soul in this part gone? Where it came from;
drrocrTdaa rorrcp' iv oSv rrj dpy^. el Se Tr\v pil^av for it did not move spatially away; so it is in its
15 SiaKoifieias ^ Kovaeias, vov ro iv rfj pl^'p; iv principle. But if you were to cut up or burn the
root, where would the soul in the root be ? In soul,
y®P * dXXov Tovov iXdovaa. dXXd for it has not gone to another place; but it could
« > j « T >\\> » v\\
Kav €V TW avTio t), aAA €v aAAcp, €t avaopafior €t
y i ts f y
be in the same place—^but in another if it ran up
Se p-q, iv dXXrj (f>vnKfj, ov yap arevoyajpeiTai' el
again [to the higher soul]; if it did not, it would be
in another plant-soul, for it is not cramped for room;
avaopafioi, €V tt) 7Tpo axrrrjs owa/Ltet. aAA but if it ran up again, it would be in the power before
iKelvr) vov; iv Trj vpo avrrjs' ij Se peypi vov, ov it. But where is that power ? In the power before
itself; but that reaches as far as Intellect, not
20 Tovcp' ovSev yap iv tovco ■^v d Se vovs voXii pdX- spatially; for none [of these soul-parts] was in
Xov ovK iv TOVCO, Siore ovSe avrrj. ovSapov o3v space; but Intellect is still more emphatically not
in space, so that neither is this [higher] soul. Since
oSaa, dXX’ iv tco o prjSapov, Kal vavrayov ovrcos therefore it is nowhere, but in that which is no­
ianv. el Se vpoeXBovaa els to dvco aralr] iv tco where, it is in this way also everywhere, but if as
it proceeds upwards it stops in the middle before
peTa^v vpiv vdvTTj els to_ dvcoraTCo yevecrdai, completely reaching the highest, it has a medium
p4aov eyei ^lov Kal iv iKelvcp tco pepei av-rijs life and stays in that [middle] part of itself. All
26 eoTTjKe. vdvra Se Tavra iKetvos koI ovk iKeivos'
these things are the One and not the One: they are
he because they come from him; they are not he,
iKeivos pev, on i^ iKeivov ovk iKeZvos Se, on because it is in abiding by himself that he gives
^Kirchhoff*: t<3vA®“BxUC: toO A“E. ^ For a fuller exposition see III. 4. 2, where it is explained
• <Ti> Tc/tjj Creuzer (ed. Paris.). what sort of souls get into lower animals and plants, and
’ oi yap coniecimus: oAk Enn. why.
62 63
 PLOTINUS; ENNEAD V. 2. THE BEINGS AFTER THE FIRST

eKeivos €<f}* iavTov lUvtav eScoKev. ecrriv oSv otov them. It is then hke a long life stretched out at
^carj (laKpa els fJ/rjKOS eKraOeura, erepov e/caorov length; each part is different from that which comes
rS)v px>pUxiV Twv i(f>e$i]s, owe^es 8e irav avrcp, next in order, but the whole is continuous with itself,
but with one part differentiated from another, and
oAAo 8e Kai oAAo 8ta<^opa, ovk diroXXvpevov iv the earlier does not perish in the later. What, then,
30 T^i Sevreptp to itporepov. tL oSy ij ev rots <f>vrots
about the soul which comes to exist in plants ? Does
yevopJvrj; ovSh' yewd; fj ev S icrri. aKeirreov it not generate anything ? Yes, that in which it is.
Se vws d,px^v oAAijv Xapovras. But we must investigate how it does so by taking a
different starting-point.

64 65
ENNEAD V. 3
 r
V. 3. ON THE KNOWING HYPOSTASES
AND THAT WHICH IS BEYOND
IrUrodtictort/ Note
This treatise, the forty-ninth in Porphyry’s chronological
order, was written towards the end of the life of Plotinus
{Life oh. 6). With another very late work which Por­
phyry placed at the beginning of the Enneads, I. 1 (53)
WJuU is the Living Being, and What is Man, it represents
the last, most fully developed and clarified stage of
Plotinus’s long refiection upon human nature and human
thinking (Porph3rry’s observation at the end of Chapter 6
of the Life on the failing of his master’s power apparent
in these last treatises, written after Porphyry had left
him, should not be taken too seriously). It is particularly
concerned with the relationship of the intelligent soul
which is our true self to the hypostasis Intelleot which in
one way transcends us, but wUch in another way we can
become, and to the One beyond Intellect and being which
the soul seeks to touch and to see by the light which is
itself. The last eight chapters of the treatise are a demon­
stration as powerful as an3rthing in Plotinus of the need
to go beyond Intellect to find the first principle of reality
and the soul’s true end. The treatise shows, perhaps more
clearly than any other in the Enneads, the stimulation of
the thought of Plotinus by critical reflection on what
Aristotle sa3rs about Intellect and the exposition of
Aristotelian doctrine by the great commentator Alexander
of Aphrodisias, a near-contemporary of his own. (For
i Plotinus’s knowledge of Aristotle and of the commen­
taries of Alexander and other Peripatetics see Life chapter
14.)
.11
69
I
 ON THE KNOWING HYPOSTASES ON THE KNOWING HYPOSTASES
Synopsis in attaining a multiple image of it which is Intellect
itself; the One or Good is not one of all things, but
If there is to be genuiae self-thinking, there must be before all things (ch. 11). There must be unity before
something simple which thinks itself: for one part of a multiplicity, the One before the many activities of In­
thing to think another part is not really self-thinking. tellect. The One remains absolutely at rest, and Intellect
Perhaps soul does not think itself, but Intellect must do springs from it like light from the sun (ch. 12). The One
so (ch. 1). An investigation of the activity of reasoning is not a “ something ” and is therefore ineffable and un­
soul, which is what we ourselves are, in its intermediate thinkable and does not think itself: only a complex whole
position between sense-perception below it and Intellect can say “ I am existent ” (ch. 13). We cannot speak or
above it (chs. 2-3). How we can transcend ourselves think the One, but can be aware of it in the way which
and become Intellect (ch. 4). How the man who has those who are possessed by a god are aware of the god
become Intellect sees himself: he finds th^t Intellect is possessing them (ch. 14). The One gives or makes In­
identical with intelligible reality; both are one single tellect, which is all things together in one; it is the pro­
actuality (ch. 5). How we can teach our soul, when we ductive power in which the things which are distinct in
have descended from Intellect, to understand what in­ Intellect pre-exist in absolute unity; this is the opposite
tellect is by observing its traces in our own intellectuality of the passive potency of matter (ch. 15). There must be
and recognising their derivation from the true Intellect, something other than the First, which must be multiple:
which is not a practical intellect (ch. 6). Intellect’s the perfect life of Intellect, which depends on the Good,
knowledge of God implies its'self-knowledge; its/peace better than life and intelleet (ch. 16). This dependence
and quiet is its own self-directed activity. Soul acts and on the Good is the reason for the perfect self-sufficiency of
produces here below in and by its contemplation, which Intellect. The birth-pangs of the soul: utter inadequacy
is an image of the entirely self-directed contemplation of of thought and discursive reason to satisfy its longing or
Intellect (ch. 7). Intellect’s vision of itself is not like express what it experiences in its union with the One.
perception here below: it is light seeing itself; this light The ultimate sudden illumination, when we see God by his
of Intellect shines on the soul and makes it truly intelligent, own light, if we let everything go (ch. 17).
so that by becoming like Intellect it is able to see Intellect
(ch. 8). The highest part of soul is an image of Intellect,
a light from InteUect, and by it we can know what Intellect
is like and attain to it; but soul has many lives and levels,
and one must start one’s quest of Intellect from the level
one has reached (ch. 9). Is there need to postulate an ulti­
mate principle beyond Intellect? Intellect, since it sees
itself, must be in some sense multiple, not absolutely one
and simple. If it was absolutely without parts, it could
not think itself or say .anything intelligible about itself:
the One can only be touched, not thought, and has no
need to think itself (oh. 10). How Intellect as sight not
yet seeing tries to apprehend the One, but only succeeds
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 V. 3. ON THE KNOWING HYPOSTASES
V. 3. (49) nEPI TON PNQPISTIKQN AND THAT WHICH IS BEYOND
TnOSTASEON KAI TOT EHEKEINA
1. Does that which thinks itself have to be com­
1. ^Apa TO voovv eauro voiklXov Set elvai, Iva ivL plex, in order that it may with one of its constituents
contemplate the rest, and so be said to know itself,
Tivi TcSv iv avT(p ra aXXa dewpovv owo) 8^ Xeyrjrai
on the supposition that the absolutely simple would
voeTv eavTO, <I)s rov dirXov iraihamacnv ovtos oi not be able to return to itself and the intellectual
dvvapJvov els eavro emarpe^ew k<u TTjv avrov grasp of itself? Or is it possible for that which is
6 Karavorjaiv; r) oTov re (cat pr] avvOerov ov vorjariv not composite also to have an intellectual awareness
of itself^? For that which is said to think itself
taxeiv eavrov; to pev yap Sion avvOerov Xeyopevov
because it is composite, just because it thinks the
voea> eavTo, on 8^ evi t<3v ev avrqi to. oAAa voet, rest with one of its constituents, as in sense-per­
wairep dv el rfj alad'^aei KaraXapPdvoipev avrciv ception we might grasp our own shape and the rest
Ttpf popcjyfjv /cat TTjv dXXr]v tov acoparos ^vcnv, ovk of our bodily nature, would not have true self­
intellection; for it would not be the whole which
dv eyoi to u)s diXrjdws voetv avro' ov yap to
was known in these circumstances, if that thing which
10 -irdv ecrrai ev tm roiovno eyvtaapAvov, prj /ca/ceivow thought the others which were with it did not also
TOV voijaavTos rd dXXa t<x ovv avr& /cat eavro think itself, and this will be, not what we are looking
vevorjKOTos, earai re ov to fi^TOu/itevov to awro for, a thing which thinks itself, but one thing thinking
another. One must, then, assume that a simple
eavro, dXX’ aXXo dXXo. Set rolwv Beadai Kal
thing thinks itself, and investigate as far as possible
d-rrXov Karavor/aiv eavrov Kal rovro vcds, OKorreiv, how it does so, or else one must abandon the opinion
el Svvarov, tj dnoarareov rrjs Sdfijj rrjs rov avro that anything really thinks itself. Now to abandon
15 eavro voetv n ovrcos. aTTOcrrijvat pev o5v rijs this opinion is not very possible, since many absurdi­
ties follow from its abandonment; for even if we do
So^rjs ravrrjs ov irdw olov re iroXXcvv t<3v droTTiov
not attribute self-thinking to the soul on the ground
avp^aivovruiv Kal yap el prj <pvxfj Sol-qpev rovro that this is not very absurd, yet it is absolutely
CVS (piy Trdvw drotrov dv, aXXd prjSe vov rij
1 For a fuller discussion of this see eh. 5.
1 F*> (= Fiomus)K*“.
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 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 3. ON THE KNOWING HYPOSTASES

<l)va€i SiSoyai 'iravrairamv aroirov, el t (3v [j,ev absurd not to attribute it to the nature of intellect,
and suppose that it has knowledge of everything
dX\cuv yvMoiv exei, eavrov 8e lirj ev yvcLaei Kal else but is not in a state of knowledge and under­
20 iTncTTqfirj KaraanjaeTai.Kal yap tcou p,ev e^cj rj standing of itself.^ For it will be, not intellect, but
sense-perception (and, if you hke, discursive thought
ataOT]ms, aAA’ ov vovg dvriX'qi/jerai, Kal, el ^ovXei, and opinion) which is aware of external things; and
Sidvoca Kal S6^a‘ el ^ 8e vovs rovrcov yvwaiv eyei it is appropriate to consider whether intellect has
knowledge of them or not; but obviously intellect
^ pur), OKeifiaadai 7rpocnj/c€i' oaa Se vorfrd, vovs is going to know everything which is intelligible.
SriXovoTi yvwaerai. dp’ oSv avra pAvov rj Kal eav- Will it then know the intelligibles only, or itself as
well, which is to know them ? And will it know
Tov, os ravra yvaraerai; Kal dpa ovtoj yvcLaerat,
itself in such a way that it knows the intelligibles
26 eavrov, on yivwoKei ravra pAvov, ris Se d>v ov alone but does not know who it is, but will know
that it knows the intelligibles which belong to it, but
yvdiaerai, dXX’ a pev avrov yvwaerai on yiyvwaKei, will not yet know who it is ? Or will it know both
rls 8e wv yivwoKei ovKen; Kal rd eavrov Kal what belongs to it and itself ? And we must consider
in what way and to what extent it knows itself.*®
eavrov; Kal rls 6 rporros Kal pdypi rlvos aKerrreov. 2. First we must enquire about the soul, whether
2. Ylporepov Se rrepl </nJxrjs ^rjrrjreov, el Soreov we should grant it knowledge of itself, and what is
that which knows in it, and how. We could say at
avrfj yvwaiv eavrfjs, Kal rl to yivwaKov ev avrfj once that its perceptive part is perceptive only of
Kal drrws. rd pev oSv aladrjriKOV avrrjs avrodev what is external; for even if there is a concomitant
awareness of what goes on inside the body, yet even
dv <l>aipev rov e^w etvai pAvov Kal yap el rwv here the apprehension is of something outside the
5 evSov ev rw awpari yivopevwv avvalad-qais eif)j, perceptive part; for it perceives the experiences in
its body by its own agency, but the reasoning power
dAAa rwv e^w eavrov Kal evravOa ij dvrlXrjifiis' rwv in soul makes its judgment, derived from the mental
yap ev rw awpari TraOrjpAirwv v<j> eavrov alaOdve- images, present to it which come from sense-percep­
tion, but combining and dividing them; and, as for
rai. rd S’ ev avrrj XoyiCopevov rrapd. rwv ck rrjs
alaO-jaews <f>avraapArwv rrapaKeipevwv Tqv emKpi- ^ Ficino’s inserted negative (see critical note) seems to me
necessary to the sense here. There is an apparent reminiscence
aiv TTOiovpevov Kal avvdyov Kal Siaipovv rj Kal em of this passage in Augustine De Trinitate IX 3, 3 (PL 42,
962).
^ Igal: o Enn. * Cp. Augustine De Trinitate X 3, 5 (PL 42, 976).

74 75
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 3. ON THE KNOWING HYPOSTASES
10 rwv €K rov vov lovrcov i<f>opd olov rovs rvirovs, Kal the things which come to it from Intellect, it ob­
€)(€i Kal 'irepl tovtovs r^v avrfjv Svvapuv. Kal serves what one might call their imprints, and has
the same power also in deahng with these; and it
awecriv eri TrpoaXap^vei wcmep iviytvoiaKov Kal continues to acquire understanding as if by recog­
i<f)app6^ov Tois ev avrip e/c ToXaiov rvirois rovs nising the new and recently arrived impressions and
fitting them to those which have long been within it:
veovs Kal dpri -^Kovras' o 8^ koX dvapv^aeis <l>(up,€v this process is what we should call the “ recollections ”
dv rijs </>vx^s elvai. Kal vovs 6 rrjs of the soul. And does the intellect of the soul come
to the end of its power and stop at this point, or
16 TOvSe Icrrdpevos rfj Swapet ^ Kal eis eavrov arpe- does it turn back upon itself and know itself? This
<j>erai Kal yiyvchoKei iavrov; t] cm rov vovv must certainly be attributed to Intellect. If, then,
we grant self-knowledge to this part of soul—^for
dvev€Kreov rovro. yvciaiv pev yap eavrov rovr<p we shall admit that it is an intellect^—we shall also
rtp pepet SiSovres—vovv yap avrdv (fnjaop^v—Kal enquire how it differs from the Intellect above; but
if we do not grant it [to the intellect in soul] we shall
OTTp Bioiaei, rov endvo) fij7Tjao/x«/, prj Se 8i86vres come to that higher Intellect as we advance in our
20 CTT €K€LVov Tj^opev rip Xoycp PiiB^ovres, Kal rd argument, and we shall consider what “ itselfknowing
itself ” means. But if we grant it here too, in the
avro eavro o ri nor eon oKe^opeoa. ei oe Kal lower intellect, we shall investigate what the differ­
evravda ev rip Kano Sidaopev, rls ij Biai^opd rov ence in self-thinking [between lower and higher
intellect] is; for if there is none, this part of soul is
voeiv eavro OKetfiopeOa' el yap prjSepla, ijSij rovro already pure Intellect.^ Does then this reasoning
vovs o aKparos, rovro rolvvv to BiavorjriKov rrjs part of the soul itself return upon itself? No, it
does not. It has understanding of the impressions
4'VX^s dpa emarpe<f>ei e^' eavro koI avro; ^ ov- which it receives from both sides. And we must
26 aAAa <Lv Several rvncov e<f>' eKarepa rrjv crvveaiv first enquire how it has understanding.
3. Well, then, sense-perception sees a human being
lox^i. Kal trios rt]v ovveaiv laxei, trpwrov ^rjrrjreov. and gives its impression to discursive reason. What
3. H pev yap ataOtjais etSev dvdptotrov Kal does reason say ? It will not say anything yet, but
only knows, and stops at that; unless perhaps it
eBcoKe rov rvtrov rfj Siavola- t] Be ri (fnjaiv; r; asks itself “ Who is this ? ” if it has met the person
ovtrco ovBev epei, dXX’ eyvco pdvov Kal eart]- el p-q
dpa trpos eavrqv BiaXoylCoiro "rls odros,” el * For the phrase vovs aKparos op. Anaxagoras Diels A 16
and for the sense B 12.
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 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 3. ON THE KNOWING HYPOSTASES
6 TTporepov ivervxe rovrcp, Kal Xeyoi vpoaxpcufievT] before, and says, using memory to help it, that it is
TTJ OTl ’^(x)Kpa,T7^S, 6t §€ KOU i^cXlTTOt TTpf Socrates. And if it makes the details of his form
pop^v, pepi^ei a rj <f>avraala eScoKev el Se, el expheit, it is taking to pieces what the image-making
ayados, Xeyoi, e^ cuv pev eyvu) 8ia Trjs aladrqaeojs power gave it; and if it says whether he is good, its
eipr]Kev, o Se eiprjKev eir avTOis, rjSrj nap' avTljs remark originates in what it knows through sense-
dv eyoi Kavova eyovaa tov dyaOov nap' avTrj. to perception, but what it says about this it has already
10 dyadov ndis eyei nap' avr^; ^ dyadoeiSijs eari,
from itself, since it has a norm of the good in itself.
How does it have the good in itself? Because it is
Kai eneppiLadt] Se els rrjv atadrjcnv rod roiovrov hke the good, and is strengthened for the perception
eniXdpnovros avrfj vov- to yap KaBapov rfjs of this kind of thing by Intellect illuminating it:
i/ivxrjs rovTO Kal vov Seyerai eniKelpeva tyvij. Sid for this is the pure part of the soul and receives the
ri Se ov rovro vovs, rd Se dXXa dnd rov reflection of intellect coming down upon it. But
aioBrjTiKov ap^apeva ; fj on xjrvx^v Sei ev Xoyiapxtis why is this not intellect, and the rest, beginning from
15 etvai' ravra Se ndvra Xoyi^opevrjs Svvdpecos epya. the power of sense-perception, soul? Because it
ctAAct Sia ri ov rovrip rev pepei Sovres* to voeiv must be soul that is engaged in reasoning; and all
eavTo anaXXa^opeBa; t] on eSopev avrep rd e^co this is the work of a reasoning power. But why do
not we give self-thinking to this part, and finish with
OKonelaBai Kai noXvnpaypoveiv, vcp Se d^iovpev the subject? Because we gave this part the task
vnapyeiv rd avrov Kai rd ev avrw OKoneiadai. of observing what is outside it and busying itself
aXX €i ns (jyt^oei n odv KcvXvei rovro dXX"^ Svvdpei ■with it, but we think that it is proper to Intellect to
20 oKoneiadai rd avrov;" ov rd SiavorjriKOV ovSe rd observe what belongs to itself and what is ■within
XoyiariKdv eni^rjrei, dXXd vovv KaOapdv Xap^dvei. itself. But if someone is going to say “ What pre­
n oSv KioXvei ev tfivyr} vovv KaOapdv etvai; ovSe'v, vents this part of soul from observing what belongs
(jyqaopev aXX eri Sei Xeyeiv ’f'vXBS rovro ; dXX' ov to itself by another power? ” he is not looking for
the power of discursive reasoning or rationahty, but
ifivxfjs pev (f>rjaopev, •qperepov Se vovv ^riaop^,
is grasping pure Intellect. What then prevents
26 dXXov pev ovra rov SiavoovpJvov Kal endveo pure Intellect from being in soul ? Nothing, we shall
Kora, opojs Se rjperepov, Kal el pr/ ovvapiBpoipev reply. But ought we to go on to say that it belongs
rots pepeai rrjs i/ivxfjs. ^ •qperepov Kal ovy to soul ? But we shall not say that it belongs to soul,
rjperepov Sid Kal npoaxpedpeOa avrip Kal ov npoa- but we shall say that it is our intellect, being difierent
XpivpeOa—Siavola ^ Se del—Kal -^perepov pev from the reasoning part and having gone up on high,
but all the same ours, even if we should not count it
1 K«mg (cogitaiione'EioimiB), Creuzer (ed. Paris.), Kirohhoflf*: among the parts of soul, yes, really, it is ours and not
Sidyoiai Enn., H-S *. ours; for this reason we use it and do not use it—■
78
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 PLOTINUS ; ENNEAD V. 3. ON THE KNOWING HYPOSTASES
Xpcofievwv, ov Trpo<r)(pw[i€vci>v 8e ov\ ri(i€Tepov. to but we always use discursive reason—and it is ours
30 8fj Tipocf\priadai tL iariv; dpa avrovs eicew'o when we use it, but not ours when we do not use it.
yivopLevovs, koX <f>deyyopxvovs o)s eKelvos; ^ Kwr But what is this “ using ” ? Is it when we become
CKeivov ov yap vovs ijpeis' /car’ CKeivo oSv ry it and speak like it? No, in accord with it; for we
XoyujTiKtp npo)T<p 8ej(opJv(p. kox yap aladavopxda ourselves are not Intellect. We are, then, in accord
hi alaB-qa^ois kS.v (,p.rjy ^ ij/xeis oi ataBavopevoi' with it by our rational power which first receives it.
3.p o3v Kal Siavoovpieda ovtcvs Kai 8ia (yoGy ^
For we perceive through perception, even if it is
not we ourselves who are the perceivers; do we
36 voovpxv ovrois; Hj avrol p,kv ol Xoyi^opevoi Kal
then reason like this, and think through Intellect
voovp,€v ra ev hiavoCa vo^piara airoL- rovro like this ^ ? No, it is we ourselves who reason and
yap •qpeis. ra Se rod vov ivepyripurra avcoOev we ourselves make the acts of intelligence in dis­
OVTCVS, cos TO. €K TTjs alodl^aeCVS KOLTCoOeV, TOVTO cursive reasoning; for this is what we ourselves are.
ovres TO Kvpiov -rijs 4ivxr\s, pAaov hwapiecos hiTrfjs, The activities of Intellect are from above in the same
\€ipovos Kal PeXTiovos, x^lpovos p.ev tt\s alcrd'qaecos, way that those of sense-perception are from below;
40 ^cXtIovos 8e Tov vov. oAA’ aiadTjais del we are this, the principal part of the soul, in the
^pxTepov So/cei ovyKexcoprjpevov—del ydp atada- middle between two powers, a worse and a better,
vop,eda—vovs 8c djLt^icTjSijTctTai, Kal oti p/rj avr& the worse that of sense-perception, the better that
del Kal on xco/jwttoj- xcvpicrros 8e Tcp prj of Intellect. But it is generally agreed that sense-
irpoaveveiv airov, aXX' ■qpas piaXXov -npos avrov
perception is always ours—for we are always per­
ceiving—^but there is disagreement about Intellect,
46 els TO dvcv ^Xe-novras. aiaOTjcns 8e tj/aiv dyyeXos,
both because we do not always use it and because it
^aaiXevs 8c Trpds Tfpds CKeivos. is separate; and it is separate because it itself does
not incline towards us, but we rather look up towards
^ Kciv Igal: Kal Enn. it. Sense-perception is our messenger, but Intellect
* Igal: Siayoovfiev Enn. is our king.®
earth ” in Plato Phildms 28C7-8. Though this goes far
^ See critical note. I agree with Igal in seeing here an beyond anything in the text of the De Anima, Alexander of
etiological explanation of Stavoov/tcffa. Cp. oh. 6, 20-2, Aphrodisias, whoso commentaries Plotinus knew (Life oh.
which makes it clear that for Plotinus SiavoeiaOcu. = Sta vov 14, 13), had identified the “ active Intellect ” of the De
voctv. Anima with the divine Intellect which is Aristotle’s First
* The term “ separate ” {xoifuaros) comes from Aristotle Cause, the Unmoved Mover (Alexander De Anima 89, 22-3
De Anima 430al7. Here as elsewhere Plotinus takes Aris­ Bruns, cp. Mantissa 110-13 Bruns, where Alexander is to
totle’s thought about Intellect as the starting-point of his some extent following an earlier commentator, either Aristo-
own reflections. Plotinus goes on to make it clear that his teles of Messene or, according to Zeller’s not certainly neces­
intellect is the divine Intellect which is “ king of heaven and sary emendation of the text, Aristocles).
8o 8l
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 3. ON THE KNOWING HYPOSTASES
4. BacriAevo/tev Se Kal -qfieZs, orav Kar' €Kelvov 4. But we too are kings, when we are in accord
Karr €K€ivov Se tj toTs oTov ypa/jifiaaiv with it; we can be in accord with it in two ways,
ojcnrep v6p,ois ev rfpXv ypa^eiaiv, tj otov ttAij- either by having something like its writing written
paidevres avrov rj Kal Swrfdevres ISeiv Kal in us like laws, or by being as if filled with it and
S aurdaveaOai irapovTOS. Kal yivdaKopev Se avToiis able to see it and be aware of it as present. And we
t<3 <rw> ^ ToiovTcp 6par& to, oAAa p,a0eiv \r& know ourselves by learning all other things by such
ToiovTw] ^ Kara ® Svvap.iv Trjv ywctxiKOvaav a vision, either learning a vision of this kind according
TO ToiovTov pMdovres airfi rij Svvdpei rj koI
to the knowing power, by that very power itself, or
ourselves becoming it; so that the man who knows
SKeivo yivopevoi, <hs rov ywcaaKovra iavrov himself is double, one knowing the nature of the
SiTTov etvat, TO pev yivcooKovra Tijs SiavoCas
reasoning which belongs to soul, and one up above
TTjS llwyiK7]S <fwOlV, TOV Se VTTepdvO} TOVTOV, TOV this man, who knows himself according to Intellect
10 yivcooKovra eavrov Kara rov vovv eKeivov yivope- because he has become that Intellect; and by that
vov KaKelvw eavrov voeiv aS ov\ viS dvOpconov Intellect he thinks himself again, not any longer as
eri, oAAa •TravreXcos dXXov yevopevov Kal ovvap- man, but having become altogether other and snatch­
Traoavra eavrov ety to avco pdvov €<j>€XKovra ro ing himself up into the higher world, drawing up only
T^s <pvxrjg apeivov o Kal Svvarai povov rrre- the better part of soul, which alone is able to be
povaOai irpos vorjaiv, Iva rig e/cei TrapaKaradolro winged for intellection,^ with which someone there
15 a elSe. to S:^ SiavoT]riK6v on SiavorjriKov dpa keeps by him what he sees. But really does not the
ovK otSe* Kal on avveaiv rcvv e^co Xap^dvei, Kal
part which reasons discursively know that it is the
reasoning part, and that it gains understanding of
on Kpivei a Kpivei, Kal on roZg ev eavrw Kavoaiv, the things outside it, and that it judges what it
ovg trapd rov vov eyei, Kal d>g eon n ^eXnov judges, and that it does so by the rules in itself which
avrov, <o)> oo ® l^'>]rei, dAA’ c;^et ndvrcvg Stjttou; it has from Intellect, and that there is something
20 oAA apa n eonv avro [o] ® ovk otSev erriordpevov better than itself, which does not seek, but totally
oiov eon Kal ola rd epya avrov; el oSv Xeyoi, possesses ? But does it n,ot know what this is itself,
on aiTo vov eon Kal Sevrepov perd vovv Kal when it knows what kind of thing it is and what its
eiKOiv vov, €yov ev eavrw rd rrdvra otov yeypap- works are? If, therefore, it says that it is from
peva, wg eKei d ypd<f>wv Kal 6 ypaifiag, dp' oSv Intellect and second after Intellect and an image of
Intellect, having in itself everything as if written
^ suspic. H-S*, sor. B-T. [in it], as the one who writes and has written is
’ del. Steinhart, Creuzer (ed. Paris.), Kirchhoff •.
* ^ Kara H-S reote: koto. Stark: ^ Kal Bnn. ^ One of Plotinus’s continual allusions to the Phaedrus myth,
* Creuzer * (novit Ficinus): eZ8c(»-) AJUC, H-S^: tSe{v) FTtR Plato Phaedrus 246ff.
' o oO A““«! (= Ficinus)R»™*, Creuzer*: o5 Enn. (o nomin- • del. Theiler, ut oorreotionem ad lin. 17 false loco insertam.
ativus, cf. V. 1. 4. 16).
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 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 3. ON THE KNOWING HYPOSTASES
cjnjaeTai fxe)(pi tovtcov 6 ovrco^ eavrov eyvcoKcos, there [in Intellect], will one who knows himself as
25 rjfMeZs Se aAAj^ Swapei TTpoaxpTrjffdnevoi vovv aS far as this stop there, but shall we by using another
yivdxTKovTa eavrov Karotjiopeda rj eKelvov pera- power as well behold also the Intellect which knows
Xa^ovres i-rreinep KaKeZvos perepos Kal ripels itself, or, having a part in that Intellect, since that
eKeivov, ovrcxj vovv Kal avrovs yvojaopeBa; rj belongs to us and we belong to it, shall we in this
avayKaiov ovrcus, ehrep yvcvaopeOa, o rL -nor way know Intellect and ourselves? Yes, we must
euTi TO ev v<p avro eavrd/’ eon vovs tls
so know, if we are to know what “ self-knowledge ”
30 avTos yeyovcos, ore rd dXXa d<f>els eavrov rovrcp in Intellect means. A man has certainly become
Intellect when he lets all the rest which belongs to
Kai rovrov ^XeTrei, avrw Se eavrov. (Ls Srj oSv
him go and looks at this with this and himself with
vovs eavrov opa. himself: that is, it is as Intellect he sees himself.
5. Ap’ oSv dXX(p pepei eavrov dXXo pepos avrov 5. Does he then see himself with another part of
KaOopa; aXX ovrcv to pLev eorai opivv, rd Se himself? But in this way one would be the seer,
opwpevov rovro Se ovk "avro eavro." rL ovv, el and the other the seen; but this is not "self-
irdv roiovrov oTov opoiopepes elvai, ware rd dpwv knowledge ”. What, then, if everything of this
6 prjSev Sia<ftepeiv rov opwpevov; ovrw yd.p ISwv kind is, in a way, composed of exactly similar parts,
eKeivo ro pepos avrov ov ravrdv avrw etSev so that the seer does not differ in any way from the
eavrov' Sia<j>epei yap ovSev rd opwv Trpds rd seen? First of all, the division of itself into parts
opwpevov. ^ rrpwrov pev drottos 6 pepiopds is absurd: for how will it divide? Certainly not at
eavrov- ttws yap Kal pepiel; ov yap Srj Kara,
random; and who is the divider ? The one who sets
himself on the contemplating or on the contemplated
rvyrjv Kai o pepi^wv Se ris; d ev rw dewpetv side ? Then, how 'will the contemplator know himself
10 rarrwv eavrov rj 6 ev rw OewpeZadai; elra ttws in the contemplated when he has set himself on the
eavrdv yvwaerai 6 dewpwv ev rep dewpovpevw contemplating side? For the contemplating is not
ra^as eavrov Kara ro dewpeZv; ov yd.p ev rw in the contemplated. Knowing himself in this way,
Bewpovpevcp ro dewpeZv. rj yvovs eavrdv ovrw he will know himself as contemplated but not as
Bewpovpevov dXX’ ov dewpovvra vorjoei- ware ov contemplating; so that he will not know himself
rravra ovSe oXov yvwaerai eavrov ov yd,p etSe, completely or as a whole; for what he saw, he saw
16 dewpovpevov dXX’ ov ffewpovvra etSe- Kal ovrws as contemplated but not as contemplating: and so
earai aXXov, aXX ovy eavrdv ewpaKws. ^ he will have been seeing another, but not himself.
TTpoadrjaei Trap avrov Kal rdv redewprjKora, iva Or perhaps he will add from himself the one who has
contemplated, in order that he may have perfect
reXeov avrdv ^ vevoijKWs. oAA’ el Kal rdv knowledge of himself. But if he adds the one who
redewprjKora, ojiov Kal rd. ewpapeva. el oSv ev
has contemplated, he at the same time adds what he
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 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 3. ON THE KNOWING HYPOSTASES

rfl Oecoplq, VTrdpxei rd reOecDprjpeva, el p,ev tvttoi

sees. If then the things contemplated are in the
contemplation, if what are in it are impressions of
20 avrdiv, ovk avra, e)(ei' el S’ avra ovk IScjv
them, then it does not have them themselves; but
avrd eK rov p,epLaai avrov exei, dAA’ nplv if it has them themselves it does not see them as a
peplaai eavrov koX decopcdv Kal el tovto. Set result of dividing itself, but it was contemplator and
TTjv Oecjplav ravTov elvai Tip Oecvprjrip, Kal rov possessor before it divided itself. But if this is so,
the contemplation must be the same as the contem­
povv ravTOV etvai rip vorjrip' Kal yap, el pur^ plated, and Intelleet the same as the intelligible;
ravTov, OVK dX^deia earai- tvttov yap e^ei 6 for, if not the same, there will not be truth; for the
eycov Ta ovra eTepov twv ovtcov, oirep ovk eariv one who is trying to possess realities will possess an
25 aXijdeia.rriv dpa dXqdeiav ovy erepov etvai Sei, impression different from the reahties, and this is
not truth. For truth ought not to be the truth of
aAA’ o Xeyei, tovto Kal etvai. ev dpa ovrcv vovs something else, but to be what it says. In this way,
Kal TO VOTJTOV Kal TO OV Kal TTpCOTOV OV TOVTO Kal therefore. Intellect and the intelligible are one, and
Srj Kal TTpioTos vovs TO. ovra eyaiv, pidXXov Se 6 this is reahty and the first reahty, and also the first
Intellect which possesses the real beings, or rather
avTOS Tois oSaiv. dAA’ el rj vorjcris Kal to vorjTOV is the same as the real beings. But if the intellection
30 ev, TTciis Sid TOVTO TO voovv vorjaei eavro; ij pev and the intelligible are one, how because of this will
yap voTjois oiov Trepie^ei to vorjTov, 7] Tavrdv Tip that which thinks think itself? For the intellection
voTyrip earai, ovttoi Se d vovs SijXos eavrov vodiv. will in a way encompass the intelligible, or be the
same as the intelligible, and Intellect will not yet
dAA’ el rj vorjais Kal to vorjTOV ravrov—evepyeia be clearly thinking itself. But if intellect and in­
yap Tis TO voijTov ov ydp Srj Svvapis ovSe y’ telligible are the same—^for the intelligible is some­
avorjTov ^ ovSe ^corjs yaipls ouS’ aS erraKrdv to thing active and actual: for it is certainly not a
35 ^rjv ovSe to voeXv dXXip ovri, oiov XLOip ^ d^yip potentiahty (and not unintellectual either), nor is it
without hfe, nor again are hfe and thought brought
Tivi—Kal ovaLa -fj rrpwTTj to vorjrov el oSv in from outside to something else, as if to a stone or
evepyeia Kal rj rrptLrrj evepyeia Kal KaXXiarrj Sfj, something Ufeless—then the intelhgible is the pri­
votjais dv eiTj Kal ovaidiSrjs vorjais' Kal ydp mary substance. If then it is active actuality, and
aXrjBeaTdrrj' vorjais Srj roiavTtj Kal rrpiVTrj o3aa the first active actuality and the fairest, it is the first
intelleetion and substantial intellection: for it is
Kal TTpcvTCvs vovs dv eitj 6 rrpwTOS' ovSe ydp d the truest; but an intellection of this kind which is
40 vovs oStos Svvdpei ovS’ erepos pkv avrds, rj Se primary and primarily intellective will be the first
‘ Theiler, testatur Epistola 61: ye vorjrov Enn.* Intellect; for this Intellect is not potential, nor is
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 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 3. ON THE KNOWING HYPOSTASES
voffois aXXo' ovrco yap dv naXiv to ovaidiSes it one and its intellection another: for in this way
avTOV 8vvdp,ei. ei oSv ivepyeia Kal rj ovala avToO again its substantiality would be potential. If then
ivepyeia, ev Kal ravTOV Trj evepyeia dv etry ev 8e it is actuality and its substance is actuality, it is one
rij ivepyeia to ov Kal to votjtov ev a/xa Travra and the same with its actuality; but being and the
intelUgible are also one with the actuality. All
earai, vovs, vorjcns, to votjtov. el odv rj vorjais together are one. Intellect, intellection, the intelligi­
45 avTov TO VOTJTOV, TO 8e VOTJTOV avTos, avTos dpa ble. If therefore Intelleet’s intellection is the in­
eavTov vorjaei" vorjaei yap ttj vorjaei, orrep ^v telligible, and the intelligible is itself, it will itself
avTOs, Kal vo-qaei to votjtov, orrep ^v ainos. Kad' think itself: for it will think with the intellection
which it is itself and will think the intelligible, which
eKaTepov dpa eavrov vorjaei, KaOon Kal rj vorjais it is itself. In both ways, then, it will think itself,
avTOS ‘^v, Kal KadoTi to votjtov avros, orrep evoei in that intellection is itself and in that the intelligible
TTj vorjaei, d •fjv avros. is itself which it thinks in its intellection and which
6. '0 jxev 8rj Aoyoy diTe8ei^ev elvai ri to avro is itself.
6. The argument, then, has demonstrated that
eavTo KvpUos voeiv. voei oSv dXXcos pev etrl self-thinking in the proper and primary sense is
</ivxfjs ov, errl 8e tov vov KvpiwTepov. rj pev yap something which exists. The thinking is different
ipvxrj evoei eavrrjv ori dXXov, 6 8e vovs on avros when it is in soul but is more properly thinking in
Intellect. For the soul [we observed] thought itself
5 Kal otos avros Kal dans Kal ck ttjs eavrov
as belonging to another, but Intellect did so as itself,
<f)vaeo}s Kal emoTpeijxjvv els avrov. rd yap dvra and as what and who it is, and [it started its thinking]
opciv eavrov etLpa Kal optav ivepyeia •^v Kal rj from its own nature and thought by turning back
ivepyeia avros' vovs yap Kal vorjais ev Kal dXos to itself. For in seeing the real beings it saw itself,
dXcp, ov pepei dXXo jiepos. dp' oSv roiovrov d
and in seeing it was in act, and its actuality was
itself: for Intellect and intellection are one; and it
Xdyos e8ei^ev, otov Kal ivepyeiav TrioTiKTjv eyeiv; thinks as a whole with the whole of itself, not one
10 rj dvdyKTjv ^ pev ovnas, Treiddy 8e ovk eyei' Kal yap part of itself with another. Has then our argument
rj pev dvayKTj iv v&, rj 8e rreiScb iv i/ivx^. ^tjtov- demonstrated something of a kind which has the
power to inspire confidence ? No, it has necessity,
pev d'q, d)s eoiKev, rjjieis Treiadrjvai pdXXov rj vip
not persuasive force; for necessity is in Intellect
KaOapcp OedaOai to dXrjdes. Kal yap Kal ecjs but persuasion in the soul. It does seem that we
•^pev dvo) iv vov <f>vaei, rjpKovpeOa Kal ivoovpev seek to persuade ourselves rather than to behold
truth by pure intellect. For while we were above
‘ APe, Kirchhoff *, of. VI. 4. 4. 5: ivdyKn A“EBxUC, H-S*. in the nature of Intellect, we were satisfied and
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 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 3. ON THE KNOWING HYPOSTASES
Kol els ev iravra awdyovres eoipcayLev vovs yap [really] thought and saw, gathering all things into
16 ijv o vocov Kou Trepl avrov XeycDV, rj Se <fivx^ one; for it was Intellect thinking and speaking about
Tfovylav ■^ye avyycDpovaa tw evepy^pari rov vov. itself, and the soul kept quiet and went along with
iirel 8e evravda yeyevqpeda TraXiv aS /cat iv tl/vyfj, the working of Intellect. But since we have come
•neiBoj Tiva yeveaOai ^rproOpev, otov iv eiKovi to to be here below again and in soul, we seek for some
kind of persuasion, as if we wanted to contemplate
apyenmov Oecopeiv ideXovres. tcrcvs oSv ypr^ t^v the archetype in the image. Perhaps, then, we
ipvx^v rjpuXv SiSd^ai, TTois ‘rrore 6 vovs BeojpeT ought to teach our soul how Intellect contemplates
20 eavTov, SiSd^ac Se rovro rrjs ° voepov ttcjs, itself, and to teach that part of the soul which is in
Siavo'qTiKOV avTO ridepevoi Kcd rfj ovopaala some way intellectual, since we call it discursively
VTTocrqpaivovTes vovv riva avro elvai t] Sia vov Trjv intelligent and by this naming indicate that it is a
Svvapiv Kal TTapd vov avro tayeiv. rovrco toCvvv kind of intellect or that it has its power through and
yiyvoiOKew TrpocrqKei,, <ibs /cat avrcp oaa opa from Intellect.^ This therefore should know that
ytvcoa/cet /cat otoev a Aeyet. /cat et avro ^ €irj a in its own case too it comes to know what it sees and
25 Xeyei, yivdioKoi dv eavro ovtcv. ovraiv Se 7]
knows what it speaks. And if it was what it speaks,
dvcudev avTcp yivopevcvv eKeZdev, o9ev nep Kal then it would in this way know itself. But since the
things which it .speaks are above, or come to it from
avTO, avyL^aivoi dv Kal rovrco Xoycp ovri Kal
above, whence it also comes itself, it could happen
avyyevfj Xap^dvovri Kal rots iv avrcp tyyeaiv to it, since it is a rational principle and receives
i<f>app6rrovri ^ ovrco roc ycvcooKecv eavro. pcera- things akin to it, and fits them to the traces in itself,
derco rocwv Kal im rov dXrjOrj vovv rrjv ecKOva, os in this way to know itself. Let it then transpose the
30 •fjv 6 avros rocs voovpevocs dXrjdeac Kal ovrco? image to the true Intellect, the one [we observed]
oScn Kal TTpchrocs, Kal on pr] olov re rovrov rov which was the same as the truths it thought which
roiovrov iKros eavrov elvac—coare ecrrep iv eavrw are really existent and primary, both because it was
eon /cat avv eavrcp Kal rovro, onep eari, vovs not possible for it, being of such a kind, to be outside
earcv {avorjros 8c vovs ovk dv irore etrj) dvdy/oj itself—so that if it is in itself and with itself, and
avvecvai avrcp rrjv yvcoacv eavrov—/cat on iv avrcp that which it is, is Intellect (there could not even be
an unintelligent intellect), its knowledge of itself
36 oSros, Kal ovk ctAAo avrcp to epyov Kal rj ovaca rj
must necessarily accompany it—and because it is
TO vcp pLovov elvac. ov yap Srj vpaKrcKos ye oSros' in itself and has no other function and no other
cos rrpos rd e^co jSAcVovrt rep rrpaKrcKcp koI prj iv substance than to be Intellect. For it is certainly
avrcp peevovre ecrj dv rcbv pev e^co ns yvcdcrcs, not a practical intellect: as the practical intellect
^ RP®, Kirchhoff *: auroy wBR*®JUC.
looks to the outside and does not stay in itself, it
® Kirchhofi^*: —orrovra Enn. * Cp. ch. 3, n. 1.
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 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 3. ON THE KNOWING HYPOSTASES

dvdyKT) 8e ovk Iveariv, evnep ro ttov irpaKTiKOS eh}, could have a kind of knowledge of the things outside,
yivdiOKeiv eavTov. ^ 8e fiTj TTpa^is—oiSe yap but if it was altogether practical, there would be no
^ ops^is Tip Ka6apa> vw ottovtos—tovtw i'm<jTpo<fq necessity in it of knowing itself. But the Intellect
TTpos avTov oSaa ov pdvov evXoyov VTTohetKwaw, which has no practical activity—^piu:e Intellect does
[t>jv eavTov] ^ dAAd Kal dvayKalav avrov t^v not even have a desire for what is absent from it—
(^eavToVy ® yvwaiv ris yap dv Kal ij ^(orj airov for this the return upon itself demonstrates that its
ett] TTpd^ecDs dirqXXaypivcp /cat €v v<p ovri; knowledge of itself is not only probable but neces­
7. AAAd Tov deov dewpei, einoipep dv. dAA’ el sary. For [otherwise] what could its life be, being
Tov deov yivwoKeiv avrov ns opoAoyijaet, Kal free from practical activity and in intellect ?
ravTT) cruyyoipeiv avayKooBrjaerai Kal eavrov 7. " But it contemplates God ”, we might say.
yivaxjKeiv. Kal yap ocra irap' eKelvov But if anyone is going to admit that it knows God,
6 yvwaerai, Kal a eScoKe, Kal a Svvarai eKeivos. he will be compelled to agree that it also knows itself.
ravra Se padwv Kal yvovs Kal ravrp eavrov For it will know all that it has from him, and what
yvdioerax' Kal yap cv ri rG>v SoOevrwv airos, he gives, and what his power is. But when it has
paXXov Se irdvra rd Sodevra avros. el pev oSv learnt and knows this, then in this way also it will
KaKeivo yvwaerai Kara ® rdj Svvdpeis avrov know itself: for it is itself one of his gifts, or, rather,
padwy, Kal eavrov yva>aerai eKeldev yevopevos Kal
itself all of his gifts. If then it comes to know that
a Svvarai Kopiadpevos' el 8e dSwarijaei ISeiv
[Good], learning by his powers, it will come to know
10 crat^cvs eKeivov, e^reiS^ rd ISeiv tacos avro eari rd
itself since it comes from there and has received what
opwpevov, ravrri pdXiara Xelrroir’ dv a{>r& ISeiv
it can ^: but if it cannot see him clearly, since per­
eavrov /cat eiSevai, el rd ISeiv rovrd eon rd avrd
etvai rd dpwpevov. rl yap dv Kal Sovqpev avrip haps that seeing is the sight itself, then especially
aXXo; •qavylav, vrj Ala. izAAd v<p rfovy^la ov vov in this way it will remain for it to see and know
15 eariv eKoraais, dAA’ eariv "qouxla rov vov axoXrjv
itself, if this seeing is being the sight itself. For
what else should we give it? Peace and quiet, of
* del. Volkmann*. course. But peace and quiet for Intellect is not
’ transposuimus.
’ Stark: xal Enn.*: del. Theiler. going out of Intellect, but the peace and quiet of
Intellect is an activity taking its rest from all other
^ The idea that God can only he knoim through his powers Good) was possible. The idea that knowledge of God and
was widespre^i op. CSoero De Divinatione I 79; Philo De self-knowledge go together was also widespread and goes back
Poateritate Caini 167. It did not of coarse satisfy Plotinus, to Plato [?] Alcibiadea I 133C.
for whom direct vision of and union with God (the One or
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 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 3. ON THE KNOWING HYPOSTASES
dyovaa dno rwv oAAojv ivefyyeia" cttci Kal rots activities, since for other beings also, which are left
dXXois, ots iariv rjovxia irepoiv, KaraXeiverai ij in peace and quiet by other things, there remains
avTwv oiKeia ivepyeia Kal fidXicrra, ots ro etvai ov their own proper activity, above all for those whose
8vvdfiei ecrrlv, dAAa ivepyeia. to etvai oSv being is not potential but actual. The Being of
ivepyeia, Kal ovSev, npos o rj ivepyeia- irpos avr& Intellect, therefore, is activity, and there is nothing
20 dpd. eavTOV dpa vodiv ovrco irpos avrip Kal els to which the activity is directed; so it is self-directed.
Thinking itself, it is thus with itself and holds its
eavTOV rrjv ivepyeiav layei. Kal yap ei ri i^
activity directed to itself. For if anything comes
avTov, rip els avrdv iv eavrip. eSei yap irpwTov from it, it is in itself and directed to itself. For it
iv^ eavrip, etra Kal els dXXo, dXXo ri -qKeiv dir had to be first in itself, then also directed to some­
avrov 6p,oiovp,evov avrip, otov Kal irvpl iv avr& thing else, or with something else coming from it
irporepov ovri irvpl Kal rrjv ivepyeiav eyovri irvpos made like itself, just as it is since fire is previously
25 ovrct) roi Kal lyvos avrov SvvrjOrjvai iroiijaai iv fire in itself and has the activity of fire that it is
dXXip. Kal yap aS Kal eariv 6 [xev vovs iv avrS> able to produce a trace of itself in another. Again,
ivepyeia, ij 8e ^fru-y^ ro piev oaov irpos vovv avrijs Intellect is an activity contained in itself, and, as
otov etaoj, ro 8’ e^ai vov irpos ro e^o). Kara for soul, the part of it directed to Intellect is, so to
ddrepa p,ev yap (hpioloirai o9ev ijKei, Kara ddrepa speak, within, and the part outside Intellect directed
to the outside. In one part, then, it is made like
8e Kalroi dvopu)iU)6eicra opMS (Lpiolwrai Kal
that from which it comes, in the other even in its
30 ivravda, eire irpdrroi, eire iroioi- Kal yap Kal unlikeness it is made like, even here below in its
irparrovaa opicos decopei Kal iroiovaa ei8rj iroiei, action and production; for its action is simultaneously
otov voijaeis dirrjpriapievas, dxrre irdvra etvai lyvi] contemplation, and in its production it produces
vo-^aews Kal vov Kara ro dpyervirov irpoiovriov Kal forms, which are like intellections carried out in
p,ipMvp.ev(x)v r&v piev iyyvs piaXXov, rcHv 8e practice, so that all things are traces of intellection
iaydrwv dp,v8pdv diroaipCdvraiv elKova. and Intellect proceeding according to their arche­
8. Ilotov 8e ri opa ro voryrov 6 vovs, Kal iroidv type, the ones near it representing it closely, and
ri ^ eavrov; rj ro piev vorp-ov ov8e ® 8ei C'lJTetv, the last and lowest keeping a faint image of it.^
otov ro iirl rots acipiaai ypiapxi i] a-y^pia- irplv 8. But as what sort of thing does Intellect see the
intelligible, and as what sort of thing does it see
> J, Kirchhofif*: om. wBRUC, H-S \ itself? As for the intelligible, one should not look
* B-T: TTOiov Se TL . . . iTOliv Ti Eiin.*: ttoiov Si r(, noiov ri
H-S 1. for something hke colour or form in bodies; for
* Perna*: ovre Emi., H-S *.
* For the doctrine that all action is simultaneously con­ last and lowest activities of soul, see the first seven chapters
templation, and the extension of contemplation down to the of the treatise On Contemplation (III. 8).
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 PLOTINUS; ENNEAD V. 3. ON THE KNOWING HYPOSTASES
yap ravra etvai, eariv eKetva- Kal o Xoyos 8e 6 the intelligibles exist before the existence of these;
5 eu rots aneppiaai rols ravra -noiovaiv ov ravra- and the rational forming principle in the seeds which
dopara yap rrj <j>va€i koX ravra, Kal eri p,dXXov produce these are not form and colour; for both
eKeXva. Kal sort <f>vais 17 avr^ eKelviov Kal rcvv
these and still more the intelligibles are naturally
invisible. And they and those which possess them
dyovraiv, otov 6 Xoyos 6 iv rip OTrippLart, Kal t]
have the same nature, as do also the rational prin­
€\ovaa iftvyri ravra. dXX’ 17 p,ev ovy dpa a exei- ciple in the seed and the soul which possesses these
ovSe yap avrr) iyewrjaev, dAA’ eari koX avrr) [invisible principles of colour and form]. But the
10 eiScvXov Kal oi Xdyoi- odev 8e ^Xde, ro evapyes Kal soul does not see what it possesses; for it did not
even generate them, but this soul as well as the
ro dXridivov Kal ro TTpcorois, odev Kal eaxrrov ecrri
rational forming principles is an image; but that
Kal avr<p- rovro 8’ edv p,rj dXXov yevrjrai koI from which it came is the clear and the true and the
iv dXX<p, ov8e p,€vei- eiKovi yap irpoa'qKei primary, and so belongs to itself and exists for itself;
iripov oSaav iv irep<p yiyveaOai, el p,rj elrj but this [image], if it does not belong to something
else and exist in something else, does not persist;
iKeivov i$r)pn^pLevr]- 816 ov8e ^Xe-irei, are 8ri (f>d}s for “it is proper to an image, since it belongs to
16 iKovov ovK exov, kS.v ^Xevi^ 8e, reXeiwOev iv dXXco something else, to come to exist in something else
aXXo Kal ovx avrd pXe-Trei. dAA’ ovv rovroiv iKet unless it is in close dependence on that original. It
does not even see, therefore, because it does not have
ov8ev, dAA’ opaais Kal ro opardv avrij opLov Kal enough light, but if it does see, it does not see itself
roiovrov ro opardv otov 17 dpaais, Kal rj opaais but another thing perfected in something else. But
otov rd opardv. rls odv avrd ipet otov icrriv; 6 there is none of this in the intelligible world, but
ISwv vovs 8e dpa. i-nel Kal ivravOa rj oipis <f>cds there seeing and the seen coincide, and the seen is
like the seeing and the seeing like the seen. Who
20 odaa, p,dXXov 8e evcuOeiaa (fxorl, <f>ws dpa- xpuyfiara
then will tell what it is like? The seer: and In­
yap Spa- iKet 8e ov 8t erepov, dAAd 81’ avrrjs, ori tellect is the seer. For here below also sight, since
fir}8e e^co. dXXcp oSv (jxvrl dAAo <f>cds dpa, ov 8t it is light, or rather united vidth light, sees light:
dXXov. <f>ci)s -dpa <j>o}s dAAo dpa- avrd dpa avrd for it sees colours; but in the intelligible world
seeing is not through another [medium], but through
dpa. rd 8e <f>dis rovro iv <jtvxfj jxev iXXdpufiav
itself, because it is not [directed] outside. Intellect
i<f)wriae- rovro 8’ iarl voepdv irtoLrjae- rovro 8’ therefore sees one light with another, not through
another. Light then sees another light: it therefore
itself sees itself. And this light shining in the soul
* From Plato Timaeus 62C2-4.
illuminates it; that is, it makes it intelligent; that
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 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 3. ON THE KNOWING HYPOSTASES
25 €<7Tiy (Lfwuoaev eavrw tw ava> ^xari. otov oSv is, it makes it like itself, the light above. For if
eari to to iy/evo/Mevov rov ^coros ev >pvxfit you consider that it is like the trace of light that
ToiovTov Kal 6Ti KtiXXiov Kal [jieT^ov avro vofjiL^cov comes to be in the soul and still more beautiful and
Kal evapyearepov eyyvs av yevoio <f>vaeo)s vov Kal greater and clearer, you will come near to the nature
vorryTov. Kal yap aS Kal emXap,<f>6€v rovro !^axr)v of Intellect and the intelligible. And again, this
eScjKe rfj ijjvxfj evapyearepav, fojijv 8e ov yev- illumination gives the soul a clearer life, but a life
which is not generative; on the contrary it turns
30 vt]TiKrjv TovvavrLov yap iirearrpei/ie npos eavrrjv tt]v
the soul back upon itself and does not allow it to
tpvxqvj Kal (TKtSvacjdai ovk eiaaey, aAA’ ayamav disperse, but makes it satisfied with the glory in
eTTOiTjcre riyv ev avr<p dyXatav ov p/qv ov8e itself; and it is certainly not a life of sense-percep­
aladqriKqv, avrrj yap e^co jSAeTrei Kal [otJ jaaAAov] ^ tion either; for sense-perception looks outside and
aladdverai' 6 S’ CKeZvo to riov dXqBu>v perceives the external world; but he who has re­
Xa^div otov jSAeirei (,oiy ^ pSXXov rd dpard, dAAa ceived that light of the true realities sees, so to
35 TovvavTiov. XeiTrerai toIwv ^cvrjv voepdv tTpoa- speak, the visible things no better, but their opposite.
€iXq<f>evai, tyvos vov ^arfjs' eKei yap rd dX^Orj. The remaining possibility, then, is for the soul to
•fj 8e ev Tw vw ^cvr/ Kal evepyeia to TTp&TOV <f>(ds have received an intelligent life, a trace of the life
eavT<p XdpTTov TrpwTOis Kal irpos avro Xap7Trj8a)v, of Intellect: for the true realities are there. But
the life and activity ^ of Intellect is the first light
Xdp-nov opov Kal Xap’jropevov, to dXqdcos vo-qrov,
shining primarily for itself and an outshining upon
40 Kai voovv Kal voovpevov, Kal eavTtp dpcvpevov Kal itself, at once illuminating and illuminated, the truly
ov 8edpevov dXXov, tva i8r], avTCp avrapKes irpos rd intelligible, both thinker and thought, seen by itself
I8eiv—Kal ydp o opa avro eoTi—yiyvcooKopevov Kal and needing no other that it may see, supplying
•nap •qpdiv avrip eKevvu), dis Kal •nap' •qpdjv -rqv itself with the power of seeing—^for it is itself what
yvidaiv avrov St’ avrov ylveadaf ^ •nodev dv it sees—^known to us by that very power, so that
eayopev Xeyecv •nepl avrov; roiovrdv eariv, otov the knowledge of it comes to us through itself;
45 aa<j>ecrrepov pev dvriXap^dveoBai avrov, •qpds 8e Si’ otherwise from where should we have the ability
avrov- Sid Se rd>v roiovrcuv Xoycopojv dvdyeadai to speak about it ? It is such a kind that it appre­
Kal rqv tpvxqv •qpG)v els avro eiKova Qepevqv hends itself more clearly, but we apprehend it by
eavrqv etvai eKeivov, d>s rqv avrqs ® C<^qv tv8aXpa
means of it; by reasonings of this kind our soul also
is led back up to it, considering itself to be an image
Kai opouvpa etvai eKeivov, Kal orav vofj, 6eoei8q
of Intellect, as its hfe is a reflection and likeness of
* del. Igal.
* KirchhofP. ^ Again a reminiscence of Aristotle’s description of divine
a R*nig_ Kirchhoff* [suam Fioinus): aOr^v wBxU. Intellect: cp. Metaphysics A 7. 1072b27.
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 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 3. ON THE KNOWING HYPOSTASES

KoX vooeiSrj yiyveadar Kal edv ns avrqv ^ dirairij it, and when it thinks it becomes godlike and intellect­
like; and if one asks it what sort of thing is that
60 oTTOiov 6 vovs eKetvos ianv 6 reXeos Kal ttSs, o
perfect universal Intellect which has primary know­
yivcaoKcov •npwruis eavrov, ev ain^v trpwrov ledge of itself, it first comes to be in Intellect or
yevofievrfv rj irapayaip^aaaav r<p vcp r^v ivepyeiav, makes room for Intellect to exercise its activity, and
cUv eaye rrjv p,vijp,r]v in’ avrg, ravra Sr/ * eyovaav ® shows itself really in possession of the things of
SeiKVVvai eavnjy, cos St’ avrfjs sIkovos ovcrqs dpdv which it has the memory in itself, so that through soul
65 BvvaaOai dptrjyeTrri CKeivov, Sid rrjs eKetvcp npds ro which is its image one can in some way see Intellect,
OLKpi^iarepov coptoujopevrjs, oaov >livxfjs ptipos els through the soul which is brought more precisely to
opLoiorqra vw Swarai iXdetv.
its likeness, as far as a part of soul can come to
likeness with Intellect.
9. Wvxrjt' oSv, cos eoiKe, Kal rd >f>vy^s Oeiorarov 9. It is probable, then, that he who intends to
KanSeiv Set tov pteXXovra vovv eiaeaOai 6 n iari. know what Intellect really is must know soul, and
yevoiTO S’ dv tovto tacos Kal ravrrj, el d^eXots the most divine part of soul. This could happen
npanov to awpta and tov dvOpconov Kal StjXovoti also in this way, if you first of all separated the body
6 aavTov, elra koX rqv nXdrTovaav tovto ipvyriv from man (and, obviously, from yourself), and then
the soul which forms it and, very thoroughly, sense-
Kal Tr/v aiaOrjaiv Se eS ptdXa, intdvptias Se Kal
perception and desires and passions and all the rest
dvptovs Kal Tas dXXas Tas Totavras <f>Xvaplas, cos
of such fooleries,^ since they incline so very much
npds TO OvTjTdv vevovaas Kal ndvv. to S^ Xoindv towards the mortal. What remains of soul is this
avrfjs TOVTO ianv, o eiKova €<f>apt€v vov acp^ovadv which we said was an image of Intellect preserving
n <j)ws iKCLVov, otov -qXlov pteTa TTjv tov peyeOovs something of its light, like the light of the sun which,
10 a<j>aipav to nepl avrrjv i^ avrfjs Xdptnov. ijAtou beyond its spherical mass, shines around it and from
piev oSv TO c^cds ovK dv ns avy^copijaeiev i<f>’ it. Now one would not concede that the light of
iavTov nepl avTdv rjXtov etvai, i^ oS <hpptt]ptevov the sun exists by itself which is around the sun itself,
springing from it and remaining around it, though one
Kal nepl avrdv pteivav, dXXo 8e i^ dXXov del light comes from another, always going forth from
npotdv TOV npd avTov, ecos dv els 'Qptas Kal ini yfjv that before it until it reaches us on the earth; but
'^K‘j^‘ dAAd nav Kal to nepl avrdv rjXiov drfaeTai iv one will place all of it, including that which is around
16 dXXcp, iva ptf) StdoTTjpta StScp Kevdv rd pterd rdv the-sun itself, in something else, so as not to assume
■qXiov acdptaros. ij Se ipvyrj iK vov <f>cds n nepl that there is a space, that under the sun, which is
empty of body. But the soul has arisen from In-
^ KirchhofiF*: a^ov Bnn., H-S
* KirchhoflF*: Sc Enn., H-S
® Kirchhoff*: exovaa Enn. ‘ Cp. Plato Phaedo 66C3.
lOI
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 PLOTINUS; ENNEAD V. 3. ON THE KNOWING HYPOSTASES
avrov yevoyiAvrj i^'qpnjraC re avrov Kal ovre iv tellect as a light around it and is immediately
dXXcp dAAd Trepl CKeZvov, ovre tottos avrij’ ovSe yap dependent on it and not in something else but around
€Keiv<p. odev to p,ev tov rjXlov <j)U>s ev depi, avrr] it, and has no place, for neither has Intellect. So
8e f) >f>vxT] Tj roiavTr] Kadapd, diare Kal i<f>’ avTrjs the light of the sun is in the air, but the soul itself
20 opdaOai vtto t€ avrijs Kal dXXr]s roiavTTjs- Kal which is of this kind is pure, so that it itself and any
other soul of the same kind can see it by itself. And
avTp p,€v Trepl vov cwXXoyicjrea otos d<l>' eavrijs
soul must draw conclusions about what Intellect is
aKOTTovpLevr], vovs Se avros avrov ov avXXoyi^6p,e- like, starting its investigation from itself, but In­
vos Trepl avTOV’ Trdpeari yap del avrw, rjpeis Se, tellect knows itself without drawing conclusions about
orav ets avrov pepepiarai yap r]pXv ij forij Kol itself; for it is always present to itself, but we are
TToXXal Coial, eKeZvos Se ovSev SeZrai dXXrjs ^coijs rj only so when we attain to it; for our life is divided
26 dXXcov, dAA’ d? rrapeyei dXXois Trapeyet,, ovy and we have many lives, but Intellect has no need
eavrcp- ovSe yap SeZrai ruiv yeipovcov, ovSe avrip of another life or other hves, but the hves which it
Trapeyet to eXarrov eycov ro rrav, ovSe rd lyvrj gives, it gives to others, not to itself: for it has no
eycvv rd Trp&ra, pioXXov Se ovk eycov, dAA’ avros need of the worse, nor does it give itself the less when
cov ravra. el Se ns dSvvareZ Trpcorrjv] ^ it has the all, nor the traces of reality when it has
the primary realities, or rather does not have them,
rrjv roiavTTjv f/rvyrjv eyeiv Kadapcds voovaav,
but is them itself. But if someone is unable to
30 So^aoriKTiv Xa^erco, elra arro ravrrjs dva^aiverco. grasp this kind of soul which thinks purely, let him
el Se p,r]Se rovro, acadrjaiv epmXarvrepa rd eiSrj take the soul which forms opinions, and then ascend
Kopu^opevrjv, alaOrjaiv Se Kal e<j>’ eavrrjs peO' cLv from this. But if he cannot even do this, let him
Svvarai Kal TjSr) ev roZs etSeaiv oSaav. el Se take sense-perception which acquires the forms in
^ovXerai ns, Kara^aLvcov koX errl r^v yewcdaav broader extension and sense-perception by itself
tno p-iypc Kal cov iroceZ- elra evrevdev dva^aiverco with its powers which is already in the forms. But
if someone wants to, let him descend to the generative
36 arro eaydrcov elSdiv els rd eayara dvd-rraXiv elSr),
soul and go right on to what it makes, and then
pdXXov Se els rd Trpcora. ascend from there, from the ultimate forms to the
10. Tavra p,ev oSv ravr^. el Se ^ rd Troirjdevra forms which are ultimate in the opposite sense, or,
pcovov, OVK ® dv ^v eayara. eKeZ Se Trpcora rd rather, to the primary forms.
TToiovvra, odev Kal Trpcora. SeZ ovv dpa Kal rd 10. So much for this. But if there were only the
things which are made, there would be no ultimate
^ del. Dodds (Gnomon 33, 1961, 708), ut glossam ad rf/v reahties. But in the intelligible world the princi­
roiavrriv.
’ « 8^ Enn.: ouSe H-S ' false. ples which make are primary; it is because they make
® Huller: oo yap Enn. that they are primary. The primary principle, then,
102 103
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PLOTINUS; ENNEAD V. 3. ON THE KNOWING HYPOSTASES
iroiovv elvai Kal ev dfjufxjt)' el Se Seijaet TrdXiv and the making principle must coincide, and both
6 dXXov. TL oSv; ov SeTjaei ‘irdXxv (joCy ^ etreKeiva must be one; if not, there will be need of yet another.
TOVTOV; 7] 6 fiev vovs tovto; tl odv; ovx dp^ What then? Is there not a need of that wliich is
eavTov; vj oStos ov8ev Setrai opdaews. beyond Intellect ? Or is Intellect this ? What then ?
’AAAd TOVTO els varepov vvv Se iraXiv Xey(op,ev— Does it not see itself? This one has no need of
ov yap TTepl tov eiriTvyovTos ij oKetlns—
seeing.
But this we will deal with later. Now let us say (
XeKTeov Se irdXiv tovtov tov vovv 8e7]6i]vai tov again—^for our investigation is not about some casual j
10 opdv eavTov, paXXov Se eyeiv to opav eavTov, matter ^—^we ought to repeat that this Intellect ^
TTpwTov pev Tcp rroXvv elvai, elra Kal Tip eTepov needs to see itself, or rather to possess the seeing of
elvai, Kai e^ dvdyKrjs opaTiKov elvai, Kal opaTiKov itself, first because it is multiple, and then because
it belongs to another, and must necessarily be a seer, \
eKeivov, Kal TTjv ovaiav avrov opaaiv elvai- Kal yap and a seer of that other, and its seeing is its substance; |
OVTOS Tivos dXXov opaaiv Set elvai, jitij Se ovros for the existence of something else is a necessary
pd-rqv earl. Set Toivvv TrAetco evos elvai, Iva condition of seeing, and if there is nothing else
16 opaais Kal ovveKmirTeiv Trjv opaaiv Tip opaTcp, seeing is useless. There must, then, be more than
Kal TO opidpevov to vtt' avTov -n-XrjOos elvai ev one, that seeing may exist, and the seeing and the 1
seen must coincide, and what is seen by itself must
iravrl. ovSe yap eyei to ev -ndvTr] els tI evepy-^aei, be an universal multiplicity. !l^or what is absolutely
dAAd povov Kal ep-qpov dv Trdvn) on^aeTai- -fj one has nothing to which to direct its activity but
yap evepyei, dXXo Kal dXXo- el Se pr] ei-q dXXo, to since it is “ alone isolated will remain absolutely
20 Se dXXo, Tt Kal wotijaet; rj trov irpo^TjaeTai; 8i6 immobile. For in so far as it is active, there is one
thing after another; but if there is not one thing and
Set TO evepyovv rj nepl dXXo evepyeiv, rj avrd rroXv
then another, what will it make, or where will it
Ti elvai, el p^XXoi evepyeiv ev avrip. el Se p-fj ti proceed ? Therefore that which is active must either
-irpoeXevaeTai in’ dXXo, or-qaeTai- orav Se ndaav be acting on something else, or must itself be a
ardaiv, ov vo-qaei. Set toIwv to voovv, otov vorj, ev multiple thing, if it is to be active within itself.
But if a thing is not going to go forth to something
* Muller: <oAAou> Volkmann, H-S **. else, it will be immobile; but when it is altogether
immobile, it will not think. The thinking principle,
' Cp. Plato RepMic I 362D5-6. then, when it thinks, must be in two parts, and either
• An inappropriate reminiscence of Plato Philebua 63B7-8, kinds of knowledge. Plotinus does not always remember or ,
where Plato seems to be saying that the “ elass ’’ of pleasures advert to the context of the Platonic phrases which come into
should not be kept alone and isolated from the “ class ” of
his mind.
104 105
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 3. ON THE KNOWING HYPOSTASES
Svalv elvai, Kal rj Oarepov t] ev tw avrw dfufyca, one must be external to the other or both must be
26 Kal del ev erepoTTjTi Tr]v vorjaiv elvai Kal ev in the same, and the thinking must be in otherness,
TavTorrjTi Se e^ dvdyKrjS’ Kal elvai rd Kvplois and necessarily also in sameness; and the proper
objects of thought must be the same and other in
voovpeva irpos rov vovv Kal ra avra Kal erepa.
relation to the intellect. And, yet again, each of
Kal naXiv av eKaarov tu>v voovpJvcov aweK(f>epei the things which are being 'thought brings out along
TTjv ravrorrjra ravrqv Kal TTp/ eVe/jd-nyra" ^ rl with itself sameness and otherness ^: or what will
voTfoei, o p.rj eyei dXXo Kal dXXo; Kal yap ei the thinker think which does not contain one and
30 eKaarov Xoyos, rroXXd eari. KarapavOdvei rolvvv then another? For certainly if each one is a ra­
tional principle, it is many. So it comes to know
eavTO rep ttoikiXov 6<f>9aXpi6v elvai rj ttoikiXcov itself by being an eye which sees a variety of images
XpcapdriDv. ei yap evl Kal dpiepet rrpoa^dXXoi, or by being an object of varied colours. For if it
riXoyr)drp ri yap dv eyoi rrepl avrov elrreiv, rj ri directed its gaze to a single object without parts,
aweivai; Kal yap ei ro dp,epes rrdvrri eirreiv avrov it would be without thought or word: for what
would it have to say about it, or to understand?
Seoi, SeT rrporepov Xeyeiv a p/rj eariv ware Kal For if the absolutely partless had to speak itself, it
36 ovrws voXXd dv elvai, iva ev eir/. eld' orav Xeyr) must, first of all, say what it is not; so that in this
€LfJU T00€ , TO T006 €t fJL€V €T€pOV Tl aVTOV €p€L, way too it would be many in order to be one. Then
ipevaerai' el ovp^ep'qKOS avrw, rroXXd epei ^ when it says “ I am this ”, if it means something
other than itself by “ this ”, it will be telling a lie;
roxrro epei eipu €LfJu Kai eyco eyo). tl ovv, €l ovo but if it is speaking of some incidental property of
pova elr) koX Xeyoi "eyw Kal rovro"; fj dvdyKt) itself, it will be saying that it is many or saying
rroXX' rjSr) elvai- Kal yap ws erepa Kal orrr] erepa “ am am ” or “ I I ”. Well then, suppose it was
40 Kal dpiOpos rjhri Kal rroXXd dXXa. Set roiwv rd
only two things and said “ I and this ”. It would
already be necessary for it to be many: for, as the
voovv erepov Kal erepov Xa^eZv Kal rd voovpevov two things are diverse and in the manner of their
Karavoovpevov dv rroiKiXov elvai- rj ovk earai vorjais diversity, number is present and many other things.
avrov- dAAct 6l^is Kal olov erra<l>r] povov dpprjros Therefore the thinker must apprehend one thing
Kal dvorjros- rrpovoovaa ovrrw vov yeyovoros Kal
different from another and the object of thought in
being thought must contain variety; or there ■will
rov Oiyydvovros ov voovvro^. 8ei Se rd voovv not be a thought of it, but only a touching and a
sort of, contact -without speech or thought, pre­
^ Again the “Platonic Categories”; cp. Plato Sophist thinking because Intellect has not yet come into
254D-E. being and that which touches does not think. But
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 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 3. ON THE KNOWING HYPOSTASES

46 [iTjSe avTO fieveiv drcXovv, Kal oatv dv (laXiara avro the thinker must not itself remain simple, especially
vofj- Sixdaei yap avro eavro, kSv avveaiv 8w rrjv in so far as it thinks itself; for it will duplicate itself,
aiWTTciaavX etra ov8e Seijaerai otov voXwTpayjJio- even if it gives an understanding which is silent.
vetv eavro • ri yap Kal p,a0ijaerac vorjaav; rrplv Then [the One] will not need to make a kind of fuss
yap vovv vorjaai virdp^ei^ oirep iarlv eavr^. Kal about itself: for what will it learn by thinking itself?
60 yap aS rrodog rig Kal yvaxjLg iari Kal otov For what it is will belong to itself before Intellect
Crjrqoavrog evpeaig. ro roLwv 8id<l>opov ■ndvnq thinks. Also, knowledge is a kind of longing for
avro rrpog avro p,evei, Kal ov8ev CijreL rrepl avrov, the absent, and like the discovery made by a seeker.
o 8’ i^eXCrrei eavro, Kal noXXo. dv etrj. But that which is absolutely different remains itself
by itself, and seeks nothing about itself; but that
11. Aid Kol 6 vovg odrog 6 iroXvg, drav rd
eneKeiva eOeXji voeiv, ev ® p,ev ovv avrd eKeivo,
which explicates itself must be many.
11. Therefore this multiple Intellect, when it
dAA’ emjSdAAeiv deXcov <bg dirAoi e^eiaiv dXXo del
Xap^dvcDV ev avr& rrXriOvvopevov ware wpp/qae wishes to think that which is beyond, [thinks] that
6 /xev eir' avrd ovx dig vovg, dAA’ d>g oipig ovttw itself which is one, but in wishing to attain to it in
l8ovaa, e^rjXBe 8e exovaa ovep avrri enXrjdvvev its simplicity ^ comes out continually apprehending
ware dXXov p^v eTredvprjaev dopiarwg exovaa erd
something else made many in itself; so that it
moved to it not as Intellect but as sight not yet
avrjj <f>dvraapd ri, e^fjXOe Se dXXo Xa^ovaa ev
seeing, but came out possessing the multiplicity
avrfj avrd rroXv rrovqaaaa. Kal yd.p aS e^ci
rvrrov rov opdfiarog- rj ov ‘irape8e^aro ev avrfj
which that sight itself made; so that it desired one
thing, having vaguely in itself a kind of image of it,
10 yeveaOai. odrog 8e TToXvg e^ evdg eyevero, Kal
but came out having grasped something else which
ovrwg * yvovg et8ev avro, Kal rare eyevero it made many in itself. The sight, again, certainly
l8ovaa oipig. rovro 8e rj87] vovg, ore eyei, Kal dig has the impression of what is seen; otherwise it would
vovg rovrov e<f>eaig povov Kal not have allowed it to come into existence in itself.
^ Page: oioiTrrjv !Enn. But this impression became many out of one, and so
* Schwyzer: Trpo yav rov voijaai tWapfet H—S*: irpo yap vov Intellect knew it and saw it, and then it became a
vorjoai vTrdpxet Snn.
’ Dodds (loc. cit.): tl Dnn.: I'oei Kirohhoff*: els suspic. seeing sight. It is already Intellect when it possesses
Cilento: ou Theiler. * Kirchhoff *: oSxor ms Enn., H-S *. this, and it possesses it as Intellect; but before this
but not certainly convincing, and the change might have con­
* H-R Schwjrzer now wishes to read in line 2, instead of
im^dXXeiv, the better attested MS reading emOa^eiv: “to siderable implications for our understanding of Plotinus’s
flower upon the One in its simplicity” instead of “to attain thought about the relationship of the One and Intellect. But
to the One in its simplicity”. His reasons seem to me strong it certainly deserves serious consideration.
109
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 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 3. ON THE KNOWING HYPOSTASES
aTUTTcoros oifus. oStos oSv 6 vovs ine^aXe jjLev it is only desire and unformed sight. So this In­
eKeivco, AajScov Se eyevero vovs, del Se evSeofievos ^ tellect had an immediate apprehension of the One,
Kal yevofievos Kal vovs Kat oyala /cat voTjais, ore but by grasping it became Intellect, perpetually in
15 evorjae' irpo yap rovrov ov vorjais ^v ro vorjrov need [of the One] and having become at once
ovK eyiuv ovSe vovs ovttco vo'qaas. to 8e -rrpo Intellect and substance and intellection when it
rovTcov rj apyr] rovrcov, ovy a>s evVTrdpxovaa. to thought for before this it was not intellection
since it did not possess the intelligible object, nor
yap d(j> o5 OVK ewTrapyei, dXX e^ cvv d<f> oS Se
Intellect since it had not yet thought. But that
eKaarov, ovy eKaarov, dAA’ erepov aTrdvrcjv. ov
which is before these is their principle, not as imma­
TOivvv ev Ti Tcov irdvrcvv, dXXd rrpo ndvrcvv, ware
nent in them; for it is not that from which something
20 Kal rrpo vov‘ Kal yap aS vov evros rd ndvra' comes which is immanent, but the parts of which it
cvare Kal ravrr) rrpo vov' Kal el rd per' avrdv 8e is constituted; but that from which each individual
TTjv rd^iv eyei Trp> rS)v irdvrcvv, Kal ravrr/ rrpd thing comes is not an individual thing, but other
vavTCOv. ov Sr/ SeZ, rrpd div eari, rovrcvv^ ev ri than all of them. It is not, then, one of all things
etvai, ovSe vovv avrdv rrpoaepeZs' ovSe rdyaddv but before all things, so that it is before Intellect;
oSv el ar/paLvei ev ri rcvv rrdvrcvv rdyaddv, ovSe again, all things are certainly in Intellect; so in this
26 rovro' el Se rd rrpd rrdvrcvv, earcv ovrcvs cvvopaa- way too it is before Intellect; and if what comes
pevov. el o5v vovs, on rroXvs eon, /cat rd voeZv after it has the position of being all things, in this
avrd otov rrapeprreadv, Koiv e^ avrov ij, rrXr/dvei, SeZ way too it is before all things. It must not be one
of the things before which it is, and you are not to
ro rravrr/ arrXovv Kal rrpcvrov drrdvrcvv erreKeiva vov
call it Intellect; not even the Good, then; no, not
etvai. Kal ydp el vor/aei, ovk erreKeiva vov, dAAd even this if “ the Good ” means one of all things;
30 vovs earai- dXXd el vovs earai, Kal avrd [to] * but if it means that which is before all things, lej the
rrXrjdos earai. name stand. If, then. Intellect is Intellect because
it is multiple, and thinking itself, even if it denyes
from Intellect, is a kind of internal occurrence which
‘ Igal: evBidiievos BR®®(prob., sed idficvos eras.)JUC: makes it many, that which is absolutely simple and
evSiaBduevos w, Pema*.
* del. Kirchhoff*. first of all things must be beyond Intellect. And
certainly if it is going to think, it will not be beyond
Intellect, but will be Intellect; but if it is Intellect,
‘ Of the many conjectures which have been made to replace
the corrupt MSS reading evBidnevos (see H-S critical note) it itself will be multiplicity.
Igal’s ivBedfievos seems to me the best, and I adopt it in the
text. Intellect only constitutes itself as Intellect because it therefore is perpetually in need of and perpetually desires
eternally falls short in its endeavour to reach the One and the One: op. III. 8.11. 23-4 Kal i^ndfievos del Kal del Tvyx'1'’wv.
no Ill
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 3. ON THE KNOWING HYPOSTASES
12. Kai Tt KcuXvei OVTOJ TrXrjOos etvai, ecDs icrrlv 12. But what prevents it from being a multiplicity
ovoia [lia; to yap TrXijdos ov awOeaeis, oAA’ ai in this sense, as long as it is one substance? For
ivepyetai avrov to TrXrjOos. oAA’ el pev al the multiplicity [of Intellect] is not a plurality of
compositions, but its activities are the multiplicity.
cvepyeiai avrov pri ovalat, dAA* e/f Svvdpetvs els But if its activities are not substances, but it passes
6 evepyeiav epxerai, ov TrXijdos pev, dreAe? Sc irplv from potency to active actuality, it is not a multi­
evepyijaai Tjj ovaLa. el Se ovaia avrov evepyeia, plicity, but imperfect before it becomes actual and
active in its substance. But if its substance is
7] Se evepyeia avrov to irXijOos, roaavrq earai ri activity, and its activity is its multiplicity, then its
ovaia avrov, oaov to vXijOos. rovro Se rai pev substance is just as large as the multiplicity. But
we allow this to Intellect, to which we attributed
v& avyxoipovpev, S Kal to voeTv eavro aTreSCSop^v, self-thinking, but not any more to the principle of
rfj Se dpxu TTavrwv ovKeri. Seirai ^ 8e npo rov all things. But there is a need for the One from
10 noXXov TO ev elvai, d^’ o5 Kal ro iroXv' in which the many derives to exist before the many:
for in every nmnber-series the one comes first. But
dpidpov yap navros ro ev irpcorov. dAA’ in' in the case of a number-series people do say this;
apidpov pev ovTCOS <f>aal‘ avvOeais yap rd e^s' for the successive numbers are [the result of] com­
ini Se rdiv ovrwv rls dvdyKT) ■^Sij Kal ivravda ev ri position; but in the series of realities, what necessity
is there now for there to be some one here too from
etvai, d<l>’ o5 rd noXXd; 7) Sieanaapeva earai an’
which the many derive ? [If there is not] the many
aXXijXcav rd noXXd, dXXo dXXodev ini T7p> avvdeaiv will be separated from each other and will each come
16 Kard rvy^v lav. dAA’ i^ evds rov vov dnXov by chance from a different direction to their com­
position. But they will say that the activities pro­
ovTOS ^aovai rds ivepyeias npoeXOeiv piev ceed from the one Intellect which is simple^: so
ri dnXovv rd npd rdiv ivepyeudv rldevrai. etra already they assume that what comes before the
rds ivepyeias pevovaas del Kal vnoardaeis del energies is something simple. Then of course they
will always assume that the activities abide for ever
B’qaovrai'^ vnoardaeis Se oSaai erepai iKelvov, and are substantial realities; but, being substantial
d^’ oS elaiv, eaovrai, pevovros pev iKelvov dnXov, realities, they will be other than that from which
they come, since that remains simple, but what
20 rov Se ef airov i<f> ® eavrov nXrfdovs ovros Kal
'comes from it is in itself multiplicity and depends on
1 Em., defendit Theiler: 8«I Kirohhoff*, H-S K * “ They ” are the Peripatetics, who asserted the simplicity
' det diforoirac coniecimus: aujB'qaovTai Enn. of the Divine Intellect: op. Alexander of Aphrodisias Mantissa
• Kirohhoff*, Cilento, B-T: d^’ Enn., H-S K
109, 37-110, 3 Bruns.
112 113
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 3. ON THE KNOWING HYPOSTASES
i^7]prr][jJvov air' cKeivov. et [lev yap eKetvov that [simple principle]. For if these activities come
TTodev evepyyaavTOS aSrai VTTearrjaav, KOLKei TrXijdos into existence because the principle started to be
earai- el S’ avral elaiv al trpGiTai ivepyeiai, to active from some point, then there will he multi­
hevrepov trotijaaaai, eldaaaai ^ 8e eKetvo, o npo plicity there in the principle; but if they themselves
Tovrcoy tcHv evepryei&v, ov e<f>' eavrov, peveiv, to) are the first activities, then, making the second
26 Sevrepw tw 4k tcov ivepyeiciv micnrdvTi rds reality, and allowing that which is before these
activities and exists by itself to remain [inactive],
evepyelas dv 7rapaxojp'^or<€t>av* oAAo yap avro, they would cede the activities to the second reality
dXXo al ivepyeiai al (X7r’ avrov, on p,r] avrov which has come together out of the activities ^: for
evepyqaavTOs. el Se p-q, ovk ecrrai rj tt/joSttj it itself is one thing, and the activities proceeding
evepyeia 6 vovs' ov yap otov TTpovOvpiqOT] vovv from it another, since they do not proceed from its
yeveadai, elra eyevero vovs Tqs npodoplas pera^v activity. If this is not so, Intellect will not be the
30 avrov re Kai rov yewqOevros vov yevopevrjs' primary activity; for the One did not in some sort
oi58’ ad oXcvs TrpovOvpqOq, ovrio re yap djv dreXrjs of way want Intellect to come into being, with the
Kai rj rrpodvpla ovk ely^ev 6 ri iTpoOvprjOfj- ov8' ad result that Intellect came into being with the wanting
TO pev eiye rod trpdyparos, ro 8e odK etyev as an intermediary between the One and the gene­
ov8e yap -ijv ri, irpds d rj eKraais. dXXd 8rjXov, on, rated Intellect; for if this was so, the One would be
incomplete, and also the wanting would have nothing
ei ri vrrearrj per avrov, pevovros eKelvov ev to want; and again, it could not have one part of
35 rip avrip rjOei vrrearrj. 8ei odv, iva n dXXo the thing [which it wanted] and not have another;
VTToarfj, Tjovyiav ayeiv ecf)’ eavrov rravraxov for there was not anything at all to which the impulse
eKeivo- el 8e pq, q vpo rov KivqOqvai Kivqaerai, could be directed. But it is clear that, if anything
Kai TTpo rov voqaai voqoei, ^ ® ij rrpdirq evepyeia came into existence after him, it came into existence
avrov areXqs earai oppq povov odaa. em rl “ while he remained in his own proper state ?
odv dis arvyovod* rov ecfioppa; el Kara Xoyov Therefore, in order that anything else may exist, it
is necessary that the One should keep absolutely
^ Igal: Tioiriaaaa Snn. quiet by itself; otherwise, it will move before there
* Igal: as Trapaxiopijaav Enn.
* (vei Fioinus), Creuzer, KirohhofF*. is movement, and think before there is thinking, or
* Theiler: <58e rvxovoa Enn.* its first activity will be incomplete, since it will be
only an [objectless] drive. For at what is it to aim,
‘ The text of this sentence is corrupt. I adopt provisionally
as if it was missing something ? If we are to make
Igai’s conjectures in lines 23 and 25. See critical note. body to the younger gods. It is interesting that Plotinus
® The reference is to Timaeus 42E5-6, where the Demiurge applies it to the One, who exercises no activity at all, though
ends his own activity and leaves detailed work on the human he is the source of all subsequent creativity.
114 II5 1
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 3. ON THE KNOWING HYPOSTASES

40 BrjaofieOa, rrjv fiev a/rr’ airov oTov pveicjav h>epyeiav a rational statement, we shall state that the first
activity, which, so to speak, flows from it hke a light
(I)S arro rjXlov <j>a}g vovv ^ 6ijffo/xe0a Kal -rraiaav rrjv
from the sun, is Intellect and the whole intelligible
voijrijv <f>vcnv, avrov Se en’ a/cpo> roi vorjT<p
nature, but that he himself, staying still at the summit
ioTqKOTO. jSaffiAewetv err’ avrov ovk e^toaavra dir' of the intelhgible, rules over it; he does not thrust
avrov ro €K<f>avev—rj dXXo (j>wg Trpo <f>wr6s the outshining away from himself—or we shall make
TTovqaopev—emXapLneiv 8e del pAvovra erri rod another hght before hght—but he irradiates for
46 vorjrov. ovSe yap drrorerprjrai ro drr’ avrov ovS' ever, abiding unchanged over the intelligible. For
aS ravrov avr^ ovSe roiovrov olov pr/ ovata etvai what comes from him has not been cut off from him,
ovS’ aS olov rv<f>X6v etvai, dAA’ opdiv Kal yivcvaKov nor is it the same as him, nor is it the sort of thing
iavro Kal Tipwrov yivwaKov. ro Se wairep not to be substance, or to be blind, but it sees and
iv€K€iva vov, ovTCvs Kal erre/ceiva yvotaeios, ovSev knows itself and is the primary knower. But the
Seopevov u>cnrep ovSevog, ovrcog ovSe rov yivwaKeiv One, as it is beyond Intellect, so is beyond knowledge,
60 dAA’ eariv iv Sevrepa <f>vaei rd yivoiOKeiv. ev
and as it does not in any way need anything, so it
does not even need knowing; but knowing has its
yap ri Kal ro yivoiOKeiv rd Se eariv dvev rov
tt \9> V i \ \ If in it place in the second nature. For knowing is one
Tt) Mi
<(
€V* €i
\
yap Tt €v, OVK av avTO€V TO yap
M «( > >>
thing; but that is one without the thing; for if it
avro TTpO TOV Tt. is one thing it would not be the absolute One: for
13. Aid /cat dpprqrov rp dXrjdeia' o ri yap dv “ absolute ” comes before “ something ”.
eimjs, rl epeis. dAAd to "etreKeiva rravroiv Kal 13. It is, therefore, truly ineffable: for whatever
eneKeiva rov aepvordrov vov” ev rois irdai pAvov you say about it, you will always be speaking of a
dXrjOes OVK ovopa ov avrov, dAA’ ori ovre ri rwv “ something ”. But “ beyond all things and beyond
6 TTavroiv ovre ovopa avrov, on pt]8ev Kar' the supreme majesty of Intellect ” is the only one
avrov- dAA’ d)g evSeyerai, -qpiv avroig arjpaiveiv of all the ways of speaking of it which is true; it is
not its name, but says that it is not one of all things
eniyeipovpev trepl avrov. dAA’ orav diropwpev
and “ has no name because we can say nothing
"dvaiaOrjrov oSv eavrov Kal ovSe irapaKoXovdovv of it: we only try, as far as possible, to make signs
eavrcp ovSe otSev avro,” CKeivo yprj evdvpeiadai, to ourselves about it. But when we raise the diffi­
on ravra Xeyovreg eavrovg rrepirpeTTopev em culty “ Then it has no perception of itself and is not
1 R*n>* (infellectum Eicinus): n oSv Enn.* even conscious of itself and does not even know
itself ”, we should consider that by saying this we
are turning ourselves round and going in the opposite
* A free paraphrase of Plato Republic VI 609B9-10, with
Nous (quite naturally for Plotinus) replacing oioia. This is Plato for the doctrine of the One, the First Hypothesis of the
followed by a reference to the other great source-text in Parmenides (142A3).
Il6 117
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 3. ON THE KNOWING HYPOSTASES
10 Tavavria. ttoXv yap avro TToiovp,ev yvcocrror Kal direction. For we are making it many when we
yvibaiv TToiovvres Kal 8iS6vt€s voeiv Seiadai tov make it object of knowledge and knowledge, and by
voeiv TTOiovpLev kov avv avrip to voeiv ■nepiTTov attributing thought to it we make it need thought;
earai avTcp to voeiv. KivSvvevei yap oXtas to even if thought goes intimately with it, thought will
voeiv TToXXciv els Tavro ^ avveXSomcov avvalaOrjais be superfluous to it. For in general thought seems
elvai TOV oXov, otov avTo ti eavro vo^, o Sij Kal to be an intimate consciousness of the whole when
15 Kvpicvs euTi voeiv ev 8e eKaarov avro tI eari Kal
many parts come together in the same thing; [this
is so] when a thing knows itself, which is knowing in
ov8ev !^7]Tei- el 8e tov e^w earai rj vorjcis, ev8ees
the proper sense: each single part is just itself and
Te eoTai Kal ov KvpUos to voeiv. to 8e Travn] seeks nothing; but if the thinking is of what is
aTrXovv Kal avrapKes ovrcos ov8ev 8eiTar to 8e outside, the thoughts will be deficient, and not
8evTepoJS avTapKes, 8e6p,evov 8e eavrov, tovto thought in the proper sense. But that which is
8eiTai TOV voeiv eavro- Kal to ev8ees irpos avro altogether simple and self-sufficient needs nothing;
20 ov Ttp oXqj iTeTTolr]Ke to avrapKes iKavov e^ but what is self-sufficient in the second degree, but
airdvTcvv yevopevov, avvov eavrip, Kal els avro needs itself, this is what needs to think itself; and
vevov.^ enel Kal rj avvaladtjais iroXXov rivos that which is deficient in relation to itself achieves
aiOrjols eoTi- Kal piapropei Kal rovvopa. Kal rj self-sufficiency by being a whole, with an adequacy
voTjois -nporepa oScra eiaco els avrov emoTpe<f>ei deriving from all its parts, intimately present to
itself and inclining to itself. For intimate self-
8rjXov6ri TToXvv ovra- Kal yap edv avro tovto povov
consciousness is a consciousness of something which
25 €L7Trj OV €L[JU, CUS €^€VpO}V A€y€i /Cat €LKOTO)S is many; even the name bears witness to this.'-
Xeyei, to yap ov ttoXv eariv errei, orav d>s els And thinking, which is prior, turns inward to In­
airXovv em^dXrj Kal eirrrj "ov elpi'' ovk ervyev tellect which is obviously multiple; for even if it
ovre avTov ovre tov ovtos. ov yap cbs Xldov Xeyei only says this, “ I am existent ”, it says it as a
TO ov, orav dXrjOevrj, dXX’ eiprjKe pia p-qaei rroXXd. discovery, and says it plausibly, for existence is
TO yap eivai tovto, orrep ovtcvs eivai Kal prj tyw? multiple: since if it concentrated its gaze on itself
as something simple and said “ I am existent ”, it
1 Harder B-T: avro Enn.* would not attain either itself or existence. For it
* Theiler: voovv Enn.*
does not mean something like a stone by existence,
when it is speaking the truth, but says many things
^ The reference is to the aw— of owaCaBrjats which is not in one word.^ For this being—which is meant to
literally translatable into English. At the beginning of his
writing period Plotinus does not see this reference to multi­
plicity in owaioBrjais and uses it of the One (with an “ as if ”): ® The emphasis here on the intrinsic multiplicity of Intellect
cp. V. 4. 2. 18. is very striking.
ii8 II9
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 3. ON THE KNOWING HYPOSTASES
30 exov rov ovtos Xeyerai, o ov8e ov Sid rovro
be real being and not what has a trace of being,
Xeyoir’ ^ dv, coa-nep eiKihv irpds apyeTunov, iroXXd which would not even be called being because of this
eyei. ri ovv; eKaarov avrciv ov vorjOrjaerai; rj trace, but is as image to archetype—contains many
epTjpov Kai povov edv ideX'qarjs Xa^eiv, ov things. Well, then, will not each of these many
vo'qaeis' dAA’ adrd to etvai ev avrip ttoXv iari, things be thought? Now if you want to grasp the
Kav dXXo Ti eiTTYjs, eyei to elvai. ei Se rovro, ei rl “ isolated and alone you will not think; but
35 iariv aTrXovararov dirdvrcov, ovy e^ei v6r)aiv absolute being is multiple in itself, and if you speak
avrov' el yap e^ei, tw ttoXv ^ etvai e^ei. ovr' oSv of something else, being contains it. But if this is
avro voeiv ovr' eari vorjcris avrov. so, if anything is the simplest of all, it will not possess
14. n<3? ovv 17/ieIy Xeyopev itepi avrov; t] Xe'yo- thought of itself: for if it is to possess it, it will
pev pev ri nepl avrov, ov prjv avro Xeyopev ovSe possess it by being multiple. It is not therefore
yvcdaiv ovSe vorjoiv eyopev avrov. ttcHs ovv Xeyopev thought, nor is there any thinking about it.
trepi avrov, ei pyj avro eyopev; yj, el pyj eyopev rfj
14. How then do we ourselves speak about it?
We do indeed say something about it, but we
6 yvioaei, Kal navreXivs ovk eyopev; dXX’ ovtms
certainly do not speak it, and we have neither
eyopev, ojore yrepi avrov pev Xe'yeiv, avro Se pyj
knowledge or thought of it.® But if we do not have
Xeyeiv. Kol yap Xeyopev o pyj eariv o Se eariv, ov
it in knowledge, do we not have it at all ? But we
Xeyopev (Lore €k rwv varepov ytepi avrov Xeyopev.
have it in such a \\;ay that we speak about it, but do
eyeIV Se ov KwXvdpeda, Kav pyj Xeyiopev. dAA’ wayrep not speak it. For we say what it is not, but we do
oi evdovaicuvres Kai Kdroyoi yevopevoi em roaovrov not say what it is: so that we speak about it from
10 Kav elSeiev, on eyovoi pei^ov ev avrois, Kav _ pyj what comes after it. But we are not prevented from
elSwaiv o ri, e^ c5v 8e KeKiv-qrai Kai Xeyovaiv, €/c having it, even if we do not speak it. But just as
rovraiv aiadyjmv riva rov Kivrjaavros Xap^dvovaiv those who have a god within them and are in the
erepcvv ovrcuv rov Kivqaavros, ovrcv Kal yjpeis kivSv- grip of divine possession may know this much, that
they have something greater within them, even if
1 Kirchhoff**: Acyoi ARCP»: Xe'yei EBJUC“».
* Kirchhoff*: vov Enn. they do not know what, and from the ways in which
they are moved and the things they say get a certain
' Again the inappropriate reference to Philebus 63B7-8 awareness of the god who moves them,® though these
(cp. oh. 10, n. 2). are not the same as the mover; so we seem to be
* Again a reminiscence of Plato Parmenides 142A1-6.
• This passage seems to owe something to Plato’s descrip­ inferior to the clear knowledge of the philosopher) a suitable
tion of the inspiration of poets in Ion 633-4 (cp. especially analogy for our highest awareness, that of the One, and that
fvffeoi ovT€S Kai Karexoiievoi 533E6-7). It is interesting that
Plotinus finds this poetic possession (for Plato a state far it is for him a kind of knowledge (though not knowledge of
the One) which it certainly is not for Plato.
120 121
 PLOTINUS; ENNEAD V. 3. ON THE KNOWING HYPOSTASES

vevofjLev exeiv Trpo? eKeXvo, orav vovv Kadapov exctipev, disposed towards the One, divining, when we have
our intellect pure, that this is the inner intellect,
16 xp<^P'^voi, cos oStos iariv d evhov vovs, 6 Soils oitaiav
which gives substance and everything else which
Kal TO. (zAAa, oaa tovtov tov aroLxov, avros Se otos belongs to this level, but that he is not only of a kind
dpa, cos ov Tavra, dAAd Tt Kpelrrov tovtov, o Xeyo - not to be these, but something higher than what we
p,ev "ov," dAAd Kal nXeov Kal fieiCov rj Xeyopevov, call “ being ”, but is more and greater than any­
oTi Kai avTos KpeiTTcov Xoyov Kal vov Kal atadija- thing said about him, because he is higher than speech
and thought and awareness; he gives us these, but
ecos, napaoxcov Tavra, ovk avros cov ravra. he is not these himself.
15. ’AAAd 7TC0S irapaoxcov; rj rto exeiv (rj r<3
prj exeivyX dAA’ a p/r) exei, rrcos rrapeaxev; dAA’
15. But how does he give them ? By having them,
or by not having them ? But how did he give what
ei pev excov, ovx anXovs' el Se prj e;^eov, rrcos e he does not have ? But if he has them, he is not
avTOv TO rrXrjOos; ev pev yap e^ avrov drrXovv ray’ simple; if he does not have them, how does the
5 av Tis SoIt]—Kairoi Kal tovto ^rjrrjdelri dv, rrcos e >' multiplicity come from him? One might perhaps
TOV rrdvrrj ivos' dAA’ opcos Se eoriv elrreiv olov sk grant that he gives one simple thing from himself—
(ficoTOS TTjV e^ avrov rreplXapijnv—rrcos Se rroXXd; yet there would be room for enquiry how this could
come from the absolute One; but all the same one
7] OV ravTOV e/xcAAe to eg €K€lvov €K€tv(p» €l ovv can speak of the radiance from him, as from a light—
prj ravTov, ovSe ye PeXriov tL yap dv rov evos
but how can he give many things ? Now what comes
^eXriov rj erreKeiva dAws; ;^etpoi' dpa- tovto Se from him could not be the same as himself. If then
10 eariv evSeearepov. tl ovv evSeearepov rov evos; it is not the same, it cannot of course be better; for
Tj TO prj ev rroXXd dpa- ecjnepevov Se opcos rov what could be better than the One or in any way
evos' ev dpa rroXXd. rrav yap to prj ev rep ev transcend him? It must then be worse; and this
aca^erai Kal ecrriv, drrep earl, tovtco- p-ij yap means more deficient. When then is more deficient
ev yevopevov, kov Ik rroXXedv ovrreo eariv o dv ^ than the One ? That which is not one; it is there­
etrroi ns avro. Kdv eKaarov exj) Xeyeiv ns d ean, fore many; but all the same it aspires to the One:
so it is a one-many.1 For all that is not one is kept
I (an potiua non habendo Ficinus), Creuzer, of. Epiatola in being by the one, and is what it is by this “ one ”:
139: r) fir) ex**” Pema, Kirohhoff*. for if it had not become one, even though it is com­
* 0 av do Strycker optime: ov Enn.: ov Kirohhoff: S n Igal. posed of many parts, it is not yet what one would
call “ itself And if it is possible to say of each
' ev iroAAd is from Plato Parmenides 144E5 (the Seoond individual part what it is, one says it because each
Hypothesis, which Plotinus, following an older tradition of
exegesis—^probably Neopythagorean—referred to his seoond
Hypostasis, Intellect). * Cp. III. 8. 10. 20-8.
123
122
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 3. ON THE KNOWING HYPOSTASES
16 ev eKaarov avraiv elvai Xeyei, Kal tw avrw i of them is one and it is it because of this very fact.
€OTL, ^ TO 0€, O fMrj TTOAAa €^OV €V €aVTiO 7)07) OV
But that which does not already have many parts
in itself is not one by participation in the One, but
fierovaia evos ev, dAAa avro ev, ov Kar dXXov, is the One itself, not the “ one ” predicated of some­
dAA’ oTi rovTo, trap' oS ttcus Kal rd dXXa, rd fiev thing else but because it is this One from which,
somehow, the others derive their oneness, some [in a
r<p eyyvs, ra oe rip TToppcv. enei [oej ** to /xer greater degree] because they are near and others
avTQ * Kal oTt p.eT avrd SrjXov TTOiel -rip to TrX'^dos [in a lesser degree] because they are far away. For
that which comes immediately after it shows clearly
20 avTOv ev Travrayov elvai- Kal ydp TrXijdos ov that it is immediately after it because its multiplicity
opxos ev Ttp avTtp Kal SiaKpivai ovk dv eyois, on is a one-everywhere; for although it is a multiplicity
it is at the same time identical with itself and there
opLOV navTa' eirel Kal eKacrrov ra>v e^ avrov,
is no way in which you could divide it, because “ all
ecos Ceorjs pereyei, ev iroXXd- ddvvarei ydp SeT^ai things are together ” for each of the things also
which come from it, as long as it participates in life,
avrd ev irdvra. avrd 8e eKetvo ev jravra, on perd
is a one-many: for it cannot reveal itself as a one-all.
Trjv ® dpyqv apyri ydp ev dvrcos Kal dXTjOws ev But [Intellect] does reveal itself as a one-all, because
it comes after the origin: for its origin is really one
26 TO 8e perd Trjv dpyi)v JiSe ttcos em^plaavros rov
and truly one. But that which comes after the
evds Trdvra pereyov rov ev, Kal dnovv avrov origin is, somehow, under the pressure of the One,
all things by its participation in the One, and each
irdvra av Kal ev. nva ovv Trdvra; ^ cLv dpyrj
and every part of it is both all and one. What then
eKeivo. OTTOJS 8e eKetvo dpyrj rwv rrdvrwv; dpa, are “ all things ” ? All things of which that One
is the principle. But how is that One the principle
on avrd atp^et ev eKaarov avrcdv ironjaacra etvai; of all things ? Is it because as principle it keeps
fj Kal OTt VTTearrfaev avrd. ttcos S'^; ^ r(p irporepov them in being, making each one of them exist ? Yes,
and because it brought them into existence. But
30 eyetv avrd. dXX eiprjrat, on TrXfjdos ovrcjs earat.
how did it do so ? By possessing them beforehand.
dXX' dpa ovrcos elyev cos prj StaKeKptpeva' rd 8’ But it has been said that in this way it will” be a
multiplicity. But it had them in such a way as not
* BC. T(S Cl* etvai. to be distinct: they are distinguished on the second
® ooniecimus: in Enn.
* del. Theiler.
* Harder: iiiv ravro Enn.* ^ Anaxagoras Diels B 1 (the original mixture of all things,
® Igal: /j,eydXrjv Enn. which was not in the least like the Plotinian World of Forms).
124 I2S
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 3. ON THE KNOWING HYPOSTASES

iv T<S Sevrepw BieKeKpiro rw Xoyw. evepyeia yap

level, in the rational form. For this is already
actuality; but the One is the potency of all things.
i)orj' TO oe ovvafxis Travrcov, aAAa rts* o rpoiros But in what way is it the potency ? Not in the way
rijs 8wdp-eu)s; ov yap (Ls rj vXt] Sum/xet Xeyerai, in which matter is said to be in potency, because it
35 oTi Sexerai- -ndaxei ydp- dXX’ oSros dvrireraypLe- receives; for matter is passive; but this [material]
way of being a potency is at the opposite extreme to
vcos TW TToietv ircHs ovv TToieZ a p/rj eyei; ov yap making.^ How then does the One make what it
(Ls ervye' /xrjS’ evOvprjdels o TToiiqaei, TTOirfaei does not have? It does not do it casually, nor
opLcas- eiprjrai pev oSv, on, el n €k rov evos, reflecting on what it will make, but all the same it
will make. Now it has been said that, if anything
aAAo 0€L Trap avro' aAAo oe ov ov\ €v* touto yap comes from the One, it must be something different
wo »
rjv €K€cvo. €L 0€ p/Tj €v, ovo 0€, avayKT) rpT] Kai from it; and in being different, it is not one; for
40 TrXrjOos elvar /cat yap erepov Kal ravrov ‘^Srj /cat if it was, it would be that One. But if it is not one,
but two, it must necessarily also be many: for it is
TTOiov /cat Ta aAAa, /cat ore p€V orj ^ p'q ev ro already the same and different and qualified and all
e/cetVoii, SeSety/xeVof av elr]’ on Se TrXfjOos Kal the rest.^ And that what comes from the One is
vXfjdos TOLovTov, otov €v Tw per’ avTo Oecvpeirai, certainly not one, may be taken as demonstrated;
diTopriaai d^iov Kal ij dvdyKT] 8e rov per’ avro en but it is worth querying the proposition that it is a
multiplicity, and a multiplicity of the sort which is
CrjTrjrea. observed in what comes after it; and the necessity
16. "Ort pev oSv Set n etvai to perd ro -npoirov, of there being anything after the One remains to be
dXXayov etprjrai, /cat oXevs, on Bvvapls ean Kal enquired into.
16. It has been said elsewhere that there must be
dprjxavos Svvapis, /cat rovro, on e/c to5v dXXcuv something after the first, and in a general way that
dirdvTCOv ■m.arovreov, on prjBev ean prjBe rdiu it is power, and overwhelming power ®; and the
5 eaydrojv, o pr] Svvapiv els ro yewav eyei. eKeiva point has also been made that this is to be believed
on the evidence of all other things, because there is
Se vvv XeKreov, (Ls, eveiBrj ev roXs yewcopevois ovk
nothing, even among the things on the lowest level,
ean irpos ro dvco, dXXd npds ro /edreo yajpeiv Kal which does not have power to produce. But we
1 w, Perna*: S« BxUC, H-S i.
now have to add this further point, that, since in
things which are generated it is not possible to go
^ A good clarification of what Plotinus means when he
uses the ambiguous phrase Swa/us ndvruiv of the One (op. III. ® Cp. e.g. II. 9. 3; IV. 8. 6. For the One as Swofus see n. 1
8. 10. 1; V. 4. 1. 36; VI. 7. 32. 31). above.
® Again the “Platonic Categories”: op. Plato Sophist
254E6-255A1. 127
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 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 3. ON THE KNOWIl^IG HYPOSTASES
fidXXov els TrXrjdos levai, Kal rj eKaOTOJV upwards but only to go downwards and move further
aiiXovarepa rj avrdX Koffjxov tolwv to voiijaav towards multiplicity, the principle of each group of
things is simpler than they are themselves. There­
aiadrjTov ovk dv etrj Koaptos aladrjros avro, dAAa
fore that which makes the world of sense could not
10 vovs Kal KoapLos vorjros' Kal to npo tovtov toIvuv be a world of sense itself, but must be an intellect
TO yewfjcrav avro ovre vovs ovt€ Kocrpios vorjTos, and an intelligible world; and that which is before
aTrXovorepov Se vov Kal dnXovaTepov KoapLov vorj- this and generates it could not be intellect or an
intelligible world, but simpler than intellect and
Tov. ovyap €k ttoXXov ttoXv, dXXd to ttoXv tovto simpler than an intelligible world. For many does
e^ ov TToXXov' el yap Kal avTO ttoXv, ovk apyr/ not come from many, but this [intelUgible] many
comes from what is not many; for this would not be
TOVTO, dAA’ dXXo TTpO TOVTOV. ovGTtjvai ovv 8eZ els the principle if it was also many itself, but something
16 ev OVTCOS TTavTOS TrX'qdovs e^co Kal aTrXoTTjTOS else before it. There must therefore be a concen­
TjCTTivocTOVv, etiTep OVTCOS aTrXovv. dAAct ttcos to tration into a real one outside all multiplicity and
any ordinary sort of simplicity, if it is to be really
yev6p,evov e^ avTov Xoyos ttoXvs Kal ttos, to Sc ^v simple. But how is what comes from it a multiple
SrjXovoTi ov Adyo? ; el Se pvrj tovto ^v, ttcos oSv ovk and universal rational form, when it is obviously not
e/c Adyou Adyos; Kal ttcDj to dyaOoeiSes e^ dyaOov ; a rational form? And if it is not this why does
rational form come not from rational form [but
20 Tt yap eyov avTOV ^ dyadoeiSes XeyeTai; dp’ eyov something else]? And how does what is like the
TO KaTa Ta avTa Kal coaavTCOS; Kal tI TavTa irpos Good come from the Good? What does it have
from the Good in virtue of which it is called “ like
TO dyaOov; to yap coaavrcos ^r]Tovpi,ev ov Ttov dya-
the Good ” ? Is it unchanging stability ? What has
dcdv. fj TTpoTepov €Keivo, oS pvfj e^loTaadai Seijaei, this to do -with the Good? For we seek stability
OTC dyadov el Se pvq, ^eXTiov aTToaTTjvai' dp’ ovv because it is one of the goods. We seek that
TO l^fjv coaavTcos pAvovra €ttI tovtov eKovalcos; el before stability from which it will not be necessary
to depart, because it is the Good; but if it was not
25 o5v dyaTTTjTOV tovtco to ^rjv, SrjXov oti ovSev l^TyreZ' the Good, it would be necessary to go away from it.
eoiKe TOLWV Sid tovto to (Laavrcos, otl dpKeZ Ta Is it then having a stable life and abiding willingly
TTapovra. dXXd irdvrcov •^Sr) Trapdvrcov tovtco
with it [which is “ desirable ”] ? If then its life is
satisfactory to it, it is clear that it seeks nothing;
‘ Kirohhoff*: i) avrri Enn., Cilento, H-S so its stability seems to be for this reason, that what
* Bi>“, Kirohhoff* {iUiua Fioinus): cavrov wBR*“JUC, Perna, is there present to it is sufficient for it. But its life
Creuzer, H-S.
is satisfactory because all things are present to it,
128
129
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 3. ON THE KNOWING HYPOSTASES
dyaTrqrov to ^t\v Kal Sij ovroj TrapoVTCOV, oi>x tSj and present in such a way that they are not other
oAAcov ovTcov avTov. el S’ ‘n’S.aa Jiuyrj tovtw /cat than it. But if it has all life, and a clear and perfect
Ccorj ivapyr/s Kal reXela, irdoa ev rovrtp 'pvy^ Kal life, then every soul and every intellect is in it, and
30 Tray vovs, Kal ovSeu avrlp ovre ^corjs ovre vov no part of life or intellect is absent from it. It is
sufHcient then for itself and seeks nothing; but if it
anoaraTeT. avrdpKrjs ovv eawrw Kal ovSev fijTet' seeks nothing, it has in itself what it would have
el Se firjBev ^17x61, e^et ev eavrw o e^'qTTjaev dv, el sought, if it was not present. Therefore it has in
p/rj Traprjv. e;^et ovv ev eavT<p to dyaOdv ^ roiovrov itself the Good, which is either something of the sort
dv, o ^coTjv Kal vovv eiTropev, ^ dAAo ti ou/tjSejSij- which we called life and intellect, or something else
36 /coy rovTois. dAA’ el tovto to dyaOdv, ovSev dv eir) which is an incidental accompaniment of these. But
eveKeiva tovtcov. el Se eariv e/cetvo, SrjXovdri ^cor) if this is the Good, there would be nothing beyond
life and intellect. But if there is that something
TTpos e/cetvo tovtco e^rjppevr) eKelvov Kal TTp/ beyond, it is clear that the life of this other is direc­
VTToaraaiv eyovaa e^ eKelvov Kal irpos e/cetvo fa/aa' ted to that and dependent on that, and has its
eKeZvo yap avrov dpy^. Set rolwv e/cetvo C^rjg existence from that and lives towards that; for that
elvai Kpetacrov Kal vov‘ ovrco yap emaTpetfiei irpos is its principle. That, therefore, must be better
40 e/cetvo Kal Trjv ^wrjv Trjv ev avrcp, filpTjpA ti tov ev than life and intellect; thus the other will turn to­
wards it.both the life which is in it, a kind of image
eKeivai ovroy, KaOo tovto Kal tov vovv tov ev of the life in that in so far as this lives, and the
TOVTO), piprjpd Tt TOV ev CKelvco ovroy, o ti S'^TTore intellect in it, a kind of representation of what is in
eOTl TOVTO. that, whatever this may be.
17. Tt odv eoTi KpevTTOv ^ojfjs ip<f>poveaTdTov Kal 17. What then is better than the wisest life, with­
dvraloTov Kal dvapaprffTov Kal vov Trdvra eyovTOS out fault or mistake, and than Intellect which
contains all things, and than universal life and
Kal to/'ijy TTaarjs Kal vov •navros; edv ovv Xeyo)pev
universal Intellect? If we say “ That which made
"to TTOirjaav Tavra," Kal ttcHs noirjaav; Kal, pr] them ”—^well, how did it make them ? And, in case
6 ^avfj Tt KpeiTTOV, ovk dneiaiv 6 Xoyiapos eir' dXXo, something better may appear,^ our train of thought
dXXd OTqaeTai avrov. dAAd Set dva^rjvai Sid ye will not go on to something else but will stop at
dXXa TToXXd Kal on tovtm to avrapKes e/c wavTCov Intellect. But there are many reasons for going
higher, particularly the fact that the self-sufficiency
of Intellect which results from its being composed of
^ If we keep here, as we should, the MSS reading Kal, this
sentence expresses very well that shrinking from the doctrine Origen the Platonist). It waa probably felt by many Plato-
of the One beyond Intellect with which Plotinus was quite nists (and of course all Aristotelians) in his time, as it was by
familiar (it was shared by his fellow-pupil of Ammonius, Christian theologians then and later.
130 131
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 3. ON THE KNOWING HYPOSTASES

c^O) ecTTiv eKaoTov 8e avrcDv SrjXovori, evSees' Kal all things is something which comes to it from outside:
on €Kaarov [tov avrov evoy] ^ /xeretA'rj^e Kat fier- each of the things of which it is composed is obviously
insuiBcient; and because each of them has partici­
e^ei (j-ov avr6y ^ ivos, ovk avTo eV. tI oSv to oS
pated in the absolute One and continues to partici­
10 [j,€T€')(€i, o TToiet ouTo Kal etvai Kal ofiov to, Ttavra; pate in it, it is not the One itself. What then is that
dAA’ cl TTOieZ €Kaarov etvai Kal Trj ivos Trapovaia in which it participates, which makes it exist, and
avrapKes to TrXrjOos aiiTov Kal avros, SrjXovon all things along with it ? If it makes each individual
thing exist, and it is by the presence of the One
TTOir/riKov ovaCas Kal avrapKeias CKeivo avTo oiK that the multitude of individual things in Intellect,
ov ovaia, dAA’ eneKeiva ravTtjs Kal iireKeiva avrap- and Intellect itself, is self-sufficient, it is clear that
Keias. it, since it is the cause of existence and self-suflficiency,
16 'ApKei oSv ravra Xeyovras WTTaXXaxdfjvai; rj en is not itself existence but beyond it and beyond setf-
sufficiency.
7] cuSivei Kal paXXov. tacos otv yp/t) avTrp> Is that enough? Can we end'the discussion by
'TjSrj yewrjaai ai^aaav irpos avro ■aXr^pcodeiaav saying this ? No, my soul is still in even stronger
(hhlvcov. ov p7]v dAAd vdXiv etraareov, et Trodev labour. Perhaps she is now at the point when she
nva TTpos TTjv (IiBiva iircud^v evpoipev. rdya Be must bring forth, having reached the fulness of her
birth-pangs in her eager longing for the One. But
20 Kal €K tcDv ^Brj .XeyOevTcov, el TroXXaKis ns eiraBoi, we must sing another charm to her, if we can find one
yevoiTo. ns oSv coanep Kaivrj encpB^ dXXr]; em- anywhere to allay her pangs. Perhaps there might
Oeovaa yap rraai rots dXrjOeai Kal wv pereyopev be one in what we have said already, if we sang it
aXr]9d)v opMS eK<f>evyei^ et ns ^ovXoito ehreiv Kal over and over again. And what other charm can
we find which has a sort of newness about it ? The
Biavo7]9Tjvai, eTTemep Bei rrjv Bidvoiav, tva n etirrj, soul runs over all truths, and all the same shuns the
aXXo Kal aXXo AajSeiv ovtco ydp Kal Sie^oSos' ev truths we know if someone tries to express them in
26 Be TrdvTT] anXip Bie^oBos tLs ianv; dAA’ dpKei kSv words and discursive thought; for discursive thought,
voepios e<j>difiaa9ai' e<f>aipdpevov Be, ore e^dirrerai, in order to express anything in words, has to consider
one thing after another; this is the method of des­
Trdvrri pvrjBev p/i^e Bvvaa9ai ptjre axoXrjv dyeiv cription; but how can one describe the absolutely
Xeyeiv, varepov Be Trepl avrov avXXoyl^ea9ai. rare simple ? But it is enough if the intellect comes into
contact with it; but when it has done so, while the
^ delevimus: tov avroevos Harder, H-S B*T. contact lasts, it is absolutely impossible, nor has it
* conieoimus: (tov outoC> H-S *.
’ Creuzer (ed. Paris.), Kirchhoff* (aufugit Pioinus): cloditvyti time, to speak; but it is afterwards that it is able to
wBUC, H-S €ia<l>€VYoi X. reason about it. One must believe one has seen.
132
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 PLOTINUS; ENNEAD V. 3. ON THE KNOWING HYPOSTASES

8e XPV fwpaKemt TnaTeveiv, orav rj ijivx^ i^aC^vrjs ■when the soul suddenly takes light ^; for this is from
<l>u>s Xd^rj- TOVTO yap [rovro to ^<3j] vap’ him and he is it; we must think that he is present
30 avTov Kal avTog- Kal rare ypr] vopi^eiv Trapeivai, when, hke another god whom someone called to his
orav woTTep Oeog dXXog [orav] ^ elg olkov KaXovvrog house, he comes and brings hght to us: for if he had
not come, he would not have brought the light. So
rivog eXOcbv ^ p.rj8’ iXdwv ovk i<j)aynaev.
the unenlightened soul does not have him as god;
OVTCO TOC Kac >pvxq a<f>d)Tiarog ddeog eKeivov
but when it is enlightened it has what it sought,
(fxDTcadicaa 8e d i^ijrei, Kal rovro to reXog and this is the soul’s true end, to touch that light
35 rdXrjdcvdv <p'^XV> ^<!>d^aa9ac <j)a)r6g e/ceiVou /cat and see it by itself, not by another light, but by the
avrcp avrd dedaaaOai, ovk dXXov (f)Ct)TC, dAA’ avro, light which is also its means of seeing. It must see
Ofc ov /cat opa, ot ov yap €<po}TLcrurj, rovro cariv, that light by which it is enlightened: for we do not
o Sec OedcraaOac ovSe yap rjXcov Scd ^corog dXXov. see the sun by another hght than his own. How
•ndyg dv ovv rovro yevocro; dcjieXe ndvra. then can this happen? Take away everything!
* del. Kirohhoff*. ^ The suddenness and unexpectedness of the final vision
is an important feature of Plotinus’s descriptions of it—it is
not something one can plan for and bring about when one
wishes: cp. VI. 7. 36. 18-9. It has antecedents in Plato
Symposium 210E4—5 and Letter VII 341C7—Dl.

135
ENNEAD V. 4
 THAT WHICH IS AFTER THE FIRST
of the Intelligible (the First Principle). Besides its pri­
mary activity which is itself it has, like all things, a secon­
dary activity distinct from itself: this is Intellect, which
is all things, the whole world of living being; the One is
therefore beyond being (ch. 2.).
V. 4. HOW THAT WHICH IS AFTER THE
FIRST COMES FROM THE FIRST, AND
ON THE ONE

Introductory Note
This little treatise is the seventh in Porphyry’s chrono­
logical order. It deals with much the same subject-matter
as the tenth treatise in the chronological order, On The
Three Primary Hypostases (V. 1), and may be a kind of
preliminary study for it, but the treatment is very different,
much more schematic and scholastic, and without the
“ protreptic ” element, the exhortation to the soul to
rediscover its true nature and origin and so ascend to the
Grood.
In the second chapter the One or Good is spoken of, in
a way unusual in Plotinus, as the Intelligible, and is said
to have a higher sort of thinking than that of Intellect.
In his later writings Plotinus avoids this sort of language,
and is careful to rule out any suggestion that the One is
a sort of higher Intellect.

Synopsis
There must be a hierarchy of beings, ascending in order
to the First Principle. This must be the absolutely
simple One, and because it is absolutely perfect, and
everything which is perfect produces, it must produce
the next reality, the One-Many (ch. 1). How and why the
One produces Intellect: explanation of the Platonic doc­
trine of the derivation of Forms and Numbers from the
One and the Indefinite Dyad. The conscious inner life
138 139
 V. 4. (7) nns Ano toy npoTOT to V. 4. HOW THAT WHICH IS AFTER
META TO nPOTON KAI HEPI TOT THE FIRST COMES FROM THE FIRST,
ENOS AND ON THE ONE
1. Ek Tt eoTi fieTa to irpaiTov, dvdyKr] CKelvov 1. If there is anything after the First, it must
etvai 7] evdvs rj r^v avayayy^v i-n' cKeivo Sid necessarily come from the First; it must either come
from it directly or have its ascent back to it through
Toiv eyeiv, Kai to^iv etvai Sevrepcov Kal rpi- the beings between, and there must be an order of
T(ov, Tov pev em to irpuyTov rov Sevrepov dvayope^ seconds and thirds, the second going back to the
5 vov, TOV Se rp'iTov em to SevTepov. Set pev yap ti first and the third to the second. For there must be
TTpo TTavTOjv eivai dirXovv, tovto Kai Travrcuv eTepov something simgle before all things, and this must be
other than all the things which come after it, existing
Tcuv peT avTo, e<f> eavrov 6v, ov pepiypevov tois by itself, not mixed with the things which derive
air avTov, Kai miXiv eTepov Tpoirov tois dXXois nap- from it, and all the same able to be present in a
eivai Svvapevov, ov ovrios ev, oi5^ eTepov 6v, etra different way to these other things, being really one,
ev, KaO’ oS ipevSos Kal to ev etvai, oS prj Xoyos and not a different being and then one; it is false
even to say of it that it is one, and there is “ no
10 p7]Se €TTi(TT-qprj, o Srj Kal eneKeiva XeyeTai concept or knowledge ” of it; it is indeed also said
etvai ovaias—el yap pr] d/TrXovv earai avp^daecos to be “ beyond being ” For if it is not to be
e^O) Trdcnrjs Kal avvOeaecos Kal ovrcus ev, ovk dv simple, outside all coincidence and composition, it
could not be a first principle; and it is the most self-
dpxT] eiT)—avTapKeoTaTov re t<3 dirXovv etvai Kal sufficient, because it is simple and the first of all;
TTpuyTov aTTavTwv TO yap to prj rrpuiTov evSees tov for that which is not the first needs that which is
TTpo avTOv, TO Te prj drrXovv tiov ev avrip drrXidv before it, and what is not simple is in need of its
16 Seopevov, iv ^ e^ eKeivcvv. to Srj toiovtov ev pdvov simple components so that it can come into existence
from them. A reality of this kind must be one alone;
Set etvai- dXXo yap et eirj toiovtov, ev dv eirj t<z for if there was another of this kind, both would be
for the Neoplatonic doctrine of the One beyond being; Par­
^ Again the two foundation texts from Plato’s dialogues menides 142A3-4 and Republic 509B9.
140 141
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 4. THAT WHICH IS AFTER THE FIRST
a(i<f)W. ov yap Srj aiopaTa Xeyop,ev Svo, t] to ev one. For we are certainly not talking about two
TTpMTov acHpa. ovSh' .yap aTrXovv acopia, yiv6p,ev6v bodies, or meaning that the One is the first body.
T6 TO ao)p,a, aAA* * ovk apyrj' rj 8e apyrj dyevTjTOS' For nothing simple is a body, and body is what
comes into being, but not the first principle; and
20 p/r] acxiparLK'q Se oScra, dXX' ovrcjs p^a, eKelvo dv etrj
“ the first principle has not come into being ” ^; if
TO TTpwTov. el dpa eTepov tl peTo. to TrptoTov etrj, then it was a principle which was not bodily, but was
OVK dv €Ti d-n-Xovv etrj- ev dpa mXXd earai. irodev truly one, that [other of this kind] would be the
oSv TOVTO ; and tov irpcoTov' ov yap Srj /card avvTV- First. If then there is something else after the
First, it cannot still be simple; it will therefore be a
yCav, ovh' dv eri CKelvo travTCov dpx'j. ttms odv dno One-Many. Whence, then, does this come ? From
TOV TTpcvTov; el TeXeov eoTC to irputTov Kai TrdvTCvv the First: for it certainly does not come about by
25 TeXecoTaTov Kai Svvapis "fj TrpcuTij, Set TravTOiv tcvv chance, and if it did the First would no longer be the
dvTcov SvvaTcoTaTov etvai, Kai rd? dXXas Svvdpeis principle of all things. How then does it come from
the First ? If the First is perfect, the most perfect
Kaddaov BvvavraL pipeXaOai eKetvo. 6 ti 8’ dv tcov of all, and the primal power, it must be the most
aXXcov els TeXeiojaiv tjy, opdipev yevvcov Kai ovk powerful of all beings and the other powers must
dveydpevov e<f>' eavrov peveiv, dXX’ eTepov Trotovv, imitate it as far as they are able. Now when any­
thing else comes to perfection we see that it produces,
ov povov d Tl dv irpoalpeaiv e^ij, dXXd Kai oaa <j>vei and does not endure to remain by itself, but makes
30 avev Trpoaipeaecos, Kai rd dipvya Se peTaSlSovTa something else. This is true not only of things
eavTcdv KaOoaov SvvaTai' olov to nvp Beppaivei, which have choice, but of things which grow and
Kai ifivyei rj yidiv, /cat rd <f>dppaKa Se els dXXo produce without choosing to do so, and even lifeless
things, which impart themselves to others as far as
epyd^eTai olov avTa—ndvTa Tr)v dpxrjv koto. they can: as fire warms, snow cools, and drugs act
Svvapiv dnopipovpeva els diSiOTTjTa re /cat dya- on something else in a way corresponding to their
doTTjTa. TTws oiv TO TeXedjTaTov Kai to TrpcoTov own nature—all imitating the First Principle as far
as they are able by tending to everlastingness and
36 ayadov ev avrip oratij cvairep <f>6ovrjaav eavTov t] generosity. How then could the most perfect, the
dSvvaTrjaav, t] wavrcov Svvapis; ttcvs 8 dv en
’ first Good, remain in itself as if it grudged to give of
itself 2 or was impotent, when it is the productive
^ Plato Phaedrus 245D1. I
power of all things ? How would it then still be the
• The absence of (ftdovos, the selfish, grudging wish to keep
one’s good to oneself which is the opposite of truly divine divine (and a conscious challenge to older Greek ideas): cp.
generosity, is a cardinal feature of Plato’s thought about the Plato Phaedrus 247A7 and Timaeus 29E1-2.
142 143
 I

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 4. THAT WHICH IS AFTER THE FIRST

^■PXV ^'■V> avTov yeviaOai, etTtep Principle ? Something must certainly come into i
earai n kcu twv dXXoiv Trap’ ovtov ye viroaTavrcov being from it, if anything is to exist of the others
OTi p,ev yap a-n' avrov, dvdyicr]. [Sei 8rj Kal which derive their being from it: that it is from it
40 TipioiTarov elvai to yewibv to. e^e^j] ^ Set ir) Kal that they come is absolutely necessary. That which
Tip,ioirarov etvai to yewcopevov Kal Sevrepov is generated by it must certainly also be most
honourable, and though it is second to the Principle
€K€ivov T&v dXXcDV dpeivov etvai. must be better than all else.
2. Et /xef oSv avTo VOSS’ '^v to yewiov, vov evSee'a- 2. If, then, the generator itself is Intellect, what
repov, TTpoae)(eaTepov Se vw Kal opoiov Set etvai- is generated by it must be more defective than
e-rrei Se etreKeiva vov to yewa>v, vovv etvai dvdyK-q, Intellect, but fairly close to it and hke it; but since
the generator is beyond Intellect, it is necessary that
8ia Tt Se ov vovs, od ivepyeid eari v6i]ais; vorjais what is generated should be Intellect. But why is
5 Se TO voTfTov opwaa /cat -irpos tovto eTTiarpa<f>eiaa the generator not Intellect, whose active actuality is ^
/cat a-rr e/cetvou otov dnoTeXeiovpievr] [/cat TeXeiov- thinking ? Thinking, which sees the intelligible i
p.€VTj], 2 dopiOTOS p,ev avTT] ® coOTTep oijiis, opiCopievrj and turns towards it and is, in a way, being per­
fected by it, is itself indefinite like seeing, but is
Se VTTo Tov voTjTov. 8io Kal eiprjTai- e/c ttjs dopLcr- defined by the intelligible. This is why it is said;
Tov 8vd8os Kal TOV evos to. ei8r] /cat ot dpidpoi- from the Indefinite Dyad and the One derive the
TOVTO yap 6 vovs. 8i6 ovy aTrXovs, dXXd TToXXd, Forms and Numbers: that is. Intellect.^ For this
reason Intellect is not simple but many; it manifests
10 avvdealv Te ep^aiviov, vorj-rrjv pevToi, Kal ttoXXo,
a composition, of course an intelligible one, and
opwv t]8t]. eoTt p,ev ovv Kal avTOs votjtov, ciAAd already sees many things. It is, certainly, also
/cat voibv 8i6 8vo -^8r]. eoTi Se /cat dXXo Tip peT’ itself an intelligible, but it thinks as well: so it is
avTO VOTJTOV. aAAa ttojs d-rro tov votjtov 6 vovs already two. And it is also a different intelligible
oStos; to votjtov iifd eavTov pevov Kal ovk ov by being posterior to the One itself. But how does
ei/See?, loarrep to dpoiv Kal to voovv—evSee? Se this Intellect come from the Intelhgible ? The
Intelligible remains by itself and is not deficient, '
15 Xeyio TO voovv cos trpos e/cetvo—ovk eoTiv otov like that which sees and thinks—I call that which
avaiadijTov, dAA’ eoTiv avrov Trdvra ev avreo Kal thinks deficient as compared with the Intelligible, .
ovv avTip, TrdvTTj Sta/cptTt/cdv eavrov, ^corj ev avreo but it is not like something senseless; all things >
^ om. C: del. Harder. belong to it and are in it and with it. It is com- j
* anoTeXeiovfievTj Volkmann: aTrore^ovaevn Kal rcActova^im pletely able to discern itself; it has life in itself and ^
Enn., H-S». ■ '
’ Kirehhoff*: ounj Enn., H-S *. ^ See note 1 to eh. 5 of V. 1. !
144 145 1
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 4. THAT WHICH IS AFTER THE FIRST
Kal Trdvra ev avTib, Kal ij KaravorjcTLS avTov avTO all things in itself, and its thinking of itself is itself,
oiovel awaiaOi^aeL oSaa iv ardaei dtSiw Kal vorjoei and exists by a kind of immediate self-consciousness,
irepcos ^ Kara rijv vov vorjaiv. ei ri, oSp [levovTOS in everlasting rest and in a manner of thinking
20 avTov €v avrcp yiperai, dtr' avrov tovto yiverat, different from the thinking of Intellect. ^ If, then,
something comes into being while the Intelligible
orav €KeiPo pAXiara ^ o ecrri. fiivovros oSp
abides in itself, it comes into being from it when it
avrov €P T& oIk€iu) rjdei avrov piep to is most of all what it is. When, therefore, the
yLPOfiepop yiperac, p,€POPros 8e ytVerai. iirel oSp Intelligible abides “ in its own proper way of life ”,®
eKeiPo fi€P€i poTjrop, ro yip6p.€Pop yiperai porjais' that which comes into being does come into being
porjaig Se oSaa Kal poovcra d<f> oS iyepero—dXXo from it, but from it as it abides unchanged. Since,
therefore, it abides as Intelligible, what comes into
25 yap ovk eyei—povs ylyperai, dX\o otop porjrop being does so as thinking: and since it is thinking and
Kai otop CKeZpo Kal p,ip,rjpuL Kal etSwAov e/cetVov. thinks that from which it came—^for it has nothing
dAAd TTcvs pLCPoPTOS eKeipov ylperai; epepyeta rj else—^it becomes Intellect, hke another intelligible
p,ep earI rfjs ovaiag, -q S' €k rfjs ovaias eKdarov and like that Principle, a representation and image
Kal rj fi€P rijg ovalag avrd iarip ipepyeia cKaarop, of it. But how, when that abides unchanged, does
Intellect come into being ? In each and every thing
rj Se art' e/ceiVijy, ^p Set rraprl erreadai dpdyKrjg there is an activity which belongs to substance and
30 irepap oSaap avrov • otop Kal errl rov rrvpog rj jjiep one which goes out from substance; and that which
rig iari avjxrrXrjpovaa rrjp ovaLap Bepjionrjg, rj Se belongs to substance is the active actuality which is
arr eKeiprjg rjSrj yipojieprj epepyovprog CKeiPov rrjp each particular thii^, and the other activity derives
avjJKf)vrop rfj ovaia ip rip piipeip rrvp. ovrco Srj from that first one, and must in everything be a
consequence of it, different from the thing itself:
KaKei' Kal rroXi) rrporepop e/cei jiipoprog avrov
as in fire there is a heat which is the content of its
35 iv rip oiKelcp rjOei iK rrjg ip avrip reXeiorrjrog substance, and another which comes into being from
Kal avpovarjg ivepyeCag rj yewrjOekra ipepyeia vtto- that primary heat when fire exercises the activity
which is native to its substance in abiding unchanged
^ This passage stands alone in the Enneads in the clarity as fire. So it is also in the higher world; and much
with which it attributes a kind of thinking to the One: cp. more so there, while the Principle abides “ in its
Introductory Note and n. 1 (p. 119) to ch. 13 of V. 3. The view own proper way of fife ”, the activity generated
which Plotinus adopts here is close to that of Numenius, whose
First God is an Intellect (frs. 16 and 17 des Places, 25 and 26 from the perfection in it and its coexistent activity
Leemans), but an Intellect, it would seem, whose thinking is acquires substantial existence, since it comes from
ineffably superior to that of the Seoond God or Demiurge who
contemplates the Forms and makes the world. 2 Plato Timaeus 42E5-6 (quoted again below).
146
147
 THAT WHICH IS AFTEE THE FIRST
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 4.
araaiv Xa^ovaa, are e/c /xeydAij? 8vvdfiecos, fieyicr-
a great power, the greatest indeed of all, and arrives
at being and substance: for that Principle is “ beyond
TT]s (lev ovv aTTaadiv, els to etvai Kal ovalav •^Xdev
being That is the productive power of all things,
eKeZvo yap eneKeiva ovalas •fjv. Kal eKetvo (lev
and its product is already all things. But if this
Svva(ics ndvroiv, to 8e ijSij to. Trdvra. el Se tovto product is all things, that Principle is beyond all
40 TO, ndvra, eKetvo eireKeiva toUv irdvrcov eneKeiva things: therefore “beyond being”; and if the
dpa ovalas • Kal el to. Trdvra, npo 8e irdvrcvv to ev product is all things but the One is before all things
ov TO laov eyov rots Ttaai, Kal Tavrrj Set eireKeiva and not on an equality with all things, in this way too
etvai Trjs ovalas. tovto Se Kal vov- erreKeiva it must be “ beyond being That is, also beyond
apa Ti vov. TO yap ov ov veKpov ovSe ov ^a>'^ ovSe Intellect; there is, then, something beyond In­
ov voovv vovs 8y Kal ov ravrov. ov yap tcjv tellect. For being is not a dead thing, nor is it not
46 TTpayfidrayv 6 vovs—diavep ij aladrjais twv alaOr(- life or not thinking; Intellect and being are one and
the same thing; for Intellect does not apprehend
Tciv—irpoovTcvv, dAA’ avros vovs rd irpdypiaTa,
eiirep firj eiStj avrdiv Kopil^erai. rrodev ydp; dXX’
objects which preexist it—as sense does sense-
objects—^but Intellect itself is its objects, granted
ivravda (lerd tcvv TTpayixdriov Kal ravrov avrots
that it does not get their forms from somewhere
Kal €v Kal rj emarrip/t] Se rivv dvev vXrjs rd trpdy- (for where could it get them from ?). But it is here
(xara. with its objects and the same as and one with them:
the knowledge of things without matter is its objects.^
* Here again Plotinus is taking Aristotle’s doctrine of
intellect as his starting-point: op. Categories 7. Sail (on the
priority of sense-objects to sense) and De Anima P 4. 430a^6
and 7. 431bl7 (on the identity of intellect with its objects).

149
148
ENNEAD V. 5
 INTELLIGIBLES NOT OUTSIDE INTELLECT
theme of intelligible beauty and it is shown how, wrongly
apprehended, it can distract us from the Good. Chapter
13 sums up the argument, and prepares the way for the
polemical appendix refuting Gnostic ideas of spiritual
reality which occupies II. 9.
V. 5. THAT THE INTELLIGIBLES ARE NOT
OUTSIDE THE INTELLECT, AND ON THE Synopsis
GOOD
The truth of Intellect (and what can be truer than ab­
solute Intellect) depends on its identity with its objects
Introductory Note. (ch. 1). These intelligible objects which are Intellect are
This treatise is the third section of the great work com­ real, living, thinking being: no proof of their absolute
prising III. 8 (30), V. 8 (31), V. 5 (32) and II. 9 (33), truth is necessary or possible (ch. 2). The image of the
which Porph3nry divided and inserted in various places court procession in which Intellect immediately precedes
in the Enneads without regard to the original order (see the King (ch. 3). Demonstration that the One must
Introductory Notes to II. 9 and III. 8). It is best read exist from a consideration of the nature of number (chs.
after V. 8 with which it is completely continuous: the 4-5). That Being proceeds from the One is confirmed by
last sentence of V. 8 directly introduces the argument which etymology (oh. 5). The One is beyond form and sub­
occupies the first three chapters of V. 5. The two treatises stance, for if it was form or substance it would be a
together form the second “ ascent to the Good ” in the particular being, not the origin of all: it is therefore un­
great work. The first, in III. 8, starts at the bottom, knowable and ineffable (oh. 6). Intellect sees it by an
with Nature, the lowest form of Soul. This one begins inner light identical with itself (oh. 7). The mysterious
at the stage immediately below the Good, with Intellect, coming and going of the vision of the One, which is not
Real Being or the World of Forms, which we discover a movement of the One, but of Intellect (ch. 8). The One
within ourselves as soon as we make any progress in is not in anything, therefore it is everywhere: body is in
genuine contemplation. In V. 8 the beauty of the in­ Soul, Soul in Intellect, Intellect in the One (oh. 9). The
One is the transcendent source of all else, unlike all which
telligible world was considered in depth, and it was
already clearly indicated that its intelligibility was non- he produces (ch. 10). The infinity of the One: he is
discursive. In the first three chapters of the present utterly unlike the sense-perceived objects which most
people think are real (oh. 11). The Good and intelligible
treatise we pass from the beauty to the truth of Intellect,
beauty: indifference of the Good to all he has made
and its absolute identity with the intelligible objects, the
Forms, is powerfully argued. Then follows a demon­ (oh. 12). We must not think that the Good has anything
in himself, even good: this would detract from his absolute
stration that the One or Good beyond Intellect and Being
must exist, leading into one of the most impressive simplicity (ch. 13).
accounts in the Enneads of its transcendent and ineffable
nature and the strange kind of direct awareness by which
we apprehend it. In Chapter 12 there is a return to the
152 153
 V. 5. (32) OTI OYK EHQ TOT NOT TA V. 5. THAT THE INTELLIGIBLES ARE
NOHTA KAI DEPI TATAOOT NOT OUTSIDE THE INTELLECT,
AND ON THE GOOD
1. Tov vow, Tov dXrjOij vow (cat ovrws, dp’ dv ns
1. Could anyone say that Intellect, the true and
(f>alrj tfieuaeadaL ttots /cat jai) rd ovra So^daeiv; real Intellect, will ever be in error and believe the
ovSafjLcos. TTcos yap dv en vovs dvorjTatvatv etij; unreal? Certainly not. For how could it still be
Intellect when it was being unintelligent ? It must,
Set dpa avTov del etSevat /cat /tijS’ dv eviXadeadai then, always know and not ever forget anything,
and its knowing must not be that of a guesser, or
6 TTore, T^v Se etSrycrtv avTo) /tiyre eiKaCovn elvai ambiguous, or like that of someone who has heard
p/rjTe dp^i^oXov p.r]S’ av Trap’ dXXov olov dKovaavn, what he knows from someone else. Nor, certainly,
can it depend on demonstration. For even if any­
ov Tolvvv ovSe Sc’ dnoSec^ecos. /cat yap et rtvct ns one did say that some of the things it knows were
(jialtj Sc’ dTToSec^ecvs, dAA’ oSv avrodev avrcp ivapyrj known by demonstration, some, all the same, would
be immediately self-evident to it. (The argument in
nv’ ^ etvat. /catVot d Adyo? <f>7]ac Travra' ttcos yap fact says that all things it knows are self-evident:
/cot Scopcec Tcs rd re avroOev rd re p/q; dAA’ ovv, for how is one going to distinguish those which are
from those which are not ?) But anyhow, as regards
10 d avyxwpovacv avrodev, vodev ^aovac rotircov rd the things of which they agree that Intellect’s
knowledge is immediate, where do they say that the
evapyes avrw vapecvac; rrodev Se avrcp irccrrcv, self-evidence comes to it from ? From where will it
on ovrojs eyec, nape^erac; enec /cat rd em rrjs acquire the confidence that things are so? For
there is a lack of confidence about even those
accrdijarecos, a Srj So/cet mcrrcv eyetv evapyecrrdrrjv, objects of sense-perception which seem to inspire
dmarecrac, p'q rtore ovk ev rocs diroKecp-evocs, dAA’ the strongest confidence in their self-evidence,
whether their apparent existence may be not in the
15 ev rocs Trddeacv eyec rrjv SoKovaav irroaraacv /cat underlying realities, but in the ways the sense-
' Cilento: n Enn., H-S organs are affected, and they need intellect or dis-
IS4 I5S
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 5. INTELLIGIBLES NOT OUTSIDE INTELLECT
vov Set rj Siavoias rwv Kpivovvroov eirel Kal avyKe- cursive reason to make judgments about them; for
even if it is agreed that they are in the underlying
XOjprjfievov ev rois VTTOK€ip,evois etvai aiadtjrols,
sense-realities which sense-perception is to grasp,
J>v avTiXrppiv rj atcrOrjais Tronjaerai, to re yivcua- that which is known by sense-perception is an image
KOfievov 8i alaO'jaecDS rov TTpa.ypM.TOS eihcoXov eari of the thing, and sense-perception does not appre­
Kal ovK avro to irpaypLa rj a'ladrjcns XapL^dvei- hend the thing itself; for that remains outside.^
Now when Intellect knows, and knows the intelligi-
20 fj.€V€i yap eKeivo e^co. 6 Stj vovs yivcooKcov Kal to. bles, if it knows them as being other than itself, how
vorjTCL yivwaKcov, el pLev erepa ovra yivoioKei, ttws could it make contact with them ? For it is possible
p.ev dv avuTvyoi avroTs; epSe'^erai yap paq, ware that it might not, so that it is possible that it might
not know them, or know them only when it made
epSeyerai fvq yivaioKeiv q Tore ore avvervye, Kal
contact with them, and it will not always possess its
OVK del e^ei rrjv yvwcnv. el Se avve^evyOai (fyqaov- knowledge. But if they are going to say that the
cri, Ti TO avve^evyOai tovto ; erreiTa Kal al voqaeis intelhgibles and Intellect are linked, what does this
“ linked ” mean ? Then the acts of intelligence will
26 TVTToi eaovTar el Se tovto, Kal eiTaKTol Kal rrXq-
be impressions; but if this is what they are, they
yal. TTCvs Se Kal TVTTCoaeTai, fj tLs twv toiovtcuv q eome to it from outside and are impacts. But then
liop^; Kal q voqais rov e^cj dvatrep q atadqais. how will the impressions be made, and what shape
Kal tL Siolaei q tco apuKpoTepcov avTiXapL^dveadai; are things like intelhgibles? And intellection will
be of what is external, just like sense-perception.
TTOos 8e Kat, yvajoerai, on dvreXd^ero ovtcos j ttu>s And in what way will it differ from sense-perception,
30 Se, OTi dyadov tovto q on KaXov q SiKaiov; eKaa- except by grasping smaller objects ? But how, also,
Tov yap TOVTCov dXXo avTOV, Kal ovk ev avrip al rqs will it know that it really grasped them ? And how
Kplaecos dpyal, aXs iTMTevaei, dXXd Kal aSrac e^cv, will it know that this is good or beautiful or just?
For each of these will be other than it, and the
Kat. q aXqdeM e/cei. elra KdKeZva dvaladqra Kal principles of judgment on which it will rely will not
apxnpa C<^qs Kal vov, q vovv eyei. Kal el vovv be in itself, but these too wll be outside, and that
eyei, dpta evravOa dpL^cv, Kal to dXqOes (LSI, Kal is where truth will be. Then again, either the
intelhgibles are without perception and without any
35 o irpcoTos vovs oStos, Kal em tovtov ^qTqaop.ev,
share of life or intelligence, or they have intelligence.
And if they have intelhgenee, both are here in them
* Total confidence in sense-perception was characteristic at once, truth is here and this is the primary Intelleet,
of the Epicureans: cp. Sextus Empiricus Adv. Mathem. VIII
9 and VII 203 {Against the Logicians II 9 and I 203 Bury) = much concerned to refute this position. But the argument
Epicurea fr. 244 and 247 Usener. The Scepties were naturally Plotinus uses here is Platonic rather than Sceptic. '
156 IS7
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 5. INTELLIGIBLES NOT OUTSIDE INTELLECT

Trojs '>7 evravda aXijOeia, Kal to voijtov Kal 6 and we shall proceed to investigate how truth and
vovs el ev rip avTw fiev /cat dfia, Svo Se /cat erepa, the intelhgible and Intellect are related [in this unity-
in-duality] ; are they together in one and the same
fj TTciis ; el 8’ dvorjra /cat dvev ri ovra ; oi yap reality, but also two and diverse, or how are they
8tj TTpordcreis ovSe d^iw/j-ara ovSe XeKrd' related? But if they are without intelligence and
40 1^8/j yap av /cat avrd irepl erepcjv Xeyoi, /cat ovk life, what sort of realities are they? They are
avrd rd ovra eirj, otoi> to SiKaiov KaXov, dXXov rov certainly not " premises ” or “ axioms ” or “ expres­
sions for then they would only say something
St/catou /cat tov KaXov ovro?. el S’ dvXa (fyqaovaL,
about other things and would not be the things
SiKaiov yoipls Kal KaXov, Trpcbrov p.ev ovy ev Tt themselves, as when [one says] “ Justice is beautiful ”,
oiiS’ ev evl TO vorjTov earai, dXXd SieavaapLevov though justice and beauty are different [from the
eKaarov. Kal ttov Kal /card rlvas SieanaoTai ro- words used].^ But if they are going to say that
justice and beauty are simple realities, justice by
45 TTovs ; TTcijg Se avrols awrev^eiai, 6 vovg irepideoiv; itself and beauty by itself, then first of all, the in­
TTios Se (level; rj ev tw avroi irdis fievet^; rlva S' telligible will not be a unity or in a unity, but each
oXcog p,op<j)7]v ^ TVTTov €^et; el p,7j (vairep dydXfiara intelligible will be cut off from the others. Well,
€KKel[ieva ypvad ^ dXXrjg rivog vXrjg vtto Tivog then, where will they be, and over what regions will
they be dispers ed ? And how will Intellect encounter
TTXdaTov rj ypa<j>ecog TreTToi7)p,eva; dXX’ el tovto, them when it runs round looking for them? And
6 dewpwv vovg aiadrjaig earai. Sid Tt 8e to [lev how will it stay in its place? How will it remain
50 lari TOJV roiovrcov SiKaioavvrj, to S’ dXXo Tt; identical with itself? Whatever sort of shape or
[leyiarov Se Trdvrcov e/cetvo- ei ydp Kal on [idXiara imprint will it receive from them? Unless we as­
sume that they are like images set up, made of gold
Sotij Tig ravra e$o) etvai Kal tov vovv avrd or some other material by a sculptor or engraver?
1 BUfo, Creuzer*: /xcm wxU“C, H-S But if this is so, the intellect which contemplates
them will be sense-perception. And why should
one of things like these be righteousness, and an­
^ Here Plotinus is arguing against those who see the know­
ledge of Intellect in terms of discursive logic, whether Aris­ other something else ^ ? But the greatest objection
totelian or Stoic. Por “ premises ” op. Aristotle Anal. Priora of all is this. If one grants that the objects of
A 1, 24al6: for “ axioms ” and “ expressions ” cp. SVF II thought are as completely as possible outside In-
132 and 136.
’ In this passage Plotinus is arguing against contemporary of this position and conversion, Life of Plotinus 18). He
Platonists like Longinus, who held that the Platonie Forms seems to have in mind particularly a very literal Interpretation
were external to and separate from Intellect (op. Proolus In of the vision of the Forms in his favourite Phaedrus myth:
Tim. I. 322. 24 Diehl and, for Porphyry’s original acceptance cp. Plato Phaedrus 247D-E.
iS8 159
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 5. INTELLIGIBLES NOT OUTSIDE INTELLECT

ouTO)? €-)(ovra dewpetv, avayKaZov avrw pLrqTe to tellect, and that Intellect contemplates them as
dXyjdes avTcov eyeiv BietfievaOai re ev dmaaiv ols absolutely outside it, then it cannot possess the
dewpeX. rd p,ev yap dXrjdLvd dv etrj eKeZva' truth of them and must be deceived in everything it
eontemplates. For they would be the true realities;
65 decjp^aei rolvvv avra ovk eycov avrd, etScoAa Se
and on this supposition it will contemplate them
avTwv €v Trj yuaiaei Tfj Toiav-rp Xa^cdv. to roivvv without possessing them, but will only get images of
dXrjOtvov OVK eycov, eidwXa 8e tov dXrjdovs •nap' them in a knowledge of this sort. If then it does
avT(p Xa^d>v rd tfievdrj e^ei Kal ovSev dXrjdes. el p.ev not possess the true reality, but only receives in
odv elS-qaei, on to ifievdfj eyei, opxtXoyqaei itself images of the truth, it will have falsities and
dpLoipos dXrjdelas elvai- el Se Kal rovro dyvorjaei nothing true. If, then, it knows that what it has
60 Kal ol-paerai to dX-qdes eyeiv ovk eycvv, SiTrAdotov
is false, it will admit that it has no part in truth;
iv avTw TO ipevdos yev6p.evov •noXv ttj? dXrjOeias
but if it does not know even this, and thinks it has
the truth when it has not, the falsehood in it will be
avTOV dTTOcrrqoei. did rovro ydp Kal ev rais doubled and will set it far away from the truth.
a'laOifiaeaiv, otpiai, ovk eveariv dX'qOeia, dXXd So^a, (This is the reason, I think, why there is no truth
on Trapa8eyop,evq Kal Sid rovro So^a oSaa dXXo in the senses, only opinion; opinion is opinion
65 TTapaSeyerai dXXov ovros eKelvov, e^ ov rovro o because it reeeives, and what it reeeives is different
TTapaSeyerai eyei. el oSv p/fj dX-qdeia ev rw v<p, from that from which it receives it.) ^ So if there
oSros pev 6 roiovros vovs ovre dX'qOeia earai is not truth in Intellect, then an intellect of this sort
ovre dX’qOeia vovs ovre oXcus vovs earai. dXX' will not be truth, or truly Intellect, or Intellect at
all. But then truth will not be anywhere else either.
ovSe dXXoOl TTOV ■q dX'qOeia earai. 2. One must not, then, look for the intelligibles
2. Ou rolvvv Set ovre e^co rd voqrd J^qreiv, ovre outside, or say that there are impressions of the real
rvTTOvs ev rep vcp rdiv ovnvv Xeyeiv elvai, ovre •7~qs
beings in Intellect, or by depriving it of truth make
dXrjOelas dnoarepodvras aiirdv dyvwalav re rwv the intelligibles unknowable and non-existent and
voqrcov •noielv Kal dvvirap^lav koI eri avrdv rdv finally abolish Intellect itself. But, since one must
5 vovv dvaipeiv. dAA’ evnep Kal •yvcdaiv Set /cat bring in knowledge and truth and watchfully pre­
dX-qOeiav eladyeiv Kal rd ovra rqpeZv Kal •yvcoaiv serve reaUty and the knowledge of what each thing
rov ri eKaarov eariv, dXXd p'q rov ttoZov ri is—but not [only] the knowledge of each thing’s
eKaarov, are etSo/Aov avrov Kal lyvos layovras.
qualities,* since [if we only had that] we should have
an image and a trace of realities, and not possess
* Plotinus is here deriving Sofa from Sfxoft“‘> '"'^y ® For the important distinction between the thing itself and
adjective So'^oy. its quality (or “ what it is like ”) cp. Plato Letter VII 342EfF.
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 PLOTINUS; ENNEAD V. 5. INTELLIGIBLES NOT OUTSIDE INTELLECT
dAAd ixrj avTO. exovras Kal awovra^ Kal avyKpa.- and live with and be fused with the realities them­
devras avrois, t(o aXrjOivw voi Soreov ra irdvra. selves—we must attribute all [real existences] to the
10 ovTO) yap dv Kal elBeCrj, Kal dXrjdivws elSeCr), Kal true Intellect. For in this way it vdll also know
them, and know them truly and will not forget
ovS' dv emXddoiro ov8’ dv TrepieXdoi fijTwv, Kal ij them or go round looking for them, and the truth
dX'qdeia ev avrip Kal edpa eorat rots oSai Kal will be in it and it will be the foundation of all
^■^aerai Kal vo-qaei. d 817 irdvra nepl rrjv p,aKa- realities and they will live and think. All this must
piorrd-rqv <j>vcnv 8eT vvdpxeiv rj •nov to rlpuov Kal
belong to the most blessed nature; or where will
its honour and majesty be ? And then again, it will
<jep,v6v eorai; Kal yap aS ovtws ov8’ aTroSei^eoj? need no proof and no confirmation that it is so, for
16 Set ov8e maretog, on ovrcos—avros yap ovros Kal it is so, and is manifest to itself—and if there is any­
evapY^s avTos avrcp—Kal ei n npo avrov, on thing before it. Intellect knows clearly that this is
avTov, Kal €t n per eKelvo, on avros—Kal ovSels
what it derives from, and if there is anything after
it, it knows clearly that this is itself—and nobody
mardrepos avrw irepl avrov—Kal on €Kei rovro can confirm this about it better than itself—and' it
Kal dvrcos' cocrre Kal rj ovrcos dX'^deia oil avpcjHov- knows clearly that all this is there in the intelligible
oucra aAAw aAA €avTfj, /cat ovoev Trap avTqv oAAo
world, and really there. So that the real truth is
also there, which does not agree with something
20 Xeyei, <dAA’ o Xe'yei},^ Kal ean, Kal 6 ean, rovro
else, but with itself, and says nothing other than
Kal Xeyei. ns dv oSv eXey^eie;. Kal noOev otaei itself, but it is what it says and it says what it is.
rov eXeyyov; els yap ravrov 6 ^epopevos eXeyyos Who then could contradict it, and where would he
rep npoeiTTOvn, Kdv Koplarj ais dXXo, <f>eperai els bring his contradiction from? For the contradic­
tory answer would coincide with the preceding
rov e^apxrjs elirovra Kal ev eanv ov yap dXXo
statement, and even if one introduces it as different,
dXrjOecrrepov dv evpois rov dXrjdovs. it is brought into conformity with and is one with the
3. Mta roivvv (fivais avTT] rjpXv, vovs, rd ovra original statement; for you could not find anything
ndvra, rj dX'qOeia' el 8e, Beds ns pAyas' paXXov truer than the truth.
3. We have here, then, one nature. Intellect, all
8e ov ns, dAAd nds d^ioZ ravra elvai. Kal Beds
realities, and truth; if so, it is a great god; or,
avrrj ij (jivais, Kal Beds 8evrepos -npoefiaLvoiv eavrdv better, not just a god, but it demands as of right
5 Trplv dpdv eKelvov d 8e vvepKdBrjrai Kal virep- that this which it is is universal god. This nature is
I8pvrai em KaXfjs ovrcos oXov Kpr]m8os, e^ avrov god, and the second god revealing himself before
we see that other one; he, the First, is enthroned
^ Theiler. above and set firm on high on Intellect in this its
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 PLOTINUS; ENNEAD V. 5. INTELLIGIBLES NOT OUTSIDE INTELLECT
e^’^pTTjTai. eSei yap eKeZvov ^alvovra p/q k-n beauty, like a pedestal, and the pedestal. Intellect,
aifivxov Tivos pr]8’ aS i-nl <pvyfls evdii^ ^e^rjKevai, hangs from it.^ For the First in its progress could
dXX etvaL avTW KaXXos dp’^yavov irpo avrov not take its stand upon something soulless, nor im­
TTpoLov, otov Ttpo peydXov ^aaiXecos Trpoeim pev mediately upon Soul, but there must be an incon­
10 npcoTa ev raZs TTpooSois rd kXdrrrw, del Se rd ceivable beauty going out before it, as in the proces­
/xeifw Kai TO, crepvoTepa kn ainoZs, Kal rd Trepl
sion before a great king the lesser ranks go first, and
then in succession the greater and after them the
^aaiXka rjSr] pdXXov ^acnXLKwrepa, elra rd per’
yet more majestic and the court which has still more
avTov Tipia' k<j) dnaai Se tovtois ^aaiXevs
of royal dignity, and then those who are honoured
TTpo(f>aiverai k^alcj)vr]s avros 6 peyas, oi 8’
next after the king; and after all these the great
evyovrat Kal npoaKwovaiv, oaoi prj TTpoaTrijXdov king himself is suddenly revealed, and the people
15 apKeadevres toZs irpd rov ^aaiXecus d<l>deZaLV. pray and prostrate themselves before him—those at
€KeZ pev ovv o ^aaiXevs dXXoSf ot re irpo avrov least who have not gone away beforehand, satisfied
rrpo'Covres dXXoi avrov' 6 8e kKeZ ^aaiXevs ovk with what they saw before the coming of the king.
aXXorplcvv apycov, dAA’ eya>v rrjv SiKaiordryjv Kal Now in our example the king is a different person
(fivaei dpyrjv Kal rriv dXrjOrj ^aaiXelav, are rrjs from those who go before him; but the king there
dXrjdelas ^aaiXeiis Kal wv Kard <f>vaiv Kvpios rov in the higher world does not rule over different, alien
20 avrov adpoov yewijparos Kal Belov avvrdyparog, people, but has the most just, the natural sovereignty
^aaiXevs ^acriXeojs Kal ^aaiXecvv Kal irarrip and the true kingdom; for he is king of truth and
SiKaiorepov dv KXrjBelg Bedov, ov 6 Zeur Kal ravrr] natural lord of all his own offspring and divine
epipr/aaro rrjv rov eavrov rrarpds ovk dvaayopevos company, king of the king and of the kings, and more
Becjplav, dXXd rrjv rov npondropos otov kvepyeiav rightly than Zeus called the father of the gods;
elg vTToaraatv ovalas. Zeus imitates him in this way also in that he is not
satisfied with the contemplation of his father but
4. "On pev ovv SeZ rrjv dvaycoyrjv TTOvqaaaBai, els aspires to, we might say, the active power with which
ev Kal dXrjBcbs ev, dXXd p'fj (oarrep rd dXXa ev, d his grandfather establishes reality in being.^
TToXXd ovra peroyfj ivds ev—SeZ Se rd prj peroyfj 4. We have said, then,® that the ascent must be
made to a one, and this means truly one, but not one
^ The remarkable correction of the metaphor here should like all other things which are multiple and one by
be noted. The First towers above Intellect like a statue on participation in a one—^the One must be grasped
its pedestal or an Oriental king on his throne, but is in no
way supported or elevated by it. Intellect is totally depen­ 2 The usual identification of the Three Hypostases with the

dent for its existence on That of which it is called the “ pedes­ successive mythological chief gods, Ouranos, Kronos and Zeus.
tal ”. “ In the first part of this work. III. 8. 10-11.
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 PLOTINUS; ENNEAD V. 5. INTELLIGIBLES NOT OUTSIDE INTELLECT
ev Xa^eZv /xijSe to ov fidXXou ey rj TroXXd—Kal on 6 that is not one by participation and is not as much
5 fiey vorjTos Koofios Kal 6 vovs iJ,aXXov ev riov dXXcov, many as one—and that the intelhgible universe and
Kal ouSer eyyvTepct) avrov roll evd?, ov firjv to Intellect are more one than all other things, and
Kadapws h>, e'iprjTai. tL Se to KaOapdis ev Kal there is nothing nearer the One itself, but all the
same this is not the pure One. Now we long to
ovTCVS Kal ov KaT dXXo, vvv dedaaadai TTodovp.ev, see, if it is in any way possible, what is the pure,
el TTrj SvvaTov. XPV '^olvvv evravda ^ai tTpos ev, real One, unrelated to anything else. At this point,
Kal p,r]Sev avT<p en TrpoaOetvai, aXXd oTrjvat then, you must rush to one, and not any longer add
10 -navreXibs SeSioTa avTOV aTToaTaTrjaai pirjSe anything to it, but stand absolutely still in fear of
departing from it, and not progress the least little
TovXdxtoTov p,rj8e els 8vo npoeXSelv. el 8e p,7j,
way towards two. If not, you get two, and not a
eax^S 8vo, ovK ev ols to ev, dXXd dp,<f>cv voTepa. two which contains the One, but [a two of which]
ov yap OeXei dAAou oiSre evos ovTe onoaovovv both units are posterior to it. For it will not be
avvapiOpeladaL ov8’ oXcvs dpidpeladai' p,eTpov yap included in the count with another one, or another
avTO Kal ov p,eTpovp.evov, Kal toIs dXXois 8e ovk
number of any size; it will not be counted at all;
for it is a measure and not measured, and it is not
16 laov, Iva avv avToXs' el 8e p.ij, koivov ti earai in’ equal to the other units so as to be one of their
aiiTOV Kal twv avvapiOpovpLevojv, KaKeXvo npo company; otherwise, there will be something in
avTOV' Set Se p.rj8ev. odSe yap ov8’ 6 ovaid)8r]s common between it and those which are included
dpiOpids KaT’ avTov, ov8e ye 6 voTepos tovtov, d in the count with it, and that something in common
will be before the One itself; but there must be
Tov noaov' ovaic68r/s p.iv 6 to etvai det napeyiov,
nothing [before the One itself]. It does not even
Tov Se noaov 6 to noaov p,eT dXXcuv en ^ p.r] p.eT belong to the category of essential number, and so
20 dXXcuv, elnep dpi9p,6s tovto. enel Kal rj ev toXs certainly not to that which is posterior to it of
TOV noaov dpi9p,ov npos to ev t^v dpyyv avTcjv quantitative number ^ (substantial number is that
dnopup,ovp,evrj tt)v ev toXs npoTepois dpL9p,oXs which continually gives existence, quantitative num­
ber is that which gives quantity when it is with other
* Theiler: on Enn., Perna, Creuzer: 5 n Creuzer (ed. Paris.), numbers, and still when it is not with other numbers,
Kirohhoif•: en o = Eioinus): en 6 Cilento. if this [which is not with other numbers] really is a
number). Since the nature which belongs to the
‘ “ Essential number ” is Platonic Ideal Number. For the numbers in the class of quantitative number, imitat­
way in which Plotinus understands the Platonic Ideal Num­
bers, see the treatise On Numbers VI. 6 [34] to which he refers ing in relation to the one which is their principle the
forward at the end of this chapter. relationship of the nature in the prior [substantial]
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(j)V(7is TTpos TO OVTWS ev ovK dvaXioKovaa ro ev numbers to the real One, does not exist by expending
ovSe KepnarlCovaa rrjv dmaracnv e^et, dXXd or breaking up its one, but when a dyad comes to be,
the monad before the dyad exists, neither each of
SvdSos y€vop,€vr]s eon p,ovds 'q npo rrjg BvdSos, Kal
the two units in the dyad nor one of them is the
25 ovx q iv TT] SvdS^ pLovds eKarepa ov8’ erepa monad in the dyad. For why should it be one of
eKeLvTj. tL yap p,dXXov ovorepaovv; el oSv them more than the other ? If then it is neither of
p/qSerepa avruiv, dXXrj eKelvrj Kal fievovoa oS ^ them, it is different, and remains where it remains.
How then are those [two units of the dyad] different ?
p,evei. TTLOS ovv erepai eKeXvai; Kal ttws r) Sody
'And how is the dyad one? and is it the same one,
ev; Kai et ravro ev, onep ev eKarepa rfj nepi- which is in each of the two terms comprised in the
exop.evr). ^ p-erexeiv rfjs Trpwrrjs (j>areov, dXXas dyad ? It must be maintained that they participate
30 8e p-erexovoi, Kal rrjv 8vd8a 8e, Kado ev, in the first monad, but are other than that in which
p.erexeiv, ovx dioavrcus 8e- errel ov8e 6p.olojs they participate, and the dyad, in so far as it is one,
arpards ev Kal oiKia. Kal avrrj irpds ro avvexes also participates, but not in the same sense; for an
ovre Kara ro ws etvai ev, ovre Kara ro ttooov ev. army and a house are not one in the same way. A
dp oSv al p,ev p,ovd8es dXXcvs al ev Trevrd8i Kal
house is one in virtue of its continuous structure, not
by substantial unity or quantitative unity. Are then
Se/cdSi, TO 8e ev ro ev rfj 7revrd8i. TTpos ro ev ro cttI the monads in the number five and the number ten
35 rrjs 8eKd8os ro avro ; rj, el vavs Trdoa TTpos -rrdaav, different, but is the one in the number five the same
fUKpd TTpos fieydXqv, Kal ttoXis TTpos ttoXiv, Kal as the one in the number ten ? Now if every ship
orparos TTpos arparov, ravro ev Kal evravda' el is the same as every other ship, small the same as
great, and every city the same as another city or
8e p.q8’ eKeZ, ov8’ evravda. el ydp rives TTepl army the same as another army, then here also the
rovrcuv aTTopiai, varepov. one is the same; but if not in those other cases, then
5. ’AAA’ eir' eKeivo eTravireov Xeyovaiv, on pieve not here either. If there are any difficulties about
ro TTpwrov to avro, kov e$ avrov ylvrjraL erepa. this, we will deal with them later.
ev piev ovv roZs dpidp-oZs pievovros piev rov ev, 5. But we must go back to that point where we
TTOiovvros 8e dXXov, 6 dpidpios yiverai Kar' avro-^ said that the First remains the same even if other
things come into being from it. In the case of
5 8^ Tw o ion TTpo rd)V ovrcvv pievei fiev ttoXv numbers, then, the one remains unchanged, but
p,dXXov evravda ro ev pievovros 8e avrov ovk another one makes number, and number comes into
existence on the model of it; but in the case of
» B-T:oi!Enn., H-Si. that which truly exists, here the One still more
^ (idem atque 3 aXXov) w, Perna, Muller: Kara ravro BxUC,
H-S Kar avro (ro lv> Volkmann*: Kara ro (iv) Theiler. remains unchanged before the real beings; but
169
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 PLOTINUS; ENNEAD V. 5. INTELLIGIBLES NOT OUTSIDE INTELLECT
aAAo TTotei, el Kar avro ra ovra, dAA’ dpKet avro while it remains unchanged, it is not another which
yewijaai rd ovra. Kai wcnrep eKel im rwv makes, if the real beings are modelled on the One,
apidpwv rov npcorov—rijj povdSos—ini ndaiv but the one itself is sufficient to generate reality.
etSos npwTCJS Kai Sevrepcos, Kai ovk inlcrrjs
And, as there in the case of numbers, the form of
10 eKaarov p,eToXap^d.vovTos rcDv varepov avrijs,
the first, the monad, was in all of them primarily or
OVTOJ Kai ivravda eKaarov p,ev ru>v pefa to secondarily, and each of the numbers which come
npcdrov eyet ti eKelvov olov ethos iv avrip. KaKel after the monad did not participate in it equally,
pev rj p,erdXr]tljis to noaov vnecrrqaev avridv, so here too each of the beings which come after the
evTavOa 8e [to tov evo?] ^ njv ovalav avrois First has in itself a kind of form of it. Their parti­
vnearrjaaTO, war elvat to etvai tyvos <(tov} * cipation made the quantity of the numbers exist,
evos- Kai TO etvai he tovto—t] rrjs ovaias but here it gives beings substantial existence, so
15 hr)Xa>TiKr] dvopaaia—dno tov ev ei ns Xeyoi that being is a trace of the One. And if someone
yeyovevai, ray dv rvyoi tov diXrjdovs. to yap rot says that this word einai [being]—which is the term
Xeyopevov ov tovto npdjTov eKeidev otov dXiyov which signifies substantial existence—^has been de­
npopePrjKOS ovk rjdeXrjaev en npoacv eXdeiv, rived from the word hen [one] he might have hit
p,eTaarpa<f)ev he elsto eiaio earr], Kai eyevero upon the truth. For this which we call primary
ovaia Kai earla ®dndvroiv otov ev <f>66yyo} being proceeded, so to speak, a little way from the
20 evanepeiaavTos aiiTov tov (f>covovvTos v^iaraTai to One, but did not wish to go still further, but turned
ev hr)Xovv to dno tov evos Kai to ov arjpaZvov to inwards and took its stand \esle^ there, and became
<j)dey^dp,evov, cos hvvarai. ovrco toi to piev substance [o««ia] and hearth \Jiestia\ of all things;
yevopevov, ij ovaia Kai to etvai, pilp-qaiv eyovra eK it is like what happens in the utterance of the sound;
Trjs hvvdpiecos avrov pvevra- rj he Ihovaa Kai when the utterer presses on it hen is produced which
eniKivqdeiaa tw dedpan pupiovpievrj o ethev epprj^e manifests the origin from the One and on [being]
25 <j>covriv TTjv "dv” Kai "to etvai” Kai "ovalav” Kai signifying that which uttered, as best it can. Thus
eanav. oSroi yap ol <f>66yyoi OeXovai crqp.rjvai that which came to exist, substance and being, has
TTjv vndaraaiv yevvrjBevros chhivi tov fj>deyyop,evov an image of the One since it flows from its power;
and the [soul] which sees it and is moved to speech
anopiipiovpLevoi, cos otov re aiiTois, rrjv yeveaiv tov by the sight, imaging what it saw, cried out “ on ”
dvTos.
and “ einai ”, and “ ousia ” and “ hestia For these
^ del. Theiler. sounds intend to signify the real nature of that pro­
* transpos. Theiler. duced by the birth-pangs of the utterer, imitating, as
“ Vitringa, Muller*: eonv Enn. far as they are able, the generation of real being.
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6. ’AAAA ravTa /ieV, rts ideXei, XeXexOcu. 6. But these [etymologies] are to be taken as
anyone wishes. Since the substance which is gene­
■j-rjs 8e yevofjLev7]s ovalas eiSovs ovarjs—ov yap Sr) rated [from the One] is form-—one could not say
(iAAo Ti dv rts eirroi to cKeidev yevoptevov—Kal that what is generated from that source is anything
else—and not the form of some one thing but of
eiSovs ov rivos, dAAo. rravros, <!>s ptrj dv vnoXirreZv ri everything, so that no other form is left outside it,
5 dXXo, dvdyKt) dveiSeov eKstvo elvai. dveiSeov Se ov the One must be without form. But if it is without
form it is not a substance; for a substance must be
ovK ovata' roSe yap ri Set rrjv ovatav etvaf rovro some one particular thing, something, that is, defined
Se (hpiapevov to 8e ovk eari Xa^etv ais roSe- and limited; but it is impossible to apprehend the
One as a particular thing: for then it would not be
ySr) yap ovk apyr), dXX eKetvo povov, o roSe the principle, but only that particular thing which
eiprjKas elvai. el oSv rd rravra ev rip yevopevw, rl you said it was. But if all things are in that which
is generated [from the One], which of the things in
rdjv ev TovTtp eKetvo epets; ovSev Se rovrojv
it are you going to say that the One is ? Since
10 ov povov dv XeyoiTo eireKeiva rovrtav. ravra Se it is none of them, it can only be said to be beyond
TO. ovra Kal to ov erreKeiva dpa ovros. to yap
them. But these things are beings, and being: so
it is “ beyond being This phrase “ beyond
erreKeiva ovros ov roSe Xeyei-—ov yap rtOrjatv— being ” does not mean that it is a particular thing—
ovSe ovopa avrov Xeyei, dXXd <j>epet povov to ov
for it makes no positive statement about it—and it
does not say its name, but all it implies is that it is
TOVTO. TovTO Se TToiovv ovSapov avTo rrepiXap- “ not this ”. But if this-is what the phrase does,
16 ^dvef yeXoZov yap ^rjTetv eKeivrjv rrjv drrXerov it in no way comprehends the One: it would be
absurd to seek to comprehend that boundless nature;
<j>vatv rrepiXap^dveiv 6 yap rovro ^ovXopevos for anyone who wants to do this has put himself out
TTOietv drTearr)aev avrov Kal rov orrwaovv Kal Kara of the way of following at all, even the least distance,
in its traces; but just as he who wishes to see the
Ppayv els iXf'OS avrov levaf dXX’ warrep rjvT intelligible nature will contemplate what is beyond
vorjTTjv (f>vaiv ^ovXopevos ISetv ovSeplav (ftavraatav
the perceptible if he has no mental image of the
perceptible, so he who wishes to contemplate what
aladrjrov eycvv dedaerai 6 eartv erreKeiva rov is beyond the intelligible will contemplate it when
20 aladrjrov, ovrco Kal 6 dedaaadai deXcov ro erreKeiva 1 Yet again the phrase from Plato Republic VI 609B9; its
usual companion, the negative conclusion of the First Hypo­
rov voTjTov TO vorjrov rrdv dcftels dedaerai, on pev thesis of the Parmenides, appears below (line 12).
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 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 5. INTELLIGIBLES NOT OUTSIDE INTELLECT
€cm Sid TovTov [laOwv, olov S’ earl tovto d<f>eLs.
TO Se "ojov” arj/juiivot dvto ov)( oTov ov yap evi
he has let all the intelligible go; he will learn that
it is by means of the intelligible, but what it is like
OVO€ TO olov, OT(p fJirjO€ TO TL, aAAa 7jfJL€LS by letting the intelligible go. But this " what it is
rats '^p.erepaLS wScmv d.TTopovp.€v d ri yprj Xeyeiv, like ” must indicate that it is “ not like for there
25 Kal XeyopLev nepl ov prjrov, Kal 6vop,dCop,ev is no “ being like ” in what is not a “ something ”.
crr]p,aiveiv eavrots deXovres, cos hvvdp.eda. rdya But we in our travail do not know what we ought to
0€ Kai TO €V OVOfia TOVTO apaiv €)(€t 7TpO$ Ta say, and are speaking of what cannot be spoken, and
TToXXd. o0€v Kal 'ATToXXcova OL UvBayopiKot avp.- give it a name because we want to indicate it to
jSoAi/ciS? Ttpos dXX'qXovs iaTjp-aivov d'7TO<f>daet rcbv ourselves as best we can. But perhaps this name
TToXXdiv. €i Se Beats tis to ev, to re ovopta to re “ One ” contains [only] a denial of multiplicity.
30 SrjXovptevov, daa^earepov dv ylvoiro too el p/fj ns This is why the Pythagoreans symbolically indicated
ovopta eXeyev avrov- rdya yap tovto eXeyeTo, iva it to each other by the name of Apollo, in negation
6 CiJTTjo’as, dp^dptevos dir' avTov, o -ndvroos ^ of the multiple.^ But if the One—name and reality
aTTXoTTjTOS iart arjpavTtKov, d-TTO^'qar] TeXevTwv expressed—was to be taken positively it would be
Kal TOVTO, cos TeBev pev oaov olov t€ KaXcos tw less clear than if we did not give it a name at all:
Bepevtp ovK d^tov p'qv ov8e tovto els StjXcoatv ttjs for perhaps this name [One] was given it in order
35 <f>vaecos eKeivrjs, on /xijSe dKovarov eKetvo pr)8e that the seeker, beginning from this which is com­
pletely indicative of simplicity, may finally negate
T(p dKovovTt Set avveTov eivai, dAA’ etTrep nvi, t<3
dpwvn. dXX’ el to opcov elSos fijTei ^Xevetv,
this as well, because, though it was given as well as
possible by its giver, not even this is worthy to
ovSe TOVTO eiaeTat.
manifest that nature; since that cannot be heard,
7. "H eTtetSrj Sittov Kal to ivepyeia ^XeTretv, olov
nor may it be understood by one who hears, but, if
em d<f)BaXptov—to pev ydp eartv opapta avT&, to at all, by one who sees. But if the seer tries to look
etSos TO TOO alaBrjTov, to Se Si’ od opa to elSos at a form, he will not know even that.
avTov, o Kal avTO alaBrjTov eartv avr&, erepov 7. For, again, actual seeing is double; take the
5 ov TOO ei8ovs, atnov Se rip etSei too ® opdaBat, ev eye as an example, for it has one object of sight which
pev Tcp eiSet Kal em tov eiSovs avvopcopevov Sid is the form of the object perceived by the sense, and
^ Theiler: ndvrcov Knn. one which is the medium through which the form
2 A»<!Ei«!C“ Perna*: to AacEBKaoJUC. of its object is perceived, which is also itself percepti­
ble to the eye; it is different from the form, but is
2 For this Pythagorean etymology op. Plutarch Isis and the cause of the form’s being seen; it is seen con­
Osiris 381P. currently in the form and with the form; this is the
174 US
 PLOTINUS; ENNEAD V. 5. INTELLIGIBLES NOT OUTSIDE INTELLECT
ovK evapyij tots BlScoai Trjv atcxdfjcnv avTOV, are reason why it affords no clear perception of itself,
rov ofifiaros reTpa/xfievov irpos to TTe<f>ci}Ticrp,evov since the eye is directed to the illuminated object;
orav Se firjSev a^o Trap avro, adpoa elSe but when there is nothing there but the medium,
TTpoa^oXfj, KavToi Kal tots etSev eirepeiSo/xevov the eye sees it by an instantaneous immediate per­
10 dAAo), p.6vov 8e avro yevd/xevov, fj/f/ Trpos erepcp, ov ception, though even then it sees it based upon
Swarai rj ataOrjais Xa^eZv. i-irel Kal rov riXlov to something different, but if it is alone and not resting
(f>(vs TO ev avrcp rd^ dv rrjv atadrjGLV e^e<f>iyyev, et on something else the sense is not able to grasp it.^
p/^ oyKos vTT€K€iro ^ avrcp arepecorepos • ct tij
For even the hght of the sun which it has in itself
cjjctis ttSv elvai avrov Xeyoi, rovro dv ns Xa^oi Trpos would perhaps escape our sense of sight if a more
StjAcoctiv rov Xeyopevov earai yap cfrcos ev ovSevi sohd mass did not lie under it. But if someone said
15 ec8ei rcXv dXXcvv opcopevcvv, Kai lacos oparov povov
that the sun was all light, one might take this as
rd yap dXXa opard ov cfrws povov. ovrar roiwv
contributing to the explanation of what we are
Kal r/ rov vov oipis' dpa pev Kal avrrj 8i aXXov
trying to say; for the sun will then be Hght which is
in no form belonging to other visible things, and will
(fxvrds Ta Trecjxvriapeva eKeivrj rfj Trpcdrrj cjrvaei, Kai
be, perhaps, purely visible: for the other visible
ev eKeivois ovros dpa' vevovaa pevroi upos rrp> objects are not pure light. This, then, is what the
rd)v KaraXapiTopevcvv cfrvaiv •^rrov avro dpa' ei
seeing of Intellect is hke; this also sees by another
20 S’ dcfyi^aei rd dpcvpeva Kal 8i o5 eI8ev eis avro light the things illuminated by that first nature, and
pXeTTOi, cfrcos dv Kal cfrcords dpyrjv dv pXeTfoi. aXX sees the light in them; when it turns its attention
i-irel p'T] (hs e^cv ov Set tov vovv rovro rd cfrcds to the nature of the things illuminated, it sees the
^Xetreiv, traXiv eirl rov dcfrdaXpdv Ireov, os TTore Kal light less; but if it abandons the things it sees and
avrds ov rd e^cv cfrcds ov8e ro aXXorpiov etocTcu, looks at the medium by which it sees them, it looks
dAAd TTpd rov e^co ocKeldv n Kal pdXXov crriXTTvd- at hght and the source of hght. But since Intellect
25 repov ev aKapeZ dedrai, ^ vvKrcop ev oKorcp [rrpd must not see this hght as external, we must go back
avrov] * e^ avrov TrpoTrrjdrjaavros, ^ orav pr]8ev again to the eye; this will itself sometimes know a
edeXijaas rwv dXXcov j3A«retv Tvpo^dXXoiro irpo hght which is not the external, alien hght, but it
momentarily sees before the external hght a hght
^ Harder: «Wk«to Enn. of its own, a brighter one; it either springs out
* del. MaoKenna, Harder, Theiler. from itself at night in the dark or, when the eye
does not want to look at anything else, it lowers the
1 Here Plotinus is assuming, for the purposes of his illus­ problem in IV. 5 (29) he rejects the medium theory and holds
tration, the common doctrine, that sight takes place through that sense-perception takes place through the universal sym­
a medium. But in his fuller (and earlier) discussion of the pathy of the All.
176 177
 PLOTINUS; ENNEAD V. 5. INTELLIGIBLES NOT OUTSIDE INTELLECT
avTov TTjv Twv ^Xe^dpcov <f>vaiv to bpxos eyelids before it and all the same sends out light,
TTpo(j)epwv, rj Kal meaavTos rov exovros to iv or the eye’s possessor squeezes it and sees the light
avTW <l>ibs iSot. Tore yap ovy opcbv opa Kal in it. P'or then in not seeing it sees, and sees then
most of all: for it sees hght; but the other things
30 p,dXiara rare opa' <j>5)s yap opa' rd 8’ a\Xa
which it saw had the form of light but were not Hght.
(f>u}ToeiB'fi p,ev ■^v, <j>d>s 8c ovk ^v. ovto> Brj koI Just so Intellect, veiling itself from other things and
vovs avTov aTTO rwv dXXwv KaXvtjjas Kal awayaydn' drawing itself inward, when it is not looking at any­
els TO eioco p,r]Bev 6pu>v Oedaerai ovk dXXo iv thing will see a light, not a distinct light in something
dXX(p <l>d)s, dAA’ avTO KaO’ eavro pAvov Kadapov different from itself, but suddenly appearing, alone
i(j)' avTov i^al(f)V7js (f>avev, ojctt6 diropeZv odev
by itself in independent purity, so that Intellect is
at a doss to know whence it has appeared, whether
35 i(j)dv'q, e^wdev ^ evSov, Kal aTreXOovTOS elnecv it has come from outside or within, and after it has
"evSov dpa ■^v Kal ovk evSov av” gone away will say “ It was within, and yet it was
8. "H oil Bet l^-qrelv iroBev ov ydp eari to not within.”
TTodev ovre ydp epyerai, ovre aTreicnv ovBapov, 8. But one should not enquire whence it comes,
for there is no “ whence for it does not really
dXXd <j>aLverat re Kal ov (fialverai' Bid ov yPV
come or go away anywhere, but appears or does not
BiwKeiv, dXX' ’rjavxf] peveiv, ews dv <l>avrj, Trapa- appear. So one must not chase after it, but wait
5 oKevdoavra eavrov dearrjv elvai, wairep defiOaXpos quietly till it appears, preparing oneself to contem­
dvaroXds ‘rjXlov irepipevei' o Be VTrepijjaveis rov plate it, as the eye awaits the rising of the sun; and
oplCovTos—i^ WKeavov (fiaaiv ol -TToiyrai—eBojKev the sun rising over the horizon (“ from Ocean ”, the
poets say) ^ gives its^f to the eyes to see. But
eavTov OedaaOai rots oppaaiv. oiiroal Be, ov
from where will he of whom the sun is an image rise ?
pipetrai 6 ‘^Xios, vrrepaxrioei irodev; Kai ri What is the horizon which he will mount above when
v’nep^aXiuv (jiavT^aerai; ^ avrdv VTTepoxcvv rov he appears ? He will be above Intellect itself which
10 vovv rov Bewpevov eo-nj^erai pev ydp 6 vovs rrpds contemplates him. For Intellect will be standing
TTJV Beav els ovBev dXXo rj rrpds rd KaXdv ^Xerrwv, first to its contemplation, looking to nothing but
the Beautiful, all turning and giving itself up to him,
eKet eavrdv rrds rperrcov Kal BiBovs, ards Be Kai and, motionless and filled somehow -with strength, it
OLOV rrXT]pcoBels pevovs elBe pev rd rrparra KaXXlo) sees first of all itself become more beautiful, all
yevopevov eavrdv Kal emarlX^ovra, chs eyyvs glittering, because he is near. But he did not come
as one expected, but came as one who did not come;
dvros avTOV. 6 8e ovk jjei, o»j ns rrpoaeBoKa,
16 dAA’ ^XBev dis oiiK eXBwv dxfiBr^ ydp <Ls ovk ' Cp. e.g. Homer Iliad 7. 421-2.
178 179
 PLOTINUS; ENNEAD V. 5. INTELLIGIBLES NOT OUTSIDE INTELLECT

iX9a>v, dXXa irpo dtravTOiiv Trapwv, 'srp'iv Kal top for he was seen, not as having come, but as being
vovv iXOeXv. elvat Sc top povp top iXOopra Kal there before all things, and even before Intellect
rovTOP eipai koI top dmopra, on p/rj ol8e ttov Set came. It is Intellect which comes, and again Intel­
fiepeip Kal ttov eKeXpos /xeVei, on ip ovSepl. Kal lect which goes away, because it does not know
where to stay and where he stays, that is in nothing.*^
et oTop re ■ijf Kal avT& t& i/<3 pUpeip p/qSapov—ovx
And if it was possible for Intellect to abide in that
20 on ip Toirw' ovSe yap ovS’ avro^ ip tottoj dAA’ nowhere—I do not mean that Intellect is in place;
oXios prjSapLov—•^p dp del iKeiPov jSAeTrcov /catroi it is no more in place than he is, but [in that sense]
odSe pXeTTcop, dXX’ ev iKeipo) d>p Kal ov 8vo. pvp absolutely nowhere—it would always behold him, or
8i, on iarl pops, ovtoj jSAeirei, ore ^Xewei, rep rather not behold him, but be one with him, not two.
eavrov p/f] p&. davpa 8rj, ttcos ovk iXOcop irdpeari, But as it is, because it is Intellect, it sees him, when
Kai TreXs ovk dip ov8apov ov8apov ovk earip ottov it does see him, with that of it which is not Intellect.
25 p,7j earIP. eari pep ovp ovraial avrodep OavpAaai, It is really a wonder how he is present without
rep 8e ypopri, to ipaprlop eunep ^p, davpdaai' having come, and how, though he is nowhere, there
pdXXop Se ov8e 8vparop elpai, ipa ns Kal davpdai^.
is nowhere where he is not. One can, certainly, be
eyei Se tSSe-
surprised in this way at the first moment, but one
who knows would be surprised if the opposite was
9. TT&p ro yepopepop vtt dXXov ^ ev iKelpep iarl true; but, rather, the opposite eould not even happen
rep TTeTTOiriKon rj ip dXXep, etnep etrj n perd ro for one to be surprised at. For this is how it is;
TToiijaap avro- are yap yepopepop in' dXXov Kal 9. Everything which is brought into being by
npos rrjp yepeaip 8erj6ep dXXov, dXXov Selrat something else is either in that which made it or in
5 TTaPTayov' StOTrep /cat ev dXXep. Treef>vKep o5p rd another thing, if there is something after what made
pep varara ip roes npd avreXp vardrois, rd S’ it; for, in that it is brought into being by something
[ev TrpeoTots] ^ ev roes nporipois Kal dXXo ip dXXep, else and needed something else for its coming into
eeos els rd npeXrop dpyrp/ ov.^ ®PX’7 being, it needs something else at every point; and
prj8ep eyovaa npo avrrjs, ovk eyet ip orep dXXep- this is why it is also in something else. The last
and lowest things, therefore, are in the last of those
^ del. Page, Harder, B-T. before them, and these are in those prior to them,
® -rTpixnov dpx^v 6v coniecimns: irpatTov dpx^s Enn.*: npioTov and one thing is in another up to the First, which is
d-px^i ov Harder, H-S ^: irpo dpxijs Theiler: Trptorov lAflijy suspic.
de Stryoker. the Principle. But the Principle, since it has nothing
before it, has not anything else to be in; but since it
^ This passage is one of the most difficult in the Enneads first six chapters of the treatise On Time and Eternity III. 7.
to reconcile with the imposing descriptions of the changeless Plotinus here seems to be speaking directly from his own
eternity of Intellect which we find elsewhere, notably in the experience, without considering the metaphysical implications.
l8o l8l
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 5. INTELLIGIBLES NOT OUTSIDE INTELLECT

[ir] exovaa 8’ iv otw avTrj tu)v aXXwv ovrwv iv has nothing else to be in, and the other things are
in those which come before them, it encompasses all
10 TOLS •npo avTcov ra aAAa TrepieiXrjtjye -navTa avrq‘ the other things. But in encompassing them it is
nepiXa^ovaa 8e ovt eaKehaad-q ei? aina koX e^ei not dispersed into them and it possesses them
without being possessed. But certainly, if it posses­
ovK ixop,evr]. exovaa 817 Kal avTri ovk exopLevt] ovk
ses and is not itself possessed, there is nothing in
earIV ovov firj eariv el yap p,ri eariv, ovk exei. which it is not; for if it is not in anything, it does not
possess it. But if it is not possessed, it is not there.
8e Sk pvf] exerai, ovk eariv ware eari Kal ovk So it is there and not there; it is not there because
eari, rip piev ju.17 vepiexeadai ovk oSaa, rip 8’ it is not in the grasp of anything, but because it is
free from everything it is not prevented from being
16 elvai TTavros eXevOepa ovSapxiv KCvXvopievr] elvai.
anywhere. For if, on the other hand, it was pre­
el yap av KeKioXvrai, copiarai vrr dXXov, Kal rd vented, it would be limited by something else, and
what comes next would be without a share in it, and
e^e^ijs dpioipa avrov, Kal pieypi rovrov 6 Beos, Kal God would go just so far, and would not be indepen­
ovS' dv eri e(f>' avrov, dXXd dovXevcov rois per dent but a slave to the beings which come after him.
avrov. rd pev oSv ev rivi €Kei eariv, ov eariv The things, therefore, which are in something are
there where they are; but everything which is not
oaa 8e prj nov, ovk eariv ojrov prj. el ydp pr^ somewhere has nowhere where it is not. For if it
20 evBaSi, SijXov on dXXos avrov Kareyei ronos, Kal is not here, it is clear that another place contains it,
and it is here in something else, so that the “ not
evBaSl ev dXXip, ware tfievSos rd ov itov. el oSv somewhere ” is false. If therefore the “ not some­
dXrjdes rd ov ttov Kal tpevdos rd ttov, iva p^ ev where ” is true and the “ somewhere ” is false (so
that it may not be in something else), it will not be
dXXw, ovSevds dv arroararoi. el 8e prjSevds dno- absent from anything. But if it is not absent from
ararei ov ttov wv, Travraxov earai e<f>’ eavrov. anything and is not anywhere, it is everywhere
^ ^ i ^ fO/ \ » \
independent. And one part of it is not here and
oi;o€ yap to puev ri avrov coot, to 0€ coot* ov firjv another there: it is not even here as a whole; so
25 odd' oXov cdSl' ware oXov Travraxov ovSevd^ that it is everywhere as a whole; nothing possesses
it or does not possess it; that is, everything is
[evoj]^ exovros avrd ou8’ av prj exovros' exopevov possessed by it.^ Observe the universe also, that,
dpa drovovv. dpa 8e Kal rdv Koapov, on, eTrel 1 The starting-point of this discussion of the plaoelessness of
^he One is to be found in phrases of Plato’s Parmenides: cp.
' om. Q: del. Kirchhoff*. 138B5, 144B2, 131B.
182 183
 PLOTINUS; ENNEAD V. 5. INTELLIGIBLES NOT OUTSIDE INTELLECT
firjSet? Koafios TTpo avrov, ovk ev Koayiip avros since there is no universe before it, it is not itself in
oi38’ av ev roTTur rls yap tottos nplv Koap,ov a universe, nor again in place; for what place could
elvai; ra Se p-epr) dvTjpn^pieva els avrov Kai ev there be before a universe existed? But its parts
are dependent on it and in it. But Soul is not in the
30 eKelvtp. >pvy^ Se ovk ev eKelvco, dAA’ eKecvos ev universe, but the universe in it: for body is not the
avrfj' ovSe yap tottos to au>pa rfj i/tvyfj, dAAd soul’s place, but Soul is in Intellect and body in
4>vxh owpa he ev ^vyp, vovs he ev dXXip- Soul,^ and Intellect in something else; but there is
nothing other than this for it to be in; it is not, then,
rovTov 0€ ovK€Ti aAAo, IV av t)v ev avrco* ovk ev in anything; in this way therefore, it is nowhere.
OTCpovv dpa' ravTTj oSv ovhap'^. ttov offv ra Where then are the other things ? In it. It has not,
dXXa; ev avr&. ovre dpa d^ecrTrj/ce tcov dXXcvv then, gone away from all other things, nor is God
35 ovre avros ev avrots eartv ovhe eariv ovhev eyov himself in them, nor is there anything which possesses
the First, but it possesses everything. Therefore it
avTo, dAA’ avTo eyei ra Trdvra. hio Kai ravTT) is in this way also the Good of everything, because
dyadov tu>v vavrcov, on Kai eari Kai dv^p-n^rai all things have their being directed towards it and
TTavra els avrd dXXo dXXcvs. hid Kai dyaddirepa depend upon it, each in a different way.* Therefore
some things are better than others, because some
erepa erepcvv, on Kai pdXXov ovra erepa erepcvv. things have more existence than others.
10. ’AAAd ai) prj poi hi erepcvv avrd Spa' el he 10. But do not, I beg you, look at it through other
ixi]i tx^os* av toots*, OVK avro* aAA evvoet, rt av etry
things; otherwise you might see a trace of it, not
itself; but consider what this might be which it is
rovro, d eon AajSeiv e^’ eavrov ov Kadapdv possible to grasp as existing by itself, pure, mixed
ovhevi piyvvpevov pereyovrcov aTvavrcvv avrov with nothing, in which all things have a share,
6 prjhevds eyovros avrd- dAAo pev yap ovhev though nothing has it; for there is nothing else like
roiovrov, hei he n roiovrov elvai. rls av oSv rr\v
this, but there must be something hke this. Who,
then, could capture its power all together as a whole ?
hvvapiv avrov eXoi dpov Trdaav; el yap dpxvv For if one did capture it all together as a whole, why
TTaaav, rl dv ns avrov hia<f>epoi; Kara pepos dpa ; would one be different from it? Does one then
dAAd rrpoa^aXeis pev ddpocvs d TrpoojSdAAcov, oAov grasp it partially ? But when you concentrate on
it, you will do so totally, but you will not declare
OVK dtrayyeXeiS' el 8e prj, vovs vocvv ear], kciv
establish, again, the placeless omnipresence of the One.
* A remarkable example of the ease with which Plotinus
' That body is in soul is Platonic doctrine: cp. Plato interchanges masculine and neuter, “ personal ” and “ im­
Timaeus 36E. Plotinus here develops it powerfully to personal ” ways of speaking of the First Principle.
184
185
 PLOTINUS;' ENNEAD V. 5. INTELLIGIBLES NOT OUTSIDE INTELLECT

10 Tvxus, iKetvos ae ^ eK^ev^erai, [idXXov Se gv avrov. the whole: otherwise, you will be [only] Intellect
aAA orav [Ji€v opas, oAov pA€7T€' orav be vorjs, o n thinking, and, even if you attain, he will escape you,
av ixvTj^ovevarjg avrov, voei, on rdyadov— or rather you will escape him. But when you see
him, look at him as a whole; but when you think
yap ep,<j>povos xal voepas ainos Bvvapug d>v, d(j>' ov him, think whatever you remember about him, that
Cojrj Kal vovs o tL <re]> ^ ovatag Kal rov ovrog— he is the Good—for he is the productive power of
on €v—aTrXovv yap Kal npcbrov—on dpyq—an' thoughtful, intelligent life, from whom come life and
15 avrov yap ndvra- an' avrov Kiv-qaig rj npcurr]—oi5 intelligence and whatever there is of substance and
yap ® €v avrw—0,77’ avrov ordaig, on avrog p,rj being—that he is One—for he is simple and first—
that he is the Principle—for all things come from
eheZro- ov yap Kivelrai ovS earrjKev ovSe him: from him comes the first movement (for it is
yap elyev ovre iv (L arrjaerai ovre ev w Kivrjd'qae- not in him); from him comes rest, because he had
rai' nepl rL yap ^ npog ri 7) iv rivi; npatrog yap no need of rest; for “ he does not move, nor does he
avrog. dXX' ovhe nenepaapievog [civat]'^ vno stand still ” i; for he has no place to stand still in
20 rtvog yap; dXX' ov8' dneipog dig pLeyedog" nov and no place to move in: for round what or to what
or in what [should he move] ? For he is the First.
yap eSei npoeXdetv ® avrov rj Lva rL yevrjrai avrw
But he is not limited: for by what? But he is not
ovBevog Seop.ivcp; ro 8’ dneipov fj ® Svvapug unlimited like a magnitude either; for where should
oil yap dXXuig nore ovS' iniXeitjiei, onov koI rd pA; he proceed to, or what should he intend to gain when
iniXeLnovra Si avrov. he lacks nothing ? But he has infinity in the sense
11. Kat TO dneipov rovrcp np prj nXeov evog of power; for he will never be otherwise, or fail,
eivai prjSe eyeiv npog o opiei ri rwv iavrov- rip since the things which do not fail exist through him.
yap ev eivai ov peperprjrai ovS' eig dpiOpov rjKei. II. And this has infinity by not being more than
one, and because there is nothing in which anything
ovr oSv npog aXXo ovre npog avro nenepavrai'
belonging to it will find its limit; for by being one
5 €7ret ovrwg dv e'Lrj Kal Svo. ovSe ayripa roLvvv, it is not measured and does not come within range
on prjSe piprj, oiiSe papifi-q. prj roLvvv C'^rei of number. It is therefore not limited in relation to
dvrjroig oppaai rovro, otdv (fyrjaiv 6 Xoyog, prjS' itself or to anything else: since if it was it would
be two. It has no shape, then, because it has no
^ Muller*: eKelvos 8e wBxUC, H-S e/cetvo de z.
parts, and no form. Do not, then, seek to see with
“ o tI (et quidquid) coniecimus: on Enn.*: in Theiler. mortal eyes this as our account describes it, nor to
® ou yap Harder: ovk Enn.
■' del. Beutler. ' The One’s transcendence of the “ Platonic Categories ”
* z, Kirchhoff*: irpooeXSeiv wBxUC, H-S *. of Intellect (cp. Plato Sophist 254D5) is expressed in the
® Harder, B-T: -q Enn. language of the first hypothesis of the Parmenides (139B3).
186 187
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 5. INTELLIGIBLES NOT OUTSIDE INTELLECT

on OVTCOS iarlv ISetv, c5? av ns d^icooeie ndvra see that it is in the way in which someone would
atadrjrd ^ etvai viroXa[j,pdva}v to [jAXiara
expect it to be who assumes that all things are
perceived by the senses, by which supposition he
Trdvrcov dvaipeZ. a yap rjyetral res elvai pAXiara, eliminates that which is most real of all. For the
10 ravra pedXiara ovk eon- rd Se pUya ^rrov eon. things which one thinks are most real, are least
TO Se rrpwrov dpyrj rov elvai Kal Kvpidrepov ai real; and the [materially] large has less genuine
rrjs ovaias' iLore avnarperTreov rrjv Sd^av el Se existence. But the First is the principle of existence
p.y, KaraXeXei^JTj eprjpios 6eov, olov oi ev rais and, again, more authentic than substantial reality.
So reverse your way of thinking, or you will be left
iopraZs vtto yaarpipiapyias trXijoavTes' eavrovs, deprived of God, like the people at festivals who by
ct)v ov 9ep,is Xa^eZv rovs etaiovras irpos roiis Oeovs their gluttony stuff themselves with things which it
15 vopLiaavres pidXXov eKeZva evapyeorepa elvai rrjs is not lawful for those going in to the gods to take,
6eas rov 6eov, <L eoprd^eiv TrpoorjKei, ov p.ereoyov thinking that these are more obviously real than
rdiv eKeZ iepS>v. Kal yap ev rovrois roZs iepoZs 6 the vision of the god for whom they ought to be
celebrating the festival, and take no part in the rites
9eos ovy opwpievos dmareZoBai -rroieZ d)s ovk u>v
within. Yes, in these our rites also the god, since
ToZs evapyes vopi^ovai piovov, o rfj oapKi povov he is not seen, creates disbelief in his existence in
iSoiev olov ei rives Sid ^Lov Koipwpevoi ravra pev those who think that that alone is obviously real
20 TTiard Kal evapyrj vopi^oiev rd ev roZs dveipaaiv, ei which they see only with the flesh; as if people who
Si ns avrovs e^eyelpeiev, dmoryoavres roZs Sid slept through their life thought the things in their
rdiv 6<f)6aXpxdv dveepyorojv d<f>9eZai ndXiv KaraSap- dreams were reliable and obvious, but, if someone
Bdvoiev. woke them up, disbelieved in what they saw with
12. 8e ^Xeireiv a! eKaara SeZ aloOdveadai, their eyes open and went to sleep again.
12. One must perceive each thing by the appro­
o<f>9aXpoZs pev dXXa, <hol Se erepa, Kal rd dXXa priate organ, some things with the eyes, others with
cuoavnvs' Kal rip vip mareveiv dXXa opdv, Kal the ears, and so on. * One must believe, also, that
prj rd voeZv aKoveiv vopi^eiv ^ opdv, wa-nep dv el one sees other things with the intellect, and not think
5 roZs cdolv emrdrroiev ^Xeireiv, Kal rds <f>covds ovk that intellectual perception is seeing or hearing,
elvai, on prj dpdivrai. yprj 8e ewoeZv, d>s eloiv which would be like insisting that the ears should see
emXeXrjopevoi, ov Kal e^ dpxfjs els vvv ttoBovoi Kal and that sounds do not exist because they are not
eif>ievrai avrov. rrdvra ydp dpeyerai eKeivov Kal visible. And we must consider that men have for­
gotten that which from the beginning until now
e<f>ierai avrov <j>vaeojs dvdyKTj, woTrep dnopepav- they want and long for. For all things reach out
‘ Igal.
to that and long for it by necessity of nature, as if
189
l88
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 5. INTELLIGIBLES NOT OUTSIDE INTELLECT

rev[leva, cor dvev avrov ov Svvarai etvai.^ Kai rov divining by instinct that they cannot exist without
10 [lev KoXov 7[St] oXov elSoai /cat eyprjyopoaiv r[ it. The grasp of the beautiful and the wonder and
the waking of love for it come to those who, in a
avriXriiliis /cat to dd[i^os, /cat rov epcvros rj way, already know it and are awake to it. But the
eyepais' to S’ dya96v, are TrdAat irapov els e<f>emv Good, since it was there long before to arouse an
cnip^vrov, /cat KOL[iw[ievois Trapeari Koi ov dap^el innate desire, is present even to those asleep and
TTore iSovras, on avveanv del Kai ovnore ij does not astonish those who at any time see it,
because it is always there and there is never recol­
dvdpvTjais' ov prjv 6pu>aiv avro, on Koipcopevois lection of it; but people do not see it, because it is
15 TrapeoTt. rov Se KaXov 6 epojs, drav Trapfj, present to them in their sleep. But the passionate
dSvvas StScoCTiv, on Set iSdvras e<f>ieo9ai. Sevrepos love of beauty, when it comes, causes pain, because
U)V oSros 6 epojs Kai ■^Sij avvievrcvv paXXov Sevrepov one must have seen it to desire it. Beauty is shown
to be secondary because this passionate love for it
prjvvei TO KaXov elvar Se dpyaiorepa rovrov
is secondary and is felt by those who are already
Kai dvala9r[ros e<j>eat,s dpyaiorepov Kai conscious. But the more ancient, unperceived de­
rdya96v etvai Kai nporepov rovrov. Kai otovrai Se sire of the Good proclaims that the Good itself is
20 rdya96v Xa^ovres dpKeiv avroZs dtravres' els yap more ancient and prior to beauty. All men think
rd reXos d^Zy9ai- to Se KaXov ovre irdvres etdov that when they have attained the Good it is sufficient
for them: for they have reached their end. But
yevopevov [to] ^ re KaXov avrw oiovrai etvai, dXX'
not all see beauty, and when it has come into
ovK avroZs, ota Kai to rfjSe KaXXos" rov yap existence they think it is beautiful for itself and not
eyovros rd KaXXos etvai. Kai KaXoZs etvai doKeZv for them; this appUes also to beauty here: it belongs
dpKeZ, Koiv prj coat" to S’ dya9dv ov Sd^jj e9eXovaiv to the one who has it. And it is enough for people
26 eyeiv. dvrnroiovvrai yd.p pAXiara rov Trpcdrov to seem to be beautiful, even if they are not really;
Kai ^iXoveiKOvai /cat epl^ovai np KaXip, tor /cat but they do not want to have the Good in seeming
only.i Then they dispute the first place with beauty
avr(p yeyovdri (Lanep avroL- otov et ns vcrrepos and wrangle contentiously with it, considering that it
(X770 ^aaiXeios r^ perd, ^aaiXea els di^lcvaiv larjv has come into being like themselves. It is as if
^ovXoiro levai, cos dj>' evds /cat rov avrov eKeivcp someone who holds the lowest rank at court were to
yeyevrjpevos, dyvocdv cos dvqprrjrai pev Kai avrds want to attain equal honour with the man who
stands next to the king, on the ground that they
‘ (es«e ricinus)R>i">eQP<!L»«, Creuzer*: elScvai wBx both derive from one and the same source; he does
UCQ“LP», Pema, H-S \
^ del. Theiler: to et koXov del. Muller*.
' Cp. Plato Republic 505D.
190 191
 1,

PLOTINUS; ENNEAD V. 6. INTELLIGIBLES NOT OUTSIDE • INTELLECT

30 els PaaiXea, eari Se eKetvos Ttpo aiiTov. oAA’ oSv 77 not realise that though he too depends on the king i
T7JS 'TtXo.VTJS CUTta TO fMCTe^eiV <xpi(j>0) TOV aUTOU KO.I the other ranks before him. The cause of the error
Trporepov to ev dfi<f>oTepcuv elvai, Kal on KOKet to is that both participate in the same and the One is
p.kv dyadov avro ov Secrai rov koXov, to 8e before both, and that in the higher world also the
KaXov €K€ivov. Kal eon 8e ro p,ev TjTuov Kal -npoa- Good itself does not need beauty, though beauty
r)ves Kal d^porepov Kal, chs eOeXet ns, irapov needs it. The Good is gentle and kindly and gra- 8
cious, and present to anyone when he wishes. !
35 avrw- to Se dap-^os eyei Kal eKnXrj^iv Kal Beauty brings wonder and shock and pleasure min- J
avppiyfj rep dXyvvovn rriv rjhovrjv. Kal yap aS gled with pain. It even draws those who do not [
Kal eXKei drro rov dyadov rovs ovk elSoras, ojairep know what is happening away from the Good, as |
avo varpos ro epeLpevov vewrepov yap- ro Se the beloved draws a child away from its father; for
TTpea^vrepov ov xpovip, dXXd rep dXyjOeZ, o Kal rrjv Beauty is younger.^ But the Good is older, not in
Svvapiv •nporepav eyei- Traaav yap eyee- ro yap time but in truth, and has the prior power; for it j
has all power; that which comes after it has not all |
40 per avro ov 'ndaav, aAA oar] per’ avrov Kal djr’
power, but as much as can come after it and derive j
avrov. eoare eKetvos Kal ravrrjs Kvpios, ov from it. The Good then is master also of this de- i
Serjdels oSros reov ef avrov yevopevevv, dXXd nav rived power. He does not need the things which a
Kae oAot' a^ees ro y^vopevov, on pTj eSetro prjBkv have come into being from him, but leaves what has
avrov, aAA eanv 6 avros, oios Kal Trplv rovro come into being altogether alone, because he needs
yewfjerae. evel ov8’ dv epeXrjerev avrep prj yevo- nothing of it, but is the same as he was before he
45 pevov eiree ovS et aXXep 8vvardv yeveadai e^ ^ brought it into being. He would not have cared if
avrov, eef)96v7]aev dv vvv Se ovk eanv ovSev it had not come into being; and if anything else
yeveadai- ov8ev yap eanv o prj ye'yove yevopevevv could have been derived from him he would not have
' grudged it existence; but as it is, it is not possible
ru>v TTavreov. avros Se ovk rjv rd rrdvra, tv’ dv ^ for anything else to come into being; all things
eherjdrj avreuv, vnep^e^rjKevs Se Ta rrdvra otos re have come into being and there is nothing left. He
Tjv Kai rroietv avrd Kal eef>' eavrevv eaaai etvai was not all things; if he was he would have needed
60 avros vrrep avreuv euv. them; but since he transcends all things he can
make them and let them exist by themselves while
he remains above them.
’■ For a full discussion of this remarkable account of how light or grace which plays upon it from the Good is totally
intelligible beauty can distract us from the Good and an } unattractive, see my “ Beauty and the Discovery of Divinity
attempted reconciliation of it with the equally remarkable [ in the Thought of Plotinus ” in Kephalaion: Studies in Greek
VI. 7. 22, in which intelligible beauty considered without the I Philosophy . . . offered to G. J. de Vogel (Assen 1976) 160—62.
192
193 I
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 5. INTELLIGIBLES NOT OUTSIDE INTELLECT

13. ESei Se Kal rdydOov avTov ovra /cat fj/rj 13. But since he is the Good and not a good, he
ayaOov /j/rj eydy ev avTw fjLt^Sev, inel fiTjSe must have nothing in himself, since he does not even
have good in himself. Eor what he will have is
ayaOov. o yap e^ei, rj dya66v e^et rj ovk dyadov either good or not good; but that which is not good
aAA owre ev rep ayad(p t(u Kvplios /cat irpayTios cannot be in the Good, the authentically and pri­
5 dyadw to pr] dyadov, oiSre to dyadov eyet to marily Good, nor does the Good have the good. If
ayadov. et odv p/ffre to ovk dyadov to
then he does not have what is not good or what is
good, he has nothing. If then he has nothing
ayadov eyei, ovSev eyet. el oSv ”ov8ev eyet,” he is “ alone and isolated ^ from all other things.
povov /cat eprjpov twv dAAcov eoTUv. el oSv If then the other things are either goods, but not the
Ta aXXa tj ayada eari Kal ov Tdyaddv ^ ovk Good, or not goods, and he has neither of these, he
dyadd eariv, ovBerepa Se tovtojv eyet, ouSev has nothing and is the Good by having nothing.
But then if anyone adds anything at all to him, sub­
eycov Tw prjSev eyetv earl ro dyadov. el S’ dpa ns stance or intellect or beauty, he will deprive him
10 dnovv avT(p TTpoarld-qaiv, ^ ovalav rj vovv rj of being the Good by the addition. If then one
KaXov, TT] TTpoodijKrj d(f>aipeXTai avrov rdyadov takes away everything and says nothing about him
and does not say falsely about anything that it is
etvat. rravra apa a^eXcov Kal ovSev rrepl avrov
with him, he allows him his “ existence ” without
eirrdjv ovSe n ipevadpevos, dis eon Trap’ avT<p, attributing to him anything which is not there, as
eiaae to eanv ovSev KarapaprvpTjoas tcov ov those do who compose inartistic panegyrics, and
TTapovTOjv, oTov ot prj emaTrjprj tovs enalvovs diminish the reputation of those who are being praised
by adding matters inferior to their worth, since they
15 TTOLovpevoi, OL eXarrovat rrjv tcov erraivovpevojv are incapable of making true speeches about their
So^av rrpoondevTes avroXs a rijs d^las avTwv eanv subjects. We also, then, must not add any of the
eXaTTOi, d-TTopovvTes dXrjdets elrreiv rrepl tcov things which are later and lesser, but say that he
VTTOKecpe'vojv rrpocjcoTTCov tovs Xoyovs. Kal odv Kal moves above them and is their cause, but not that
he is them. For, again, it is the nature of the Good
Tjpels prjSev tcov varepcov Kal tcov eXarrovcov not to be all things and not to be any one of them;
rrpoandcopev, aXX’ cos vrrep ravra tcov e/cetvo? for [if he were] he would come under one and the
20 TOVTCov acTLos rj, aXXa prj avTOS ravra. /cat yap same classification as all of them, and if he came
av cf>vais dyadov ov rravra etvat ovS' av ev n tcov under the same classification, he would differ only
rravTCov ecrj yap av vrrd ev Kal ravrov rots
1 Again the inappropriate reference to Philebus 63B7-8.
arraaiv, vrro Se ravrov ov toTs rraai Siacfrepoi dv rco See V. 3. 10, note 2.
194 19s
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 5. INTELLIGIBLES NOT OUTSIDE INTELLECT
iBup fJ,OVOV K<Xi ^l<X(j>OpCl KCU TTpocrB'^K'Q, €<7TCtt
by his individuality and specific difference and some
Toivvv 8vo, ovx ev, tSv to p,ev ovk dyadov, to added attribute. Then he would be two and not
25 Koivov, TO 8e ayaOov. pLiKTOV dpa. eoTai one, and one of the two, what was common to him
dyaOov Kdi OVK o.yo.0ov' ovk dpa KaOapdj^ and the others, would be not good, and one would
ayadov ovSe TrpcoTcos, aAA* cKeivo ay eirj TrpdiTOis, good; he would, then, not be purely and primarily
good, but that would be by participating in which,
ov p,€reyov napd to koivov yeydvrjTaL ayadov.
over and above what was in common, he became
p-eraX-qtl/ei p.kv §17 avro ayadov oS Se pLereXa^ev,
good. So the nature of the Good would be good by
ovSev Twv TTavTcvv [oj5Sev> dpa tcov Travroiv to participation; and what it participated in would not
30 ayadov].^ dXX’ el iv avrai rovro to ayadov—Sia- be any one of all things. But if this Good was in
^opd yap, Kad' rjv tovto to avvderov ^v ayadov— the composite thing—^for it would be the specific
8eZ avT(p Trap' dXXov etvai. ^v Se avTo aTrXovv Kai difference by which the composite was good—it
povov ayadov ttoAAw apa to d<j> o5 p.6vov ayadov. would have to derive from something else. But it
TO apa TTpuiTCos Kal Tayadov virip t€ •ndvra t(x was simply and solely good; so, much more, that
ovTa avaTT€<f)avTai rjpZv Kal /xovov ayadov Kal from which it derived was good. That which is
36 ovSev eyov ev eavTcp, aAAd dp,iyes TrdvTCov Kal primary and the Good has therefore been revealed
VTTep TTavra Kal atriov t&v Travrcvv. ov yap Sij e/c
to us as above all realities, and only good, and
having nothing in itself, but unmixed with all things
KaKov TO KaXov ov8e Ta ovra ov8* ad e^ d8ia^6po)v.
and above all things and cause of all things. For
KpevTTOv yap to ttoiovv tov TTOiovp.evov TeXeioTe- the beautiful and the real beings certainly do not
pov yap. come from the bad, or from things indifferent. For
^ del. Theiler, ut glossam. the maker is better than what is made, because more
complete.

196
ENNEAD V. 6
 WHAT IS BEYOND BEING DOES NOT THINK
Synopsis
The difference between thinking something else and
thinking oneself: the latter is more of a unity, though still
a unity-in-duality (ch. 1). Reasons why before this self­
V. 6. ON THE FACT THAT THAT WHICH IS thinking unity-in-duality there must be a pure unity,
BEYOND BEING DOES NOT THINK, AND ON which because it is simply one does not think (ch. 2).
WHAT IS THE PRIMARY AND WHAT THE There must be something absolutely simple before any
SECONDARY THINKING PRINCIPLE one-in-many or whole of parts (ch. 3). Further reasons
why there must be the Good before Intellect: comparison
of Good, Intellect and Soul to light, the sun and the moon
Introductory Note (oh. 4). The Good does not think itself because thought
This treatise, the twenty-fourth in Porphyry’s chrono­
is always a movement of something else towards the Good
logical order, immediately follows in that order the great in which the thinker is established in being and attains
work VI. 4-5 (22-3): On the Reason why Being is every­ self-knowledge (oh. 6). The Good is pure actuality with­
where all present. One and the Same. In this Plotinus had
out any secondary activity; the essential multiplicity of
laid less emphasis than he did anywhere else in the Enneads the Second Hypostasis, at once being, living and thinking,
on the distinctions between his three hypostases, and had which the Good transcends and is beyond thinking as he
allowed the First, the One beyond Being, to fall very is beyond being; his gift to all others is not an impossible
much into the background. In the present treatise he knowledge of him, but to be with him, who is their Good,
seems eonoemed to make clear that the distinctions and to grasp him as far as they can (oh. 6).
between the hypostases were still real and important to
him, and in particular to insist on the sharp differentiation
of the First Principle, the One which does not thint-, from
the Second Hypostasis, the living Intellect which forms a
unity-in-duality with Being. He knew this to be one of
the most controversial parts of his philosophy, and argues
his position here, as he often does elsewhere in the Enneads,
against both Aristotle and his followers and those Platon-
ists who had made the First Principle a transcendent
Intellect. The Third Hypostasis, Soul, is mentioned
rather incidentally, and only to help his readers to see
how the primary thinking of Intellect, from which the
unthinking perfection of the One is to be distinguished,
differs from the secondary thinking of human minds in
their normal state.

200 201
 V. 6. (24) nEPI TOT TO EHEKEINA V. 6. ON THE FACT THAT THAT WHICH
TOT 0NT02 MH NOEIN KAI TI TO IS BEYOND BEING DOES NOT THINK,
nPQTOS NOOTN KAI TI TO AND ON WHAT IS THE PRIMARY
AETTEPQS AND WHAT THE SECONDARY
THINKING PRINCIPLE
1. To fji€v eoTi voeZv aXXo dXXo, ro Se avTO avTO,
1. There is a difference between one thing thinking
o rjSrj (f>€vyei fiaXXov to. 8uo elvai. to Se •nporepov
another and something thinking itself; the latter
Xeydev jSooAerat Kal avro, dXX’ ^ttov Svyarar trap' goes further towards escaping being two. The
former wants to escape being two and think itself,
avTCp p,ev yap eyei o opa, erepov ye p.rjv ov eKelvov.
but is less capable of it; for it has what it sees with
5 TO Se ov Kexdipiarai Trj ovala, dXXd avvov avr(p itself, but none the less it is different from it. But
opa eavTO. dp,cf>oj ovv ylverai ev ov. piaiXXov ovv
the latter is not substantially distinct [from its object],
but keeps company with itself and so sees itself. It
voeZ, OTi exei, Kal TTpdjrcos voeX, on to voovv Set becomes a pair, therefore, while remaining one. It
thinks more genuinely, therefore, and thinks pri­
ev Kal Svo eivac. ecre yap p,rj ev, dXXo to voovv,
marily, because the thinking principle must be one
dXXo TO voovp,evov eoTai—ovk dv oSv •npcvTOis and two. For if it is not one, that which thinks and
that which is thought will be different^—it would not
voovv eiT), on dXXov Trjv vorjaiv Xap-^dvov ov to
therefore be the primary thinker, because if the
10 TTpd)Tcx)s voovv eaTai, on o voeX ovk eyei cos avTov, thought it had was of something else it will not be
the primary thinker because it does not have what
diOTe ovS' avTo- ^ el eyei (os avTO, iva Kvplcvs vofj, it thinks as [thought] of itself, so that it does not
TO. Svo ev ecrrai" SeX dpa ev elvai dpafico—elVe ev piev, think itself; or if it has what it thinks as itself, so
that it may think authentically, the two will be one:
p,rj Svo §6 aS earai, o n voiqaei ovy e^ei' wore it must therefore be one and a pair—but if it is, on
ovSe voovv eoTai. dvXovv dpa Kal ovy aTrXovv SeX the other hand, one and not two, it will have nothing
to think: so that it will not even be a thinking prin­
elvai. fjidXXov S’ dv tls ovto toiovtov ov eXoi and ciple. It must, then, be simple and not simple.
202 203
 PLOTINUS; ENNEAD V. 6. WHAT IS BEYOND BEING DOES NOT THINK

16 rfjs ^vxfjs ava^aLvtav ivravda yap hiaipelv pd8iov, One could get a better idea of its being like this if
one made the ascent from soul; for in soul it is easy
Kol paov dv ns to SittXovv iSot. el oSv ns SittAow
to make the distinction, and one could see the
<f>dis TTOiT^aeie, -rrjv pev tfwxriv Kara to ^ttov, to he doubleness more easily. If then one were to imagine
a double light, the soul as lesser and that which it
voTjTov avT^s Kara to KaOapayrepov, elra •noii^aeie thinks as purer light, and then imagine that the
Kal TO 6pu)v Xaov etvai <j)6js T<p opcopevcp, ovk seeing light is equal to the seen, one would not be
able any more to separate them by the difference
20 eycDv en ycopl^eiv Trj hia<f>opa ev to, hvo OrjaeTai [in quality] and would suppose the two to be one,
vod)v pev, on hvo ijv, opcov 8e ijSij ev ovtoj vovv
thinking that they were two, but seeing them as
one; in this way one will grasp Intellect and its
Kal VOTJTOV aip^aei. ripeis pev oSv tw Xoycp eK object. Now we in our discourse have made one
out of two; but [in reality] the reverse is true and
hvo ev TTenoirjKapev, to 8’ dvdvaXiv ef evos ion two came from one, making itself two because it
hvo, on voel, TTOiovv avro hvo, pdXXov 8e dv, on thinks, or, better, because it thinks it is two and
because it thinks itself, one.
voel, hvo, Kal on avro, ev. 2. If then one is the primary thinking principle,
2. Ei 8ij TO jLiev irpcvTCJS voovv, to he rjhr] dXXcos and the other is already thinking in a different way,
that which is beyond the primary thinking principle
voovv, TO eneKeiva tov iTpcoTOJs voovvros ovk dv will no longer think; for in order to think it would
en vooc- vovv yap het yeveaOai, tva vo^, ovra he have to become intellect, and if it was intellect it
would have to have an object of thought, and if it
vovv Kal VOTJTOV eyeiv Kal npanojs voovvra eyeiv to was thinking in the primary sense it would have to
have its object in itself. But it is not necessary for
6 vorprov ev avrw. vorjTov 8e ov ovk dvdyK-q vav Kal everything which is an object of thought to have a
voovv ev avT<p eyeiv Kal voeiv earai yap ov povov thinking principle in itself and to think: for [then]
it will be not only an object of thought but a thinker,
vorp-ov, oAAd Kol voovv, irpcorov Te ovk eorai hvo and, since it is two, will not be the first. And the
dv. d Te vovs d to vorjTov eyojv ovk dv avaraa] prj intellect which has the object of thought would not
exist if there was not a reality which is pure object
ovcrqs ovalas Kadapats votjtou, o npos' pev tov vovv of thought; it will be an object of thought to the
VOTJTOV eoTai, Kad’ eavro he ovre voovv ovre votjtov
intellect, but in itself it will be neither thinker nor
object of thought in the proper, authentic sense;
10 Kvptojs eoTar to Te yap vorjTOV eTepw o Te vovs to for the object of thought is object for something else,
204 205
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 6. WHAT IS BEYOND BEING DOES NOT THINK

€TTi^dXXov rfj vo-qaei Kevov e^ei dvev rov AajSetv Kal and the intellect has its intellectual effort empty of
content if it does not grasp and comprehend the
eAeiv TO vorjTov o voeZ' ov yap eyei ro voeiv dvev object which it thinks; for it does not have thinking
rov vorjTov. rare oSv reXeov, orav eyr]; eSei Se without its object of thought. Is [the One], then,
TTpo rov voeiv reXeov etvai Trap’ avrov ri]s ovalas. perfect when it has it ? But it must, before thinking,
have a perfection derived from its own reality.
16 S dpa TO reXeov vTidp^ei, -npo rov voeiv rovro earai' That, then, to which perfection belongs will exist
ovSev dpa 8el avrcp rov voeiv avrdpKTjs yap rrpo before thinking; it will therefore have no need of
thinking; for he is sufficient to himself before this;
rovrov ovk dpa vo'qcrei. ro p,ev dpa ov voel, ro so he will not think. This, then, does not think,
8e TTpair(OS voel, to 8e votjaei 8evrep(os. eri el voiq- and the other is the primary thinking principle, and
another again will think in a secondary way.^ Again,
aei ro Trpcorov, VTidp^ei ri avr(p‘ ovk dpa Trpcorov, if the First thinks, something will belong to it; it
dXXa Kal 8evrepov Kal ovx ev, dAAa iroAAd 7j8rj Kal will then not be the First, but second, and not one,
but already many things, that is all the things which
20 vavra oaa vo^oer Kal yap, el p.6vov eavrov, ttoXXo. it thinks; for even if it only thinks itself it will be
earai. many.
3. But if people are going to say that nothing
3. Ei Se 770AAd TO avro ov8ev KcoXveiv (jyqcrovaiv, prevents one and the same thing from being many,
ev rovrois vnoKelp-evov earac ov 8vvarai yap ttoX- there will be a one underlying these many; for
there can be no many if there is not a one from which
Aa fj/q €Vo$ ovros, CL<f> ov q €v to, q oAios €VOS Kat or in which these are, or in general a one, and a
rovrov Trpcorov rcbv dXXcov dpidp,ovp,evov, o avro one which is counted first before the others, which
must be taken alone, itself by itself. But if it was
5 6<^’ eavrov 8el Xa^elv fiovov. el 8e 6p,ov eXt] p,erd together with the others, since it was taken with
rCov oAAcov, 8el rovro avXXa^ovra avro p,erd rcov the others but all the same was different from the
others, we should have to let it go because it was
dXXcov, opuos 8e erepov rcov oAAwv ov, edv cos p,er with the others and look for what underlies the others
dXXcov, CtjtcIv §€ rovro ro viroKelpcevov rols dXXois and is no longer with the others, but itself by itself.
For that one and the same which was in the others
p/r]Keri [lerd rcov dXXcov, dXXd avro Kad' eavro. ro would be like this One by itself, but would not be it.
yap ev rols dXXois avro opcotov pcev dv elrj rovrcp,
1 The other which thinks in a secondary way is Soul, the
10 OVK dv 8e eXrj rovro. dXXd 8el avro pdvov elvai, el primary thinking principle Intellect: cp. the end of ch. 1.
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 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 6. WHAT IS BEYOND BEING DOES NOT THINK
[ji4X\ot KoX iv oAAot? opaadai' el p/q ns avrov But it must be alone by itself if it is also to be seen
Xeyoi TO elvai aw rois aAXois rqv VTroaraaiv exeiv in other things; unless someone is going to say that
ovK dpa aTrXovv aino earai, ovSe to avyKelpevov 4k its being depends on its co-existence with other
■7T0|i\Awv earai' to re yap ov hwdpevov aTrXovv things; it will not then be simple, and the composite
etvai vnoaraaiv ovx 4^€i, ro re oxjyKelpievov 4k of many parts will not exist either; for that which
16 TToAAdiv daXov ovk ovros ov8’ avro earai. is unable to be simple will have no existence, and
the composite of many parts will not exist itself if
eKaarov yap wnXov ov Swapevov etvai ovx ^ the simple does not. For if each and every simple
vtftearTjKoros rivos ivos dnXov v<f>’ eavrov [to thing cannot exist, since there is no simple one
ovyKelpevov 4k -ttoXXwv^,^ ovSevos avrcHv vnoaraaiv coming into existence by its own agency, and no
ex^iv Kad’ eavTo [ov] * Swapevov ovSe napexeiv one of the parts is able to have existence by itself,
avro per’ dXXov etvai rip oXcos pr/ etvai, nws or to give itself to be with another because it does
20 dv ro (^ovyKeip.evov 4k noXXcovy ® 4k ndvnov evq not exist at all, how then could the composite of
avvderov 4k prj ovrcov yeyevrjpevov, ov ri pr\ dvrcov, many parts be a compound of all [these parts] which
has come into being from non-existent things—not
dXX’ oXoJS pq ovrcov; el dpa noXXd rl 4ari, 8ei from things that are not something particular, but
npo rcov noXXcov ev etvai. el oSv rw voovvri from things that do not exist at all ? If, then, some­
nXijOos, 8ei 4v rip (.p'^y * nXrfiei ro voeiv pq thing is many, there must be a on^ before the many.
etvai. •^v 8e rovro ro npdorov. 4v rois varepois If, therefore, there is multiphcity in the thinking
26 dpa avrov ro voeiv Kai vovs earai. principle, there cannot be thinking in what is not a
4. 'Eti el ro dyadov dnXovv Kai dvev8ees 8ei multiplicity. But this is the First. Thinking and
etvai, ov8’ dv rov voeiv 8eoiro' oS 8e pq Sei avrw, Intellect, then, will be in what comes after.
4. Again, if the Good must be simple and without
ov napearai avr^, 4nei Kai oXcos ov8ev ndpeariv need, it will not need thinking; but what it has no
avrip' OVK dpa ndpeariv avrip ro voeiv. Kai voei ® need of will not be present with it: since nothing at
6 ov8ev, on pr}8e dXXo. eri dXXo vovs rov dyadov' all is present with it, thinking is not present with it.
dyadoei8qs yap rip ro dyadov voeiv. eri cos 4v And it thinks nothing, because it does not need
rots 8vaiv dvros ivos Kai dXXov ovy otdv re rovro ro anything else. Again, Intellect is something other
€V TO fJL€T OAAOV TO €V €LVat., aAA €0€l €V €<f> €aU-
than the Good; for it has the form of the Good by
rov npo rov per dXXov etvai, ovrco 8ei Kol 4v <L thinking the Good. Again, just as in the number
two there is a one and another, and it is not possible
1 Kirchhoff*: o<58’ Enn. » del. Kirchhoff*. for this one with another to be the number one, but
’ Igal. ‘ (= Ficinus); om. Enn. it is necessary for there to be a one by itself before
* Volkmann*: et Enn. the one with another; in the same way it is necessary
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 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 6. WHAT IS BEYOND BEING DOES NOT THINK
fier’ dAAou to cwirdp^ov ^ aTrXovv, Kad' avro that, when a thing has immanent in it something
10 rovTo ottAow elvai, ovk exov ovSev iv iaxno) rd>v simple along with something else, the simple thing
o<ja ev TU) per dXXwv. •nodev yap ev dXXcp dAAo, should be simple in and by itself, having nothing in
itself of all that it has in its association with other
p/q ■nporepov ovros d<l>’ oS to oAAo; to pev things. For what could make it something else in
ydp dTrXovv ovk av rrap' dAAou eiq, o 8’ dv ttoXv something different, if there was not something
D 7) 8vo, Set avTo dvqprfjaOat, sis dXXo. before it from which this something else comes ?
Kat o3v aTTSiKaaTeov ro pkv (fxvrl, to Se e<f>€^7js For the simple could not derive from something else,
16 TjXup, TO 8e rpirov rep aeXqvqs darpep Kopi^opevw but that which is many, or two, must itself depend
TO <f>cos Trap’ qXLov. if/vxri jttev ydp e-iraKrov vovv on something else. The First, then, should be
compared to light, the next, to the sun, and the
eyei imxpcuwvvra avrrjv vospdv oSaav, vovs S’ ev
third, to the celestial body of the moon, which gets
avT(p oiKeiov eyei ov <j>(ds d)v povov, dAA’ d eerrt its light from the sun. For Soul has intellect as an
■ne^oiTiopevov ev rf) avTov ovaia, to Se napexov external addition which colours it when it is intellec­
20 TOVTcp TO <f>cvs OVK dXXo ov <f>cds eoTiv dnXovv irap- tual, but Intellect has it in itself as its own, and is
exov TTjv Svvapiv SKelvcp tov elvai o eoTi. tL dv oSv
not only light but that which is enlightened in its
own being; and that which gives it light is nothing
avTo SeocTO tivoj; ov ydp avTO to avTo tw ev
else but is simple light giving Intellect the power to
dXX(p- dXXo ydp TO ev dXXcp eo’Tt tov avro Kad’ be what it is. Why then would it have need of any­
avTo dvTos. thing? For it is not the same as that which is in
5. “Eti to ttoAu ^qTol dv iavrd Kal eOeXoi dv something else: for. that which is in something else
crvvveveiv Kal avvaiaOdveadai avTOV. o S’ earl is different from that which is in and by itself.
5. And again, the multiple might seek itself and
Trdvrq ev, ttov ;^wpijaeTai irpds avTo; nov S’ dv
wish to converge on and be conscious of itself. But
SeoiTO ovvaiaOqaecvs ; dAA’ eort to avTO Kal crvvaia- by what way will that which is altogether one go to
6 dqaeojs Kal vdaqs KpetTTOv vorjaecos. to ydp voelv itself? At what point will it need self-consciousness ?
ov 7Tpu>TOV ovre Tip etvai ovre Tip Tipiov etvai, But it is one and the same thing which is better than
aXXd SevTepov Kal yevopevov, eTreiSq virearq to self-consciousness and better than all thinking. For
ayadov Kal '(to]> ^ yevopevov eKwqae Trpds avTO, thinking does not come first either in reality or in
TO S’ eKivTfdq Te Kal elSe. Kal tovto eoTi voeiv, value, but is second and is what has come into being
when the Good [already] existed and moved what
Kivqais Trpds dyaddv e(j)iepevov eKelvov rj ydp
had come into being to itself, and it was moved and
' Harder, Cileuto, B-T: ev vvdpxov Enn.*, H-S \ saw. And this is what thinking is, a movement
* inseruimus. towards the Good in its desire of that Good; for
210 2II
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 6. WHAT IS BEYOND BEING DOES NOT THINK
iO e<f>€Gis T7]v vor/aiv eyewrjaekcu cwvvTTecjnrjcrev avT^' the desire generates thought and establishes it in
e<j>eais yap oi/iecDs opaais. ovSev oSv 8el avro to being along with itself: for desire of sight is seeing.
ayadov voeXv ov yap eariv aXXo avrov to ayadov. The Good itself, then, must not think anything; for
the Good is not other than itself. For when what is
€77ei Kai OTttv TO €T€pov TTapa TO ayadov avTO vofj, other than the Good thinks it, it does so by being
rep ayadoeiBes etvat voet Kal 6poio)p,a eyeiv.npos
“ like the Good ” ^ and having a resemblance to the
TO ayadov Kal dig ayadov Kal e<f>eTOV avrep yevd- Good, and it thinks it as Good and as desired by
16 p,evov vo€L Kol otov <f>avraalav rod ayadov Xapt^d- itself, and as if it had a mental image of the Good.
vov. ei 8 aei ovreog, dei roOrp. Kal yap aS cv rfj And if it is like this for ever, it thinks the Good for
voTjaei avrov Kara avpLpep-qKog avro voeZ- •kpog ever. And again, in thinking the Good it thinks
yap ro ayadov pXeTTCov avrov ^ voeT. evepyovvra yap itself incidentally: for it is in looking to the Good
av eavTov voeZ' 8’ evepyeia aTravreov npog ro that it thinks itself; for it thinks itself in actual
ayadov. activity; and the actual activity of all things is
6. El 8^ ravra opdStg Xeyerai, ovk dv eyoL ycdpav directed to the Good.
votjaewg rjvrivovv to ayadov dXXo yap 8ei rep 6. If this is correctly said, the Good would cer­
tainly not have any place for thinking: for the Good
voovvri ro ayadov etvai. dvevepyrjrov oSv. Kal
for the thinking principle must be something different
Ti 8ei evepyeXv r^v ivepyeiav ; oXevg p,ev yap ov8ep,ia
[from itself]. So the Good is without activity. And
6 evepyeia eyei ad -naXiv ivepyeiav. el 8e ye raig why should actuality be active ? For in general no
aXXaig raig elg dXXo eyovertv eTraveveyKeiv, njv ye active actuality has yet another actual activity.
irpeorrjv diraereov, elg rjv ai dXXai dv^prrjvrai, But even if some philosophers are able to attribute
avro edv ** 8et rovro o eariv, ov8ev avrfj eri irpoerri- yet another activity to the other active actualities
devrag. ij oSv roiavrrj evepyeia ov vorjaig- ov yap which are directed to something else,* yet the first
cyei o vey/jaei' avro yap npeorov. eireira ov8’ ij one of all, on which the others depend, we must let
10 vorjeng voei, dAAd ro eyov rrjv vorjeriv Svo oSv irdXiv be what it is, adding nothing further to it. So an
ad ev rep voovvri ylyverai' rovro 8e ov8ap,fj 8vo. actual activity of this kind is not thinking; for it
has nothing to think: it is itself the first. And
‘ coniecimus: avro Enn. further, it is not thinking that thinks, but what has
* coniecimus: etveu Enn.: ctvai Set ^voitl^etv) Muller, Br^hier, the thinking: so again there comes to be a two in
B-T.
second actuality ”: cp. Aristotle Be Animo B 412a-b. This
applies only to human minds which exercise their activity of
* Cp. Plato SepuMic VI 609A3 (knowledge and truth are thinking intermittently; the Aristotelian Divine Mind is
“ like the good ” but not the Good). always completely active and actual, and no distinction of
* The reference is to the Aristotelian doctrine of “ first and “ first and second actuality ” can apply to it.
212 213
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 6. WHAT IS BEYOND BEING DOES NOT THINK
eri 8e jiiaAAov ?8ot dv ns rovro, el Xd^oi, ircbs ev the thinking principle; but this [Good] is in no way
TTavTL TO voovv aa<f>eaT€pov xmdpxei, rj 8117X7] <f>vais two. Again, one would see this better if one grasped
how in all thinking this double nature is more clearly
avT7\. XeyopLev rd ovra cos ovra Kal avro eKaarov there. We maintain that the real beings as real
15 Kal rd dXijOcis ovra iv tw vot]t& roircp elvat ov beings, and each individual one of them, the ones
which truly exist, are in the “ intelhgible region
pAvov, on rd pev pevei chaavrcos rfj ovala, rd 8e and we do so not only because they abide the same
peZ Kal ov pevei, oaa ev alaBrjoei—^dya ydp Kal ev in essence but the other things, all of them which
are in the realm of sense-perception, flow and do not
rods aladrjroZs eon rd pevovra—dAAd poAXov, on abide—^for perhaps there are things which abide
TO reXeov rov elvai nap' avrcov eyei. 8ei ydp r^v
among those perceived by the senses—^but rather
because they have the perfection of existence from
npcdrcos XeyopevTjv ovalav ovk elvai rov elvai OKidv, themselves. For that which is called essence in
the primary sense must not be a shadow of being,
20 dAA’ cy^iv nXijpes rd elvai. nXi^pes 8e eon rd elvai, but have the fulness of being. And being is ful­
orav elSos rov voeZv Kal ^rjv ActjSrj. dpov dpa rd filled when it has the form of thinking and living.
voeZv, rd ^rjv, rd elvai ev rw dvri. el dpa ov, Kal So thinking, living and being are all together in
what is real. If then it is being, it is also intellect,
vovs, Kal el vovs, Kal ov, Kal rd voeZv dpov p.erd rov and if it is intellect, it is also being, and the thinking
elvai. noXXd dpa Kal ovy ev rd voeZv. dvdyKT) and the being go together. Thinking therefore is
many and one. That, then, which is not Hke this
rolvvv rip pr] roiovrcp prj8e rd voeZv elvai. Kal cannot be thinking. And as we go over things
25 KadeKaara 8e eniovaiv dvdpconos Kal vdrjais individually, there is man and thought of man, and
thought of horse, and horse, and thought of righteous­
(avBpwnov Kal vdrjaisy ^ innov Kal innos Kal ness, and righteousness. All things then are double,
diKalov vdrjcns Kal biKaiov. SinXd rolvvv dnavra and the one is two, and again the two come together
into one. But the Good is not one of all these things,
\ y « ^ >*v
/cat TO €v ovo, /cat av ra ovo €V e/op^erat. o 0€ nor is it the product of all the twos; it is not two at
OVK eon rovrcov ov9’ ev ® eKaarov, ovSe ck ndvrcov all. But how the twos come from the One has been
discussed elsewhere.* But what is “ beyond being ”
TOJVOVOOVO oAwOUO. 07T0)S 0€ ra ovo €K TOV ^vos,
‘ A phrase taken from Plato Republic VII 617B5.
1 Igal. “ The question was discussed in the earlier treatise V. 4,
• Creuzer, KirohhofiF, Muller, B-T: ov6h Enn.: ou8’ iv Volk- oh. 2. Again a reference to the passage on the transcendence
mann*. of the Good in Plato Republic VI 509B9 follows.
214 215
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 6. WHAT IS BEYOND BEING DOES NOT THINK
30 iv oAAoi?. dAA’ eneKetva ovcrlas ov ri Kal roS must be beyond thinking; it is not then absurd if he
voeZv eire/ceiva etvai- ov roivvv oi58’ CKeivo cltottov, does not know himself; for he has nothing in himself
el fi'q olSev eavTOV ov yap eyei -nap' eavr<p o fidd-r), which he can learn about, since he is one. But other
ets MV. dAA’ owSe ra aXXa Set avrov etSwai* things need not know him either; for he gives them
KpetTTOv yap ti koI pLeZ^ov SlScvaiv adroZs rov something better and greater than that they should
elSevai avrd—-^v to dyadov tmv dXXwv—dAAa p.dXr know him—he is the Good of the others—^he gives
36 Xov ev Tcp ai)T<p, Kadoaov Svvarai, e^d-nreadai them rather to be in the same place with him and
enelvov. to lay hold on him, as far as they are able.

2i6 217
ENNEAD V. 7
 ARE THERE IDEAS OF PARTICULARS
Synopaia
Is there an idea of each particular? It would seem so,
in spite of all the difficulties which can be raised, at least
in the case of individual men: this does not involve any
objectionable kind of infinity in the intelligible world
V. 7. ON THE QUESTION WHETHER (eh. 1). Problems about differences between children of
THERE ARE IDEAS OF PARTICULARS the same parents: if the children have different kinds of
beauty this must be due to different forming principles
Irtirodudory Note (which are all present in the souls of the parents) (ch. 2).
This short treatise, the eighteenth in Porphyry’s chrono­ One needs to postulate different forming principles only
logical order, is the clearest statement in the Enneada where the individuals are really different; not perhaps
that there are Platonic Ideas of particulars. (The general therefore in cases where animals have litters of large
opinion of Platonists before Plotinus seems to have been numbers of apparently exactly similar offspring. But are
that there were only Ideas of universals, not' of particu­ two individuals ever really exactly the same? The Stoic
doctrine of recurring world-period, each exactly similar
lars. The Stoics, though they did not believe in trans­
cendent Ideas, held that no individual thing was exactly in every detail, will (as already suggested in ch. 1) make it
like any other; each had its own particular qualitative unnecessary, even if there is a Form for every individual,
difference.) There has been much dispute about whether to postulate an infinite number of Forms; but we must
Plotinus held the doctrine expounded here, that there are not be afraid of the infinity contained in a single intelligible
Ideas or Forms of individuals, continually and consis­ reality (oh. 3).
tently: there are a number of other passages in the
Enneada which seem to deny it. Perhaps the safest
conclusion is that he consistently held that there were
Ideas of individual human selves in addition to (and
included in) the Idea of Man. Socrates is something more
than a mere instance of humanity (though he may be
incarnate at various times as Pythagoras and many other
empirical personalities). As regards Ideas of other in­
dividual things (including human bodies) his opinion may
have varied: he was probably prepared to postulate them
if and when he thought the facts required him to do so,
but was not always sure that they did. In this treatise
(especially in chapter 3) he goes further than anywhere
else in the Enneada towards accepting the full Stoic
position that each individual thing differs essentially from
every other (acceptance of this by a Platonist would
involve postulating a Form for each individual).
220 221
 V. 7. (18) nspi TOT El KAI TON V. 7. ON THE QUESTION WHETHER
KA0EKASTA EIEIN lAEAI THERE ARE IDEAS OF PARTICULARS
1. El’ Kal Tov KadeKaarov eariv I8ea; el eyw Kat 1. Is there an idea of each particular thing ? Yes,
eKaaros TrjV dvayayy^v em to vorjrov eyei, Kal if I and each one of us have a way of ascent and
return to the intelligible, the principle of each of us
eKacnov rj dp)(^ c/cei. t) el jxev dej ^wKpaTTjs koX
is there. If Socrates, that is the soul of Socrates,
HcDKpdrovs, earai AvroawKpdryjs, KaOo always exists, there will be an absolute Socrates in
6 tliv)(r] KaOeKaara Kal ^cS? XeyeTai)^ e/cet [co?
the sense that, in so far as they are soul, individuals
are also said to exist in this way in the intelHgible
Xeyerai eicci].® el 8’ ovk del, dAAd aAAore oAAij world. But if Socrates does not always exist, but
ylyverai 6 tTporepov HcoKpdrrjs, otov TlvOayopas 17 the soul which was formerly Socrates becomes
different people at different times, like Pythagoras
Ti? dXXos, ovKeTi 6 KadeKaara oStos’ /cd/cei. dAA’ el or someone else, then there will not be this particular
Tj i/wyri eKdoTOV d>v Sie^epyerai tovs Xoyovs eyei person Socrates also in the intelligible world. But
if the soul of each individual possesses the rational
irdvTCov, Trdvres av eKel' i’lrel Kal Xeyopev, oaovs 6
forming principles of all the individuals which it
10 Kocrpos eyei Xoyovs, Kal eKdanijv tfwy^v eyeiv. el animates in succession, then again on this assumption
oSv Kal 6 KoapLos p.rj dvdpcjTTOv povov, dXXd Kal rdiv all will exist there; and we do say that each soul
possesses all the forming principles in the universe.
KadeKaara ^(ixov, Kal ij if/vyij' dneipov oSv to rcov If then the universe possesses the forming principles,
Xoycov earai, el prj dvaKdpTTrei TrepioSois, Kal not only of man but of all individual animals, so does
the soul; there will therefore be an infinity of forming
ovrcos Tj dneipla earai 'ireirepaapevTj, orav ravrd principles, unless the universe returns on itself in
aTToSiScoTat. el ovv oXojs irXelco rd yivopeva rov regular periods; this will put a limit to the infinity
of forming principles, because the same things in this
IB TrapaSelyparos, rl Sei elvai rdiv ev pia irepiohia
case recur. Well, then, if the things which come into
* scripsimus: ^ Enn. being in all the periods together are more numerous
* transposuimus. than the models, why should there have to be forming
222 223
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 7. ARE THERE IDEAS OF PARTICULARS
rrdvTCJV yivofievwv Xoyovs Kal TrapaSeiyfiara; dp- principles and models of all the things which come
KeZv yap eva dvOpayrrov els ndvras dvOpcoTTOvs, wavep into being in one period ? One man as model would
Kod i/wxds dipiapAvas dvOpamovs iroiovaas dnei- do for all men, just as souls limited in number
produce an infinity of men. No, there cannot be the
povs. 7] Tcbv 8ia<f>6pct)v ovK eoTiv etvai rov airdv same forming principle for different individuals, and
20 Xoyov, ovSe dpKet dvOpumos irpos irapdZeiypka r&v one man will not serve as a model for several men
differing from each other not only by reason of their
Tivtbv dvdpcoiTcov Sia^epovTCUv oAAijAwv ov Tjj vXji
matter but with a vast number of special differences
pdvov, dAAa Kal IZiKals 8ia<f>opdis pLVplais' ov yap of form. Men are not related to their form as por­
ws at elKoves YiWKpaTovs “irpos to dp^eruTTOv, dXXd traits of Socrates are to their original, but their
different structures must result from different form­
Set Tip/ Sid^opov TTotijCTiv €K hia<f)dp<ov Xdywv. 8e ing principles. The whole revolution of the universe
nacia TieptoSos “ndvras eyei tovs Xoyovs, aiSdis Be contains all the forming principles, and when it
26 rd avrd naXiv Kara rovs avrovs Xoyovs. t^v Be
repeats itself it produces the same things again
according to the same forming principles. We ought
ev Tip voijt<3 dneiplav ov Bet BeBievaf naaa yap not to be afraid of the infinity which this introduces
€v dpepet, Kal otov “npoeiaiv, orav evepyp. into the intelligible world: for it is all in an indivisi­
ble unity and, we may say, comes forth when it
2. ’AAA’ et at p-l^eis rdiv Xoycov dppevos Kol acts.
6“qXeos Biaif>6povs “noiovaiv, oi/Keri tov yivop,evov 2. But if the mixtures of the forming principles
of male and female produce different children, there
eKaoTov Adyos eorat, o re eKarepos yewoov,
Tty will no longer be a forming principle of every indi­
otov d dppTfv, ov Kara Bia^opovs Adyowy novqaei,, vidual child that is born, but one of the parents, the
male, for instance, vdll produce it, not according to
5 aXXd Kad’ eva rov avTov rj Tiarpos avTov. t] ovBev different forming principles but according to one,
KcvXvei Kal Kara Biaif>6povs r& rovs ndvras cx^tf his own or his father’s. No, nothing prevents it
from being according to different principles, because
avrovs, dXXovs Be det npoxelpovs. orav Be €k rcov the parent has them all, but different ones are ready
avrojv yovewv BiA^iopoi; Bid rrjv ovk tarpi for use at different times. But what are we to say
when different children come from the same parents ?
eniKpdrrjaiv. dAA’ eKetvo, on ov, Kav ^ et ev rip
It is because of unequal dominance [of the two pa­
<f>alvecrdai, ore p,ev Kara rd dppev rd nXetarov, ore rents]. But there is this further point, that it is not
the case—even if it appears so—that sometimes the
' ov, Kav coniecimus: ovk Enn.
larger quantity of formative principle is on the male
224
225
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 7. ARE THERE IDEAS OF PARTICULARS
10 8k Kara to dijXv, Kara to taov jicpos eScoKSV side, sometimes on the female, or that each contributes
eKaTepos, dAA’ oXov p,ev eSwKe Kal eyKeiTai, KpaTeZ in equal proportion, but each of them gives their
whole forming principle and it is present as a whole
8k Trjs vXrjs pLepos eKaTepov rj daTepov. ol 8k iv in the offspring, but it is either the part belonging to
dXXrj d>pa 1 rrciis 8id<f>opoi,; dp' oSv vXrj to 8cd- one of them or the other part which dominates the
<f)opov ovy opLoiws KpaTovp,evr]; Tzavres dpa ycopis matter. But how does it come about that children
conceived in different seasons are different? Is it
15 ivos Tzapd (f>vaiv. el 8k to 8id^opov TzoXXayov
then the matter which makes the difference since it
KaXov, ovy ev to el8os. dXXd T(p alayei, p,6v<p is not dominated in the same way [in the different
d7To8oT€OV TO TTapd TTjV vXt]V KaKeZ TU)V TeXeCcov seasons] ? If that were so, then all the children but
one would be contrary to nature.^ But if the
Xoycov KeKpvp-pievcov p,iv, 8odevrwv 8k oXwv. dXX’ difference is a great diversity of beauty, the form is
ecrrcocrav 8id<f>opoi ol Xoyoi" tL 8eZ tooovtovs, ocroi not one. Only ugliness is to be attributed to the
influence of matter, and even there the perfect
ol yivofievoL iv /ua Trepi68<p, eizrep evi Tciv avTwv forming principles are present", hidden but given as
20 SiSojU.€vcov 8ia(f>6povs e^codev <f>aCveadai; ^ avyKe- wholes. But, granted that the forming principles
ycoprjTai tu>v oXcov 8i8op,e'va>v, ^rjTeZTai 8e, el tu)V
are different, why do there need to be as many as
the individual human beings bom in one world-
OLVTcbv KpaTovvTcuv. dp' oSv, OTi TO TOUTOV TrdvTr] period, if it is possible that when the same principles
ev TTj eTepa 7repi68(p, ev Tavrr] Se ov8kv TrdvTT) Tav- are given, individuals appear externally different?
No, it has [only] been granted that the principles
Tov ; are given as wholes, but the question now is whether
^ Igal: x<upa Enn. individuals can be different when the same forming
principles dominate. Are, then, different forming
principles necessary because the absolutely identical
* This brings out clearly that matter for Plotinus is always occurs in the other world-period, and in this world
a principle of resistance to nature (the immanent creative period there is nothing absolutely identical ^ ?
principle in the physical world which is the lowest form of
soul). A child would be an unnatural creature if it owed its that acceptance of the Stoic doctrine of recurrent world-
differenees from the other members of its family to matter, periods in which every detail repeats itself exactly might be a
not to the forms in nature. useful way of accepting Eorms of individuals while rejecting
“ Plotinus is here considering as a possibility (not definitely the idea that there is an infinite number of Forms, as he
accepting) the full Stoic doctrine of the iSiojj n-oiw, the unique normally does, though at the end of chs. 1 and 3 in this
individual characteristic of every entity in any one world- treatise he seems at least prepared to consider it, and it was
period: cp. SVF II 395; Seneca Epistulae Morales CXIII, held by his closest associate Amelius (Syrianus In Metaph.
16. Here and in the following chapter he is inclined to think 147. Iff).
226 227
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 7. ARE THERE IDEAS OF PARTICULARS

3. riais oSv im ‘iroXXwv SiSvfuov Bia^opovs 3. How, then, can we assert that the forming prin­
ciples are different in the case of many children born
(jyqaofiev tovs Xoyovs; el Be Kal im ra aXXa f<3a at one birth ^ ? And suppose one also turns to the
other living beings, and especially to the ones which
ns tot. Kal ra iroXuroKa paXiara ; i<f> <Si/ wnapaX- have litters ? Now in the cases where the offspring
are indistinguishable, there is one forming principle.
XaKra, els Xoyos. oAA’ et rovro, ov)(, oaa ra But if this is so, the forming principles are not equal
in number to the individuals. Yes, they are equal
6 KaOeKaara, roaovroi Kal oi Xoyoi. ^ oaa Bid<j>opa
to the number of individuals which are different, and
ra KadeKoara, Kal Bid(f)opa ov t<J) eXXetireiv Kara ro different not by reason of failure [to dominate the
matter] on the side of the form. Or what prevents
elBos. T) rL KcaXvei Kal ev ots dBid(j>opa; elirep rivd [there being different forming principles] even when
the individuals are not different? Supposing, that
oXcos eon Tfdvrtj dBidtfiopa. c5? ydp 6 reyyirris, is, that there are any individuals at all totally
without difference. For, as the craftsman, even if
Kav aSia^opa 'iroifj, Bel op,o)s ro .ravrov Bia<f>op^ he is making things which do not differ from each
other, must apprehend the sameness by means of a
Xaft^aveiv XoyiKfj, KaO’ rjv aXXo TTovqaei Tipoa^eptav logical difference, according to which he will make
10 Bid<f>op6v ri r(p avrw' ev Be rfj <j>vaei p/rj Xoyiapcp the thing another by bringing some difference to its
sameness, so in nature, where the other thing does
yivopevov rov erepov, oAAa Xoyois pLovov, awe^ev)(~ not come into being by reasoning but only by
rational forming principles, the difference must be
dai Bei r<p ecBec ro Bcd<j>opov' ripels Be Xap^dveiv rrjv linked with the form; but we are unable to grasp
the difference. And if [nature’s production] con­
Bia^opdv dBvvarovpev. Kal el pev rj ■uoItjois eyei tains a random number of individuals, that is a differ­
ent story; but if it is precisely determined how
ro elKTj rov OTToaaovv, dXXos Xoyos' el 8e peperp- many there are, the quantity will be defined by the
15 7)rai, oTToaa rivd evt], ro Ttoaov copiapevov earai rfj
unrolling and unfolding of all the forming principles;
so that, when all things come to an end, there will
ru)v Xoycov dirdvroiv e^eXl^ei Kal dvavXcooef be another beginning; for how large the universe
ought to be, and all that it will pass through in its
<v<Tre, orav rravarjrai rcdvra, dpy^ dXXrj' orrdaov ‘ Cp. “ Seven, Cousin Peter, and all of them twins! ”
(Beatrix Potter The Tale of Mr. Tod 23), which may do some­
ydp Bel rov Koapov elvai, Kal OTToaa ev r<p eavrov thing to justify my translation of SiSviuov here.
228 229
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 7. ARE THERE IDEAS OF PARTICULARS
pUo Sie^eXevaeraij Ketrai i^apxrjs ev exovri rovs life, is established from the beginning in that which
Aoyous*. o.p ovv Kai €'jn ro)v aAAcov Qiocov, €<f> cov contains the forming principles. Are we then in the
20 TrXrjdos €k jxias yeveaecos, roaovrovs rods Xoyovs; case of the other hving beings, which produce a great
7j ov <l>oPrp-eov to ev rots airepfiaai Kal rots Xoyois many offspring from one birth, to assume an equal
aneipov tlivxfjs ra ndvra ixovcrtjs. ^ Kal iv vtp, number of forming principles? Now we have no
^ ev ^vxf}, TO dweipov rovrwv dvdiraXiv rutv €Ket
need to be afraid of the infinity in seeds and forming
principles, since Soul contains them all. Yes, in
•npoxeipcov. Intellect, as in Soul, there is again the infinity of
these principles which come out ready for use in
Soul.

230 231
ENNEAD V. 8
 ON THE INTELLIGIBLE BEAUTY
contemplation of the purified soul, or, better, of the gods
(oh. 3). The heaven of the intelligible gods displayed in
all its glory, its perfect unity and its endless living moving
diversity, a universe of supremely real beings, not of
theorems and propositions (ohs. 3-4). The higher wisdom
V. 8. ON THE INTELLIGIBLE BEAUTY of Intellect which knows realities more like images than
propositions (oh. 5). Egyptian hieroglyphics as an exam­
Introductory Note ple of the expression of non-discursive thought (ch. 6).
The unplanned immediate spontaneity with which In­
This treatise is the second section of the great work tellect creates its image, this visible cosmos (ch. 7). The
comprising III. 8 (30), V. 8 (31), V. 6 (32) and II. 9 (33) beauty of the intelligible world (oh. 8). The method of
(see Introductory Notes to II. 9, III. 8 and V. 5). It dematerializing our contemplation of the visible cosmos
should be read before V. 5, with which it is particularly so that we see the intelligible (ch. 9). The true, godlike
closely linked (see Introductory Note to V. 6). Its pur­ contemplation of the intelligible world from within (chs.
pose is to give us the most vivid and powerful understand­ 10-11). Kronos and Zeus as symbols of the intelligible
ing of the true nature of Intellect possible in a written and sensible worlds; necessity of the eternal existence of
work; not a merely external understanding but one which the sensible image of the intelligible (ch. 12). Further
will enable us to become Intellect and see its world from exposition of the way in which Ouranos, Kronos, Zeus and
inside. The two great linked themes by developing which Aphrodite symbolise the Three Hypostases. All beauty
Plotinus tries to bring us to this inner understanding are: comes from the world of Intellect. Transition to V. 6
(i) that all beauty and order, both of nature and art, here (ch. 13).
below are due to living form deriving immediately from
Intellect: our material cosmos is an image or reflection
of the world of Intellect; (ii) that both the creative
activity of Intellect here below and its own inner life are
totally non-discursive, an eternal productive life imme­
diately aware of itself in a way which has nothing in
common with the reasoning from premises to conclusions
and planning which most people generally consider as
thinking.
Synopsis
The beauty of art consists in living form, originating in
the intelligible world, to which the mind of the artist has
direct access (ch. 1). The beauty of nature is also due to
form, and so to a still higher degree is moral beauty (ch. 2).
How to rise to contemplation in Intellect, through the
235
234
 V. 8. (31) nEPI TOT NOHTOY V. 8. ON THE INTELLIGIBLE BEAUTY
KAAAOTS
1. Since we maintain that the man who has
1. ’EttciSij <f>afi€v Tov iv 6ea rov vorjrov Koafiov entered into contemplation of the intelhgible world
yeyevTjftevov Kal to tov oAtjOivov vov Karavo-qcravra and understood the beauty of the true Intellect will
KaXXos TOVTOV SmrqaeaOai Kal rov tovtov Trarepa be able also to bring into his mind its Father which
KoX rov eireKeiva vov els hrvoiav ^aXeadat, ttsi- is beyond Intellect,'^ let us try to see and to say to
6 padwyiev tSetv Kal evneiv rjpuv avrois, cos otov re ra ourselves, as far as it is possible to say such things,
roiavra ehreXv, ttojs av ns ro KaXXos rov vov Kal
how it is possible for anyone to contemplate the
beauty of Intellect and of that higher world. Let us
rov Koarpov eKeivov dedaairo. Keipevcov roivvv
suppose, if you like, a couple of great lumps of stone
dXX'^Xcov iyyvs, ecrrco de, ei ^ovXei, <8uo)> ^ XLBcov lying side by side, one shapeless and untouched by
ev oyKcp, TOV pev dppvBplarov Kal reyyris dpoLpov, art, the other which has been already mastered by
rov Se ’^St] reyvTj KeKparrjpevov els dyaXpa 6eov tj art and turned into a statue of a god or of a man,
10 Kal rivos dvdpcoTTOV, 6eov pev ^dpiros y rivos of a Grace or one of the Muses if of a god, and if of
Movcrrjs, dvdpcoTTOV Se prj rivos, oAA’ ov eK jravrcov a man not just of any man but of one whom art has
KaXcov TTeTTolyjKev rj reyyi], <f>aveCr) ph> av 6 otto ttj? made up out of every sort of human beauty. The
reyyrjs yeyevrjpevos els eiSovs KaXXos koXos ov stone which has been brought to beauty of form by
Trapd TO eXvai XlOos—yap av kcu 6 erepos opoicos art will appear beautiful not because it is a stone—
16 KoXos—dAAd Ttapd rov eiSovs, o evijKev 7] reyvT].
for then the other would be just as beautiful—but as
a result of the form which art has put into it.* Now
rovro pev rolwv ro etSos ovk etyev rj vXrj, dXX’ -^v
the material did not have this form, but it was in the
ev rw eworjaavri Kal vplv eXOetv els rov Xldov Tjv man who had it in his mind even before it came into
S’ ev r& Srjpiovpycp ov Kadoaov d(j)6aXpol rj yelpes the stone; but it was in the craftsman, not in so
^jaav avrip, dAA’ on pereiye rfjs reyyrjs. ^v dpa far as he had hands and eyes, but because he had
* Volkmann*, B-T, e Theol. IV. 4.
some share of art. So this beauty was in the art,
* There is a reference back here to the end of the first section * Compare and contrast the earlier treatise I. 6 (1). 2. 26-7,
(in Porphyry’s division) of this same treatise, HI. 8 (30). 11—i.e. where sometimes art gives beauty to a whole house with its
the chapter in the original immediately preceding this one. parts, and sometimes nature gives beauty to a single stone.
236 237
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 8. ON THE INTELLIGIBLE BEAUTY
ev rfj rexvr) to KaAAo? rovro dfJueLvov ov and it was far better there; for the beauty in the
20 yap €K€Lvo ■^Xdev els tov Xldov to iv rfj rexvrj, dAA’ art did not come into the stone, but that beauty stays
e/ceivo pev pevet, dXXo Se dir' eKearqs eXarrov e/cet- in the art and another comes from it into the stone
which is derived from it and less than it. And even
vov Kal ovSe rovro epeive Kadapov iv avrco, ovSe
this does not stay pure and as it wants to be in the
otov i^ovXero, dAA’ oaov et^ev 6 XtOos rfj riyyrj. stone, but is only there as far as the stone has
el 8’ Tj reyinj o eari Kal eyei roiovro Troiet—koXov 8e submitted to the art. If art makes its work hke
TTOiei Kara Xoyov oS rroiei—p-ei^ovcos Kal dArjdeare-
what it is and has—and it makes it beautiful accord­
ing to the forming principle of what it is making—^it
25 pws KaXrj iari rd KaXXos eyovaa rd rexvrjs peZ^ov is itself more, and more truly, beautiful since it has
pevroi Kal KaXXiov rj Serov iarlv iv rep e^w. Kal the beauty of art which is greater and more beautiful
yd,p Saw Idv els rrjv vXrjv iKrerarai, roatp daOevea- than anything in the external object. For a thing
is weaker than that which abides in unity in propor­
repov rov iv evl pevovros. d<j>iararai yap eavrov tion as it expands in its advance towards matter.
Trdv Suardpevov, el laxvs, iv layvi, el Oeppo-nfs, Everything which is extended departs from itself:
iv depporrjri, el SXws dvvapis, iv hvvdpei, el if it is bodily strength, it grows less strong, if heat,
less hot, if power in general, less powerful, if beauty,
30 KoXXos, iv KoXXei. Kal rd TTpwrov iroiovv irav Ka6'
less beautiful.*- Every original maker must be in
avrd KpeZrrov etvai SeZ rov TTOiovpevov ov yd.p ij itself stronger than that which it makes; it is not
dpovala povaiKov, dAA’ ij povaiK-q, Kal rrjv iv lack of music which makes a man musical, but music,
alodrp-w ij TTpd rovrov. el 8e ns rds reyvas
and music in the world of sense is made by the music
prior to this world. But if anyone despises the arts
dripdCei, Sri pipovpevai rr]v ^vaiv rroiovai, because they produce their works by imitating nature,
TTpwrov pev <f>areov Kal rds <j>vaeis pipeZaOai dXXa. we must tell him, first, that natural things are imita-
36 eireira heZ elSevai, ws ovy dTrAdij rd opwpevov ■tions too. Then he must know that the arts do not
simply imitate what they see, but they run back up
pipovvrai, dAA’ dvarpeyovaiv iirl rods Xdyovs, ii to the forming principles from which nature derives;
wv Tj (f)vais- etra Kal Sri noXX.d Trap’ avrwv -rroiovai then also that they do a great deal by themselves,
Kal TTpoarideaai 8e, Srw ri iXXel-irei, ws eyovaai and, since they possess beauty, they make up what is
defective in things. For Pheidias too did not make
rd KaXXos' i-rrel Kal ^ d <l>et8i'as' tov Ala irpds his Zeus from any model perceived by the senses,
ov8ev ala6-r)rdv iroi-qaas, dAAd AajScov olos dv
‘ This is the normal doctrine of Plotinus: op. especially
^ Kirchhoff*, testatur Theol, IV. 20: cTrara Enn. III. 7. 11. 23-7 (on the soul’s self-extension into time).
238
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 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 8. ON THE INTELLIGIBLE BEAUTY
40 yevoiTO, el -qfuv 6 Zeu? 8i o/ifiaTCDV eOeXoi but understood what Zeus would look like if he
<j>avr\vai. wanted to make himself visible.^
2. But let us leave the arts; and let us contem­
2. ’AAA’ y/ut' a^eiaOwaav al reyvar <Hv Se \e- plate those things whose works they are said to
imitate, which come into existence naturally as
yovTai TO, epya [u/jieladai, to. (fivaei KaXXrj yivojxeva beauties and are so called, all the rational and irra­
Kal Xeyofieva, decapcofiev, XoyiKa re Kat aXoya tional living creatures and especially those among
them which have succeeded since the craftsman who
Trdvra /cat fiAXiara oaa KartopOcoTai avrcHv tov formed them dominated the matter and gave it the
B nXcLGavTOS avra /cat Srjpuovpy^aavros imKpaiij- form he wished. What then is the beauty in these ?
Certainly not the blood and the menstrual fluid;
aavTOS Trjs vXt]s koI el8os o e^ovXero ■napaaypvros. rather, the colour of these is different and their shape
tI oSv to koXXos iarlv iv tovtois; ov yap 8rj to
is either no shape or a shapeless shape or hke that
which delimits something simple.* From what
atpa /cat TCt KaTap/qvia- dXXa /cat XP°® aXXrj tov- source, then, did the beauty of Helen whom men
fought for shine out, or that of all the women like
rwv Kal ax>}p,a ^ ov8ev y n aaxr)px>v ^ otov to Aphrodite in beauty? Then again, what is the
TrepLeyov airXovv ri [ofa vAij]A TroOev 8r] i^eXapufie source of the beauty of Aphrodite herself, or of any
10 TO Trjs 'EAevrjs Trjs ‘rrepipLoyfyrov koXXos, ^ oaai 4 and my paper “ Tradition, Reason and Experience in the
Thought of Plotinus ” (in Plotino e il Neopl^onismo, Rome
yvvaiKwv ’A<f>po8lTrjs opoiai /cdAAei; irrel /cat to 1974) 179.
‘ The text and meaning of this passage must remain some­
Trjs ’A(j>po8lTqs avrqs rrodev, rj el ns oXcas koXos what doubtful, but fairly good sense can be made of it in the
way followed here, with the deletion of olo JAr) as an inept
^ del. Armstrong, ut ineptum simplicitatis ezemplum. gloss on dn-Aovi' Ti (matter cannot have an outline, even the
simplest), doyijpov of course normally means “ shapeless ”
in the sense of “ misshapen ”, “ ugly ”. Plotinus seems to
' The “ Pheidias commonplace ”, on the basis of which correct himself twice in speaking of the shape of blood and
Plotinus develops his own view of the artist’s direct access menstrual fluid—^flrst reflecting that if they are formed
to the intelligible world, goes back at least to the age of material realities, even of the most elementary kind, they
Cicero (op. Cicero Orator II. 8-9 and, for the continuance of cannot have no shape, and then finding an aox^fiov axfjfjta some­
its use down to the time of Plotinus, Philostratus Life of what too paradoxical. His final way of putting it, which
ApoUoniris VI. 19. 2). Plotinus is of eourse here in disagree­ seems to imply that a complex shape is necessary for beauty,
ment with Plato, for whom the artist is a mere copyist of the again contrasts with the aesthetic perception of the beauty
realities of the sense-world (cp. Plato Republic X 697B£F.). of simple things (light, a single stone) so strongly asserted in
On the question of whether this disagreement was conscious I. 6. 1-2 against the “ good proportion ” theory of beauty
and deliberate, see J. M. Rist, Plotinus (Cambridge 1967) 183- (see notes on ch. 1 there).
240
241
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 8. ON THE INTELLIGIBLE BEAUTY
avOpcoTTOS ^ deos tcov av els otj/iv eXdovTwv fj koi other beautiful human being or of any god of those
IMrj iovrcDv, eypvroiv §€ eir avrois opaOev av koX- who appear visibly, or even of those who do not
Xos; S.p’ ovK elBos p.ev Travra^ov tovto, “^kov Se appear but have in themselves a beauty which could
16 im TO yev6p,evov €k tov TTOi-qaavros, wairep ev racs be seen ? Is not this beauty everywhere form, which
reyvais eXeyero em to. rexvrjra levai irapa rcov comes from the maker upon that which he has brought
into being, as in the arts it was said to come from the
reyvwv; tL oSv; KoXa p,h> ra iToitjpaTa Kal 6 arts upon their works ? Well, then, are the things
cm T7]S vA7)s Aoyos*, o oc ixrj cv vArj, aAA ev t(o made and the forming principle in matter beautiful,
■jToiovvTi Xoyos ov KaXXos, 6 TTpcHros Kal dvXos but the forming principle which is not in matter but
[dAA’ els ev] ^ oStos ; dXX’ el pev 6 oyKos ^v in the maker, the first immaterial one, is that not
20 KoXos, KaOoaov oyKOS ijv, eypfjv tov Aoyov, dri p-q beauty ? But if it was the mass which was beautiful
^v oyKos, TOV TTOvijcravTa pt] KaXov etvar el 84, edv in so far as it was mass, it would necessarily follow
re ev apiKpip edv re ev peydXcp to avro e^os
that the forming principle which was the maker,
since it was not mass, was not beautiful; but if the
opolcjs Kivel Kal BiaTcOrjai ttjv i/rvyriv tt]v tov same form, whether it is in something small or some­
opdivTOS TT) avTov Svvdpei, to KdXXos ov Tip tov thing large, moves and influences the soul of one
oyKov peyedei diroSoreov. TeKpijpiov 8e Kal rdSe, who sees it in the same way by its own power,
25 on cfcu fiev ecus ecrriv, ovttcu eioofiev, orav oe eiao)
beauty is not to be attributed to the size of the mass.
yevTjTai, Stedij/cev. etaeiai Se Sc’ oppdTWV etSos It is further evidence of this that we do not yet see
a thing while it is outside us, but when it comes
ov povov ^ TTuts Sid apiKpov; avve<f>eXKeTac Se within, it influences us. But it comes in through the
«rai TO peyeOos ov peya ev oyKip, dXX’ etSei yevope- eyes as form alone; or how could it get through
vov peya. etreiTa ^ alaypdv Sec to noiovv ^ something so small ? But the size is drawn in along
d8idif>opov ^ KaXov etvai. alaypov pev ovv ov ovk with it, since it has become not large in bulk but
30 dv TO evavTcov Tronjaeiev, dSid^opov Se tc paXXov
large in form. Further the maker must be either
ugly or neutral or beautiful. Now if it was ugly it
KaXov rj alaypov; dAAd ydp eoTi Kal rj <f>v(jis rj Ta would not make the opposite, and if it was neutral
ovTW KaXd Srjpcovpyovaa ttoXv npoTepov KaX-q, why should it rather make something beautiful than
'qfJLeis
f A V ^
oe tcuv evoov ovoev opav
tv.
etuiafievoi.
j/j r
ovo something ugly? But certainly nature which pro­
elSores to e^co SidiKopev dyvoovvres, ore to evSov duces such beautiful works is far before them in
35 Kcvec' wenrep dv ei tcs to eiScoXov avTov ^Xemov
beauty, but we, because we are not accustomed to
see any of the things within and do not know them,
c del. Kirchhofif, Miiller, B-T, ut variam leotionem ad oM’ « pursue the external and do not know that it is that
y.kv. within which moves us: as if someone looking at
242 243
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 8. ON THE INTELLIGIBLE BEAUTY
dyvocHv o6ev -^Kei eKclvo 8io>koi. St^Xol 84. his image and not knowing where it came from should
on TO SicoKofievov dXXo Kal ovk 4v [leyedei to pursue it.**- But the beauty also in studies and ways
KaXXos, Kal TO ev toZs /JM.di^fjiam koXXos koI to 4v of life and generally in souls ® makes clear that what
is pursued is something else and that beauty does not
Tois imTTjSevfiaai Kal oXws to ev Tats ifw^ats' lie in magnitude: it is truly a greater beauty than
oS 8^ Kal dX'qOela fiaXXov koXXos, orav tco that when you see moral sense in someone and de­
40 <f>p6vrjoiv evi8rfs Kal dyaoBrjs ovk els to Trpoawnov light in it, not looking at his face—^which might be
d<j>op(av—eiT] yap dv tovto alayos—dAAd TTaaav ugly—^but putting aside all shape and pursuing his
pxjptftrjv d(f>els 8to)Kris to elaco KaXXos avrov. el Sc inner beauty. But if it does not move you yet, so
that you call someone like this beautiful, you will
p/qiTU) ae KiveZ, cos koXov elireZv tov toiovtov, ov8e not when you look inward at yourself be pleased
aavTov els to eXao) pXe^as tjctStjotj ais KoX<p. with your beauty. It would be in vain for you to
wcrre /xdnjv dv ovnos eycov C‘>}toZs eKeZvo- alaypip seek beauty when you are in this state, for you will
46 yap koX ov KaOapw 8i6 ov8e irpos Trdvras be seeking with something ugly and impure. This
ol TTepl Tcov ToiovTwv Xoyof el 8e Kal av el8es is why discussions about these sorts of things are not
for everybody; but if you have seen yourself beauti­
aavTov KaXov, dvap,V7]oBrjn.
ful, remember them.
3. "Eanv odv Kal ev -rij <f>vaei Xoyos koXXovs 3. There is therefore in nature a rational forming
dpyeTVTios tov ev awpan, tov 8' ev Trj (f>vaei 6 principle which is the archetype of the beauty in
ev Tjj t/jvyfj KaXXlcov, Trap’ oS Kal 6 ev Tjj ^vaei. body, and the rational principle in soul is more
evapyeuraTOs ye p.rjv 6 ev a-irov8ala tfivyfj Kal beautiful than that in nature, and is also the source
6 T]8r] trpo'iwv KaXXei' Koap^qaas yap tt/v tjwyfjv
of that in nature.® It is clearest in a nobly good
soul and is already advanced in beauty: for by
Kai <f)ws TTapaaydiv dm ^arros pel^ovos •npdmos adorning the soul aiid giving it light from a greater
KaXXovs dvTOS avXXoyl^eadai iroieZ avros ev light which is primarily beauty it makes us deduce
eanv 6 irpo avrov 6 ovKen ey- by its very presence in the soul what that before it
yiyvopevos ov8’ ev dXX(p, dXX’ ev avrw. 8i6 is like, which is no longer in anything else but in
ov8e Xoyos earlv. dXXd ■noi’qr^s tov TrpwTov Xoyov itself. For this reason it is not an expressed forming
10 KoXXovs ev vXtj ifrvyiKTj dvros' vovs 8e oSros, 6 principle at all, but is the maker of the first forming
principle which is the beauty present in the matter
which is soul *; but this [primary principle of beauty]
^ A reference to the story of Narcissus: op. I. 6. 8. 9-12.
* Cp. Plato Symposium 210B-C. * Xoyos here must be taken in its special sense of “ formative
’ The relationship of soul and nature has been explained in expression of a higher principle on a lower level of reality ”.
the first chapters of this work, III. 8 (30). 1-4. For Soul as matter op. II. 4. 3. 4-5.
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 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 8. ON THE INTELLIGIBLE BEAUTY
del vovs Kal ov Trore vovs, oti fxrj eiraKTOS avrw. is Intellect, always and not just sometimes Intellect,
TLva dv odv elKova ns avrov AajSoi; wctaa yap because it does not come to itself from outside.
What image of it, then, could one take ? For every
eoTai £K yeCpovos. dXXd yap 8ei t7]v eiKova e/c image will be drawn from something worse. But the
vov yeveaOai, ware prrj Sd sIkovos, dAA’ olov ypvaov image must be taken from Intellect, so that one is
■navTOS xpvaov nva Selypa Xa^etv, Kal el prj Kad- not really apprehending it through an image, but it
is like taking a piece of gold as a sample of all gold,
15 apos eir] 6 Xrj^dels, Kadaipeiv avrov ^ ^pyv ^ Xoyip
and, if the piece taken is not pure, purifying it in
SetKvvvras, d>s ov ■jrdv rovrd eon ypvaos, dXXd act or word by showing that not all this sample is
rovrl TO ev rip 6yK<p povov ovrco Kal evravda drto gold, but only this particular portion of the whole
mass ^; here it is from the intellect in ourselves when
vov rov ev rjpZv KeKadappevov, el Se ^ovXei, drro it has been purified, or, if you like, from the gods,
ru)v dewv, olds iariv 6 ev avrois vovs. aepvol pev that we apprehend what the intellect in them is like.
yap irdvres Oeol Kal KaXol Kal to KaXXos avrwv For all the gods are majestic and beautiful and their
20 dpriyavov dAAd rl eon Si’ o roiovroL elaiv; rj
beauty is overwhelming *; but what is it which makes
them like this? It is Intellect, and it is because
vovs, Kal on pdXXov vovs evepywv ev avrois, d>are Intellect is more intensely active in them, so as to be
opdadai. ov yap Stj, on avrcvv KoXd rd aiLpara. visible. They are certainly not like this because
their bodies are beautiful. The godhead even of
Kal yap ois eon acopara, ov rovrd eariv avrois rd
those who have bodies does not consist in this, but
elvai deois, dAAd Kara rdv vovv Kal oSroi Oeol. these too are gods because- of their intellect. They
KaXol Srj fj Oeol} ov yd.p S^ Trore pev ^povovai, are surely beautiful just because they are gods.
For they certainly do not sometimes think rightly and
25 TTore Se d<f>paivovaiv, dAA’ del <f>povovaiv ev dTraOei sometimes perversely: their thinking is always right
rip vcp Kal araalpcp Kal KaOapcp Kal loaoi irdvra Kal in the calm and stability and purity of Intellect, and
yivwoKovaiv ov rd dvOpameia, dXXd rd eavrcdv rd they know all things and are acquainted, not with
mortal matters, but with their own divine ones, with
Oeia, Kal ooa vovs dpa. rcdv Se Oecdv oi pev ev all which Intellect sees. The gods who are in heaven,
ovpavtp ovres—oyoXri ydp avrois—Oewvrai del, otov since they are free for contemplation, continually
Se irdppcodev, rd ev eKelvip aS rip ovpavip virepoyfi contemplate, but as if at a distance, the things in
that higher heaven into which they raise their
30 rf! eavridv Ke<j>aXf\. ol 8e ev eKelvip ovres, daois r]
1 Cp. the remarkable development of this image, where the
^ MacKenna: /coAot oi Qeoi Enn.*, H-S koXoI 8^ ij Oeoi “ living gold ” purifies itself, in IV. 7. 10. 47-52.
Cilento, B-T: del. Miiller, Harder. ® Cp. Plato Symposium 218E5.
246
247
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 8. ON THE INTELLIGIBLE BEAUTY
otKrjais in’ avrov Kai iv airw, iv iravrl olKovvres heads ^: but the gods in that higher heaven, all
T(Ji e/cei ovpavw—ndvra yap eKei ovpavos Kal rj yrj those who dwell upon it and in it, contemplate
ovpavos Kal ddXaaaa Kal ^<pa Kal <f>znd Kal dvdpca- through their abidiiig in the whole of that heaven.
noi, ndv ovpdviov eKcLvov tov ovpavov—ot Se Oeol For all things there are heaven, and earth and sea
36 ot €v avrcp ovk dna^ioOvres dvdpwnovs ov8’ aXXo ri and plants and animals and men are heaven, every­
tS>v eKei, OTi rwv eKct, ndaav pxv 8ie^iacn Trjv
thing which belongs to that higher heaven is heavenly.
The gods in it do not reject as unworthy men or
CKet x<S)pav Kal tov tottov dvaTravopLevoi anything else that is there; it is worthy because it
4. —Kal yap to pel a ^coeiv eKei, Kal dXijdeia 8e is there, and they travel, always at rest, through all
avrols Kal yevereipa Kal Tpo<f>6s Kal ovaia Kal rpo- that higher country and region—
<fyfi—Kal opuxji TCL ndvra, ov\ ots yeveais -npoa- 4. For it is “ the easy life ” * there, and truth is their
eoTW, dAA’ ols ovaLa, Kal eavrovs ev aXXois' mother and nurse and being and food—and they see
5 8io(f>avrj yap ndvra Kal OKoreivov oi8e dvriTVTTov all things, not those to which coming to be, but those
oi8ev, dAAd ttS? ttovti <f>avep6s els ro etaoi Kal irdv- to which real being belongs, and they see themselves
ra- ^ais yap ^corl. Kai yap eyei nds irdvra iv in other things; for all things there are transparent,
avTW, Kal aS dpd iv dXXw ndvra, ware navraxov and there is nothing dark or opaque; everything and
ndvra Kal trdv ndv Kal eKoarov ndv Kal dneipos rj all things are clear to the inmost part to everything;
for light is transparent to light. Each there has
aXyXT]- eKOOTov yap avrwv pAya, inel Kal to everything in itself and sees all things in every other,
10 puKpov peya- Kal rjXios iKel ndvra darpa, Kal so that all are eveiywhere and each and every one
eKaarov -rjXios aS koI ndvra. 8’ iv eKdarqi is all and the glory is unbounded; for each of them
oAAo, ip/j>alvei 8e Kal irdvra. eari 8e Kal Kivijais is great, because even the small is great; the sun
Kadapd' ov yap avyyel avrrjv lovaav o Kivel erepov there is all the stars, and each star is the sun and all
avTijs virdpxov Kal rj ardais ov irapaKivovpevrj, the others. A difFerent kind of being stands out in
on pij pepiKTai rw prj araalpxp' Kal to KaXov each, but in each all are manifest. Movement, too,
16 KaXov, on pij iv rep (.p^y ^ koXw. jSejSij/ce 8e is pure: for the mover does not trouble it in its going
by being different from it. Rest is not disturbed,
eKaaros ovk in’ dXXorplas otov yijs, dAA’ eanv
for it is not mixed with that which is not at rest.
* Bouillet, testatur Theologia. Beauty is just beauty, because it is not in what is
' The starting-point here is, as so often, the Phaedrua myth not beautiful. Each walks not as if on alien ground,
(cp. Plato Phaedrus 247ff.); and what immediately follows but each one’s place is its very self and when it
may be influenced by the description of the “ true heaven and
earth ” in Plato Phaedo 109D£f. But the whole of this visionary experience of Plotinus himself (cp. VI. 7. 12—3).
amazing description of the intelligible world which continues * Btol pela fwovres is a stock Homeric phrase for the gods:
through chapter 4 seems to express some kind of direct op. e.g. Iliad 6. 138.
248 249
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 8. ON THE INTELLIGIBLE BEAUTY
eKaarco iv c5 eariv avro o ioTi, Kal avvOei avrw ascends (so to speak) the plaee it came from runs
0^0^’ TTpOS TO 0.V01 loVTt. TO o9eV ioTL, Kal OVK aVTOS along with it, and it is not itself one thing and its
fiev aXXo, ij avrov dXXo. Kal yap to place another. The thing itself is Intellect and its
viTOKelpLevov vovs Kal avTOS vovs" olov et ns Kara ^ ground is Intellect; it is as if one were to suppose
that in the ease of this visible heaven of ours which is
20 TOVTOV Tov ovpavov Tov opcopevov <f>OiToeL8rj ovra luminous that the hght which comes from it was
ToCro TO (^cos TO avrov (f>vvai vo^aeie rd darpa. born to be the stars. Here, however, one part would
ivravda pkv oSv ovk €k pipovs dX\o oAAow not come from another, and eaeh would be only a
ylvoiTO dv, Kal eh] dv povov eKaarov pepos, eKeX part; but there eaeh comes only from the whole and
Se oXov del eKaarov Kal dpa eKaarov Kal oXov
is part and whole at once: it has the appearance of
a part, but a penetrating look sees the whole in it,
<f>avTd^eTai pev yap pepos, evopdrai Se r(p S$eZ supposing that someone had the sort of sight which
25 TTjv ot/nv oXov, otov et ns yevoiro rrjv o^iv roiovros, it is said that Lynceus ^ had, who saw into the inside
olos 6 AvyKeiis eXeyero Kal rd etaw rrjs yrjs dpav of the earth, a story which speaks in riddles of the
rov pvOov rods e/cet alvirropevov 6<l>6aXpovs. eyes which they have there. They do not grow
weary of contemplation there, or so filled with it as
Ti\s 0€ €K€i U€a£ ovT€ KafiaTo^ eoTtv ovr €cm to cease contemplating: for there is no emptiness
irXTjpojais els rd Travaaadai decvpevtp- ovre ydp which would result in their being satisfied when they
Kevcvais 'fjv, tva rjKcov els ■aX'^pcvaiv Kal reXos had filled it and reached their end; and things are
30 dpKeaOfj, ovre rd p^v dXXo, rd 8’ dXXo, tva ereptp not different from eaeh other so as to make what
roiv ev avrw rd rov erepov prj dpeaKovra belongs to one displeasing to another with different
characteristics; and nothing there wears out or
drpvrd re rd e/cei. dAA’ eon rd anXi^pcvrov rep wearies. There is a lack of satisfaction there in the
pr] rrjV TrX'qpeoaiv Kara^poveZv noieZv rov ttcttAij- sense that fullness does not cause contempt for that
pevKoros' dpcdv ydp pdAXov dpa, Kal Kadopedv which has produced it: for that whieh sees goes on
diteipov avrdv Kal rd dpdipeva rij eavrov ovveTrerai seeing still more, and, perceiving its own infinity and
36 <j)vaei. Kal r] ^evr] pev ovSevl Kaparov eyei, that of what it sees, follows its own nature. Life
holds no weariness for anyone when it is pure: and
orav fi Kauapa* to o apicrra Qcov ri av KafjLoi; rj how should that which leads the best life grow
Se ao<f>ia, aotj>la Se ov •nopiadeZaa XoyiapxiZs, weary? This life is wisdom, wisdom not acquired
on del '^v irdaa Kal eXXehrovaa odSevl, tva by reasonings, because it was always all present,
CrjrTjaews Serjdf}- dAA’ eanv ij ■npevrr] Kal ovk an’ without any failing which would make it need to be
' For the legend of Lynceus see Cypria XI Allen and Apol­
^ Dodds: koX Snn. lonius Khodius I 161-5.
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 PLOTINUS; ENNEAD V. 8. ON THE INTELLIGIBLE BEAUTY
ttAA^jy Kal Tj ovaLo. avrrj ao<f>la, oAA’ ovk avros, searched for; but it is the first, not derived from any
40 elra ao<f>6s. 8id tovto Se ovSe/iia fieiCwv, Kal rj other wisdom; the very being of Intellect is wisdom:
airoemcrr^fir] evravOa irdpehpos Tip vw rip avp/rrpo- it does not exist first and then become wise. For
(f>aivea6ai, otov Xeyovai Kara p,ip,T]ai.v kou rip Ail this reason there is no greater wisdom: absolute
Tt]v AlKTjv. Trdvra yap rd roiavra ckci otov knowledge has its throne beside Intellect in their
dydXpLara Trap’ avrwv ivopwp,€va, <5otc 6eap,a common revelation, as they say S)Tnbolically Justice
is throned beside Zeus.^ All things of this kind
etvai, virepevdaipLovatv Beariov. rijs pev oSv there are like images seen by their own light, to be
45 cro^las rd peyedos Kal Trjv Svvapiv av ns KorlSot,, beheld by “ exceedingly blessed spectators ”.® The
on per’ avrijs e\ei Kal TT€iroLrjKe rd ovra, Kal greatness and the power ofthis wisdom can be imagined
Trdvra •^KoXovdrjoe, koI eanv avrrj rd ovra, Kal if we consider that it has with it and has made all
Gvveyevero avrrj, Kal ev koI rj ovoLa rj €/ceI things, and all things follow it, and it is the real
cro^ia. dAA’ rjpets els ovveaiv ovk rjXBopev, on beings, and they came to be along with it, and both
Kal rds emarrjpas Betop^para Kal avp(j)6pnrjaiv are one, and reality is wisdom there. But we have
60 vevopiKapev Trpordoecvv etvaf rd 8e ov8’ ev rais not arrived at understanding this, because we con­
evravBa emar^pais. el 8e ns rrepl rovrwv sider that the branches of knowledge are made up of
dp^iaPrjrei, eareov ravras ev rw trapovn. rrepl theorems and a collection of proportions; but this
is not true even of the sciences here below. But if
8e rrjs eKei emarrjpTjs, ^v 8fj Kal 6 TlXdnov
someone wants to dispute about these, let them go
Kan8d)v (fytjoiv ov8’ •^ris earlv dXXrj ev for the present; but about the knowledge there—
dXXcp, oircvs 8e, etaae ^rjrelv Kal dvevpiaKeiv, which Plato observed and said “ that which is not a
65 etrrep d^iot rrjs rrpoarjyoplas <f>apev etvai—tacvs knowledge different from that in which it is ”, but
oSv PeXnov evrevBev rrjv dpy^v rroirjoaaBai. how this is so, he left us to investigate and discover,
5. Ildvra 8rj rd yivopeva, eXre reyyrp-d eXre if we claim to be worthy of our title [of Platonists]—
^vaiKd elrj, ao<f>La ns rroieZ, Kal rjyeirai rrjs perhaps it would be better to start from this point:
rroirjaeois rravraxov ao<f>ia. dXX’ el 8ij ns Kar’ ^ 5. Some wisdom makes all the things which have
avrrjv rrjv ao<f>Lav rroiot, earcoaav pev ai reyvai come into being, whether they are products of art
6 roiavrai. dAA’ d reyyirrjs rrdXiv aS els cro<f>lav
or nature, and everywhere it is a wisdom which is in
charge of their making. But if anyone does really
^ Miiller*: Kal Bnn. make according to wisdom itself, let us grant that
^ Justice is throned beside Zeus in Sophocles Oedipus the arts are like this. But the craftsman goes back
Golcme/us 1381—2 (in Antigone 461, for obvious dramatic
reasons, she dwells with the gods below, in the world of the knowledge and Intelleet even in their common revelation:
dead). In Plato £aws IV 716A2 she is the constant follower they are clearly not quite the same thing for him.
of God. It is interesting that Plotinus distinguishes absolute ’ Cp. Plato Phaedo 111A3.
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 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 8. ON THE INTELLIGIBLE BEAUTY
<j>vaiKrjv epxerat, Kad’ t]v yeyevqrai, ovKeri. avvre- again to the wisdom of nature, according to which
detaav Ik decaprjfidrcov, dAA’ oXqv ev n, ov TrjV he has come into existence, a wisdom which is no
ovyKeipLevrjv €k ttoXXcjv els ev, dAAd fiaXXov longer composed of theorems, but is one thing as a
dvaXvop.evr]v els TrXijdos e^ evos. el /xev oSv raurjjv whole, not the wisdom made into one out of many
ns •npomp/ driaerai, dpKeZ' ovKen yap e^ dXXov components, but rather resolved into multiplicity
10 oScra ouS’ ev aXXcp. el 8e tov p,ev Xoyov ev from one. If then one is going to make this the
<f>vaei, TOVTOV Se apyr/v (fyqaovai TTjv <f>vaiv, first, that is enough; for it no longer comes from
-rrodev e^ei ^aop,ev Kal el e^ aXXov eKelvov. el another and is not in another. But if people are
p.ev e^ avTov, arrjaofieOa’ el Se els vovv 'q^ovaiv,
going to say that the rational forming principle is
in nature, but its origin is nature, from where shall
evravda onreov, el 6 vovs eyewr^ae t^v ao<j>Lav we say that nature has it—is it perhaps from that
Kal el (fyiqaovaL, nodev; el Se e^ avrov, dSwarov other ? If it is from itself, we shall stop there; but
16 dXXcus ^ avrov ovra ao<f>lav. •q dpa dXrjdivrj ao^la if they are going on to Intellect, we must see at this
ou(7ia, /cat ri oA'quivq ovGia GO<pia, /cat 7j agia /cat point if Intellect generated wisdom; and if they
ovala rrapd Trjs ao^las, Kai, on irapd rfjs assent to this, from where did it get it? If from
ao(f>las, ovaia dXrfOTjs- Sio Kai oaai ovcnai itself, this is impossible unless it is wisdom itself.
ao(l>lav ovK eyovcn,, rip /xev Sid ao^iav nvd The true wisdom, then, is substance, and the true
yeyovevai ovaia, rip 8e p/rf eyeiv ev avrais ao<f>iav, substance is wisdom; and the worth of substance
comes from wisdom, and it is because it comes from
20 OVK dXrjdival ovalai. ov roiwv SeZ vopi^eiv e/cei
wisdom that it is true substance. Therefore all the
d^icopara opav rovs deovs ovSe rovs eKeZ vnepev-
substances which do not possess wisdom, because
Salpovas, dAA’ eKaara rd)v Xeyopevcvv eKeZ KaXd they have become substance on account of some
dydXpara, ota e<f>avrd^ero ns ev rfj ao(j>ov dvSpos wisdom but do not possess wisdom in themselves,
ilwxfj etvai, dydXpara 8e ov yeypappeva, dAAd are not true substances. One must not then suppose
ovra. Sid Kal rds ISeas ovra eXeyov elvai ot that the gods or the “ exceedingly blessed spectators ”
26 vaXaiol Kal ovaias. in the higher world contemplate propositions, but all
The “ images in the soul of the wise man ” (and probably the Forms we speak about are beautiful images in
the “ images ” in oh. 4, line 43) come from the speech of that world, of the kind which someone imagined to
Alcibiades in praise of Socrates at the end of the Symposium, exist in the soul of the wise man, images not painted
where he speaks of the wonderful images which are concealed but real.^ This is why the ancients said that the
within his Silenus-like outside: Plato Symposium 216B1-3
and 216E6-217A1. The form of reference (“ someone ima­ Ideas were realities and substances.
gined ”) is curious for a reference by Plotinus to a Platonic the Forms in Intellect are concrete living realities, not mental
passage, but Plotinus is probably attributing the imagination abstractions like propositions, a point on which Plotinus is
of the Silenus-figure containing divine images to Alcibiades
himself rather than to Plato. It brings out excellently that much concerned to insist in this treatise.
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 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 8. ON THE INTELLIGIBLE BEAUTY
6. AoKovai 8i fioi Kal ot AlyvirTUav ao<f>oi, etre 6. The wise men of Egypt, I think, also understood
OKpi^el imarqixT) Xa^ovres eire Kal avpufmrcp, this, either by scientific or innate knowledge, and
irepi tSv e^oaXovTO 8ia Go<j>ias 8eiKvvvat, p.rj when they wished to signify something wisely, did
TVTTOiS ypap,pLdr<ov 8ie^o8evovai Aoyow? /cat npo- not use the forms of letters which follow the order
6 Taffcis fiT]8£ pupovpJvois (fxovas Kal iTpo(j>opas of words and propositions and imitate sounds and
d^icapArcav Keyp^jadai, dyaX/mra 8e ypcuftavres the enunciations of philosophical statements, but by
drawing images and inscribing in their temples one
Kal ev eKoacTov eKaarov irpdypMTos dyaXp,a
particular image of each particular thing, they mani­
evTimwaCuTes iv rots lepots rrjv CKelvov (oiy ^ fested the non-discursiveness of the intelhgible world,^
-^le^oSor ep^vai, ws dpa ns Kal imarqp.ri Kal that is, that every image is a kind of knowledge and
<70<j>ia eKaarov iartv dyaXfia Kal vTTOKelpLevov Kal wisdom and is a subject of statements, all together
ddpoov Kal ov 8iav6r]ais ov8e fiovXevacs. varepov in one, and not discourse or deliberation. But [only]
10 8e an avrijs ddpoas ovarjs ctSoiAot' iv dXX<p afterwards [others] discovered, starting from it in its
i^eiXiyfievov 7)87] koI Xeyov avro iv 8ie^68w Kal rds concentrated unity, a representation in something
alnas, 81' as ovreo, i^evpioKov, ware ® koXws else, already unfolded and speaking it discursively
ovrws eyovros rod yeyevTi/ievov davpAaai el ns and giving the reasons why things are like this, so
ot^e, davpAaai e^ rrjV ao(f>iav, nws avrij ® alnas that, because what has come into existence is so
beautifully disposed, if anyone knows how to admire
15 ovK eyovaa rijs ovaLas, 8C as ovrw, nape^^ei rots
it he expresses his admiration of how this wisdom,
TTOiovpAvois Kar avrqv. ro koXws dpa ovrws Kal which does not itself possess the reasons why sub­
ro iK l^ryrqaews dv fxoXis ^ ov8' oXws <f>avev, on stance is as it is, gives them to the things which are
8et ovrws, eiTtep ns i^evpoi, npo t^rpriaews /cat made according to it. That, then, which is beautiful
Ttpo XoyiapLov VTiapyeiv ovrws' olov—Xd^wfiev yap in this way, and which is with difficulty or not at all
i<f>' evos fJLeydXov o Xeyw, onep dppwaei Kal ini discovered by research to be necessarily like this, if
ndvrwv— one were to find it out, exists before research and
7. rovro 817 TO nav, inelnep avyxwpovp,ev nap' before reasoning; for instance—^for let us take one
dXXov avro el^at Kal roiovrov etvai, dpa olofjLeda great example of what I am saying, which will also
fit all other cases—
^ eKtlvov (sc. ToC ayaKfiaros) ov Igal: fKtivov Enn.: iKtX ov 7. this All, if we agree that its being and its being
Theiler. what it is come to it from another, are we to think
* coniecimus: tuy to Enn. ’ Theiler: avn/ Enn.
speaks of temples, not of sacred writings, and is therefore not
‘ On the kind of images of which Plotinus is speaking here misunderstanding the semi-alphabetic hieroglyphics of the
see E. de Keyser La SigniJUalion de I'ari dans lea Enniadea de sacred books but speaking of tiie purely ideogrammatic sym­
Plotin (Louvain 1956) 60-2, who points out that Plotinus bols which do appear on the temple walls.
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Tov TTOirjTrjv avTov imvorjcrai Trap’ avrtp yrjv /cat that its maker conceived earth in his own mind, with
ravTqv ev peatp SeTy cjrfjvai, elra vScup Kal em its necessary place in the centre, and then water and
its place upon earth, and then the other things in
^ "nj yfj TOVTO, Kal ra oAAa ey rd^ei /tepfpi tov
their order up to heaven, then all living things, each
ovpavov, etra ^cpa ndyra Kal tovtois pop(f>ds with the sort of shapes which they have now, and
Toiavras eKaarw, oaai yvy etai, Kal to, eySoy their particular internal organs and outward parts,
eKaoTOis oirXaYxya Kal ra e^co pi-ep-q, eha Siare- and then when he had them all arranged in his mind
deyra eKaara Trap’ avrw ovtcvs i'ui^eipeiy t(o proceeded to his work? Planning of this sort is
^PYV > ovre enlyoia Svyaryj ij roiavrr]—
quite impossible—for where could the ideas of all
these things come from to one who had never seen
10 TTodey yap ewfjXOey ovvcoTTore icopaKori;—ovre them ? And if he received them from someone else
aXXov Xa^ovTi Svyaroy ijf ipydcraadai, otj-cus vvy ot he could not carry them out as craftsmen do now,
hrjpiovpyol TTOiovai yepal Kal opydyois xpd>peyoi' using their hands and tools; for hands and feet come
varepoy yap /cat yeZpes Kal TToSes. AetTrerai Tolyvy later. The only possibility that remains, then, is
etyai pey rrayra ey aXXw, ovSeyos 8e pera^v ovtos that all things exist in something else, and, since
TTfj ey T(p oyri npos dXXo yeiroveia oloy e^aC^yrjs
there is nothing between, because of their closeness
to something else in the realm of real being something
16 aya<j>ay7jyac ly^aXpa Kal eiKoya e/cetvou eyre avroOey like an imprint and image of that other suddenly
etre SiaKoyTjaapevtjs—Sia<f>epei yap ov8ey appears, either by its direct action or through the
ey TW Trapoyri—fj ifruxfjs rwos. oAA’ ovy eKelOev assistance of soul—this makes no difference for the
ifv avpirayra ravra, Kal KaXXioyois eKel- to. yap present discussion—or of a particular soul.^ All
TrjSe Kal pepiKrai Kal ovk c/ceiva pepiKrai, dXX' that is here below comes from there, and exists in
oSy ecSeai /caT€cr;i^i)Tat e^ dpyrj^ els reXos, TrpwToy greater beauty there; for here it is adulterated, but
20 pey 7j vXr] roXs rwy aroixelwy eiSeaiy, etr’ enl
there it is pure. All this universe is held fast by
forms from beginning to end: matter first of all by
eiBemy etSrj aAAa, etra irdXiy erepa" odey Kal
the forms of the elements, and then other forms
XaXemy evpeXy TTjy vXrjy vtto ttoXXols etSeat upon these, and then again others; so that it is
Kpv<f>6eXaay. errei Se Kal avnj elSos Tt eaxarov. difficult to find the matter hidden under so many
forms. Then matter, too, is a sort of ultimate form *;
' The insistence on the immediate and intimate relationship
of the intelligible and sensible universes and the comparative here it seems to be hardly necessary even as a link.
unimportance of the mediation of soul should be noted. * This passing remark, which is very dififioult to reconcile
Soul in Plotinus never has a world of its own intermediate with Plotinus’s normal view of 5Aij as the principle of evil
between the intelligible and sensible worlds; it belongs to (there are no evil Forms in Plotinus), is the nearest he ever
both worlds, and is normally thought of as linking them; but comes to a totally positive valuation of matter.
258 259
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 8. ON THE INTELLIGIBLE BEAUTY
7TOV et8os roBe ^ Kat irdvra etSrj • to yap irapa- so this universe is all form, and all the things in it
SeiypLa etBos ijv i-noieiro 8e ® dilio(fyqTi, ori nav ro are forms; for its archetype is form; the making is
26 TTOitjoav Kat ovaia Kal etBos' Sto Kal dirovos [/cai done without noise and fuss, since that which makes
ouTOi?] * ij Srjpiovpyla. Kal navros Be ^v, cos dv is all real being and form. So this is another reason
why the craftsmanship of Intellect is also without
TTav. ov toLwv to eptnoBiCov, Kal vvv Be
toil and trouble. And it is the fashioning of an All,
CTriKpaTet KaiToi aAAcov aXXois epnoBUov yivo- so an All is the maker. There is nothing to hinder
ptevcov aAA’ oiK avrfj ovBe vvv pevei yap cos the making, and even now it has the mastery, and
Trfiv. eBoKei Be /cot, ort Kal, el 17/ccts dpyeTuna koI though one thing obstructs another, nothing ob­
30 ovaia /cat eiBrj dpxi Kal to elBos to -noiovv evravOa structs it; for it abides as an All. But I think also
■fjv ■qpxvv ovaia, eKpdrqaev av dvev mvwv
that if we were archetypes and real being and forms
all at once, and if the form which makes things here
T] TipeTepa Brjpxovpyla. /catrot /cat dvOpconos below was our real being, our craftsmanship would
Brjptiovpyei etBos avTov aAAo o eari yevoptevos' have the mastery without toil and trouble. And
dneaTr] yap tov elvai to -nav vvv dvOptvnos even now, man also is a craftsman, of a form other
yevopevos' iravadpevos Be tov dvOpomos etvai than himself since he has become something else,
what he is; for he has ceased to be the All now
35 peTecvpoTTopei (fyrjai Kal TtdvTa tov Koapov
that he has become man; but when he ceases to be
Stot/cel' yevopevos yap tov oXov to oXov iToiei. man he “ walks on high and directs the whole
dXX' oS o Xoyos, OTt ejects ph> av atnav universe ” ^; for when he comes to belong to the
etireiv 8t’ •^v ev peatp rf yfj koI Bid tI arpoyyvXri whole he makes the whole. But to return to our
Kal 6 Xo^os BioTi (oBi- e/cet 8e ov, Bioti ovtcvs main theme: you can explain the reason why the
earth is in the middle, and round, and why the
TOVTO ovTW Pe^ovXevrai, dXX’ ort ecliptic slants as it does; but it is not because you
40 owTCos exei cos cort, 8ta tovto /cat Tavra cj^et can do this that things are so there; they were not
KoXcis' otov el TTpo TOV avXXoyiaptov Trjs amas to planned like this because it was necessary for them
avp-nepaapa, ov •napd tcHv -npordaeoiv ov yap ef
to be like this, but because things There are disposed
as they are, the things here are beautifully disposed:
oKoXovdias ovB’ e^ emvoias, dXXd -npo aKoXovdias as if Ae conclusion was there before the syllogism
which showed the cause, and did not follow from the
‘ Ez, Perna, KirchhofF*: eZ8oj- to Si ABR»'JXJC, Perna™*:
tlSoj tS Si Creuzer. premises; [the world-order] is not the result of
* siispic. H-S c, scr. B-T; enoiet to Si Enn.: iiroiei toSc Porna, following out a train of logical consequences and
Creuzer, Kirohhoff: imUi <Si> toSc Muller*.
• del. Theiler. Cp. Plato Phaedrua 246C1-2.
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Kal npo imvoias' varepa yap irdvra ravra, purposive thought: it is before eonsequential and
Kal Aoyo? Kai aTToSei^is Kal mans, eml yap purposive thinking; for all this eomes later, reasoning
and demonstration and the confidence [produced by
45 apyr), avroOev irdvra ravra Kal tSSe- Kal to them]. For sinee [the intelligible world-order] is a
Crjreiv atrias dpxfjs ovrco KaXdis Xdyerai, Kal rrjs principle, all these follow immediately and just as
roiavrqs dpxrjs rrji reXetas, rjris ravrov rip reXei- they do; and in this sense it is well said that we
Tjns 8 apxyj Kat reXos, avrr] ro vdv opov Kal should not enquire into the reason why of a princi­
aveXXnrjs. ple,^ and of a principle like this, the perfect one,
8. KoAov oSv TTpdncos, Kal oAov Se Kal trav- which is the same as the goal; but that which is
raxov oXov, tva prjSe peprj aTToXeltrqrai rip KaXip principle and goal is the whole all together and is
eXXeCireiv, rls odv ov ^'qaei koXov; ov yap Sr] o without deficiency.
pr] oXov avro, aXX o pepos ^xov ^ pi]Se ri avrov 8. Who, then, will not call beautiful that which is
beautiful primarily, and as a Nvhole, and everywhere
5 eyov.2 r] el pr] eKeZvo koXov, rl dv dXXo; TO yap
as a whole when no parts fail by falling short in
rrpo avrov ovSc KaXov cdcXci dlvat' ro ydp rrpdyrws
beauty? Certainly [one would not call beautiful]
eis 6eav rrapeXOov rip etSos etvai Kal Oeapa vov rov- that which is not as a whole beauty itself, but has a
ro Kal dyaaroy o^Ofjvat. Slo Kal TlXdrcov, rovro part of it, or not even any of it. Or if that is not
ar]pr]vai OeXarv ei? n rwv ivepyearepwv cos rrpds beautiful, what else is? For that which is before
■qpds, drroSe^dpeyoy rroiel rdv Sr]piovpy6v ro drro- it does not even want to be beautiful; for it is this
10 reXeaOev, Sid rovrov ivSel^aaOai deXcov rd rov which first presents itself to contemplation by being
rrapaSelyparos Kal rrjs iSeas KdXXos cos dyaaroy. form and the contemplation of intellect which is
■nay yap ro Kara dXXo rroyqOey oray ns Bavpdar], also a delight to see. For this reason Plato, wishing
to indicate this by reference to something which is
€rr €K€iyo €yet to davpa, Ka9^ d dcjn rT€7Toir]p€-
voy. el S' dyyoei o rrdaxei, Oavpa ovSe'y errel Kal
clearer relatively to ourselves, represents the Crafts­
man approving his completed work, wishing to show
* Kirohhoff*: txatv Enn., H-S by this how delightful is the beauty of the model,
* L, Kirohhoff*: e}(cuv wBxUCQ. which is the Idea.® For whenever someone admires
a thing modelled on something else, he directs his
admiration to that on which the thing is modelled.
1 Cp. Aristotle Physics A 6. 188a27-30, though Plotinus is But if he does not know what is happening to him,
as usual very much adapting Aristotle’s doctrine to his own
sytem and his own purposes. that is no wonder: since lovers also, and in general
* The reference is to Plato Timaeus 37C7-D1. But there action should be the spontaneous reflex of contemplation:
is nothing in Plato to suggest the interpretation given by this was fully expounded in the first part of the present work,
Plotinus here, which is wholly based on his own doctrine that III. 8, and applied to the creation of the universe in ch. 7 of
all perfect activity is contemplation, and that creation or this treatise.
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PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 8. ON THE INTELLIGIBLE BEAUTY

oi epwvres Kal oAto? oi to Tf}8e Ka^os redavfta- all the admirers of beauty here below, do not know
15 Kores ayvoovaiv on, 8i’ SKeivo' 8i' CKeivo yap. on that this is because of the intelligible beauty; for
Se els TO TTapdheiypM dydyei to "‘^dadrj,” SrjXov it is because of the intelligible beauty. Plato de­
TToiei imT7]8es to i^ijs Trjs Xe^eojs AajStov etire liberately makes it clear that he refers the “ was
ydp- rjydaOri tc Kal eri p.aXXov vpos to delighted ” to the model by the words which follow;
for he says, “ he was delighted, and wanted to make
TTapd8eiyp,a ai>To ejSouATj^ij d<l>op,oi(oaai,
it still more like its model ”, showing what the
TO KoXXos Tov TrapaSelypuiTos otov ianv iv8eiKvvp,€- beauty of the model is like by saying that what
20 VOS 8id TO €K TOVTOV TO yevopevov koXov Kal avTO originates from it is itself, too, beautiful because it
cos eiKova eKelvov etnetv eirel Kal el prj e/cetvo ijv- is an image of the intelligible beauty: for, if that
TO virepKoXov KdXXei dpriydvcp, tl dv tovtov tov was not transcendently beautiful with an overwhelm­
opcopevov ^v KoXXiov; odev ovk dpdcos oi pep<f>6- ing beauty, what would be more beautiful than this
pevoi TOVTCp, el prj dpa Kadoaov prj eKeivo eon. visible universe ? Those who blame it, then, do not
' do so rightly, except perhaps in so far as it is not the
9. Touto Toiwv TOV Koapov, eKdoTov tcov pxp&v
intelligible world.
pevomos o ean Kal pr/ avyxeopAvov, XdPcop,ev 9. Let us then apprehend in our thought this visi­
8iavoia, els ev opov ndvra, cos otov Te, wore evos ble universe, with each of its parts remaining what it
oTovovv TTpocftaivopevov, otov TT]s e^co acfxupas is without confusion, gathering all of them together
6 ovarjs, aKoXovdelv evdvs Kal Trjv rjXlov Kal opov into one as far as we can, so that when any one part
TCOV dXXcov darpcov tt/v <f>avTaalav, Kal yi^v kal appears first, for instance the outside heavenly
BdXaaaav Kal -ndvra to. ^ fwa opaadai, otov enl sphere, the imagination of the sun and, with it, the
other heavenly bodies follows immediately, and the
a<f>alpas Sia^arous Kal epycp dv yevoiTO ndvra
earth and sea and all the living creatures are seen,
evopaxjBai. eoTco oSv ev rfj i/ivyi} <f>coTeivi^ tis as they could in fact all be seen inside a transparent
<f>avToala a<f>aipas eyovaa irdvra ev avrfj, evre } sphere. Let there be, then, in the soul a shining
10 Kivovpeva eire ecrrrjKOTa, t] pev Kivovpeva, to. S’
to,
I imagination of a sphere, having everything within
ecrrqKOTa. cf>vXdTTCov Se TavTqv dXXrjv irapd aavrcp I it, either moving or standing still, or some things
dcf>eXcov TOV oyKov AajSe* d<f>eXe Se Kal tovs tottovs I moving and others standing still. Keep this, and
Kal TO Trjs vXrjs ev aol <j>dvTac7pa, Kal prj rreipco I apprehend in your mind another, taking away the
avrfjs dXXrjv apiKporepav Xa^eiv tco dyKcp, deov Se mass: take away also the places, and the mental
picture of matter in yourself, and do not try to
KoXeaas tov rrerroirjKOTa •^s eyeis to cfrdvraapa } apprehend another sphere smaller in mass than the
original one, but calling on the god who made that
wQ, Pema: om. BxUCL, H-S >. I of which you have the mental picture, pray him to
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PLOTINUS; ENNEAD V. 8. ON THE INTELLIGIBLE BEAUTY

16 ev^ai iX6eiv. 6 8e rjKoi top avrov Koa^iov <f>epwv come. And may he come, bringing his own universe
plj€T^ TTOVTCOV TOJV €V CLVTip Q^OiV €ls OJV KdL 7T(1VT€?, with him, with all the gods within him, he who is
Kal eKaaros irdvres avvovres els ev, Kal raTs p-ev one and all, and each god is all the gods coming to­
Svvdpeaiv dXXoi, Tfj Se pid eKeivTj ttj ttoAAjj iravres gether into one; they are different in their powers,
els- paXXov 8e o els -ndvres- ov yap imXel-nei but by that one manifold power they are all one; or
rather, the one god is all; for he does not fail if all
avTOS, -ndvres eKeZvoi yevwvrai- opov 8e elai
become what he is; they are all together and each
20 KcX eKaoTos ^copls ev orcurei aSiaoTarw ov one again apart in a position without separation,
pop<jyr)v ata67]Tr)v ovbeplav excov-^Srj yap dv o possessing no perceptible shape—for if they did, one
pev dXXoOi, 6 Se' irov iXXaxdOi, ^v, Kol eKaaros Se would be in one place and one in another, and each
ov uSs ev avTW—ovSe pepr) aAAa ej^tuv aXXois would no longer be all in himself—nor does each god
avTw, oiiSe eKaarov olov ^ Svvapis KeppanadeXaa have parts different from himself belonging to other
Kal Toaavrq ovaa, daa rd peprj perpovpeva. to gods than himself, nor is each whole like a power cut
26 Se eon [to ttSv] ^ Svvapis TTaaa, els d-neipov^ pev up which is as large as the measure of its parts. But
lovaa, els d-neipov 8e Swapevr)- koI ovto>s earlv this, the [intelligible] All, is universal power, extend­
eKeXvos peyas, <vs xat rd pepr] avrov drreipa yeyove- ing to infinity and powerful to infinity; and that god
vai. 7TOV ydp ri eariv ehreiv, ottov pt] (ftOavei; is so great that his parts have become infinite. For
peyas pev ovv Kal o8€ o ovpavos Kai at ev avrip what place can we speak of where he is not there
30 TTaaai Svvdpeis opov, dXXd pei^ivv av -fjv Kai before us? This [visible] heaven is indeed great,
oTToaos ovS' dv ^v enreiv, ei prj ns avrip avvr\v and so are all the powers together -within it, but it
awparos Svvapis piKpd. Kairoi peyaXas av ns would be greater, even indescribably great, if there
(j>T^aeie TTVpos Kal rojv aXXo)v aioparo)v ras Svva- was not present with it a petty power of body. One
pieiS- dXXd -rjSy) d-neiplq. Svvdp^cos dXrjOivrjs <f>avrd- might certainly call the powers of fire and the other
^ovrai Kalovaai Kal (fdelpovaai Kai dXi^ovaai Kai bodies great; but it is by mere inexperience of true
power that they are imagined burning and destroying
36 TTpos yeveaiv rwv t^ipwv virovpyovaai. aXXa ravra
and crushing and working as servants for the produc­
ph (j)delpei. on kclI <j)6elperai, Kal avyyevvq., ori tion of Uving things. But these destroy, because
Kal avrd ylverai- rj Se Svvapis f] eKei povov to they are destroyed, and help to generate because
elvai eyei Kal povov rd KaXov elvai, rrov yap av they are generated themselves; but the power in
eirj rd KoiXdv dtroarepr^dev rov eivai; ttov 8 av 7f the intelligible world has nothing but its being and
ovala rov KaXdv elvai iareprjpevr]; ev rw ydp its being beautiful. For where would its beauty be
if it was deprived of its being ? And where would its
^ Harder, B-T: o\ov Enn.* reality be if it was stripped of its being beautiful?
* del. Kirchhoff*.
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40 dTToXei<f)Ofjvai rov KaXov eAAeiTrei Kal Tjj ovcrla.
8to Kal TO etvai TToOeivov iariv, on ravrov tw KaX&,
For in deficiency of beauty it would be defective
also in reality. For this reason being is longed for
Kal TO KaXov epdafuav, on to eZvai. Trorepov 8e because it is the same as beauty, and beauty is
TTorepov airiov rL ^rjreZv oucnj? tjj? ^vaecos lovable because it is being. But why should we
puas; TjSe pev yap rj tlievSrjs ovaia 8etTai eitaKTOV enquire which is the cause of the other when both
elSdXov KaXov, Iva Kal KaXov <j>alvrp'ai Kal oXcos are one nature? This reality here below, which is
46 jj, Kal Kara roaovrov icm, Kadoaov p,€TeiXr]<f>€ not genuine, does indeed require a phantasm of
KaXXovs Tov Kara to etSos, Kal Xa^ovaa, oaq> dv beauty brought in from outside in order to appear
AdjSjj, fiaXXov reXeiorepa' pLoXXov yap ovaia ^ ^ ®
and in any way to be beautiful, and it is beautiful
in proportion as it has a share in the beauty which
KaX'j. is according to form, and when it has it it is more
10. Aid TOVTO Kal 6 Zed? Kamep S)v npea- perfect the more of it it has: for it is more reality
^vraros rwv dXXcov 6ewv, dv avros rjyetrai. in so far as it is beautiful.
vpdiTos TTopeverai, em TTjv rovrov 6dav, ol Se 10. For this reason Zeus, although the oldest
enovrai Oeol dXXoi Kal Saipoves Kal ifivyai, among the gods whom he himself leads, advances first
5 at Tavra opdv Svvavrai,. 6 8e eKif/alverai avrots to the contemplation of this god, and there follow
him the other gods and spirits and the souls who are
€K Tivos dopdrov tottov Kal dvareiXas vijjov eir'
capable of seeing these things.^ But he appears to
avT(dv KareXapifje pev irdvra Kal eirXrjaev avyrjs them from some invisible place and dawning upon
Kal e^eTrXrj^e pev too? Kara), Kal eaTpd<fyriaav them from high illuminates everything and fills it
ISeiv ov SeSvvrjpevoi ola tjXiov. ol pev dp' ® avrov with his rays, and dazzles those of them who are
dvexovrai re Kal pXeirovaiv ol Se raparrovrai, below, and they turn away unable to see him, as
10 oatp dv dcfyeoT^KCvaiv avrov. dpdivTes Se ol if he was the sun. Some endure him and gaze upon
Svv7]0evTes ISeiv els avrov pev irdvres pXeTTOvai Kal him, but others are troubled in proportion to their
els TO avrov • ov ravrov Se eKaaros del deapa
distance from him. But all those who are able to
see look at him and what belongs to him when they
Kopi^erai, dXX’ 6 pev dreves IScov eKXdpTTOvaav see; but each does not always gain the same vision,
elSe rrjv rov SiKaiov Trrjyrjv Kal <f>vaiv, dXXos 8e rrjs but one, gazing intensely, sees the source and nature
acv(f>poavvrjs enX’qadr] rov Oedparos, ox>x oiav of justice, another is filled with the vision of moral
16 dvdpcvTTOi Trap' avrois,’ orav eycDOL' pipeirai yap integrity, not the kind which men have here below,
when they do have it (for this is some sort of imitation
^ Theiler: oUeia Enn.* ‘ Again a reference to the Phaedrus myth, which Plotinus
* scripsimus: 17 Enn.*: « Theiler. continues to interpret in what follows: op. Plato Phaedrus
• coniecimus: an' wBxUCz: ujr’ SN Vat., Creuzer. 246E£f.
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 PLOTINUS; ENNEAD V. 8. ON THE INTELLIGIBLE BEAUTY
avTT] d[X7]yiTrr] eKean]v ij Se em irdai irepl ttSv to of that other), but that glory over all, playing upon
olov fieyedog avrov imdeovaa (^dyXatay ^ TeXevraia what we may call the whole extension of that world,^
opdrai, otg ‘ttoXXo, jjSr] M(j>0r] ivapryrj dedpMra, oi deal is seen at the end by those who have already seen
Kad' eva Kal ttSs 6p,ov, al ifivyal ac Trdvra €k« many clear visions, the gods individually and every
opdiaai Kal Ik tS>v Travraiv yevopevai, d>aTe Trdvra one together, and the souls who see everything in
the intelligible world and originate from everything,
20 TTcpUyeiv Kal avral ® els reXos' Kal
so as to include everything themselves from the
etaiv eKet Kadoaov ® av avrdiv tre^vicrj etvai €KeX,
beginning to the end; and they are there in the
TToXXdKis 8e ai)ru>v Kal to tiov eKet, orav prj wai intelligible, in so far as they are naturally able to be
SieiXrjp,p.evai. ravra oSv dpwv d Zeds, Kal eX tls there—-but often the whole of them is there, when
rjpxov avrcp avvepaarrjs, to reXevraiov dpa pevov they are not divided. Zeus then sees these things,
25 cm traaiv dXov to KaXXos, Kal KdXXovs peraaxdiv and with him any one of us who is his fellow-lover,
Tov €KeX‘ aTToarlX^ei yap Trdvra Kal TrXrjpoZ rovg and finally he sees, abiding over all, beauty as a
eKet yevopevovs, d)s KaXovs Kal avrovg yeveadai, whole, by his participation in the intelligible beauty;
OTTotoi TToXXdKis dvOpcoTTOi els vi/rt]Xovs dva^alvovreS for it shines bright upon all and fills those who have
roTTOVS ro ^avdov ypdipa eyovarjs rrjs yrjs rrjs eKet come to be there so that they too become beautiful,
eTrXi^adrjCTav eKelvrjs rijs opoiwdevres rfj
as often men, when they go up into high places
where the earth has a red-gold colour, are filled with
30 e<f>’ -^s ipeP'qKeaav. eKet 8c xpda 17 eiravdovaa koX-
that colour and made like that upon which they
Xos earl, pdXXov 8c ndv xpo® KrlXXos c/c pddovs' walked.^ But there in the intelligible world the
ov yap dXXo ro KaXov <hs eiravdovv. dXXd rots pr) colour which blooms on the surface is beauty, or
oXov opdiaiv rj TTpoa^oXi] povr/ evopCadr], rots 8c 8id rather all is colour and beauty to its innermost part:
iravTos otov olvcodetai Kal TrXrjpcodetai rov veKrapos, for its beauty is not somethings different from itself,
like a surface bloom. But those who do not see the
* Page, cum ■q 8k (lin. 16) coniungendum. whole only acknowledge the external impression,
• Kirchhoff**: aSrat Enn.
^ Theiler: icat oaov Knn.: oaov Kirchhoff*. but those who are altogether, we may say, drunk and
filled with the nectar,® since the beauty has pene-
* I follow Schwyzer here In supplying rov koAov (^ais with Nile and, as the Theologia Aristotelis (VIII. 146. 26-9) and
17 8e. After the soul has risen from the contemplation of the Br6hier in his Notice to the treatise interpret it, becoming
moral beauty in itself to that of the moral Forms (the starting- suffused with the intense light so that they look the same
point of this contemplation in each individual case being colour as the red hills on which they walk (a less romantic
different) it finally arrives at the vision of the beauty of the explanation in terms of being covered with desert dust might
intelligible world as a whole. also be possible but would be less appropriate to the context).
* Here Plotinus seems to be thinking of men going up into ’ Cp. Plato Symposium (the drunken Poros in the garden
the high desert which lies on each side of the valley of the of Zeus, used for various allegorical purposes by Plotinus).
270 271
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 8. ON THE INTELLIGIBLE BEAUTY
36 are 8t’ oX-qs tov KaXXovs eXOovros, ov dea- trated through the whole of their soul, are not
rats fJLOvov vndpxei yeveadai. ov yap eri to p,ev simply spectators. For there is no longer one thing
TO S’ aS TO dewpevov e^co, oAA’ ex^i to o^ecas outside and another outside which is looking at it,
opwv ev avT& to optLpevov, koX €XOiv to. itoXXol but the keen sighted has what is seen within, al­
though having it he for the most part does not know
ayvo€t OTt €^€t Kat o)$ €go) ov pA€n€i, on cos* opcu- that he has it, and looks at it as if it were outside
pevov pXeirei Kol on deXei jSAcTTeiv. irdv Se o ns ws because he looks at it as if it was something seen,
40 deaTov ^Xeirec e^cj pXhrei. oAAd xph avrov and because he wants to look at it. But one looks
ijSr] peTa<f>epeiv Kal ^Xeireiv 0)S ev koX jSAeTreiv <Ls from outside at everything one looks at as a spectacle.
avTov, dxnrep e? ns vtto 0€ov KaToox^Oels <j>oip6- But one must transport what one sees into oneself,
XrjTTTos fj VTTO nvos Mower))? iv awTO) dv ttoioZto
and look at it as one and look at it as oneself, as if
someone possessed by a god, taken over by Phoebus
TOW deov TTiv deav, el hvvapM/ exoi ev avr<p Oeov or one of the Muses, could bring about the vision of
pXeneiv. the god in himself, if he had the power to look at the
11. *Eti ^ 8e ns Tipubv dSwaTtov iavrov opSv god in himself.
V7T €K€lVOyjTOV U€OV €7TaV KaTaAq<pU€LS €is TO loeiv 11. Further, one of us, being unable to see him­
iTpo(l>ipy TO deapa, eowrov irpo<f>epei Kal elKova
self, when he is possessed by that god brings his
contemplation to the point of vision, and presents
avTov KaXXwmcrdeZaav pXenei,' d<f>els 8e Trjv elKova himself to his own mind and looks at a beautified
6 Kalitep koXt/v odaav els ev avrta eXdcbv Kal prjKen image of himself; but then he dismisses the image,
axioas ev opov travra earl peT' eKelvov tow deov beautiful though it is, and comes to unity with
‘ difto(f>r]Tl irapovTOS, Kal eon peT avrov oarov himself, and, making no more separation, is one and
all together with that god silently present, and is
hvvarai Kal OeXei. el S’ emcrrpa(f>elq els Swo, Kad-
with him as much as he wants to be and can be.
apos pevcov e<f>e^s eanv awr<3, ware avrep napel- But if he returns again to being two, while he
vai eKelvcjs irdXiv, el iraXiv eir' avrov arpe<f>oi. ev remains pure he stays close to the god, so as to be
10 8e Tjj emcrrpo<fyrj KepBos tovt e^ei' apxopevos present to him again in that other way if he turns
again to him. In this turning he has the advantage
atadaverai avrov, «w? erepos earr Bpap^v Be els that to begin with he sees himself, while he is
TO eioio exei irav, Kal d(l>els TTjv ataOqoiv els different from the god; then he hastens inward and
tovttLoo) tov erepos etvai <^6^(p ets eanv eKeX‘ has everything, and leaves perception behind in his
Kav emOvpTjoT] cos erepov ov ISetv, e^co avrov iroiei. fear of being different, and is one in that higher
world; and if he wants to see by being different, he
* Gollwitzer: el Enn. puts himself outside. While he is coming to know
272 273
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 8. ON THE INTELLIGIBLE BEAUTY
Sei Se KarafiavOdvovra fxev h> rivi tvtto) avTov the god he must keep to an impression of him and
16 yJvovra /xerd rod t^ryTclv yvwfJMreveiv avrov, els form distinct ideas of him as he seeks him and dis­
otov Se etaeiaiv, ovrw fiadovra Kara ttLotiv^ ws cern what he is entering into; and when he has
im i^aKapiOTOV etaeiaiv, iJSrj avrov Sovvai learnt with confidence that it is into the highest
els TO etaw Kal yeveodai dvrl opcovTOS 17S1J blessedness, he must give himself up to what is
deapa erepov Oeojpevov, olois eKetdev rjKei eKXdp-
within and become, instead of one who sees, an
object of vision to another who contemplates him
TTOvra rots vorjpaai. ttcD? oSv earai ns iv KaX^ pi]
shining out with thoughts of the kind which come
20 opiav avTo; ^ opcvv avro ws erepov ovBeirw ev from that world. How then can anyone be in beauty
KaXw, yevopevos Se avro ovrw pAXiara ev koXw. without seeing it ? If he sees it as something dif­
el ovv opams rov e^w, opaaw pev ov Set etvai rj ferent, he is not yet in beauty, but he is in it most
ovrws, ws ravrov r^ 6par(p' rovro Se otov avveais perfectly when he becomes it. If therefore sight is
Kal avvalaOrjais avrov evXa^ovpevov pi] rw pdX- of something external we must not have sight, or
only that which is identical with its object. This
26 Aov alaOdveaBai BeXeiv eavrov aTToarrjvai. Set Se
is a sort of intimate understanding and perception
KaKeivo evBvpeXaBai, ws rwv pev KaKwv al alaBr]-
of a self which is careful not to depart from itself by
aeis rds TrX-qyds eyovai pel^ovs, ijrrovs Se rds wanting to perceive too much. We must consider
yvwaeis rij •nX’qyf] eKKpovopevas' voaos yap pSX- this also, that the perceptions of evils have more
Xov e/cTrArj^iv, vyleia Se ijpepa avvovaa paXXov dv violent impacts, but produce less knowledge because
it is driven out by the impact; for illness strikes our
avveaiv Sotij avrijs' TTpom^ec ^ yap are olKeiov koX
consciousness harder, but the quiet companionship
30 evovrai • ij S’ eanv dXXorpiov KalovK olKetov, Kal rav- of health gives us a better understanding of it; for
TT] SidSr]Xos rw a<f>68pa erepov i]pwv elvai So/ceiv. it comes and sits by us as something which belongs
rd Se ijpwv Kal i]pets dvalaB-qror ovrw S’ ovres to us, and is united to us. Illness is alien and not
pdXiara -ndvrwv eapev avrols crvverol ri]v emar- our own, and therefore particularly obvious because
r]pr]v i]]iwv Kal •^pds ev iTeTTOvr]K6res. KaKeZ roiwv, it appears so very different from us. We have no
perception of what is our own, and since we are like
ore pdXiara lapev Kara vovv, dyvoeXv SoKovpev,
this we understand ourselves best when we have
36 rrjs aloBt^arews dvapevovres ro irdBos, 17 <f>r]ai pi] made our self-knowledge one with ourselves. In
ewpaKevar ov yap elSev ovS' dv rd roiavrd vore the higher world, then, when our knowledge is most
perfectly conformed to Intellect, we think we know
^ coniecimus: koI ■aiariv Snn.: koi morevoavra Kirchhoff, nothing because we are waiting for the experience of
Muller: koi OTcmr <lxorra> Volkmann*: icoi <Aaj3dv7-a> ir^onv
Harder: koX mora. Cilento. sense-perception, which says it has not yet seen:
• Theiler: trpot(ei Enn.: Trapi^a suspie. Volkmann. and it certainly has not seen, and never will see things
274 275
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PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 8. ON THE INTELLIGIBLE BEAUTY

toot. TO ovv aviOTovv 7j aicrtfrjais €oriv, o 0€ aAAos* like these. It is sense-perception which disbeheves,
€CTIV O LOOJV'
v>)
7], €1 aTHGTOL KaK€LV09, OVO
n c
aV aVTOV
^ but it is the other one who sees ; and for him to
marevaeiev elvar ovSe yap ovh' avros Swarai e^co disbeheve would be to disbeheve in his own existence:
for he cannot after all put himself outside and make
9els eavrov c5? alaOrp-ov ovra o^BaXpuits rots rod himself visible so as to look at himself with his bodily
40 awparos jSAeTretv. eyes.
12. ’AAAd etpijrai, ttcos cbs erepos Swarai tovto I 12. We have explained how he can do this as an-
TTOieiv, Kal ttcS? ws avros. lSd)v 8^, eire d>s erepos, i other and how as himself. But when he sees,
etre u>s p.elvas avros, ri dirayyeAXei; rj Beov
( whether as another or as one who remains himself,
what does he report ? He reports that he has seen
ewpaKevai roKov wSivovra KaXov Kat irdvra Srj ev a god in labour with a beautiful offspring all of which
6 avrip yeyewqKora Kal aXimov eyovra rrjv wSiva ev he has brought to birth within him, and keeping the
avrcp‘ -qadeis yap oTs eyewa Kal dyaaOels rwv I children of his painless birth-pangs within himself;
roKCov Kareaye irdvra irap' avrtp rrjv avrov Kal for he is pleased with what he has borne and de-
hghted with his offspring and so keeps all with him
rrjv avrdiv dyXatav dapevUras' 6 8e koXcHv ovtcov
in his enjoyment of his and their glory; all the others
Kal KaXXiovttiv rwv els rd etaw pepevrjKorwv povos who are beautiful, even more beautiful, have remained
€K rwv dXXwv Zeus irdts e^e<f>dvr] els rd e$w. within and Zeus, one son alone of all, has appeared
10 d^’ oS Kal vordrov iratSds dvros eariv ISetv otov outside.^ From him, even though he is the youngest
e^ elKovos rivds avrov, daos d irarrfp eKelvos Kal ol son, one can see as if from a likeness of him how great
his father is and the brothers who have remained
peivavres irap' avrw dSeXrfjol. 6 Se ov <fyt]ai pdrriv
with him. But he says that it was not without purpose
eXBeZv irapd. rov irarpos' etvai yap Set avrov dXXov that he came forth from his father; for his other
Koapov yeyovora koXov, ws elKova koXov- prjSe universe must exist, which has come into being beauti­
yap etvai Oepirdv elKova KaXijv prj etvai p-qre koXov ful, since it is an image of beauty; for it is utterly
15 p-qre ovalas. pipeirai S^ rd dpyervirov iravrayf}' unlawful that there should be no beautiful image of
beauty and reahty. This image imitates its arche­
Kal yap Coyrjv eyei Kal rd rfjs ovalas, ws plprjpa,
type in every way; for it has Hfe and what belongs to
Kal rd KoXXos etvai, (Ls eKeidev eyei Se Kal rd del reality as a representation of it should, and it has
its being beauty since it comes from that higher
1 In these last two chapters the m3rths of Ouranos, Kronos beauty; and it has its everlastingness in the way
and Zeus are explained as symbolically referring to the Three
Hypostases, the One, Intellect and Soul. Plotinus does not
often indulge in this sort of allegorization, and when he does Por another rather confusing and fluctuating allegorization see
it is somewhat tortured and he finds it difficult to be consistent. III. 6 On Love.
276 277
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 8. ON THE INTELLIGIBLE BEAUTY
avTOV, u)s eiKcov fj ttotc fiev e^ei elKova, vore Se proper to an image; otherwise [the intelligible
ov, ov T€)(vri yevofievrjs Ttjs elKovos. naaa Se universe] will sometimes have an image and some­
20 eiKcjv eariv, oaov av to apyerunov [levr]. times not—and this image is not the product of art,
but every natural image exists as long as its arche­
Sio ovK opdais, ot ^Oeipovai tov vorjTov pAvovros
type is there. For tlds reason those are not right
KoX yew&aiv ovrws, <hs irork ^ovXevcrapevov rod who destroy the image-universe while the intelligible
TToiovvros ‘TToielv. oaris yap rpoTTos Ttovqaeois abides, and bring it into being as if its maker ever
roiavnqg ovk ideXovai ovvievai ovS’ taaaiv, on, planned to make it. For they do not want to under­
stand how this kind of making works, that as long
oaov CKelvo iXXdpTrei, ov prjirore rd dXXa eX- as that higher reality gives its light, the rest of things
25 Xeirn), dXX' oS eon Kat ravra eanv yv S’ del can never fail: they are there as long as it is there;
Kal earai. ypryariov yap rovrois roZs dvopaat but it always was and will be. We must use these
rfj TOV aypaiveiv iOeXeiv dvdyKrj. [temporal] words because we are compelled to want
to signify our meaning.
13. *0 ovv Beds d els to peveiv (Laavrcvs 8e8epe- 13. The god therefore who is bound so that he
vos Kal avyyoipyaas r<p irai8l rov8e rov vavrds
abides the same, and has conceded the government
apyeiv—ov yap i^v avr<p -irpos rpoTtov ryv c/cei of this universe to his son—for it would not have been
dpxyv d<f>evn vecvrepav avrov Kal varepav peOeireLv in character for him to abandon his rule in the in­
5 Kopov exovn rutv koXcHv—ravr’ d(f>els earyae re
telligible world and go seeking a later one because
he had had enough of the beauties there—^lets this
rov avrov Ttarepa els eavrdv, Kal peypis avrov irpos
world go and establishes his father in himself, ex­
rd dvo)- earrjae 8’ aS Kal rd els ddrepa dird rov tending as far as him on the upper side; and on the
vatdds dp^dpeva etvai per' avrov, ware pera^v other side he has established what begins with his
dp<f)oZv yeveaOai ry re ereporyn rys irpds rd dvw son in the place after himself, so that he comes to be
diroropys Kal r<p dveyovri dird rov p^r’ avrdv irpds between the two, by the otherness of his severance
from what is above, and by the bond which keeps
10 TO Kdrw 8eapw, pera^v wv irarpos re dpelvovos him from what comes after him on the lower side;
Kal yrrovos vUos. aAA’ eTTei8y 6 iraryp avrw peL-
he is between a better father and a worse son. But
Cwv y Kard KoiXXos ‘yv, irpwrws avrds epeive koXos, since his father was too great to be beauty, he re­
Kalroi KoXys Kal rys ffroxys ovays' dAA’ eon koX- mained primarily beautiful; soul is certainly beauti­
Xlwv Kal ravrys, on. txvos airy avrov, Kal rovrw ful, but he is more beautiful than soul, because soul
15 earl KoXy pev ryv <f>vaiv, koXXIwv 8e, orav €KeZ
has a trace of him and is naturally beautiful by
reason of this, but still more beautiful when it looks
^Xe-rry. el oSv y tfwxy y rov iravros, Iva yvwpipAj- to that which is above it. If then, to speak more
278
279
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 8. ON THE INTELLIGIBLE BEAUTY
plainly, the Soul of the All is beautiful, that is
repov XeycDpev, koX rj 'A(f>po8irq avTr\ /coAij, ti?
Aphrodite is beautiful, what is Intellect ^ ? For
CKelvos; el p,ev yap Trap avrrjs, izoaov av etq if Aphrodite’s beauty comes from herself, how great
CKelvo; el 8e nap' aXXov, napa rivos 4’^XV ™ must that higher beauty be ? But if it comes from
another, from whom does Soul have its beauty, that
inaKTov koI to avp^ves' rfj ovala avrrjs koXXos which comes to it from outside and that which
20 eyei; enel Kal, orav /cat avrol koXoI,
rip avrwv belongs to its real nature ? For when we ourselves
etyaiy alcrypol Se in' dXXrjv pera^aivovres (fwaiv are beautiful, it is by belonging to ourselves, but we
are ugly when we change to another nature: when
Kal yivcooKovres piv iavrovs KoXoi, alaypol 8e we know ourselves we are beautiful, but ugly when
ayvoovvres. €KeZ oSv KaKeldev to KaXov. dp' oSv we are ignorant of ourselves. Beauty therefore is
in that higher world and comes from there. Is what
dpKet rd flprjpJva els ivapyij avveaiv dyayw rov
we have said, then, enough to lead to a clear under­
vorjTOV Tonov, 7] /car* aAAijv oSoy naXiy av Sei standing of the " intelligible region , or must we
go back and take another way, like this * ?
ineXOeZy <S8e;
1 Plotinus likes to identify Aphrodite with Soul (op. III. 6.
2£f.). But so far in this treatise Zeus has been Soul, who
leads the contemplation of Intellect (eh. 10) and comes out
from the intelligible world to make the sense-world (oh. 12).
Aphrodite manages to be daughter of Kronos as well as of
Ouranos in III. 6. 2. 16-20, and perhaps Plotinus is also
thinking of her as daughter of Kronos (Intellect) here, and has
dropped Zeus out of the allegory for the moment.
* For the “ intelligible region ” op. Plato Sepubltc VII
617B5. This sentence leads straight into the beginning of V.
5 and makes it clear that the two treatises are parts of a single
work.

281
ENNEAD V. 9
 ON INTELLECT, THE FORMS, AND BEING
Synopsis
Three kinds of philosopher. Epicurean, Stoic and Pla-
tonist: only the Platonist is capable of seeing and rising
to the world of Intellect (ch. 1). The Platonic ascent of
the mind from the derived beauty below to the original
V. 9. ON INTELLECT, THE FORMS, beauty above: should it stop at Intellect? (ch. 2). The
AND BEING nature of InteUeot and the Forms in Intellect, and the
necessity that they must exist, argued from the works of
Introiudory Note human and divine art here below (oh. 3). Superiority of
Intellect to Soul, and Soul’s dependence on Intellect
This early treatise, the fifth in Porphyry’s chronological (oh. 4). The unity of thought and Forms in the living
order, is the first of Plotinus’s “ ascents of the mind ” reality of Intellect (ohs. 6-8). The contents of the world
from the material world to Intellect; the One or Giood of Intellect: it is a true intelligible universe containing
is only mentioned incidentally in this treatise and the everything which exists as form in the world of sense
subject of its relation to Intellect is left for future develop­ (but not, therefore, any defect or evil) (chs. 9-10). The
ment (ohs. 2 and 14). The object of the treatise is to arts considered and distinguished according to the degrw
display the true nature of InteUeet, and to show how Soul to which they exist in the intelligible world or derive their
and the material world in which our souls find themselves principles from it (ch. 11). If the Form of man and the
depend on it, and so to teach us to live in it as our true intellectual arts are in the intelligible, then so must the
home. It stays fairly close to the traditional school- universal Forms be which are the subject-matter of those
Platonism which Plotinus had inherited, but already shows arts; a quick glance at the problem of physical individuality
clear evidence of his original development of the tradition, (oh. 12). Soul and its excellences exist in both worlds:
especially in his insistence throughout on the living unity so everything which exists in the intelligible world is also
of thought and the Forms in the Intellect which is also here below (oh. 13). Notes on a variety of problems about
Being, and the clear indication in oh. 13 that souls and the intelligible world—^the origin of its multiplicity, the
their virtues here below continue to belong to the higher question of Forms of casual compounds and products of
world of Intellect which is everywhere, not spatially putrefaction etc. (ch. 14).
separated or cut off from the lower world. The treatise
gives the impression of having been rather hurriedly
written: the later chapters are very summary in their
treatment of the contents of the world of Intellect, and
the last (eh. 14) is little more than a series of notes for
further discussion.

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 V. 9. ON INTELLECT, THE FORMS,
V. 9. (5) nEPI TOT NOT KAI TON
lAEON KAI TOT ONTOS AND BEING

1. ndvre? avdpwTTOi i^apxfjs yev6p,evoi ataO-qaei 1. All men from the beginning, as soon as they are
bom, employ sense-perception before intellect and
Ttpo vov xfyqadp^oi koX rots aladrjTots irpoa^aXov- sense-objects are necessarily the first which they
res TTpcorois i^avdy/Krjs ol evravOot Karapelvav- encounter. Some of them stay here and Hve
T€s Siefijaav ravra vpwTa Kal eayara vopUxavres, through their lives considering these to be primary
5 Kal TO ev avTois Xvmjpov re Kal ij8u to pev KaKov, and ultimate, and since they consider what is painful
TO Se dyaOdv viroXa^ovres dpKclv ivopiaav, Kal to and pleasant in them to be evil and good respec­
pev huoKovres, to 8’ diroiKovopovpevoi hieyevovro. tively, they think this is enough, and pass their liv-es
Kal ao^iav Tatmjv oX ye Aoyou peTairoiovpevoi pursuing the one and contriving to get rid of the
avTcHv eOevTO, ota oi ^apels twv opvlOwv, ot ttoXXo, other. And those of them who claim rationality
e/e yi]^ Xa^ovres Kal Papvvdevres vipov ‘irrfjvai make this their philosophy, like the heavy sort of
10 dSwaTovai Kaltrep Trre/sd irapd Trjs <f>vae<os AajSov-
birds who have taken much from the earth and are
re?. ol 8e ■qpdrjaav pkv dXiyov e/e tG>v /edreo kiv- weighed down by it and so are unable to fly high
although nature has given them wings. Others
owTos avTovs TTpos TO /edAAiov dwo tov rjheos tov have risen a little from the things below because the
TTjs 'f’vx'fjs KpeiTTovos, dSwaTT^oavres 8e I8eiv to better part of their soul has urged them on from the
avct), cos ovK eyovres dXXo, ottov ar'qaovrai, kot- pleasant to a greater beauty; but since they were
Tjvixdriaav crvv tco rrjs dpe-rijs dvopaTi eirl Trpd^eis unable to see what is above, as they have no other
16 Kal e/eAoyd? twv /edrco, dcf)' cLv iTrex^lpyjc^av to ground to stand on they are brought down, with the
•npwTov aXpeadai. TpiTov 8e yevos 9elwv dvBpcoirwv name of virtue, to practical actions and choices of
Svvdpei re Kpelrrovi Kal o^vttjti dppMTWv etSe re the things below from which they tried to raise
themselves at first.^^ But there is a third kind of
godlike men who by their greater power and the
^ This is a piece of stock Platonic school-polemic against
Epicureans and Stoics, those lumpish fowl the Epicureans sharpness of their eyes as if by a special keen-
being as usual dismissed casually and scornfully, and the
Stoics treated rather more respectfully. The “ greater virtue. For the Stoic doctrines of choice referred to hero
beauty ” to which the Stoics have been urged on is of course op. SEE in 64 and 118.
287
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 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 9. ON INTELLECT, THE FORMS, AND BEING s

&OTiep VITO 6^v8opKLas rrjv dvcj atyXrjv Kat 7jp$r] re sightedness see the glory above and are raised to it |
as if above the clouds and the mist of this lower 1
€K€t otov virep ve(f>(vv Kai rrjs evravda Kal
world and remain there, overlooking all things here f
20 epeivev e/cei rd TfjSe virepi^ov irdvra -qadev ry roncp
below and delighting in the true region which is 1
dXrjdivcp Kal olKeitp ovri, drairep ck ttoXXt}s TfXdvrjs their own, like a man who has come home after long j
els TTarpiSa evvopav dxfriKopLevos dvOpwiros. wandering to his own well-ordered country.^ |
**T* f T T t f \ ^ H >
2 . 1 iff ovv ovTOs o roTTos; Kai ttcjs av ns €ts* 2. What, then, is this region ? And how could one !
avrdv d^iKoiro ; d<f>LKoi,ro p,ev dv 6 <f>vaei epcoriKOS reach it ? The man could reach it who is by nature a I
Kal OVTCOS Trjv Siddeaiv i^ap)(f}s (f>iX6ao<f>os, wSivcov lover and truly disposed to philosophy from the ^
pJv; are epuiriKOS, irept to KaXov, ovk dvaayopLevos beginning, in travail over beauty, since he is a lover, ,
6 8e TOO ev ocoyLtari KdXXovs, dXX' evdev dva<f>v- not enduring the “ beauty of body ” but escaping
ycbv em rd rfjs KdXXT], dperds Kal from it up to the “ beauties of soul, virtues and kinds
emar'qp.as Kal eirirrfSevp.ara Kal vopovs,
of knowledge and ways of life and laws and
again he ascends to the cause of the beauties in soul, |
irdXiv aS enavaPaCvei em rrjv rdiv ev ipvyij KaX&v and again to anything there may be beyond this, I
alrCav, koI el n vdXiv aS irpo rovrov, ears eir' eaya- till he comes to the ultimate which is the first, which
rov -qicri rd vpdirov, o Trap’ avrov KaXov. evBa Kal is beautiful of itself. When he has arrived there he
10 eXddiv dihlvos iravaerai, nporepov Se ov. dXXd ceases from his travail, but not before. But how will
•jTcds dva^rfaerai, Kal irodev dvvapus avrw, Kal ris he ascend, and where will his power come from, and
Xoyos rovrov rdv epcora TraiSaycoyijaerai; fj oSe' what reasoning will guide tlfis Love on his way ?
rovro rd KdXXos rd em rots awpaaiv eiraKrov This one: this beauty which rests on bodies comes
eari roZs auipLacrf pLop^al ydp aSrai aoipArojv <hs to the bodies from elsewhere; for these beauties
15 em vXrj avroZs. pLera^dXXei yovv rd VTTOKelp,evov are forms of bodies which rest upon them as if on
Kol eK KoXov aloypdv yiverai. pede^ei dpa, (fyrjalv their matter. At any rate what underlies them
changes, and becomes ugly instead of beautiful. Its
6 Xoyos. rL o5v rd iroiijcTav ocdpa KaXov; aXXeos
beauty comes by participation, then, our reasoning
p,ev KdXXovs TTapovala, dXXurs 8e ipvyT^, ^ eirXaae re says. What then is it which makes a body beautiful ?
Kal p,op<l>rjv roidvSe evfjKe. ri oSv; In one way it is the presence of beauty, in another
avrijs KaXov; ^ ov. ov ydp ij p,ev ^v <f>povipMS re the soul, which moulded it and put this particular
form in it. Well, then, is the soul beautiful of
^ For the Homeric allusions here and their significance see itself? No, it is not. For [if it was] one soul would
I. 6. 8, n. 1.
* Plato’s Phaedrus and Symposium are here, as often, philosopher in Plotinus op. I. 3.1-2 (Plotinus in these chapters
combined: op. Phaedrus 248D3-4 and Symposium 210B3-C6. does not simply identify the lover and the philosopher as he
For the possible passage from musician to lover and lover to does in this earlier treatise).
288 289
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 9. ON INTELLECT, THE FORMS, AND BEING

20 Kol KaXq, ij 8e a^pcDv re Kal ata)(pd. (ftpovqaei not be wise and beautiful and another stupid and
dpa TO KoXov •nepl ifrux'^v- Kal tIs oSv 6 <f>p6vqGiv ugly. So beauty in the soul conies by wisdom.
And what is it, then, which gives \vfedom to the soul ?
Bovs ^vxjj: fj vovs i^avdyKTjs, vovs Se ov nore Intellect, necessarily, an intellect which is not some­
fiev vovs, 7TOT€ 8e dvovs, o ye dXrjOivos- Trap’ times intellect and sometimes unintelligent, but the
avTov dpa KaXos. Kal Trorepov Srj evravda Bel true Intellect. This, then, is beautiful of itself.
Should we then stop at Intellect as the First, or
arrjvat cos Ttpcorov, rj Kal vov eneKeiva Bel levai, must we go beyond Intellect, and does Intellect
25 vovs Be irpoecmjKe p.ev dpxfjs Trjs vpa^s d>s irpos stand from our point of view in front of the first
riixds, wa-rrep ev -npodvpois rdyadov dnayyeX- principle, as if in the porch of the Good,^ proclaiming
Xwv ev avrcp rd Trdvra, wcnrep eKelvov tvttos /aaX-
to us all that is in it, like an impression of it in
greater multiplicity while the Good remains alto­
Xov ev TrXijdei CKecvov irdvTT] pAvovros ev evi;
gether in one ?
3. ’^TTioKeirreov Be ravrrjv rrjv vov <f>vatv, ^v 3. We must consider the nature of this Intellect,
eTTayyeXXerai 6 Xdyos etvai ro ov ovtcvs Kal Trjv which our reasoning tells us is the genuine reality
and true substance, when we have first confirmed by
dXrjdrj ovaiav, irpoTepov ^e^auvaapUvovs Kar following a different course that something of the
dXXrjv oSoi/ idvras, on Bel etvai riva roiavrrjv. sort must exist. It is perhaps ridiculous to enquire
5 tcrais pev oSv yeXolov ^rjTelv, el vovs eanv ev rols whether there is intellect in the world; though there
are, it may be, people who would dispute even this.
oSar rdya 8’ dv rives Kal irepl rovrov Biap<j>ia- But it is more disputable if it is the sort of Intellect
^r/Tolev. paXXov Be, el roiovros, olov ^apev, Kal el we say it is, and if it is a separate one, and if it is
Xojpiaros ns, Kal el oSros rd ovra Kal ij ridv the real beings and if the nature of the Forms is
there; this is our present subject. We certainly
elBd>v <l>vais evravda, rrepl oS Kal rd vvv eirrelv
see that all the things that are said to exist are
TTpoKeirai. opcvpev B’fj rd Xeyopeva etvai Trdvra compoundsi, and not a single one of them is simple;
10 avvdera Kal drrXovv avrdiv ovBe ev, d re rexyr] [this appH^ to] each and every work of art, and all
things compounded by nature. For the works of
epyd^erai eKaara, a re avvearr]Ke (fivoei' rd re
art have bronze or wood or stone, and they are not
ydp rexvTjrd ;^aAKoi' rj ^vXov rj Xldov Kal irapd brought to completion from these until each art
rovrcvv ovtto) rereXearai, irplv dv rj rexyrj eKdarrj makes one a statue, another a bed, and another a
house by putting the fom^ which it has in them.
rj pev dvBpidvra, rj Be KXivrjv, rj 8e olKiav epydcrqrai
e?8ov? rov Trap’ avrfj evOeaei. Kal prjv Kal rd <f>vaei Op. Plato Philebits 64C1.
290 291

It
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 9. ON INTELLECT, THE FORMS, AND BEING

16 ovv^cnSna to. /xev voXvcwvOera airraiv koX avyKpL- And again you will be able to resolve the things put
para KaXovfjieva dvoXvaets els to em vaai toTs together by nature, those of them which are multiple
compounds and are called compositions, into the
avyKpideimv etSos' otov dvdpcDnov els Kal
form imposed on all the elements of the composi­
aS)p.a, Kal to ocDjua els rd reaaapa. eKaarov 8e tion^: man, for instance, into soul and body, and
Tovrcov avvderov evpchv e^ vXrjs Kal rov p,op<f>ovvTOS the body into the four elements. And when you
20 —vXtj yap nap' avTrjs Tj rdiv oroiyeLayv dpop<f>os— have found that each of the elements is a compound
Crprqcreis to el8os oOev Trj vXr). ^rjTqaets S' aS Kal of matter and what forms it—for the matter of the
elements is in itself formless—^you will enquire from
Trjv norepa tcHv dnXdxv ijSr], rj evi ti ev avrfj
where the form comes to the matter. And then again
TO pev (OS vXt], to 8e el8os, 6 vovs d ey avrfj, 6 pev you will enquire whether the soul is one of the simple
(l)S T) enl T& yaXKW p^p^rj, 6 Se otos 6 rqv /Lto/a^v entities, or whether there is something in it like
ev T(p xoXkw novqaas. to. avTO, Se TOvra Kal enl matter and something like form, the intellect in it,
one intellect being like the shape on the bronze, and
26 TOW navTos /xera^epcoi/ tis dvajS'^crerai Kal evravOa
the other like the man who makes the shape in the
enl vovv nouq-r^v ovtcos Kal Srjpiovpyov TiOepevos,
bronze. And one will transfer these same obser­
Kal (fyqaet to vnoKelpevov de^dpevov poppas to vations to the whole universe, and will ascend there
pev nvp, TO Se vScop, to Se depa koI yijv yeveadai, also to Intellect and suppose it to be the true maker
Tas Se pop<f>ds Tavras nap' dXXov rjKeiv. tovto and craftsman, and will say that the underlying
30 Se etvai tpvxrpr <fivxr]v Se aS Kal enl tols TeTpaai matter receives the forms, and part of it becomes
fire, and part water, and part air and earth, but that
rqv Koapov pop(fyr]v Sovvar Tavrjj Se vovv yoprjyov these forms come from another: and this other is
Twv Xoyojv yeyovevac, uxmep Kal Tats tcov TeyyiTcov soul; then again that soul gives to the four elements
ilrvyaCs napd twv Texvwv tovs els to evepyetv the form of the universe, but Intellect provides it
Xoyovs' vovv Se tov pev to? etSos rrjs f/fvxyjs, tov with the forming principles, as in the souls of artists
the forming principles for their activities come from
/caret rqv poptftqv, tov Se tov rrjv pop(f>rjv napeyovra
their arts; and that one intellect is like the form of
36 (OS TOV noiq-rr/v tov dvSpidvTOs, S ndvra ewndpyei, the soul, the one which pertains to its shape, but the
a SlSwaiv. iyyvs pev dtXridelas, a SlSwai tfivxfj' a, other is the one which provides the shape, like the
Se TO (Twpa SeyeTai, eiSa/Aa ■^Stj /cat pipqpaTa. maker of the statue in whom everything that he gives
exists. The things which Intellect gives to the soul
are near to truth; but those which body receives are
1 Plotinus seems to have left out the matter which is in­ already images and imitations.
formed or the elements brought together under the form in
this phrase, though they appear in the example which follows. Some editors supply a phrase- to make up the deficiency, but
292
Plotinus is quite capable of such an omission.
293
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 9. ON INTELLECT, THE FORMS, AND BEING

4. A«x Ti ovv Set em owevot, dAA’ ovk 4. Why, then, must we go on up when we have
avr^v elvai riOeadai to •npSnov; 7] Trp&Tov phf reached the level of soul, and not suppose that it is
the first reality ? First of all. Intellect is other and
vovs injxfjs erepov Kal KpetTTOv to 8e Kpelrrov better than soul; but the better is naturally the
<f>vaei, -npuyTov. ov yap 8ij, cos otovrai, i/tvyri voCv first. For certainly soul does not when it is made
perfect generate intellect, as they think ^; for in
5 TeAetodetoa yewa- TTodev yap to Swdpei, ivepyeia
what way will the potential become actual, if there
eorai, pr/ tov els ivepyeiav dyovros aiVtou ovros; is no cause to bring it to actuality ? For if it happens
el yap KaTo. TvyTjv, ivSexeTai eXdeXv els ev- by chance, there is a possibility of its not coming to
actuality. So we must assume that the first realities
epyeiav. Sio Set rd TrpcoTa ivepyeia Tideadai
are actual and without deficiencies and perfect; but
Kal aTTpoarhea Kal TeXeia’ to, 8e dreA^ varepa the imperfect ones come after and derive from the
air' eKelvwv, TeXeiovpeva 8e Trap' avTwv tcov first, being perfected by their begetters as fathers
perfect their originally imperfect offspring; and we
10 yeyewrjKOTOjv SiKtjv naTepcov TeXeiovvrcov, a KaTap-
must assume that soul is matter to the first reahty
yds aTeXrj eyewTjaav Kal etvai pev vXrjv irpos to which makes it and is afterwards given shape and
TTOctjaav TO -npcoTov, eVr avrrjv epp^p^ov aTToreXeta- perfected. • But certainly if soul is a thing subject
to affections, but there must be something not sub­
0at. el 8e 8rj Kal epnades dirades ject to being affected—otherwise everything will be
elvai—T] irdvra tw ypovip d-noXeiTai—Set Tt Tipo destroyed by time—there must be something before
15 4'^XV^ elvai. koX el ev Koapcu cktos Se Set
soul. And if soul is in the universe, but there must
be something outside the universe, in this way too
Tt Koapov elvai, Kal TavTTj irpo ifwxfjs Set Tt elvai. there must be something before soul. For if what
el yap to ev Koapip to ev awpaTi Kal vXrj, ovSev is in the universe is what is in body and matter,
nothing will remain the same: so that man and the
TavTOV pevei' ^ cooTe dvdpcoTTos koI -ndvres Adyot
other rational forming principles will not be eternal
OVK dtStot ouSe 01 avToC. Kal oti pev vovv Ttpo or the same. One can see then from these and many
elvai Set, e/c tovtcov Kal e^ dXXcov ■ttoXXwv other arguments that there must be an intellect
before soul.
dv Tis decoprqaeie.
‘ “They” are the Stoics: cp. IV. 7. 8>. 8-9 and for the
t Dodds (Select Passages 16), Harder: fUva Enn.* Stoic doctrine attacked here SYF I, 374, 377; II, 836—7, 839.
294 29s
 PLOTINUS; ENNEAD V. 9. ON INTELLECT, THE FORMS, AND BEING

5. Aet 8e vow Xafi^dveiv, etnep iTTaXrjSevaonev 5. But if we are to use the word in its true sense,
we must take this intellect to be, not that in poten­
r<p ovofiart, fj/rj tov Bwdnei /x.Tj8e rov d^poavvrjs tiality or that which passes from stupidity to intelli­
els vow iXOovra—el Se p/q, aXXov irdXiv aS Ttpo
gence—otherwise we shall have to look for another
intellect before it—but that which is actually and
avTov C'fjTqtJopev—oAAa tov evepyela koI del vow always intellect. But if it does not have its thinking
from outside, then if it thinks anything it thinks it
6 ovra. el 8e pq eiraKTOv to <f>povetv exei, et n from itself and if it has anything it has it from itself.
voei. Trap' avrov voeT, Kat et n e^ei. Trap' avrov But if it thinks from itself and derives the content
of its thought from itself, it is itself what it thinks.
e\ei. el 8e Trap’ avrov /cal ei avrov voet, avros For if its substance was other [than its thinking] and
ecrriv a voet. el yap rj pev ovala avrov aXXq, a Se the things which it thought were other than itself,
its substance would itself be unintellectual; and,
voet erepa avrov, avrrj rj ovala avrov dvoqros eoraf again, potential, not actual. Therefore one must
Kal Swdpei, ovK ivepyela aS. ov x<apiareov oSv not be separated from the other. But it is our
habit, derived from the things in our world, to
10 ovSerepov arro Oarepov. e6os Se qptv dm rcov nap' separate the things of that higher world in our
•qptv KaKetva rats emvolais conceptions of them. What then is its active
actuality and its thinking, that we may assume it
evepyet Kat rt voet, Iva eKetva avrov a voet OcopeOa ; itself to be what it thinks ? It is clear that, being
Intellect, it really thinks the real beings and estab­
rj SrjXov on vovs wv ovrcos voet rd ovra Kal
lishes them in existence. It is, then, the real beings.
v<f>larrjaiv. eariv dpa ovra. q yap erepcvdi ovra For it will either think them as being somewhere
else, or in itself as being itself. Now elsewhere is
16 avrd voqaei, rj ev avrcp ws avrov ovra. erepcodi pev impossible; for where could it be ? It thinks, there­
oSv dSvvarov mv ydp; avrov dpa Kal ev avrcp. fore, itself and in itself. For what it thinks is
certainly not in the realm of sense-perception, as
ov ydp Srj ev rots-aladqrots, d/arrep oiovrai. to ydp they suppose.^ For each and every primary reality
rrpu/rov eKaarov ov rd aladqrov rd ydp ev avrots is not what is perceived by the senses; for the form
on the matter in the things of sense is an image of
elSos errl vXq elSaiXov dvros, rrdv re etSos ev dXXcp the real form, and every form which is in something
else comes to it from something else and is a like­
trap' dXXov els eKetvo epyerai Kal ecrriv elKcbv
ness of that from which it comes. But also, if there
20 eKelvov. el 8e Kal noiqrrjv Set etvai rovSe rov ' The Stoics again: cp. SVI' II 88.
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navros, ov ra ev tw fi'jiTa) ovri oStos vorjcrei, tva must be a " maker of this All he -will not think
OLVTO TTOvfj. TTpo Tov /coo'/i.ov dp(i Set stvai eKeZva, what is in the not yet existent universe in order to
ov TV7TOVS d,(j>’ erepcov, aAAa (cat a.py€Tvn<i k<xl iipoi-
make it. The objects of his thought must exist
before the universe, not impressions from other
To. /cat vov ovoLav. €t 8c Xoyovs (fyrjoovaiv apK€iv,
things but archetypes and primary and the substance
diStov? BrjXov el 8e atSlovs /cat diradets, ev v/3
of Intellect. But if they are going to say that
25 Set etvai /cat roiovro) /cat -nporepcp e^ecog Kal (j>va-
rational forming principles are enough, they must
ecog Kal >pvx^S’ Svvdp,ei yap ravra. o vovg apa ra clearly be eternal; but if they are eternal and not
ovra ovTcog, ovy old eoTiv aXXodi vowv ov yap subject to affections, they must be in Intellect, and
eoTiv ovre Tvpo avrov ovTe p-ex avTOV aAAa oTov in an intellect of this kind, one which is prior to
vopLoderrjg irpSyrog, fiaXXov Se vofiog avTog tov condition and nature and soul: for these are poten-
etvai. 6p6u>g apa yap avTO voeiv eoTi re
to
tial.2 Intellect therefore really thinks the real
30 Kal etvai Kal ij twvdvev vXrjg etriaTTip.'t] beings, not as if they were somewhere else: for they
TaVTOV Tcp TTpdypiaTi Kal to epiavTOV eSt^ij- are neither before it nor after it; but it is like the-
adpiTjv dtg ev twv ovtcvv /cat at avap.v7j<jeig 8e* * primary lawgiver,® or rather is itself the law of
odSev yap e$a> tcvv ovtcvv ovb' ev tottio, p-evei Se being. So the statements are correct that “ thinking
and being are the same thing ” and “ knowledge of
det ev avTOig p.eTa^oX^v odSe ifidopav Se^op-eva* Sto
immaterial things is the same as its object ” and “ I
36 /cat ovTCvg ovra. yiyvopieva /cat aTToXXvp,eva
searched myself” (as one of the real beings); so
CTTaKTO) xp^creTai tw ovti, Kal ovKeT e/cetva also are " recollections ” for no one of the real
dAA’ e/ceivo to ov ecrrai. to. p,ev Brj aiadrjTa beings is outside, or in place, but they remain always
pieOeiei earlv a Aeyerat Tfjg viroKeiyiev-qg <f>vaeaig in themselves and undergo no alteration or destruc­
piopifn/v laxovarjg dXXoOev otov yaA/coj wapa tion : that is why they are truly real. If they come
into being and perish, they will have their being
1 Cp. Plato Timaeus 28C3-4 (the famous and much used from outside themselves, and it will not any more be
text about the difficulty of finding “ the maker and father of they, but that being which will be reality. The
this All ”). objects of sense are what they.are called by partici­
® Again a Platonic criticism of Stoic doctrme: cp. aVJ< ii
1013 p. 302, 36-7 Amim.
pation, since their underlying nature receives its
* The name “ lawgiver ” for Intellect may be taken from shape from elsewhere: bronze, for instance, from
Numenius; cp. fr. 13 Des Places (22 Leemans), where it is
used of his Second God or Demiurge, whom Numenius by the earlier philosophers of very varied significance in their original
use of this name may be consciously trying to identify with contexts to support his own doctrine: cp. Parmenides fr. B 3
the God of the Jews. Diels; Aristotle De Anima.V 4. 430a3—4 and 7. 431al—2;
* An excellent example of how Plotinus collects texts from Heraclitus fr. B 101 Diels; and (e.g.) Plato Phaedo 72B6-6.
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 PLOTINUS; ENNEAD V. 9. ON INTELLECT, THE FORMS, AND BEING
dvS/stavTOTTOtiicjjsKoX ^vXov -napa rsKTOViKijs 8ia the art of sculpture and wood from the art of car­
40 elhwXov Ttjs TexKTj? els avrd lovcrqs, rijs 8e pentry, the art passing into them through an image,
re^vTiS avrijs e^co vXrjs ev TavTOTryri p,evovcn]s Kai but itself remaining in self-identity outside matter
and possessing the true statue or bed.^ This is also
Tov aX-qOij dvdpidvra koX kXIvtjv ixovcrqs. ovrco Brj
true of [natural] bodies; and this All shows by its
Kal iirl tSw awpArcov Kat toSc irav lvSaXp,dra)V participation in appearances that the real beings
perexpv erepa avrtov Set/cwtri rd ovra, a/rpenra fthr are other than they; the real beings are unchanging,
ovra CKelva, avrd Sc rpeiropieva, IhpvpAva re e<^' but the appearances change, the real beings are
set firm on themselves and need no place; for they
46 eavTwv, ov tottov Scd/xeva* ov ydp p,eyedr)' voepdv
are not magnitudes; they have an intelligent exis­
Sc Kal avrdpKt] iavroZs viroaraaiv exovra. awpA- tence sufficient to themselves. For the natmre of
TCDV ydp <j)vais atpCeadai nap' dXXov OeXei, vovs Sc bodies wants to be preserved by something else, but
dvexcov 6avp,aarfj (f>vaei rd nap' avrcov ninrovra, Intellect upholds by its wonderful nature the things
which fall down by themselves, and does not look
onov tdpvOij avrds ov ^tjtci. for a place to be set in.
6. Nous /iw Sr/ eoTO> rd ovra, Kat ndvra iv 6. Let it be granted, then, that Intellect is the
avT(p ovx d>s ev roncp eycov, dXX' ws avrdv cj^tov real beings, possessing them all not as if [they were
Kal ev d>v avToXs- ndvra Sc 6p,ov eKeX Kal ovSev in it] as in a place, but as possessing itself and being
one with them. “ All things are together ” * there,
-^rrov StaKeKpi/jteva. enel Kal ifruxT) opov eyovaa and none the less they are separate. For even soul
6 noXXds emarripMS ev iavrfj ovSev eyei avyKeyope- has many kinds of knowledge in it but does not
vov, Kal eKoarq npdrret rd avrrjs, orav Scjj, od contain any confusion, and each kind of knowledge
(TVve<f>eXKOvaa rds dXXas, vorjpa Sc eKaarov Kada- does its own work ® when the need arises without
dragging in the others along with it, and each indi­
pdv evepyeX €k rwv cvSov aS vorjftdrwv Keipevcov. vidual thought is clear of the other thoughts which
ovrws odv Kal noXi) paXXov 6 vovs eariv opov remain within the mind when it comes into activity.
ndvra Kal ad ovy dpov, on eKaarov bvvapis iSi'a. In this way, and much more than this. Intellect is
10 d Sc nds vovs nepceyei d>anep yevos ciSij koI dianep all things together and also not together, because
each is a special power. But the whole Intellect
^ An interesting combination of Aristotle, Plato, and it is only in Plotinvis that the art of the human artist possesses
Plotinus’s own views on art. Examples of craftsmen, espe­ the true Forms: op. V. 8. 1, n. 1 (p. 241).
cially sculptors, are frequently used by Aristotle when dis­ * The phrase is taken from Anaxagoras fr. B 1 Diels,
cussing causation: cp. e.g. Physics B 1-3. The “ true bed ” rd ra avrov nparrav is Plato’s concise definition of justice
(the Form of bed) comes from Plato Republic X 697C3. But (in city and soul): op. Republic IV 433A-B.
300 301
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 9. ON INTELLECT, THE FORMS, AND BEING
oAov /xepij. /cat al to/v anepfiAToyv Se Bvvdfieis encompasses them as a genus does its species and a
elKova (f>epovcn rov Xeyopevov h> yap rw oXw whole its parts. The powers of seeds give a hkeness
dSia/cpira irdvra, /cat ol \6yoi wcmep iv evt Kevrptp' of what we are talking about: for all the parts are
Kal J)s ^ iariv dXXos o(f>0aXpu>v, dXXos 8e yeipcov undistinguished in the whole, and their rational
forming principles are as if in one central point;
Adyo? TO erepos etvai irapd tov yevopevov vtt
and all the same there is one principle of the eye and
15 avTov alaBrjrov yvcaaOels. ai pev oSv ev rots another of the hand, known from the sense-object
OTTeppaai Bvvdpeis eKdarr] avrojv Adyo? ets oXos which is produced by it to be distinct. As for the
perd rwv iv avrtp ip'nepieyop.evtav pepwv to pev powers in the seeds, then, each of them is one whole
aoipariKov vXtjv oTov oaov vypov, avros 8i formative principle with the parts included in it;
etSds icrri to oAov /cat Adyos d avros div i/>v)(rjs it has the corporeal as its matter, for instance all
etSet rw yewcUvri, rj iariv IvSaXpa if/vyTjs dXXtjs which is moist in the seed, but is itself form as a
whole and a formative principle which is the same
20 Kpelrrovos- <f>vaiv Si rives avrrjv ovopA^ovaiv r^v
as the form of soul which produced it, which is the
iv rots airippaaiv, ^ iKetdev opprjOetaa ano tcDv likeness of another better soul. Some people call
TT/jo avrijs, cjonep iK TTVpos <f>d>s, ■qarpatfii re /cat the soul in the seed “ nature which starts firom
ipopijxjoae rrp> vXr]v ovk didovaa ovSe rats ttoXv- above, from the principles before it, like hght from
OpvXX’qrois poyXeiais xpwpevr], Sovaa 8e rdiv fire, and flashes out and shapes the matter, not push­
Xoyaiv. ing it or using all that levering they keep on talking
7. At 8e iTTiarrjpai iv XoyiKrj oSaai al pev about,* but giving it a share in its forming principles.
rcov atadrjrcov—el Set imarripas rovrcvv Xeyeiv, 7. But as for the kinds of knowledge which exist
in a rational soul, those which are of sense-objects—-
•npeirei Se avrats to rrjs So^rfs ovopa—varepai rdiv
if one ought to speak of “ kinds of knowledge ” of
npayparcvv oSaai ei/cdvej etcjt rovrcvv rdiv Se these; “ opinion ” is really the suitable name for
6 vorjrcdv, at S^ /cat ovrcvs imarijpai, Ttapd vov els them—are posterior to their objects and likenesses
XoyiKTjv iXdovaai aladrjrov pev ovSev voovar of them; but those which are of intelligible objects,
KaOoaov Se elaiv iiriarrjpai, elaiv avrd e/caora a which are certainly the genuine kinds of knowledge,
^ Kal <t>7 (nihilominua) coniecimus: koX uomp Enn.: Kal
come from Intellect to rational soul and do not think
Kirchhoff*. any sense-object; but in so far as they are kinds of
knowledge, they are each and all of the active objects
* This seems to be an allusion to stock and often repeated
* An allusion to the Stole doctrine from which Plotinus Epicurean objections to the divine creation of the physical
develops his own view of nature, the lowest immanent form universe, for an example of which see Cicero De Natura
of souh fully expounded in the first chapters of III. 8; cp. Deorum I 8. 19, which may be paraphrased “ Where did God
871' II 743. get his construction machinery and labour force from? ”
302 303
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PLOTINUS; ENNEAD V. 9. ON INTELLECT, THE FORMS, AND BEING

voovm, Kol €vSo0€V TO T€ VOTjTOV T^V T6 VOrqcnV which they think, and they have from within them
ixovaiv, oTi 6 vovs evSov—o eoriv avra ra irpcjTa— the object of thought and the thought, because
Intellect is within, which is the actual primary reali­
awwv avT& ael ko.1 evepyei^ vndp^wv koX ovk ties, and always keeps company with itself and exists
in actuality and does not seek to apprehend its ob­
10 emjSoAAcov to? ovk e^cov ij emKrtofievos r} Ste^oSev-
jects as if it did not have them or was trying to obtain
(ov ov irpoKexeipi(TiJL€va—ipvxrjs yap ravra ifdOrj— them, or was going through them discursively as if
they were not ready to hand before any disciursive
dAA’ eanjKev ev avr<o 6px>v irdvra div, ov vo^aas, process—^these are experiences of soul-—^but it stands
tv’ VTTocrrqarf eKoara. ov ydp, or evorjae 6e6v, firm in itself, being all things together, and does not
think each thing in order to bring it into existence.
6e6s iyevero, ov8e, ore evorjae Kivrjoriv, Korqais For it is not true that when it thought a god, a god
came into existence or when it thought motion,
iyevero. oOev Kol to Xiiyetv voqaeis. rd etSij, el motion came into existence. It is, then, incorrect
16 ovTOi Xeyeraj,, <hs, enetSri evorjoe, roSe iyevero rj to say that the Forms are thoughts if what is meant
by this is that when Intellect thought this particu­
earl rdSe, o^k dpOws' ravrqs ydp rijs vorqaeois lar Form came into existence or is this particular
Form; for what is thought must be prior to this
irporepov Set rd voovpevov etvai. ^ ttcos dv eXdoi thinking [of a particular Form]. Otherwise how
em rd voetv avro; ov ydp Srj Kard auvroylav would it come to thinking it? Certainly not by
chance, nor did it happen on it casually.^
ovSe cTTejSaAev elKtj. 8. If, then, the thought [of Intellect] is of what is
within it, that which is within it is its immanent
8. Ei oSv rf vorjais evdvros, eKetvo rd elSos rd form, and this is the Idea. What then is this?
evov KOX ij iSea avn], rl oSv rovro; vovs Kat r^ Intellect and the intelligent substance; each indivi­
dual Idea is not other than Intellect, but each is
voepd ovaLa, ovy erepa rov vov e/cdomj ISea, dAA’ Intellect. And Intellect as a whole is all the Forms,
and each individual Form is an individual intellect,
eKdoTt] vovs. Kal oXos pev d vovs rd ndvra eiSrf,
as the whole body of knowledge is all its theorems,
6 eKoarov 8e etSos vovs eKaaros, d)s rj oXrj cmonj/iTj but each theorem is a part of the whole, not as being
spatially distinct, but as having its particular power
TO irdvra decvprjpara, eKoarov Se pepos rfjs oXrjs
* An important early indication of the sense in which
ovx d>s SiaKeKpipevov romp, Svvapiv eKoa- Plotinus accepts the common Middle Platonist doctrine that
the forms are the “ thoughts of God ”.
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PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 9. ON INTELLECT, THE FORMS, AND BEING

Tov h> TW oXtp. eGTtv oSv oStos 6 vovs iv avr& in the whole. This Intellect therefore is in itself,
and since it possesses itself in peace is everlasting
Kal excDv iavrov ev rjavxto- Kopos det. et p.ev fullness.^ If then Intellect was thought of as pre­
oSv iTpoeTTevoeiTo 6 vovs irporepos tov ovtos, eSec ceding being, we should have to say that Intellect by
10 TOV vovv Xeyeiv ivepyTjaavra Kal vorjaavra dirore- coming to active actuality in its thinking perfected
I and produced the real beings; but since we must
Xeaai Kal yewijaai to, ovra- eirel Se to ov tov vov I think of being as preceding Intellect, we must
TTpoemvoeiv dvdyKt], eyKetadai Set nOeaBai iv t<5) assume that the real beings have their place in the
thinking subject, and that the active actuality of
voovvTi rd ovra, Trp> 8e evepyeiav Kal TTjv votjoiv
thinking is in the real beings, as the active actuality
im ToZs oSaiVj olov iirl mSp i^Sij tov -nvpos of fire is in fire already existing, in order that they
16 evepyeiav, tv' ev ovra tov vovv e^’ eavrois exxi may have Intellect in its unity in them as their
1 active actuality. But being is active actuality: so
evepyeiav avTwv. eari Se Kal to ov evepyeia- put both have one active actuality, or rather both are
ovv dpiifioiv evepyeia, p^XXov Se rd d^^o> er. pia one thing. Being and Intellect are therefore one
nature; so therefore are the real beings and the
pev oiv ^vais to re ov o re vovs' Sid Kal to, ovra active actuality of being and Intellect of this kind;
Kal'q TOV OVTOS evepyeia Kal 6 vovs 6 toiovtos’ Kal and the thoughts of this kind are the form and shape
of being aVid its active actuality. But they are
ai ovTW vo'qaeis to etSos Kal pop<f>ri tov ovtos Kal ' thought of by us as one before the other because they
20 evepyeia. emvoeiTal ye prp> pepi^opevcov v^' are divided by our thinking. For the dividing
ripatv daTepa irpd Tidv erepcov. eTepos yap d intellect is a different one, but the undivided Intellect
which does not divide is being and all things.
pepl^a>v vovs, 6 Se dpepiaros Kal pr] pep^cvv to 9. What then are the things in the one Intellect
ov Kal TO. Trdvra. which we divide in our thinking? For they are in
repose, but we must bring them forward, as one
9. TiW odv eoTi to. ev evl vw, a voovvres pepi- examines in order the contents of a unified body of
Copev •qpeis; Set yap avTa Tipepomna irpo^peiv, knowledge. Since this universe is certainly a living
I being containing all living beings and deriving its
otov e^ emaT^p7)s ev evl ovarjs emdeojpeiv to, , being and its being as it is from another, and the
evovra. Koapov TovSe ovtos ^a>ov irepieKTiKov origin of that from which it derives is traced back to
6 ^waiv aTrdvTwv Kal nap' dXXov eyovros to eivai Kal ^ For the curious mythological etymology implied here and
the Platonic reminiscence which lies behind it see V. 1. 4,
ToiwSe eivai, nap' oS Se eariv els vovv dvayopevov, n. 1 (p. 23).
306
3°7
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 9. ON INTELLECT, THE FORMS, AND BEING

avayKCuov Kal ev vw to apyemrov ttSv etvai, koI Intellect, its whole archetype must necessarily be
in Intellect, and this Intellect must be an intelU^ble
Koapav voTjTov tovtov rov vovv etvai, ov ^aiv o
universe, which Plato says exists in “ the absolute
llAarcov €v tco o €ort ^coov. ws yap ovtos hving being For just as, if there exists the
Xoyov ^(pov Tivos, ovar]s Se /cat uAij? rijs rov Xoyov rational forming principle of a living creature, and
10 rov anepp-ariKov de^apJvrjs, dvdyKt} ^<3ov yeveadai, the matter which receives the seminal forming prin­
rov avrov rpoirov Kal ^vaecos voepas Kal TravSvv- ciple, the living creatme must necessarily come into
dfiov ovcrrjs Kal ovSevos Sielpyovros, pvjSevos
being, in the same way also when an intelligent and
all-powerful nature exists and nothing hinders it,
ovros pera^i) rovrov Kal rov Se^aadai 8wap4vov, since there is nothing between it and what is able to
dvdyKT] ro pev KoaprjOTjvou., ro Se Koapijaai. Kal to receive it, it is necessary that one should be formed
16 pev Koaprjdev eyei ro elBos pepepiapevov, dXAayov into the order and beauty of the universe and the
dvOpwTTov Kal d^ayov TjXiov ro Se iv evl irdvra. other should form it. And that which is formed into
the universe has its form divided, man in one place
10. "Oaa phf oSv <I)s eiSij ev rep alaOrirep eart, and the sun in another; but the forming nature has
ravra eKeZdev oaa Se pT^, ov. Sio rwv irapa all things in one.
<f>vaiv ovK eariv e/cet ovSev, uxnrep ovSe rcHv napd 10. All the things, then, which exist as forms in the
rexvT]v ierrlv ev raZs rexvais, ovSe ev roZs aireppaat world of sense come from that intelligible world;
those which do not, do not. Therefore none of the
5 yojiXeia. ttoSwv Se ycoXela -q ev rfj yeveaei ov things which are contrary to nature are there, just
Kparqaavros Xoyov, rj Se e/c rvxqs Xvprj rov eiSous’. as there are none of the things which are contrary
Kal TToioTTjTe? 8ri crvpejxvvoi Kal TToaorryTes, dpiOpoi to art in the arts, and there is no lameness in seeds.®
(Congenital lameness of the feet occurs when the
forming principle does not master [the matter],
* Cp. Plato Timacm 39E8; there is an allusion above (line 4)
to 33B2-3. accidental lameness by damage to the form.) There
• The doctrine of Plotinus in this chapter differs from that are certainly [in the intelligible world] qualities
of Plato, whose dialognes contain many allusions to Forms of which harmonize [with nature] and quantities, and
negation, defect and evil (see the full discussion in W. D. Boss numbers and dimensions and relations, and actions
Plato's Theory of Ideas (Oxford 1951) 167-9, where references
are given to the passages where Forms of this kind are men­
tioned). What Plato meant by asserting their existence, and advantage: Plato: The Written and Unwritten Doctrines
how they are to be fitted in with other aspects of his Theory (London 1974) 41-6 and 374-5. The Middle Platonists
of Forms, are questions which have often puzzled ancient and generally denied the existence of such Forms (cp. Alcinous
modem commentators. J. N. Findlay makes most interesting [Albinas] Didaskalikos IX), and Plotinus is simply following
philosophical sense of Forms of this kind, and contrasts the common opinion of the school (which he very often does
Plato’s doctrine on this point with that of Plotinus, to Plato’s not).
308 309
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 9. ON INTELLECT, THE POEMS, AND BEING

T€ Kal iJLeyedy) Kal axeoeis, TTOi-qaeis re Kal Treiaeis and experiences which are according to nature, and
both universal motion and rest and the motion and
al Kara <f>vmv', Kivr^aeis re koX ardaeis KodoXov re
rest of parts of the intelligible. But there is eternity
Kal ev [lepei rcov eKei. dvrl Se xpdvov aux)v. 6 Se instead of time. And place there exists in the
10 TOTTOj eKei voepcos ro aXXo ev aXX<p. e/cei pev ovv
intellectual mode, the presence of one thing in
another. There, then, since all things are together,
opov TTavrctyv 6vro)v, o ri av Xd^Ds avraiv, ovaia koi whichever you take of them is substance and intelli­
voepd, Kal eKaarov perexov, Kal ravrov Kal gent, and each shares in hfe, and is same and other,
and motion and rest, and in motion and at rest, and
ddrepov, Kal Kivt]ms Kal ordain, Kal Kivovpevov substance and quality, and all of them are substance.
Kal earcjs, Kal oiala Kal ttoiov, Kal Trdvra ovala. For each real being is actual, not potential: so that
the quality of each substance is not separated from
16 KoX yap evepyela, ov Svvdpei ro ov eKaarov More it.^ Are there, then, in the intelligible world only
ov Kexdipiarat ro ttoiov eKdarrjs ovaias. dp’ oSv the things which are in the sense-world or are there
others over and above them? But we must first
pdva rd ev r(p ala0T]rw eKei, t] Kai aXXa TrXeico; enquire about works of art: for there is no Form
oAAa irporepov irepl rwv Kara rexvrjv aKenreov of Evil; since evil here is the result of want and
KaKov yap ouSevos" to ydp KaKov evrav6a e^ deprivation and failure and is a misfortune of matter
and of that which becomes like matter.
ivSeias Kal arep^aecos Kal eXXeupews, Kai vXrjs 11. Are the works of art and the arts there, then ?
20 drvxovoTjs irdOos Kal rov vXrj (Lpxnwpevov. As for all the imitative arts, painting and sculpture,
dancing and mime, which are in some way composed
11. To. o5v Kara rexyrjv Kal al rexvai; rd)V 8^ of elements from this world and use a model perceived
rexvciv oaai pipr^riKal, ypa<f>iKrj pev Kai avhpiavro- by sense and imitate the forms and movements and
transpose into their own terms the proportions which
TTOila, 6pxr]ais re Kal j^eipovo/Aia, evravdd ttov
they see, it would not be reasonable to trace them
Trjv avaraaiv Xa^ovaai Kal aladrjrw TTpoaxpd>pevai back to the intelligible world except as included in
5 irapahelypari Kal pipovpevai eiSij re Kal Korqaeis the forming principle of man. But if any artistic
skill starts from the proportions of [individual] living
rds re avpperpias as opwai perariOeiaai ovk

dv elKorcxiS eKei dvdyoivro, ei pr] rip dvOpdyirov Xoycp. '■ On substance and quality in the intelligible world see the
mueh fuller discussion in the treatise On Substance, or on
el 8e ns e^is sk rrjs -rrepl rd C<3a avpperpias oXws ^ Quality (II. 6); ep. also VI. 2. 14 and the very thorough
investigation of the whole subject in Klaus Wurm Substanz
* Harder: oAojv wBUCz: opov R: opcav J. und Qualitdt (Berlin-New York 1973).
310 311
 ON INTELLECT, THE FORMS, AND BEING
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 9.
things and goes on from there to consider the pro­
^u>o)v emaKOTToZro, iwpiov av etrj Swdfiews rijs ko,- portions of living things in general, it would be a
K€i imaKOTTOVcrrjs /cat dewpovcrqs Trjv iv vot]t& part of the power which also in the higher world
10 irepl irdvra avp,perplav. /cat p/r/v Kal povaiKrj iracra considers and contemplates universal proportion m
[TTepl dppoviav l^oucra Kal pvdpov ij /xev] i nepl the intelUgible. And certainly all music, since the
ideas which it has are concerned with rhythm and
pvOpov /cot dppoviav exovaa to vo^/tara tov avrov
melody, would be of the same kind, just hke the art
rpoTTOv dv etTj, uxrrrep Kal 17 irept tov vcnqrdv dpi9- which is concerned with intelligible number.^ ^ And
pov exovaa. oaai 8e noirjTiKol aladrjruiv tmv as for the arts which produce artificial sense-objects,
Kara re^vijv, otov oiKo^opiK'^ Kal reicroviK-q, for instance building and carpentry, in so far as they
16 KaOoaov avpperpLais TTpoaxpiovrai, dpxds dv e/cet- make use of proportions, they would have their
principles from the intelligible world and the practical
6ev exoiev Kal rwv e/cet <f>povqaeu}v r<p Se atcr-
thinking there; but since they mix these up wiA
01JTW ravra ovyKepaadpevai to oAov ovk dv etev what is perceived by the senses they would not be
€K€L 1] iv TW dvOpcoTTW. ov prjv ovSi yecopyla altogether in the intelhgible world, except in the
avXXapPdvovaa aladrjrw <l>VT<p, tarpiK'q re Ttjv [Form of] man.** There would certainly not be
ivravda vyieiav Oewpovaa rj re irept laxyv -rqvSe farming there which helps the plants of the sense-
world to grow, or medicine which has as its object
20 /cat €ve$iav oAAij yap e/cet Zvvapis koI vyieia, koB'
of contemplation health here below, or the art
^v arpepi] Trdvra Kal t/cava, oaa ^wa. pr/ropeia Se which is concerned with strength and good bodily
/cat orpaTqyla, oiKovopia re Kal j3aatAi/c^, et rives condition; for power in the intelligible world is
adrdiv ro KoXdv Koivcvvovai rats irpd^eaiv, el different, and so is the health by which all
living things there are undisturbed and adequate.
eKeivo Oecopoiev, pxdpav eKeZdev els imaTqpTfv And rhetoric and generalship, and the arts of ad­
*• delevimus: ^ /liv legendum, nam exorditur variam leo- ministration and kingship, if any of them con^i^-
tionem; J jicv Kirchhoff (guatenus Ficinus). cate excellence in the field of action, supposing that
they contemplate that intelligible excellence, fney
^ On art in the intelligible world and the access of the have some part for their knowledge derived from the
artist’s mind to the Forms cp. V. 8. 1. There is no reason to
suppose that Plotinus intends to abandon there the distinction vigorously discussed since Aristotle: s^ ^mary
which he makes here between art which is simply unintelligent of the discussion (with full references) sTh^y of
copying of sense-objects and the truly intellectual visual art Ideas 171-6 (op. oh. 10, n. 2, p. 309). Most Middle Platomsts
and music which has its origin in the intelligible world. rejected them: see the passage from Alomous [Albinus] cited
* Forms of artefacts are mentioned several times in the in ch. 10, n. 1. Plotinus is here again following school tradition
Dialogues, but the question whether Plato really believed in in this rather summary early treatise.
their existence (or changed his mind about them) has been 313

312
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 9. ON INTELLECT, THE FORMS, AND BEING

25 exovaiv €K rfjs imar'qiJLrjS rijs eK€C. yew/terpia Se knowledge there. And since geometry is con­
voTjTWP oSaa ra/crea e/cei, ao<f>ia re dvwTOTO) irepl cerned with intelligibles, it must be placed there,
and wisdom, which is on the highest level and
ro ov oSaa. Kal irept p,ev reyvwv /cat rwv Kara concerned with being. This is enough about the
rexvas ravra. arts and their works.
12. Et 8e dvdpcivov eKet /cat XoyiKov e/cet /cat 12. But if the Form of man is there, and of rational
and artistic man, and the arts which are products of
rexviKov teal ai reymt vov y€wij/taTa o5aat, y/017 Intellect, then one must say that the Forms of uni-
8e /cat t<3v KaOoXov Xeyeiv to et87j etvai, ov Stt»/cpd- versals are there, not of Socrates but of man.^ But
Tovs, dAA’ dvdpatiTov. emoKemiov 8e 77ept dvOpdt- we must enquire about man whether the form of the
individual is there; there is individuality, because
5 oTov, €c Kal o ^ KaOeKaoTa- to 8e KadeKaerrov, the same [individual feature] is different in different
on |ja:7] ^ to outo oAAo oAAo)’ orof OTt d /tei/ at/tdy, people; for instance, because one man has a snub
d 8c ypimos, ypvtTonqra pkv Kal mpMTrjra Biacftopds nose and the other an aquiline nose, one must assume
iv €t8et dereov dvdpoiitov, otaTtep l^tpov diatftopai aquilinity and snubness to be specific differences in
the form of man, just as there are different species
elaiv T]Kew Se /cat Trapd rrjs uAijs to tov /tev of animal; but one must also assume that the fact
ToidvSe ypVTTOTTjTa, tov 8c TOidvSe. Kal xpatpaTcvv that one man has one kind of aquiline nose and one
10 Sia^opds Tas pev ev X6y<p oiiaas. Tag Se Kal vX-qv another comes from their matter. And some
differences of colour are contained in the formative
Kal Tonov Sid^pov ovra iroieTv. principle but others are produced by matter and by
^ Blumenthal: o Enn.* different places of abode.
® del. Muller.
ble, but the question of their existence is left open. Plotinus
is ftee to assert the existence of individual Forms on different
^ With the older punctuation of Pema and Creuzer, to grounds, as he did later in V. 7 (18), without any inconsistency
which Henry-Schwyzer have now returned, the sense of this with the present passage. It should be noted that in what
passage and its relevance to its context is clear, as Igal has immediately follows Plotinus is not considering men’s souls,
point^ out (he has kindly communicated his conclusions to selves or personalities but the bodily differences between
Schwyzer and me by letter, and published them in Spanish individuals, exemplified as usual by Socrates’s snub nose.
in Emerita XLI, 1973, 92-8). The subject of discussion is But in the next chapter he reminds us that, whether there me
still intellectual and artistic man and his arts and sciences: Forms of individual selves in the intelligible world (a question
Plotinus is pointing out that if they are there the universal he does not raise here) or not, our souls have a permanent
Forms which intellectual and artistic man thinks about must footing in the intelligible world. On the whole subject of
necessarily be there also, but no necessary conclusion follows Forms of individuals in Plotinus see my article “ Form,
about individual Forms. We cannot assert their existence Individual and Person in Plotinus ” (Dionysius 1,1977,49-68)
because the intellectual arts and sciences exist in the intelligi- and the references to other literature there given.

314 31S
 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 9. ON INTELLECT, THE FORMS, AND BEING

13. Aovrrov Se etireXv, el [wva to ev aladnyrca 13. It remains to say whether only the Forms of
eK€i, rj KOt, wcmep dvdpamov 6 avrodvOpuynos ^ things in the sense-world exist in the intelligible, or
if also, just as there is an Absolute Man different
erepos, el teal >jnix^s avroilw)(q €Kei erepa koX vov from man, there is an Absolute Soul different from
avTovovs. XeKTeov 8e “npwTov pev, ori ov irdvra soul and an Absolute Intellect different from in­
6 Set, oaa evravda, etScaXa vopl^eiv apxervTruiv, ovSe tellect. It must be , said first that not all things
etSojXov etvai avTo^wx^s, Tipiorqri Se which are here below ought to be considered as
aXXqv dXXrjs Sia<ftepeiv, Kat etvai Kal evravda, images of archet3rpes, and soul should not be con­
sidered as an image of Absolute Soul, but one soul
tatvs Se ovx <vs evravda, avrofjwx'fp’• etvai Se differs from another in honour, and there is Absolute
ilwxfjs ovrcos owcnj? e/cdonjs Kal SiKaioavvrp' 8ei Soul here below, though perhaps not as if here
riva Kai aca^poavvriv, Kai ev rats •nap' •qptv below. And there must belong to an individual
10 ifwxais emonj/iijv dXqdivqv, ovk eiStoAo o^Se soul that is really a soul some kind of righteotisness
elnovas eKelvaiv <hs ev aladrjrM, dAAd ravrd and moral integrity, and there must be true know­
ledge in the souls which are in us, and these are not
CKeiva d^ov rponov ovra evravda' ov yap ev rivi images or likenesses of their Forms as things are in
rorrip dxjxvpiapeva e/ceivo- ware, Sirov 4’^Xd the sense-world, but those very Forms themselves
awparos e^ave8v, eKei KaKetva. o pev yap existing here in a different mode: for they are not
separated off in a particular place; so that when the
aladrp-os Koapos povayov, 6 Se voryros rtavraxov. soul emerges from the body, those virtues too are
16 oaa phf oSv ^X^ exei * roiavrq evravda, ravra in the higher world. For the sense-world is in one
eKer ware, el rd ev rw aladijrw to ev rots opwpe- place, but the intelligible world is everywhere.
vois Xap^dvoiro, ov povov rd ev rw aladryTtp eKet, Ever3Tthing then which a soul of this kind has here
below is there in the intelligible world; so that if
dXXd Kai irXeiw el Se to ev rw KoapM Xeyoiro
one takes “ things in the sense-world ” to mean
avpirepiXapPavopevwv Kat t/nixfis Kai rwv ev “ things in the visible realm ”, there are not only the
'jrvx^, irdvra evravda, oaa KaKet. things in the sense-world there, but more; but if
14. Ti^v oSv rd •ndvra irepiXa^ovaav ev rw voTjrw one means “ things in the universe ”, including soul
<f)vaiv ravrrp apyr/v dereov. Kal irws, rijs pev
and the things in soul, all the things are here below
which are in the intelligible world.
dpxrjs Trjs ovrws evds Kal dirXov irdvrrj ovarjs, 14. This nature, therefore, which includes all
•nX-rfiovs Se ev rots oSaiv ovros; irws rrapd ro ev, things in the intelligible is to be taken as the prin­
1 R*n>e, Kirohhoff*: airos avBpamos Enn. ciple. But how is this possible, when the real prin­
* R*“ {hdbet Ficinus):«« (nunc era8um)EBxUCz: om. A. ciple is one and altogether simple, but there is
317
316
 PLOTINUS; ENNEAD V. 9. ON INTELLECT, THE FORMS, AND BEING

6 Kal •ncjs irXrjdos, Kal Trwg ra Travra ravra, Kal 8ta multiplicity on the level of the real beings? We
Ti vovs ravra Kal irodev, XeKreov a-n dXXrjs dp)(7js must begin from another starting point our explana­
dpxopAvois. tion of how there is anything besides the One, and
Ilepi 8e ru)v e/c cr^tpecvg Kal rwv ;^aA67rwv, el
how it is a multiplicity, and how it is all these
[intelligible] beings, and why Intellect is all these
KOLKet elSog, Kal ei pvtrov Kal TrqXov, XeKreov, cLg,
beings and where it comes from.^
oaa Kopl^erai vovg diro rov •npoirov, travra dpiara- But about the creatures which originate from putre­
10 iv otg eiSeaiv ov ravra' ov8' €k rovrwv vovg, faction and savage beasts, whether there is a Form
dXXd tfivxrj trapd vov, Xa^ovaa trapd vXtjg dXXa, ev of them in the intelligible, and if there is one of dirt
olg ravra. and mud, we must say that all things which Intellect
Ilepl 8e ro'vrojv aa^earrepov XexS'Qcrerai etraveX- gets from the First are the best; and among these
Bovaiv itrl rt]v dtioplav, trcog evog trXrjBog. Forms there are not the things we have just men­
"On 8e rd avvBera eiKtj ovra, ov vw, dAA’ i<f>’ tioned®; nor does Intellect take them from these
16 eavrcov alaOrp-d crweXOovra, ovk ev e18eai' rd re Forms, but Soul which derives from Intellect, which
e/c crfppeoig iltvx'fjs dXXo ri tocog dSvvarovcrrjg' ei takes other things, including these, from matter.
8e p-rj, etTOLt]aev dv ri rdiv ^vaer troiel yovv,
We shall speak more clearly about these questions
when we return to the problem of how multiplicity
otTov 8vvarai.
comes from 6ne.
Hepl 8e rcov rexvdiv, on ev avroavBpdmco trepi- But we must say that casual composites, which are
exovrai, oaai rexvai dva<f>epovTai trpog rd /card not produced by Intellect but are things of sgnse
(j>vaiv dv6pdyn<p. coming together by themselves, are not among the
20 Uporepov 8e dXXt]v KadoXov, Kal rfjg KaOoXov Forms; and the products of putrefaction occur,
ainofpvx^v •^roi rr/v t^oyqv; ^ ev v<p trplv yeveoBai perhaps, because the soul was unable to produce
tpvxT^v, Iva Kol yevrp-ai, avroifwxrjv eKelvrjv Xeyeiv. anything else; if it had been it would have produced
something natural; it does so, at any rate, wherever
it can.
^ The references forward here and at lines 12-13 "may well About the arts we must say that all the arts are
be to V. 4 (7)—^not that Plotinus thought that what he said included in the Absolute Man whose subject-matter
in this little treatise by any means exhausted the subject,
which he deals with again and again in later treatises. is in accordance with human nature.
• Here again Plotinus is following Middle Platonlst school But is there, before the individual soul, another
tradition, probably against Plato’s real thought: op. oh. 10, universal soul, and before the universal soul the
n. (p. 309) and oh. 11, n. 2. The much fuller and profounder Absolute Soul or Life ? [We must] say that Absolute
discussion of Forms of animals in the intelligible world in Soul must be in Intellect before Soul comes to be in
VI. 7. 7-10 should be contrasted with the casual dismissal of
“ savage beasts ” from that world here. order that it may come to be.
318 319
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