Christine Joy A.
Jungoy September 19, 2020
Law 209-A
LANDMARK CASES
Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.
G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993
FACTS:
The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented
and joined by their respective parents. The chief allegation by the plaintiffs is that they “are all citizens
of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the
natural resource treasure that is the country’s virgin tropical forests.” Under Sec. 16, Art. II of the
Constitution, and protection of the State by virtue of parens patriae doctrine, the petitioners raised their
entitlement to the right to a balanced and healthful ecology under Sec. 16, Art. II of the Constitution, and
protection of the State by virtue of parens patriae doctrine. In addition, they claimed that the prevalent
deforestation brought about by timber licensing arrangements adversely affected and caused irreparable
impairment to the petitioners’ generation, and to succeeding generations. As such, the petitioners prayed
that the Supreme Court order the defendants to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the
country, cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber
license agreements, and grant them “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises”. The
original defendant refused the petitioners’ request and filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint alleging
that the petitioners did not have legal standing to pursue the case and that the issue raised involved a
political question which was not up to the courts to resolve. The lower court ruled in the respondents’
favor. Thus, the petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing to file the case.
2. Whether or not the petitioners have a cause of action in filing the case.
RULING:
The Court granted the petition and set aside the assailed dismissal of the petitioners’ original
case. The Court allowed the petitioners to amend their complaint to bring as defendants in the suit the
timber license holders or grantees.
1. Acting in behalf of the future generations based on the notion of intergenerational responsibility
with respect to the right to a balanced and healthful ecology, the petitioners have locus standi in the case.
The Court acknowledged that said constitutional right was of paramount importance not only to the
present generation but also to the generations to come as it involved self-preservation and self-
perpetuation. The Court also invoked the DENR’s mandate to protect and advance the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology of the Filipinos. Thus, the denial or violation of this right by the very entity
entrusted to protect the same produces a cause of a judiciable action.
2. The Court furthered that timber licenses are merely permits granted to do what otherwise would
be illegal and are used to regulate the utilization of its forest resources. Therefore, these privileges may
be revoked at any time through the State’s exercise of its police power. According to the Court, such
rescission will not give rise to impairment of any right.
International Services for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. vs. Greenpeace Southeast Asia
G.R. No. 209271, 8 December 2015
FACTS:
Former President Marcos approved the funding of a BIOTECH at UPLB. In the year 1990,
President Corazon Aquino signed an Executive Order (EO) No. 43 which created the National Committee
on Biosafety of the Philippines (NCBP) which was tasked to 1) identify and evaluate potential hazards
and 2) formulate and review national policies and guidelines on biosafety. A year later, the Philippine
Biosafety guidelines was created by the National Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines.
For two years, the University of the Philippines Los Banos (UPLB) which was the implementing
institution of the field trials, conducted a contained experiment on Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) talong under
the supervision of the National Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines (NCBP) and upon the
completion of the contained experiment, the NCBP issued a certificate stating that all biosafety measures
were complied with, and no untoward incident had occurred.
Respondents filed before the Court a Petition for Writ of Continuing Mandamus and Writ of
Kalikasan with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) alleging
that the Bt Talong field trials violate their constitutional right to a healthful and balanced ecology.
Further, they contended that since the scientific evidence as to the safety of Bt talong remained
insufficient or uncertain, and that preliminary scientific evaluation shows reasonable grounds for
concern, the precautionary principle should be applied and, thereby, the field trials be enjoined.
Later, the Court issued a writ of kalikasan against International Service for the Acquisition of
Agri-Biotech Applications Inc. (ISAAA), EMB/BPI/FPA and UPLB, ordering them to make a verified
return within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days, as provided in Sec. 8, Rule 7, of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases. They all argued that the issuance of writ of kalikasan is not proper
because in the implementation of the Bt talong project, all environmental laws were complied with,
including public consultations in the affected communities, to ensure that the people's right to a balanced
and healthful ecology was protected and respected. They also asserted that the Bt talong project is not
covered by the Philippine Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) Law and that Bt talong field trials will
neither significantly affect the quality of the environment nor pose a hazard to human health.
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of respondents and directed petitioners to permanently cease and
desist from conducting the Bt talong field trials.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Greenpeace, et. al. has a legal standing
2. Whether or not the law on environmental impact statement/assessment applies on projects
involving the introduction and propagation of GMOs in the country
3. Whether or not there is neglect or unlawful omission committed by the public respondents in the
processing and evaluation of the applications for Bt talong field testing.
RULING:
1. Greenpeace et. al has a legal standing. The liberalized rule on standing is now enshrined in the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases which allows the filing of a citizen suit in environmental
cases. The provision on citizen suits in the Rules “collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct
interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature,” and aims to “further encourage the
protection of the environment.”
2. YES. The law on environmental impact assessment applies on projects with regards to the
propagation of the GMOs in the Philippines. EO 514 mandates that concerned departments and agencies,
most particularly petitioners DENR-EMB, BPI and FPA, to make a determination whether the EIS system
should apply to the release of GMOs into the environment and issue joint guidelines on the matter.
3. YES. It must be stressed that DAO 2002-08 and related DA order are not the only legal bases for
regulating field trials of GM plants and plant products. EO 514 clearly provides that the NBF applies to
the development, adoption and implementation of all biosafety policies, measures and guidelines and in
making biosafety decisions concerning the research, development, handling and use, transboundary
movement, release into the environment and management of regulated articles.
Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers
G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016
(Petition for review on certiorari)
FACTS:
Sangguniang Panglungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance 0309 s. 2007 imposing a ban on aerial
spraying as an agricultural practice by all agricultural entities within Davao City. The ordinance entitled
“An Ordinance Banning Aerial Spraying as an Agricultural Practice in all Agricultural Activities by all
Agricultural Entities in Davao City” shall be enforceable three months after the effectivity of such
Ordinance. Punishment in the form of imprisonment and fines was also mentioned in the ordinance.
Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association (PBGEA) challenged the Constitutionality
of the ordinance, arguing that it was 1) an unreasonable exercise of police power; 2) a violation of equal
protection; and 3) was confiscatory. Residents living near banana plantations, led by Wilfredo Mosqueda.
Intervened.
The lower court ruled that the ordinance is a valid police power exercise. Aerial spraying was
distinct because of the higher health risk it caused to residents. However, the Court of Appeals reversed
the judgment of the Regional Trial Court. It declared the ordinance as void and unconstitutional for being
unreasonable and oppressive and that the ordinance did not make reasonable distinction between the
hazards, safety and beneficial effects of liquid substances that were being applied aerially and that these
substances could be beneficial and could enhance agricultural production.
The City of Davao and the intervenors filed their respective motions for reconsideration, but the
CA denied the motions. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Ordinance No. 0309 is unconstitutional
RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court took judicial notice of significance of banana industry, and that the
Sangguniang Panglungsod of Davao did have authority to pass the ordinance. The ordinance, however,
violates substantive due process in the imposition of the 3-month compliance period (physically
impossible to implement the needed changes within the given period); buffer zone was not confiscatory
because it did not divest owner of beneficial use of property; ordinance violated equal protection in that
the means (prohibition on aerial spraying) was not based on substantial distinction (because the problem,
pesticide drift, still occurs with ground-based spraying).
For an ordinance to be valid, the following are the requisites:
(1) it must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) it must be fair, not oppressive;
(3) it must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) it must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) it must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) it must not be unreasonable.
The Court denies the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari for their lack of merit and
affirms the decision declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07 unconstitutional.
Maynilad Water Services, Inc. v. Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
G.R. Nos. 202897, 206823 & 207969, August 6, 2019
(Petitions for Review on Certiorari)
FACTS:
On ApriI 2, 2009, the Regional Office of the DENR Environmental Management Bureau-Region
III (EMB-RIII) filed a complaint before the DENR's Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) charging MWSS
and its concessionaires, MAYNILAD and MANILA WATER, with failure to provide, install, operate, and
maintain adequate Wastewater Treatment Facilities (WWTFs) for sewerage system resulting in the
degraded quality and beneficial use of the receiving bodies of water leading to Manila Bay, and which
has directly forestalled the DENR's mandate to implement the operational plan for the rehabilitation and
restoration of Manila Bay and its river tributaries.
Prompted by the said complaints, the SENR issued a Notice of Violation (NOV) which
determined petitioners' violation of Section 8 of the Clean Water Act, in that they have not provided,
installed, or maintained sufficient WWTFs and sewerage connections satisfactory enough in quantity to
meet the standards and objectives of the law, notwithstanding court orders and the lapse of the five-year
period provided by the Clean Water Act.
Petitioners submitted their respective answers to the charges before the Pollution Adjudication
Board (PAB) and claimed that they were compliant with the law. The SENR ruled, citing the MMDA v.
Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, that strict compliance with the Clean Water Act is a necessary given,
and the five-year periodic review stipulated in the Agreements between petitioners should have
considered and factored in the requirements of the Clean Water Act. Upon recommendation of the PAB,
the SENR found MWSS, Maynilad, and Manila Water liable for violation of the Clean Water Act.
Petitioners filed separate petitions for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court before the Court of
Appeals questioning these Orders of the SENR. However, the CA likewise dismissed the same. Hence,
this consolidated petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners violated the Clean Water Act
RULING:
YES. The wording of the law is clear that petitioners violated Section 8 of the Clean Water Act
and should be fined for such. Through legislative act of police power, the enactment of the Clean Water
Act directs the obligation onto the water concessionaires to provide for a proper sewerage and septage
system that complies with environmental and health standards to protect present and future generations.
The magnitude of this law is highlighted by the trust relationship among the State, concessionaires, and
water users, which must reflect a universal intangible agreement that water is an ecological resource that
needs to be protected for the welfare of the citizens.
This Court introduces the Public Trust Doctrine based on the basic precept that water is a vital
part of human existence. This aims to put an additional strain upon the duty of the water industry to
comply with the laws and regulations of the land. Doctrines have protected and sanctified public welfare
highlighting State’s roles thereto. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution elaborates on
the ownership of the State over the nation's natural resources and its right and duty to regulate the same.
This provision is the embodiment of jura regalia, or the Regalian doctrine, which reserves to the State
ownership of all natural resources and its sovereign power as owner of lands of the public domain and
of the patrimony of the nation. Sources of water form part of this patrimony.
This further enjoins not only petitioners herein, but all water supply and sewerage facilities
and/or concessionaires in Metro Manila and other highly urbanized cities as defined in Republic Act
No. 7160 or the Local Government Code, in the strict compliance with Section 8 of Republic Act No.
9275 or the Philippine Clean Water Act.
Arigo, et al vs. Swift, et al
G.R. No. 206510, September 1, 2014
(Petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan)
FACTS:
While transiting the Sulu Sea, the USS Guardian, a US Navy ship, ran aground on the South
Shoal of Tubbataha Reefs, a restricted and marine protected area considered as a World Heritage Site.
Petitioners on their behalf and in representation of their respective sector/organization and others, filed
the present petition against the commanding officer of said ship.
Notwithstanding the fact that the US Government was made to undertake salvage operations to
remove the grounded ship from the coral reef, the petitioners implored for an issuance of a Writ of
Kalikasan with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) under
Rule 7 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, otherwise known as the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
(Rules), in reference to the violations of environmental laws and regulations which emanated from the
grounding of the US military ship, USS Guardian, over the Tubbataha Reefs. For the petitioners, the US
respondents were civilly, criminally and administratively liable for the acts committed as it were to have
had violated their constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology since these events mainly yield
to environmental damage of such magnitude that these affect not only Tubbataha Reefs but the
surrounding provinces as well. In addition, the petitioners wished that the respondents produce
compensation for the damages caused in relation thereto.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the US respondents who did not submit any
pleading in the case.
2. Whether or not there is a waiver of immunity from suit in the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)
that would make the US respondents liable.
RULING:
1. The US respondents, being in their official capacity, is not within the jurisdiction of our courts.
This inhibition to implead a foreign state in a local jurisdiction is expressed in the maxim par in parem,
non habet imperium, that is, “all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one
another”. This is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly
performed by them in the discharge of their duties. Moreover, if the judgment against such officials will
require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as, in this case, the
appropriation of the amount needed to pay regarding the damages awarded against them, the suit must
be treated as one against the state itself albeit it has not been formally impleaded.
2. Since the alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on
the TRNP was committed while the US respondents were performing official military duties, the suit is
deemed to be one against the US itself as the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require
remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government. Therefore, the principle of State
immunity bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents.
The waiver of state immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special
civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan. On the other hand, the Court
cannot grant the additional reliefs prayed for in the petition to order a review of the VFA and to nullify
certain immunity provisions thereof. As held in BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Exec. Sec.
Zamora, the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by
the United States as attested and certified by the duly authorized representative of the United States
government. The VFA being a valid and binding agreement, the parties are required as a matter of
international law to abide by its terms and provisions. The present petition under the Rules is not the
proper remedy to assail the constitutionality of its provisions.
Segovia, et. al. vs. Climate Change Commission
G.R. No. 211010, March 7, 2017
(Petition for the issuance of writs of kalikasan and continuing mandamus to compel the implementation of
environmental laws and executive issuances)
FACTS:
As a response to climate change, AO 171 created the Presidential Task Force on Climate Change
(PTFCC) on 2007. This body was reorganized through EO 774, supplemented by AO 254 in 2009, which
expressed what is now referred to by the petitioners as the "Road Sharing Principle." The Department
of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) shall reform the transportation sector to reduce the
consumption of fossil fuels. The new paradigm in the movement of men and things must follow a simple
principle: "Those who have less in wheels must have more in road." For this purpose, the system shall
favor nonmotorized locomotion and collective transportation system.
Later that same year, Congress passed the Climate Change Act. It created the Climate Change
Commission which absorbed the functions of the PTFCC and became the lead policy-making body of the
government which shall be tasked to coordinate, monitor and evaluate the programs and action plans of
the government relating to climate change.
Herein petitioners pleaded for the implementation of the Road Sharing Principle, demanding the
reform of the road and transportation system. Having not received any response, they filed a petition
claiming that they are entitled to the issuance of the extraordinary writs due to the alleged failure and
refusal of respondents to perform acts mandated by environmental laws. Petitioners contend that
respondents' failure to implement the foregoing laws and executive issuances resulted in the continued
degradation of air quality in violation of the petitioners' constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology, and may even be tantamount to deprivation of life, and of life sources or "land, water, and
air" by the government without due process of law. They also decry the "unequal" protection of laws in
the prevailing scheme, claiming that ninety-eight percent (98%) of Filipinos are discriminated against by
the law when the car-owning two percent (2%) is given almost all of the road space and while large
budgets are allocated for construction and maintenance of roads, hardly any budget is given for
sidewalks, bike lanes and non-motorized transportation systems.
Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, sought the outright dismissal of the
petition for lack of standing and failure to adhere to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Moreover,
respondents argued that petitioners are not entitled to the reliefs prayed for. In response, petitioners
reiterated the arguments they raised in this Petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have standing to file the petition;
2. Whether or not the petition should be dismissed for failing to adhere to the doctrine of hierarchy
of courts; and
3. Whether or not a Writ of Kalikasan and/or Continuing Mandamus should be issued.
RULING:
1. The Court agrees with the petitioners' position. The Rule of Procedure for Environmental Cases
(RPEC) did liberalize the requirements on standing, allowing the filing of citizen's suit for the
enforcement of rights and obligations under environmental laws.
2. The petition should not be dismissed. At the very least, the magnitude of the ecological problems
contemplated under the RPEC satisfies at least one of the exceptions to the rule on hierarchy of courts, as
when direct resort is allowed where it is dictated by public welfare. Given that the RPEC allows direct
resort to this Court, it is ultimately within the Court's discretion whether or not to accept petitions
brought directly before it.
3. Writ of Kalikasan and/or Continuing Mandamus should not be issued.
It is well-settled that a party claiming the privilege for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan has to
show that a law, rule or regulation was violated or would be violated. In this case, apart from repeated
invocation of the constitutional right to health and to a balanced and healthful ecology and bare
allegations that their right was violated, the petitioners failed to show that public respondents are guilty
of any unlawful act or omission that constitutes a violation of the petitioners' right to a balanced and
healthful ecology.
Similarly, the writ of continuing mandamus cannot issue. Mandamus lies to compel the
performance of duties that are purely ministerial in nature, not those that are discretionary, and the
official can only be directed by mandamus to act but not to act one way or the other. At its core, what the
petitioners are seeking to compel is the manner of implementation of the Road Sharing Principle. Clearly,
petitioners' preferred specific course of action to implement the Road Sharing Principle finds no textual
basis in law or executive issuance for it to be considered an act enjoined by law as a duty, leading to the
necessary conclusion that the continuing mandamus prayed for seeks not the implementation of an
environmental law, rule or regulation, but to control the exercise of discretion of the executive as to how
the principle enunciated in an executive issuance relating to the environment is best implemented. Hence,
the continuing mandamus cannot issue.
The allegations and supporting evidence in the petition fall short in showing an actual or
threatened violation of the petitioners' constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology arising
from an unlawful act or omission by, or any unlawful neglect on the part of, the respondents that would
warrant the issuance of the writs prayed for. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
