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FIRST DIVISION

MARIA VICTORIA A. REYES, G.R. No. 237201

Petitioner,
Present:

- versus - PERALTA, CJ, Chairperson,

CAGUIOA,
LAZARO-JAVIER,
ISABEL MENDOZA MANALO, DELOS SANTOS,* and
CELSO MENDOZA, JOSEPHINE GAERLAN,** JJ
GONZALES, ISAGANI BLANCO,
and all persons acting for ancll in
their behalf,
Respondents.

D E CISION

PERALTA, C.J. :

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45

of the Rules of Comi seeking to nullify and set aside the Decision I dated
February 13, 2017 and the Resolution2 dated January 11, 2018 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 145429, which set aside the July 6,
2015 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pinamalayan, Oriental
M indoro, Branch 41, which, in turn, affirmed the November 10, 2014
Decision4 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Pinamalayan, Oriental
Mindoro, that granted the complaint for unlawful detainer filed by petitioner
against respondents.

The antecedent facts are as follows.

Designated additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez per Raffle dated
August 19, 2020.
.. Designated additional member per Special Order No. 2788 dated September 16, 2020.
Penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang (now a member of this Court, wi th Associate
Justices Mario V. Lopez (now also a member of this Court) and Myra V. Garcia-Ferrnandez, concurring;
rollo, pp. 199-205.
2
Id. at 208-209.
Penned by Presiding Judge Harry D. Jaminola, id. at 139- 144.
Penned by Judge Rosalie A. Lui, id. at 115-11 7.
Decision - 2- G.R. No. 237201

At the heart of the present dispute is a parcel of land with an area of

19,735 square meters, more or less, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No: J-7757 (T-1120), in the name of the spouses Asuncion Mercader
and Damian Reyes, and situated in Pinamalayan, Province of Oriental
Mindoro. On September 2, 2014, petitioner, Maria Victoria A. Reyes, filed
a Complaint5 for unlawful detainer as a co-owner of the subject property,
granddaughter of the deceased spouses Asuncion and Damian, and daughter
of the spouses' son, Rufino Reyes. In the complaint, she alleged that her
grandparents owned and possessed the subject property and that during their
lifetime, they hired farmworkers and administrators to m·ake the same
productive. The property was once a part of a coconut plantation straddling
Barangays Zone I, II, and Marfrancisco and used to include the present site
of the St. Agustine Church and the Immaculate Heart of Mary Academy.
Victoria narrated that her grandmother, Asuncion, died in 1939, her
grandfather, Damian, died in 1979, and her father, Rufino, died in 1982.
Thereafter, in 1999, Victoria and her co-heirs extrajudicially adjudicated the
subject property. 6

Victoria maintained that, for years her family allowed and tolerated
political supp011ers from Marinduque to occupy and cultivate portions of the
property. Throughout the years, Pinamalayan became urbanized making the
subject property ideal for residential and commercial purposes. As such,
informal settlers, including the respondents Isabel Mendoza Manalo, Celco
Mendoza, Josephine Gonzales, Isagani Blanco, also occupied the premises.
According to Victoria, her family tolerated the respondents' use and
possession thereof with the understanding that in the event that they would
need the same, the occupants would vacate peacefully. She added that
respondents built structures for residential and commercial purposes without
permission from her family's predecessors. 7

During her inspection of the property in February 2014, she

discovered that respondents occupied the same in the following proportions:
Isabel Mendoza Manalo and Celso Mendoza with a total of 1,350 square
meters, Josephine Gonzales with a total of 350 square meters, and Isagani
Blanco with a total of 1,000 square meters. As Victoria and her co-owners
now need the property, she demanded that they vacate the premises through
letters sent to each of the respondents in April and July 2014. But despite
these demands, respondents remained in their respective portions. As a
result, Victoria filed the subject complaint before the MTC for unlawful
detainer with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order/preliminary injunction and damages. The MTC, however, denied the
prayer for the issuance of an injunction. 8

Rollo, pp. 30-53.

Id. at 200.
Id. at 200-20 I.
Id. at 201.
Decision -3- G.R. No. 237201

Despite receipt of summons, respondents failed to file their Answer

on time, filing the same 33 days late. Consequently, Victoria moved that
judgment be rendered which was, however, opposed by respondents who
argued that the case involves documents and transactions which happened
almost 70 years ago. As such, it took them several days to find the
necessary documents to prove ownership as they had to make a research in
the archive of the Clerk of Court and the office of the notary public
involved. They also had a hard time looking for their counsel to represent
them in the instant case. 9

The MTC, however, did not give credence to respondents' arguments

and instead, granted Victoria's Motion to Render Judgment, eventually
rendering a Decision on November 10, 2014 granting Victoria's complaint
for unlawful detainer. It disposed of the case as follows :

WHEREFORE, finding the allegations of the plaintiff to be with

merit, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants . Defendants, their privies and all persons claiming rights under
them are hereby ordered to:

I. Vacate the property and surrender possession thereof to

plaintiff.

2. Remove [the] house, improvements, and structures found

therein.

3. Pay attorney's fees in the amount of Phpl0,000.00.

4. Pay the Cost of suit.

SO ORDERED. 10

On July 6, 2015, the RTC rendered a Decision affim1ing the MTC

ruling. It held that the MTC was correct in acting expediently pursuant to
the summary nature of the unlawful detainer case, in rendering judgment
based on Victoria's complaint, and in disregarding the belatedly-filed
Answers of respondents.

In its Decision dated February 13, 2017, however, the CA set aside
the rulings of the MTC and the RTC. It found that the controversy involved
was not simply an ejectment case wherein the main issue was possession de
facto since there is a need to resolve the issue of ownership in addition to the
issue of possession. As such, it necessitates a full-blown trial on the merits
in an accion reivindicatoria that is cognizable by the RTC. Consequently,
the CA ruled that instead of dismissing the complaint, it is in the interest of
substantial justice that the case be remanded to the RTC to conduct further

9 Id. at 201-202.
10 id. at 117.
Decision -4- G.R. No. 237201

proceedings and try the case as an action for recovery of possession and
ownership. 11

When the appellate court denied Victoria's motion for reconsideration

in its Resolution dated January 11, 2018, she filed the instant petition
invoking the following issues:

I.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
WHEN IT REVERSED THE MIC AND RIC AND ADMITTED
RESPONDENTS ' ALLEGATIONS IN THEIR RESPECTIVE
ANSWERS WHICH WERE FILED 33 DAYS FROM SERVICE OF
SUMMONS.

II.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
WHEN IT ADMITTED RESPONDENTS' ANSWER IN VIOLATION
OF SECTION 6 OF RULE 70 OF THE RULES OF COURT EVEN IF
THE ANSWERS DID NOT CONTAIN ANY EXPLANATION AS TO
ITS LATE FILING.

Victoria posits that the reasons cited by the respondents for their
failure to file their Answers within the reglementary 10-day period are not
cogent reasons to warrant a relaxation of the Rules. 12 Assuming, without
admitting, that respondents have documents which they claimed to be 70
years old, then it would not take them 33 days to produce the same. With
respect to respondents Isagani Blanco and Josephine Gonzales, Victoria
argued that as buyers of the property in 2014, they had the duty to ensure
that the property they were buying had complete documents of ownership.
As for respondents Isabel Mendoza Manalo and Celso Mendoza, Victoria
maintained that if they claimed that they had proof of ownership dating back
to 1944, it should not have taken them 33 days to produce the same.

In addition, she pointed out that the purported transactions being

mentioned by respondents were not among those annotated on the title TCT
No. J-7757 (T-1120) of the subject property. As correctly observed by the
CA, the title embraces a large tract of land, which has been subdivided into
smaller lots, and which contained annotations of sale, including sale to the
Catholic Church way back in 1938 and several other individuals. As such,
assuming arguendo that there is an issue on who really owns the subject
property, Victoria maintained that in an ejectment case such as this, the issue
of ownership is resolved only preliminarily to determine the issue of

II Id. at 203-205.
12 Section 6 of Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 6. Answer. - Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the defendant shall file
his answer to the complaint and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff. Affinnative and negative defenses not
pleaded therein shall be deemed waived, except lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Cross-claims
and compulsory counterclaims not asserted in the answer shall be considered barred. The answer to
counterclaims or cross-claims shall be served and filed within ten (I 0) days from service of the answer in
which they are pleaded. ~
Decision -5- G.R. No. 237201

material possession. At any rate, respondents' Answers with claim of

ownership should not divest the MTC of jurisdiction since jurisdiction is not
dependent on the allegations in the Answer but on the allegations of the
complaint.

The petition is denied.

Prefatorily, We find that contrary to Victoria's contention, the

circumstances of the instant case warrant a relaxation of procedural rules.
Time and again, the Court has ruled that litigation is not merely a game of
technicalities. The law and jurisprudence grant to courts - in the exercise of
their discretion along the lines laid down by this Court - the prerogative to
relax compliance with procedural rules, mindful of the duty to reconcile both
the need to put an end to litigation speedily and the parties' right to an
opportunity to be heard.13 Settled is the principle that procedural rules of the
most mandatory character may be suspended where "matters of life, liberty,
honor or property" warrant its liberal application especially so when
attended by the following: ( 1) special or compelling circumstances, (2) the
merits of the case, (3) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (4) a lack of
any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (5)
the other paiiy will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby." 14 Thus, a liberal
application of procedural rules requires that: (1) there is justifiable cause or
plausible explanation for non-compliance, and (2) there is compelling reason
to convince the court that the outright dismissal would seriously impair or
defeat the administration of justice.15

Here, the Court finds that the ends of justice and fairness would best
be served if respondents are given the full opportunity to present their
defenses in their belatedly-filed Answers. In the first place, the Answers
contain meritorious arguments as to why and how respondents have come to
possess the subject property. According to them, they have been in
possession of the same as early as 1944 through their predecessors-in-
interest and have valid and legal documents to show ownership thereof. But
since the necessary documents are almost 70 years old, they encountered
several delays and setbacks in their search. In addition, they similarly faced
challenges in their search for legal representation.

Second, as the respondents pointed out, Victoria presented no

evidence to show that the parcels of land belonging to them are still included
in her reconstituted TCT. No subdivision plan was submitted. As aptly found
by the appellate court, the subject property is a large tract of land totaling an
area of 19,735 square meters, more or less. A perusal of the TCT would

13 Spouses Edillo v. Spouses DuLpina, 624 Phil. 587, 597 (20 I 0).
14 Villanueva v. People, 659 Phil. 4 l 8, 430 (2011).
15 Pagadora v. !lao, 678 Phil. 208, 226 (201 I).
Decision - 6- G.R. No. 237201

show that certain portions of the subject property have been subdivided and
even sold to several third persons. Thus, it is not far-fetched that the portions
actually being possessed by the respondents were acquired by their
predecessors-in-interest by virtue of a sale.

Third, it must be noted that the respondents and their predecessors-in-

interest have built their homes on the subject property and have allegedly
been residing thereat for decades. Thus, an irreparable and grave injustice
would certainly befall upon respondents if the MTC's order to vacate and
demolish their houses thereon is summarily executed. Besides, it cannot be
said that Victoria would be unjustly prejudiced by a full-blown trial as she is
neither stripped of any affirmative defenses nor deprived of due process of
law. Indeed, the Court must relax the rigid application of the rules of
procedure to afford the paiiies opportunity to fully ventilate the merits of
their cases, in line with the time-honored principle that cases should be
decided only after giving all parties the chance to argue their causes and
defenses. 16 This is especially since respondents' seemingly meritorious
claims would remain unventilated unless We relax our application of the
technical requirements under the Rules.

Having resolved the procedural hurdles of the present case, the Court
further resolves to deny Victoria's request to reinstate the rulings of the
MTC and the RTC which granted her complaint for unlawful detainer. Time
and again, the Court has held that a person claiming to be the owner of a
piece of real property cannot simply wrest possession thereof from whoever
is in actual occupation of the property. To recover possession of real
prope11y, said party claiming to be the owner thereof must first resort to the
proper judicial remedy, and thereafter, satisfy all the conditions necessary
for such action to prosper. Accordingly, the owner may choose among three
kinds of actions to recover possess10n of real property
an accion interdictal, accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria.
Notably, an accion interdictal is summary in nature, and is cognizable by the
proper municipal trial comi or metropolitan trial court. It comprises two
distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry (detentacion) and unlawful
detainer (desahuico). In forcible entry, one is deprived of the physical
possession of real property by means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats,
or stealth, whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds possession
after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any
contract, express or implied. Conversely, an accion publiciana is the
plenary action to recover the right of possession, which should be brought in
the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than
one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of
possession of realty independently of title. Finally, an accion
reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership, also brought in the proper
RTC in an ordinary civil proceeding. 17 It is a suit which has for its object

"
17
Polonco v. Cm, 598 PhH. 952, 960 (2009).
Javelosa v. Tapus, G.R. No. 204361 , July 4, 2018.
~I
vr
Decision -7- G.R. No. 237201

the recovery of possession over the real property as owner. It involves

recovery of ownership and possession based on the said ownership. 18

Here, Victoria elected to file an action for unlawful detainer, claiming

to be the owner of the subject property. As such, she bore the correlative
burden to sufficiently allege, and thereafter prove by a preponderance of
evidence all the jurisdictional facts in the said type of action. Specifically,
Victoria was charged with proving the following jurisdictional facts, to wit:
(i) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or
by tolerance of the plaintiff; (ii) eventually, such possession became illegal
upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter's right of
possession; (iii) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the
property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (iv) within
one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the prope1ty, the
plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment. 19

A cursory perusal of Victoria's complaint, however, would show her

failure to prove the necessary jurisdictional facts of how and when the
respondents entered the subject property, as well as how and when her
family tolerated said respondents' possession. In her complaint, Victoria was
so elusive in her narration of facts that one cannot possibly determine the
details of the element of tolerance. First, she stated that her grandparents,
during their lifetime, "hired farmworkers and administrators to make the
property productive." Then, she revealed that Asuncion died in 1939,
Damian died in 1979, and her father died in 1982. In 1999, she and her co-
heirs extra-judicially adjudicated the subject prope1iy among themselves.
Victoria went on to state that "for years, the Reyes clan has allowed and
tolerated political supporters from Marinduque to occupy and cultivate
portions of the subject property. Through the years, Pinamalayan became
urbanized which made the subject property ideal for residential and
commercial uses. Informal settlers totally unknown to the Reyes clan also
occupied the subject prope1iy." Thereafter, she narrated that "plaintiff
tolerated these settler's possession and use of the subject property with the
understanding that in the event that they would need the same, the tolerated
occupants would vacate and peacefully turn-over the subject lots to the
owners." It was only after the foregoing that Victoria mentioned the
respondents, for the first time, in saying that: "in fact, these tolerated
occupants, including the defendants, built structures for their residential and
even commercial uses without the permission from the plaintiff and her
predecessors. " 20

There arises, then, a consequent vagueness on the element of tolerance

that was imperative upon Victoria to prove. Unfortunately, no clear
allegation was presented as to how the entry of respondents was effected, as

18 Tuazon v. Tuazon, G .R. No. 200115 (Notice), August 1, 2018.

19 Javelosa v. Tapus, supra note 17.
20
Rollo, pp. 3 1-3 3.
 I ' t 4

Decision -8- G.R. No. 23720 1

well as to how and when the dispossession started and who permitted such
alleged entry.21 In her complaint, Victoria makes mention of several
occupants of the subject property at various, unknown periods of time: (1)
"during the lifetime of her grandparents," farmworkers and administrators to
make the property productive; (2) "for years," political supporters from
Marinduque to cultivate the property; and (3) "through the years," informal
settlers totally unknown to the Reyes clan. One can only surmise that
respondents fall under this third category of "informal settlers" who "also
occupied" certain portions of the 19,735-square-meter property.

Lamentably, the vagueness of the complaint is aggravated by

respondents' assertion that they have been in possession of the subject
property as early as 1944 through their precedessors-in-interest, which was
not exactly denied by Victoria. Thus, We find no cogent reason to reverse
the findings of the appellate court in view of Victoria's failure to prove the
jurisdictional fact that respondents' initial possession was effected through
her permission or tolerance or any of her predecessors-in-interest nor as to
when respondents' possession of the properties became unlawful - a
requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case. Victoria
simply declared that "these tolerated occupants, including defendants
(respondents), built structures .. . without permission." Unfortunately for her,
however, mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof. 22

Indeed, the Court has always been consistent in emphasizing that the
fact of tolerance is of utmost importance in an action for unlawful detainer. 23
This rule is so stringent such that the Court categorically declared that
tolerance cannot be presumed from the owner's failure to eject the occupants
from the land. 24 Rather, "tolerance always carries with it 'permission' and
not merely silence or inaction for silence or inaction is negligence, not
tolerance." 25 Accordingly, when the complaint fails to aver the facts
constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state
how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy
should either be an accion publiciana or ace ion reivindicatoria. 26

In view of the foregoing, We sustain the findings of the CA that the

present controversy is not simply an ejectment case wherein the main issue
is possession de facto . A review of the records would reveal an undeniable
reality that there is a need to resolve the issue of ownership to completely
settle the controversy. In fact, it appears that Victoria, herself, has conceded
that the issue of the present case is not merely confined to possession but
necessarily includes ownership when she argued that as buyers of their
respective portions of the subject property, respondents Isagani Blanco and

21 Javelosa v. Tapus, supra note 17, citing Carboni/la v. Abiera, et al., 639 Phil. 473 (20 10).~
22
Javelosa v. Tapus, supra note 17.
23
Id.
24 Id., citing Go, Jr. v. CA, 415 Phil. 172 (2001).
25 Id., citing Dr. Carboni/la v. Abiera, et al., 639 Phil. 482 (20 I0).
26 Id., citing Suarez v. Spouses Emboy, 729 Phil. 315 (2014).
' . ' .
Decision -9- G.R. No. 237201

Josephine Gonzales had the duty to ensure that the same had complete
documents of ownership.

Accordingly, We further affinn the CA's view that instead of

dismissing the complaint that would merely postpone the ultimate reckoning
between the parties, We deem it in the interest of substantial justice to
remand the case to the RTC to conduct further proceedings and try it as an
action for recovery of possession and ownership. Certainly, justice is better
served by a brief continuance, trial on the merits, and a final disposition of
cases before the court. 27 Contrary to Victoria's assertion though, remand
must be made to the RTC and not the MTC. It bears repeating that if,
indeed, Victoria is the owner of the subject property, but possession was
deprived from her for almost 70 years, now almost 80, case law dictates that
she presents her claim before the RTC in an accion reivindicatoria and not
before the MTC in a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer. For even if
she is the owner, possession of the property cannot be wrested from another
who had been in possession thereof for a good 70 years through a summary
action for ejectment. Conversely, whatever may be the character of
respondents' prior possession, if they have in their favor priority in time,
they have the security that entitles them to remain on the property until they
are lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by an accion
reivindicatoria. 28

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED

for lack of merit. The Decision dated February 13, 2017 and the Resolution
dated January 11, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 145429
is AFFIRMED. The instant case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial
Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 41, and the latter is
DIRECTED to conduct further proceedings and try the case as a plenary
action for recovery of possession and ownership.

SO ORDERED.

27 Ramos v. Spouses Alvendia, et al., 589 Phil. 226, 236 (2008).

28 Javelosa v. Tapus, supra note 17, citing Spouses Munoz v. Court of Appeals, 288 Phil. I 00 I
(1992).
 . ..
Decision - 10 - G.R. No. 237201

WE CONCUR:

·~CAGUIOA

EDGAR O L. DELOS SANTOS

Associate Justice

----=,~
SAMUEL .
Associate Justice ·

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that

the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court' s
Division.

.PERALTA