Conventional weapons cause commitment trap

Christine Leah Spring 2017 -- Former Chauncey Postdoctoral Fellow in Grand Strategy, Yale University,
“Conventional Arms and Nuclear Peace,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, vol. 11, no. 1, pp 14-24

What many in the arms control community fail to appreciate, understand, or adequately analyze is how
Conventional Arms and Nuclear Peace

conventional force imbalances play into a state’s security dilemma. Conventional arms imbalances
generally— and US conventional military superiority specifically—are as much potential drivers of nuclear
proliferation and geostrategic instability as nuclear weapons are. American preponderance in power-
projection capabilities has in the past influenced some countries to acquire nuclear weapons as a
deterrent against US intervention. There has been far less effort expended on exploring the relationship between conventional arms and nuclear proliferation than on nuclear arms and
nuclear proliferation. In part, this may be because the spread of conventional weapons is viewed as a serious problem in its own right, possessing its own dynamics and its own bureaucratic and academic constituencies. However,

conventional imbalances are just as important in understanding the threat perceptions that lead states
to acquire nuclear weapons. Why Conventional Military Balances Are Important The relationship between the size of a state’s arsenal
and the resultant proliferation consequences is complex and, at best, only one part of the proliferation puzzle. For the past quarter-century, the US military’s

mastery of precision warfare has provided it with a significant advantage over its prospective rivals . Both
China and Russia are working to offset this advantage, in part by developing their own competing
capabilities. However, according to recent research by national security analyst Matthew Kroenig, there is no clear relationship
between US nuclear force posture and proliferation decisions by other states.1 Indeed, the connection may even be an odd proposition
to make in the first place. That national leaders (aside from a Russian president) would stop to assess US nuclear policy or the size of the US nuclear arsenal before making decisions about nuclear proliferation is a tenuous

states are
assertion. Kroenig’s research addresses an important question, but it does not analyze the role that the geographical deployment of US military forces has on a country’s threat perceptions. In fact,

more likely to confront, and therefore fear, America’s conventional capabilities. This content downloaded from 8.28.179.47 on Sat,
01 Sep 2018 21:20:32 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Conventional Arms and Nuclear Peace Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Spring 2017 15 In the interim, the Russians in particular

are seeking to offset the American advantage in precision-guided munitions by modernizing their
nuclear arsenal and changing nuclear doctrine—even stressing nuclear escalation as a de-escalation
mechanism. What appears clear is that both nuclear and nonnuclear nations see the prospects for conventional
conflict with the United States as a losing proposition. For Russia and China, threatening to escalate
their way out of a conventional loss is clearly an attractive option that Russian nuclear doctrine
suggests is at the forefront of Pres. Vladimir Putin’s strategic planning .2 For nonnuclear states, acquiring
nuclear weapons may be perceived as the only viable deterrent against American aggression. In general,
nuclear weapons are largely seen as an offset to superior conventional capabilities

possessed by an adversary. With Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) ambitions, for instance, evidence suggests that Saddam Hussein, from the mid- and late 1970s onward, was interested in
nuclear weapons for two reasons: deterrence vis-à-vis enemies like Israel and Iran and considerations of national prestige.3 However, Hussein also wanted nuclear weapons as a means of enabling conventional attacks on Israel:
When the Arabs start the deployment, Israel is going to say, “We will hit you with the atomic bomb.” So should the Arabs stop or not? If they do not have the atom, they will stop. For that reason they should have the atom. If we
were to have the atom, we would make the conventional armies fight without using the atom. If the international conditions were not prepared and they said, “We will hit you with the atom,” we would say, “We will hit you with
the atom too. The Arab atom will finish you off, but the Israeli atom will not end the Arabs.”4 The acquisition of nuclear weapons by a weaker state significantly complicates the decision-making calculus of a militarily superior state.
For these reasons, power-projecting states fear nuclear proliferation to both allied and enemy states.5 This is a point worth underscoring and one that is often overlooked when nonproliferation is discussed and its rationale and
purposes debated. These factors demonstrate that the “more may be better” view of nuclear weapons proffered by political scientist Kenneth Waltz is entirely relevant and accurate.6 Waltz famously argued that more nuclear
weapons in the world would tend to increase deterrence among states. That logic is turned on its head in a world with far fewer nuclear weapons and a greater reliance on conventional systems, which may actually be destabilizing.
This was true even before the advent of the atomic bomb. The awesome destructive power of nuclear weapons This content downloaded from 8.28.179.47 on Sat, 01 Sep 2018 21:20:32 UTC All use subject to
https://about.jstor.org/terms Christine Leah and Adam B. Lowther 16 Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Spring 2017 tended to overshadow the failure of conventional deterrence in the decades and centuries preceding the first use of
nuclear weapons.7 Thomas Schelling, an economist and foreign policy scholar, also argued very specifically that more nuclear weapons might enhance strategic stability by increasing the survivability of a nation’s nuclear forces.8

Because states might be more risk acceptant with conventional forces and concepts of first and second
strikes are much less well defined in the conventional realm, stability was much more fragile in the pre-
nuclear age and would likely prove fragile in a world with fewer, or zero, nuclear weapons. Advocates of a world free of nuclear weapons often overlook this point. A world with fewer nuclear, but more conventional,
forces is likely to bring forth new dynamics for arms races, which increase the likelihood of disputes and wars.9 Reducing or eliminating nuclear weapons does not remove proliferation problems from the agenda. Might we fear
arms races in the second conventional age less because of the subnuclear consequences of an advanced conventional missile system, or should we fear it more because of the lower threshold to the use of armed force that might
be involved? A world not anxious about nuclear proliferation is more likely to be anxious about the proliferation of advanced conventional systems. In that world, the knowledge that war might escalate to the use of an immediate
and devastating nuclear strike is gone. This also raises new issues influencing the extent to which a conventional war may be more controllable than a nuclear one. As Lawrence Freedman, the doyen of British strategic studies,
writes, “In principle, denial is a more reliable strategy than punishment because, if the threats have to be implemented, it offers control rather than continuing coercion. With punishment, the [adversary] is left to decide how much
more to take. With denial, the choice is removed.”10 Nuclear Reductions, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Nuclear abolitionists have very different views on the nature of deterrence. Their efforts are based largely on a
fundamental ideological dislike of nuclear weapons rather than a deep understanding or appreciation of them. Global nuclear disarmament, if considered in a vacuum, would make the world safer for US conventional power
projection but would not necessarily promote strategic stability. This observation is made repeatedly by Russian and Chinese analysts, who clearly understand American conventional superiority. On this basis an argument can This
content downloaded from 8.28.179.47 on Sat, 01 Sep 2018 21:20:32 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Conventional Arms and Nuclear Peace Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Spring 2017 17 indeed be made that
global disarmament disproportionately benefits the United States, not regional or global competitors like Russia and China. The effects of conventional capabilities are certainly a neglected topic when compared to the focus on
nuclear arms control over the past seven years. They are generally said to bear, or lack, significance in comparison to WMDs. But does this argument still hold in a world with no nuclear weapons? A great deal of analysis is still
needed to assess whether and how reductions could be managed to the point that no nuclear-armed state has more than a minimum deterrent. For even further reductions to occur, the process would necessarily have to be
multilateral, including China, India, and Pakistan. While China and other states have indicated that they would potentially be willing to enter into negotiations once the United States and Russia reduce their arsenals, they have not
specified at what level of forces this might conceivably take place. In any case, the process would involve complex calculations of deterrence equations involving changing sets of multiple actors as well as conventional imbalances
that are, again, a major source of concern for many countries that may find themselves at odds with the United States. For the “P5” nuclear weapons states (those with permanent seats on the United Nations’ Security Council)
such as Russia and China who are members of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the issue of conventional imbalance compounds the difficulty they face in shaping the perception of some states who suggest that the P5
failed to take significant steps toward nuclear disarmament. Pakistan, for instance, has recently accused the United States and other countries of nuclear hypocrisy, with the Pakistani ambassador to the United Nations saying that a
handful of nuclear-weapon states advocate abstinence for others but are unwilling to give up their large inventories of nuclear weapons or cease modernization efforts. The ambassador also stressed that double standards were
not only evident on nuclear issues but also in the area of conventional arms: “While professing strict adherence to responsible arms transfers, some powerful states continue to supply increasing numbers of conventional weapons
in our region, thereby aggravating instability in South Asia.”11 Indeed, from the Pakistani perspective, the international community does not give enough attention to the issue of vertical proliferation (arms buildup). Certainly, it
should come as no surprise that Pakistan continues to stress the importance of nuclear weapons in acting as a deterrent to perceived Indian conventional military superiority.12 This content downloaded from 8.28.179.47 on Sat,
01 Sep 2018 21:20:32 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Christine Leah and Adam B. Lowther 18 Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Spring 2017 Pakistan has made efforts at addressing issues of conventional force
imbalances with India in the past, but New Delhi has traditionally dismissed these efforts, instead focusing on its larger regional competitor, China.13 The problem in South Asia is therefore at least a trilateral one. However, the
issue speaks to a much larger problem, and that is multilateral conventional arms control. If the India-Pakistan strategic situation offers any lesson, it is that weaker states (such as Pakistan) may desire to develop a “great equalizer”
to achieve the security that they cannot find through traditional (conventional) means. With the United States and Russia undertaking a 90 percent reduction in their nuclear arsenals since the end of the Cold War, it is fair to say
that these efforts have promoted neither goodwill nor a peaceful posture in countries like China or North Korea. We are not suggesting that American nuclear force reductions have pushed Beijing to expand its antiship ballistic
missile inventory, place multiple warheads on its DF-41 ballistic missiles, build artificial islands with deployed military capabilities, or build bases in northern Africa. Nevertheless, it does show that there is little evidence to suggest
that nuclear cuts necessarily lead to a more peaceful security environment. If anything, regional and global security evolve independently of the size and shape of one country’s nuclear arsenal. North Korea, in particular, has
pursued a nuclear weapons program as a means of countering American conventional superiority, paying little or no attention to the United States’ declining nuclear arsenal. Conventional Arsenals, Crisis Stability, and Arms Race

Nuclear reductions have important consequences for both crisis stability and arms race stability .
Stability

Conventional forces differ tremendously from nuclear forces in the way they are organized and operate
and in their destructiveness. These distinctions influence the way in which arms-control arrangements aimed at conventional arms-race stability and crisis stability must be conceptualized in a world
free of nuclear weapons but safe for conventional conflict. To be highly destructive, conventional forces need to be used en masse. Their successful application requires well-organized cooperation between many military units,
often between different types of military forces (land, air, naval, cyber, and space), and, due to the globalization of conflict, also the participation of several allied states granting military support and access. Conventional This
content downloaded from 8.28.179.47 on Sat, 01 Sep 2018 21:20:32 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Conventional Arms and Nuclear Peace Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Spring 2017 19 forces most often seek
military victory, which requires they first defeat adversarial forces before the political objectives of the conflict can be achieved. Also, to be militarily effective, conventional forces need upto-date technology and well-trained troops
that are capable of effectively employing weapons of war. Crisis stability is a term that was perfected in its use during the nuclear age. Crisis stability aims at developing incentives for using the lowest level of military force possible
—all while seeking to prevent escalation. It also seeks to control the emotions that are prevalent in conflict, providing procedures to cope with a crisis. Nuclear reductions and disarmament may make a paradoxical and undesired
contribution; reducing expected levels of death and destruction if war comes might actually increase the probability of the onset of war. Even if two states went to war, one would expect the nuclear sword of Damocles to

the historical record clearly shows there is not the same taboo or norm
incentivize them to end the conflict as soon as possible. In addition,

against using conventional missiles and bombers as there is against using an atomic version .14 Not a
single nuclear warhead has been delivered by any delivery system since 1945. By contrast, over the past
45 years, ballistic missiles were employed in at least six different conflicts: the Egyptian and Syrian
missile attacks on Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the 1980–88 war between Iraq and Iran, the
Afghan civil war of 1988–91, the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the Yemen civil war of 1994, and the 2003 US-
led invasion of Iraq. Indeed the duration and controllability of a war becomes important here. As antinuclear advocate Randall Forsberg admits, The main role of nuclear
weapons has always been to deter conventional war among the world’s “big powers” (the USA, the USSR, the UK, France,
West Germany, China, and Japan) by posing a clear risk that such a war would escalate to nuclear war. If ballistic missiles were abolished, raising
again the prime strategic question of the 1950s—could a conventional war be fought without going nuclear, and if it went nuclear, could it be won?—it would diminish nuclear deterrence of conventional war.15 (emphasis in
original) The fog of war could become much thicker. Even if lower-yield nuclear weapons were used, they could still significantly disrupt command, control, communication, and intelligence. In the conventional world this would be
less of an issue because of the smaller level of destruction, over a much more protracted amount of time, thus enabling more time to react. In the nuclear age, time becomes much more compressed. This content downloaded from

assuming that
8.28.179.47 on Sat, 01 Sep 2018 21:20:32 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Christine Leah and Adam B. Lowther 20 Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Spring 2017 Moreover,

deterrence was still desirable, states would have to rethink how to reorient their forces toward
achieving a conventional second-strike capability . This might lead to a different type of arms race. This concept
was already present before the advent of the bomb, in discussions about the importance of airpower and having enough aircraft to deter aggression among European states.16 All these issues raise the importance of focusing on

Arms race stability aims at lowering incentives to further build

conventional arms control as much as nuclear reductions, especially in the Asia-Pacific.

up military forces. Thus we might conceivably ask: if the United States and Russia reduce their nuclear
arsenals to a few hundred warheads each— and other nations to a few dozen—might we see a nonnuclear arms race to fill a nuclear void?17 As the
2010 Nuclear Posture Review states, “fundamental changes in the international security environment in recent years—including the growth of unrivaled US conventional

military capabilities [and] major improvements in missile defenses . . . enable us to fulfill . . . objectives at
significantly lower nuclear force levels and with reduced reliance on nuclear weapons . . . without jeopardizing our traditional
deterrence and reassurance goals.18 If one accepts this statement, and if opponents of nuclear modernization are truly concerned about

reducing global instability, they should be urging the administration to cancel and eliminate a number of
conventional capabilities that are far more concerning to our adversaries. Granted, such a position is irrational, but if stability is the key then
this is the logical position to hold. Indeed, even with successful elimination of nuclear weapons, the tasks of strategic deterrence ,

extended deterrence, and arms control do not go away. Instead, they become more difficult to manage. This
is especially true for conventional arms control, because nuclear weapons tend to make deterrence
much easier, or so the historical record would seem to indicate. If one argues for further nuclear reductions and nuclear disarmament, then one needs to
 Conventional imbalances and any remaining system of deterrence would increasingly become the focus of deterrence and
be responsible and also think seriously about conventional arms control.

would serve as the source of instability .19 This is especially true because, in many instances, the imbalance and insecurity of a conventional-only world have remained obscured during
the nuclear age.20 This content downloaded from 8.28.179.47 on Sat, 01 Sep 2018 21:20:32 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Conventional Arms and Nuclear Peace Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Spring 2017 21
With Article VI of the NPT obliging nuclear-weapon states to work toward general and complete disarmament of nuclear weapons, would such a treaty be required or feasible in a conventional world? This possibility raises an
important question: to what extent should nuclearweapon states focus on reducing their arsenals as a precondition for conventional disarmament? We have tended to think that it would first be a good idea to reduce nuclear
weapons before reducing conventional forces. However, nuclear weapons are but one component of the overall military balance among states. In an age without nuclear weapons, it is also conceivable that deterrence relationships
will simply not work without boosting some aspects of conventional arsenals. The more-maybe-better logic that Schelling (and others) applied to nuclear weapons may also carry into an entirely conventional era. That is, fewer
nuclear weapons in the world would likely entail more conventional forces to compensate, which would not necessarily be a stabilizing development. For advocates of “global zero,” the implications of a world free of nuclear
weapons are assumed to be inherently positive. However, the reality of such a world may be far less positive because the psychological effect achieved by the understood destructive power of nuclear weapons will no longer push
risk-acceptant national leaders to allow caution to prevail. Given that no current leader of a nuclear-weapon state was even alive prior to the development of the atomic bomb, the security and stability of a nuclear-free world
should not be taken for granted. Instead, much more work is required to understand the implications of such a fundamental change to a proven and stable approach to constraining great-power conflict.

NFU doesn’t solve accidental war---counterforce buildup still risks accidents

Alexander Lanoszka 18, Ph.D. from Princeton, Assistant professor of Political Science at University of
Waterloo, Thomas Leo Scherer, Ph.D. from Princeton in politics, ogprram Officer at the US Institute of
Peace, 02-06-18, “Nuclear ambiguity, no first use, and crisis stability in asymmetric crises,” The
Nonproliferation Review,
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Alexander_Lanoszka/publication/322962076_Nuclear_ambiguity
_no-first-use_and_crisis_s-tability_in_asymmetric_crises/links/5a7d62570f7e9b9da8d78aa2/Nuclear-
ambiguity-no-first-use-and-crisis-s-tability-in-asymmetric-crises.pdf)

Accidental war

The accidental-war pathway resembles the downward-spiral pathway, but it is instead predicated
on organizational and human
fallibility. In this situation, the adversary takes measures to increase the survivability of its forces and deter
an attack by the major power.34 These measures may include bringing weapons closer to launch by raising their
readiness and adopting a launch-on-warning posture , as well as policies to prevent leadership decapitation, such as pre-
delegating launch authority. By implementing them, the adversary raises the probability of accidentally launching an attack. This unintentional
first strike can occur in the presence of uncoordinated decision making, poor information flows between various government departments,
technical failures, or even rogue bureaucratic agents acting without authorization from top leadership.35 Had the major power credibly
declared NFU, the adversary would not undertake the risky measures that could produce the accident.

But, for a rational adversary to take only such survivability measures under AFU, it must believe that
these measures are beneficial against a nuclear strike but not against a conventional strike. We can apply the
same logic as before, the difference being that the probability of war represents an accidental initiation by the adversary.
We can say that AFU may be dangerous, but under conditions of overwhelming conventional superiority
we can also say that NFU may be dangerous.

We are not arguing that crisis fears cannot produce accidental war. Other
explanations of accidental war are quite
compelling, but they differ in two ways from the pathway outlined here.36 First, the adversary’s fear springs
not from US nuclear doctrine per se, but rather from US counterforce capabilities. Indeed, growing evidence
from the Cold War suggests that the Soviet leaders grew apprehensive of these capabilities in the 1980s.37 Second,
the adversary’s measures are able to increase survivability. With these stipulations, the threat of any
kind of first strike is dangerous.

It’s impossible to solve Chinese threat perceptions, regardless of our force posture or
declaratory policy
Brendan Rittenhouse Green 17, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Cincinnati;
and Austin Long, Assistant Professor at the School of International and Public Affairs and a Member of
the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, Summer 2017,
“Correspondence: The Limits of Damage Limitation,” International Security, Vol. 42, No. 1, p. 193-207
Finally, damage-limitation capabilities might provide the United States with benefits during peacetime competition. Glaser and Fetter dismiss
one such advantage, increased assurance of U.S. alliance partners, because the United States managed credible reassurance without damage-
limitation capabilities in the much tougher Cold War case (p. 91). In contrast, the fears
induced by these capabilities risk a
spiral of arms racing and hard-line policies from the Chinese (p. 96).

Of all the arguments that Glaser and Fetter offer against damage limitation, this is by far the most powerful. There
are empirical and
theoretical reasons, however, to doubt that the United States will be able to avoid sending malign signals to
the Chinese, regardless of its force posture decisions. Glaser and Fetter’s analysis of U.S. theater missile defense
provides a perfect example

(p. 75): technically,

it is clear that terminal high altitude area defense poses no threat to Chinese strategic
nuclear capabilities, but that has not stopped Beijing from drawing negative inferences about U.S.
intentions.17 Compounding this problem, many surveillance assets vital to damage limitation are
“indistinguishable” from those needed for other purposes. So even if the United States rejects damage
limitation and embraces mutually assured destruction, it would procure [End Page 198] these capabilities
for these other purposes and China would likely infer that the United States was seeking a damage-limiting
capability regardless of U.S. declarations to the contrary.

No war – deterrence mutual interests and interdependence check escalation

Crabtree 16 (James Crabtree, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, “Five reasons why America and
China will not go to war” 5/31/16, Mr James Crabtree, Senior Visiting Research Fellow at the LKY School
and Contributing Editor of the Financial Times, hosted an panel discussion titled “Must America and
China Clash? The Troubled Future of Sino-US Relations” The panelists were Mr Gideon Rachman, Chief
Foreign Affairs Columnist for the Financial Times; Dr Tim Huxley, Executive Director of The International
Institute for Strategic Studies – Asia; and Professor Huang Jing, Director of the LKY School’s Centre on
Asia and Globalisation, and Lee Foundation Professor on US-China Relations. http://global-is-
asian.nus.edu.sg/index.php/five-reasons-why-america-and-china-will-not-go-to-war/ )

Despite these worrisome signs, however, war between the two countries is unlikely, according to experts at a recent panel discussion on the US-China relationship, organised by the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public
Policy. The main deterrent is the threat of nuclear retaliation. While clashes between ruling powers and rising powers

– as the US and China are now, respectively – have led to war in the past, these instances occurred before the nuclear age. Mr Gideon

Rachman, who is the chief foreign affairs columnist for the Financial Times, noted that both the US and China now possess nuclear weapons . He said: “The stakes were much lower in the

past. The leadership of both countries are rational, and neither wants a conflict – one hopes that
because they are both nuclear powers, that it won’t come to war. ” Mr Rachman said, however, that the tensions between the two countries were
unlikely to lead to war: “Rising powers do tend to clash with established powers, and this has led to war in 12 out of 16 cases since the 1500s. But these instances were before the nuclear age, when the stakes were much lower.

One hopes that because both China and the US are nuclear powers, it won’t come to war.” Consensus for war is unlikely China’s economic rise has also increased its
interdependence with the US. China is the US’s largest goods trading partner, with US$598 billion (S$825 billion) in
total, two-way goods trade in 2015. China was also the US’s third-largest goods export market in that year, as well as its largest supplier of goods imports. The multi-faceted relationship
between the two countries reduces the likelihood that either side can achieve an internal consensus for
war. Even if territorial disputes lead to growing tensions, the financial interests of both countries in maintaining a good relationship might trump such disagreements. “ China’s rise has diversified
the US’s interests to such an extent that it’s difficult for any US leader to strike a consensus-based China
policy,” said Professor Huang Jing, who is director of the LKY School’s Centre on Asia and Globalisation, and the Lee Foundation Professor on US-China Relations. “That gives me hope that the interdependence between the
 Foreign entanglement fatigue The US’s
US and China is unprecedented in such a way that you cannot reach a strategic consensus for launching a war against the other side,” he said.

other foreign entanglements and priorities may also dissuade it from war with China. Mr Rachman noted: “The Chinese may
have overstepped the mark (in the South China Sea), but they have been quite intelligent in making each move small enough to make it hard for the US to respond aggressively. “The US also has all these other things going in the

the US and China have shared interests

Middle East, including its fight against ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, a terrorist group).” Cooperation, not conflict In fact,

that might encourage cooperation rather than conflict. In 2014, US President Barack Obama and Chinese
President Xi Jinping announced a historic US-China agreement to combat climate change. The two
countries also worked together, and with others, to forge the global climate agreement in Paris in late 2015. Terrorism and North Korea’s
nuclear threat are other common concerns. Dr Tim Huxley, executive director of The International Institute for Strategic Studies – Asia, said: “Both the US and
China agree that there should be more cooperation and intelligence-sharing in the security sphere .” The
tensions between the two countries may worsen in the short term, but is unlikely to lead to outright war. Prof Huang summed up their relationship: “They might have a messy engagement with each other, with constant
negotiation, but they both want to optimise common interests and manage conflicts. If they both see that they are very close to a fight, they will step back.”