SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 159595. January 23, 2007.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES , petitioner, vs . LOURDES ABIERA

NILLAS , respondent.

DECISION

TINGA , J : p

The central question raised in this Petition for Review is whether prescription or
laches may bar a petition to revive a judgment in a land registration case. It is a hardly
novel issue, yet petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) pleads that the Court rule
in a manner that would unsettle precedent. We deny certiorari and instead a rm the
assailed rulings of the courts below.
The facts bear little elaboration. On 10 April 1997, respondent Lourdes Abiera Nillas
(Nillas) led a Petition for Revival of Judgment with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Dumaguete City. It was alleged therein that on 17 July 1941, the then Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Negros Oriental rendered a Decision Adicional in Expediente Cadastral
No. 14, captioned as El Director De Terrenos contra Esteban Abingayan y Otros . 1 In the
decision, the CFI, acting as a cadastral court, adjudicated several lots, together with the
improvements thereon, in favor of named oppositors who had established their title to
their respective lots and their continuous possession thereof since time immemorial and
ordered the Chief of the General Land Registration O ce, upon the nality of the decision,
to issue the corresponding decree of registration. 2 Among these lots was Lot No. 771 of
the Sibulan Cadastre, which was adjudicated to Eugenia Calingacion (married to Fausto
Estoras) and Engracia Calingacion, both residents of Sibulan, Negros Oriental. 3
Nillas further alleged that her parents, Serapion and Jose na A. Abierra, eventually
acquired Lot No. 771 in its entirety. By way of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 7 November
1977, Engracia Calingacion sold her undivided one-half (1/2) share over Lot No. 771 to the
Spouses Abierra, the parents of Nillas. On the other hand, the one-half (1/2) share
adjudicated to Eugenia Calingacion was also acquired by the Spouses Abierra through
various purchases they effected from the heirs of Eugenia between the years 1975 to
1982. These purchases were evidenced by three separate Deeds of Absolute Sale all in
favor of the Spouses Abierra. 4
In turn, Nillas acquired Lot No. 771 from her parents through a Deed of Quitclaim
dated 30 June 1994. Despite these multiple transfers, and the fact that the Abierra
spouses have been in open and continuous possession of the subject property since the
1977 sale, no decree of registration has ever been issued over Lot No. 771 despite the
rendition of the 1941 CFI Decision. Thus, Nillas sought the revival of the 1941 Decision and
the issuance of the corresponding decree of registration for Lot No. 771. The records do
not precisely reveal why the decree was not issued by the Director of Lands, though it does
not escape attention that the 1941 Decision was rendered a few months before the
commencement of the Japanese invasion of the Philippines in December of 1941. ESCacI

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 No responsive pleading was led by the O ce of the Solicitor General (OSG),
although it entered its appearance on 13 May 1997 and simultaneously deputized the City
Prosecutor of Dumaguete City to appear whenever the case was set for hearing and in all
subsequent proceedings. 5
Trial on the merits ensued. The RTC heard the testimony of Nillas and received her
documentary evidence. No evidence was apparently presented by the OSG. On 26 April
2000, the RTC rendered a Decision 6 nding merit in the petition for revival of judgment,
and ordering the revival of the 1941 Decision, as well as directing the Commissioner of the
Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the corresponding decree of con rmation and
registration based on the 1941 Decision.
The OSG appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals, arguing in main that the
right of action to revive judgment had already prescribed. The OSG further argued that at
the very least, Nillas should have established that a request for issuance of a decree of
registration before the Administrator of the LRA had been duly made. The appeal was
denied by the appellate court in its Decision 7 dated 24 July 2003. In its Decision, the Court
of Appeals reiterated that the provisions of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which
impose a prescriptive period for enforcement of judgments by motion, refer to ordinary
civil actions and not to "special" proceedings such as land registration cases. The Court of
Appeals also noted that it would have been especially onerous to require Nillas to rst
request the LRA to comply with the 1941 decision considering that it had been established
that the original records in the 1941 case had already been destroyed and could no longer
be reconstructed.
In the present petition, the OSG strongly argues that contrary to the opinion of the
Court of Appeals, the principles of prescription and laches do apply to land registration
cases. The OSG notes that Article 1144 of the Civil Code establishes that an action upon
judgment must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues. 8
Further, Section 6 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure establishes that a nal
and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within ve (5) years from the
date of its entry, after which time it may be enforced by action before it is barred by
statute of limitations. 9 It bears noting that the Republic does not challenge the authenticity
of the 1941 Decision, or Nillas's acquisition of the rights of the original awardees. Neither
does it seek to establish that the property is inalienable or otherwise still belonged to the
State.
The OSG also extensively relies on two cases, Shipside Inc. v. Court of Appeals 1 0
a n d Heirs of Lopez v. De Castro . 1 1 Shipside was cited since in that case, the Court
dismissed the action instituted by the Government seeking the revival of judgment that
declared a title null and void because the judgment sought to be revived had become nal
more than 25 years before the action for revival was led. In Shipside, the Court relied on
Article 1144 of the Civil Code and Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in
declaring that extinctive prescription did lie. On the other hand, Heirs of Lopez involved the
double registration of the same parcel of land, and the subsequent action by one set of
applicants for the issuance of the decree of registration in their favor seven (7) years after
the judgment had become nal. The Court dismissed the subsequent action, holding that
laches had set in, it in view of the petitioners' omission to assert a right for nearly seven (7)
years. cEDIAa

Despite the invocation by the OSG of these two cases, there exists a more general
but de nite jurisprudential rule that favors Nillas and bolsters the rulings of the lower
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 courts. The rule is that "neither laches nor the statute of limitations applies to a decision in
a land registration case." 1 2
The most extensive explanation of this rule may be found in Sta. Ana v. Menla , 1 3
decided in 1961, wherein the Court refuted an argument that a decision rendered in a land
registration case wherein the decree of registration remained unissued after 26 years was
already "final and enforceable." The Court, through Justice Labrador, explained:
We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the
assignment [of error], except insofar as it supports his theory that after a decision
in a land registration case has become nal, it may not be enforced after the
lapse of a period of 10 years, except by another proceeding to enforce the
judgment or decision. Authority for this theory is the provision in the Rules of
Court to the effect that judgment may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and
after ve years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39). This
provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to
special proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so
because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment
that is secured as against the adverse party, and his failure to act to
enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules
makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special
proceedings[,] the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in
land registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of
land is sought to be established. After the ownership has been proved
and con rmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce
said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party
had been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to
oust him therefrom.

Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to

Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action, except the
proceedings to place the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession.
The decision in a land registration case, unless the adverse or losing party is in
possession, becomes nal without any further action, upon the expiration of the
period for perfecting an appeal. . . .

. . . There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which
the court may order or issue a decree. The reason is . . . that the
judgment is merely declaratory in character and does not need to be
asserted or enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore, the
issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the
Land Registration Commission; failure of the court or of the clerk to
issue the decree for the reason that no motion therefor has been led
can not prejudice the owner, or the person in whom the land is ordered
to be registered . 1 4

The doctrine that neither prescription nor laches may render ine cacious a decision
in a land registration case was reiterated ve (5) years after Sta. Ana, in Heirs of Cristobal
Marcos, etc., et al. v. De Banuvar, et al . 1 5 In that case, it was similarly argued that a prayer
for the issuance of a decree of registration led in 1962 pursuant to a 1938 decision was,
among others, barred by prescription and laches. In rejecting the argument, the Court was
content in restating with approval the above-cited excerpts from Sta. Ana. A similar tack
was again adopted by the Court some years later in Rodil v. Benedicto . 1 6 These cases
further emphasized, citing Demoran v. Ibanez, etc., and Poras 1 7 and Manlapas and
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 Tolentino v. Llorente , 1 8 respectively, that the right of the applicant or a subsequent
purchaser to ask for the issuance of a writ of possession of the land never prescribes. 1 9
Within the last 20 years, the Sta. Ana doctrine on the inapplicability of the rules on
prescription and laches to land registration cases has been repeatedly a rmed. Apart
from the three (3) cases mentioned earlier, the Sta. Ana doctrine was reiterated in another
three (3) more cases later, namely: Vda. de Barroga v. Albano, 2 0 Cacho v. Court of Appeals,
2 1 and Paderes v. Court of Appeals . 2 2 The doctrine of stare decisis compels respect for
settled jurisprudence, especially absent any compelling argument to do otherwise. Indeed,
the apparent strategy employed by the Republic in its present petition is to feign that the
doctrine and the cases that spawned and educed it never existed at all. Instead, it is
insisted that the Rules of Court, which provides for the ve (5)-year prescriptive period for
execution of judgments, is applicable to land registration cases either by analogy or in a
suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. 2 3 The Republic further
observes that Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 has no provision on execution of nal
judgments; hence, the provisions of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure should
apply to land registration proceedings.
We a rm Sta. Ana not out of simple re ex, but because we recognize that the
principle enunciated therein offers a convincing refutation of the current arguments of the
Republic.
Rule 39, as invoked by the Republic, applies only to ordinary civil actions, not to other
or extraordinary proceedings not expressly governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure but by
some other speci c law or legal modality such as land registration cases. Unlike in
ordinary civil actions governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, the intent of land
registration proceedings is to establish ownership by a person of a parcel of land,
consistent with the purpose of such extraordinary proceedings to declare by judicial at a
status, condition or fact. Hence, upon the nality of a decision adjudicating such
ownership, no further step is required to effectuate the decision and a ministerial duty
exists alike on the part of the land registration court to order the issuance of, and the LRA
to issue, the decree of registration.
The Republic observes that the Property Registration Decree (PD No. 1529) does
not contain any provision on execution of nal judgments; hence, the application of Rule 39
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in suppletory fashion. Quite the contrary, it is precisely
because PD No. 1529 does not speci cally provide for execution of judgments in the
sense ordinarily understood and applied in civil cases, the reason being there is no need
for the prevailing party to apply for a writ of execution in order to obtain the title, that Rule
39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is not applicable to land registration cases in the
first place. Section 39 of PD No. 1529 reads:
SEC. 39. Preparation of Decree and Certi cate of Title . — After the
judgment directing the registration of title to land has become nal, the court
shall, within fteen days from entry of judgment, issue an order directing the
Commissioner to issue the corresponding decree of registration and certi cate of
title. The clerk of court shall send, within fteen days from entry of judgment,
certi ed copies of the judgment and of the order of the court directing the
Commissioner to issue the corresponding decree of registration and certi cate of
title, and a certi cate stating that the decision has not been amended,
reconsidered, nor appealed, and has become nal. Thereupon, the Commissioner
shall cause to be prepared the decree of registration as well as the original and
duplicate of the corresponding original certi cate of title. The original certi cate
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 of title shall be a true copy of the decree of registration. The decree of registration
shall be signed by the Commissioner, entered and led in the Land Registration
Commission. The original of the original certi cate of title shall also be signed by
the Commissioner and shall be sent, together with the owner's duplicate
certi cate, to the Register of Deeds of the city or province where the property is
situated for entry in his registration book.EHTADa

The provision lays down the procedure that interposes between the rendition of the
judgment and the issuance of the certi cate of title. No obligation whatsoever is imposed
by Section 39 on the prevailing applicant or oppositor even as a precondition to the
issuance of the title. The obligations provided in the Section are levied on the land court
(that is to issue an order directing the Land Registration Commissioner to issue in turn the
corresponding decree of registration), its clerk of court (that is to transmit copies of the
judgment and the order to the Commissioner), and the Land Registration Commissioner
(that is to cause the preparation of the decree of registration and the transmittal thereof to
the Register of Deeds). All these obligations are ministerial on the o cers charged with
their performance and thus generally beyond discretion of amendment or review.
The failure on the part of the administrative authorities to do their part in the
issuance of the decree of registration cannot oust the prevailing party from ownership of
the land. Neither the failure of such applicant to follow up with said authorities can. The
ultimate goal of our land registration system is geared towards the nal and de nitive
determination of real property ownership in the country, and the imposition of an
additional burden on the owner after the judgment in the land registration case had
attained finality would simply frustrate such goal.
Clearly, the peculiar procedure provided in the Property Registration Law from the
time decisions in land registration cases become nal is complete in itself and does
not need to be lled in . From another perspective, the judgment does not have to be
executed by motion or enforced by action within the purview of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure.
Following these premises, it can even be posited that in theory, there would have
been no need for Nillas, or others under similar circumstances, to le a petition for revival
of judgment, since revival of judgments is a procedure derived from civil procedure and
proceeds from the assumption that the judgment is susceptible to prescription. The
primary recourse need not be with the courts, but with the LRA, with whom the duty to
issue the decree of registration remains. If it is su ciently established before that body
that there is an authentic standing judgment or order from a land registration court that
remains unimplemented, then there should be no impediment to the issuance of the
decree of registration. However, the Court sees the practical value of necessitating judicial
recourse if a signi cant number of years has passed since the promulgation of the land
court's unimplemented decision or order, as in this case. Even though prescription should
not be a cause to bar the issuance of the decree of registration, a judicial evaluation would
allow for a thorough examination of the veracity of the judgment or order sought to be
effected, or a determination of causes other than prescription or laches that might
preclude the issuance of the decree of registration. IcESaA

What about the two cases cited by the Republic, Shipside and Heirs of Lopez? Even
though the Court applied the doctrines of prescription and laches in those cases, it should
be observed that neither case was intended to overturn the Sta. Ana doctrine, nor did they
make any express declaration to such effect. Moreover, both cases were governed by their
unique set of facts, quite distinct from the general situation that marked both Sta. Ana and
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 the present case.
The judgment sought belatedly for enforcement in Shipside did not arise from an
original action for land registration, but from a successful motion by the Republic seeking
the cancellation of title previously adjudicated to a private landowner. While one might
argue that such motion still arose in a land registration case, we note that the
pronouncement therein that prescription barred the revival of the order of cancellation was
made in the course of dispensing with an argument which was ultimately peripheral to that
case. Indeed, the portion of Shipside dealing with the issue of prescription merely restated
the provisions in the Civil Code and the Rules of Civil Procedure relating to prescription,
followed by an observation that the judgment sought to be revived attained nality 25
years earlier. However, the Sta. Ana doctrine was not addressed, and perhaps with good
reason, as the signi cantly more extensive rationale provided by the Court in barring the
revival of judgment was the fact that the State no longer held interest in the subject
property, having divested the same to the Bases Conversion Development Authority prior
to the ling of the action for revival. Shipside expounds on this point, and not on the
applicability of the rules of prescription.
Notably, Shipside has attained some measure of prominence as precedent on still
another point, relating to its pronouncements relating to the proper execution of the
certi cation of non-forum shopping by a corporation. In contrast, Shipside has not since
been utilized by the Court to employ the rules on prescription and laches on nal decisions
in land registration cases. It is worth mentioning that since Shipside was promulgated in
2001, the Court has not hesitated in rea rming the rule in Sta. Ana as recently as in the
middle of 2005 in the Paderes case.
We now turn to Heirs of Lopez, wherein the controlling factual milieu proved even
more unconventional than that in Shipside. The property involved therein was the subject
of two separate applications for registration, one led by petitioners therein in 1959, the
other by a different party in 1967. It was the latter who was rst able to obtain a decree of
registration, this accomplished as early as 1968. 2 4 On the other hand, the petitioners were
able to obtain a nal judgment in their favor only in 1979, by which time the property had
already been registered in the name of the other claimant, thus obstructing the issuance of
certi cate of title to the petitioners. The issues of prescription and laches arose because
the petitioners led their action to enforce the 1979 nal judgment and the cancellation of
the competing title only in 1987, two (2) years beyond the ve (5)-year prescriptive period
provided in the Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court did characterize the petitioners as guilty
of laches for the delay in ling the action for the execution of the judgment in their favor,
and thus denied the petition on that score. IHSTDE

Heirs of Lopez noted the settled rule that "when two certificates of title are issued to
different persons covering the same land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must prevail
. . . ," and indeed even if the petitioners therein were somehow able to obtain a certificate of
title pursuant to the 1979 judgment in their favor, such title could not have stood in the
face of the earlier title. The Court then correlated the laches of the petitioners with their
pattern of behavior in failing to exercise due diligence to protect their interests over the
property, marked by their inability to oppose the other application for registration or to
seek enforcement of their own judgment within the five (5)-year reglementary period.
Still, a close examination of Heirs of Lopez reveals an unusual dilemma that negates
its application as precedent to the case at bar, or to detract from Sta. Ana as a general rule
for that matter. The execution of the judgment sought for belated enforcement in Heirs of
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 Lopez would have entailed the disturbance of a different nal judgment which had already
been executed and which was shielded by the legal protection afforded by a Torrens title.
In light of those circumstances, there could not have been a "ministerial duty" on the part of
the registration authorities to effectuate the judgment in favor of the petitioners in Heirs of
Lopez. Neither could it be said that their right of ownership as con rmed by the judgment
in their favor was indubitable, considering the earlier decree of registration over the same
property accorded to a different party. The Sta. Ana doctrine rests upon the general
presumption that the nal judgment, with which the corresponding decree of registration
is homologous by legal design, has not been disturbed by another ruling by a co-extensive
or superior court. That presumption obtains in this case as well. Unless that presumption
is overcome, there is no impediment to the continued application of Sta. Ana as precedent.
25

We are not inclined to make any pronouncements on the doctrinal viability of

Shipside or Heirs of Lopez concerning the applicability of the rules of prescription or
laches in land registration cases. Su ce it to say, those cases do not operate to detract
from the continued good standing of Sta. Ana as a general precedent that neither
prescription nor laches bars the enforcement of a nal judgment in a land registration
case, especially when the said judgment has not been reversed or modi ed, whether
deliberately or inadvertently, by another nal court ruling. This quali er stands not so much
as a newly-carved exception to the general rule as it does as an exercise in stating the
obvious.
Finally, the Republic faults the Court of Appeals for pronouncing that the 1941
Decision constituted res judicata that barred subsequent attacks to the adjudicates' title
over the subject property. The Republic submits that said decision would operate as res
judicata only after the decree of registration was issued, which did not happen in this case.
We doubt that a nal decision's status as res judicata is the impelling ground for its very
own execution; and indeed res judicata is more often invoked as a defense or as a factor in
relation to a different case altogether. Still, this faulty terminology aside, the Republic's
arguments on this point do not dissuade from our central holding that the 1941 Decision is
still susceptible to effectuation by the standard decree of registration notwithstanding the
delay incurred by Nillas or her predecessors-in-interest in seeking its effectuation and the
reasons for such delay, following the prostracted failure of the then Land Registration
Commissioner to issue the decree of registration. In this case, all that Nillas needed to
prove was that she had duly acquired the rights of the original adjudicates — her
predecessors-in-interest-in order to entitle her to the decree of registration albeit still in
the names of the original prevailing parties who are her predecessors-in interest. Both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals were satis ed that such fact was proven, and the
Republic does not offer any compelling argument to dispute such proof. cCESaH

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Carpio, Carpio-Morales and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Penned by Judge Patricio C. Ceniza.

2. The pertinent portions read:

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 xxx xxx xxx
Previa vista celebrada, las personas que mas abajo se mencionada han probado ser
dueñas de sus respectivos lotes habiendolos poseido desde tiempo immemorial.
EN SU VIRTUD, el Juzgado les adjudica los lotes a que tienen derecho, a saber:

xxx xxx xxx

"SE ORDENA, FINALMENTE, el Jefe de la Oficina General del Registro de Terrenos, que,
una vez firme esta decision, de lo cual se le avisara oportunamente mediante una orden
expresa en el formularia Judicial No. 115, y despues de recibidos por el los planos
finales preparados por la Oficina de Terrenos segun los terminos de esta decision,
expida los decretos de inscripcion de titulo correspondientes. ENTENDIENDOSE, SIN
EMBARGO, que el citado Jefe de la Oficina General del Registro de Terrenos podra
expedir, de conformidad con el plano original obrante en autos, los decretos de
inscripcion de titulo correspondiente a aquellos lotes que no han sido objeto en
enmienda en la presente decision.
ASI SE ORDENA.
Sibulan, Negros Oriental, [J]ulio 17, 1941." (Rollo, pp. 61, 63-64, emphasis supplied)
3. Rollo, p. 62.
4. Id. at 58.
5. Id. at 50.
6. CA rollo, pp. 10-11 and 37-38. Penned by Judge Fe Lualhati D. Bustamante, Presiding
Judge, Branch 33.
7. Rollo, pp. 8-15. Penned by Associate Justice Remedios Salazar-Fernando of the Sixth
Division, concurred in by Associate Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and Edgardo F.
Sundiam.
8. Id. at 28.
9. Id. at 29.
10. 404 Phil. 981 (2001).
11. 381 Phil. 591 (2000).
12. See Vda. de Barroga v. Albano, G.R. No. L-43445, 20 January 1988, 157 SCRA 131. See
also Heirs of Cristobal Marcos, etc., et al., v. De Banuvar, et al., 134 Phil. 257, 265 (1968).
13. 111 Phil. 947 (1961).
14. Id. at 951-952.
15. 134 Phil. 257 (1968).
16. No. L-28616, 22 January 1980, 95 SCRA 137.
17. 97 Phil. 72, 74 (1955).
18. 48 Phil. 298 (1925).
19. See also Vda. de Barroga v. Albano, G.R. No. L-43445, 20 January 1988, 157 SCRA 131.
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 20. Id.
21. 336 Phil. 154, 167 (1997).
22. G.R. No. 147074, 15 July 2005, 463 SCRA 504, 526-527.

23. Rollo, p. 33; citing Section 34, P.D. No. 1529.

24. The narration in Heirs of Lopez does not indicate when the certificate of title was
issued in favor of the other party, though the petitioners therein did seek the judicial
cancellation of the titles in the name of the contrary party.AcISTE

25. Different principles may apply if the final judgment in the land registration case were to
be affected not by another court ruling but by subsequent legislation. It bears noting that
since the final judgment-applicant is no longer required to perform any act to perfect
ownership over the property, said applicant bears a vested property right that cannot be
generally impaired by law, much less without any proceedings that do not bear the
hallmark of due process. Still, we decline for now to make any definite pronouncement
on that question.

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