Co v.

HRET

EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 92191-92. July 30, 1991.]

ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner, vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and JOSE
ONG, JR., respondents.

[G.R. Nos. 92202-03. July 30, 1991.]

SIXTO T. BALANQUIT, JR., petitioner, vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
and JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.

Hechanova & Associates for petitioner Co.

Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro and Arcilla Law Offices for respondent Ong, Jr.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND

HOUSE OF SENATE; SOLE JUDGES OF ALL CONTESTS RELATING TO ELECTION, RETURNS AND
QUALIFICATIONS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE MEMBERS. — The Constitution explicitly provides that the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole
judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members
(See Article VI, Section 17, Constitution). The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear
and complete. The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals.
The Supreme Court in the case of Lazatin vs. HRET (168 SCRA 391 [1988]) stated that under the 1987
Constitution, the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal is original and exclusive. And that, " . . . so long as
the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to election,
returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the
HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court . . . the power
granted to the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete and excludes the exercise of any authority on
the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same."

2. ID.; ID.; JUDGMENTS THEREOF AS A RULE BEYOND JUDICIAL INTERFERENCE; EXCEPTION;

ARBITRARY AND IMPROVIDENT USE OF POWER RESULTING TO DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS. — In the case
of Robles vs. HRET (181 SCRA 780 [1980]) the Supreme Court stated that the judgments of the Tribunal
are beyond judicial interference save only "in the exercise of this Court's so-called extraordinary
jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the Tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered without or
in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear
showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due
process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated ERROR, manifestly constituting such
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION that there has to be a remedy for such abuse." In the leading case of
Morrero vs. Bocar (66 Phil. 429 [1938]) the Court ruled that the power of the Electoral Commission "is
beyond judicial interference except, in any event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and
improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of due process." The Court does not venture into
the perilous area of trying to correct perceived errors of independent branches of the Government. It
comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave
or glaring that no less than the Constitution calls for remedial action.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLIED IN CASE AT BAR. — In the absence of a showing that the HRET has
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court
to exercise its corrective power; it will not decide a matter which by its nature is for the HRET alone to
decide (See Marcos vs. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 [1989]). It has no power to look into what it thinks is
apparent error. As constitutional creations invested with necessary power, the Electoral Tribunals,
although not powers in the tripartite scheme of the government, are, in the exercise of their functions
independent organs — independent of Congress and the Supreme Court. The power granted to HRET by
the Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the
legislature (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 [1936]). In passing upon petitions, the Court
with its traditional and careful regard for the balance of powers, must permit this exclusive privilege of
the Tribunals to remain where the Sovereign authority has placed it (See Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers
of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919]).

4. ID.; SUPREME COURT; EXPANDED JURISDICTION UNDER 1987 CONSTITUTION. — The Supreme
Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been given an expanded jurisdiction, so to speak, to review the
decisions of the other branches and agencies of the government to determine whether or not they have
acted within bounds of the Constitution (See Article VIII, Section 1, Constitution). Yet, in the exercise
thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or not the government branch or agency has gone beyond
the Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view.

5. ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS; HOW CONSTRUED; SPIRIT AND INTENDMENT MUST

PREVAIL. — In construing the law, the Courts are not always to be hedged in by the literal meaning of its
language. The spirit and intendment thereof, must prevail over the letter, especially where adherence to
the latter would result in absurdity and injustice (Casela vs. Court of Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 [1970]). A
Constitutional provision should be construed so as to give it effective operation and suppress the
mischief at which it is aimed, hence, it is the spirit of the provision which should prevail over the letter
thereof (Jarrolt vs. Mabberly, 103 U.S. 580). In the words of the Court in the case of J.M. Tuazon vs. LTA
(31 SCRA 413 [1970]); "To that primordial intent, all else is subordinated. Our Constitution, any
constitution is not to be construed narrowly or pedantically, for the prescriptions therein contained, to
paraphrase Justice Holmes, are not mathematical formulas having their essence in their form but are
organic living institutions, the significance of which is vital not formal . . . ."

6. ID.; CITIZENSHIP; SECTION 1, PARAGRAPH 3 OF ARTICLE IV OF 1987 CONSTITUTION;

CONSTRUED. — Article IV of the Constitution provides: "Section 1. The following are citizens of the
Philippines: . . . (3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and . . . Section 2. Natural-born Citizens are those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be
deemed natural-born citizens." The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only
to those who elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born
of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date. The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to
correct an unfair position which discriminates against Filipino women. To make the provision
prospective from February 3, 1987 is to give a narrow interpretation resulting in an inequitable situation.
It must also be retroactive. The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation
where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a
natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect
Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-
born. Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers
with an alien father were placed in equal footing. They were both considered as natural-born citizens.
Hence, the bestowment of the status of "natural-born" cannot be made to depend on the fleeting
accident of time or result in two kinds of citizens made up of essentially the same similarly situated
members. It is for this reason that the amendments were enacted, that is, in order to remedy this
accidental anomaly, and, therefore, treat equally all those born before the 1973 Constitution and who
elected Philippine citizenship either before or after the effectivity of that Constitution.

7. ID.; ID.; SECTION 2 OF ARTICLE IV OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION; ELECTION OF CITIZENSHIP;

APPLIES ONLY TO THOSE BORN OF FILIPINO MOTHER AND ALIEN FATHER BUT NOT TO ONE WHOSE
FATHER HAS BEEN NATURALIZED WHEN MINOR WAS ONLY NINE (9) YEARS OF AGE. — There is no
dispute that respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage. Crucial to this
case is the issue of whether or not the respondent elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen. Election
becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born status to
children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age
of majority. To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of
age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only
was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only
nine (9) years old. He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the
Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing
citizenship in spite of his already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election through a sworn
statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen
since he was nine years old.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE OF IN RE: FLORENCIO MALLARE (59 SCRA 45 [1974]) APPLIES IN CASE AT
BAR. — In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise of
the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the Court, we held: "Esteban's exercise of the right
of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship." The
private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in
the Philippines. For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be expected to have
elected citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule. The filing of a sworn
statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to elect citizenship. For those
already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be
less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a
qualification, voting during election time, running for public office, and other categorical acts of similar
nature are themselves formal manifestations of choice for these persons.

9. ID.; ID.; AN ATTACK THERETO MAY ONLY BE DONE THROUGH A DIRECT ACTION. — The
petitioners argue that the respondent's father was not, validly, a naturalized citizen because of his
premature taking of the oath of citizenship. The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of
stripping Mr. Ong's father of his citizenship after his death and at this very late date just so we can go
after the son. The petitioners question the citizenship of the father through a collateral approach. This
can not be done. In our jurisprudence, an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a
direct action for its nullity (See Queto vs. Catolico, 31 SCRA 52 [1970]).

10. ID.; ID.; TO DECLARE THE GRANT THEREOF AS NULL AND VOID VIOLATIVE OF THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE WHERE PERSON INVOLVED HAS BEEN LAID TO REST. — To ask the Court to declare that grant of
Philippine citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan as null and void would run against the principle of due process.
Jose Ong Chuan has already been laid to rest. How can he be given a fair opportunity to defend himself.
A dead man cannot speak. To quote the words of the HRET: "Ong Chuan's lips have long been muted to
perpetuity by his demise and obviously he could not rise beyond where his mortal remains now lie to
defend himself were this matter to be made a central issue in this case."

11. ID.; ID.; ARTICLE 17 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF SPAIN SUB-PARAGRAPH 4 THEREOF IN RELATION TO
SECTION 4 OF THE PHILIPPINE BILL OF 1902, APPLIED IN CASE AT BAR. — Article 17 of the Civil Code of
Spain enumerates those who were considered Spanish Subjects, viz: "ARTICLE 17. The following are
Spaniards: . . . (4). Those without such papers, who may have acquired domicile in any town in the
Monarchy." The domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence. This domicile, once
established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established (Article
50, NCC; Article 40, Civil Code of Spain; Zuellig vs. Republic, 83 Phil. 768 [1949]). Ong Te became a
permanent resident of Laoang, Samar around 1895. Correspondingly, a certificate of residence was then
issued to him by virtue of his being a resident of Laoang, Samar. The domicile that Ong Te established in
1895 continued until April 11, 1899; it even went beyond the turn of the 19th century. It is also in this
place where Ong Te set up his business and acquired his real property. Ong Te falls within the meaning
of sub-paragraph 4 of Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain. Although Ong Te made brief visits to China,
he, nevertheless, always returned to the Philippines. The fact that he died in China, during one of his
visits in said country, was of no moment. This will not change the fact that he already had his domicile
fixed in the Philippines and pursuant to the Civil Code of Spain, he had become a Spanish subject. If Ong
Te became a Spanish subject by virtue of having established his domicile in a town under the Monarchy
of Spain, necessarily, Ong Te was also an inhabitant of the Philippines for an inhabitant has been defined
as one who has actual fixed residence in a place; one who has a domicile in a place (Bouvier's Law
Dictionary, Vol. II). A priori, there can be no other logical conclusion but to educe that Ong Te qualified
as a Filipino citizen under the provisions of Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
12. ID.; ID.; "RESIDENCE"; MEANING THEREOF UNDER THE CONSTITUTION. — Under the
Constitution, the term "residence" has been understood as synonymous with domicile not only under
the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The term "domicile" denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return (Ong Huan
Tin vs. Republic, 19 SCRA 966 [1967]). The absence of a person from said permanent residence, no
matter how long, notwithstanding, it continues to be the domicile of that person. In other words,
domicile is characterized by animus revertendi (Ujano vs. Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966]).

13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ESTABLISHMENT THEREOF; OWNERSHIP OF A HOUSE NOT NECESSARY. — The
petitioners' allegation that since the private respondent owns no property in Laoang, Samar, he cannot,
therefore, be a resident of said place is misplaced. The properties owned by the Ong family are in the
name of the private respondent's parents. Upon the demise of his parents, necessarily, the private
respondent, pursuant to the laws of succession, became the co-owner thereof (as a co-heir),
notwithstanding the fact that these were still in the names of his parents. Even assuming that the
private respondent does not own any property in Samar, the Supreme Court in the case of De los Reyes
vs. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it is not required that a person should have a house in order
to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented
house or in that of a friend or relative.

14. ID.; ID.; ID.; TEMPORARY ABSENCE DOES NOT NECESSARILY CONNOTE CHANGE THEREOF;
"ANIMUS REVERTENDI" ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. — It has also been settled that absence from
residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place
where one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence (Faypon vs. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 [1954]). The
private respondent stayed in Manila for the purpose of finishing his studies and later to practice his
profession. There was no intention to abandon the residence in Laoang, Samar. On the contrary, the
periodical journeys made to his home province reveal that he always had the animus revertendi.

15. ID.; ID.; PROSPECTIVE JUDICIAL RECOMMENDATION; MORE HUMANE AND LESS TECHNICAL
APPROACH TO CITIZENSHIP PROBLEMS. — Our citizens no doubt constitute the country's greatest
wealth. Citizenship is a special privilege which one must forever cherish. However, in order to truly
revere this treasure of citizenship, we do not, on the basis of too harsh an interpretation, have to
unreasonably deny it to those who qualify to share in its richness. Under the overly strict jurisprudence
surrounding our antiquated naturalization laws only the very affluent backed by influential patrons, who
were willing to suffer the indignities of a lengthy, sometimes humiliating, and often corrupt process of
clearances by minor bureaucrats and whose lawyers knew how to overcome so many technical traps of
the judicial process were able to acquire citizenship. It is time for the naturalization law to be revised to
enable a more positive, affirmative, and meaningful examination of an applicant's suitability to be a
Filipino. A more humane, more indubitable and less technical approach to citizenship problems is
essential.

16. ID.; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE; CANDIDATES; PROPERTY OWNERSHIP; NOT A QUALIFICATION.

— To require the private respondent to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would
be tantamount to a property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the
age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements. Nowhere is it required by the Constitution that the
candidate should also own property in order to be qualified to run (see Maquera vs. Borra, 122 Phil. 412
[1965]).

17. REMEDIAL LAW; BEST EVIDENCE RULE; EXCEPTION; ORIGINAL HAS BEEN LOST; REQUIREMENTS
THEREOF TO BE ADMISSIBLE; PROPERLY LAID IN CASE AT BAR. — The petitioners' sole ground in
disputing that respondent was a natural-born Filipino is that the documents presented to prove it were
not in compliance with the best evidence rule. The petitioners allege that the private respondent failed
to present the original of the documentary evidence, testimonial evidence and of the transcript of the
proceedings of the body upon which the resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention was
predicated. On the contrary, the documents presented by the private respondent fall under the
exceptions to the best evidence rule. It was established in the proceedings before the HRET that the
originals of the Committee Report No. 12, the minutes of the plenary session of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention held on November 28, 1972 cannot be found. This was affirmed by Atty. Ricafrente,
Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional Convention; by Atty. Nolledo, Delegate to the 1971
Constitutional Convention; and by Atty. Antonio Santos, Chief Librarian of the U.P. Law Center, in their
respective testimonies given before the HRET to the effect that there is no governmental agency which
is the official custodian of the records of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. The execution of the
originals was established by Atty. Ricafrente, who as the Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention was the proper party to testify to such execution. The inability to produce the originals
before the HRET was also testified to as aforestated by Atty. Ricafrente, Atty. Nolledo, and Atty. Santos.
In proving the inability to produce, the law does not require the degree of proof to be of sufficient
certainty; it is enough that it be shown that after a bona fide diligent search, the same cannot be found
(see Government of P.I. vs. Martinez, 44 Phil. 817 [1918]). Since the execution of the document and the
inability to produce were adequately established, the contents of the questioned documents can be
proven by a copy thereof or by the recollection of witnesses.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; JURISDICTION THEREOF; EXPANDED UNDER THE 1987
CONSTITUTION; DECISION OF HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW. — I believe
that, contrary to the respondents' contentions, the Court has the jurisdiction and competence to review
the questioned decision of the House Electoral Tribunal and to decide the present controversy. Article
VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution provides that: "Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." The Constitution, it is true,
constitutes the tribunal as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives. But as early as 1938, it was held in Morrero
vs. Bocar (66 Phil. 429), construing Section 4, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution which provided that
" . . . The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly." that: "The judgment rendered by the
(electoral) commission in the exercise of such and acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference,
except, in any event, 'upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will
constitute a denial of due process of law' (Barry vs. US ex rel. Cunningham, 279 US 597; 73 Law. ed., 867;
Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 35 Off. Gaz., 23)." And then under the afore-quoted provisions of
Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, this Court is duty-bound to determine whether or not, in
an actual controversy, there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLIED IN CASE AT BAR. — The present controversy, involves more than
perceived irregularities in the conduct of a congressional election or a disputed appreciation of ballots,
in which cases, it may be contended with great legal force and persuasion that the decision of the
electoral tribunal should be final and conclusive, for it is, by constitutional directive, made the sole judge
of contests relating to such matters. The present controversy, however, involves no less than a
determination of whether the qualifications for membership in the House of Representatives, as
prescribed by the Constitution, have been met. Indeed, this Court would be unforgivably remiss in the
performance of its duties, as mandated by the Constitution, were it to allow a person, not a natural-born
Filipino citizen, to continue to sit as a Member of the House of Representatives, solely because the
House Electoral Tribunal has declared him to be so. In such a case, the tribunal would have acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as to require the exercise by this
Court of its power of judicial review. Besides, the citizenship and residence qualifications of private
respondent for the office of Member of the House of Representatives, are here controverted by
petitioners who, at the same time, claim that they are entitled to the office illegally held by private
respondent. From this additional direction, where one asserts and earnestly perceived right that in turn
is vigorously resisted by another, there is clearly a justiciable controversy proper for this Court to
consider and decide.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION
OF POWERS. — The Court, in reviewing the decision of the tribunal, does not assert supremacy over it in
contravention of the time-honored principle of constitutional separation of powers. The Court in this
instance simply performs a function entrusted and assigned to it by the Constitution of interpreting, in a
justiciable controversy, the pertinent provisions of the Constitution with finality. "It is the role of the
Judiciary to refine and, when necessary, correct constitutional (and/or statutory) interpretation, in the
context of the interactions of the three branches of the government, almost always in situations where
some agency of the State has engaged in action that stems ultimately from some legitimate area of
governmental power (the Supreme Court in Modern Role, C.B. Sevisher, 1958, p. 36)." Moreover, it is
decidedly a matter of great public interest and concern to determine whether or not private respondent
is qualified to hold so important and high a public office which is specifically reserved by the Constitution
only to natural-born Filipino citizens.

4. ID.; CITIZENSHIP; NATURAL-BORN; REQUISITE; NOT COMPLIED WITH IN CASE AT BAR. — The
records show that private respondent was born on 19 June 1948 to the spouses Jose Ong Chuan, a
Chinese citizen, and Agrifina E. Lao, a natural-born Filipino citizen, in Laoang, Northern Samar. In other
words, at birth, private respondent was a Chinese citizen (not a natural-born Filipino citizen) because his
father was then a Chinese citizen (not a naturalized Filipino citizen). Under the 1935 Constitution which
was enforced at the time of private respondent's birth on 19 June 1948, only those whose fathers were
citizens of the Philippines were considered Filipino citizens. Those whose mothers were citizens of the
Philippines had to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, in order to be
considered Filipino citizens. Following the basic definition in the 1987 Constitution of a natural-born
citizen, in relation to the 1935 Constitution, private respondent is not a natural-born Filipino citizen,
having been born a Chinese citizen by virtue of the Chinese citizenship of his father at the time of his
birth, although from birth, private respondent had the right to elect Philippine citizenship, the
citizenship of his mother, but only upon his reaching the age of majority.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 15 OF THE REVISED NATURALIZATION LAW (C.A. 473); DID NOT CONFER
STATUS OF NATURAL-BORN IN CASE AT BAR. — While under Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization
Law (C.A. 473) minor children of a naturalized citizen (father), who were born in the Philippines prior to
the naturalization of the parent automatically become Filipino citizens, this does not alter the fact that
private respondent was not born to a Filipino father, and the operation of Section 15 of CA 473 did not
confer upon him the status of a natural-born citizen merely because he did not have to perform any act
to acquire or perfect his status as a Filipino citizen.

6. ID.; ID.; NATURALIZATION; NATURE THEREOF; PRIVILEGE NOT A RIGHT. — "Naturalization is not
a right, but a privilege of the most discriminating as well as delicate and exacting nature, affecting public
interest of the highest order, and which may be enjoyed only under the precise conditions prescribed by
law therefor."

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITION; GRANT THEREOF; APPEALABLE; OATH TAKEN BEFORE EXPIRATION OF THE
PERIOD OF APPEAL; IMPROPER. — It is settled that an order granting a petition to take the requisite
oath of allegiance of one who has previously obtained a decision favorable to his application for
naturalization, is appealable. It is, therefore, improper and illegal to authorize the taking of said oath
upon the issuance of said order and before the expiration of the reglementary period to perfect any
appeal from said order. In Cua Sun Ke vs. Republic (159 SCRA 477), this Court held that: "Administration
of the oath of allegiance on the same day as issuance of order granting citizenship is irregular and makes
the proceedings so taken null and void (Republic vs. Guy, 115 SCRA 244 [1982]; citing the case of Ong So
vs. Republic of the Philippines, 121 Phil. 1381)."

8. ID.; ID.; NATURAL-BORN; DEFINED AND INTERPRETED UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. —
Article IV, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution defines natural-born (Filipino) citizens as: "Natural-born
citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens." Article IV, Section 1, paragraph
(3) of the 1987 Constitution provides that: "Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: . . .
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority." It would appear then that the intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution in defining a natural-born Filipino citizen was to equalize the position of Filipino fathers and
Filipino mothers as to their children becoming natural-born Filipino citizens. In other words, after 17
January 1973, effectivity date of the 1973 Constitution, all those born of Filipino fathers (with alien
spouse) or Filipino mothers (with alien spouse) are natural-born Filipino citizens. But those born to
Filipino mothers prior to 17 January 1973 must still elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority, in order to be deemed natural-born Filipino citizens. The election, which is related to the
attainment of the age of majority, may be made before or after 17 January 1973. This interpretation
appears to be in consonance with the fundamental purpose of the Constitution which is to protect and
enhance the people's individual interests, and to foster equality among them.

9. ID.; ID.; ELECTION THEREOF; MUST BE MADE EXPRESSLY AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 625. — It is settled doctrine in this jurisdiction that election of Philippine
citizenship must be made in accordance with Commonwealth Act 625, Sections 1 and 2 of the Act
mandate that the option to elect Philippine citizenship must be effected expressly, not impliedly.

10. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE OF IN RE: FLORENCIO MALLARE (ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 533, SEPTEMBER
12, 1974, [59 SCRA 45]) NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — The respondent tribunal cites In re:
Florencio Mallare which held that Esteban Mallare's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of
age, constituted a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. Mallare, cited by respondent tribunal
as authority for the doctrine of implied election of Philippine citizenship, is not applicable to the case at
bar. The respondent tribunal failed to consider that Esteban Mallare reached the age of majority in
1924, or seventeen (17) years before CA 625 was approved and, more importantly, eleven (11) years
before the 1935 Constitution (which granted the right of election) took effect.

11. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITE PROVIDED FOR UNDER COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 625 NOT COMPLIED
WITH IN CASE AT BAR. — The respondent tribunal erred in ruling that by operation of CA 473, the
Revised Naturalization Law, providing for private respondent's acquisition of Filipino citizenship by
reason of the naturalization of his father, the law itself had already elected Philippine citizenship for
him. For, assuming arguendo that the naturalization of private respondent's father was valid, and that
there was no further need for private respondent to elect Philippine citizenship (as he had automatically
become a Filipino citizen) yet, this did not mean that the operation of the Revised Naturalization Law
amounted to an election by him of Philippine citizenship as contemplated by the Constitution. Besides,
election of Philippine citizenship derived from one's Filipino mother, is made upon reaching the age of
majority, not during one's minority. There is no doubt in my mind, therefore, that private respondent
did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority in 1969 or within a reasonable time
thereafter as required by CA 625. Consequently, he cannot be deemed a natural-born Filipino citizen
under Sections 2 and 1 (3), Article IV of the 1987 Constitution.

12. ID.; ELECTION PROTEST; QUESTIONING ELIGIBILITY OF A CANDIDATE-ELECT; IN EFFECT A QUO

WARRANTO PROCEEDING; INELIGIBILITY OF CANDIDATE-ELECT RESULTS IN NO-CHOICE. — Neither
of the petitioners may take the place of private respondent in the House of Representatives
representing the second district of Northern Samar. The ruling of this Court in Ramon L. Labo, Jr. vs. The
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) EN BANC and Luis L. Lardizabal (176 SCRA 1), is controlling. There
we held that Luis L. Lardizabal, who filed the quo warranto petition, could not replace Ramon L. Labo, Jr.
as mayor of Baguio City for the simple reason that as he obtained only the second highest number of
votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City for mayor of that City.
A petition alleging that the candidate-elect is not qualified for the office is, in effect, a quo warranto
proceeding even if it is labelled an election protest. It is a proceeding to unseat the ineligible person
from office but not necessarily to install the protestant in his place. The general rule is that the fact that
a plurality or a majority of the votes are cast for an ineligible candidate in an election does not entitle
the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. In such a case, the
electors have failed to make a choice and the election is a nullity.

13. ID.; ID.; PHILIPPINE BILL OF 1902; REQUIREMENTS PROVIDED THEREIN; NOT COMPLIED WITH IN
CASE AT BAR. — The "test," following the premises of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, is whether or
not Ong Te, private respondent's and Emil L. Ong's grandfather was "an inhabitant of the Philippines
who continued to reside therein and was a Spanish subject on April 11, 1899." If he met these
requirements of the Philippine Bill of 1902, then, Ong Te was a Filipino citizen; otherwise, he was not a
Filipino citizen. Petitioners (protestants) submitted and offered in evidence before the House Electoral
Tribunal exhibits W, X, Y, Z, AA, BB, CC, DD and EE which are copies of entries in the "Registro de Chinos"
from years 1896 to 1897 which show that Ong Te was not listed as an inhabitant of Samar where he is
claimed to have been a resident. Petitioners (protestants) also submitted and offered in evidence before
the House Electoral Tribunal Exhibit V, a certification of the Chief of the Archives Division, Records and
Management and Archives Office, stating that the name of Ong Te does not appear in the "Registro de
Chinos" for the province of Samar for 1895. These exhibits prove or at least, as petitioners validly argue,
tend to prove that Ong Te was NOT a resident of Samar close to 11 April 1899 and, therefore, could not
continue residing in Samar, Philippines after 11 April 1899, contrary to private respondent's pretense. In
the face of these proofs or evidence, private respondent FAILED TO PRESENT ANY REBUTTAL OR
COUNTERVAILING EVIDENCE.

14. ID.; ID.; RES JUDICATA; NOT APPLICABLE. — The decision of the 1971 Constitutional Convention
in the case of Emil L. Ong was a decision of a political body, not a court of law. And, even if we have to
take such a decision as a decision of a quasi-judicial body (i.e., a political body exercising quasi-judicial
functions), said decision in the Emil L. Ong case can not have the category or character of res judicata in
the present judicial controversy, because between the two (2) cases, there is no identity of parties (one
involves Emil L. Ong, while the other involves private respondent) and, more importantly, there is no,
identity of causes of action because the first involves the 1935 Constitution while the second involves
the 1987 Constitution. As held in Lee vs. Commissioners on Immigration (G.R. No. L-23446, 20 December
1971, 42 SCRA 561): " . . . Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial
or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as
to such citizenship is generally not considered as res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and
again as the occasion may demand."

15. ID; SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION; MUST BE ENFORCED. — It is regrettable that one (as
private respondent) who unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes for the elective position
of Representative (Congressman) to the House of Representatives for the second district of Northern
Samar, would have to cease in office by virtue of this Court's decision, if the full membership of the
Court had participated in this case, with the result that the legislative district would cease to have, in the
interim, a representative in the House of Representatives. But the fundamental consideration in case of
this nature is the Constitution and only the Constitution. It has to be assumed, therefore, that when the
electorate in the second legislative district of Northern Samar cast the majority of their votes for private
respondent, they seemed and believed that he was fully eligible and qualified for the office because he
is a natural-born Filipino citizen. That erroneous assumption and belief can not prevail over, but must
yield to the majesty of the Constitution.

SARMIENTO, J., concurring:

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES; AS SOLE

JUDGE OF ALL CONTEST RELATING TO MEMBERS THEREOF; ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP INCLUDED; BEYOND
JUDICIAL INTERVENTION. — The question of citizenship is a question of fact, and as a rule, the Supreme
Court leaves facts to the tribunal that determined them. I am quite agreed that the Electoral Tribunal of
the House of Representatives, as the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the membership in the
House, as follows: "Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of
whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six
shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be
chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the
Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman." is the best judge of facts and this Court can not substitute its
judgment because it thinks it knows better.

2. ID.; SUPREME COURT; EXPANDED JURISDICTION THEREOF; REVIEW OF FACTS NOT INCLUDED. —
In the case of Aratuc vs. Commission on Elections (88 SCRA 251), it was held that this Court can not
review the errors of the Commission on Elections (then the "sole judge" of all election contests) — in the
sense of reviewing facts and unearthing mistakes — and that this Court's jurisdiction is to see simply
whether or not it is guilty of a grave abuse of discretion. It is true that the new Constitution has
conferred expanded powers on the Court, but as the Charter states, our authority is "to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." It is not to review facts.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; "GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION" DEFINED. — "Grave abuse of discretion" has been
defined as whimsical exercise of power amounting to excess of jurisdiction, or otherwise, to denial of
due process of law.