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Epifanio vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 157057, June 26, 2007
Post under case digests, Criminal Law at Tuesday, January 31, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

Facts: On August 15, 1990, Crisaldo Alberto (Crisaldo) and hiscousin, Allan Perez (Allan), were walking to their respective homes after spending

time at the house of Crisaldo's father. Since the pavement going to Crisaldo's house followed a narrow pathway along the local shrubs called

banganga, Allan walked ahead of Crisaldo. Suddenly, Crisaldo felt the piercing thrust of a bladed weapon on his back, which caused him to cry out in

pain. He made a quick turnaround and saw his attacker, petitioner, also known as "Iyo (Uncle) Kingkoy." Petitioner stabbed Crisaldo again but only

hit the latter's left arm. When Allan heard Crisaldo's outcry, he rushed to Crisaldo's side which caused petitioner to run away. Allan then brought

Crisaldo to his father's house where Crisaldo's wounds were wrapped in a blanket. Crisaldo was then brought to the Peñaplata Hospital where he

was given first aid and then transferred to theDavao Medical Center where he stayed for three weeks to recuperate from his wounds.

Subsequently, petitioner was charged with Frustrated Murder. During his arraignment, petitioner pleaded "not guilty." Petitioner's defense consisted

mainly of denial. On July 5, 1994, the RTC rendered its Decision convicting the petitioner. Petitioner appealed his conviction to the CA, which

affirmed the decision in toto.

Issue: Whether the accused was guilty of frustrated murder.

Held: No. It must be stressed that it is not the gravity of the wounds alone which determines whether a felony is attempted or frustrated, but whether

the assailant had passed the subjective phase in the commission of the offense.

In homicide cases, the offender is said to have performed all the acts of execution if the wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause the

death of the victim barring medical intervention or attendance. If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter survives, the crime committed is

either consummated physical injuries, if the offender had no intention to kill the victim; or frustrated or attempted homicide or frustrated murder or

attempted murder if the offender intends to kill the victim. Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or number of weapons

used in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of wounds inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed; and (e)

words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries were inflicted by him on the victim.

In the present case, the intent to kill is very evident and was established beyond reasonable doubt through the unwavering testimony of Crisaldo on

the manner of execution of the attack as well as the number of wounds he sustained. Crisaldo was stabbed from behind by petitioner. When Crisaldo

turned around, petitioner continued his assault, hitting Crisaldo on the left arm as the latter tried to defend himself. The treacherous manner in which

petitioner perpetrated the crime is shown not only by the sudden and unexpected attack upon the unsuspecting victim but also by the deliberate

manner in which the assault was perpetrated. Nonetheless, petitioner failed to perform all the acts of execution, because Allan came to the aid of

Crisaldo and petitioner was forced to scamper away. He did not voluntarily desist from stabbing Crisaldo, but he had to stop stabbing

when Allan rushed to help Crisaldo and recognized petitioner. Thus, the subjective phase of the crime had not been completed.

Moreover, the prosecution failed to present testimonial evidence on the nature of the wounds sustained by Crisaldo. No evidence in this case was

introduced to prove that Crisaldo would have died from his wound without timely medical attendance. It is well-settled that where there is nothing in

the evidence to show that the wound would be fatal if not medically attended to, the character of the wound is doubtful; hence, the doubt should be

resolved in favor of the accused and the crime committed by him may be declared as attempted, not frustrated murder.
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People vs. Ravelo

202 SRCA 655 (1991)

Facts:
Accused-appellants allegedly kidnapped by means of force one Reynaldo Gaurano on May 21, 1984. They then detained Reynaldo at the house of
Pedro Ravelo, one of the accused.  Accused-appellants assaulted, attacked, and burned Reynaldo Gaurano and latter die as consequence thereof.

On May 22, 1984; the accused-appellants kidnapped by means of force Joey Lugatiman and was brought to Ravelo's house where he was tortured.
Lugatiman was able to escape.

Lugatiman reported what happened to him and to Gaurano to the police authorities. RTC convicted the accused-appellants of murder of Gaurano and frustrated
murder of Lugatiman.

In this appeal, counsel contends that there can be no frustrated murder absent any proof of intent to kill, which is an essential element of the offense of
frustrated murder.  

Issue: 
Whether the statement by the accused stating that “Lugatiman” would be killed is sufficient proof of intent to convict a person of frustrated murder.

Held: No. In a crime of murder or an attempt of frustration thereof, the offender must have the intent or the actual design to kill which must be
manifested by external acts. A verbal expression is not sufficient to show an actual design to perpetrate the act. Intent must be shown not only by a
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statement of the aggressor, but also by the execution of all acts and the use of means necessary to deliver a fatal blow while the victim is not placed
in a position to defend himself.

People vs Felipe Kalalo, et.al.

G.R. Nos. 39303-39305
March 17, 1934

Facts:

On November 10, 1932, the appellants namely, Felipe Kalalo, Marcelo Kalalo, Juan Kalalo, and Gregorio Ramos, were
tried in the Batangas jointly with Alejandro Garcia, Fausta Abrenica and Alipia Abrenica in criminal cases Nos. 6858,
6859 and 6860, the first two for murder, and the last for frustrated murder. Upon agreement of the parties said three
cases were tried together and after the presentation of their respective evidence, the said court acquitted Alejandro
Garcia, Fausta Abrenica and Alipia Abrenica, and sentenced the other appellants.

Issue:

W/O accused-appellants are liable of the crimes of murder and discharge of firearms?

Held:
The first case is, for the alleged murder of Marcelino Panaligan, to seventeen years, four months and one day of
reclusion temporal, with the corresponding accessory penalties, and to indemnify the heirs of the said deceased
Marcelino Panaligan in the sum of P1,000, with the costs.

The second case is, for the alleged murder of Arcadio Holgado, to seventeen years, four months and one day of
reclusion temporal, with the corresponding accessory penalties, and to indemnify the heirs of the aforesaid victim,
the deceased Arcadio Holgado, in the sum of P1,000, with the costs.

In the third case, that is, the court held that the crime committed was simply that of discharge of firearm, not
frustrated murder, the appellant Marcelo Kalalo was sentenced to one year, eight months and twenty-one days of
prision correccional and to pay the proportionate part of the costs of the proceedings. Felipe Kalalo and Juan Kalalo,
as well as their co-accused Fausta and Alipia Abrenica, Gregorio Ramos and Alejandro Garcia, were acquitted of the
charges therein.

In all other respects, the appealed sentences in the said three cases are hereby affirmed without prejudice to
crediting the appellants therein with one-half of the time during which they have undergone preventive
imprisonment, in accordance with article 29 of the Revised Penal Code. So ordered.

--

2006 Criminal Law Case Digests

EVANGELINE LADONGA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 141066. February 17, 2005

Facts: In 1989, spouses Adronico and Evangeline Ladonga became Alfredo Oculam’s regular customers in his
pawnshop business. Sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a P9,075.55 loan from him, guaranteed by
United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No. 284743, post dated to July 7, 1990 issued by Adronico; sometime in
the last week of April 1990 and during the first week of May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained an additional loan of
P12,730.00, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 284744, post dated to July 26, 1990 issued by Adronico; between May and
June 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a third loan in the amount of P8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB Check No.
106136, post dated to July 22, 1990 issued by Adronico; the three checks bounced upon presentment for the reason
“CLOSED ACCOUNT”; when the Ladonga spouses failed to redeem the check, despite repeated demands, he filed a
criminal complaint against them. While admitting that the checks issued by Adronico bounced because there was no
sufficient deposit or the account was closed, the Ladonga spouses claimed that the checks were issued only to guarantee
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the obligation, with an agreement that Oculam should not encash the checks when they mature; and, that petitioner is
not a signatory of the checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof. The RTC rendered a joint decision
finding the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22. Petitioner brought the case to the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner. 

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner who was not the drawer or issuer of the three checks that bounced but her co-
accused husband under the latter’s account could be held liable for violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 as
conspirator.

Held: The conviction must be set aside. Article 8 of the RPC provides that “a conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.” To be held guilty as a
co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or
furtherance of the complicity. The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active participation in the actual
commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by moving them to execute or
implement the criminal plan. In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any overt
act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. Apparently, the only semblance of overt act that may be attributed to
petitioner is that she was present when the first check was issued. However, this inference cannot be stretched to mean
concurrence with the criminal design. Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and
conclusive evidence. Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the scene of the crime does not
in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute
one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the
furtherance of the common design and purpose

--

CASE DIGEST: PEOPLE VS. SIMON

FACTS
Accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga was alleged that he sold four tea bags found to be marijuana. On December
4, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment convicting appellant, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable to the case?

HELD
Yes. The Indeterminate Sentence Law is a legal and social measure of compassion, and should be liberally interpreted
in favor of the accused. Drug offenses are not included in nor has appellant committed any act which would put him
within the exceptions to said law.

--
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Case of People of the R.P. vs. Oriente

G.R.No. 155094 30January2007

FACTS OF THE CASE:

This case is about Manuel Oriente’s appeal of his conviction for the crime of homicide. The appellant w/ other
persons, attacked and assaulted Romulo Vallo, hitting him with a lead pipe on different parts of the body, thereby
inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death (as confirmed
by the medico- legal). In the case there was one witness for the prosecution; Arnel Tanael.
When the case was tried at the C.A. the court (C.A.) found that the R.T.C erred in finding two mitigating circumstances
were present, namely, lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong and sufficient provocation or threat on the part of
the offended party, so the court modified the penalty imposed by the R.T.C.

ISSUES OF THE CASE: 

[in this particular case there are a number of issues, but the most compelling is the 2nd and 4th issues]

DID THE C.A. AND THE R.T.C ERR IN NOT APPRECIATING THAT THERE WAS AN UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION ON THE PART
OF THE VICTIM, AND THE MEANS EMPLOYED BY APPELLANT TO PREVENT THE SAME WAS REASONABLE AND FALLS
UNDER THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OR SELF-DEFENSE

- No. Since when self-defense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to show that the killing is
legally justified. It must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. The appellant cannot rely on the weakness of the
evidence of the prosecution.
- All three requirements for self- defense must concur; but unlawful aggression is condition sine qua non.
- The fact that the deceased was not able to make use of his gun after being hit in the forehead by the weapon of the
appellant as alleged by the defense makes their claim of self-defense unusual
- Injuries sustained by the deceased were extensive
- Importantly, the appellant failed to establish the existence of the gun, that was alleged to have constituted the
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“unlawful aggression”

CAN THE ACCUSED BE GRANTED THE OPPORTUNITY OF MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE, DUE TO THE PREMISE THAT
THERE WAS LACK OF INTENT IN THE PART OF THE APPELLANT TO COMMIT SO GRAVE A WRONG AND THAT THERE
WAS SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION ON THE PART OF THE DECEASED?

- Modification of the penalties was based on the presence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances.
- The claim of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong cannot be appreciated because the acts employed by the
accused were reasonably sufficient to produce and did actually produce the death of the victim
- Provocation in this case cannot be appreciated as well since provocation is deemed sufficient if it is adequate to
excite a person to commit the wrong, w/c must be proportionate in gravity
- The fact that a heated or intense argument preceded the incident is not by itself the sufficient provocation on the
part of the offended party as contemplated by law. Also, appellant failed to establish by competent evidence that the
deceased had a gun and used it to threaten petitioner.

HELD:
PETITION DENIED. DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF C.A. ARE AFFIRMED W/ MODIFICATIONS, the C.A. erred in
imposing 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence. In the
computation of the maximum term, the law prescribes that the attending circumstances should be considered. There
being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance in this case, the penalty that should be imposed is the medium
period of the penalty prescribed by law, that is, reclusion temporal in its medium period, or, anywhere between
fourteen years, eight months and one day to seventeen years and four months
I hope this helps.

--

Plaintiff-appellee: People of the Philippines

accused-appellat: Cunigunda Boholst-Caballero (Boholst here, for brevity)

Facts:

(According to Boholst)

 The couple had a rough marriage. Soon after, Caballero left, and Boholst and her
daughter was left to the support of her parents.
 One night, after carolling, Boholst met Caballero who upon seeing her, manhandled her.
There were an exchange of words and later on, Caballero was already holding her by the
hair and slapping her face until her nose bled.
 Caballero pushed her to the grounds, and to stop herself from falling, she held on to his
waist. As she did so, she grasped the knife tucked by the left side of his body.
 She fell to the ground then Caballero knelt over her and chocked her saying that he will
kill her. Because she had no other recourse, she pulled out the knife of her husband and
thrust it at him, hitting the left side of his body near the belt line.
 When she was finally free, she ran home and on the way, she threw the knife.
 In the morning, she surrendered to the police and presented the torn and blood-stained
dress she wore that night. The police officer accompanied her to look for the weapon but
when it can no longer be found, she was advised to just give any knife and she did (now
marked Exhibit C).
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(According to the Prosecution’s witness, Caballero’s friend)

 On the night of the incident, Boholst was already waiting for Caballero, and when he
approached her, she suddenly stabbed Francisco her with the knife marked by the
prosecution as Exhibit C.
 His friends brought him to the hospital where he was later interviewed by the police
officer confirming that his wife stabbed him. But because he needs blood transfusion, he
needs to be transferred to another hospital. He died on the way.

Issue: Did Boholst act in legitimate defense of her person?

Held: Yes.

Ratio decidendi:

 The RTC held that Boholst’s evidence was not clear and convincing:
 Testimony improbable as brought out by her demonstration during the trial
 No wound or injury on her body treated by the physician
 That the knife used was a Moro knife and not exhibit C is incredible
 Contradictory statements
 Has motive: husband’s abandonment
 The court departs from the general rule that appellate court will not disturb the findings of
the trial court on facts testified by the witnesses
 The trial court judge overlooked an important piece of evidence that could confirm the
narration of the appellant: location of the wound inflicted on the victim.
 As she was flat on her back and and her husband choking her, she had no other recourse
but to pull out the knife inserted at the left side of her husband’s belt and stabbed him hitting
the left back portion just below the waist, as also described by the attending physician as the
left lumbar region.
 The fact that the blow landed in the vicinity from where the knife was drawn is a strong
indication of the truth of her testimony, for as she lay on the ground with her husband bent
over her it was quite natural for her right hand to get hold of the knife tucked in the left side
of the man’s belt and thrust it at that section of the body nearest to her hand at the moment.
 This particular location of the wound negates the credibility of the prosecution witness
that is if it was true, then the wound should have been directed towards the front of the body
of the victim rather than at his back.
 The Court finds the location of the wound as a valuable circumstance which confirms the
plea of self-defense.
 Appellant also lacks motive. She declared that she still loved her husband and for several
months prior to the incident, she appeared resigned to her fate.
 She also surrendered herself immediately the morning after.
 The court also believed that the knife must be a blade of six inches as stated by Boholst
for it to penetrate through the left lumbar region to the victim’s large intestine and cause the
discharge of fecal matter. >.<
 All the elements of self-defense are present:
 unlawful aggression as pointed out above
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 reasonable necessity for means employed: woman strangled and chocked by a

furious aggressor, rendered almost unconcious by the strong pressure on her throat.
What is vital is the imminent peril to Boholst’s life. The knife afforded appellant the
only reasonable means with which she could free and save herself. Necessity knows no
law.
 Lack of sufficient provocation: Boholst did not provoke Caballero. She gave a
valid excuse that she went carolling to earn money for their child.
--
People vs. Alconga
Facts: On May 27, deceased Silverio Barion, the banker of the card game, was playing black jack against Maria De Raposo. De Raposo and
Alconga were partners in the game, they had one money. Alconga was seated behind Barion and he gave signs to De Raposo. Barion, who was
suffering losses in the game, found this out and he expressed his anger at Alconga. The two almost fought outright this was stopped. 

The two met again on May 29. when Alconga was doing his job as a home guard. While the said accused was seated on a bench in the guardhouse,
Barion came along and said “Coroy, this is your breakfast” followed by a swing of his “pingahan”, a bamboo stick. Alconga avoided the blow by falling
to the ground under the bench with the intention to crawl out of the guardhouse. A second blow was given by Barion but failed to hit the accused,
hitting the bench instead. Alconga managed to go out of the guardhouse by crawling on his abdomen. While Barion was about to deliver the 3rd
blow, Alconga fired at him with his revolver, causing him to stagger and hit the ground. The deceased stood up, drew forth his dagger and directed a
blow to the accused who was able to parry the attack using his bolo. A hand to handfight ensued. The deceased, looking already beaten and having
sustained several wounds ran away. He was followed by the accused and was overtaken after 200 meters. 

A second fight took place and the deceased received a mortal boloblow, the one which slasehde the cranium. The deceased fell face downward
besides many other blows delivered. Alconga surrendered. 

Issue: Whether or not self-defense can be used as a defense by Alconga

Held: No. Self-defense cannot be sustained. Alconga guilty of Homicide 

The deceased ran and fled w/o having to inflicted so much a scratch to Alconga, but after, upon the other hand, having been wounded with one
revolver shot and several bolo slashes the right of Alconga to inflict injury upon him has ceased absolutely/ Alconga had no right to pursue, no right
to kill or injure. He could have only attacked if there was reason to believe that he is still not safe. In the case at bar, it is apparent that it is Alconga
who is the superior fighter and his safety was already secured after the first fight ended. There was no more reason for him to further chase Barion.
The second fight will be treated differently and independently. Under the first fight, self-defense would have been valid, but that is not the case in the
second fight. In the second fight, there was illegal aggression on the part of Alconga and as a result, he is found guilty of Homicide with no mitigating
circumstance (MC) of Provocation 

Note – Provocation in order to be an MC must be sufficient and immediately preceding the act. “It should be proportionate to the act committed and
adequate to stir one to its commission” 

People vs. Sumicad, 56 Phil. 643 (1932)

Article 11 (Self Defense)

FACTS:

On the 23rd of February, 1931, Sumicad along with his fellow workers saw Segundo Cubol passing along their place. Sumicad demanded that his five and on half
days service should be paid. Cubol in shout asked for clarification as to what Sumicad asked then hit Sumicad with his fist. Sumicad rose from the log trying to
escape, but Cubol pursued him and continued striking him with his fists. Sumicad continued to recede then found himself cornered by a pile of logs.

Cubol lunged at Sumicad with evident intention of wrestling the bolo of Sumicad. Sumicad struck Cubol and delivered a blow on his right shoulder and two deep
cuts on his forehead. This was witnessed by Francisco Villegeas. Villegeas turned to Sumicad and told to put up his bolo and go to the poblacion. Sumicad testified
that Cubol attempted to draw a knife from his pocket when he struck him with his bolo.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sumicad acted on self-defense.

Held:

Yes.It is evident that the quarrel which resulted in the death of Segundo Cubol was of his own making, and that Julian Sumicad was not materially to blame in
bringing about the trouble. Two of the elements of self-defense were therefore clearly present, namely, that the deceased was the aggressor and that there was
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused.

--

Title: People v. Genosa, GR No. 135981

Subject Matter: Applications of the provisions of Art. 11(1) and Art. 14 of the Revised
Penal Code
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Facts:
Marivic Genosa, the appellant, on November 15, 1995, attacked and wounded his husband which ultimately led to
his death. According to the appellant, she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night and it was
her husband who began the provocation. The appellant said she was frightened that her husband would hurt her
and she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely.

The appellant testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five times, but that Ben
would always follow her and they would reconcile. The appellant said that the reason why Ben was violent and
abusive towards her that night was because he was crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu Rubillos. The appellant,
after being interviewed by specialist, has been shown to be suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome. The
appellant with a plea of self-defense admitted the killing of her husband. She was found guilty of the crime of
parricide, with the aggravating circumstance of treachery, for the husband was attacked while asleep.

Issues:
(1)    Whether or not appellant acted in self-defense.
(2)    Whether or not treachery attended the killing.

Held:
For the first issue, the SC held that the defense failed to establish all the elements of self-defense arising from
battered woman syndrome, to wit: (a) Each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have
characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimated partner; (b) The final acute
battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered person’s mind an actual
fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her
life, and; (c) At the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable – not necessarily immediate and
actual – grave harm to the accused based on the history of violence perpetuated by the former against the latter.

For the second issue, the SC ruled out treachery as an aggravating circumstance because the quarrel or argument
that preceded the killing must have forewarned the victim of the assailant’s aggression.

People vs. Jaurigue [C.A. No. 384, February 21, 1946]

Post under case digests, Criminal Law at Saturday, February 25, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

Facts: Inside the chapel of the 7th day Adventist Church, Amado Capina sat beside the appellant and with the greatest
of impudence, placed his hand on the upper part of her right thigh. On observing this highly improper and offensive
conduct, Avelina Jaurigue, conscious of her personal dignity and honor, pulled out a fan knife and stabbed Amado
once at the base of the left side of the neck’ 

Amado Capina died from the wound a few minutes later. 

Appellant Avelina Jaurigue was subsequently tried and convicted of the crime of Homicide. 

Issue: Whether or not appellant Jaurige acted in the legitimate defense of her honor and that she should be completely
absolved of all criminal responsibility

Held: No. The judgment of conviction is affirmed. 

The attempt to rape a woman constitutes an unlawful aggression sufficient to put her in a state of legitimate defense
inasmuch as a woman's honor cannot but be esteemed as a right as precious, if not more than her very existence; and
it is evident that a woman who, thus imperiled, wounds, nay kills the offender, should be
affordedexemption from criminal liability, since such killing cannot be considered a crime from the moment it became
11

the only means left for her to protect her honor from so great an outrage (1 Viada,Codigo  Penal, 5th ed., p. 301; People
vs. Luague and Alcansare, 62 Phil., 504). . 

As long as there is actual danger of being raped, a woman is justified in killing her aggressor in the defense of her
honor. 

When the deceased sat by the side of the appellant on the same bench, near the door of the barrio chapel and placed
his hand on the upper portion of her right thigh without her consent, the said chapel was lighted with electric lights, and
there were already several people inside the chapel, including her own father and the barrio lieutenant and other
dignitaries of the organization; and under the circumstances, there was and there could be no possibility of her being
raped. And when she gave Amado Capina a thrust at his neck, inflicting upon him a mortal wound and causing his
death a few moments later, the means employed by her in the defense of her honor was evidently excessive; and
under the facts and circumstances of the case, she cannot be legally declared completely exempt
from criminal liability. 
--

People vs. Narvaez, 121 SCRA 389 (1983)

FACTS: Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder (qualified by treachery) of David Fleischer and Flaviano
Rubia. On August 22, 1968, Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia during
the time the two were constructing a fence that would prevent Narvaez from getting into his house and rice mill. The
defendant was taking a nap when he heard sounds of construction and
found fence being made. He addressed the group and asked them to stop destroying his house and asking if they
could talk things over. Fleischer responded with "No, gadamit, proceed, go
ahead." Defendant lost his "equilibrium," and shot Fleisher with his shotgun. He also shot Rubia who was running
towards the jeep where the deceased's gun was placed. Prior to the
shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the company of Fleischer's family) was involved in a legal battle with the defendant and
other land settlers of Cotabato over certain pieces of property. At the time
of the shooting, the civil case was still pending for annulment (settlers wanted granting of property to Fleisher and Co.
to be annulled). At time of the shooting, defendant had leased his
property from Fleisher (though case pending and ownership uncertain) to avoid trouble. On June 25, defendant
received letter terminating contract because he allegedly didn't pay rent.
He was given 6 months to remove his house from the land. Shooting was barely 2 months after letter. Defendant
claims he killed in defense of his person and property. CFI ruled that
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Narvaez was guilty. Aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation offset by the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender. For both murders, CFI sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs, and to pay
for moral damages.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not CFI erred in convicting defendant-appellant despite the fact that he acted in defense of his person.

No. The courts concurred that the fencing and chiselling of the walls of the house of the defendant was indeed a form
of aggression on the part of the victim. However, this
aggression was not done on the person of the victim but rather on his rights to property. On the first issue, the courts
did not err. However, in consideration of the violation of property rights, the courts referred to Art. 30 of the civil
code recognizing the right of owners to close and fence their land.

Although is not in dispute, the victim was not in the position to subscribe to the article because his ownership of the
land being awarded by the government was still pending, therefore putting ownership into question. It is accepted
that the victim was the original aggressor.

2. WON the court erred in convicting defendant-appellant although he acted in defence of his rights.

Yes. However, the argument of the justifying circumstance of self-defense is applicable only if the 3 requirements are
fulfilled. Art. 11(1) RPC enumerates these requisites:

Unlawful aggression. In the case at bar, there was unlawful aggression towards appellant's property rights. Fleisher
had given Narvaez 6 months and he should have left him in peace before time was up, instead of chiseling Narvaez's
house and putting up fence. Art. 536 of the Civil Code also provides that possession may not be acquired through
force or intimidation; while Art. 539 provides that every possessor has the right to be respected in his possession

Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel attack. In the case, killing was disproportionate to the
attack.

Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person defending himself. Here, there was no provocation at all since he was
asleep

Since not all requisites present, defendant is credited with the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense,
pursuant to Art. 13(6) RPC. These mitigating circumstances are: voluntary surrender and passion and obfuscation
(read p. 405 explanation) Crime is homicide (2 counts) not murder because treachery is not applicable on account of
provocation by the deceased. Also, assault was not deliberately chosen with view to kill since slayer acted
instantaneously. There was also no direct evidence of planning or preparation to kill. Art. 249 RPC: Penalty for
homicide is reclusion temporal. However, due to mitigating circumstances and incomplete defense, it can be lowered
three degrees (Art. 64) to arrestomayor.

3. WON he should be liable for subsidiary imprisonment since he is unable to pay the civil indemnity due to the
offended party.

No. He is not liable to be subsidiarily imprisoned for nonpayment of civil indemnity. RA 5465 made the provisions of
Art. 39 applicable to fines only and not to reparation of damage caused, indemnification of consequential damages
and costs of proceedings. Although it was enacted only after its conviction, considering that RA 5465 is favorable to
the accused who is not a habitual delinquent, it may be given retroactive effect pursuant to Art. 22 of the RPC.

Judgment: Defendant guilty of homicide but w/ mitigating circumstances and extenuating circumstance of incomplete
self defense. Penalty is 4 months arresto mayor and to indemnify
each group of heirs 4,000 w/o subsidiary imprisonment and w/o award for moral damages. Appellant has already
been detained 14 years so his immediate release is ordered.

Gutierrez, dissenting. Defense of property can only be invoked when coupled with form of attack on person defending
property. In the case at bar, this was not so. Appellant should then be sentenced to prision mayor. However, since he
has served more than that, he should be released.
==
 13

PEOPLE V BONOAN

Facts:
Celestino Bonoan is charged with the crime of murder for stabbing Carlos Guison with a knife, which caused his
death three days afterwards. An arraignment was then called, but the defense objected on the ground that the
defendant was mentally deranged and was at the time confined at the Psychopatic Hospital. After several months
of summons for doctors, production of the defendant’s complete record of mental condition from the hospital and
defendant’s admission to the hospital for personal observation, assistant alienist Dr. Jose Fernandez finally
reported to the court that Bonoan may be discharged for being a “recovered case”. After trial, the lower court
found Bonoan guilty and sentenced him to life imprisonment.

The defense now appeals, claiming the lower court made errors in finding Bonoan suffered dementia only
occasionally and intermittently, did not show any kind of abnormality, that the defense did not establish the
defendant’s insanity and finding accused guilty.

Issue:
W/N the lower court erred in finding the accused guilty

Held:
Yes. The Court finds the accused demented at the time he perpetrated the crime, which consequently exempts
him from criminal liability, and orders for his confinement in San Lazaro Hospital or other hospital for the
insane. This ruling was based on the following evidence:
1. Uncontradicted evidence that accused was confined in the insane department of San Lazaro Hospital and
diagnosed with dementia praecox long before the commission of the offense and recurrence of ailments were not
entirely lacking of scientific foundation
2. Persons with dementia praecox are disqualified from legal responsibility because they have no control of
their acts; dementia praecox symptoms similar to manic depression psychosis
3. Accused had an insomnia attack, a symptom leading to dementia praecox, four days prior to act according
to Dr. Francisco
4. Accused was sent the Psychopatic hospital on the same day of crime and arrest, indicating the police’s
doubt of his mental normalcy
5. Defendant suffered from manic depressive psychosis according to Dr. Joson
 

Dissenting (Justices Imperial, Diaz and Concepcion):

o The dissenting opinions pose that the accused committed the crime when he was sane, or at least,
during a lucid interval.
o The legal presumption is always in favor of sanity; no positive evidence of accused mental state
was established
o Based on expert testimonies, accused was cured of dementia praecox and later manic depressive
psychosis
o Based on observance of arresting officer Damaso Arnoco, corrobating statement of Benjamin
Cruz, and other witnesses, accused appear sane at the time immediately after commission
o There is a motive of aggression on part of accused is real and positive fact: deceased’s failure to
pay borrowed money

People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Isabelo Puno y Guevarra, alias "Beloy," and Enrique Amurao y Puno,
alias "Enry," accused-appellants
En Banc
Regalado, February 17, 1993

Topic: Mental Element (Mens rea) -- Deliberate intent (Dolo) -- General and specific intent

Facts:

January 13, 1988 in QC, at around 5:00 pm: the accused Isabelo Puno, who is the personal driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's
husband (who was then away in Davao purportedly on account of local election there) arrived at Mrs. Sarmiento's
bakeshop in Araneta Ave, QC. He told Mrs. Sarmiento that her own driver Fred had to go to Pampanga on an
emergency so Isabelo will temporarily take his place When it was time for Mrs. Sarmiento to go home to Valle Verde
in Pasig, she got into her husband's Mercedes Benz with Isabelo driving. After the car turned right on a corner of
Araneta Ave, it stopped and a young man, accused Enrique Amurao, boarded the car beside the driver
Enrique pointed a gun at Mrs. Sarmiento as Isabelo told her that he needs to "get money" from her
14

Mrs. Sarmiento had P7,000 on her bag which she handed to the accused. But the accused said that they wanted
P100,000 more. The car sped off north towards the North superhighway where Isabelo asked Mrs. Sarmiento to issue
a check for P100,000. Mrs. Sarmiento drafted 3 checks: two P30,000 checks and one P40,000 check
Isabelo then turned the car around towards Metro Manila; later, he changed his mind and turned the car again
towards Pampanga. According to her, Mrs. Sarmiento jumped out of the car then, crossed to the other side of the
superhighway and was able to flag down a fish vendor's van, her dress had blood because according to her, she fell
down on the ground and was injured when she jumped out of the car. The defense does not dispute the above
narrative of the complainant except that according to Isabelo, he stopped the car at North Diversion and freely
allowed Mrs. Sarmiento to step out of the car. He said he even slowed the car down as he drove away, until he saw
that his employer had gotten a ride. He claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while running across the
highway

Issue:
Whether or not the accused can be convicted of kidnapping for ransom as charged
Whether or not the said robbery can be classified as "highway robbery" under PD No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-
Highway Robbery Law of 1974)

Holding:
No.
No.
Ratio:
There is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive, nurtured prior to or at the time they committed the
wrongful acts against complainant, other than the extortion of money from her under the compulsion of threats or
intimidation.
For this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the
offended party of her liberty
In the case, the restraint of her freedom of action was merely an incident in the commission of another offense
primarily intended by the offenders
This does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal detention
Jurisprudence reveals that during the early part of the American occupation of our country, roving bands were
organized for robbery and pillage and since the then existing law against robbery was inadequate to cope with such
moving bands of outlaws, the Brigandage Law was passed (this is the origin of the law on highway robbery)
PD No. 532 punishes as highway robbery only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any
person or persons on Philippine highways and not acts of robbery committed against only a predetermined or
particular victim. The mere fact that the robbery was committed inside a car which was casually operating on a
highway does not make PD No 532 applicable to the case. This is not justified by the accused's intention

Accused-appellants convicted of robbery (indeterminate sentence of 4 years and 2 months or prision correccional, as
minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor. Accused to pay Mrs. Sarmiento P7,000 as actual damages and P20,000 as
moral damages.)
==
15
16

People vs. Taneo

March 31, 1933 (58 Phil 255)

Plaintiff and appellee: People of the Philippines

Defendants and appellant: Potenciano Taneo

FACTS:

On January 16, 1932, in the house of Potenciano Taneo’s parents in Dolores, Ormoc, Leyte, because of severe
stomachache, Potenciano slept early. While sleeping, he suddenly got up, left the room with a bolo in hand and upon
meeting his wife who tried stop him, he wounded her int eh abdomen. Several others were also attacked, this includes
his father, and his guests, Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao. It was claimed that he was dreaming when the crime
happened. The trial court found Potenciano guilty of parricide and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE:WON the defendant is criminally liable.

HELD: No. The defendant acted while in a dream and his acts with which he was charged were not voluntary in the
sense of entailing criminal liability. The expert witness claimed that the defendant was under the influence of
hallucination and not in his right mind. The defendant is not criminally liable however, he was ordered to be confined
in an insane asylum.

==

LLAVE V. REPUBLIC 

G.R. No. 169766, [March 30, 2011]

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision dated August 17, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762 and its subsequent Resolution dated September 13, 2005,
which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 89 declaring
petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llave s (Estrellita) marriage to Sen. Mamintal A.J. Tamano (Sen.
Tamano) as void ab initio.

FACTS:
17

Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamanomarried Estrellita twice – initially under the

Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently, under a civil
ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993. In their
marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano s civil status was indicated as “divorced”. Since
then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano s wife, and upon
his death, his widow.

On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son
Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamano s
legitimate children with Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration
of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The
complaint alleged that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that
this marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993.

ISSUE:

Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous.

HELD:

Yes. The civil code governs the marriage of Zoraydaand late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was never
invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano s subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio.

RATIO:

The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under
civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage
relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the
provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given time. Under the marriage provisions
of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 394
which was not availed of during its effectivity.

As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano s prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way
of divorce under PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot
benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to “marriage and
divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the
marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines.”
But Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in
civil and Muslim rites.”

==
Jarco Marketing Co. v. CA

Facts:

Petitioner is the owner of Syvel's Department Store, Makati City. Petitioners Leonardo Kong, Jose Tiope and Elisa
Panelo are the store's branch manager, operations manager, and supervisor, respectively. Private respondents
Conrado and Criselda Aguilar are spouses and the parents of Zhieneth Aguilar.

On May 9, 1983, Criselda and Zhieneth were at the department store. Criselda was signing her credit card slip when
she heard a loud thud. She looked behind her and beheld her daughter pinned beneath the gift-wrapping counter
structure. She was crying and shouting for help. He was brought to Makati Medical Center, where she died after 14
days. She was 6 years old.

Private respondents demanded upon petitioners the reimbursement of the hospitalization, medical bills and wake
and funeral expenses which they had incurred. Petitioners refused to pay. Consequently, private respondents filed a
complaint for damages wherein they sought the payment of P157,522.86 for actual damages, P300,000 for moral
damages, P20,000 for attorney's fees and an unspecified amount for loss of income and exemplary damages. The trial
court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the proximate cause of the fall of the counter was Zhieneth’s act of clinging
to it. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. It found that petitioners were negligent in
18

maintaining a structurally dangerous counter. The counter was defective, unstable and dangerous. It also ruled that
the child was absolutely incapable of negligence or tort. Petitioners now seek for the reversal of this decision.

Issues:

(1) Whether the death of ZHIENETH was accidental or attributable to negligence

(2) In case of a finding of negligence, whether the same was attributable to private respondents for maintaining a
defective counter or to CRISELDA and ZHIENETH for failing to exercise due and reasonable care while inside the store
premises

Held:

(1) An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to the defendant. It is "a
fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly
or partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to
whom it happens." On the other hand, negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided
by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something
which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence is "the failure to observe, for the protection of the
interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury." The test in determining the existence of negligence is: Did the defendant
in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would
have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. We rule that the tragedy which befell
ZHIENETH was no accident and that ZHIENETH's death could only be attributed to negligence.

(2) It is axiomatic that matters relating to declarations of pain or suffering and statements made to a physician are
generally considered declarations and admissions. All that is required for their admissibility as part of the res gestae is
that they be made or uttered under the influence of a startling event before the declarant had the time to think and
concoct a falsehood as witnessed by the person who testified in court. Under the circumstances thus described, it is
unthinkable for ZHIENETH, a child of such tender age and in extreme pain, to have lied to a doctor whom she trusted
with her life. We therefore accord credence to Gonzales' testimony on the matter, i.e., ZHIENETH performed no act
that facilitated her tragic death. Sadly, petitioners did, through their negligence or omission to secure or make stable
the counter's base.

Without doubt, petitioner Panelo and another store supervisor were personally informed of the danger posed by the
unstable counter. Yet, neither initiated any concrete action to remedy the situation nor ensure the safety of the
store's employees and patrons as a reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have done. Thus, as confronted by
the situation petitioners miserably failed to discharge the due diligence required of a good father of a family. Anent
the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply the conclusive presumption that favors children below nine (9) years
old in that they are incapable of contributory negligence. Even if we attribute contributory negligence to ZHIENETH
and assume that she climbed over the counter, no injury should have occurred if we accept petitioners' theory that
the counter was stable and sturdy. For if that was the truth, a frail six-year old could not have caused the counter to
collapse. The physical analysis of the counter by both the trial court and Court of Appeals and a scrutiny of the
evidence on record reveal otherwise, i.e., it was not durable after all. Shaped like an inverted "L," the counter was
heavy, huge, and its top laden with formica. It protruded towards the customer waiting area and its base was not
secured. CRISELDA too, should be absolved from any contributory negligence. Initially, ZHIENETH held on to
CRISELDA's waist, later to the latter's hand. CRISELDA momentarily released the child's hand from her clutch when
she signed her credit card slip. At this precise moment, it was reasonable and usual for CRISELDA to let go of her child.
Further, at the time ZHIENETH was pinned down by the counter, she was just a foot away from her mother; and the
gift-wrapping counter was just four meters away from CRISELDA. The time and distance were both significant.
ZHIENETH was near her mother and did not loiter as petitioners would want to impress upon us. She even admitted
to the doctor who treated her at the hospital that she did not do anything; the counter just fell on her.

==

US v. CABALLEROS Case Digest

4 Phil. 350 (1905)

Facts: 

Robert Baculi and Apolonio Caballeros were convicted as accessories to the crime of assassination or murder of
four American school-teachers, having buried the corpses of the victims to conceal the crime. They were
allegedly coerced.
19

Issue: 

WON the defense under Art12(5) is tenable

Held: 

Yes. Not only is Baculi’s confession that he only assisted in the burial of the corpses because he was compelled
by the murderers, but this was corroborated by the only eyewitness to the crime, Sabate. Sabate said that he was
present when the Americans were killed; that Baculi was not a member of the group of murderers but he was in
the banana plantation gathering some bananas; that when he heard the shots he began to run; that he was,
however, seen by Damaso and Isidro, the leaders of the band; that the latter called to him and striking him with
the butts of their guns forced him to bury the corpses. As for Caballeros, there was no proof that he took any part
in the execution of the crime; there was conclusive proof to the contrary. Sabate and Baculi declared that
Caballeros did not take any part in the burial of the aforesaid corpses, nor was he even in the place of the
occurrence when the burial took place. Their failure to report the crime is not an offense punished by the Penal
Code.

--
US V EXALTACION

GR No. 1481 | February 17, 1904 | J. Torres

Uncontrollable Fear
Facts:
Liberato Exaltacion and Buenaventura Tanchino were charged with the crime of rebellion for swearing allegiance
to the Katipunan Society, which aimed to overthrow the Government of the United States governing the
Philippine Islands. Seized documents from the encampment of a so-called General Contreras showed that they
signed the documents and allegedly made such allegiance.
The two, however, contend that they were captured by brigands, who compelled them to take an oath supporting
the Katipunan Society under threats of death. They produced several witnesses which corroborated the fact of
their capture and of their subsequent report to Don Tomas Testa, municipal president of Meycauayan, who was
also kidnapped.

 
Issue:
W/N duress relieves them from criminal liability of rebellion
 
Held:
Yes. The Court reversed the decision and acquitted the defendants because the documents were insufficient to
prove their guilt. Documents signed under compulsion (under threat of death) and while in captivity relieve the
two from all criminal liability from the crime of rebellion.
-==
20

PEOPLE VS. CALLET 382 SCRA 42 APPELLEE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES APPELLANT: ELBERT CALLET y SABANAL PON:
JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO

FACTS: On September 15, 1996 at 3:00 p.m., the accused, Elbert Callet, played volleyball near the flea market. After
two (2) games, he stopped playing. It was past 4:00 p.m. He stayed at the flea market and watched as others played
volleyball. While watching the game, he was hit on the left side of the body by Alfredo’s elbow. He asked Alfredo why
he hit him. Alfredo retorted, “Are you angry?” Next, Alfredo grabbed his left arm and tried to twist it. He pleaded with
Alfredo to let go of his arm, but Alfredo warned that he would be his third victim if he would get angry with him. As
Alfredo was pulling out
21

a hunting knife from his waist, he (the accused) managed to stab him first. Thereafter, he ran towards the municipal
hall to surrender. The accused also claims that his liability should be mitigated by the fact that he had no intention to
commit so grave a wrong.

Issue: won the accused should be given the benefit of mitigating circumstance of acting without intention to commit
so grave a wrong.

held: no, The lack of “intent” to commit a wrong so grave is an internal state. It is weighed based on the weapon
used, the part of the body injured, the injury inflicted and the manner it is inflicted. The fact that the accused used a
9-inch hunting knife in attacking the victim from behind, without giving him an opportunity to defend himself, clearly
shows that he intended to do what he actually did, and he must be held responsible therefor, without the benefit of
this mitigating circumstance. 

-==

Criminal Law Case Digest: People vs Jaime Jose y Gomez, et al. G.R.
No. L-28232 February 6, 1971
People vs Jaime Jose y Gomez, et al.
G.R. No. L-28232
February 6, 1971

Criminal Law
Criminal Case Digest

Facts: 

On June 26, 1967, four (4) principal-accused Jaime Jose, Basilio Pineda Jr., alias “Boy”, Eduardo Aquino Alias “Eddie”
and Rogelio Cañal; together with Wong Lay Pueng, Silverio Guanzon and Jessie Guion as accomplices, conspired
together, confederated with and mutually helped one another, then and there, to willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with lewd design to forcibly abduct Magdalena “Maggie” de la Riva, 25 years old and single, a movie actress by
profession at the time of the incident, where the four principal accused, by means of force and intimidation using a
deadly weapon, have carnal knowledge of the complainant against her will, and brought her to the Swanky Hotel in
Pasay City, and hence committed the crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape.

Wherefore, the court finds that the accomplices Pueng, Guanzon and Guion, on the ground that the prosecution has
failed to establish a prima facie case against them, the Motion to Dismiss filed for and in their behalf is hereby granted,
and the case dismissed against them. 

(Facts of this case are too descriptive. I’d rather not include much details on the scene of the crime to protect the
complainant’s repute). 

Issue: 

(a) What kind of rape was committed?

Held: 

Undoubtedly, rape is that which is punishable by the penalty reclusion perpetua to death, under paragraph 3, Article
335, as amended by Republic Act 4111 which took effect on June 20, 1964. Under the law, rape is committed by
having canal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) by using force and intimidation; (2)
when the woman is deprived of reason and otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the woman is under twelve years of
age, even though neither of the circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present. The
crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. Whenever the rape is committed the use of a deadly weapon or
by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. 

As regards, therefore, the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, the first of the crimes committed, and the latter
is the more serious; hence, pursuant to the provision of Art 48 of the RPC, the penalty prescribed shall be imposed in
its maximum period. Consequently, the appellants should suffer the extreme penalty of death. In this regard, there is
hardly any necessity to consider the attendance of aggravating circumstances, for the same would not alter the nature
of the penalty to be imposed. 

However, said crime as attended with the following aggravating circumstances: (a) nighttime, appellants having
purposely sought such circumstance to facilitate the commission of these crimes; (b) abuse of superior strength, the
22

crime having been committed by the four appellants in conspiracy with one another; (c) ignominy, since the appellants
in ordering the complaint to exhibit to them her complete nakedness for ten minutes before raping her, brought about a
circumstance which tended to make the effects of the crime more humiliating; and (d) the use of motor vehicle. 

Of the three principal-appellants (Jose, Aquino and Cañal), none of them may claim aggravating circumstances has
been offset by the mitigating circumstance. Appellant Pineda should, however, be credited with the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty, a factor which does not in the least affect the nature of the proper penalties to
be imposed, for the reason that there would still be three aggravating circumstances remaining. 

Insofar as the car used in the commission of the crime is concerned, the order of the court a quo for its confiscation is
hereby set aside; and whoever is in custody thereof is hereby ordered to deliver its possession to intervenor Filipinas
Investment & Finance Corporation in accordance with the judgment of the First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No.
69993 thereof.

Before the actual promulgation of the decision, the Court received a formal manifestation on the part of the Solicitor
general to the effect that Rogelio Cañal, one of the herein appellants, died in prison on December 28, 1970. As a result,
the case is dismissed as to him alone, and only insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, with one-fourth (1/4) of the
costs declared de officio.

Wherefore, the judgment under review is hereby modified as follows: Jaime G. Jose, Basilio Pineda, Jr., and Eduardo
P. Aquino are pronounced GUILTY of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, and each and every one of
them likewise convicted of three (3) of the crimes of rape. As a consequence thereof, each of them is hereby
sentenced to four (4) death penalties; all of them shall jointly and severally, indemnify the complainant of the sum of
P10,000.00 in each of the four crimes, or a total of 40,000.00; and each shall pay one-fourth of the costs.

===

PEOPLE VS ESPINA 361 SCRA 701

FACTS: In the afternoon of September 30, 1992, the members of an association locally known as the

“ripa-ripa” went to the house of Eufornia Pagas in Bohol for their scheduled contribution to fund

intended for a wedding celebration. Among present thereat were Romeo Bulicatin, Rogelio Espina and

Samsung Abuloc who were having a drinking spree and playing cards. Romeo Bulcatin asked Espina to

buy 3 bottles of “Kalafu wine” which he acceded. After they have emptied their wines, Bulcatin then

asked Espina to buy another 3 bottles again which the he refused to obey. Romeo Bulcatin then

proceeded to where Espina was playing card and without warning, urinated on the latter and clipped him

under his arms. Espina went home to avoid in any altercation.

At around 9:00 p.m. in the same evening, while they were still having a drinking spree at the store of

Eurofina Pagas, accused-appellant was outside saying “Borgs, get out because I have something to say”.

Three of them went down and at the juncture, when Romeo Bulcatin was still at the stairway, Espina

shot him at the back and was chased after receiving another 2 shots.

CONTENTION OF THE STATE: In convicting the accused-appellant, the trial court appreciated the

special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearms, pursuant to R.A. 8294. Accused-

appellant should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED: The amendatory provision cannot be applied to the accused, lest

it acquires the character of an ex post facto law. Likewise, the court erred in treating alevosia merely as

a generic aggravating circumstance, more so in offsetting the same by the generic mitigating

circumstance of having committed the crime in immediate vindication of grave offense.

23

HELD: Accused is Guilty of the crime of murder, having his sentenced lowered to an Indeterminate

penalty of 8 years to 17 years, four months and one day.

The court correctly appreciated the mitigating circumstance of having acted in immediate vindication of

grave offense. The accused was urinated by the victim in front of the guests. The act of the victim,

which undoubtedly insulted and humiliated the accused, came within the purview of a “grave offense”.

Thus, this mitigating circumstance should be appreciated in favour of the accused

==

United States v Hicks

Brief Fact Summary. The Defendant, Hicks (Defendant), was jointly indicted with another man on one
count of murder. Defendant had been present when his companion (co-defendant) shot and killed a man at
24

the conclusion of a discussion. Defendant then rode off on horseback with co-defendant after the shooting.
Defendant was subsequently captured and convicted of murder.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The presence of another person at the scene of a murder who does not assist in
carrying out the murder is not sufficient to implicate that person as an accomplice in the absence of
evidence of a prior agreement to render assistance in the crime.
Facts. Defendant was present while co-defendant fatally shot another person and left the crime scene with
co-defendant after the shooting. Defendant did not render assistance in actually completing the crime, but
merely acted in the capacity of a witness. There was testimony from witnesses further away that Defendant
took off his own hat and told the victim to “take off your hat and die like a man” immediately before his co-
defendant fired his gun.

Issue. Is a person an accomplice to the crime of murder merely by his presence at the crime scene when
the killing takes place, though he does not render assistance in completing the crime and there is no
evidence of a prior agreement to render assistance?
Held. No. Judgment reversed.
The trial court was in error in charging the jury that Defendant qualified as an accomplice to the murder even
if he did not render any assistance in the act because his assistance may merely have been unnecessary at
the time. In the absence of evidence that co-defendants conspired to aid one another in killing the victim,
which aid ultimately proved unnecessary, Defendant’s mere presence at the crime scene cannot alone
confer on him the status and criminal responsibility, of an accomplice. Defendant’s statement to victim prior
to the shooting was too ambiguous to infer a prior conspiracy between co-defendants to kill the victim.
Discussion. In this case, the court held that Defendant had not been sufficiently involved in the victim’s
murder to constitute being convicted as an accomplice in the act itself.

People vs. Javier [G.R. No. 130654 July 28, 1999]

Post under case digests, Criminal Law at Thursday, March 08, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

Facts: Eduardo is husband of victim Florentina. Married in 1854. 47 years of marriage. 10 children. On June 15
Consolacion heard her mother saying “Your father is going to kill me”. Her sister, Alma is weeping and told her that
their parents are quarrelling. They went to the house of their brother Manuel and when they came back they saw their
mother dead. And their father has a wounded stomach. He admitted hacking his wife and stabbed himself afterwards. 

He was brought to the hospital. SPO1 Racho, desk investigator, said that when they went to see the crime scene
Manuel told him that Eduardo pleaded guilty and surrendered the bolo. Eduardo said the he haven’t slept for a month
and his mind was completely blank when he killed his wife. Trial Court rejected his claim of insanity and sentenced him
to death for parricide. 

In this appeal, accused-appellant alleged that the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty, considering the
presence of two mitigating circumstances of illness of the offender and passion and obfuscation 

Eduardo does not question the rejection of insanity as his defense but he says he was suffering from lost of sleep for a
prolonged period of time. He also has suspicion that his wife is having an illicit relationship, aggravated with his illness,
goaded him to commit the crime. 

Issue: Whether or not there is a mitigating circumstance of illness and passion and obfuscation 

Held: None. 

FOR ILLNESS: 

For the mitigating circumstance of illness of the offender to be appreciated, the law requires the presence of the
following requisites: (1) illness must diminish the exercise of the will-power of the offender; and (2) such illness should
not deprive the offender ofconsciousness of his acts. 
25

The defense failed to show medical evidence and since he remembered the vital circumstances surrounding
the ghastlyincident, from the time of the killing up to the time he was brought to the hospital, it shows that he was in  full
control of his mental faculties 

AS FOR PASSION: 

In order to be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion and to obfuscation, the following elements should
concur: (1) there should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind; and (2) said act
which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of
time, during which the perpetrator might recover his moral equanimity. Elements were not proved, he even said that he
was not jealous of his wife. 

In this case, the information for parricide against accused-appellant did not allege any aggravating circumstance. Nor
did the evidence show that the prosecution was able to prove any aggravating circumstance. Likewise, no mitigating
circumstance is appreciated by this Court in favor of the accused-appellant. Thus, in the absence of any aggravating or
mitigating circumstance for the accused-appellant, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed. 

===

People v Rodil (1981) case digest

G.R. No. L-35156               November 20, 1981

FACTS:

Accused Floro Rodil was found guilty for the death of Lt. Guillermo Masana of the Philippine Constabulary. The
accused, armed with a double-bladed dagger, with evident premeditation and treachery, and with intent to kill, did,
attack and stab PC Lt. Guillermo Masana while the latter was in the performance of his official duties, which directly
caused his death.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the crime of murder can be complexed with assault upon agent of authority.

HELD:

Yes. The Solicitor General claims the crime committed was murder because "it was established by the prosecution
that during the stabbing incident, appellant suddenly and without giving the victim a chance to defend himself,
stabbed the latter several times with a dagger, inflicting. The suddenness of the attack does not by itself suffice to
support a finding of treachery , the record failed to show that the accused made any preparation to kill his victim so
as to insure the commission of the crime. Clearly, therefore, the impelling motive for the attack by appellant on his
victim was the latter's performance of official duty, which the former resented. This kind of evidence does not clearly
show the presence of treachery in the commission of the crime.

The aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank should be appreciated because it is obvious that the victim.
Identified himself as a PC officer to the accused who is merely a member of the Anti-Smuggling Unit and therefore
inferior both in rank and social status to the victim. If the accused herein were charged with the complex crime of
murder with assault against an agent of a person in authority, and not merely murder, then the aggravating
circumstance of disregard of rank or contempt of or insult to public authority cannot be appreciated as aggravating
because either circumstance is inherent in the charge of assault against a person in authority or an agent of a person
in authority. 

But in the case at bar, the appellant is accused of murder only. Consequently, either aggravating circumstance should
be considered in the imposition of the penalty. Appellant guilty of HOMICIDE AGGRAVATED BY CONTEMPT FOR OR
INSULT TO A PUBLIC AUTHORITY OR DISREGARD OF THE RESPECT DUE THE OFFENDED PARTY ON ACCOUNT OF HIS
RANK.