210.

Morales vs Juan Ponce Enrile

FACTS:

In April 21,1982, Morales and some others while they were riding together in a motor vehicle on Laong-
Laan Street, Quezon City, by elements of Task Force Makabansa of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
Since their arrest, they have been under detention. Petitioner Morales filed his petition for habeas
corpus with this Court on July 9, 1982, while petitioner Moncupa filed his on July 19, 1982. On July 20,
1982 petitioners, together with several others, were charged with rebellion (Art. 134, Revised Penal
Code) before the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Criminal Case No. Q-21091 filed by the City Fiscal of
Quezon City. The trial of the case has yet to be terminated. The continued detention of petitioners to
answer for the offense charged is therefore legal. Morales alleged that they were arrested without any
warrant of arrest; that their constitutional rights were violated, among them the right to counsel, the
right to remain silent, the right to a speedy and public trial, and the right to bail. Respondents countered
that the group of Morales were already under surveillance for some time before they were arrested and
that the warrantless arrest done is valid and at the same time the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
was already suspended.

ISSUE:Whether or not petitioners’ continued detention is legal.

HELD:Yes. Their continued detention is legal for the reason that a proper case of rebellion had been filed
against them in the proper court and the trial has yet to be terminated.

Although martial law was terminated on Jan 17, 1981 by the President, the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus continues to be suspended in all other places with respect to certain offenses such as
rebellion or insurrection, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, among others. Thus
the right to bail is also suspended.

211. Olaguer vs Military Commission

Habeas Corpus
In 1979, Olaguer and some others were detained by military personnel and they were
placed in Camp Bagong Diwa. Logauer and his group are all civilians. They were charged
with (1) unlawful possession of explosives and incendiary devices; (2) conspiracy to
assassinate President and Mrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy to assassinate cabinet members
Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno; (4) conspiracy to assassinate
Messrs. Arturo Tangco, Jose Roño and Onofre Corpus; (5) arson of nine buildings; (6)
attempted murder of Messrs. Leonardo Perez, Teodoro Valencia and Generals Romeo
Espino and Fabian Ver; and (7) conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, and inciting to
rebellion. On August 19, 1980, the petitioners went to the SC and filed the instant Petition
for prohibition and habeas corpus.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus be granted.
HELD: The petition for habeas corpus has become moot and academic because by the
time the case reached the SC Olaguer and his companions were already released from
military confinement. “When the release of the persons in whose behalf the application for a
writ of habeas corpus was filed is effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ becomes
moot and academic. 18 Inasmuch as the herein petitioners have been released from their
confinement in military detention centers, the instant Petitions for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus should be dismissed for having become moot and academic.” But the
military court created to try the case of Olaguer (and the decision it rendered) still continues
to subsist.
ISSUE2: The issue is then shifted to: Whether or not a military tribunal has the jurisdiction
to try civilians while the civil courts are open and functioning.
HELD: The SC nullified for lack of jurisdiction all decisions rendered by the military courts or
tribunals during the period of martial law in all cases involving civilian defendants. A military
commission or tribunal cannot try and exercise jurisdiction, even during the period of martial
law, over civilians for offenses allegedly committed by them as long as the civil courts are
open and functioning, and that any judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian is
null and void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunal concerned.

212. Rolando Abadilla vs General Ramos

Facts: Colonel Rolando Abadilla of the Philippine Constabulary of the AFP was one of the
leaders of the unsuccessful seizure of the GMA radio-television facilities. The event was known
as the “Black Saturday Revolt”. The mutiny failed and Abadilla was detained. Ramos, who was
then-chief of staff, issued an order dropping the name of Abadilla from the roll of regular officers
in the military. Later, Susan, Abadilla’s wife filed a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus together with their minor children. They questioned the validity of Abadilla’s detention. It
was alleged that when Col. Abadilla was dropped from the roll of officers, he became a civilian
and as such, the order for his arrest and confinement is null and void because he was no longer
subject to military law. His detention is illegal because he is not charged with any criminal
offense, either before a civil court or a court-martial.
Issue: Whether Abadilla’s detention is legal
Held: The fact that Colonel Abadilla was dropped from the rolls of officers cannot and should not
lead to the conclusion that he is now beyond the jurisdiction of the military authorities. If such a
conclusion were to prevail, his very own refusal to clear his name and protect his honor before
his superior officers in the manner prescribed for and expected from a ranking military officer
would be his shield against prosecution in the first place. His refusal to report for duty or to
surrender when ordered arrested, which led to his name being dropped from the roll of regular
officers of the military, cannot thereby render him beyond the jurisdiction of the military courts
for offenses he committed while still in the military service. Military jurisdiction had fully attached
on Colonel Abadilla inasmuch as proceedings were initiated against him before the termination
of his service in the military. The record of the case discloses that Col Abadilla has been
charged by the military authorities for violation of Article of War (Mutiny or Sedition) which is a
serious offense, and the corresponding charge sheets have been prepared against him. The
detention of Col Abadilla under the circumstances obtaining in this case is not illegal. For this
reason, the petition for habeas corpus should be dismissed for lack of merit.
 213. Juan Ponce Enrile vs Judge Salazar
FACTS
In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law
enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a
warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No.
9010941.

The warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors composed of
Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor
Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan
with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the
failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990.

Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail, none
having been recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest warrant. The following morning, February
28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the custody of the
Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.

On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for habeas corpus herein
(which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990), alleging that he was deprived of his
constitutional rights.

ISSUE
(a) Whether the petitioner has committed complex crimes (delito compleio) arising from an offense being a
necessary means for committing another, which is referred to in the second clause of Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code?

HELD
There is one other reason and a fundamental one at that why Article 48 of the Penal Code cannot be applied in the
case at bar. If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately (assuming
that this could be done), the following penalties would be imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of
rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon the
modifying circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of murder,
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying circumstances present. In other
words, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However,
under Article 48 said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a single aggravating
circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of the prosecution, would be
unfavorable to the movant.

The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute books, while
technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed with other offenses committed
on the occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez,
the information does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code:
simple rebellion.

Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's reaffirmation of Hernandez as
applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary corollary that the information against him should be
considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion, which is bailable before conviction, that must now be
accepted as a correct proposition. But the question remains: Given the facts from which this case arose, was a
petition for habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial?
The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner's right to have
provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said
respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to
bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that remedy
was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then, not
without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.

The Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the questioned information filed
against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple
rebellion only, hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's
earlier grant of bail to petitioners being merely provisional in character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered
remanded to the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said
respondent for any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this Court shall become functus oficio.
No pronouncement as to costs.

214. People vs Donato

FACTS:
In this case petitioner filed for certiorari and prohibition in the court for the bail filed by respondent
Rodolfo Salas AKA “COMMANDER BILOG” who happened to be a member of the NPA military
forces, and thereby committed a lot of atrocities in the state which is rebellion punishable under ART 135
of rpc by reclusion perpetua to death and that on those who promote, maintain, or head a rebellion the
accused is no longer entitled to bail as evidence of his guilt is strong.
However, according to the respondent judge Section 3, Rule 114, aforementioned, in relation to Section
21, same rule. In view, therefore, of the present circumstances in this case, said accused-applicant is now
entitled to bail as a matter of right in as much as the crime of rebellion ceased to be a capital offense.
On the contrary the petitioner assails that granting the respondent his bail is stature in the CPP-NPA
hierarchy, whose ultimate and overriding goal is to wipe out all vestiges of our democracy and to replace
it with their ideology, and that his release would allow his return to his organization to direct its armed
struggle to topple the government.
Again, the judge contended that the right to bail is clearly manifest in the bill of rights in which every
person is entitled to. Respondent judge interposed DURA LEX SED LEX. Thereby the right to bail by
the respondent was granted.
ISSUE:
1.) whether there was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge
2.) whether the grant of bail was constitutional
HELD:
1.) YES. On the part of the respondent judge seemingly, the latter was in favor of the petitioner in all
aspects. In this case, it was quite obvious, for the respondent judge even denied the petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration upon filing the prohibition for the bail by the respondent. According to
the law if the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of
discretion. However, the trial court erred in giving its good discretion for the said offense was an
odious crime committed within the state.

2.) NO. Given with the intensity and gravity of the crime committed by the respondent it was just if
it were to waive the right to bail. According to the civil code Art. 6. Rights may be waived, unless
the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial
to a third person with a right recognized by law. Rights guaranteed to one accused of a crime fall
 naturally into two classes: (a) those in which the state, as well as the accused, is interested; and
(b) those which are personal to the accused, which are in the nature of personal privileges. Those
of the first class cannot be waived; those of the second may be. the right to bail is another of the
constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right which is personal to the accused and whose
waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

215. Rep. Edcel Lagman , et al. vs Executive Secretary

Facts
President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao on May 23, 2017 for a
period not exceeding 60 days.
The full text of Proclamation No. 216 reads as follows:
WHEREAS, Proclamation No. 55, series of 2016, was issued on 04 September 2016 declaring a state of
national emergency on account of lawless violence in Mindanao;
WHEREAS, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution provides that ‘x x x In case of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he (the President) may, for a period not exceeding sixty
days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof
under martial law x x x’;
WHEREAS, Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6968, provides that ‘the
crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising and taking arms against the Government
for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the
Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or
depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or
prerogatives’;
WHEREAS, part of the reasons for the issuance of Proclamation No. 55 was the series of violent acts
committed by the Maute terrorist group such as the attack on the military outpost in Butig, Lanao
del Sur in February 2016, killing and wounding several soldiers, and the mass jailbreak in Marawi
City in August 2016, freeing their arrested comrades and other detainees;
WHEREAS, today 23 May 2017, the same Maute terrorist group has taken over a hospital in Marawi
City, Lanao del Sur, established several checkpoints within the City, burned down certain government
and private facilities and inflicted casualties on the part of Government forces, and started flying the flag
of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in several areas, thereby openly attempting to remove from
the allegiance to the Philippine Government this part of Mindanao and deprive the Chief  Executive of his
powers and prerogatives to enforce the laws of the land and to maintain public order and safety in
Mindanao, constituting the crime of rebellion; and
WHEREAS, this recent attack shows the capability of the Maute group and other rebel groups to sow
terror, and cause death and damage to property not only in Lanao del Sur but also in other parts of
Mindanao.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, RODRIGO ROA DUTERTE, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution and by law, do hereby proclaim as follows:
SECTION 1. There is hereby declared a state of martial law in the Mindanao group of islands for a period
not exceeding sixty days, effective as of the date hereof.
SECTION 2. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall likewise be suspended in the aforesaid area
for the duration of the state of martial law.
DONE in the Russian Federation, this 23rd day of May in the year of our Lord, Two Thousand and
Seventeen.
Three (3) Petitions were filed questioning the legality of the said declaration, to wit:
1. A) G.R. No. 231658 (Lagman Petition)
On June 5, 2017, Representatives Edcel C. Lagman, Tomasito S. Villarin, Gary C. Alejano, Emmanuel A.
Billones, and Teddy Brawner Baguilat, Jr. filed a Petition11 Under the Third Paragraph of Section 18 of
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
First, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient factual basis
because there is no rebellion or invasion in Marawi City or in any part of Mindanao. It argues that
acts of terrorism in Mindanao do not constitute rebellion 12 since there is no proof that its purpose is to
remove Mindanao or any part thereof from allegiance to the Philippines, its laws, or its territory. 1
Xxx  xxx  xxx
Second, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient factual basis
because the President’s Report contained “false, inaccurate, contrived and hyperbolic accounts”. 21
Third, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient factual basis since
the President’s Report mistakenly included the attack on the military outpost in Butig, Lanao del Sur in
February 2016, the mass jail break in Marawi City in August 2016, the Zamboanga siege, the Davao
market bombing, the Mamasapano carnage and other bombing incidents in Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, and
Basilan, as additional factual bases for the proclamation of martial law. It contends that these events
either took place long before the conflict in Marawi City began, had long been resolved, or with the
culprits having already been arrested.26
Fourth, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient factual basis
considering that the President acted alone and did not consult the military establishment or any ranking
official27 before making the proclamation.
Finally, the Lagman Petition claims that the President’s proclamation of martial law lacks sufficient
factual basis owing to the fact that during the presentation before the Committee of the Whole of the
House of Representatives, it was shown that the military was even successful in pre-empting the ASG and
the Maute Group’s plan to take over Marawi City and other parts of Mindanao; there was absence of any
hostile plan by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front; and the number of foreign fighters allied with ISIS was
“undetermined”28which indicates that there are only a meager number of foreign fighters who can lend
support to the Maute Group.29
1. B) G.R. No. 231771 (Cullamat Petition)
The Cullamat Petition, “anchored on Section 18, Article VII” of the Constitution, likewise seeks the
nullification of Proclamation No. 216 for being unconstitutional because it lacks sufficient factual
basis that there is rebellion in Mindanao and that public safety warrants its declaration.
1. C) G.R. No. 231774 (Mohamad Petition)
The Mohamad Petition posits that martial law is a measure of last resort and should be invoked by the
President only after exhaustion of less severe remedies. It contends that the extraordinary powers of
the President should be dispensed sequentially, i.e., first, the power to call out the armed forces;
second, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and finally, the power to
declare martial law.48 It maintains that the President has no discretion to choose which
extraordinary power to use; moreover, his choice must be dictated only by, and commensurate to,
the exigencies of the situation.
According to the Mohamad Petition, the factual situation in Marawi is not so grave as to require the
imposition of martial law.
The OSG acknowledges that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution vests the Court with the authority
or power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law. The OSG,
however, posits that although Section 18, Article VII lays the basis for the exercise of such authority or
power, the same constitutional provision failed to specify the vehicle, mode or remedy through which the
“appropriate proceeding” mentioned therein may be resorted to. The OSG suggests that the “appropriate
proceeding” referred to in Section 18, Article VII may be availed of using the vehicle, mode or remedy of
a certiorari petition, either under Section 1 or 5, of Article VIII. 61 Corollarily, the OSG maintains that the
review power is not mandatory, but discretionary only, on the part of the Court. 62 The Court has the
discretion not to give due course to the petition.63
 
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the petitions docketed as G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771, and 231774 are the
“appropriate proceeding” covered by Paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution sufficient to
invoke the mode of review required of this Court when a declaration of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is promulgated;
2. Whether or not the President in declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus:
3. is required to be factually correct or only not arbitrary in his appreciation of facts;
4. is required to obtain the favorable recommendation thereon of the Secretary of National Defense;
5. is required to take into account only the situation at the time of the proclamation, even if
subsequent events prove the situation to have not been accurately reported;
6. Whether or not the power of this Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis [of] the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is independent
of the actual actions that have been taken by Congress jointly or separately;
7. Whether or not there were sufficient factual [basis] for the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus;
8. What are the parameters for review?
9. Who has the burden of proof?
10. What is the threshold of evidence?
11. Whether the exercise of the power of judicial review by this Court involves the calibration of
graduated powers granted the President as Commander-in-Chief, namely calling out powers, suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and declaration of martial law;
12. Whether or not Proclamation No. 216 of 23 May 2017 may be considered vague and thus null
and void:
13. with its inclusion of “other rebel groups;” or
14. since it has no guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire Mindanao
region;
15. Whether or not the armed hostilities mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 and in the Report of the
President to Congress are sufficient [bases]:
16. for the existence of actual rebellion; or
17. for a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
the entire Mindanao region;
18. Whether or not terrorism or acts attributable to terrorism are equivalent to actual rebellion and the
requirements of public safety sufficient to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus; and
19. Whether or not nullifying Proclamation No. 216 of 23 May 2017 will:
20. have the effect of recalling Proclamation No. 55 s. 2016; or
21. also nullify the acts of the President in calling out the armed forces to quell lawless violence in
Marawi and other parts of the Mindanao region.
After the oral argument, the parties submitted their respective memoranda and supplemental memoranda.
Ruling
1. Locus standi of petitioners.- Yes. Petitioners are citizens and have locus standi
One of the requisites for judicial review is locus standi, i.e., “the constitutional question is brought before
[the Court] by a party having the requisite ‘standing’ to challenge it.” As a general rule, the challenger
must have “a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement.”Over the years, there has been a trend towards relaxation of
the rule on legal standing, a prime example of which is found in Section 18 of Article VII which
provides that any citizen may file the appropriate proceeding to assail the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. “[T]he only requisite for standing to challenge the validity of the suspension is that the
challenger be a citizen. He need not even be a taxpayer.
Petitioners in the Cullamat Petition claim to be “suing in their capacities as citizens of the Republic;”
similarly, petitioners in the Mohamad Petition all claim to be “Filipino citizens, all women, all of legal
[age], and residents of Marawi City”. In the Lagman Petition, however, petitioners therein did not
categorically mention that they are suing as citizens but merely referred to themselves as duly
elected Representatives. That they are suing in their official capacities as Members of Congress
could have elicited a vigorous discussion considering the issuance by the House of Representatives
of House Resolution No. 1050 expressing full support to President Duterte and finding no reason to
revoke Proclamation No. 216. By such resolution, the House of Representatives is declaring that it finds
no reason to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the martial law declaration, which is in direct
contrast to the views and arguments being espoused by the petitioners in the Lagman
Petition. Considering, however, the trend towards relaxation of the rules on legal standing, as well
as the transcendental issues involved in the present Petitions, the Court will exercise judicial self-
restraint85 and will not venture into this matter. After all, “the Court is not entirely without discretion
to accept a suit which does not satisfy the requirements of a [bona fide] case or of standing.
Considerations paramount to [the requirement of legal standing] could compel assumption of
jurisdiction.” In any case, the Court can take judicial cognizance of the fact that petitioners in the
Lagman Petition are all citizens of the Philippines since Philippine citizenship is a requirement for
them to be elected as representatives. We will therefore consider them as suing in their own behalf
as citizens of this country. Besides, respondents did not question petitioners’ legal standing.
1. Whether or not the petitions are the “appropriate proceeding” covered by paragraph 3,
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution sufficient to invoke the mode of review required by the
Court.-YES
All three petitions beseech the cognizance of this Court based on the third paragraph of Section 18,
Article VII (Executive Department) of the 1987 Constitution which provides:
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the
extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
During the oral argument, the petitioners theorized that the jurisdiction of this Court under the
third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII is sui generis. It is a special and specific jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court different from those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII. 88
The Court agrees.
1. a) Jurisdiction must be specifically conferred by the Constitution or by law.
It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or by the
law. Unless jurisdiction has been specifically conferred by the Constitution or by some legislative
act, no body or tribunal has the power to act or pass upon a matter brought before it for
resolution. It is likewise settled that in the absence of a clear legislative intent, jurisdiction cannot be
implied from the language of the Constitution or a statute. It must appear clearly from the law or it will
not be held to exist.
A plain reading of the afore-quoted Section 18, Article VII reveals that it specifically grants
authority to the Court to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of
martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
1. b) “In an appropriate proceeding” does not refer to a petition for certiorari filed under
Section 1 or 5 of Article VIII.
It could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution that the phrase “in an appropriate
proceeding” would refer to a Petition for Certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or Section 5 of Article VIII. The
standard of review in a petition for certiorari is whether the respondent has committed any grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the performance of his or her
functions. Thus, it is not the proper tool to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation or suspension. It must be emphasized that under Section 18, Article VII, the Court is
tasked to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President’s exercise of emergency powers. Put
differently, if this Court applies the standard of review used in a petition for certiorari, the same would
emasculate its constitutional task under Section 18, Article VII.
1. c) Purpose/ significance of Section 18, Article VII is to constitutionalize the pre-Marcos
martial law ruling in In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Lansang.
The third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII was inserted by the framers of the 1987 Constitution to
constitutionalize the pre-Marcos martiail law ruling of this Court in In the Matter of the Petition for
Habeas Corpus of Lansang, to wit: that the factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not a political question but precisely
within the ambit of judicial review.
“In determining the meaning, intent, and purpose of a law or constitutional provision, the history of
the times out of which it grew and to which it may be rationally supposed to bear some direct
relationship, the evils intended to be remedied, and the good to be accomplished are proper subjects
of inquiry.” Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J. (Fr. Bernas), a member of the Constitutional Commission that
drafted the 1987 Constitution, explained:
The Commander-in-Chief provisions of the 1935 Constitution had enabled President Ferdinand Marcos to
impose authoritarian rule on the Philippines from 1972 to 1986. Supreme Court decisions during that
period upholding the actions taken by Mr. Marcos made authoritarian rule part of Philippine
constitutional jurisprudence. The members of the Constitutional Commission, very much aware of
these facts, went about reformulating the Commander-in-Chief powers with a view to dismantling what
had been constructed during the authoritarian years. The new formula included revised grounds for the
activation of emergency powers, the manner of activating them, the scope of the powers, and review of
presidential action.94 (Emphasis supplied)
To recall, the Court held in the 1951 case of Montenegro v. Castaneda95 that the authority to decide
whether there is a state of rebellion requiring the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is lodged with the President and his decision thereon is final and conclusive upon the courts. This
ruling was reversed in the 1971 case of Lansang where it was held that the factual basis of the
declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not a
political question and is within the ambit of judicial review.However, in 1983, or after the declaration
of martial law by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, the Court, in Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile,
abandoned the ruling in Lansangand reverted to Montenegro. According to the Supreme Court, the
constitutional power of the President to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not subject to
judicial inquiry.
Thus, by inserting Section 18 in Article VII which allows judicial review of the declaration of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the framers of the 1987
Constitution in effect constitutionalized and reverted to the Lansang doctrine.
1. d) Purpose of Section 18, Article VII is to provide additional safeguard against possible
abuse by the President on the exercise of the extraordinary powers.
Section 18, Article VII is meant to provide additional safeguard against possible abuse by the
President in the exercise of his power to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus. Reeling from the aftermath of the Marcos martial law, the framers of the Constitution
deemed it wise to insert the now third paragraph of Section 18 of Article VII. This is clear from the
records of the Constitutional Commission when its members were deliberating on whether the President
could proclaim martial law even without the concurrence of Congress.
1. e) Purpose of Section 18, Article VII is to curtail the extent of the powers of the President.
The most important objective, however, of Section 18, Article VII is the curtailment of the extent of the
powers of the Commander-in-Chief. This is the primary reason why the provision was not placed in
Article VIII or the Judicial Department but remained under Article VII or the Executive Department.
During the closing session of the Constitutional Commission’s deliberations, President Cecilia Munoz
Palma expressed her sentiments on the 1987 Constitution. She said:
The executive power is vested in the President of the Philippines elected by the people for a six-year term
with no reelection for the duration of his/her life. While traditional powers inherent in the office of the
President are granted, nonetheless for the first time, there are specific provisions which curtail the
extent of such powers. Most significant is the power of the Chief Executive to suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus or proclaim martial law.
The flagrant abuse of that power of the Commander-in-Chief by Mr. Marcos caused the imposition of
martial law for more than eight years and the suspension of the privilege of the writ even after the lifting
of martial law in 1981. The new Constitution now provides that those powers can be exercised only in
two cases, invasion or rebellion when public safety demands it, only for a period not exceeding 60 days,
and reserving to Congress the power to revoke such suspension or proclamation of martial law which
congressional action may not be revoked by the President. More importantly, the action of the President is
made subject to judicial review, thereby again discarding jurisprudence which render[s] the executive
action a political question and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts to adjudicate.
For the first time, there is a provision that the state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution nor abolish civil courts or legislative assemblies, or vest jurisdiction to military tribunals
over civilians, or suspend the privilege of the writ. Please forgive me if, at this point, I state that this
constitutional provision vindicates the dissenting opinions I have written during my tenure in the Supreme
Court in the martial law cases.101
1. f) To interpret “appropriate proceeding” as filed under Section 1 of Article VIII would be
contrary to the intent of the Constitution.
To conclude that the “appropriate proceeding” refers to a Petition for Certiorari filed under the expanded
jurisdiction of this Court would, therefore, contradict the clear intention of the framers of the Constitution
to place additional safeguards against possible martial law abuse for, invariably, the third paragraph of
Section 18, Article VII would be subsumed under Section 1 of Article VIII. In other words, the framers of
the Constitution added the safeguard under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII on top of the
expanded jurisdiction of this Court.
1. g) Jurisdiction of the Court is not restricted to those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of
Article VIII.
The jurisdiction of this Court is not restricted to those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII. For
instance, its jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President can be found in the last paragraph of Section 4, Article
VII.102 The power of the Court to review on certiorarithe decision, order, or ruling of the Commission on
Elections and Commission on Audit can be found in Section 7, Article IX(A).
1. h) Unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII make it sui generis.
The unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII clearly indicate that it should
be treated as sui generis separate and different from those enumerated in Article VIII. Under the
third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII, a petition filed pursuant therewith will follow a different rule
on standing as any citizen may file it. Said provision of the Constitution also limits the issue to the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise by the Chief Executive of his emergency powers. The usual
period for filing pleadings in Petition for Certiorari is likewise not applicable under the third paragraph of
Section 18, Article VII considering the limited period within which this Court has to promulgate its
decision.
A proceeding “[i]n its general acceptation, [is] the form in which actions are to be brought and defended,
the manner of intervening in suits, of conducting them, the mode of deciding them, of opposing
judgments, and of executing.” In fine, the phrase “in an appropriate proceeding” appearing on the third
paragraph of Section 18, Article VII refers to any action initiated by a citizen for the purpose of
questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of the Chief Executive’s emergency
powers, as in these cases. It could be denominated as a complaint, a petition, or a matter to be resolved by
the Court.
III. The power of the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Section 18, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution is independent of the actions taken by Congress.
During the oral argument,the OSG urged the Court to give deference to the actions of the two co-equal
branches of the Government: on the part of the President as Commander-in-Chief, in resorting to his
extraordinary powers to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and on
the part of Congress, in giving its imprimatur to Proclamation No. 216 and not revoking the same.
The framers of the 1987 Constitution reformulated the scope of the extraordinary powers of the President
as Commander-in-Chief and the review of the said presidential action. In particular, the President’s
extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and imposing martial law
are subject to the veto powers of the Court and Congress.
1. a) The judicial power to review versus the congressional power to revoke.
The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate proceeding filed by any
citizen on the ground of lack of sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may revoke the
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, the Court considers
only the information and data available to the President prior to or at the time of the declaration; it is not
allowed to “undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings.” On the other hand, Congress
may take into consideration hot only data available prior to, but likewise events supervening the
declaration. Unlike the Court which does not look into the absolute correctness of the factual basis as will
be discussed below, Congress could probe deeper and further; it can delve into the accuracy of the facts
presented before it.
In addition, the Court’s review power is passive; it is only initiated by the filing of a petition “in an
appropriate proceeding” by a citizen. On the other hand, Congress’ review mechanism is automatic in the
sense that it may be activated by Congress itself at any time after the proclamation or suspension was
made.
Thus, the power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress are not only totally different
but likewise independent from each other although concededly, they have the same trajectory, which is,
the nullification of the presidential proclamation. Needless to say, the power of the Court to review can be
exercised independently from the power of revocation of Congress

216. Fortun vs President Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo

FACTS
On November 23, 2009, heavily armed men believed led by the ruling Ampatuan family of
Maguindanao gunned down and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians.  In response to this
carnage, President Arroyo issued on November 24, 2009 PP 1946 declaring a state of emergency
in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City.
On December 4, 2009, President Arroyo issued PP 1959 declaring martial law and suspending
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao except for identified areas of the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front. On December 6, 2009, President Arroyo submitted her report to Congress.
On December 9, 2009, Congress convened in joint session to review the validity of the
President’s action.  But two days later, or on December 12, 2009,
before Congress could act, the President issued PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus.

Petitioners Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun and the other petitioners in G.R. 190293, 190294, 190301,190302,
190307, 190356, and 190380 brought the present actions to challenge the constitutionality of President
Arroyo’s Proclamation 1959 affecting Maguindanao. But, given the prompt lifting of that proclamation
before Congress could review it and before any serious question affecting the rights and liberties of
Maguindanao’s inhabitants could arise, the Court deems any review of its constitutionality the
equivalent of beating a dead horse.

ISSUE
Whether the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the writ in Maguindanao, render the
issues moot and academic?

Held
[The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions on the ground that they have become MOOT and
ACADEMIC.]
YES, the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the [privilege of the] writ in Maguindanao,
rendered the issues moot and academic Prudence and respect for the co-equal departments of the
government dictate that the Court should be cautious in entertaining actions that assail the
constitutionality of the acts of the Executive or the Legislative department.  The issue of
constitutionality, said the Court in Biraogo v. Philippine
Truth Commission of 2010, must be the very issue of the case, that the resolution of such issue is
unavoidable.  
          
The issue of the constitutionality of Proclamation 1959 is not unavoidable for two reasons:
          
1. President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus before the joint houses
of Congress could fulfill their automatic duty to review and validate or invalidate the same. 
               
Under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to
proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.  They exercise the power, not
only sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the
suspension, only the Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on
the ground, a power that the President does not have. Consequently, although the Constitution
reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to exercise
its own review powers, which is automatic rather than initiated.  Only when Congress defaults in its
express duty to defend the Constitution through such review should the Supreme Court step in as its
final rampart.  The constitutional validity of the President’s proclamation of martial law or suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a
justiciable one in the hands of the Court. Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before
the joint houses of Congress, which had in fact convened, could act on the same.  Consequently, the
petitions in these cases have become moot and the Court has nothing to review.  The lifting of martial
law and restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao was a supervening
event that obliterated any justiciable controversy.
2.  Since President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus in just eight days, they have not been meaningfully implemented.  The military
did not take over the operation and control of local government units in Maguindanao.  The President
did not issue any law or decree affecting Maguindanao that should ordinarily be enacted by
Congress.  No indiscriminate mass arrest had been reported.  Those who were arrested during the
period were either released or promptly charged in court.  Indeed, no petition for habeas corpus had
been filed with the Court respecting arrests made in those eight days.  The point is that the
President intended by her action to address an uprising in a relatively small and sparsely populated
province.  In her judgment, the rebellion was localized and swiftly disintegrated in the face of a
determined and amply armed government presence.  In a real sense, the proclamation and the
suspension never took off.  The Congress itself adjourned without touching the matter, it having become
moot
and academic.

217. Zaldy Ampatuan vs Sec. Ronaldo Puno

Facts: 
On 24 November 2009, the day after the Maguindanao Massacre, then Pres. Arroyo
issued Proclamation 1946, placing “the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat
and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency.” She directed the AFP and the
PNP “to undertake such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to
prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence” in the named places. Three days
later, she also issued AO 273 “transferring” supervision of the ARMM from the Office of
the President to the DILG. She subsequently issued AO 273-A, which amended the
former AO (the term “transfer” used in AO 273 was amended to “delegate”, referring to
the supervision of the ARMM by the DILG). 
Claiming that the President’s issuances encroached on the ARMM’s autonomy,
petitioners Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, Ansaruddin Adiong, and Regie Sahali-Generale, all
ARMM officials, filed this petition for prohibition under Rule 65. They alleged that the
President’s proclamation and orders encroached on the ARMM’s autonomy as these
issuances empowered the DILG Secretary to take over ARMM’s operations and to seize
the regional government’s powers. They also claimed that the President had no factual
basis for declaring a state of emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat
and the City of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred and that the
deployment of troops and the taking over of the ARMM constitutes an invalid exercise of
the President’s emergency powers. Petitioners asked that Proclamation 1946 as well as
AOs 273 and 273-A be declared unconstitutional.

Issues: 

1. Whether Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate the principle of local
autonomy under the Constitution and The Expanded ARMM Act
2. Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she
called out the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence
in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City
3.  Whether or not the President had factual bases for her actions

Held:

1. The principle of local autonomy was not violated. DILG Secretary did not take over control of
the powers of the ARMM. After law enforcement agents took the respondent Governor
of ARMM into custody for alleged complicity in the Maguindanao Massacre, the ARMM
Vice‐Governor, petitioner Adiong, assumed the vacated post on 10 Dec. 2009 pursuant
to the rule on succession found in Sec. 12 Art.VII of RA 9054. In turn, Acting Governor
Adiong named the then Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner Sahali‐
Generale, Acting ARMM Vice-Governor. The DILG Secretary therefore did not take over
the administration or the operations of the ARMM. 

2. The deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood under Section 23

(2), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides:

SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the

Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject
to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and
proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by
resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment
thereof.

The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places
mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that
authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution
directly vests in the President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise
the same.

3. The President’s call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence
springs from the power vested in her under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution,
which provides:

Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces
of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. x x
x

While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the President’s
exercise of the above power, it would generally defer to her judgment on the matter. As
the Court acknowledged in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, it is clearly
to the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for calling out the armed
forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence. Unless it is shown that such
determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord respect to the
President’s judgment. Thus, the Court said:

If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the President acted
without factual basis, then this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation
beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily
quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since matters considered for
satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not always accessible
to the courts. Besides the absence of textual standards that the court may use to judge
necessity, information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove
unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify,
or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the
President might decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a
nature not constituting technical proof.

On the other hand, the President, as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence

network to gather information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or
affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot
decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of
human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the
military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it
were to have any effect at all. x x x. 

Here, petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of emergency in the
Provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City, as well as the President’s
exercise of the “calling out” power had no factual basis. They simply alleged that, since
not all areas under the ARMM were placed under a state of emergency, it follows that
the takeover of the entire ARMM by the DILG Secretary had no basis too.
The imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President issued Proclamation
1946 was too grave to ignore and she had to act to prevent further bloodshed and
hostilities in the places mentioned.  Progress reports also indicated that there was
movement in these places of both high-powered firearms and armed men sympathetic
to the two clans.  Thus, to pacify the people’s fears and stabilize the situation, the
President had to take preventive action.  She called out the armed forces to control the
proliferation of loose firearms and dismantle the armed groups that continuously
threatened the peace and security in the affected places.

Since petitioners are not able to demonstrate that the proclamation of state of
emergency in the subject places and the calling out of the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence there have clearly no factual bases, the Court must respect
the President’s actions.(Ampatuan vs Puno, G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011)

218. Prof. Randolf S. David et al vs Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as

President and Commannder-in-chief, et al. and Ninez Cacho-Olivares
and Tribune Publishing Co. vs. Honorable Secretary Eduardo Ermita
and Honorable Director General Arturo C. Lomibao
FACTS: On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 declaring a state of emergency, thus:

Now, therefore, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, [calling-out power] by virtue of the powers
vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: The President,
whenever it becomes necessary, may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress rebellion and in
my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to
maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as
well as any act of insurrection or rebellion ["take care" power] and to enforce obedience to all the laws
and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and
[power to take over] as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State
of National Emergency.

On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017, directing the members of the AFP and
PNP "to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and
prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence."

David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of
Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial
law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly.
They alleged “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search” committed by police
operatives pursuant to PP 1017.

During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5 have factual
basis, and contended that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the
President in determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces. The petitioners did not contend
the facts stated b the Solicitor General.

ISSUE: Whether the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional

RULING: The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus:

First provision: “by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII … do hereby command
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or
suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion”

Second provision: “and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;”

Third provision: “as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of
National Emergency.”

PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the first provision of the decree.

First Provision: Calling Out Power.

The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that “whenever it becomes necessary,” the
President may call the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.”
(Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora)

President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely an act declaring a status or condition
of public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4, Chap 2, Bk II of the Revised
Administration Code. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance,
and deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of national
emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision
calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on
Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the State’s extraordinary power to take over privately-owned
public utility and business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an
awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless.

To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of President Arroyo’s
calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence.

Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power.

The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed. This is based on Section 17, Article VII which reads:

SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the
authority to promulgate “decrees.” Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature.
Section 1, Article VI categorically states that “[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of
the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” To be sure, neither
Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of
legislative power by issuing decrees.

Third Provision: The Power to Take Over

Distinction must be drawn between the President’s authority to declare “a state of national emergency”
and to exercise emergency powers. To the first, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such power,
hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional
issues arise.

Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2),
Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a
power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or
practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it
wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:

(1) There must be a war or other emergency.

(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.

(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.

(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.

Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The
taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency
powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the “the State may, during
the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the
operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest,” it refers to
Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent
on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.

Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017,
this Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take
over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public
interest without authority from Congress.

Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency,
however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business
affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased.
Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected
with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to
exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers
act passed by Congress.

As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should
implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and
prevent acts of lawless violence.” Considering that “acts of terrorism” have not yet been defined and
made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared unconstitutional.
 219. Sanlakas vs Exec. Secretary
FACTS: During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men of
the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown leaders have seized
the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFP and declared
their withdrawal of support for the government, demanding the resignation of the President, Secretary
of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code,
and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared under the
State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers went back to their barracks in the evening of
the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and
Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the State of Rebellion was issued.

In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG
MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of the
Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and that there is
no factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al,
petitioners contending that the proclamation is a circumvention of the report requirement under the
same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours
from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the presidential issuances cannot be
construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the
President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo,
petitioners contending that there was usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution. (4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a
state of rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the
crime of rebellion.

ISSUE: Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional?

HELD: The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are
constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The
President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution executive
powers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces
and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may examine whether
the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of
discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the
President acted without factual basis. The issue of the circumvention of the report is of no merit as
there was no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts or that military authorities have
taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation of the legislative power of the Congress
is of no moment since the President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces,
was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are
purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the
delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear on warrantless arrest is
unreasonable, since any person may be subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime
punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid warrantless arrest is present.
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the
President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members
of the Congress.

220. Atty. Alicia Vidal vs Comelec & Joseph Ejercito Estrada

Facts: In September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada for the crime of
plunder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of
civil interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification. On October 25,
2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of
pardon, to former President Estrada, explicitly stating that he is restored to his civil and political rights.
In 2009, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of President. None of the
disqualification cases against him prospered but he only placed second in the results.
In 2012, Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of Candidacy,
this time vying for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of Manila.
Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against Estrada before
the Comelec stating that Estrada is disqualified to run for public office because of his conviction for
plunder sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with perpetual absolute disqualification.
Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code (OEC). 
The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that President Estrada’s right to
seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria
M. Arroyo.
Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Alfredo Lim, who garnered the second
highest votes, intervened and sought to disqualify Estrada for the same ground as the contention of
Risos-Vidal and praying that he be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila.

Issue: May former President Joseph Estrada run for public office despite having been convicted of the
crime of plunder which carried an accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office?

Held: Yes. Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights,
which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The
wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified.
It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective,
and constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles
36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. 
It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon given to and accepted by former
President Estrada does not actually specify which political right is restored, it could be inferred that former
President Arroyo did not deliberately intend to restore former President Estrada’s rights of suffrage and to
hold public office, orto otherwise remit the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. Even if her
intention was the contrary, the same cannot be upheld based on the pardon’s text.

221. Barrioquinto vs Fernandez

FACTS:
Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged for murder for the killings they made during the war.
The case was proceeded against Jimenez because Barrioquinto was nowhere to be found.
Jimenez was then sentenced to life imprisonment. Before the period for perfecting an appeal
had expired, the defendant Jimenez became aware of Proclamation No. 8, which grants
amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged with an act penalized under the RPC in
furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the
enemy. Barrioquinto learned about the proclamation and he surfaced in order to invoke
amnesty as well. However, Commissioner Fernandez of the 14 th Amnesty Commission refused
to process the amnesty request of the two accused because the two refused to admit to the
crime as charged. Jimenez & Barrioquinto in fact said that a certain Tolentino was the one who
committed the crime being charged to them.

ISSUE:
Whether or not admission of guilt is necessary in amnesty.

HELD:
Pardon is granted by the President and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and
proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by
Proclamation of the President with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which
the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty
is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses,
generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after
conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an
offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for
that reason it does “nor work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of
suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon,” and it “in no case
exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the
sentence” (art 36, RPC). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the
offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the
person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no
offense.
In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation, it is not necessary that
he should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non, admit having committed the criminal act
or offense with which he is charged, and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the
evidence, either of the complainant or the accused, shows that the offense committed comes
within the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say that “invocation
of the benefits of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance.” Although the
accused does not confess the imputation against him, he may be declared by the courts or the
Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits of the amnesty. For, whether or not he admits or
confesses having committed the offense with which he is charged, the Commissions should, if
necessary or requested by the interested party, conduct summary hearing of the witnesses
both for the complainants and the accused, on whether he has committed the offense in
furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the
enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to the benefits of amnesty and to be “regarded as a
patriot or hero who have rendered invaluable services to the nation,” or not, in accordance
with the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation. Since the Amnesty Proclamation is a public act,
the courts as well as the Amnesty Commissions created thereby should take notice of the terms
of said Proclamation and apply the benefits granted therein to cases coming within their
province or jurisdiction, whether pleaded or claimed by the person charged with such offenses
or not, if the evidence presented shows that the accused is entitled to said benefits.

222. Vera vs People

Amnesty – Reversal of the Doctrine Held in the Barrioquinto Case
FACTS:
Vera, together with 92 others were charged for the crime of kidnapping with murder done against
Amadeo Lozaňes. The said crime was committed allegedly to aid the Japanese occupation.
During the hearing, none of the petitioners-defendants admitted having committed the crime
charged. In fact, Gaudencio Vera, the only defendant who took the witness stand, instead of
admitting the killing of the deceased Lozañes, categorically denied it. Hence, the Amnesty
Commission held that it could not take cognizance of the case, on the ground that the benefits of
the Amnesty Proclamation, could be invoked only by defendants in a criminal case who,
admitting the commission of the crime, plead that said commission was in pursuance of the
resistance movement and perpetrated against persons who aided the enemy during the Japanese
occupation. Consequently, the Commission ordered that the case be remanded to the court of
origin for trial.
ISSUE: 
Whether or not the accused can avail of amnesty sans admission of guilt.
HELD: 
It is rank inconsistency for appellant to justify an act, or seek forgiveness for an act which,
according to him, he has not committed. Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime, and
when an accused maintains that he has not committed a crime, he cannot have any use for
amnesty. Where an amnesty proclamation imposes certain conditions, as in this case, it is
incumbent upon the accused to prove the existence of such conditions. The invocation of
amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance, which means that the pleader
admits the allegations against him but disclaims liability therefore on account of intervening
facts which, if proved, would bring the crime charged within the scope of the amnesty
proclamation. The present rule requires a previous admission of guilt since a person would not
need the benefit of amnesty unless he was, to begin with, guilty of the offense covered by the
proclamation.

223. Cristobal vs Labrador

FACTS:
Teofilo C. Santos was convicted of estafa and was sentenced to 6 months arresto mayor and an
accessory penalty as provided by the law. He was confined to the Pasig provincial jail. On August 22,
1938, Commonwealth Act No. 357, otherwise known as the Election Code, was approved by the national
Assembly, section 94, paragraph (b) of which disqualifies the respondent from voting for having been
"declared by final judgment guilty of any crime against the property." In view of this provision, the
respondent forth with applied to his Excellency, the President for an absolute pardon, his petition bearing
date of August 15, 1939. Upon the favorable recommendation of the Secretary of Justice, the Chief
Executive, on December 24, 1939, granted the said petition, restoring the respondent to his "full civil and
political rights.

ISSUE: Whether the pardoning power of the Chief Executive was limited in this case.

HELD
It should be observed that there are two limitations upon the exercise of this constitutional prerogative by
the Chief Executive, namely: (a) that the power be exercised after convictions; and (b) that such power
does not extend to cases of impeachment. Subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the
pardoning power does not extend to cases of impeachment. Subject to the limitations imposed by the
Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action. It must remain
where the sovereign authority has placed it and must be exercised by the highest authority to which it is
entrusted. When granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is
left of the consequences of conviction. In the present case, while the pardon extended to respondent
Santos is conditional in the sense that "he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which are
clerical or manual in nature involving no money or property responsibility," it is absolute insofar as it
"restores the respondent to full civil and political rights." The petition for certiorari had been denied.

224. People vs Jose

FACTS:

Jose was prosecuted and convicted in Criminal Case No. 3 of the Court of Special
Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction of the City of Greater Manila, for a violation of section 3 (b) and
2 (b) of Act No. 65 of the national Assembly of the Republic of the Philippines in connection
with section 11 of Ordinance No. 1 of the President of the said Republic, and sentenced to ten
years of imprisonment, which sentence he commenced to serve on the aforesaid date, April 19,
1944. Act 65 was an act of the Nat’l Assembly of Republic of the Philippines while the Japanese
were still occupying the country. After serving 6 months or in April 1944, Jose was granted a
conditional pardon – the simple condition was for him not to violate any other Penal Laws of
Republic of the Philippines. Later he committed a crime of qualified theft. The Fiscal then went
on to file an additional charge against Jose for violating the conditions of the pardon granted
him. Jose argued that he did not violate the pardon conditions at all because there is no pardon at
all. The pardon granted him is inoperative because the law he violated before was a political law
which was abrogated when the US army took over the country as proclaimed by MacArthur in
Oct 1944.

ISSUE: 

Whether the defendant can now be prosecuted for having allegedly violated the
conditional pardon granted by the President of the so-called Republic of the Philippines or not.

HELD: 

The Supreme Court held that Jose cannot be prosecuted criminally for a violation of the
conditional pardon granted by the President of the so-called RP (during the Jap Occupation), for
the following reasons:

1) Because, without necessity of discussing and determining the intrinsic validity of the
conditional pardon, as an act done by the President of the so-called RP, after the
restoration of the Commonwealth Government, no elaborate argument is required to
show that the effectivity of a conditional pardon depends on that of the sentence
which inflicts upon a defendant the punishment inflicted by the sentence ceases to be
of any effect in so far as the individual upon whom it is bestowed is concerned, for
the latter cannot be required to serve a void sentence of penalty imposed on him, even
without such pardon.
2) Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code provides that if the penalty remitted by the
granting of a pardon than six years, the convict shall suffer the unexpired portion of
his original sentence. As the unexpired portion of t he original punitive sentence
imposed upon Jose is higher than six years (inasmuch as he had served only about six
months of the ten years imprisonment imposed upon him), if Jose be now prosecuted
and convicted, he shall have to be sentenced to serve the unexpired portion of his
original sentence; but as the said sentence is now invalid and of no effect, it is
obvious that Benedicto Jose can no longer be prosecuted, for no penalty can be
imposed upon him for violation of said conditional pardon.

225. Pelobelo vs Palatino

FACTS: Palatino was the mayor elect of Torrijos, Marinduque. Pelobello filed a quo warranto
proceeding alleging that Palatino is no longer qualified to hold office because he was already
convicted before and was even imprisoned. Because of such conviction and imprisonment,
Peleobello averred that Palatino is already barred from voting and being voted upon. Palatino
also invoked par (a), sec 94 of the Election Code which supports his contention.

ISSUE: Whether or not Palatino is eligible for public office.

HELD: Yes, Palatino was granted a conditional pardon by the then Gov-Gen but such pardon
was converted into an absolute pardon by President Quezon who succeeded the Gov-Gen. The
pardon was already after Palatino’s election but prior to him assuming office. The SC then held
that since there is an absolute pardon, all the former disabilities imposed and attached to the
prior conviction had been removed and that Palatino is therefore eligible for the public office in
question.

226. People vs Pasilan

Amnesty – when cannot be invoked – new trial

Pasilan was a former guerilla fighting against the Japanese. In 1944, while cleaning his gun outside the
house of one Justina Miguel, a certain Ciriaco Abarra passed by. Pasilan ordered Abarra to wait for him.
Abarra waited and after cleaning his gun, Pasilan interrogated Abarra. Abarra was alleged to be
supporting the Japanese cause and he was one of the persons who accompanied the Japanese troops in
raiding the barrio where Pasilan lived. After interrogating, Pasilan inflicted upon Abarra 2 stab wounds
on Abarra’s chest. Abarra run away towards the river. Ten days later, the decaying body of Abarra was
found. About 10 years after the incident, Morales, an agent, was sent to the barrio to investigate crimes
committed during the war. He conducted some investigation and was also able to have Miguel testify
against Pasilan and he later found Pasilan to be guilty for the murder of Abarra. On July 29, 1964, Pasilan
moved for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence which allegedly would reverse the
decision of the lower court. Alleged as newly discovered evidence are sworn statement attesting to
Justina Miguel’s recantation. Pasilan likewise seeks to avail of Proclamation No. 8 by President Roxas
granting amnesty to persons who during the war committed any act penalized under the RPC in
furtherance of the resistance against the enemy or against person aiding in the war efforts of the
enemy.

ISSUE: Whether or not Pasilan is eligible to be admitted for amnesty.

HELD: Not every recantation of a witness entitles the accused to a new trial. Otherwise, the power to
grant a new trial would rest not in the courts but in the witnesses who have testified against the
accused. Recanting testimony, furthermore, is exceedingly unreliable. Since Justina Miguel’s alleged
recantation has already been passed upon by the trial court, new trial is uncalled for.

Neither can the additional ground of amnesty entitle appellant to a new trial. In the first place,
Proclamation No. 8 of President Roxas is not a newly discovered evidence, for it was already known
when the case was tried. Secondly, availing of the benefits granted by the amnesty proclamation would
be inconsistent with the plea of not guilty which appellant entered upon his arraignment. Amnesty
presupposes the commission of a crime, and when the accused maintains that he has not committed a
crime, he cannot avail of amnesty.

227. Legaspi vs Minister

“Amnesty Does not Need Concurrence from Congress if the President Acts Pursuant to His
Power to Legislate”
In 1982, after the lifting of Martial Law, Legaspi, then incumbent member of the interim
Batasang Pambansa, petitioned to declare Presidential Decree 1840 “granting tax
amnesty and filing of statement of assets and liabilities and some other purposes”
unconstitutional. He argued that said decree was promulgated despite the fact that under
the Constitution ‘(T)he Legislative power shall be vested in a Batasang Pambansa’ (Sec. 1,
Article VIII) and the President may grant amnesty only ‘with concurrence of the Batasang
Pambansa. In this case, there was no concurrence given by the IBP. Legaspi averred that
since Martial Law is already lifted, the president can no longer arbitrarily enact laws. At the
same time,  Legaspi averred that Amendment No. 6, which provides legislative powers to
Marcos, is invalid because that is no longer allowed after the lifting of the ML.

ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly grant tax amnesties w/o the concurrence of the
Batasan Pambansa.

HELD: SC ruled PD 1840 to be valid. Legaspi argued that PD 1840 is invalid for it did not
enjoy the concurrence of the Batasan. He relies on Article 7, Sec 11 of the Constitution
which provides that –
‘The President may, except in cases of impeachment, grant reprieves, commutations and
pardons, remit fines and forfeitures and with the concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa,
grant amnesty.’
The SC noted that Article 7, sec. 11, applies only when the President is exercising his
power of executive clemency. In the case at bar, PD 1840 was issued pursuant to his power
to legislate under Amendment No. 6. It ought to be indubitable that when the President acts
as legislator as in the case at bar, he does not need the concurrence of the Batasan.
Rather, he exercises concurrent authority vested by the Constitution.”
228. Monsanto vs Factoran

the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) and
three other accused, of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents. Petitioner Monsanto
appealed her conviction to this Court (supreme court) which subsequently affirmed the same. She then filed a
motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended on December 17, 1984 by then
President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted on December 21, 1984.
By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her
former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant. The letter was then referred to the ministry
of finance, which the local government code transferred the power of appointment of treasurers from the city
government to the said ministry. The Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her position
without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon.

Seeking reconsideration of the foregoing ruling, petitioner wrote the Ministry on April 17, 1985 stressing that the
full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which implies that her service in the government has never
been interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive
suspension which is August 1, 1982; that she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her suspension; and
that she should not be required to pay the proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50.

The latter letter was then referred to the office of the president.

Issue:

Whether or not absolute pardon entitles Monsanto of backpay.

Ruling:
a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eye of the law the
offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very
essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the
commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain. It involves forgiveness
and not forgetfulness.

The better considered cases regard full pardon (at least one not based on the offender's innocence) as relieving the
party from all the punitive consequences of his criminal act, including the disqualifications or disabilities based on
the finding of guilt. But it relieves him from nothing more. "To say, however, that the offender is a "new man", and
"as innocent as if he had never committed the offense;" is to ignore the difference between the crime and the
criminal. A person adjudged guilty of an offense is a convicted criminal, though pardoned; he may be deserving of
punishment, though left unpunished; and the law may regard him as more dangerous to society than one never
found guilty of crime, though it places no restraints upon him following his conviction."

A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for what
has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for
what has been suffered. "Since  the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done
or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no
satisfaction for it can be required." This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to
receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits.

Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to
all his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on the person's innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back lost
reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing.

229. Lllamas vs Executive Secretary Orbos

Facts:  Vice-Governor Llamas together with some other complainants filed an administrative
case against Governor Ocampo III of Tarlac for alleged acts constituting graft and corruption.
After trial, the Secretary of the then Department of Local Government found Ocampo guilty of
serious neglect of duty and/or abuse of authority for entering into a loan contract
grossly/manifestly disadvantageous to Tarlac Province and meted a penalty of suspension for
90 days. Llamas, assumed office. In not less than 30 days, however, Executive Secretary Orbos,
by authority of the President, issued a Resolution granting executive clemency to Ocampo (after
finding the relative success of Ocampo's livelihood loan program) in the sense that the latter's
90-day suspension is reduced to the period already served. Ocampo reassumed the
governorship of the province, allegedly without any notification made to Llamas. Llamas
questioned the Resolution before the SC. 

Petitioner's main argument is that the President may grant executive clemency only in criminal
cases, based on Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution which reads:

“Sec. 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in Constitution, the

President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures,
after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of majority of all the
Members of the Congress.”

Petitioner argued that the qualifying phrase “after conviction by final judgment” applies solely
to criminal cases, and no other law allows the grant of executive clemency or pardon to anyone
who has been “convicted in an administrative case. 

Respondent Governor avers that since under the Constitution discretionary authority is granted
to the President on the exercise of executive clemency, the same constitutes a political
question which is beyond judicial review.

Issues:

1. May the President grant executive clemency in administrative cases?

2. Was petitioner's right to due process violated when he was not notified of the grant of
executive clemency?

Held:

1. Yes. "Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguire debemos." If the law does not distinguish, so
we must not distinguish. The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive
clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By
the same token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed
be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article
VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Following petitioner's proposed interpretation, cases of
impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve
criminal offenses. In the same vein, We do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why
the President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is Our considered
view that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in
administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.

If those already adjudged guilty criminally in court may be pardoned, those adjudged guilty
administratively should likewise be extended the same benefit. In criminal cases, the quantum
of evidence required to convict an individual is proof beyond reasonable doubt, but the
Constitution grants to the President the power to pardon the act done by the proved criminal
and in the process exempts him from punishment therefor. On the other hand, in
administrative cases, the quantum of evidence required is mere substantial evidence to support
a decision, not to mention that as to the admissibility of evidence, administrative bodies are not
bound by the technical and rigid rules of admissibility prescribed in criminal cases. It will
therefore be unjust and unfair for those found guilty administratively of some charge if the
same effects of pardon or executive clemency cannot be extended to them, even in the sense
of modifying a decision to subserve the interest of the public.

Moreover, the President, in the exercise of her power of supervision and control over all
executive departments, may substitute her decision for that of her subordinate, most especially
where the basis therefor would be to serve the greater public interest. It is clearly within the
power of the President not only to grant "executive clemency" but also to reverse or modify a
ruling issued by a subordinate against an erring public official, where a reconsideration of the
facts alleged would support the same. It is in this sense that the alleged executive clemency was
granted, after adducing reasons that subserve the public interest. — "the relative success of . . .
livelihood loan program.

However, that when we say the President can grant executive clemency in administrative cases,
we refer only to all administrative cases in the Executive branch, not in the Judicial or
Legislative branches of the government. 

2. Petitioner's argument that his constitutional rights to due process were violated is
uruneritorious. Pardon has been defined as "the private, though official, act of the executive
magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended and not communicated
officially to the court. ..." Thus, assuming that petitioner was not notified of the subject pardon,
it is only because said notice is unnecessary. (Llamas vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
99031, October 15, 1991)

230. Torres vs Gonzales

FACTS:
1978, Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the president w/ the condition that
he shall not violate any penal laws again. Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against
in the manner prescribed by law. Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently
released from confinement. In 1982, Torres was charged with multiple crimes of estafa. In 1986,
Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of Torres’ pardon. Hence, the president cancelled the pardon.
Torres appealed the issue before the SC averring that the Exec Dep’t erred in convicting him for violating
the conditions of his pardon because the estafa charges against him were not yet final and executory as
they were still on appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the petitioner can
be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and
accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence.

HELD:
In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have
breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (1) Section 64 (i) of
the Revised Administrative Code, a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny, or (2) Article 159
of the Revised Penal Code, a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional
pardon.
Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial
pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final
judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional
pardon.
Under art. 159 of the RPC, parolee or convict who is regarded as having violated the provisions thereof
must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final judgment before he can be made to suffer the
penalty prescribed.
In the case at bar, President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President’s executive prerogative and is
not subject to judicial scrutiny.
*Who determines if violated? The PRESIDENT. When the person was conditionally pardoned it was a
generous exercise by the Chief Executive of his constitutional prerogative. The acceptance thereof by
the convict or prisoner carrie[d] with it the authority or power of the Executive to determine whether a
condition or conditions of the pardon has or have been violated. To no other department of the
Government [has] such power been intrusted.

Section 20. The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law. The Monetary Board shall, within thirty days from the end of every quarter of the
calendar year, submit to the Congress a complete report of its decision on applications for loans to
be contracted or guaranteed by the Government or government-owned and controlled corporations
which would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters as may be
provided by law.

Section 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by
at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
 231. Saguisag vs Ochoa
FACTS:

The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) is an executive agreement that

given U.S. troops, planes and ships increased rotational presence in Philippine military bases and
allows the U.S. to build facilities to store fuel and equipment there. It was signed against the
backdrop of the Philippines’ maritime dispute with China over the West Philippine Sea.

The U.S. embassy and DFA exchanged diplomatic rotes confirming all necessary
requirements for the agreement to take force. The agreement was signed on April 2014. President
Benigno Aquino III ratified the same on June 2014. It was not submitted to congress on the
understanding that to do so was no longer necessary.

Petitions for certiorari were filed before the Supreme court assailing the constitutionality
of the agreement. Herein petitioners now contend that it should have been concurred by the
senate as it is not an executive agreement. The senate issued Senate resolution no. 105
expressing a strong sense that in order for EDCA to be valid and binding, it must first be
transmitted to the senate for deliberation and concurrence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the EDCA between the Philippines and the U.S. is constitutional.

RULING: Yes. The EDCA is an executive agreement and does not need the Senate’s
concurrence. As an executive agreement, it remains consistent with existing laws and treaties
that it purports to implement.

Petitioners contend that the EDCA must be in the form of a treaty duly concurred by Senate.
They hinge their argument under the following Constitutional provisions:

- Sec. 21, Art. VII: “No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least 2/3 of all the members of the senate.
- Section 25, Art. XVII: military bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not
be allowed in the Philippine except under a treaty duly concurred in by the senate.

The president, however, may enter into an executive agreement on foreign military bases, troops,
or facilities, if (a) it is not the instrument that allows the presence of foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities; or (b) it merely aims to implement an existing law or treaty.

232. Suzette Nicolas y Sombilon vs Alberto Romulo

**This case is consolidated with Salonga vs Daniel Smith & BAYAN vs Gloria Arroyo
On the 1st of November 2005, Daniel Smith committed the crime of rape against Nicole. He
was convicted of the said crime and was ordered by the court to suffer imprisonment. Smith
was a US serviceman convicted of a crime against our penal laws and the crime was
committed within the country’s jurisdiction. But pursuant to the VFA, a treaty between the
US and Philippines, the US embassy was granted custody over Smith. Nicole, together with
the other petitioners appealed before the SC assailing the validity of the VFA. Their
contention is that the VFA was not ratified by the US senate in the same way our senate
ratified the VFA.
ISSUE: Is the VFA void and unconstitutional & whether or not it is self-executing.
HELD: The VFA is a self-executing Agreement because the parties intend its provisions to
be enforceable, precisely because the VFA is intended to carry out obligations and
undertakings under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. As a matter of fact, the VFA has
been implemented and executed, with the US faithfully complying with its obligation to
produce Smith before the court during the trial.
The VFA is covered by implementing legislation inasmuch as it is the very purpose and
intent of the US Congress that executive agreements registered under this Act within 60
days from their ratification be immediately implemented. The SC noted that the VFA is not
like other treaties that need implementing legislation such as the Vienna Convention. As
regards the implementation of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, military aid or assistance
has been given under it and this can only be done through implementing legislation. The
VFA itself is another form of implementation of its provisions.

233. Gonzales vs Hechanova

Facts: Then President Diosdado Macapagal entered into two executive agreements with Vietnam and
Burma for the importation of rice without complying with the requisite of securing a certification from the
Nat’l Economic Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals. Hence, Hechanova authorized the
importation of 67000 tons of rice from abroad to the detriment of our local planters. Gonzales, then
president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association assailed the executive agreements. Gonzales
averred that Hechanova is without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction”, because RA 3452 prohibits the
importation of rice and corn by “the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive agreements entered into by Macapagal.

HELD: Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress.
The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the
exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of laws,
by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the
very act prohibited by said laws. In the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which is
latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, Hechanova not only admits, but,
also, insists that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. No such justification can be given as regards
executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of
separation of powers and the system of checks and balances which are fundamental in our constitutional
set up.
As regards the question whether an executive or an international agreement may be invalidated by our
courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by
providing that the SC may not be deprived “of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm
on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and
decrees of inferior courts in “All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law,
ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question”. In other words, our Constitution authorizes the
nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs
counter to an act of Congress.
234. Tan Sin vs Deportation Board
104 Phil. 868 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Executive Order – Power to Deport an Undesirable
Alien

FACTS:
Tan Sin was a Chinese residing in Pasay. In December 1953, he was convicted of the crime of estafa. He
was sentenced to jail. When he finished serving his sentence, he learned that an order to detain him was
issued by the Deportation Board because apparently, a special prosecutor filed with the Deportation
Board an action to deport Tan Sin because by reason of the crime he had committed, he became an
undesirable alien. The Deportation Board after hearing, recommended to the President of the
Philippines that Tan Sin be deported. In his defense, Tan Sin averred that he cannot be deported by the
Deportation Board (an entity under the executive department) or by the President because only
Congress has the absolute and inherent power to deport aliens.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tans Sin can be deported by the President.

HELD: Yes. The power to deport aliens is lodged in the President. As an act of state, it is vested in the
Executive by virtue of his office, subject only to the regulations prescribed in Sec 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code or to such future legislation as may be promulgated on the subject. There is no
provision in the Constitution nor act of the legislature defining the power, as it is evident that it is the
intention of the law to grant to the Chief Executive full discretion to determine whether an alien’s
residence in the country is so undesirable as to affect or injure the security, welfare or interest of the
state. The adjudication of facts upon which deportation is predicated also devolves on the Chief
Executive whose decision is final and executory.

235. Commissioner of Customs vs Eastern Sea Trading

FACTS: Eastern Sea Trading (EST) was a shipping company which imports from Japan
onion and garlic into the Philippines. In 1956, the Commissioner of Customs ordered the
seizure and forfeiture of the import goods because EST was not able to comply with Central
Bank Circulars 44 and 45. The said circulars were pursuant to Executive Order 328. On the
other hand, EO 328 was the implementing law of the Trades and Financial Agreements, an
executive agreement, entered into between the Philippines and Japan. The said executive
agreement states, among others, that all import transactions between Japan and the
Philippines should be invoiced in dollar. In this case, the said items imported by EST from
Japan were not invoiced in dollar.
EST questioned the validity of the said EO averring that the executive agreement that the
EO was implementing was never concurred upon by the Senate. The issue was elevated to
the Court of Tax Appeals and the latter ruled in favor of EST. The Commissioner appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Agreement is subject to the concurrence by the
Senate.
HELD: No, Executive Agreements are not like treaties which are subject to the concurrence
of at least 2/3 of the members of the Senate. Agreements concluded by the President which
fall short of treaties are commonly referred to as executive agreements and are no less
common in our scheme of government than are the more formal instruments — treaties and
conventions. They sometimes take the form of exchanges of notes and at other times that
of more formal documents denominated ‘agreements’ or ‘protocols’.
The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and
agreements — whether denominated executive agreements or exchanges of notes or
otherwise — begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It would be useless
to undertake to discuss here the large variety of executive agreements as such, concluded
from time to time. Hundreds of executive agreements, other than those entered into under
the trade- agreements act, have been negotiated with foreign governments. . . . It would
seem to be sufficient, in order to show that the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are
not anomalous in character, that they are not treaties, and that they have abundant
precedent in our history, to refer to certain classes of agreements heretofore entered into by
the Executive without the approval of the Senate.
They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income tax on
shipping profits, the admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and commercial relations
generally, international claims, postal matters, the registration of trade-marks and
copyrights, etc. Some of them were concluded not by specific congressional authorization
but in conformity with policies declared in acts of Congress with respect to the general
subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still others, particularly those with respect to the
settlement of claims against foreign governments, were concluded independently of any
legislation.

236. Ichiong vs Hernandez

[Petitioner: Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations
and partnerships adversely affected by RA 1180
Respondents: Jamie Hernandez, Secretary of Finance and Marcelino Sarmiento, City Treasurer
of Manila]

Facts:
Petitioner Lao H. Ichong brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that Republic Act
1180 is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting
under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner
attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal
protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law; (2)
the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates
international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines. In answer, the Solicitor-
General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that the Act was passed in the valid exercise
of the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the Constitution in the interest of
national economic survival.

Issue:
Whether or not Republic Act 1180 violates the equal protection of laws.

Held/Ruling:
No. According to the Court, RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. It was also then
provided that police power cannot be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a
contract. The enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State. The law
does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist
for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the
due process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the
privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege. The
petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.

The Court also provided that RA 1180 was enacted to remedy a real and actual danger to
national economy posed by alien dominance and control. If ever the law infringes upon the said
treaty, the latter is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law and the
same may never curtain or restrict the scope of the police power of the state.

Section 22. The President shall submit to the Congress, within thirty days from the opening of every
regular session as the basis of the general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources
of financing, including receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures.

Section 23. The President shall address the Congress at the opening of its regular session. He may
also appear before it at any other time.

237. Hidalgo vs Marcos

FACTS:
This is a petition for mandamus and prohibition against the former president Ferdinand Marcos.
On December 1977, a referendum was supposed to be held to ask the people whether or not they want
President Marcos to serve as their President after the interim Batasang Pambansa will be organized. The
purpose of this referendum was to merge the Office of the President and the Office of the Prime
Minister. Note at the time that President Marcos was both wielding legislative and executive powers.
Ernesto Hidalgo averred that the said referendum was unconstitutional and improper since it would lead
to the amendment of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether the president can be sued and compelled by the SC for specific action through a writ of
mandamus?

HELD:
The Supreme Court did not pass upon the issue in this case considering the COMELEC was
impleaded.

The Supreme Court, however, ruled that the referendum was constitutional since it did not in
any way sought to amend the Constitution, but was merely an inquiry among the people whether or not
they would want Ferdinand Marcos to stay in power.

238. Carillo vs Marcos

239. Maximo Soliven vs Judge Makasiar

Facts:
Luis Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He, together with others, was charged
with libel by the then president Corzaon Aquino. Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit against
him and others. Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit because this would
defeat her immunity from suit. He grounded his contention on the principle that a president
cannot be sued. However, if a president would sue then the president would allow herself to be
placed under the court’s jurisdiction and conversely she would be consenting to be sued back.
Also, considering the functions of a president, the president may not be able to appear in court to
be a witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt.
ISSUE:
  Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, a person other than the
president.
HELD:
  No. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is
to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction,
considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring
all of the office-holder’s time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may
be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President’s behalf.
Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in a criminal case in which the President is the complainant
cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against
such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the
privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and
submit to the court’s jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is
solely the President’s prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any
other person.