THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC)
v.
JOSE O. VERA, Judge. of the Court of First Instance of Manila
G.R. No. L-45685, November 16, 1937
TOPIC: Art. VI, Sec. 1
FACTS:
● On. Oct 15, 1931, a criminal case was filed against Mariano Cu Unjieng within the CFI of Manila and
Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) intervening in the case as private prosecutor.
Respondent Vera was the judge. (No. 42649 entitled “The People of the Philippine Islands vs Cu
Unjieng, et. Al.”)
● On Jan 8, 1934, the Court rendered judgment of conviction sentencing Mariano to a penalty ranging
from 4 years and 2 mos of prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor and costs. He then appealed
and the sentence was modified to 5 years and 6 mos of prision correccional to seven years, six mos
and 27 days of prision mayor.
● Mariano filed a motion for reconsideration, 4 successive motions for trial – denied Dec 17, 1935. He
then elevated on certiorari to US SC, denied, PH SC also denied motions for reconsideration or new
trial. Mariano filed probation before the trial court under the provisions of Act No. 4221 Philippine
Probation Act of 1935) of the defunct PH Legislature – that he is innocent, he has no criminal record, he
would observe good conduct.
● Petition for hearing set on Apr 5, 1937, On the same day, private prosecution filed opposition alleging
Act No. 4221, if not repealed by sec 2 of Article XV of Consti, was nevertheless violative of sec 1,
subsec (1), Article III of the Consti. Also alleged unconstitutionality of Act No 4221 as undue delegation
of legislative power to provincial boards of several provinces (sec.1, Art VI, Constitution) Fiscal Court of
Manila filed its own opposition, concurring with private prosecution.
● Respondent Vera promulgated a resolution: Evidence did not conclusively prove defendant’s guilt, but
Vera denied the petition for probation because it might interfere with stillness and effectiveness of
decisions.
● Mariano’s counsel filed exception to said resolution and filed a motion for reconsideration or new trial.
New trial was scheduled but postponed because of a motion for leave to intervene in the case as amici
curiae. Private prosecution filed its opposition for the previous motion saying the same should be
denied. The Fiscal Court of Manila also filed for motion for the issuance of an order of execution.
Hearing of the motion for execution was set on Aug 21, 1937, but respondent Vera considered motion
for leave to intervene as amici curiae as in order.
● On Aug. 19, 1937, petitioners filed to the SC writs of certiorari and prohibition to the CFI of Manila. SC
asked to review actuations of said court. They wanted to put an end to what was alleged as an
interminable proceeding which fostered “the campaign of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for delay in
the execution of the sentence imposed by this Honorable Court on him, exposing the courts to criticism
and ridicule because of the apparent inability of the judicial machinery to make effective a final
judgment of this court imposed on the defendant.”
● Petitioners also argued that Act No. 4221 is unconstitutional because it denies the equal protection of
the laws and constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative power, and further, that the whole Act is
void; that the Commonwealth is not estopped from questioning the validity of its laws, that the private
prosecution may intervene in probation proceedings and may attack the probation law as
unconstitutional and that court may pass upon the constitutional question in prohibition proceedings.
ISSUE:
1) WON the question of constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been properly raised.
2) WON petitioners have standing to question said law.
3) WON Act No. 4221 is unconstitutional.
RULING: Act No. 4221 declared unconstitutional. Writ of prohibition granted.
1) The constitutionality of a statute will not be considered on application for prohibition where the question has
not been properly brought to the attention of the court by objection of some kind. In the case at bar, it is
unquestionable that the constitutional issue has been squarely presented not only before this court by the
petitioners but also before the trial court by the private prosecution. General rule, questions of constitutionality
must be raised in the earliest possible opportunity, but courts may determine the time when a question
affecting the constitutionality of a statue be presented (In re Woolsey). Court can consider the constitutionality
question even if raised for the first time in SC. (Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad)
2) People of the Philippines are a proper party in the proceedings. If Act No 4221 really violates the
Constitution, the People of the Philippines have a substantial interest in having it set aside. Damage caused by
illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of
an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws.
(Philippine Islands vs Springer, Attorney General vs. Perkins, State vs Doane) The mere fact that the Probation
Act has been repeatedly relied upon and has not been attacked as unconstitutional is no reason for
considering the People of the PH is stopped from now assailing its validity. The fact that a question has not
been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raised later. The fiscal and all others are
justified in relying upon the statue and treating it as valid until it is held void by the courts.
3) By section 11 of the Act, the legislature does seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the
Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various provincial boards to
determine, whether said law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. If the provincial board does not wish to
have the act applied, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of the
probation officer. This is a virtual surrender of legislative power to provincial boards. Sec 11 of Act No. 4221
constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of legislative authority and is unconstitutional and void.
Section 11 also allows one province to appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a probation
officer, while another may refuse or fail to do so. The Probation Act will be in operation in the former but not the
latter. A person can enjoy benefits in one province while another person similarly situated in another province
would be denied those same benefits. This creates a situation in which discrimination and inequality are
permitted or allowed. A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of
unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibition. If a law has the effect of denying the
equal protection of the law, it is unconstitutional.
Since section 11 is unconstitutional and void, the next inquiry is whether the entire Act should be avoided. It is
argued that even without section 11, probation officers may be appointed in provinces under section 10 of the
Act. But the probation officers and administrative personnel referred to in the foregoing section are clearly not
those probation officers required to be appointed for the provinces under section 11. Act No. 4221 being
complete is an impracticable thing under the remainder of the Act unless it is conceded that in our case there
can be a system of probation in the provinces without probation officers. Hence, the law must be set aside.
