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G.R. No. 212376. January 31, 2017.*

 
MADAG BUISAN, et al., namely: HADJI MUSA MANALAG,
HADJI SUKOR MAMADRA, H. SALAM TUMAGANTANG,
SUGRA SUKOR BUISAN, MONAURA TUMAGANTANG,
NOJA TUMAGANTANG, SULTAN BUISAN, PAULO
TUMAGANTANG, DAKUNDAY MANALAG, KINGI BUISAN,
BUGOY PANANGBUAN, TUMBA TUMAGANTANG,
MAMALO ELI, MALIGA ATOGAN, PAGUIAL SALDINA,
EBRAHIM TAGURAK, HADJI ESMAEL KASAN, OTAP
GANDAWALI, TWAN IT SALAM, EDEL SABAL, GUIMA H.
SALAM, KATUNTONG H. SALAM, THONY IBAD,
BANGKALING BANTAS, ALON KIKI, DAMDAEN
TUMAGANTANG, MAMASALIDO KIKI, ROSTAN
TUMAGANTANG, MONTASER DAMDAMEN, MODSOL
TANDIAN, RAHMAN SUKOR, SUKARNO H. SUKOR,
KUNGAS PAYAG, JIMIE BUISAN, MADAODAO
KEDTUNGEN, TUTIN MANALAG, DATU ALI MANALAG,
TUGAYA MANALAG, SAGANDINGAN MANALAG,
SAUIATRA MANALAG, KAUTIN MANALAG, PANTAS
DALANDAS, ULAD BANTAS, PALANO BUISAN, PANIANG
BUISAN, INDASIA BUISAN, MAKAKWA BUISAN, SULTAN
BUISAN, MANTIKAN BUISAN, ABULKARIM
TUMAGANTANG, SAKMAG MANALAG, DEMALANES
BUISAN, MANALAG PAKAMAMA, MALAMBONG PANDIAN,
ABDULKARIM TUMAGANTANG, GUIANDAL OPAO, KUSIN
PUWI, H. SULAIMAN UNAK, PABLO ALQUESAR, SAGIBA
GABAO, TABUAN LUAY, POTENCIANO NAVARRO, KUSIN
PENEL, MALAMON TALIB, MALIGA BIDA, MOKAMAD
KUDALIS, CEDULA PAGABANGAN, SALILAGUIA
LENANDANG, ENGKEL ALILAYA, MANGATOG SUDANG,
MANAGKING MANGATONG, SEVERINO FERNANDEZ,
JOSEAS GOTOKANO, MALYOD LAWADI, MANSALGAN
UDAY, SANDATO DALANDAS, BANTAS DALANDAS,
MAMANTAL

_______________

*  EN BANC.

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Buisan vs. Commission on Audit

DALANDAS, MAKALIPUAS MAKALILAY, BINGKONG

BUISAN, FARIDA SUMAGKA, NUNET YUSOP, KADIGIA
SABAL, NANANGGA TAYA, MAMA BANGKALING, CORRY
DAMO, BUKA LATIP, MADAODAO KADTUNGAN, KOMINIE
ADAM, BANGKALING BANTAS, RONIE EDZAKAL,
KEDOPAO BUTO, SARIP EDZEMBAGA, TUTEN MANALAG,
ABAS LATIP, MAKALIPUAS MAKALILAY, DAGENDENGAN
ZUMBAGA, PAGUIAL LUBALANG, JIMMY BUISAN, KADIL
SUKOR, JAKIRI LOZANO, MANUEL MAKATIMBEL, AISA
BANSUAN, TATO BUISAN, HARON ABO, MAMAAN
LAMADA, THING GUIAMILON, TATO SUMAGKA, NORALYN
KAHAR, MOKAGI ANTAS, KINGI BUISAN, ZAINUDEN
PANAYAMAN, PIAGA MANALAG, SAGIATRA MANALAG,
SAILA LATIP, PINKI KADTUNGAN, ALI KADTUNGAN,
NANDING TAYA, INDAY BUISAN, KINTOL KADTUNGAN,
MALAWINIE EDZAKAL, MINGUTIN AMAL, BUGLI
MANALAG, MANGAPANG SADINA, KURANUNGAN
SADINA, SANGUTIN LUBALANG, DAUD H. LATIP, REY
PALAMAN, MONTANER KID, BAKATED KADTUNGAN,
GUIAMATULA DIMAGIL, ALON H. LATIP, SULTAN BUISAN,
HADJI MUSA MANALAG, MANTO BANTAS, ABAS L. LATIP
RODIEL KID, DATU BUTO ALI, ODIN TIAGO, ABDUL ANTA,
EMBIT BUKA, LAGA KID, ULAMA DALUS, SUWAILA
DAMDAMIN, TALILISAN PALEMBA, LANTOKA PATOG,
MAKATEGKA BANGKONG, BEMBI KUDO, MOGAWAN
GINANTE, PATANG BALODTO, EUSEBIO QUIJANO, FAISAN
TAYA, LAGA KAHAR, ESMAEL KID, TAYA PALAMAN,
NORJANA BUISAN, TONTONGAN MANALAG, SAMIER
MANGULI, SINUMAGAD BANSUAN, BHING HARON,
NENENG BUISAN, DIDO KID, ZALDI AGIONG, ROWENA
MANALAG, NASSER MAMALANGKAP, TANOSI ZUMBAGA,
GUIDAT DANDALANAN, FATIMA KID, KIMAMA KATIMPO,
ALON GUIANDAL, MAMALUBA AKOD, AIN SUKOR and
NORIA DALANDAS, all represented by BAI ANNIE C.
MONTAWAL, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT and
DEPARTMENT OF PUB-

 
 
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LIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, respondents.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Section 5 of Rule 64 of the

Rules of Court requires, among others, that in a petition for review of
judgments and final orders or resolutions of Commission on Audit (COA),
the petition should be verified and contain a sworn certification against
forum shopping as provided in the fourth paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.
—Section 5 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court requires, among others, that in
a petition for review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of COA,
the petition should be verified and contain a sworn certification against
forum shopping as provided in the fourth paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46,
viz.: SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of noncompliance with
requirements.—x x x. x x x x The petitioner shall also submit together with
the petition a sworn certification that he has not theretofore commenced any
other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if
there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same;
and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been
filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or
different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to
promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency thereof
within five (5) days therefrom. x  x  x  x The failure of the petitioner to
comply any of the requirements shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal of the petition.
Same; Same; Certification Against Forum Shopping; In the case of
natural persons, the rule requires the parties themselves to sign the
certification against forum shopping.—In the case of natural persons, the
rule requires the parties themselves to sign the certification against forum
shopping. The reason for such requirement is that the petitioner himself
knows better than anyone else whether a separate case has been filed or
pending which involves substantially the same issues. In this case, the
certification against forum shopping in the filing of this petition was neither
signed by the petitioners nor their counsel, but by the mayor of their town
who is not even one of the petitioners in this case. Evidently, the petitioners
failed to comply with the certification against forum shopping requirement
absent any compelling reason as to warrant an exception based on the
circumstances of the case.

 
 

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Political Law; State Immunity from Suit; It is a fundamental postulate

of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the
State, as well as its government, is immune from suit unless it gives its
consent.—The fundamental law of the land provides that the State cannot be
sued without its consent. It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism
flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the State, as well as its
government, is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. The rule, in any
case, is not absolute for it does not say that the State may not be sued under
any circumstances. The doctrine only conveys that “the state may not be
sued without its consent”; its clear import then is that the State may at times
be sued. Suits filed against government agencies may either be against
incorporated or unincorporated agencies. In case of incorporated agencies,
its suability depends upon whether its own organic act specifically provides
that it can sue and be sued in Court.
Same; Same; The Doctrine of Non-Suability clothes the  Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH) from being held responsible for
alleged damages it performed in consonance with its mandated duty.—As
the State’s engineering and construction arm, the DPWH exercises
governmental functions that effectively insulate it from any suit, much less
from any monetary liability. The construction of the Project which was for
the purpose of minimizing the perennial problem of flood in the area of
Tunggol, Montawal, Maguindanao, is well within the powers and functions
of the DPWH as mandated by the Administrative Code of 1997. Hence, the
Doctrine of Non-Suability clothes the DPWH from being held responsible
for alleged damages it performed in consonance with its mandated duty.
Nowhere does it appear in the petition that the State has given its consent,
expressly or impliedly, to be sued before the courts. The failure to allege the
existence of the State’s consent to be sued in the complaint is a fatal defect,
and on this basis alone, should cause the dismissal of the complaint.
Administrative Agencies; Commission on Audit; Jurisdiction; Rule II,
Section 1(b) of the 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of the Commission on
Audit (COA) specifically enumerated those matters falling under COA’s
exclusive jurisdiction, which include “money claims due from or owing to
any government agency.” Rule VIII, Section 1(a) further provides that COA
shall have original jurisdic-

 
 

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Buisan vs. Commission on Audit

tion over money claims against the Government, among others.—

Undeniably, the petitioners’ money claims which were only filed with the
DPWH in 2004 or even in 2001 had already prescribed. As correctly pointed
out by the Office of the Solicitor General, “[i]t will be the height of injustice
for respondent DPWH to be confronted with stale claims, where verification
on the plausibility of the allegations remains difficult, either because the
condition of the alleged inundation of crops has changed, or the physical
impossibility of accounting for the lost and damaged crops due to the
considerable lapse of time.” On the other hand, “[l]aches has been defined
as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence could or should have
been done earlier.” In the case at bar, laches has set in as the elements
thereof are present. Firstly, the premature opening by the DPWH of the
Project allegedly causing flash floods, and damaging the petitioners’
properties took place in 1989 or even in 1992. Secondly, the petitioners took
15 years to assert their rights when they formally filed a complaint in 2004
against the DPWH. Thirdly, as the petitioners failed to file a formal suit for
their claims before the COA, there is an apparent lack of notice that would
give the DPWH the opportunity to defend itself. Under Commonwealth Act
No. 327, as amended by Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 1445, which
were the applicable laws at the time the cause of action arose, the COA has
primary jurisdiction over money claims against government agencies and
instrumentalities. Moreover, Rule II, Section 1(b) of the 2009 Revised Rules
of Procedure of the COA specifically enumerated those matters falling
under COA’s exclusive jurisdiction, which include “money claims due from
or owing to any government agency.” Rule VIII, Section 1(a) further
provides that COA shall have original jurisdiction over money claims
against the Government, among others. Therefore, the petitioners’ money
claims have prescribed and are barred by laches for their failure to timely
file the petition with the COA.
Same; Same; Same; The Commission on Audit (COA) is endowed with
enough latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds.
—Even if the Court sets aside the technical and procedural issues in the
interest of substantive justice, the instant petition must be denied. The COA
is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow
irregular, un-

 
 

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necessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of

government funds. It is tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in
safeguarding the proper use of the government’s and, ultimately, the
people’s property. The exercise of its general audit power is among the
constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check and balance system
inherent in our form of government.
Political Law; Separation of Powers; It is the general policy of the
Supreme Court (SC) to sustain the decision of administrative authorities,
especially one that was constitutionally created like herein respondent
Commission on Audit (COA), not only on the basis of the doctrine of
separation of powers, but also of their presumed expertise in the laws they
are entrusted to enforce.—It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the
decision of administrative authorities, especially one that was
constitutionally created like herein respondent COA, not only on the basis
of the doctrine of separation of powers, but also of their presumed expertise
in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. It is, in fact, an oft-repeated rule
that findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but
also finality when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or
arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
   Ismael M. Guro for petitioners.
   The Solicitor General for respondents.

REYES, J.:
 
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under
Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision2 dated November 20, 2012 of the Commission on Audit
(COA) in COA CP Case No. 2010-089, which

_______________

1  Rollo, pp. 12-27.

2  Rendered by Chairperson Ma. Gracia M. Pulido-Tan, Commissioners Juanito G.
Espino, Jr. and Heidi L. Mendoza; id., at pp. 28-35.

 
 

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Buisan vs. Commission on Audit

denied the money claims of Madag Buisan (Buisan), et al.

(petitioners) against the Department of Public Works and Highways
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(DPWH) in the amount of P122,051,850.00 for lack of merit, and

the Resolution3 dated February 14, 2014 denying the motion for
reconsideration.
 
The Antecedents
 
In 1989, the DPWH undertook the construction of the Liguasan
Cut-off Channel (Project) in Tunggol, Pagalungan, Maguindanao, to
minimize the perennial problem of flooding in the area. In April
2001, the DPWH received various claims from land owners for
damages allegedly caused to their properties, crops and
improvements by the premature opening or the Project. Hence, the
Regional Director (RD), DPWH Regional Office (R.O.) No. XII,
Cotabato City, investigated the claims.4
The DPWH R.O. No. XII and the Technical Working Group
(TWG) recommended in 2004 to pay just compensation to the
claimants. The TWG, however, noted that since the event occurred
in 1989, it could not account physically the actual quantity of the
damaged crops and properties. In 2006, an ad hoc committee was
created to determine the legality and propriety of the claims.
However, due to the considerable lapse of time and the insufficiency
of evidence, no final resolution was made by the DPWH. The claims
were forwarded to the RD of the DPWH R.O. No. XII to be returned
to the claimants, as such are considered to be under the jurisdiction
of the COA pursuant to Rule VIII of the 2009 Revised Rules of
Procedure of the COA.5
On April 14, 2010, the petitioners, represented by Mayor Bai
Annie C. Montawal (Montawal), filed a petition with the

_______________

3  Id., at p. 36.
4  Id., at p. 28.
5  Id., at pp. 28-29.

 
 

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COA,6 praying that the DPWH be ordered to pay the petitioners the
sum of P122,051,850.00 as compensation for their damaged crops,
properties and improvements. On September 16, 2010, Buisan filed
a Motion to Dismiss the Petition alleging that Montawal was not
authorized to represent them. In fact, Buisan and the other claimants

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filed a separate petition with the COA based on that same money
claim.7
In its Answer, the DPWH averred that the petitioners failed to
establish that they are the owners of crops and properties allegedly
damaged, and that the damage was caused by the construction of the
Project. Moreover, the DPWH asserted that the petitioners’ cause of
action had already prescribed.8
In its Decision9 dated November 20, 2012, the COA denied the
money claims of the petitioners, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission DENIES the

herein Petition for money claim for lack of merit.10

 
The COA held that for the petitioners’ failure to file their money
claims within a reasonable time, they are deemed to have committed
laches. Furthermore, the petitioners’ cause of action had already
prescribed in view of Article 1146 of the Civil Code.11
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same
was denied by the COA for lack of merit.12

_______________

6   Id., at pp. 37-42.

7   Id., at p. 29.
8   Id., at pp. 29-30.
9   Id., at pp. 28-35.
10  Id., at p. 34.
11  Id., at p. 33.
12  Id., at p. 36.

 
 

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Buisan vs. Commission on Audit

Issue
 

WHETHER THE COA GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN

FINDING THAT THE PETITIONERS’ CLAIM WAS BARRED BY
LACHES AND PRESCRIPTION.

Ruling of the Court

 
The Court denies the petition.

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The petition failed to
comply with the rules
on certification against
forum shopping.
 
Section 5 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court requires, among
others, that in a petition for review of judgments and final orders or
resolutions of COA, the petition should be verified and contain a
sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in the fourth
paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46, viz.:

SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of noncompliance with

requirements.—x x x.
x x x x
The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a sworn
certification that he has not theretofore commenced any other action
involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or
different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such
other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he
should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is
pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different
divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly
inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five
(5) days therefrom.

 
 

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Buisan vs. Commission on Audit

x x x x
The failure of the petitioner to comply any of the requirements shall
be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. (Emphasis ours)

 
In the present case, the certification against forum shopping was
signed by Montawal, the mayor of the Municipality of Montawal,
Maguindanao.13 Her bare statement that she was the petitioners’
duly constituted attorney-in-fact in filing the petition before the
COA can hardly constitute as compliance with the rules. She did not
even append a Special Power of Attorney executed by the affected
landowners. Montawal’s legal capacity to sue on behalf of the
petitioners is questionable, considering that her authority to
represent the claimants was even assailed by the petitioners, when

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they filed with the COA a Motion to Dismiss the Petition filed
therein by Montawal.14
In the case of natural persons, the rule requires the parties
themselves to sign the certification against forum shopping. The
reason for such requirement is that the petitioner himself knows
better than anyone else whether a separate case has been filed or
pending which involves substantially the same issues.15 In this case,
the certification against forum shopping in the filing of this petition
was neither signed by the petitioners nor their counsel, but by the
mayor of their town who is not even one of the petitioners in this
case. Evidently, the petitioners failed to comply with the certification
against forum shopping requirement absent any compelling reason
as to warrant an exception based on the circumstances of the case.16

_______________

13  Id., at pp. 25-26.

14  Id., at p. 29.
15  Fuentebella v. Castro, 526 Phil. 668, 675; 494 SCRA 183, 192 (2006).
16  Altres v. Empleo, 594 Phil. 246, 261-262; 573 SCRA 583, 595 (2008).

 
 

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Buisan vs. Commission on Audit

The Doctrine of Non-Suability

of State insulates the DPWH,
a governmental entity, from
claims of damages.
 
The fundamental law of the land provides that the State cannot be
sued without its consent.17 It is a fundamental postulate of
constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty
that the State, as well as its government, is immune from suit unless
it gives its consent. The rule, in any case, is not absolute for it does
not say that the State may not be sued under any circumstances. The
doctrine only conveys that “the state may not be sued without its
consent”; its clear import then is that the State may at times be
sued.18 Suits filed against government agencies may either be
against incorporated or unincorporated agencies. In case of
incorporated agencies, its suability depends upon whether its own
organic act specifically provides that it can sue and be sued in
Court.19

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As the State’s engineering and construction arm, the DPWH

exercises governmental functions that effectively insulate it from
any suit, much less from any monetary liability. The construction of
the Project which was for the purpose of minimizing the perennial
problem of flood in the area of Tunggol, Montawal, Maguindanao, is
well within the powers and functions of the DPWH as mandated by
the Administrative Code of 1997.
Hence, the Doctrine of Non-Suability clothes the DPWH from
being held responsible for alleged damages it performed in
consonance with its mandated duty. Nowhere does it appear in the
petition that the State has given its consent, ex-

_______________

17  1987 CONSTITUTION, Article XVI, Section 3.

18  Department of Agriculture v. NLRC, 298 Phil. 491, 498; 227 SCRA 693, 699
(1993).
19   Deutsche Gesellschaft Für Technische Zusammenarbeit v. Court of Appeals,
603 Phil. 150, 166; 585 SCRA 150, 168 (2009).

 
 

357

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Buisan vs. Commission on Audit

pressly or impliedly, to be sued before the courts. The failure to

allege the existence of the State’s consent to be sued in the
complaint is a fatal defect, and on this basis alone, should cause the
dismissal of the complaint.20
 
The petitioners’ cause of
action has been barred by
prescription and laches.
 
The COA denied the petition primarily on the ground that the
petitioners filed their money claims only on 2014, or 15 years after
their cause of action arose in 1989. The petitioners’ assertion that the
cause of action arose in 1992 is self-serving as no pieces of evidence
was presented or even attached as supporting documents in their
petition to prove their claim. Worse, the petitioners could not even
pinpoint the exact moment of time of the destruction of their
properties.21
The petitioners’ statement that there were already heavy rains
since 1989 that caused flooding in the area negates their previous
claim that the cause of action arose in 1992. If in fact there were

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already heavy rains since 1989, then it can also be argued that prior
to 1992, their properties were already damaged by the floods and
that would be the reckoning point of their cause of action. This
further establishes that their cause of action has already prescribed.
Thus, while it may be argued that the petitioners have a cause of
action against the DPWH, the same has already prescribed in view
of Article 1146 of the Civil Code, viz.:

ART. 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years:
(1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;
(2) Upon a quasi-delict. (Emphasis ours)

_______________

20  Republic v. Feliciano, 232 Phil. 391, 396; 148 SCRA 424, 430 (1987).
21  Rollo, p. 23.

 
 

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Buisan vs. Commission on Audit

Undeniably, the petitioners’ money claims which were only filed

with the DPWH in 2004 or even in 2001 had already prescribed. As
correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, “[i]t will
be the height of injustice for respondent DPWH to be confronted
with stale claims, where verification on the plausibility of the
allegations remains difficult, either because the condition of the
alleged inundation of crops has changed, or the physical
impossibility of accounting for the lost and damaged crops due to
the considerable lapse of time.”22
On the other hand, “[l]aches has been defined as the failure or
neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which, by exercising due diligence could or should have been
done earlier.”23
In the case at bar, laches has set in as the elements24 thereof are
present. Firstly, the premature opening by the DPWH of the Project
allegedly causing flash floods, and damaging the petitioners’
properties took place in 1989 or even in 1992. Secondly, the
petitioners took 15 years to assert their rights when they formally
filed a complaint in 2004 against the DPWH. Thirdly, as the
petitioners failed to file a formal suit for their claims before the
COA, there is an apparent lack of notice that would give the DPWH
the opportunity to defend itself.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 327,25 as amended by Section 26
of Presidential Decree No. 1445,26 which were the
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_______________

22  See COA and DPWH’s Comment, pp. 235-256.

23  Akang v. Municipality of Isulan, Sultan Kudarat Province, 712 Phil. 420, 439;
699 SCRA 745, 762 (2013).
24  Republic v. Marjens Investment Corporation, G.R. No. 156205, November 12,
2014, 739 SCRA 676, 689.
25   An Act Fixing the Time Within Which the Auditor General Shall Render his
Decisions and Prescribing the Manner of Appeal Therefrom. Approved on June 18,
1938.
26  ORDAINING AND INSTITUTING A GOVERNMENT AUDITING CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
Approved on June 11, 1978.

 
 
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applicable laws at the time the cause of action arose, the COA has
primary jurisdiction over money claims against government
agencies and instrumentalities. Moreover, Rule II, Section 1(b) of
the 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA27 specifically
enumerated those matters falling under COA’s exclusive jurisdiction,
which include “money claims due from or owing to any government
agency.” Rule VIII, Section 1(a) further provides that COA shall
have original jurisdiction over money claims against the
Government, among others. Therefore, the petitioners’ money
claims have prescribed and are barred by laches for their failure to
timely file the petition with the COA.
 
COA did not abuse its discretion
in denying the petitioners’ claims
for damages against the DPWH.
 
Even if the Court sets aside the technical and procedural issues in
the interest of substantive justice, the instant petition must be denied.
The COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent,
and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or
unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It is tasked to be
vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the
government’s and, ultimately, the people’s property. The exercise of
its general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that
gives life to the check and balance system inherent in our form of
government.28
In denying the petitioners’ money claims against the DPWH, the
COA did not abuse the exercise of its discretion as its denial was
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grounded on facts and circumstances that

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27  Approved September 15, 2009.

28  Espinas v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 198271, April 1, 2014, 720 SCRA
302, citing Delos Santos v. Commission on Audit, 716 Phil. 322, 332; 703 SCRA 501,
513 (2013).

 
 

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would warrant such denial arising from the following observations:

In her 5th Indorsement dated July 22, 2011, the ATL, DPWH, Cotabato
2nd Engineering District, interposed no objection to the claims for payment
for damaged crops allegedly caused by the construction of the [Project] but
made significant observations, among others, to wit:
x x x x
3. That the names of claimants and other details in the attached List of
Claims for Crop Damages Affected by the Overflow of the Diversion
Cut-Off Channel in Tunggol, Pagalungan, Maguindanao, (Annexes C-1
to C-12) submitted by the IROW Task Force, DPWH Central Office
amounting to P122,049,550.00, were based on and the same with that of
the following three (3) reports:
3.1) Undated and Unsigned “List of Improvements Affected by the
Overflow of the Diversion Cut-Off Channel in Tunggol, Pagalungan,
Maguindanao amounting to P122,049,550.00 (Annex “D” to Annex
“D-4”) with sub-heading, “NOTE: BASE[D] ON THE ATTACHED
AFFIDAVIT AND APPROVED DATA FROM ARMM” (Original
List)
x x x x
4. That in the above mentioned paragraph (3.1), the claimants/owners
declared their lots as either cornland, riceland, lowland or
marshyland as opposed to their claim for crop damages for coconut
trees, mango trees, coffee, jackfruits and banana under paragraphs
(3.2) and (3.3) and Annexes “C-1” to “C-12,” mentioned below.

 
 
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Buisan vs. Commission on Audit

5. That [in the] analysis of all lists with regards to the population density of
plant and fruit trees, it was computed that population density was only
about 2-3 per square meter. This means that the distance of every fruit
tree trunk/clump to each other is only about 2-3 meters, hence, in order
for the fruit trees to be fruit bearing, it would appear that their branches
would already be interlocking with each other. (Schedule 1)
6. That in view of the above, the total number of fruit trees per lot
indicated in the lists were determined to be only estimates and not
the actual number/quantity of fruit trees allegedly damaged.
7. That review of the lists of claimants disclosed that there are instances
that two (2) or more claimants are owners of the same lot number.
(Schedule 2)
8. That [in the] tracing [of] the affected lots in the parcellary map, there
were lots which we believe the flooding of which should not be
attributed to the construction of the Cut-Off Channel but to the
original and existing course of the river. Moreover, said lots are not
on the downstream of the project (Lots # 61, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78, 297,
291, 289, 288, 287, 286, 284, 281, 282, 279, 280, 276, 273, 274, 271,
270, 265, 263, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 379, 377,
380, and 378). The construction of the Cut-Off Channel was actually a
relief to the upstream which [do not] experience

 
 
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Buisan vs. Commission on Audit

perennial flooding, but sadly a disaster to the downstream portion. (See

attached Parcellary Map)
x x x x
  9. That there are listed lots which are not in the parcellary map. (Lot #
386, 1440, 1441, 1442, 1443 and 1444)
10. That all undated DECLARATION OF REAL PROPERTY
submitted by the owners/claimants in support of [their] claims for
crop damages were all signed by Municipal Assessor Babai M.
Bangkulit of Datu Montawal, Maguindanao, which we believe were
issued only on April 12, 2007, the same date the Statements of Tax
Delinquency were signed by the aforementioned Municipal Assessor.
11. That [in the] tracing [of] the lots on the parcellary map, majority of the
lots are located on the side of the Municipality of Pagalungan,
Maguindanao, and not in the Municipality of Datu Montawal,
Maguindanao. (See attached Parcellary Map).
x x x x
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13. That not a single copy of land title was submitted by the claimants to
prove that they are the legal owners and rightful claimants to the
alleged crop damages therein.
x x x x
 
Finally, the then Cluster Director, Cluster D-Economic Services,
National Government Sector (NGS), this Commission, in her 8th
Indorsement dated December

 
 

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15, 2011, stated that taking into account the fact that DPWH undertook
the construction of the [Project] in the discharge of its governmental
function, it cannot be held liable. In support of her position, she cited the
decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Torio v. Fontanilla, G.R. No.
L-29993 dated October 23, 1978, citing Palafox, et al. v. Province of Ilocos
Norte, et al., 102 Phil. 1186 (1958).
After observing that there are conflicting claims between the
petitioners and that it is a primary consideration that a claim must be
instituted by the proper party-in-interest otherwise the same will fail,
the then Cluster Director, Cluster D, NGS, this Commission,
recommended the dismissal of the Petition, subject to the final
determination by the Commission Proper.29 (Emphasis ours)

 
Absent any showing that COA capriciously, arbitrarily or
whimsically exercised its discretion that would tantamount to
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty or
to act at all in contemplation of law resulting to the prejudice of the
rights of the claimants, the Court believes that COA did not abuse,
much less gravely, its discretion in denying the claims of the
petitioners.
Thus, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
COA in denying the petitioners’ money claims for failure to present
substantial evidence to prove that their properties were damaged by
floods due to the premature opening of the Project of the DPWH.
Without a doubt, the inconsistencies and discrepancies in the
evidence presented by the petitioners backed by the findings of COA
lead only to one inescapable conclusion: that there is no substantial
evidence to prove the petitioners’ claims that would render the
DPWH or the State liable for the amount claimed.

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29  Rollo, pp. 30-32.

 
 

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In the absence of grave abuse of discretion, the factual findings of

COA, which are undoubtedly supported by the evidence on record,
must be accorded great respect and finality. COA, as the duly
authorized agency to adjudicate money claims against government
agencies and instrumentalities has acquired special knowledge and
expertise in handling matters falling under its specialized
jurisdiction.30
Finally, it is the general policy of the Court to sustain the
decision of administrative authorities, especially one that was
constitutionally created like herein respondent COA, not only on the
basis of the doctrine of separation of powers, but also of their
presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. It is, in
fact, an oft-repeated rule that findings of administrative agencies are
accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision and
order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would
amount to grave abuse of discretion.31
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision
dated November 20, 2012 and Resolution dated February 14, 2014
of the Commission on Audit in COA CP Case No. 2010-089 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Sereno (CJ.), Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro,

Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Mendoza, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen
and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Jardeleza, J., No part prior OSG action.

Petition dismissed, judgment and resolution affirmed.

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30  Daraga Press, Inc. v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 201042, June 16, 2015,
758 SCRA 393.
31  Yap v. Commission on Audit, 633 Phil. 174, 195; 619 SCRA 154, 174 (2010).

 
 

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Note.—The power to institute actions necessarily includes the

power to execute the verification and certification against forum
shopping required in initiatory pleadings. (Cunanan vs. Jumping Jap
Trading Corporation, 586 SCRA 620 [2009])
 
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