ISPL

FINAL DRAFT

Project Topic:
BASIC RULES OF INTERPRETATION

Submitted by
PRASHASTI PRIYA
Roll No. - 1145
7 Semester, 4th Year, B.A.LL.B. (Hons.)
th

Submitted to
Dr. Ali
Faculty of ISPL

CHANAKYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY,

PATNA
November, 2017.

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The projects and presentations has been one of the most appreciated areas for the holistic
development of a student. It helps a student to be more curious, to know more and to
research more.
I would like to extend my deepest thanks to Dr. Ali who has provided me with all the
possibilities to complete the project. I would also like to extend my regards to my friends for
their aspiring guidance, invaluably constructive criticism and friendly advice during the
project work.

Prashasti Priya
7th semester
Roll No. 1145

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Table of Contents
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.................................................................................................................2

1. INTRODUCTION.....................................................................................................................3

2. APPLICATION OF LITERAL RULE OF INTERPRETATION........................................6

3. APPLICATION OF GOLDEN RULE OF INTERPRETATION........................................9

4. APPLICATION OF MISCHIEF RULE OF INTERPRETATION...................................16

5. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS.................................................................................24

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 1. INTRODUCTION

The interpretation of laws is confined to courts of law. In course of time, courts have evolved a
large and elaborate body of rules to guide them in construing or interpreting laws. Most of them
have been collected in books on interpretation of statutes and the draftsman would be well
advised to keep these in mind in drafting Acts. Some Interpretation Acts, like the Canadian one,
lay down that every Act shall be deemed remedial and shall accordingly receive such fair, large
and liberal construction and interpretation as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the
Act according to its true intent, meaning and spirit. The object of all such rules or principles as
aforesaid broadly speaking, is to ascertain the true intent, meaning and spirit of every statute. A
statute is designed to be workable, and the interpretation thereof by a court should be to secure
that object, unless crucial omission or clear direction makes that unattainable.1

The term statutory interpretation refers to the action of a court in trying to understand and
explaining the meaning of a piece of legislation. Many cases go to appeal on a point of
interpretation, Indeed, Lord Hailsham, a senior English judge, once said that “probably 9 out of
10 cases heard by the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords turn upon or involve the meaning
of words contained in statute or secondary legislation.”

Interpretation is of two kinds – grammatical and logical. Grammatical interpretation is arrived at

by reference to the laws of speech to the words used in the statute; in other words, it regards only
the verbal expression of the legislature. Logical interpretation gives effect to the intention of the
legislature by taking into account other circumstances permissible according to the rules settled
in this behalf. ‘Proper construction’ is not satisfied by taking the words as if they were self-
contained phrases. So considered, the words do not yield the meaning of a statute.2

According to Gray, grammatical interpretation is the application to a statute of the laws of

speech; logical interpretation calls for the comparison of the statute with other statutes and with
the whole system of law, and for the consideration of the time and circumstances in which the
1
Whitney v. Inland Rivenue Commissioners, 1926 AC 37.
2
Romero v International Terminal Operating Co 358 US 354, 3 L Ed 2d 368, 375.

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statute was passed. It is the duty of the judicature to ascertain the true legal meaning of the words
used by the legislature. A statute is the will of the legislature and the fundamental rule of
interpretation , to which all others are subordinate, and that a statute is to be expounded,
according to the intent of them that made it. 3 The object of interpretation is to find out the
intention of the legislature.

First, laws must be drafted in general terms and must deal with both present and future situations.
Often, a law which was drafted with one particular situation in mind will eventually be applied to
quite different situations. A classic example is the UK Criminal Justice Act, part of which was
originally designed to curb illegal warehouse parties but which was later used to crush
demonstrations, often involving people from very different backgrounds to those attending the
so-called raves.

Legislation is drawn up by draftsmen, and a draftsman’s capacity to anticipate the future is

limited. He may not foresee some future possibility, or overlook a possible misinterpretation of
the original intentions of the legislation. Another problem is legislation often tries to deal with
problems that involve different and conflicting interests.

Both legal and general English contain many words with more than one meaning. In fact, some
of the terms in TransLegal’s Legal English Dictionary have seven or more distinct definitions.
With this being the case, even the best drafted legislation can include many ambiguities. This is
not the fault of the draftsman, simply a reflection of the fact that where people look at a text from
different points of view they will naturally find different meanings in the language used.

Judges in England generally apply three basic rules of statutory interpretation, and similar rules
are also used in other common law jurisdictions. The literal rule, the golden rule and the mischief
rule. Although judges are not bound to apply these rules, they generally take one of the following
three approaches, and the approach taken by any one particular judge is often a reflection of that
judge’s own philosophy.

Our law has gradually developed a vast body of authority pertaining to statutory interpretation. 4
Some of the rules in this law are very ancient, others rather recent. Most of this authority is
3
Sussex Peerage 65 RR 11.
4
The leading modern texts on statutory interpretation arc SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CoNSTRUCTION (3rd cd., Horack, 1943).

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applicable to statutes in any field; some of it only to one field, such as criminal law or
constitutional law. Nearly all of it is entirely judge made, although a few rules of interpretation
appear in the general statutes of most states.5

Salmond defines “interpretation” as “a process by which the Court seeks the meaning of
Legislature through the medium of authoritative forms in which it expresses”. The purpose of
interpretation is always to find out what the statute stands for, what is the defect it intends to
remove and what is the remedy it seeks to advance. 6 Judges are not at liberty to add or take from
or modify the letter of the law, simply because they have reason to believe that the true sententia
legis is not completely or correctly expressed by the law. 7 The duty of the Court is to discover
and act upon the true intention of the legislature.

The Supreme Court in Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. M/s. Price Waterhouse 8,
while lamenting the scant attention paid by draftsman to the language of statutes, referred to the
British jingle “I am the Parliamentary draftsman. I compose the country’s laws. And of half of
the litigation, I am undoubtedly the cause”. Reference was also made to Kirby v. Leather 9, where
the Court observed that the provision of the (UK) Limitation Act, 1939 was so obscure “that the
draftsman must have been of unsound mind”. Construction of statutes and interpretation of laws
should obviously cover all areas affecting the rights of the citizens. The art of judicial
interpretation, according to Krishna Iyer, J., “Supreme Court, is imbued with creativity and
realism …. Legal Darwinism adapting the rule of law to new societal developments, so as to
survive and serve the social order, is necessary”10

5
KAN. G.S. 1949,77-201. Mo. REV. STAT. c. 1 (1949).
6
Seventilal Maneklal Seth v. Commr. Of Income Tax(Central) Bombay, (1968) 2 SCJ 129.
7
Moss v. Charnock, 1802) 2 East 399.
8
A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 90
9
(1965) 2 All ER 441
10
D.R.Venkatachalam v. Dy. Transport Officer,  AIR1977 SC 842 (847).

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 2. APPLICATION OF LITERAL RULE OF INTERPRETATION

The primary and important rule of interpretation is called the Literal Rule, laid down in the
Sussex Peerage Case11. This rule stated that:

"The only rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is, that they should be construed
according to the intent of the Parliament which passed the Act. If the words of the statute are in
themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those
words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do, in such case; best
declare the intention of the lawgiver. But if any doubt arises from the terms employed by the
Legislature, it has always been held a safe mean of collecting the intention to call in aid the
ground and cause of making the statute, and to have recourse to the preamble, which, according
to Chief Justice Dyer is "a key to open the minds of the makers of the Act, and the mischiefs
which they intend to redress".

The literal rule, in its purest form, has an inflexibility which places particular strain on the
draftsperson, requiring language which expressly covers all eventualities. This extreme
inflexibility can be seen in the words of Lord lisher MR in R. v. The Judge of the City of London
Court12 where he stated that

"if the words of an Act are clear you must follow them, even though they lead to manifest
absurdity. The Court has nothing to do with the question whether the Legislature has committed
an absurdity. This means that only the words of the statute count; if they are clear by themselves
then effect must be given to them. This rule also has its drawbacks; it disregards consequences
and the object of the statute may be considered only if there is doubt. It should be noted,
however, that the object of a statute and the circumstances that led to its enactment are always
relevant-not just in cases of doubt. When the words of a statute are clear, plain or unambiguous,
i.e. they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, the Courts are bounds to give effect to
that meaning irrespective of consequences.16 Statutory enactment must be construed according
to its plain meaning and no words shall be added, altered or modified unless it is plainly

11
Sussex Peerage Case [1844] 11 Clark and Finnelly 85, 8 ER 1034 at 1844
12
[1892] 1QB273 9CA.

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necessary to do so to prevent a provision from being unintelligible, absurd, unreasonable,
unworkable or totally irreconcilable with the test of the statute.

There are three fundamental rules suggested in the English Cases:

Firstly, the literal rule that, if the meaning of section is plain, it is to be applied whatever the
result. The Second is “golden rule” that the words should be given their ordinary sense unless
that would lead to some absurdity or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument; and the
“mischief rule” which emphasizes the general policy of the enactment and the evil at which it
was directed.”

For the application of literal rule a clear and unequivocal meaning is essential. In Jugal Kishore
Saraf v. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd. 13The Supreme Court held that the cardinal rule of construction of
statutes is to read the statutes literally, that is by giving to the words their ordinary, natural and
grammatical meaning. If, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are
susceptible of another meaning, the court may adopt the same. But when no such alternative
construction is possible, the court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal interpretation. In New
India Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bihar, 14 the Apex Court had held: “It is a
recognized rule of interpretation of statutes that expressions used therein should ordinary be
understood in a sense in which they best harmonies with the object of the statute and which
effectuate the object of the legislature. Therefore, when two constructions are feasible, the court
will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppress the mischief as the legislature
envisioned. The Court should adopt a project oriented approach
keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative
possibility permits.” In Newspapers Ltd. v. State Industrial Tribunal, 15 the Supreme Court said:
“in order to get true import of the statute, it is necessary to view the enactment in retrospect, the
reasons for enacting it, the evils it was to end and the object it was to sub-serve. The Act has
therefore to be viewed as a whole and its intention determined by construing all the construing
parts of the Act together and not by taking detached section as to take one word here and another
there.”

13
AIR 1955 SC 376
14
1963 SCR Supl. (2) 459
15
[1957] S.C.R. 754.

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Literal Rule or Plain Meaning Rule is acclaimed as the safest guide to legislative intent, as the
legislature is not to be supposed to use words in a statute, in vain. A Court of law is bound to
proceed upon the assumption that the legislature is an ideal person that does not make mistake. 16
The Courts are warned not to assume ambiguity where there is none. 17 Ambiguity can be inferred
if the word or phrase in a statute is capable of more than one meaning in that particular
context.18 A consequence that follows from the doctrine of literal constructions is that, effect
must be given, if possible, to every word, clause and sentence of a statute.19

The function of the Court is “not to scan the wisdom and policy, where the language of a statute
is clear, and it is the duty of the Court to give full effect to the same. 20 It is the duty of the Court
to interpret the language actually employed and to determine the intention of the legislature from
such language and where there is no ambiguity about the language actually employed, neither the
recommendation if the Law Commission, nor the aims and objects set out in the Statement of
Objects and Reasons can be brought in aid or can be allowed to influence the natural
grammatical meaning of the statute as enacted by the Parliament. 21 The length and detail of
modern legislation has undoubtedly reinforced the claim of literal construction as the safe rule. 22
It is always advisable to find out the intention from the plain meaning as conveyed by the words
as used in the Statute.

16
Thakur Madho Singh v. Lieut.Kames, R.R.Skinner, AIR 1942 Lahore 243
17
Mahadeolal Kanodia v.Administrator General W.B. AIR 1960 SC 936 (940)
18
Kirkness v. John Hudson & CO., (1955 2 All ER 345 (HL) 366.
19
State v. Bartlay, 39 Neb 353 (1894)
20
Commissioner of Sales Tax, UP., Lucknow v. M/s. Parsons Tools and plants, kanput, AIR 1975 SC 1039
21
Subhash Ganpat Roy Buty v. maroti, AIR 1975 Bom 244; Indian Chamber of Commerce v. CIT West
Bengal AIR 1976 SC 348
22
 Lord Evershed, M.R. – Foreword to Maxwell’s Interpretation of Statutes 11th Edition.

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 3. APPLICATION OF GOLDEN RULE OF INTERPRETATION

According to Gray,23 the process by which a judge (or indeed any person, lawyer or layman, who
has occasion  to search for the meaning of a statute) constructs from words of a statute book, a
meaning which he either believes to be that of the legislature, or which he proposes to attribute to
it, is called ‘interpretation’.

The primary object in interpreting a statute is always to discover the intention of the legislature
and in England the rules of interpretation, developed there , can be relied on to aid the discovery
because those whose task is to put the intention of the legislature into language, fashion their
language with those very rules in view. Since framers of statutes couch the enactments in
accordance with the same rules as the judicial interpreter applies, application of those rules in the
analysis of a statute naturally brings up the intended meaning to the surface. It is at least doubtful
whether in a case of framers of Indian statutes of the present times, specially of the provincial
legislature, the same assumption can always be made.24

The primary and foremost task of a court in interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of
the legislature, actual or imputed. The words of the statute are to be construed so as to ascertain
the mind of the legislature from the natural and grammatical meaning of the words which it has
used. ‘The essence of the Law’, according to Salmond, Lies in its spirit, nor in its letter, for the
letter is significant only as being the external manifestation of the intention that underlies it.
Nevertheless in all ordinary cases the courts must be content to accept the litera legis as the
exclusive and conclusive evidence of the sententia legis. They must, in general, take it absolutely
for granted that the legislature has said what it meant, and meant what it has said. Ita
scriptumest is the first principal of interpretation. Judges are not at liberty to add to or take from
or modify the letter of the law simply because they have reason to believe that the true sententia
legis is not completely or correctly expressed by it. It is to say, in all ordinary case grammatical
interpretation is the sole form allowable.

23
Gray, Nature and Sources of the Law, second edn, pp 176-78.
24
Badsha Mia v Rajjab Ali, AIR 1946 Cal 348, p 353.

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Parke B in Becke v Smith25 formulated the following well-known rule for the interpretation of
statutes:

If the precise words used are plain and unambiguous, in our judgment, we are bound to construe
them in their ordinary sense, even though it does lead, in our view of the case, to an absurdity or
manifest injustice. Words may be modified or varied where their import is doubtful or obscure,
but we assume the function of legislators when we depart from, the ordinary meaning of the
precise words used merely because we see, or fancy we see, an absurdity or manifest injustice
from an adherence to their literal meaning.

Burton J in Warburton v Loveland,26 observed:

I apprehend it is a rule in the construction of statutes, that, in the first instance, the grammatical
sense of the words is to be adhered to. If that is contrary to, or inconsistent with any expressed
intention, or declared purpose of the statute, or if it would involve any absurdity, repugnance, or
inconsistency, the grammatical sense must then be modified, extended, or abridged so far as to
avoid such inconvenience, but no further.

LORD WENSLEYDALE’S GOLDEN RULE

Lord Wensleydale called it the ‘golden rule’ and adopted it in Grey v Pearson27 and thereafter it
is usually known as Lord Wensleydale’s Golden Rule. This is another version of the golden rule.
His Lordship expressed himself thus:

I have been long and deeply impressed with the wisdom of the rule, now I believe universally
adopted at least in the courts of law in Westminster Hall that in construing wills, and indeed
statutes and all written instruments, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be
adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity or some repugnance or inconsistency with
the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be
modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no further.

It is a very useful rule in the construction of a statute to adhere to the ordinary meaning of the
words used, and to the grammatical construction, unless that is at variance with the intention of
25
(1836) 2 M&W 191.
26
(1929) 1 H&B IR 623, p 648.
27
(1857) 6 HL 61.

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the legislature to be collected from the statute itself, or leads to any manifest absurdity or
repugnance, in which case the language may be varied or modified so as to avoid such
inconvenience, but no further.

Jervis CJ, also described it as the ‘golden rule’ in Matteson v Hart28

We must, therefore, in this case have recourse to what is called the golden rule of construction,
as applied to Acts of parliament, viz to give to the words used by the Legislature their plain and
natural meaning, unless it is manifest, from the general scope and intention of the statute,
injustice and absurdity would result from so construing them.

Thus, if the meaning of the words is at variance with the intention of the legislature to be
collected from the statute itself and leads to some absurdity or repugnance, then the language
may be varied or modified so as to avoid such inconvenience, absurdity or repugnance and no
further. The modern positive approach is to have a purposeful construction, which is to effectuate
the object and purpose of the Act. In other words ambiguity, inconsistency, incompleteness in
literal interpretation leads modification of language so as to avoid such inconvenience. When in
construing a word literally, there exist variance with the intention of the legislature to be
gathered from the subject or context of the statute, the language may be varied or modified in
such a case, but no further. Ambiguity here means double meaning, a word’s expression capable
of more than one meaning. A word is inconsistent when it is incompatible with other words or
gives separate meaning when read with other parts of the statute. The word ‘absurdity’ also
means ‘repugnance’: Repugnancy appears when there is a direct conflict or inconsistencies like
one provision says, “do” and other says, “don’t.” A situation may be reached where it is
impossible to obey the one without disobeying the other. 29 In all such cases, the statute becomes
equivocal i.e., double meaning or questionable, suspicious or uncertain in nature. Whenever the
meaning of the word, phrase, expression or sentence is uncertain, it may be a case of departing
from the plain grammatical meaning, and there may be need for application of golden rule. It is
however reiterated in every concerned case, that the province of the judge is very different one of
construing the language in which the legislature has finally expressed. If they undertake the other
province, which belongs to the legislature who, have to endeavor to interpret the desire of the

28
(1854) 23 LJCP 108.
29
T.S. Baliah v. T.S. Regachari, AIR 1969 SC 701.

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country, the courts are in danger of going astray in a labyrinth to the character of which they
have no sufficient guide. And in this order again, the only safe course is to read the language of
the statute in what seems to be its natural sense. When we say that the ordinary and grammatical
sense of the words must be adhered to in the first instance, it means that most words have
primary meaning in which they are generally used, and such a meaning should be applied first.
Words have a secondary meaning

If the choice is between two interpretations, said Viscount Simon, L.C. in Nokes v. Doncaster
Amalgamated Collieries Ltd.30 “We should avoid a construction which would reduce the
legislation to futility or the narrower one which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the
legislation. We should rather accept the bolder construction based on the view that Parliament
would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result. Thus, if the language is
capable of more than one interpretation, one ought to discard the literal or natural meaning if it
leads to an unreasonable result, and adopt that interpretation which leads to reasonably practical
results.”

In R. v. Sweden Lord Parker 31 construed section 1(1) of the poor Prisoners’ Defense Act, 1930:
“Any person committed for trial for an indictable offence shall be entitled to free legal aid in the
preparation and conduct of his defense at the trial and to have solicitor and counsel assigned to
him for that purpose.” The Court of Criminal appeal held that this section gave the right to an
accused person once the certificate is granted to have a solicitor assigned for the purposes
mentioned, but not a right that that solicitor or another should defend him at the trial. The court
observed: “if the section properly construed, gave an accused person a right to have a solicitor at
the trial, it would mean that he could repeatedly refuse to have the solicitor assigned when he got
advice which he did not like and go to others, and there would be no means whatever to prevent
that, with the result that there might be added expense to the country, delays and abuse of the
whole procedure.” Such an unreasonable intention of Parliament cannot be imputed. In Nyadar
Singh v. Union of India,32 a restricted construction was given to rule 11 (VI) of the Central
Services (Classification, Appeal and Control) Rules, 1965. This Rule empowers imposition of
“penalty of reduction to a lower time-scale pay, grade post or service.” The Supreme Court held

30
(1940) AC 1014.
31
(1964) 1 WLR 1454.
32
AIR 1988 SC 1979.

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that a person initially appointed to a higher post and grade of pay scale cannot be reduced to a
lower grade or post. A wider construction if given to the provision, it may affect the recruitment
policy itself for a person directly recruited to a higher post may not have the requisite
qualification for the lower post.

In Inland Revenue Commissioner v. J.B. Hodge & Co. (Glasgow) Ltd.,33 held; “Where
possible, a construction should be adopted which will facilitate the smooth working of the
scheme of legislation established by the Act, which will avoid producing or prolonging
artificiality in the law and which will not produce anomalous results. Where two possible
constructions present, the more reasonable one is to be chosen. In Gill v. Donald Humberstone &
Co. Ltd., (1963) 1 WLR 929 per Lord Reid: ‘Beneficial laws are addressed to practical people,
and ought to be construed in the light of practical consideration, rather than a meticulous
comparison of the language of their various provisions. If the language is capable of more than
one interpretation, we ought to discard the more natural meaning if it leads to an unreasonable
result, and adopt that interpretation which leads to a reasonably practical result.” 

INDIAN CASES

In India there are several good examples where the Supreme Court or High Courts have applied
the Golden Construction of Statutes. Certain confusion one may face when it appears that even
for literal rule, this rule is named. As golden rule initially starts with the search of literal meaning
of the provision, and if there is unequivocal meaning, plain and natural and no repugnancy,
uncertainty of absurdity appears, apply the meaning. But when there is possibility of more than
one meaning, we have to go further to avoid the inconvenience by even modifying the language
by addition, rejection or substitution of words so as to make meaning accurate expounding of
intention of the legislature.

In Uttar Pradesh Bhoodan Yagna Samiti v. Brij Kishore 34, the Supreme Court held that the
expression “landless person” used in section 14 of U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1953 which made
provision for grant of land to landless persons, was limited to “landless laborers”. A landless
labour is he who is engaged in agriculture but having no agricultural land. The Court further said
that “any landless person” did not include a landless businessman residing in a city. The object
33
(1961) 1 WLR 92.
34
AIR 1981 SC 1656.

14
of the Act was to implement the Bhoodan movement, which aimed at distribution of land to
landless labourers who were verged in agriculture. A businessman, though landless cannot claim
the benefit of the Act.

In Lee v. Knapp,35 section 77(1) of the Road Traffic Act, 1960 provided that “a driver causing
accident shall stop after the accident”, the interpretation of the word “stop” was in question. In
this case, the driver of the motor vehicle stopped for a moment after causing an accident and then
ran away. Applying the golden rule the court held that the driver had not fulfilled the
requirement of the section, as he had not stopped for a reasonable period so as to enable
interested persons to make necessary inquires from him about the accident at the spot of accident

In Ramji Missar v. State of Bihar36 in construing section 6 of the Probation of

Offenders Act, 1958, the Supreme Court laid down that the crucial date on which the age of the
offender had to be determined is not the date of offence, but the date on which the sentence is
pronounced by the trial court An accused who on the date of offence was below 21 years of age
but on the date on which the judgment pronounced, if he was above 21 years, he is not entitled to
the benefit of the statute. This conclusion reached having regard to the object of the Act. The
object of the Statute is to prevent the turning of the youthful offenders into criminals by their
association with the hardened criminals of mature age within the walls of the prison. An accused
below 21 years is entitled to the benefit of the Act by sending him under the supervision of the
probation officer instead of jail.

In Annapurna Biscuit Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U P. 37 Sales Tax

was fixed at two per cent, of the turnover in the case of “cooked food” under section 3A of the
U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948. The appellant firm engaged in the business of biscuit manufacture and
sale. Whether biscuits though intended for human consumption, can be construed as “cooked
food” and liable to be taxed as per the notification issued under the said provision. Held that if an
expression is capable of a wider meaning, the question whether the wider or narrower meaning
should be accepted depends on the context of the statute. Here biscuit was not covered within the
words ‘cooked food’. However, where the precise words used are plain and unambiguous the

35
(1966) 3 AH ER 961.
36
AIR 1963 SC 1088: (1963) Supp 2 SCR 745
37
AIR 1981 SC 1656

15
court is bound to construe them in their ordinary sense and not to limit plain words in an Act of
Parliament by consideration of policy which has to decided not by court but by Parliament itself.

In Tirath Singh v. Bachitter Singh38 the appellant argued that it was obligatory under Section
99 (1) (a) of the Representation of the Peoples Act, 1951 for the tribunal to record names of all
persons who had been guilty of corrupt practices including parties and non-parties to the petition
and that under the proviso, notice should be given to all persons named under Section 99(1)(a)(ii)
He being a party to the petition was, therefore, entitled to a fresh notice. Supreme Court said that
such an interpretation will lead to an absurdity and held that the proviso along with clause (b)
thereto and the setting of the section pointed out that notice is contemplated only against non-
parties to the petition.

38
AIR 1955 SC 850

16
4. APPLICATION OF MISCHIEF RULE OF INTERPRETATION

This is a very important rule as far as the Interpretation of Statute is concerned. It is often
referred to as the “rule in Heydon’s Case”.39  This very important case reported by Lord Coke
and decided by the Barons of the Exchequer in the 16th century laid down the following rules:

That for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general, be they penal or beneficial,
restrictive or enlarging of the common law; four things are to be considered –

1)      What was the common law before the passing of the Act?

2)      What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide?

3)      What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the “disease of the
Commonwealth”.

4)      The true reasons for the remedy.

And then the office of all the Judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the
mischief and advance the remedy. Before proceeding any further, a word of warning is
appropriate. Uses the exact words – “disease of the Commonwealth” – used byLord Coke in his
report and it is important to bear in mind that words had different meanings. It is necessary to
discover their meaning at the time of writing. From the 14th century to the end of the 17th, the
meaning of disease was lack of ease, disquiet or distress and Commonwealth, of course, meant
the Country. According to an early case, The Longford40 an Act must be construed as if one were
interpreting it on the day it was passed. Thus, we ask ourselves what the word meant on the day
it was uttered, if by analogy we argue that the same can be said of a judgment. The importance of
the mischief rule in the criminal law can best be shown byconsidering examples. An Act of
Parliament will state the purpose for which it was enacted. Ifwe take the case of Parkin
v. Norman41, it can be seen that the court decided that the Public Order Act 1936 was never
designed to deal with homosexual behaviour in public toilets. The long title to the Act reads:

39
[1854] EWHC Exch J36
40
(1889) 14 P.D. 34.
41
[1982] 2 All E.R. 583,.

17
“An Act to prohibit the wearing of uniforms in connexion with political objects and the
maintenance by private persons of associations of military or similar characters; and to make
further provision for the preservation of public order on the occasion of public processions and
meetings and in public places.”

Literature Survey: A lot of work has been done on this particular topic which belongs to
Interpretation of Statute because of the peculiar nature of its operation as it is considered to
discover Parliament’s intention and to give the judge more discretion than any other rule as it
allows him to effectively decide on Parliament’s intent. But at the same time It can be argued
that this undermines Parliament’s supremacy and is undemocratic as it takes law-making
decisions away from the legislature. There’s Judicial Overreach, So this controversy has been
considered in favour by many authors in their books of which some are like “Interpretation of
Statutes” by Kafaltiya, B.M. Gandhi, Maxwell and “Principles of Statutory Interpretation” by
G.P. Singh and many more in this regard and therefore Purposive interpretation was introduced
as a form of replacement for the mischief rule, the plain meaning rule and the golden rule to
determine cases. Purposive interpretation is exercised when the courts utilize extraneous
materials from the pre-enactment phase of legislation, including early drafts, hansards,
committee reports, white papers, etc. The purposive interpretation involves a rejection of
the exclusionary rule.

Case Laws

Smith v. Hughes42 

The brief facts were that the defendant was a common prostitute who lived at No. 39 Curzon
Street, London, and used the premises for the purposes of prostitution. On November 4, 1959,
between 8.50 p.m. and 9.05 p.m. the defendant solicited men passing in the street, for the
purposes of prostitution, from a first-floor balcony of No. 39 Curzon Street (the balcony being
some 8–10 feet above street level). The defendant’s method of soliciting the men was

(i)                 to attract their attention to her by tapping on the balcony railing with some metal
object and by hissing at them as they passed in the street beneath her and
42
[1960] 1 WLR 830

18
(ii)               having so attracted their attention, to talk with them and invite them to come inside
the premises with such words as ‘Would you like to come up here a little while?’ at the same
time as she indicated the correct door of the premises.

It was contended on behalf of the defendant, inter alia, that the balcony was not ‘in a Street’
within the meaning of section 1(1) of the Street Offences Act, 1959, and that accordingly no
offence had been committed. “The sole question here is whether in those circumstances the
appellant was soliciting in a street or public place. The words of s. 1(1) of the Act are in this
form: ‘It shall be an offence for a common prostitute to loiter or solicit in a street or public place
for the purpose of prostitution’.

Lord Parker CJ said Case that she ‘being a common prostitute, did solicit in a street for the
purpose of prostitution, contrary to section 1(1) of the Street Offences Act, 1959.’ It was found
that the defendant was a common prostitute, that she had solicited and that the solicitation was in
a street. The defendants in this case were not themselves physically in the street but were in a
house adjoining the street, on a balcony and she attracted the attention of men in the street by
tapping and calling down to them. At other part the defendants were in ground-floor windows,
either closed or half open. The sole question here is whether in those circumstances each
defendant was soliciting in a street or public place. The words of section 1(1) of the Act of 1959
are in this form: ‘It shall be an offence for a common prostitute to loiter or solicit in a street or
public place for the purpose of prostitution.’ Observe that it does not say there specifically that
the person who is doing the soliciting must be in the street. Equally, it does not say that it is
enough if the person who receives the solicitation or to whom it is addressed is in the street. For

my part, I approach the matter by considering what is the mischief aimed at by this Act.
Everybody knows that this was an Act intended to clean up the streets, to enable people to walk
along the streets without being molested or solicited by common prostitutes. Viewed in that way,
it can matter little whether the prostitute is soliciting while in the street or is standing in a
doorway or on a balcony, or at a window, or whether the window is shut or open or half open; in
each case her solicitation is projected to and addressed to somebody walking in the street. For
my part, I am content to base my decision on that ground and that ground alone.

19
Royal College of Nursing v DHSS43 

The Royal College of Nursing brought an action challenging the legality of the involvement of
nurses in carrying out abortions. The Offences against the Person Act 1861 makes it an offence
for any person to carry out an abortion. The Abortion Act 1967 provided that it would be an
absolute defence for a medically registered practitioner (i.e. a doctor) to carry out abortions
provided certain conditions were satisfied. Advances in medical science meant surgical abortions
were largely replaced with hormonal abortions and it was common for these to be administered
by nurses it was Held: It was legal for nurses to carry out such abortions. The Act was aimed at
doing away with back street abortions where no medical care was available. The actions of the
nurses were therefore outside the mischief of the Act of 1861 and within the contemplate defence
in the 1967 Act.

Elliot v Grey44

The defendant’s car was parked on the road. It was jacked up and had its battery removed. He
was charged with an offence under the Road Traffic Act 1930 of using an uninsured vehicle on
the road. The defendant argued he was not ‘using’ the car on the road as clearly it was not
driveable. It was held: The court applied the mischief rule and held that the car was being used
on the road as it represented a hazard and therefore insurance would be required in the event of
an incident. The statute was aimed at ensuring people were compensated when injured due to the
hazards created by others.

Corkery v Carpenter45 

The defendant was riding his bicycle whilst under the influence of alcohol. S.12 of the Licensing
Act 1872 made it an offence to be drunk in charge of a ‘carriage’ on the highway. It was held:
The court applied the mischief rule holding that a riding a bicycle was within the mischief of the
Act as the defendant represented a danger to himself and other road users.  According to S.12 of
the Licensing Act 1872, a person found drunk in charge of a carriage on the highway can be
arrested without a warrant. A man was arrested drunk in charge of a bicycle. According to the
plain meaning rule a bike is not a carriage. Under the Mischief rule the bicycle could constitute a
43
[1981] 2 WLR 279
44
[1960] 1 QB 367
45
[1951] 1 KB 102

20
carriage. The mischief the act was attempting to remedy was that of people being on the road on
transport while drunk. Therefore a bicycle could be classified as a carriage.

Sodra Devi v. Commr. Of Income Tax46

By s 16(3) of the Indian Income Tax Act 1922, ‘In computing the total income of any individual
for the purpose of assessment, there shall be included so much of the income of a wife or minor
child of such individual as arises indirectly or directly’ In CIT v Sodra Devi the court observed
that the legislature was guilty of using an ambiguous term. There is no knowing with certainly as
to whether the legislature meant to enact these provisions with reference only to a male of the
species using the words ‘any individual’ or ‘such individual’ in the narrower sense of the term
indicated above or intended to include within the connotation of the words ‘any individual’ or
‘such individual’ also a female of the species. Holding the words ‘any individual’ and ‘such
individual’ as restricted in their connotation to mean only the male of the species, the court
observed that the evil which was sought to be remedied was the only resulting from the
widespread practice of husbands entering into nominal partnerships with their wives, and fathers
admitting their minor children to the benefits of the partnerships of which they were members.
This evil was sought to be remedied by the Income-tax Act. The only intention of the legislature
in doing so was to include the income derived by the wife or a minor child, in the computation of
the total income of the male assessee, the husband or the father as the case may be for the
purpose of the assessment.

RMDC v. UOI47

In RMDC v Union of India the definition of ‘prize competition’ under s 2(d) of the Prize
competition act 1955, was held to be inclusive of only those instances in which no substantive
skill is involved. Thus, those prize competitions in which some skill was required were exempt
from the definition of ‘prize competition’ under s 2(d) of the Act. Hence, in the aforementioned
case, the Supreme Court has applied the Heydon’s Rule in order to suppress the mischief was
intended to be remedied, as against the literal rule which could have covered prize competitions
where no substantial degree of skill was required for success.

46
1957 AIR 832, 1958 SCR 1
47
AIR 1957 SC 628

21
Bengal immunity co. v State of Bihar48

Within the context of law, the mischief rule is a rule of statutory interpretation that attempts to
determine the legislator’s intention. Originating from a 16th century case in the United Kingdom,
its main aim is to determine the “mischief and defect” that the statute in question has set out to
remedy, and what ruling would effectively implement this remedy. When material words are
capable of bearing two or more constructions the most firmly established rule for construction of
such words “of all statutes in general” is the rule laid down in Heydons case also known as
mischief rule. This rule is also known as purposive construction. The rules lay down that the
court should adopt the construction which shall suppress the mischief and advance the
remedy. In Indian context the rule was best explained in the case of Bengal immunity co. v State
of Bihar.The appellant company is an incorporated company carrying on the business of
manufacturing and selling various sera, vaccines, biological products and medicines. Its
registered head office is at Calcutta and its laboratory and factory are at Baranagar in the district
of 24 – Perganas in West Bengal. It is registered as a dealer under the Bengal Finance (Sales
Tax) Act and its registered number is S.L. 683A. Its products have extensive sales throughout the
Union of India and abroad. The goods are dispatched from Calcutta by rail, steamer or air against
orders accepted by the appellant company in Calcutta. The appellant company has neither any
agent or manager in Bihar nor any office, godown or laboratory in that State. On the 24th
October, 1951 the Assistant Superintendent of Commercial Taxes, Bihar wrote a letter to the
appellant company which concluded as follows :-

“Necessary action may therefore be taken to get your firm registered under the Bihar Sales Tax
Act. Steps may kindly be taken to deposit Bihar Sales Tax dues in any Bihar Treasury at an early
date under intimation to this Department”.

The principal question is whether the tax threatened to be levied on the sales made by the
appellant company and implemented by delivery in the circumstances and manner mentioned in
its petition is leviable by the State of Bihar. This was done by construing article 286 whose
interpretation came into question and the meaning granted to it in the case of The State of
Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd was overruled. It raises a question of construction of
article 286 of the Constitution. It was decided that Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 in so far as it
48
AIR 1955 SC 661.

22
purports to tax sales or purchases that take place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce,
is unconstitutional, illegal and void. The Act imposes tax on subjects divisible in their nature but
does not exclude in express terms subjects exempted by the Constitution. In such a situation the
Act need not be declared wholly ultra vires and void. Until Parliament by law provides
otherwise, the State of Bihar do forbear and abstain from imposing sales tax on out-of-State
dealers in respect of sales or purchases that have taken place in the course of inter-State trade or
commerce even though the goods have been delivered as a direct result of such sales or
purchases for consumption in Bihar. The State must pay the costs of the appellant in this Court
and in the court below. Bhagwati, J. had agreed to the above interpretation.

5. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS

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We may conclude by referring to an article written by John Willis way back in 1938 in the
Canadian Bar Review. According to Willis if you are trying to guess what meaning a court will
attach to a section in a statute which has not yet been passed on by a court, you should be careful
how you use Craies' Statute haw and Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes. Willis maintains
that as armories of arguments for counsel they can be very useful, but you must know how to
choose your weapon. In at least three respects these legal classics are very defective. Both books
assume one great sun of a principle, "the plain meaning rule", around which revolve in planetary
order a series of minor rules of construction. Both assume that what courts do is unswervingly
determined by that one principle. That is not so. These books base their rules not on decisions,
not on what the courts did in cases before them, but on dicta, the remarks let fall by a
heterogeneous collection of judges in an unrelated series of situations. This is unsound. Both
books treat the "principles" and dicta with which they deal as if, having once been enunciated by
a court, they remained equally valid at all times and in all places. Once again they are merely
misleading. If you are trying to guess what meaning your court will attach to a section in a
statute which has already been passed on by the courts, when it comes to apply it to the facts of
your case, you should beware of putting too implicit a trust in previously decided cases.
According to Willis one should not be misled in reading of cases by pious judicial references to
"the intent of the Legislature". The expression does not refer to actual intent - a composite body
can hardly have a single intent: it is at most only a harmless, if bombastic, way of referring to the
social policy behind the Act. According to Willis "Every school boy knows" that our law
recognizes three main approaches to all statutes: their usual names are (1) the "literal (plain
meaning) rule"; (2) the "golden rule"; (3) the "mischief (Heydon's Case) rule" and any one of
these three approaches may legitimately be adopted by the court in the interpretation of any
statute which it does in fact adopt, and the manner of its application, will, if the case in question
is a close one, be decisive of the result. Ultimately according to Willis a court invokes whichever
of the rules produces a result that satisfies its sense of justice in the case before it. According to
him the basic rule of statutory interpretadon is that it is taken to be the legislator's intention that
the enactment shall be construed in accordance with the guides laid down by law and that where
in a particular case these do not yield a plain answer but point in different direcdons the problem
shall be resolved by a balancing exercise, that is by weighing and balancing the factors they
produce. But Francis Bennion does not agree. Bennion maintains that for at least the past half

24
century the teaching of this subject has been bedeviled by the false notion that statutory
interpretation is governed by a mere three 'rules' and that the court selects which 'rule' it prefers
and then applies it in order to reach a result. The error according to him perhaps originated in an
article published in 1938 by Willis. After warning his readers that it is a mistake to suppose that
there is only one rule of statutory interpretation because 'there are three-the literal, golden and
mischief rules', Willis went on to say that a court invokes 'whichever of the rules produces a
result which satisfies its sense of justice in the case before it'. Academics are still producing
textbooks which suggest that the matter is dealt with by these three simple 'rules'. However, as
demonstrated at length in his 1984 textbook Statutory Interpretation, the truth is far more
complex. Willis, and those who have followed him, are wrong according to Bennion in two
ways. First, there are not just three guides to interpretation but a considerable number. Second,
the court does not 'select' one of the guides and then apply it to the exclusion of the others. The
court takes (or should take) an overall view, weighs all the relevant factors, and arrives at a
balanced conclusion. What is here called the basic rule of statutory interpretation sets out this
truth. It is a rule because it is the duty of the interpreter to apply it in every case.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Websites

 http://www.itatonline.org/articles_new/index.php/interpretation-of-statutes-a-treatise/

25
  www.manupatra.com/roundup/338/Articles/Literally%20interpreting%20the%20Law.pdf

Articles

 DEEPAK JAIN, Interpretation of Statutes: A Treatise, ITAT

 Alekhya Reddy, LITERALLY INTERPRETING THE LAW- A APPRAISAL OF THE
LITERAL RULE OF INTERPRETATION IN INDIA, Manupatra.

Books

 FITZGERALD, GRAY NATURE AND SOURCES OF LAW, (2nd edn.).

 Justice G.P SINGH, PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (11th ed
Wadhwa Nagpur 2008).
 AIYER,P.RAMNATHAN, LAW LEXICON (2nd ed.,Wadhwa and Co., ,2002).
 N.S BINDRA, INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 4 (9th edn Lexis Nexis
Butterworths, 2002).
 FITZGERALD, GRAY NATURE AND SOURCES OF LAW, 176(2nd edn.).
 SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CoNSTRUCTION (3rd cd., Horack,
1943).
 Lord Evershed, M.R. – Foreword to Maxwell’s Interpretation of Statutes 11th Edition.
 Gray, Nature and Sources of the Law, second edn

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