PEDRO MAGO vs. JUANA Z.
BARBIN
G.R. No. 173923 October 12, 2009
Facts:
An action for cancellation of Emancipation Patents, Disqualification of Tenant-Benificiary,
repossession and damages was filed by the respondent with the PARAD of Camarines Norte
alleging that she is the owner in free simple of an irrigated Riceland, and that petitioners were
tenants of the subject landholding. Also, alleged that petitioners violated the terms of their
leasehold contracts for failure to pay lease rentals for more than two years, which is a ground
for their dispossession of the landholding. Petitioners alleged that the landholding was placed
under the Operation Land Transfer program. Respondents’ title was then cancelled and the
landholding was transferred to the Magos who were issued Emancipation Patents. The TCT
were registered with the Registry of Deeds. Petitioners said that prior to the issuance of the
Emancipation Patents, already delivered their lease rentals to respondent and after the
issuance of the same, the subject landholding ceased to be covered by any leasehold contract.
PARAD denied the petition for lack of merit. On appeal, the DARAB reversed and set aside the
PARAD Decision orderingthe Register of Deeds to cancel the Emancipation Patent of the
Petitioners and directing the MARO of Vinzons, Camarines Norte, to reallocate the subject lands
to qualified beneficiaries. A motion for reconsideration was filed but subsequently denied by
the DARAB for lack of merit. On appeal, DARAB Decision was affirmed and thereafter denied
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether the Emancipation Patents and Transfer Certificates of Title issued to the Petitioner
which were already registered with the Register of Deeds have already become indefeasible
and can no longer be cancelled even if they failed to fully pay the landowner.
Held:
No. the Emancipation Patents and Transfer Certificates of Title already registered with the
Register of Deeds cannot be considered indefeasible and it can be cancelled even the failure to
pay the landowner in full. The Supreme Court ruled that the mere issuance of an emancipation
patent does not put the ownership of the agrarian reform beneficiary beyond attack and
scrutiny. Emancipation patents issued to agrarian reform beneficiaries may be corrected and
cancelled for violations of agrarian laws, rules and regulations. In fact, DAR Administrative
Order No. 02, series of 1994 enumerates the grounds for cancellation of registered
Emancipation Patents or Certificates of Landownership Award and one of which is” Default in
the obligation to pay an aggregate of three (3) consecutive amortizations in case of voluntary
land transfer/direct payment scheme, except in cases of fortuitous events and force majeure”.
To be sure, the court scrutinized the evidentiary records but found no valid reason to depart
from the challenged decision and it does not also allow unjust treatment of landowners by
depriving the latter of the just compensation due.
Padua vs. CA GR 153456, Mar. 2, 2007 517 SCRA 232
Facts:
Private respondents Pepito Dela Cruz, et al. were tenants of Lots which was donated said to the
municipality on the condition that these be used as school sites. The project did not materialize
and, Dela Cruz, et al. asked that the properties be returned to them.
However, they found out that Mayor Cruz had distributed the Lots who were each issued a
Certificate of Land Transfer). Upon Petition for Cancellation of CLT filed by Dela Cruz, et al., DAR
Secretary issued an Order cancelling the CLT issued to Labagnoy and Cruz.
The latter filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment for lack of due process but the same was
denied which was subsequently appealed to the Office of the President (OP) which was
dismissed.
However, during the pendency of the appeal before the OP, Cruz executed an Affidavit of
Waiver over his interest in Lot No. 90 on the basis of which DAR Regional Office III issued an
Order cancelling the CLT of Cruz and declaring Lot No. 90 open for disposition.
Then DAR Secretary Santiago issued an Order awarding Lot No. 90 to herein petitioner Padua
who had been occupying said property and paying the amortization thereon to the LBP.
Aggrieved, Dela Cruz, et al., filed with the DAR Secretary a Letter-Petition for Cancellation
(Letter-Petition) of the DAR Regional Office III Orders. DAR Secretary Garilao granted the Letter-
Petition in a Garilao Order cancelling the Order of Award issued in favor of Roberto Padua and
directing the Regional Director to cause the restoration of possession of said lot in favor of the
Dela Cruz, et al.
All payments made by Roberto Padua on account of said lot as rentals for the use thereof are
forfeited in favor of the government. Accordingly, DAR Regional Director Acosta issued a
Memorandum directing herein public respondent PARO Inocencio to implement the Garilao
Order. In turn, PARO Inocencio instructed Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer Lino Mabborang
(MARO Mabborang) to issue the necessary documents to award Lot No. 90 to Dela Cruz, et
al. Upon being informed by MARO Mabborang of the implementation of the Garilao Order,
Padua filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of a Final and Executory Order of the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction. The CA issued the herein assailed Decision, dismissing the Petition for Annulment for
being the wrong mode of questioning the Garilao Order. The CA also affirmed the Garilao
Order, holding that then DAR Secretary Garilao had authority to resolve the Letter-Petition as it
involved an agrarian dispute. The CA also rejected the contention of Padua that he was not
accorded due process in view of evidence on record that he was notified of the proceedings on
the Letter-Petition but he chose not to participate therein. Padua filed a Motion for
Reconsideration was subsequently denied by CA. Hence, the present Petition.
Issue: Whether the DAR has no jurisdiction in Hearing the land dispute on the said case?
Held: No, The statutory mechanism for the acquisition of land through agrarian reform requires
full payment of amortization before a farmer-beneficiary may be issued a CLOA or EP, which, in
turn, can become the basis for issuance in his name of an original or a transfer certificate of
title. As Padua himself admitted that he is still paying amortization on Lot to LBP, his status in
relation to said property remains that of a mere potential farmer-beneficiary whose eligibilities
DAR may either confirm or reject. In fact, under DAR Administrative Order, DAR has authority to
issue, recall, or cancel a CLT, CBC, EP, or CLOA issued to potential farmer-beneficiaries but not
yet registered with the Register of Deeds.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sec. 50 if CARL cannot take cognizance of the petition for
cancellation because the matter involved is a civil law issue relating to the validity of a contract
of sale executed by LBP and petitioner, not an agrarian reform matter.
DECISION: The CA dismissed the Petition and held that Rule 47 applies only to final judgments
and orders of Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) in civil cases and not to orders issued by the DAR
Secretary. The CA also affirmed the Garilao Order, holding that then DAR Secretary Garilao had
authority to resolve the Letter-Petition as it involved an agrarian dispute.
G.R. No. 165501 Case Digest
G.R. No. 165501, March 28, 2006
Spouses Jesus and Evangeline Pasco
vs Pison-Arceo Agricultural and Development Corp.
Ponente: Carpio-Morales
Facts:
Pison-Arceo is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Negros Occidental, of which houses
were constructed and occupied by its workers.
Spouses Pasco, along with other workers have ceased to be employed in 1987, so Pison-Arceo
asked them to vacate the house they occupy. Spouses refused to vacate, hence Pison-Arceo
filed an unlawful detainer case in Talisay City.
In their answer, the workers claimed that they built the house they occupied at their own
expense and their stay was upon the tolerance of the corporation.
Pison-Arceo claimed that the houses built by the workers were destroyed by a typhoon, forcing
them to built it at their expense.
Pison demands for them to vacate as they had paid rental thru salary/wage deductions. The
workers, on the other hand, say that their refusal to vacate is justified for they are owners and
actual possessors.
MTC Talisay favored the corporation, saying that the corporation built the [original] houses for
their workers without requiring for payment of rentals, but with an implied promise that the
same be vacated upon cessation from work.
After the promulgation of the judgment, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Talisay
sent a notice of coverage and filed investigation advising the corporation that the land is now
covered under RA 6657. In the meantime, the workers have appealed the decision in RTC
Bacolod.
The workers argued that the land is covered by CARL and that they are qualified beneficiaries
and that it is material to the determination whether they are planters, sowers or builders in bad
faith. Ultimately saying that MTCC has no jurisdiction.
However, RTC Bacolod affirmed MTCC Talisay.
Workers filed a petition before the appellate court, attaching the copy of the notice of coverage
and field investigation. In the mean time, MARO of Talisay declared Jesus Pasco as potential
beneficiary of the land.
CA denied the petition of the workers, saying that the material averments in the petition were
not raised in the trial court, making their contention untenable.
MTCC Talisay does not lose jurisdiction over the case. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
1. Whether or not one who has been identified by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) as
potential agrarian reform beneficiary may be ejected from the land where he is identified as
such, by the landowner, who has already been notified by the DAR of the coverage of his land
by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program of the government.
2. Whether or not the foregoing issue involves an issue affecting the jurisdiction of the court
over the nature of the action or it involves primary jurisdiction.
3. Whether or not the matters involving jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action
could be raised for the first time on appeal.
Ruling:
Although the issue of jurisdiction may be considered by the reviewing court at anytime, the
mere issuance of notice of coverage does not automatically make the ejectment case an
agrarian dispute. The issuance of notice of coverage is a mere preliminary step for the States
acquisition of the land and does not automatically vests title or ownership of the land to the
government.
Purpose of notice of coverage and field investigation is to identify the landholding and
determine its suitability for agriculture and its productivity.
The owner retains its right to eject unlawful possessors of his land. The potentiality of the
beneficiary does not prevent the owner to exercise ownership also.
JESUS PASCO et al. v. PISON-ARCEO AGRICULTURAL AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
485 SCRA 514 (2006)
Under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, ownership of the land is transferred only after
the award of the same to the beneficiary by the Department of Agrarian Reform.
Pison-Arceo Agricultural and Development Corporation, is the registered owner of a parcel of
land in Negros Occidental. Constructed on the said land are houses occupied by the
corporation‘s workers. Jesus Pasco et al. are former workers of the corporation. When their
employment contracts were terminated, they were asked to vacate the house but they refused
to do so. The corporation thereafter filed a complaint for unlawful detainer before the
Metropolitan Trial Court in Cities in Bacolod City. The trial court rendered judgment in favor
of Pasco et al. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court affirmed the decision. Pasco et al. appealed
the decision contending that the court has no jurisdiction over the case on the ground of a
pending agrarian reform dispute between them and the corporation.
The Court of Appeals rendered a decision which affirmed the RTC‘s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not one who has been identified by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
as potential agrarian reform beneficiary may be ejected from the land where he is identified as
such, by the landowner, who has already been notified by the DAR of the coverage of his land
by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program of the government
HELD:
The issuance during the pendency of the case of a Notice of Coverage to Pison-Arceo
Agricultural and Developmevnt Corporation does not, however, automatically make the
ejectment case an agrarian dispute over which the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) has jurisdiction. The issuance of a Notice of
Coverage is merely a preliminary step for the State‘s acquisition of the land for
agrarian reform purposes and it does not automatically vest title or transfer the ownership of
the land to the government.
Since during a field investigation the DAR and Land Bank of the Philippines would make a
determination as to whether, among other things, “the land will be placed under
agrarian reform, the land‘s suitability to agriculture,” a Notice of Coverage does not
ipso facto render the land subject thereof a land reform area. The owner retains its right
to eject unlawful possessors of his land, as what respondent Pison- Arceo Agricultural and
Development Corporation did in the present case.
Nothing in the records of the case shows that the DAR has made an award in favor
of Spouses Pasco et al. Hence, no rights over the land they occupy can be considered to have
vested in their favor in accordance with Section 24 of the CARL which provides that the rights
and responsibilities of the beneficiary shall commence from the time the DAR makes an award
of the land to him, which award shall be completed within one hundred eighty (180) days from
the time the DAR takes actual possession of the land.
PASCO V. PISON-ARCEO AGRI. DEV. CORP.
FACTS: Respondent is the registered owner of a parcel of land containing more than 100
hectares. Constructed on respondents’ parcel of land are houses which are occupied by its
workers. Petitioners, among other workers, used to work for respondent until 1987. They
having ceased to be employed by respondent, petitioners were asked to vacate the house they
were occupying but they refused, hence, respondent filed a complaint for unlawful detainer
against them before the MTCC in Talisay City. Petitioners claimed that respondent constructed
houses for its workers but the house they were occupying was destroyed by a typhoon, forcing
them to build their house; respondents demand was merely for them to vacate the house, as
they had paid rentals thru salary/wage deductions; and their refusal to vacate the house is
justified, they being the owners and actual possessors thereof. Petitioners argued that
respondents’ hacienda is covered by the CARL and they are qualified beneficiaries.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject land is covered by [CARL] and whether or not the
defendants are qualified agrarian reform beneficiaries;
DECISION: The petition is denied. As for the registration of petitioners as potential CARP
beneficiaries, the same does not help their cause. As potential CARP beneficiaries, they are
included in the list of those who may be awarded land under the CARP. Nothing in the records
of the case shows that the DAR has made an award in favor of petitioners, hence, no rights over
the land they occupy can be considered to have vested in their favor in accordance with Section
24 of the CARL. Moreover, to allow petitioners to continue to stay in respondents land on the
ground that they are potential CARP beneficiaries would give them preferential treatment over
other potential CARP reform beneficiaries who are not occupying the premises and still
awaiting the award to be made by the DAR in their favor. Worse, to further tolerate petitioners
occupancy of respondents land might give other potential CARP beneficiaries the wrong signal
that they too can occupy the land which may be awarded to them even before they are chosen
or before an award is made in their favor.
Estribillo v DAR
Facts:
Private respondent Hacienda Maria Inc. requested that 527.8308 hectares of its landholdings
be placed under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Receiving compensation
therefor, HMI allowed petitioners and other occupants to cultivate the landholdings so that the
same may be covered under Agrarian Reform Program. In 1982, a final survey over the entire
area was conducted and approved. From 1984 to 1988, the corresponding TCTs and EPs
covering the entire 527.8308 hectares were issued to petitioners, among other persons. In
December 1997,
HMI filed with RARAD petitions seeking the declaration of erroneous coverage under
Presidential Decree No. 27 of 277.5008 hectares of its former landholdings. HMI claimed that
said area was not devoted to either rice or corn, that the area was untenanted, and that no
compensation was paid therefor.
RARAD rendered a decision declaring as void the TCTs and EPs awarded to petitioners because
the land covered was not devoted to rice and corn, and neither was there any established
tenancy relations between HMI and petitioners. Petitioners appealed to the DARAB which
affirmed the RARAD Decision. On appeal to the CA, the same was dismissed. Petitioners
contended that the EPs became indefeasible after the expiration of one year from their
registration.
Issue:
Whether or not EPs have become indefeasible one year after their issuance
Held:
After complying with the procedure in Section 105 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree where the DAR is required to issue the
corresponding certificate of title after granting an EP to tenant-farmers who have complied with
Presidential Decree No. 27, the TCTs issued to petitioners pursuant to their EPs acquire the
same protection accorded to other TCTs. The certificate of title becomes indefeasible and
incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the issuance of the order for
the issuance of the patent. Lands covered by such title may no longer be the subject matter of a
cadastral proceeding, nor can it be decreed to another person.
Estribillo v. DAR
FACTS: Petitioners are the recipients of Emancipation Patents (EPs) over parcels of land which
were formerly part of a forested area which have been denuded as a result of the logging
operations of Hacienda Maria, Inc. (HMI). Petitioners occupied and tilled these areas believing
that the same were public lands. HMI acquired such forested area through Sales Patent
covering three parcels of land. PD 27 mandated that tenanted rice and corn lands be brought
under Operation Land Transfer and awarded to farmer-beneficiaries. HMI, through Colmenares,
requested that 527 hectares of its landholdings be placed under the coverage of Operation
Land Transfer. Receiving compensation therefor, HMI allowed petitioners and other occupants
to cultivate the landholdings so that the same may be covered under said law. DAR conducted a
parcellary mapping of the entire landholdings of 527 hectares and approved the Parcellary Map
Sketching (PMS) and the Amended PMS covering the entire landholdings. HMI participated in
the determination of the Average Gross Production per hectare at the Barangay Committee on
Land Production, and was a signatory of an undated Landowner and Tenant Production
Agreement (LTPA), covering the 527 hectares which was submitted to the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP). A Deed of Assignment of Rights was also executed in favor of petitioners,
which was registered with the Register of Deeds. A final survey over the entire area was
conducted and approved.
The corresponding TCTs and EPs covering the entire 527 hectares were issued to petitioners.
HMI filed with the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) of CARAGA, Region XIII, 17
petitions seeking the declaration of erroneous coverage under PD 27 of 277 hectares of its
former landholdings. HMI claimed that said area was not devoted to either rice or corn, that
the area was untenanted, and that no compensation was paid therefor. The 17 petitions, which
were later consolidated, sought for the cancellation of the EPs covering the disputed 277
hectares which had been awarded to petitioners. HMI did not question the coverage of the
other 250 hectares under Presidential Decree No. 27 despite claiming that the entire
landholdings were untenanted and not devoted to rice and corn.
Petitioners failed to submit a Position Paper, the RARAD rendered a Decision declaring as void
the TCTs and EPs awarded to petitioners because the land covered was not devoted to rice and
corn, and neither was there any established tenancy relations between HMI and petitioners
when PD 27 took effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not the EPs and the corresponding TCTs issued to petitioners or to their
successors-in-interest are declared valid.
DECISION: The rule in this jurisdiction, regarding public land patents and the character of the
certificate of title that may be issued by virtue thereof, is that where land is granted by the
government to a private individual, the corresponding patent therefor is recorded, and the
certificate of title is issued to the grantee; thereafter, the land is automatically brought within
the operation of the Land Registration Act, the title issued to the grantee becoming entitled to
all the safeguards provided in Section 38 of the said Act. In other words, upon expiration of one
year from its issuance, the certificate of title shall become irrevocable and indefeasible like a
certificate issued in a registration proceeding. The EPs themselves, like the Certificates of Land
Ownership Award (CLOAs) in Republic Act No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
of 1988), are enrolled in the Torrens system of registration. The Property Registration Decree in
fact devotes Chapter IX on the subject of EPs. Indeed, such EPs and CLOAs are, in themselves,
entitled to be as indefeasible as certificates of title issued in registration proceedings.
The unreasonable delay of HMI in filing the Petition for cancellation more than 20 years after
the alleged wrongful annotation of the Deed of Assignment and more than ten years after the
issuance of the TCTs to the farmers, is apparently motivated by its desire to receive a
substantially higher valuation and just compensation should the disputed 277 hectares be
covered under RA 6657 instead of Presidential Decree No. 27.
The following EPs and the corresponding TCTs issued to petitioners or to their successors-in-
interest are hereby declared VALID and SUBSISTING.
G.R. No. 78214, December 5, 1988
Yolanda Caballes
vs Dept. Agrarian Reform, Hon. Heherson Alvarez and Bienvenido Abajon
Facts:
The landholding subject of the controversy is consists of 60 sqm was acquired by spouses
Arturo and Yolanda Caballes by virute of a Deed of Sale executed by Andrea Alicaba Millenes,
this land is situated in Lawaan Talisay, Cebu. Before the sale of the property to Caballes,
Bienvenido Abajon constructed his house on a protion of the land, paying monthly rental to
Andrea Millenes. Abjon was likewise allowed to plant thereon, and they have agreed that the
produce thereon would be shared by them 50-50.
When the property was sold, Caballes told Abajon that they will put up a poultry on the land
and they intended to build it close to Abajon's house and they pursuaded Abajon to transfer his
dwelling to the opposite portion of the land. Abajon offered to pay rental; to the new owners,
but they refuse and later demanded for Abajon to vacate. Abajon refused to leave.
DAR concluded that Abajon was a tenant of the former owner, Andrea.
Issue: Whether Abajon is a tenant under the new owners.
Ruling:
Abajon is not a tenant for it only occupied a miniscule portion of the land which cannot be
interpreted as economic-family size farm under the definition of RA 3844.
The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:
1. The parties are the landowner and the tenant;
2. The subject is agricultural land;
3. There is consent;
4. The purpose is agricultural production;
5. There is personal cultivation; and
6. There is sharing of harvests.
All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties.
The absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a
planter thereon, a de jure tenant. This is so because unless a person has established his status
as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform
Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws.
Therefore, the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship.
Certainly, it is not unusual for a landowner to accept some of the produce of his land from
someone who plants certain crops thereon. This is a typical and laudable provinciano trait of
sharing or patikim, a native way of expressing gratitude for favor received. This, however, does
not automatically make the tiller-sharer a tenant thereof especially when the area tilled is only
60, or even 500, square meters and located in an urban area and in. the heart of an industrial or
commercial zone at that.
Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has been given its possession for
the primary purpose of agricultural production. The circumstances of this case indicate that the
private respondent's status is more of a caretaker who was allowed by the owner out of
benevolence or compassion to live in the premises and to have a garden of some sort at its
south western side rather than a tenant of the said portion.
Anent the second assignment of error, the petitioner argues that since Abajon, is not an
agricultural tenant, the criminal case for malicious mischief filed against him should be declared
as proper for trial so that proceedings in the lower court can resume.
FACTS
This is a petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of an Order issued by public respondent
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), through its then Secretary, the Hon. Heherson Alvarez,
finding the existence of a tenancy relationship between the herein petitioner and the private
respondent. The landholding subject of the controversy, which consists of only sixty (60) square
meters was acquired by the spouses Arturo and Yolanda Caballes (petitioner), by virtue of a
Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 24, 1978 executed by Andrea Alicaba Millenes. This
landholding is part of Lot No. 3109-C, which has a total area of about 500 square meters,
situated at Lawa-an, Talisay, Cebu. In 1975, before the sale in favor of the Caballes spouses,
private respondent Bienvenido Abajon constructed his house on a portion of the said
landholding, paying a monthly rental of ₱2.00 to the owner, Andrea Millenes. The landowner
likewise allowed Abajon to plant on a portion of the land, agreeing that the produce thereof
would be shared by both on a fifty-fifty basis. Abajon planted corn and bananas on the
landholding. For four years, he paid the ₱2.00 rental for the lot occupied by his house, and
delivered 50% of the produce to the owner
As the property was sold, the new owners asked Abajon to vacate the premises, saying they
needed the property, but Abajon refused. On April 1, 1982, Yolanda Caballes, executed an
Affidavit stating that immediately after she reprimanded Abajon for harvesting bananas and
jackfruit from the property without her knowledge, the latter, with malicious and ill intent, cut
down the banana plants on the property worth about ₱50.00. A criminal case for malicious
mischief was filed against Abajon. (Obviously, all the planting on the property, including that of
the banana plants, had been done by Abajon).
Upon motion of the respondent in open court, the trial court ordered the referral of the case to
the Regional Office of the Public Respondent for a preliminary determination of the relationship
between the parties. The Regional Director of DAR held that there is the existence of a tenancy
relationship between the parties. On appeal by the petitioner, the Secretary of DAR, reversed
the decision of the Regional Director. Upon motion for reconsideration filed by the private
respondent, the New DAR Secretary sets aside the previous decision and finds the existence of
a tenancy relationship between the parties.
ISSUE 1. Whether or not there is an existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties.
HELD
There is none. The Higher Court laid down the essential requisites of a tenancy relationship. All
requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties. The
absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a
planter thereon, a de jure tenant.
The fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. This does not
automatically make the tiller-sharer a tenant thereof especially when the area tilled is only 60
square meters and located in an urban area and in the heart of an industrial or commercial
zone. Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has been given its possession
for the primary purpose of agricultural production. The circumstances of this case indicate that
the private respondent's status is more of a caretaker who was allowed by the owner out of
benevolence or compassion to live in the premises and to have a garden of some sort rather
than a tenant. Agricultural production as the primary purpose being absent in the arrangement
is a clear proof that the private respondent was never a tenant.
G.R. No. 86186 May 8, 1992
RAFAEL GELOS
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO ALZONA
Facts:
Subject land is originally owned by private respondent Alonza together with his parents. It has
an area of 25,000 sq. m.
They entered into a written contract with petitioner Gelos employing him as a laborer at P5.00
per day.
Alonzo acquired full ownership of the land and terminated Gelos but Gelos refused and
continued working on the land.
Gelos asked for the fixing of the agricultural lease rental to the MARO which granted his
petition.
Alonza filed a complaint with the RTC.
RTC dismissed the complaint and found Gelos to be a tenant of the subject property.
CA reversed the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not Gelos is entitled to the benefits of tenancy laws?
Ruling:
No. The stipulations of their “Kasunduan ng Upahang Araw” clearly indicate that parties did not
enter into tenancy agreement but only a contract of employement.
The court held that “tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged
tenant does upon the land”, it is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the
understanding when the farmer is installed, and their written agreement, are even more
important.
A tenant is defined under Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 1199 as a person who himself and
with the aid available from within his immediate farm household cultivates the land belonging
to or possessed by another, with the latter's consent, for purposes of production, sharing the
produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a
price-certain or ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy
system.
For this relationship to exist, it is necessary that:
1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; 2) the subject is agricultural land; 3) there is
consent; 4) the purpose is agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation; and 6) there
is sharing of harvest or payment of rental. In the absence of any of these requisites, an
occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or planter thereon, cannot qualify as a de
jure tenant.
Thus, the relationship established between the petitioner and respondent is not of tenant-land
owner but employee-employer relationship.
TENANCY RELATIONSHIP AND FARM EMPLOYER-FARM WORKER RELATIONSHIP,
DISTINGUISHED
1. in farm employer-farm worker relationship, the lease is one of labor with the agricultural
laborer as the lessor of his services and the farm employer as the lessee thereof;
2. the tenancy relationship, it is the landowner who is the lessor, and the tenant the lessee
of agricultural land;
3. the agricultural worker works for the farm employer and for his labor he received a
salary
or wage regardless of whether the employer makes a profit; and
4. the tenant derives his income from the agricultural produce or harvest.
The requirements set by law for the existence of a tenancy relationship, to wit:
1. the parties are the landholder and tenant;
2. the subject is agricultural land;
3. the purpose is agricultural production; and
4. there is consideration; have not been met by the private respondent.
In the absence of any of these requisites, an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator
thereof,
or planter thereof, cannot qualify as a de jure tenant. (189 SCRA 194, 181 SCRA 247).
Gabriel v. Pangilinan
Gabriel filed a complaint against Pangilinan claiming she is the owner of a 169,507 sqm
fishpond in barrio Sta. Ursula, Pampanga. An oral contract of lease with a yearly rental was
entered between them.
Defendant was notified that the contract would be terminated, but upon request was extended
for another year.
Defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint claiming that the trial court had no
jurisdiction. It should properly pertain to the Court of Agrarian Relations, there being an
agricultural leasehold tenancy relationship between the parties.
Upon opposition by plaintiff, the motion was denied. The defendant filed his answer that the
land was originally verbally leased to him by the plaintiff's father, Potenciano for as long as the
defendant wanted, subject to the condition that he would convert the major portion into a
fishpond and that which was already a fishpond be improved at his expense, which would be
reimbursed by Potenciano Gabriel or his heirs at the termination of the lease. Plaintiff also
assured him that he could continue leasing as long as he wanted since she was not in a position
to attend to it personally.
Parties were ordered to adduce evidence for the purpose of determining which Court shall take
cognizance of the case.
It appears that the defendant ceased to work on planting fingerlings, repairing dikes and such,
personally with the aid of helpers since he became ill and incapacitated. His daughter, Pilar
Pangilinan, took over who said that she helps her father in administering the leased property,
conveying his instructions to the workers. Excepting Pilar who is residing near the fishpond,
defendant’s other children are all professionals; a lawyer, an engineer, and a priest all residing
in Manila. None of these has been seen working on the fishpond.
Defendant: relationship between the parties is an agricultural leasehold tenancy governed by
Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, pursuant to section 35 of Republic Act No. 3844, and the
present case is within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.
Plaintiff: defendant ceased to work the fishpond personally or with the aid of the members of
his immediate farm household (Section 4, Republic Act No. 1199) the tenancy relationship
between the parties has been extinguished (Section 9, id.) and become of civil lease and
therefore the trial court properly assumed jurisdiction over the case.
Trial Court: The lease contract is a civil lease governed by the New Civil Code. No tenancy
relationship exists between the plaintiff and the defendant as defined by Republic Act No. 1199.
Court is vested with jurisdiction to try and decide this case.
Reconsideration by the defendant was denied. He appealed to this Court.
ISSUES:
1. Lower court erred in considering the relationship of appellee and appellant as that of a civil
lease and not a leasehold tenancy under Rep. Act No. 1199 as amended.
2. The lower court erred in not holding that the Court of First Instance is without jurisdiction,
the cue being that of an agrarian relation in nature pursuant to Rep Act. No. 1199.
HELD:
Important differences between a leasehold tenancy and a civil law lease.
The leasehold tenancy is limited to agricultural land; that of civil law lease may be either rural
or urban property.
As to attention and cultivation,
the law requires the leasehold tenant to personally attend to, and cultivate the agricultural
land, whereas the civil law lessee need not personally cultivate or work the thing leased.
As to purpose,
the landholding in leasehold tenancy is devoted to agriculture, whereas in civil law lease, the
purpose may be for any other lawful pursuits.
As to the law that governs
, the civil law lease is governed by the Civil Code, whereas leasehold tenancy is governed by
special laws.
The requisites for leasehold tenancy under the Agricultural Tenancy Act to exist:
1. land worked by the tenant is an agricultural land;
2. land is susceptible of cultivation by a single person together with members of his
immediate farm household;
3. must be cultivated by the tenant either personally or with the aid of labor available
from members of his immediate farm household;
4. land belongs to another; and
5. use of the land by the tenant is for a consideration of a fixed amount in money or in
produce or in both
There is no doubt that the land is agricultural land. It is a fishpond and the Agricultural Tenancy
Act, which refers to "agricultural land", specifically mentions fishponds and prescribes the
consideration for the use thereof. The mere fact that a person works an agricultural land does
not necessarily make him a leasehold tenant within the purview of Sec 4 of Republic Act No.
1199. He may still be a civil law lessee unless the other requisites as above enumerated are
complied with.
The court doesn’t want to decide on the second requisite since it wasn’t raised. For the third
requisite, the tenancy agreement was severed in 1956 when he ceased to work the fishpond
personally because he became ill and incapacitated. Not even did the members of appellant's
immediate farm household work the land. Only the members of the family of the tenant and
such other persons, whether related to the tenant or not, who are dependent upon him for
support and who usually help him to operate the farm enterprise are included in the term
"immediate farm household".
Republic Act No. 1199 is explicit in requiring the tenant and his immediate family to work the
land. A person, in order to be considered a tenant, must himself and with the aid available from
his immediate farm household cultivate the land. Persons, therefore, who do not actually work
the land cannot be considered tenants; and he who hires others whom he pays for doing the
cultivation of the land, ceases to hold, and is considered as having abandoned the land as
tenant within the meaning of sections 5 and 8 of Republic Act. No. 1199, and ceases to enjoy
the status, rights, and privileges of one.
We are, therefore, constrained to agree with the court a quo that the relationship between the
appellee Trinidad Gabriel and appellant Eusebio Pangilinan was not a leasehold tenancy under
Republic Act No. 1199. Hence, this case was not within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the Court of Agrarian Relations.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in its Civil
Case No. 1823, appealed from, is affirmed, with costs against the appellants.
In Lubrica v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 170220, November 20, 2006, 507 SCRA 415,
the Court declared that it would be highly inequitable on the part of the landowners therein to
compute just compensation using the values at the time of taking in 1972, and not at the time
of payment, considering that the government and the farmer-beneficiaries have already
benefited from the land although ownership thereof has not yet been transferred in their
names.
