PADILLA vs.

CA
This is a petition for review on certiorari on a previous ruling by the Angeles RTC wherein
On October 26, 1992, high-powered firearms with live ammunitions were found in the
possession and without permit petitioner Robin Padilla’s vehicle in Violation of P.D. 1886 at
Angeles, Pampanga:
(1) One .357 Caliber revolver, Smith and Wesson, SN-32919 with six (6) live ammunitions;
(2) One M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4) long and one (1) short magazine
with ammunitions;
(3) One .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A 35723 Y with clip and eight (8) ammunitions; and
(4) Six additional live double action ammunitions of .38 caliber revolver.
The following were recovered after Padilla tried to outrun police officers after he had hit
another vehicle on Mitsubishi Pajero with Plate No. PMA 777 while there was heavy downpour.
Enrique Manarang and Danny Perez, happened to be in a restaurant when the noticed the
speeding vehicle; Danny Cruz, who also happened to be there, was the first among the group to
see the accident. Manarang, belonging to a civic group Barangay disaster coordinating council,
reported the incident via radio to the PNP when Padilla started to leave heading north.
Petitioner was thereafter apprehended, arrested for the hit and run accident and was found in
possession of the abovementioned without permit. He admitted to possession of firearms
during investigation
It was later revealed that the baby armalite rifle, the revolver, and the Pietro Beretta were
actually not registered under Padilla’s Name; later Capt. Espino also found out that the three
firearms were not registered under appellant’s name.
The petitioner argued that:
(1) That his arrest was illegal and consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken in
the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule;
COURT:
Under Rev. Rules on Crim Pro. Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested:
1. After he has committed or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to
commit an offense,
2. In the presence of the arresting officer or private person.
3. Offense has just been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it
 4. Person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or where
he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while case is pending or escaped
while being transferred to another confinement.
Both first two elements occurred here, as it has been established that petitioner's vehicle
figured in a hit and run in the presence of Maranang, a private person, seeking to arrest
petitioner.
*presence" does not only require that the arresting person sees the offense, but also when he "hears
the disturbance created thereby AND proceeds at once to the scene. (US v. Samonte, citing Ramsey v.
State,etc.)

Besides, the policemen's warrantless arrest of petitioner could likewise be justified under
paragraph (b) as he had in fact just committed an offense. There was no supervening event or a
considerable lapse of time between the hit and run and the actual apprehension.
Verily then, the arresting police officers acted upon verified personal knowledge and not on
unreliable hearsay information in identifying the car model and the plate number. Especially
because the policemen saw for themselves at the Abacan Bridge a fast approaching Pajero with
a dangling plate number PMA 777 as well as its dented hood and railings.
Further, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect or irregularity attending
an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea. Petitioner failed to quash the
information, and due to his participation in the trial and by presenting his evidence, he is
estopped to question the legality of his arrest.
The seizure without a search warrant nonetheless can still be justified under a search incidental
to a lawful arrest (first instance). Once the lawful arrest was effected, the police may undertake
a protective search of the passenger compartment and containers in the vehicle which are
within petitioner's grabbing distance regardless of the nature of the offense.
This satisfied the two-tiered test of an incidental search:
(i) the item to be searched (vehicle) was within the arrestee's custody or area of immediate
control and
(ii) the search was contemporaneous with the arrest. The products of that search are
admissible evidence not excluded by the exclusionary rule.
(2) that he is a confidential agent authorized, under a Mission Order and Memorandum
Receipt, to carry the subject firearms; (issued from a PNP Supt. Rodialo Gumtang of Task
Force Aguila, Surigao Del Sur)
Crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two requisites must be established, viz.: (1) the
existence of the subject firearm and, (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the
firearm does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess. ( A fact later established
by the PNP Firearms and Explosives Office [FEO]). Padilla neither presented the Mission Order
or Memorandum during the arrest nor the preliminary investigation and not even in the
presentation of evidence in court
Petitioner’s claim of Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt duly issued by PNP Supt. Rodialo
Gumtang, the deputy commander of Task Force Aguila, Lianga, Surigao del Sur is immaterial as
the license to possess a firearm holds greater weight in the case at bar. The petitioner failed to
dispel doubt as to the suspicious origins of this alleged Mission Order and Memorandum
Receipt.
The said Mission Order is supposed to “be shown without resentment to avoid
embarrassment and/or misunderstanding.” and that they do “not cover violation of laws. If
such is the case it is rendered inoperative” according to a AFP Directive from the Chief of Staff.
Additionally, his surname was “misspelled” as Durembes which also does not appear in the
plantilla of either the PNP or Civilian Agents/Employees of the PNP; Said Memorandum should
also only be issued from Unit Commanders and Chief of Offices as opposed to a deputy
commander.
All of this considered, the Court ruled that the accused, not being the licensee of the
abovementioned firearm is sufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of
illegal possession of firearm
(3) that the penalty for simple illegal possession constitutes excessive and cruel punishment
prescribed by the 1987 Constitution.
The Courts are bound to apply the governing law which is P.D. 1866. The fact that it is not
repealed means that it is operative.
The penalty for illegal possession of firearm ranges from reclusion temporal maximum to
reclusion perpetua. The Court reiterates that it is a well-settled principle that although "The fact
that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual’
(Baylosis v. Chavez, Jr.).
Laws have in its favor, the presumption of constitutionality. Claims of unconstitutionality must
be proven by a clear, unequivocal breach of the Constitution. In fact, the appellant’s grievances
on the morality of the law is not within the Court’s jurisdiction but it exclusively belongs to the
Congress.
PD 1866 is a special law but its penalties were taken from the RPC, thus, determining the
proper period should apply. The penalty being imposed with rules and not merely as a general
prescription of law shall be prision mayor in its maximum period and reclusion temporal in its
medium period.
WHEREFORE, the court affirms the RTC decision with modification, Padilla shall suffer 10 years
and 1 day minimum and a maximum of 18 years, 8 months, and 1 day as maximum.