THE ORIGINS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR.

The outbreak of the First World

War is one of the most repeatedly debated subjects in world history. The
historical debate has been intensely affected by the prevailing political climate
and by the urge to find out who was primarily responsible. The official report
on the origins of the First world War, written by the victorious powers,
presented at Versailles Peace Conference in 1919, declared that the war was
pre-meditated by Germany and her allies, and resulted from ‘acts deliberately
committed to make it unavoidable’. The report held that Germany and Austria
Hungary deliberately worked to defeat ‘all the many conciliatory proposals
made by the Entente powers to avoid war’. This argument, that blames the
outbreak of the war and presents Germany as the sole perpetrator, is enshrined
in Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles.
This led to the development of the ‘war guilt’ interpretation for the causes of the
First World War. Article 231 laid down that Germany accepted responsibility for
the war imposed ‘by the aggression of Germany and her allies’. The proponents
of this model blame the policies of the monarch Kaiser Wilhelm II for the
outbreak of the war.

WAR GUILT This article not only ensured the ‘primacy of foreign policy’ in
German historiography, but its interpretation incensed the German nation form
Left to Right. In the first month of the war, the German Government declared
that the guiding principles of any future publication would be the German
reaction towards the alleged Allied policy of encirclement; grandiose German
war aims were to be denied (H.Koch). Convinced of the righteousness of its
cause, during the inter-war years, the German government sought to reverse the
verdict of Article 231 and released 15,889 official documents during the 1920s
to accomplish this end.

The weight of this new evidence led many to alter their original views. In 1927,
Erich Brandenburg, a German historian, argued that Germany did not plan the
war, but it was a result of miscalculations on the part of several European
countries. He blamed Russia for wanting control of the Balkans, France for
coveting Alsace-Lorraine. The German attempt to revise Versailles
historiographically also received considerable support from historians outside
Germany, notably in the U.S., where in 1930, Sidney Fay published The Origins
of the First World War, he claimed that no European country desired war in
1914, and that all, to greater or lesser degrees, must share the blame of its
outbreak. He attached some liability to each power involved in the July crisis.
Germany, he claimed, was a casualty of its alliance with Austria-Hungary, which
was most responsible, but believed that she was acting in self-defense against
the expansion of Serb nationalism. Serbia in turn, despite not wanting war, felt
that she would be force to fight and Russia was partly responsible for
encouraging Serbia and mobilizing its troops. France may be blamed for its
support to Russia and Britain for the lack of its support to restraining Russia. By
and large, a consensus of sorts was established, aptly summarized in the words
of the British PM, Lloyd George, who suggested that ‘all the nations of Europe
slithered over the edge of the boiling cauldron of war in 1914’. This indicated
that Germany no longer bore the sole burden of the 1914 catastrophe.

COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY In the light of diplomacy, the question of

German War Guilt was dropped as it emerged as a sensitive issue in
international politics. The debate had moved away from apportioning guilt
towards an assessment of long-term causes. (G.P Gooch). After 1945, the focal
point of the debate over war origins sifted to the Second World War. Gerhard
Ritter, a leading German historian, concluded that the archives published did
not permit attributing a premeditated desire for war on the part of any
government or people in 1914. This ‘consensus’ survived the Second World
War, and a Franco-German historians conference in 1950s.In fact, several
scholars came to the conclusion that in 1914, all major powers felt that their
rival powers were antagonistic, and felt their respective interests threatened by
the same. Governments of most nations became obsessed with short-term
decisions during the July crisis and all major powers perceived themselves as
the injured part in the crisis.

FAULTY SYSTEM OF Intrnl Reltn: Yet another school of thought perceives the
war as an outcome of a faulty system of International Relations. The system of
international relations that geared Europe up for war, accompanied as it was by
military alliances, was the predominant reason for the War. No explanation for
the outbreak of the First World War can be devoid of a consideration of the
nature and composition of the alliance system. By the end of the 19 th century,
alliances came to be developed, not with a view to avoid war, but for warfare.
This factor ensured that a problem in any part of the continent was likely to lead
to faulty system of international relations. If a local crisis could not be resolved
through international relations and diplomacy, it could lead to a continental war,
as most bilateral negotiations, tended to become multi-lateral. The role of the
belligerent powers within such a system became significant.
 In the last decade of the 19th century, due to several reasons, animosity was at
its peak in Europe. In this atmosphere of mutual distrust and antagonism,
alliances began to be forged between nations that were, very often, only united
to a common foe. Since the 19 th century, alliances had been formed and re-
formed, but their nature was different from the two groups that emerged in the
first decade of the 20th century. In 1873, Bismarck led Germany to an alliance
with Austria-Hungary and Russia called the Three Emperor’s League. In 1881 a
Second Three Emperor’s League was formed which stated that in case a fourth
power attacked one power, the other two remain neutral. In 1882, was formed,
the Triple Alliance comprising Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy. Italy’s
loyalty to this alliance was uncertain from the very beginning as prime interest
lay in gaining territories in Europe at the expense of Austria-Hungary and in
conquering Tripoli with French help. As opposed to this alliance emerged the
Entente Cordiale between Britain and France in 1904. Britain and France
resolved outstanding issues, while France was to get Morocco, Britain got a free
hand in Egypt. The concept of Quid pro quo determined all the settling of all
disputes in this context. Russia entered into an alliance with Britain and France
in 1907 and thus emerged the Triple Entente.

The Balkan region was traditionally an extremely unstable and volatile zone
due to the presence of distinct ethnic groups such as Greek orthodox Christians,
Roman Catholics and Muslims. There was perpetual conflict here between the
Croats, Serbs and the Turks as no race had overriding rights over the other. In
1908, Europe was thrown on turmoil when Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-
Herzegovina, formerly a part of the Ottoman Empire. This territory was also
coveted by Serbia. Russia encouraged Pan-Slavism claiming to be the traditional
leader of all the Slavs in Europe. She encouraged Serbian nationalism vis-à -vis
Austria-Hungary, which was the principle ally of the powerful Germany.
Germany threatened to go to war against Russia should the latter continue to
support Serbia. A war was averted when Russia withdrew for the fear of an
attack from Germany. At this juncture, it became evident that nations were now
willing to go to war for the sake of their allies.

In 1912, war broke out between Serbia, Bulgaria, Montenegro and Greece on the
one hand, and the declining Ottoman Turkey on the other. The Balkan League
emerged victorious but fought another war amongst themselves over the spoils
of the first Balkan war in 1914. Austria succeeded in making Albania, which was
also coveted by Serbia, an independent power. This further embittered the
prevailing atmosphere in the most turbulent part of the continent, which was to
become the birthplace for the First World War. In June, 1914, Archduke Francis
Ferdinand was assassinated in Sarajevo, capital of Bosnia by a Serb nationalist.
An ultimatum was served by Austria-Hungary to Serbia, which would effectively
destroy the latter’s sovereignty. Thus Austria declared war on Serbia, Germany
ordered mobilization against Russia and vice versa. Germany declared war on
France subsequently and Britain, after biding her time, declared war on
Germany. Italy deserted the Triple Alliance and joined the war on the side of the
Entente powers.

Bernadotte Schmitt argues that the issue at stake during the July Crisis was a
struggle to decide the balance of power in Europe for an indefinite time ahead
between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente. Thus, in Schmitt’s view,
alliance that had originally been formulated to serve the cause of peace, when
put to final test, almost automatically operated to convert a local battle into a
general war. Indeed, few scholars would disagree with the view that the alliance
system was important in encouraging the build-up of animosity in Europe.
However, A.J.P. Taylor claims that pre-1914 alliances were so precarious and
fragile that they should not be read as a major cause for the outbreak of the War.
This indicates that the fundamental problem that led to the outbreak of war was
the lack of fully effective balance of power in Europe- not its existence. Even a
formal alliance with Austria-Hungary and Germany did not ensure Italy’s
support for War. On the other hand, Britain, with no binding alliance decided to
go to war.

The crucial alliances in this context were the German alliance with Austria-
Hungary and the Franco-Russian alliance. German was determined to support
the cause of her ally, through crisis, but was clearly following her own aims.
France did clearly offer her support for her alliance partners, but did not play a
crucial role in the decision for the war. James Joll argues that no European ally
really accepted that the alliance system comprised two distinct, firm and
balanced power blocs, and no major European power subscribed to the idea that
the alliance system was a complete deterrent against the war. Each power
miscalculated the intentions and likely behavior of its alliance opponents. Thus,
alliances did not serve to make the war inevitable, as has been argued. The
relevance of the system of international relations lies in the fact that it indicated
the likely allies and enemies in the event of the outbreak of a war. Such a system
suggested the permanent lines of alignments, where factors like deep-rooted
animosities and bonds came into play.
MILITARISM: At this juncture, it is pertinent to mention that the formation of
alliances was accompanied by an arms race among the powers of Europe. A
mood of militarism pervaded Europe before1914 & hence militarism,
armaments and war plans of the major powers have all been put forward as key
factors in the outbreak of the war. Europe has been viewed as an armed camp
from 1870 & 1914.

Michael Howard argues that each announcement of increased armaments

expenditure by a European power before 1914 was viewed as a threat by its
perceived rival, thus created an atmosphere of fear & suspicion which whipped
up war-time hysteria. In 1914, Germany spent 3.5% of its Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) on defense, Britain less than 4.9%, France 3.9% and Russia 4.6%.
However, the belief that high expenditure on arms leads to a desire for war
remains unproved. Austria-Hungary which spent 1.9% of its GDP on defense
was determined to go to war. Niall Ferguson is also of the view that the role of
the arms race in encouraging the First World War has been greatly exaggerated.
His argument sates that the country with the largest growth in military
expenditure was the least keen on war, and that most European nations spent
far more on education and social services than on armaments. L.F.C Turner
holds that the crisis cannot be understood without knowledge of the balance of
military power, planning and strategy. In the first decade of the 19 th century, the
balance of power was turning sharply against Austria-Hungary whereas Russian
position seemed to be getting stronger. This is a vital factor why the Austro-
Hungarian bureaucracy was open to the idea of a ‘preventive’ war against
Serbia. Further, the possibility of ‘encirclement’ by her enemies became an
imminent threat for Germany & German chiefs of staff had become pessimistic
about the German geo-strategic position. They feared the growing strength of
the French & the Russian army & believed that the balance of power was moving
sharply away from Germany.

The fact that the spark that triggered of the explosion originated from the most
unstable zone of the continent- the Balkans- is also an indication of the
importance of strategic balance of power in the First World War. Austria feared
that the Pan-Slav movement would spill over in to the country and bring about
the dismemberment of the Hohenzollern Empire.

Strategic insecurity and fears were closely linked with military plans & strategy.
A.J.P Taylor claims that the First World War was caused ‘almost entirely by
rival plans for mobilization by the European Powers’. In ‘War by Timetable’
claims that all the great powers, had vast conscript armies which were not
maintained in peace time. Thus mobilization was seen as the key to a military
victory. All the mobilization plans had been timed to the minute, months or even
years before and they could not be changed. According to Taylor, “Every chief
of staff had offensive plans, and only offensive plans. It was often said in 1914,
and has been often repeated since: ‘mobilization means war’”. Taylor’s
argument is that the War broke out because, troops, once mobilized could not be
retracted. The relationship between military plans and actual decision for war is
notoriously complicated. It is simplistic to argue that a war of the dimensions
such as the First World war broke out because of railway timetables, and
because it was too late to exercise restraint. In fact, the British Prime Minister
Edward Grey did not take any notice of the naval an army chiefs in deciding
whether to enter the war or not. The French government did not support an
offensive strategy and did not consult the military planners. The military
planning, as pointed out by empirical evidence, ran deeper in Austria-Hungary
and Germany. The Austrian chiefs convinced the Habsburg government of the
indispensability of lightening assault on Serbia. However, the final decision, in
most cases, lay with the political leaders and not their military counterparts

In the years succeeding the II World War, the question of Nazi Germanys
responsibility in 1939, led to the re-examination of the question of her
responsibility in the outbreak of the First World War. An analysis of policies in
the run-up to the First World War again became a heated topic of debate.

In 1961, a Hamburg historian, Fritz Fischer published Griff nach der Weltmacht,
book apportioned chief responsibility to Germany for preparing and launching
the First World War. Fischer argued that German expansionist aims were
pursued not simply by fringe movements like Pan-Germans or militarists like
Ludendorff, but by sectors and personalities previously considered to be
moderate, such as the Chancellor- Benthmann-Hollweg. Fischer concentrated on
four key figures In German Governement: The Kaiser- Wilhelm II, Chancellor
Bethmannn Hollweg, Foreign Secretary Jagow and the chief of the army staff von
Moltke. Fischer contended that Germany was prepared to resort to war, in order
to become a Weltmacht or a World power. The world balance of power was
turned into a plan for organizing the world in a way that it would be dominated
by Germany and serve German social, political, cultural and economic interests.
Fischer suggests that Germany, if she did not want war, was willing to risk it in
pursuit of her general aims and even systematically encouraged her ally Austria-
Hungary to provoke war with Serbia, despite the knowledge that such a war
wouldn’t be localized. As soon as the war broke out, Germany developed for
large-scale territorial annexations and the establishment of a German controlled
new order in Europe. Fischer claims that military circles enjoyed a stronghold
over the Government, which put too much reliance on the former who devised
war plans that were bound to lead to an escalation of the crisis. He seeks to
establish the point that German war aims were a product of the socio-economic
situation and the presuppositions and pressures to which the German leaders
were subjected. Individual decisions were strictly limited by the operating
social, economic and ideological climate. Fischer claims the German war aims be
analyzed as “product of Germanys claims to world power”.

In this context, it becomes important to discuss the German foreign policy post-
unification. Europe was accustomed to weakness in the center, however, post
the German unificatio, the balance of power changed profoundly in Bismarck
strove to preserve the status quo in Europe as feared the encirclement of
Germany by her opponents. He wanted to keep enemies of the German Empire
divided and reduce the number of adversaries. He designed the policy of
Realpolitik- politics governed by reality- for the same. The domestic situation
within the German Empire did nit permit her to enter into acrimonious relations
with other European powers. Bismarck sought to construct an intricate web of
alliances ensuring that Europe wouldn’t go to war. The Draikaiserbund or Three
Emperor’s League was formed in 1873 between Russia, Austria-Hungary and
Germany. This was designed to ensure the other two allies of Germany
commitment to monarchy. In 1879, Germany and her ally Austria-Hungary
entered into the Dual Alliance designed for protection against France and Russia
respectively. A second Three Emperor’s League emerged in 1881, which stated
that incase a fourth power attacked any one of the allies, the other two would
remain neutral. The Triple Alliance was formalized in 1882. In 1887, Bismarck
persuaded Austria-Hungary and Italy to sign the Mediterranean agreement
ensuring that no single power was to have a monopoly over the strategic
Mediterranean route. In addition, Germany signed a Re-insurance Treaty with
Russia in 1887. However, this was an incompitative way of preserving a
conservative objective. The balance of power was secured through a complex
counter posing of interests and ambitions that would succeed only if a man of
Bismarck’s genius could sustain the system. However, in 1891, Bismarck was
succeeded by Kaiser Wilhelm II, who desired “a Napoleonic supremacy… in the
peaceful sense”. Bismarck’s Realpolitik was replaced by the Wilhelm II
Weltpolitik or global policy in order to achieve the objective of WeltMacht. The
Kaiser strove to establish one monolith uniform unitary German national
identity. In 1890, the Russian offer to renew the Re-insurance Treaty was
rejected by Wilhelm II. Germany found a permanent foe in the powerful Britain
once the latter’s naval supremacy was challenged by Tirpitz’s naval construction
programme in 1889. Fischer points out the continuity between Wilhelmine and
Nazi Germany’s foreign policy and claims that the aggressive nature caused the
outbreak of both the First and the Second World War.

In Ritter’s view, Germany ‘stumbled into war’ by supporting Austria-Hungary

and by allowing the military planners to dictate terms to the civilian
government. He claimed that the German policy was merely mistaken, it was
essentially defensive and the most consistent aspects of the policy were not
cold-blooded planning and expansionist aims, but bluff and brinkmanship. In
July, 1914, the German government saw an ideal opportunity to drive a wedge
between the powers of the Entente Cordiale, thereby presenting Austria-
Hungary with enhanced power and status. In Ritter’s view, Germany wanted to
risk the threat of a European war in order to gain a diplomatic victory, but
hoped in earnest that she would not be required to fight one. Thus, what Fischer
perceived as planning and premeditation, Ritter read as miscalculation, where
Fischer saw aims, Ritter saw tactics.

Fischer’s critics contend that German leaders desired a limited ‘defensive war’ in
1914. Egmont Zechlin criticizes Fischer for not highlighting those elements
within the German government that did not want war. Zechlin proposes in his
counter-thesis that Benthmann-Hollweg was not a mastermind behind the plan
of First World War, but a statesman who took a ‘calculated risk’ in 1914, in order
to gain a diplomatic victory, or failing this, to fight a ‘defensive protective war’.
According to Zechlin, Benthmann-Hollweg believed that the Entente powers
were paralyzing Germany and that Russia was growing stronger in the Balkans,
and Austria-Hungary weaker. Yet, Zechlin was willing to accept that German
policy took advantage of the Austro-Serb crisis to further its own aims. He
claimed Kaiser Wilhelm II hoped that the crisis would divide the Entente powers
and grant Germany the bloodless diplomatic victory she desired.

Historian Karl Erdmann attempted to add weight to the aforementioned

explanation by publishing the diary of Kurt Riezler, private secretary to
Benthmann Hollweg. He also refutes Fischer by claiming that the development
of territorial aims, was a product of the war and not the fulfillment of a pre-war
plan. He rejects the notion that the war was launched for economic and
imperialist gains or as an escape from the domestic problems. For Erdmann,
German war aims were limited to preventing a diplomatic ‘encirclement’ by the
Entente powers.

Despite the problematic reception of Fischer’s work in Germany, he found

supporters in several scholars, most notably Immanuel Geiss, Hans Ulrich
Wehler and Jurgen Kocka. Geiss suggests that the dominant long-term cause
of the First World War was the German desire for Weltpolitik or global policy.
“Imperialism, with Wilhelmine Weltpolitik as its specifically German version,
provided the general framework and the basic tensions. Further, the
determination of the German empire to uphold the conservative and monarchic
principles against the rising flood of democracy, plus it’s Weltpolitik made war
inevitable”, says Geiss. For him, Weltpolitik was a belligerent policy, which
invited a hostile reaction and ultimately produced the ‘explosion known as the
First World War’. The July Crisis was thus a logical culmination of the German
challenge to the existing status quo in European relations.

More recently, John Rohl has argued that not only were leading German figures
planning the war, Germany was pursuing a pre-existing plan during the July
crisis, which had two clearly defined aims, firstly to split the Entente alliance
and secondly to keep Austria-Hungary in the front line and provoke Russia to
declare the war first. Rohl claims that German plan for war was hatched during
the Agadir crisis of 1911, & attained concrete shape during the Balkan Wars.

As against this, historian Hans Ulrich Wehler claims that German war aims,
were to a large extent determined by her domestic policy. He highlights the role
of the Prussian aristocratic landowning ‘Junker’ class in the determination of
German foreign policy. Post industrialization, the new industrial elite or the
proletariat competed for political power with the established aristocracy, the
‘Junker’ class. The Junker class therefore supported an aggressive foreign policy
as an escape form the political consequences of industrialization, especially the
desire for greater democracy in Germany. Wehler believes that Fischer’s idea of
continuity in German history from 1871-1914 is the best way to comprehend
the outbreak of the First World War. Thus, Weltpolitik was used as a distraction
from domestic problems in German.

Arno Meyer takes this debate on to a higher, more complex platform. He

suggests that the German government hoped for great diplomatic victories with
which to consolidate the monarchy, hold back reform and prevent revolution.
Ralf Dahrendorf claimed that Germany, as a nation, was destined to follow a
distinct historical path. Dahrendorf suggested that imperial Germany was an
‘industrial feudal society’ with an industrial economy which allowed for the
survival of its pre-industrial elites in order to hold back democratic
development. Therefore, the middle class never rose to a position of political
pre-eminence and remained subordinate to the Junker class. The Kaiser
conspired with the Junker class to devise complex strategies to weaken the
influence of organized labor, rally the middle class to the cause of imperialism
and manipulate foreign policy to this end. This collective Weltpolitik is known
as Sammlungspolitik. However it must be borne in mind that whether or not it
was intended, outbreak of the First World War diverted the attention of
belligerent nations away from domestic problems. This is as true for Germany as
it is for England-where the Irish problem took a backseat, or for France- where
fiscal reform was postponed.

IMPERIALIST RIVALIRES Between 1870 & 1914, all parts of Asia and Africa
had become colonial possessions of one European power or the other. The world
had been divided up between various European powers and more colonies
could be gained only at the expense of another power. Imperialism as apolitical
force transformed to become neo-imperialism wherein imperialism was
accompanied by armed might and a search for wealth.

It is contested by several scholars, that it was Imperialist rivalries between the

various European powers that caused the WWI. The newly unified nations
Germany, and Italy, were late entrants on the scene of scramble for colonies, and
this added a new element of tension within the existing one. Italy, France’s equal
in power, desired control over Eritrea and Somaliland in Africa, France wanted
to control Morocco and her cotton resources whereas Russia, like all other
European powers coveted the states under the declining Ottoman Empire.
Germany’s ambitions of a Berlin-Baghdad railway line thus naturally alarmed
the other European powers. The Moroccan crisis of 1904, the 2 Balkan wars only
served to antagonize the powers further.

It has been argued that the second industrial revolution, believed to be a Pan-
European phenomena, caused capital to grow in excess of the market in most
economies of Europe. The need to export capital abroad and then the
subsequent compulsion to secure one’s investment by gaining political control
has been termed as colonialism.

Lenin, declared in 1916, that ‘Imperialism is the highest stage of capitalism’

implying that the War was caused due to imperial rivalries that caused capitalist
businessmen to seek new markets and encouraged governments to support
economic interests. He emphasizes the German responsibility again, by claiming
that German monopoly capital was behind the expansionist German foreign
policy. It remains difficult to find convincing evidence of the involvement of
capitalistic business interest in the formulation of foreign policies.

J.A Hobson claims that the exodus of capital form Britain which occurred due to
lack of investment opportunities at home due to lesser real wages of the
consumers (industrial workers) was the real problem. He perceives capitalism
as an intrinsically selfish system. Norman Angell claims that since the
mercantilist notion of wealth being in a limited stock does not hold good, the
imperialist nations fought over what was available in abundance. He argues, that
it isn’t capitalism but capitalists that are inherently disposed to causing war. He
seeks to justify colonialism by claiming that colonies were merely administered
and not exploited. H.N. Brailford believed that imperialism, as a political and
economic ideology, benefits not a minority, but a plutocracy.

However, a rejection of the Marxist stand should not lead to a general rejection
of the importance of economic reasons for the outbreak of the war. Diplomat
historian Paul Kennedy has recently suggested that ‘economic interests’ are a
key ‘reality behind diplomacy’. While the political decisions are made
independent of reference to economic interest groups, the success of these
decisions is ultimately determined by the resources at the disposal of the
nations. Thus, while politicians have primacy of political decisions during war,
they have no control over the economic consequences of such decisions.

However, one cannot view the factors leading to the First World War in isolation
of the general prevailing ideological climate. In 1914, prevalent ideology and
modes of belief contributed greatly to the whipping up of war-time hysteria. In
the Origin of Species, Darwin claimed to have found the key to social change in
natural selection-survival of the fittest. This, when applied to human societies,
became social Darwinism-a motive for power and a justification for expansionist
policies. Arguably, this ideology was used to correct the harm done by the
Communist Manifesto, and to counter balance social thinking.

H.Koch argues that every state had acquired a specific identity, and a
consciousness o differentiation between the satisfied and unsatisfied emerged,
everything was apparently supported by science. As long as the masses were
made to forget the injustices of the society they lived in, it reduced the chances
of stress within the nation and suspicion about the motives of the rival prevailed
over more serious domestic issues. However, Koch claims that it is unfair to
believe that the German version of Social Darwinism was more sinister than
similar manifestations in other nations. James Joll also emphasizes on the role
played by ideas of Darwin and Nietzsche which were widely available in
secondary works such as newspapers and periodicals. In fact, Nietzsche’s words
aptly summarize the state in Europe at the time, “Insatiable as flame, I burn and
consume myself.” James Joll also stressed on the role of education systems that
operated on indoctrination and propagated a strange jingoistic nationalism in
most nations.

Whether ‘revisionist’ or ‘anti-revisionist’ most of the historiography on origins

of the First World War is marked not only by its partisan nature but also by its
purely political frame of reference in which social, economic & institutional
questions are hardly posed, let alone answered. (H. Koch). The historiographical
debate on the origins of the war also has a tendency to become German centric.
To insist upon a single logic in an attempt to explain the outbreak of the First
World War is futile simply because of war the nature of the War. The truth lies in
the collaborative functioning of all these factors to cause the First World War.