E-Commerce Insights & Trends
E-Commerce Insights & Trends
E-Commerce
1
•Industry Overview :3
• Consumer Behavior Trends : 10
•E-Retail : 16
•Sourcing and Stocking Model : 27
•Online Grocery : 30
•Online Furniture and Handicrafts : 55
•Online Jewellery : 64
•Online Ticketing : 73
•Online Deals : 83
•Online Portals : 92
•Snapdeal : 97
•Flipkart Vs Amazon India : 109
•Udaan : 129
•Paytm Mall : 133
• Infi-beam : 135
• Amazon vs Walmart : 148
•Key Policies and their impact : 154
•Profitability
2 : 156
Industry Overview
3
E-commerce industry is expected to reach Rs. 5800 bn by 2021-
22.
E-COMMERCE SEGMENTS
5
Source: Industry, Company sources
Share of online ticketing has come down while that of online
Retail / Marketplace has gone up.
SEGMENTAL CHANGE
6
Source: Industry, Company sources
E-COMMERCE : GROWTH DRIVERS
•Cash on delivery
7
LONG-TAIL: WHAT IS IT?
•A brick and mortar (store based) book retailer is considering which titles to stock.
There are 100 titles. Each of the top 10 titles sell on an average of 9 units per month
while each of the remaining 90 titles sell only one unit per month.
1. Draw the line graph with the titles as “x” axis and the sales per month as “Y”
axis.
2. What is the share of top 10 titles and the remaining 90 titles in the overall sales?
3. Which of the titles store based retailer can sell and which of the titles online
8
9
10
2
4
7
9
0
1
3
Sales per month5
6
8
1
4
7
10
13
16
19
22
25
28
31
34
37
Title
40
43
46
49
52
55
58
61
64
67
70
73
76
79
82
85
88
91
94
97
100
Sales per month
E-Commerce constitute a tiny fraction of overall retail in India
10
Consumer Behavior Trends
11
Overview 12
Average retail e-commerce revenue per user in India from 2016 to 2022
(in U.S. dollars)
Source: Statista
Digital buyers 17
Source: statista
Shopping behavior 22
17
E-retail segment is expected to grew at CAGR of 28-33%
between 2018-19 and 2021-22.
18
Source: Crisil Research
E-retail constitute only 2% of the overall retail in India.
2018-19
19
Even in 2021-22, e-retail penetration will be low across several
categories.
E-RETAIL PENETRATION
20
Share of categories sold online has significantly changed in the last
few years
22
CONSUMER ELECTRONICS
• Even in the online mobile market, the share of relatively low value
23
APPARELS
24
NEWER SEGMENTS
25
SEGMENT WISE GROWTH EXPECTATIONS
28
There are 3 business models in online retailing : Drop shipping
model, On-demand sourcing model, Stocking model.
29
BUSINESS MODELS IN ONLINE RETAILING
30
Online Grocery
31
Online grocery retail is expected to grow at 57-62% between
2018-19 to 2021-22 to reach $375bn.
Business Models
33
Many players entered the grocery segment between 2012 to 2015
through hyper-local model.
•the execution time is relatively low, as the orders were delivered from a
34
MARGIN COMPARISON (ILLUSTRATION) : INVENTORY
MODEL VS HYPERLOCAL MODEL
•Average Customer Order Size: Rs. 500 •Average Customer Order Size: Rs. 250
• Gross Margin (20%): Rs. 100 • Gross Margin (5%): Rs. 12.50
• Transportation cost per order: Rs. 20 • Transportation cost per order: Rs. 30
• Average Profit per order: Rs.30 • Average loss per order: Rs. 22.50
35
Apart from lower margins, hyper-local players also face the
problem of inventory tracking and quality.
• Lower Margins
attractive discounts.
• Quality issues
36
Many Online grocers following hyper-local model closed down
in 2015-16.
37
Big Basket and Grofers are the top 3 players in online grocery
segment.
38
BIG BASKET : OVERVIEW
• Largest player in the online grocery segment and operates in 26 cities customer base of 12
million.
• Daily Orders increased from 75000 to 80000 orders day in 2018 to 2.5 lacs -1.3 lacs for BB and
1.2 lacs for micro delivery BB Instant and BB Daily (Pre-Covid)
• Increased its revenues in 2 years from Rs. 1197 crores in FY 2017 to Rs. 2380 crores in 2019
• The company managed to control it’s losses very well. Net Losses reduced from Rs. 653
crores in FY17, from Rs 350 crores in FY19 (in terms of percentage of sales , losses came
down from 54.% to 14.7%.
• Valued at $1.2 bn in October 2019 (Alibaba CDC and Mirae Asset are major investors).
Source:
• https://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/bigbasket-fy-19-loss-widens-to-rs-348-cr-
119112901037_1.html
• https://www.techcircle.in/2020/04/06/exclusive-alibaba-backed-online-grocery-platform-
bigbasket-valued-at-1-2-bn
• https://yourstory.com/2019/06/startup-bigbasket-online-grocery-hari-menon-plans-2020
39
BIG BASKET : ACQUISITIONS AND NEW INITIATIVES
• Big Basket has launched 3 new segments – BB Daily, BB Instant and Beauty Store.
• BigBasket acquired three ventures- RainCan , Morning Cart and Kwik24.
• RainCan and Morning Cart were micro-delivery start-ups while Kwik24 is a smart
vending machine start-up
• Big Basket has branded the micro- delivery service as BB Daily and it’s Vending
machine segment as BB Instant
• Bigbasket’s third new business is the BB Beauty Store.
• BB Daily and BB Instant have two separate apps, while the third is included in Big
Basket’s main app.
• BB Instant and BB Daily to contribute 15-20 percent of the business and BB Beauty Store
to contribute 10% in the near future. .
• Source: https://yourstory.com/2019/06/startup-bigbasket-online-grocery-hari-menon-plans-2020
40
BB DAILY
• On BB Daily, one can subscribe for milk, fruits and vegetables, bread, dairy, eggs,
breakfast cereals, tender coconut, etc for “every day or alternate days”.
• Orders can be placed till 10 pm, and change that subscription too (increase or
decrease the milk quantity etc).
• Delivery happens between 5 am and 7 am.
• CEO, Hari Menon says that this model is working out well, and tender coconut
has become their single largest sale item. “It succeeded because of the ability we
have - processing plants where we clean, process, and package them. We sell
60,000-70,000 nuts a day.”
• Bigbasket’s third new business is the Beauty Store, which was launched in
March 2019.
• Competing with online beauty products retailer Nykaa, this category goes
beyond the usual personal care products that you will find in supermarkets.
• At present, the contribution to overall sales from this category is six-seven
percent; the company aims to grow it to 10 percent this year.
Source: https://yourstory.com/2019/06/startup-bigbasket-online-grocery-hari-menon-
plans-2020
43
PRIVATE LABELS
• Bigbasket’s private label business is also growing driven by lower prices and
higher margins.
• About 35 percent of their revenue is from private labels, which aim to fill the
gap in categories like organic food, high-end consumer products, etc.
• On the B2B side, the company serves its private label to more than a thousand
kiranas, corporates, and HoReCa (hotels, restaurants, cafes).
44
LOYALTY PROGRAMS
Source: https://yourstory.com/2019/06/startup-bigbasket-online-grocery-hari-
menon-plans-2020
45
QUICKER DELIVERY THROUGH DARK STORES
• Big Basket operate with inventory turns of 36 times (as per Marketing Head,
Meera Iyer). This is very good.
• To shorten the delivery time, Big Basket is established multiple small
warehouses in the city (Dark Stores) which are fed by the city’s Central
Warehouse.
• Dark Stores have reduced the distance travelled to the customers’ location.
• Bigbasket now delivers in two hours of customers placing an order in all Tier I
cities
Source: https://yourstory.com/2019/06/startup-bigbasket-online-grocery-hari-menon-
plans-2020
https://www.exchange4media.com/marketing-news/the-biggest-challenge-is-to-get-the-
supply-chain-rightmarketing-headbigbasket-89507.html
46
FASTER SCALING UP IN NEWER CITIES
• Kolkata was the last Tier I city Bigbasket entered and fastest to reach 2000
orders per day.
• In 2019, Bigbasket also entered Kochi, its 26th city.
• According to CEO, Hari Menon, “During pilot, we got 25-30 orders per day in
Kochi. At launch, it jumped to 150 orders per day. Soon we hit 300-400 per day.
In the last Tier II city we launched, it had taken about eight months to reach
these numbers.”
Source: https://yourstory.com/2019/06/startup-bigbasket-online-grocery-hari-
menon-plans-2020
47
GROFERS
•In 2016, the company was in bad shape – making a loss of Rs. 7.2 crores
• It’s delivery costs was high , order size was low and the viability of the
Source:
• https://www.financialexpress.com/industry/after-rough-ride-grofers-takes-a-turn-for-
better-as-revenues-touch-rs-11-7-cr/738672/
• https://yourstory.com/2018/04/grofers-got-online-grocery-game-right-won-rs-400-
crore-softbank/
48
GROFERS TURNAROUND STORY
•In the second half of 2016, the company made the following changes in the business
model:
• Moved from Hyper-Local to Inventory based model.
• Replaced same-day delivery with next delivery
• Over-hauled its delivery mechanism by replacing two-wheelers with mini-trucks
• Increased the assortment of goods (like General Merchandise)
• Introduced Private Labels
• Launched Grofers’ membership/subscription-based service Smart Bachat Club. It
achieved subscription of 1,50,000 in 90 days of its launch.
• Closed Operations in many cities and focused primarily in NCR, Mumbai, Pune
and Bangalore.
Source:
• https://www.financialexpress.com/industry/after-rough-ride-grofers-takes-a-turn-for-
better-as-revenues-touch-rs-11-7-cr/738672/
• https://yourstory.com/2018/04/grofers-got-online-grocery-game-right-won-rs-400-
crore-softbank/
49
GROFERS TURNAROUND STORY: IMPACT OF THE INITIATIVES
• Order size increased from Rs. 750 in July 2016 to Rs. 1000 in December in
2016 and to Rs. 1750 in March 2019
• Daily orders increased from 13000 to 14000 in 2016 to 35000 to 40000 in
2018 and 80,000 to 90,000 orders(pre COVID)
• 40% of sales in 2017 came from private label brands
• 30% reduction in the delivery costs.
• After stabilizing it’s operations, it has expanded to 27 cities
Source:
• https://www.financialexpress.com/industry/after-rough-ride-grofers-takes-a-turn-for-
better-as-revenues-touch-rs-11-7-cr/738672/
• https://yourstory.com/2018/04/grofers-got-online-grocery-game-right-won-rs-400-
crore-softbank/
50
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
• The company’s GMV in FY19 was Rs. 2500 crores, in FY 18 was Rs1200 crore,
up from Rs250 crore in 2016.
• Losses in terms of percentage of sales have come down ( Rs. Rs. 448 crores in
2019 vs Rs200 crore for both financial years 2018 and 2017)
• Major investors – Softbank, Tiger Global, Sequia.
• SoftBank Vision Fund (SVF) Growth has valued Grofers International at
around $643.52 million in Series F round (December 2019)
Source:
• https://www.financialexpress.com/industry/after-rough-ride-grofers-takes-a-turn-for-
better-as-revenues-touch-rs-11-7-cr/738672/
• https://yourstory.com/2018/04/grofers-got-online-grocery-game-right-won-rs-400-
crore-softbank/
• https://entrackr.com/2019/12/exclusive-softbank-valued-grofers-644-mn/
51
NEW ENTRANTS
“In the very near future, JioMart and WhatsApp will empower nearly three crore
small Indian kirana shops to digitally transact with every customer in their
neighbourhood. This means all of you can order and get faster delivery of day-to-day
items from nearby local shops. At the same time, small kiranas can grow their
52
NEW ENTRANTS
FLIPKART “SUPERMART”
• In February 2019, Flipkart s launched its online grocery store
Flipkart Supermart in the city.
• As part of the launch, Flipkart Supermart promises free delivery on orders above
Rs. 600, the best prices on top brands, and Re. 1 deals.
• Flipkart has set up a separate supply chain for groceries in the city that includes
fulfillment centers and a last-mile delivery network.
• By September 2019 had on-boarded nearly 27,000 kirana shops across 700 cities
to strengthen its pan-India supply chain and expand its reach in the tier 2 and
tier 3 cities.
• Flipkart is contemplating to go for partnership with local stores offering its
customers a "touch and feel" experience, at least for some products.
• Flipkart proposes to have authorised "buy zones" where a customer can walk in
and check a product but he or she has to order it online.
55
Online Furniture and Handicrafts
56
Online Furniture and Handicrafts is expected to increase 1.7 times
between 2018-19 and 2021-22.
URBAN LADDER
FY 2019 FY 2018
PEPPERFRY
FY 2019 FY 2018
Revenues Rs. 206.8 crs Rs. 140.6 crores
Profit/Loss Rs. 183 crs Rs. 106.7 crs
Source:
https://yourstory.com/2019/11/urban-ladder-doubles-revenues-profitable-
narrows-losses-fy19
https://www.business-standard.com/article/companies/pepperfry-loss-widens-
to-rs-183-crore-now-trails-urban-ladder-119113000989_1.html
58
Urban Ladder achieved profitability due to increased volumes and
change in the business model.
• Increased volumes (Operating Revenues doubled from Rs. 15crs to Rs. 298
crores).
• Change in its business model from being an online marketplace service
provider and to commence operating as a retail seller of its own brand of
furniture both online and offline.
• A hybrid sales model helped the company to cater to a larger audience and
processed more sales orders in 2018-19.
Source: https://entrackr.com/2019/11/urban-ladder-posts-a-rs-50-crore-profit-in-
fy19-but-has-a-long-way-to-go/
59
Competition from Brick and Mortar Players
• Several players such as Ikea and US furniture major Ashley have entered the
Indian furniture market.
• Ikea has plans to invest Rs 7 billion to set up 25 stores across the country.
Ashley also recently set up a store in India, with an aim to increase the count
to 100 stores.
60
Tier I demand forms backbone of online furniture industry
• More than 80% of the online furniture demand is from Tier I cities, as top
industry players have a presence in over 20 of them.
• Limited space along with the need to accommodate household essentials has
made online furnishing websites popular in cities.
• Players such as Urban Ladder and Pepperfry have tie-ups with several
suppliers, and display over 0.1 million products on their websites.
• They offer a wide variety of designs and colours, which are generally not
available in the brick-and-mortar setup owing to limitations of physical
display.
• Mushrooming of e-retail players in the furniture and handicrafts space has
changed the styling pattern of interiors.
• The festive season and wedding season typically see high demand for
furniture and handicrafts.
• From wall paintings to clocks, coffee tables, sofas and beds, consumers are
ordering a wide range of products online.
61
OMNI-CHANNEL ROUTE TO DRIVE GROWTH
• Although the biggest edge for the online furniture industry is no requirement
of physical space for display, players like Pepperfry have taken the offline route
to connect more strongly with customers.
• With its 42 studios, the company offers live experience to customers by
showcasing a few products and helping customers better visualise designs.
•In fact, over 25% of the Pepperfry’s sales is estimated to come from these
studios.
•On similar lines, Urban Ladder has opened 8 brick and mortar stores.
62
LOGISTICS AND RETURNS ARE A MAJOR CHALLENGE
Furniture rentals, a newer business model, is making inroads into the sector.
64
Online- Jewellery
65
Online jewellery expected to grow at a CAGR of 35 to 40% between
2018-19 to 2021-22..
BLUESTONE VS CARATLANE
67
ONLINE JEWELLERY : GROWTH DRIVERS
Players mostly see demand for smaller ticket-size ornaments like rings. They are
coming up with new, modern and light-weight designs to attract customers.
•Pre-Sales Assistance/Consultancy Services: Companies have started providing pre-
sales assistance and consultancy services aggressively. For example, if a customer is
not sure of whether how the design look like on reality or if there are sizing issues,
the company can arrange free trial with dummy of the product at a door step of the
customers. Through this, the customer gets to look and feel the jewellery and its
design.
68
ONLINE JEWELLERY : GROWTH DRIVERS
69
Different models are followed in the online jewellery segment.
OPERATING MODELS
70
ONLINE JEWELLERY MARGINS
71
ONLINE JEWELLERY MARGINS
72
OMNI CHANNEL STRATEGY
Considering the high value of jewellery, the customers' need to touch and feel
it cannot be completely replaced by multiple trial and return options.
Considering benefits of both online and offline presence for growth, players
are adopting omni-presence strategy for growth.
stores across the country, several established jewellers like Tanishq, TBZ and
Kalyan have tie-ups with Flipkart and Amazon to sell their products online.
73
Segmental Analysis: Online Ticketing
74
Online ticketing growth is expected to double between
2018-19 and 2021-22.
CONSOLIDATION
• Two major players in the travel industry, MakeMyTrip and Ibibo Group, have
merged and MakeMyTrip owns 100% of Ibibo Group.
• The combined entity holds a substantial market share (60% of the travel
industry)
• The industry now comprises three major players: MakeMyTrip, Cleartrip and
Yatra.
• All three players have strong promoters backing them and will be able to fend
off any pricing pressure from peers.
• Other recent acquisitions include – Yatra acquiring ATB (Corporate travel
service provider), Paytm acquiring Insider.in (event ticketing platform).
Yatra.com has partnered with OYO to increase its inventory of hotels, especially
in the budget hotels category.
• Consolidation in the industry is expected to ease pricing pressure and improve
profitability in the long-term.
78
RECENT M&As
Source: Industry
79
OTHER EMERGING TRENDS:
Micro-event ticketing
• Large online ticketing players like Kyazoonga and Bookmyshow.com are
getting into 'micro event' ticketing. Kyazoonga has come up with 'iTicket' that
allows users to create events, price tickets and sell them using the platforms.
• Micro events can be anything - startup meets, training events, employee get-
togethers, alumni get together, niche music events, kitty parties and even
cocktail parties.
Selling Merchandise
• Movie/ event-based online ticketing websites have started to diversify into
online retail.
• For example, a website selling event-based tickets for, say, a concert of
Metallica also retails related merchandise such as t-shirts, caps and other
related products.
• Such companies are already witnessing frenetic growth in online retail sales.
80
OTHER EMERGING TRENDS:
Package Deal
• Some websites are offering a package deal: for events of any scale, they
arrangements.
81
Competition from OYO and increasing marketing expenses will be a
challenge for the players despite consolidation.
PROFITABILITY
• Going forward, margins to slightly improve on account of consolidation in the
industry.
• As operational costs do not rise drastically for the players with increase in
revenue, a rise in sales volume will aid operational profitability.
• However, marketing expense in the hotel and travel packages segment will
increase as the companies look to increase their market penetration and
competition grow.
• Further, the increase in the margins will be partially offset by pricing pressure in
the hotels segment, due to competition from OYO Rooms.
• But the extent of competition will be limited as all existing players have strong
promoter backing, making it difficult for any company to topple the rivals
82
MakeMyTrip, reported loss at the operating level for fiscal 2018 as it
doubled its marketing costs compared with previous year.
84
OVERVIEW
•The market for online deals in India began with non-travel services such as
restaurants, spas, tattoos, etc but now has expanded to products also.
•Through this segment, the service providers can off-load excess inventory at
discounted prices and improve the demand during the lean period.
85
MAJOR PLAYERS IN THE SEGMENT
86
Online deals companies follow full payment or token payment or
no payment model.
87
Online Deals segment has been growing at a CAGR of close to
35% in the last 3 years.
89
Source: Crisil Research
SEGMENT OVERVIEW
The number of players in the online deals segment is relatively large at over
100, with Nearbuy, Coupondunia and CashKaro being the major players.
While the segment comprises over 100 players, not all are doing well.
This can be attributed to low differentiation among players as a majority of
them provide only deals.
The industry is expected to consolidate, as in the case of the acquisition of
Nearbuy and Little, which provide online deals on services, by Paytm.
Paytm is expected to benefit from the large pool of merchant partners of the
two as well as the customer base with the acquisitions, thereby boosting its
online-to-offline model.
90
SEGMENT OVERVIEW
91
KEY CHALLENGES
•Gross margins hover around 20% in India for players providing deals on
services.
•Globally, companies make 50-60% as they have higher bargaining power with
the vendor due to high volumes provided by online deal players.
• The companies are making net losses as spending on marketing to generate sales
and build a brand.
• Consumer stickiness is very low, as users look for the player providing highest
discount, irrespective of the brand and credibility.
• Building exclusive relationships with strong brands is the only route to retain
customers and move closer to profitability.
92
Online Portals
93
TYPE OF PORTALS AND PLAYERS
Simplymarry.com
94
Revenue mix differ significantly between Car/Property portals Vs
Job /Matrimonial portals.
•Further, job seekers are ready to pay to promote their resume to a prospective
97
Snapdeal
98
SNAPDEAL’S FALL
“The one thing I am very, very clear about right now is that I think we’re going to be No.
1 (in terms of sales) by March 2016. I think we’re going to beat Flipkart by then,” Bahl
said in an interview with The Economic Times. “I’m very confident that whatever their
(Flipkart’s) numbers are, we will be ahead of them by March (2016).”
- Kunal Bansal , CEO Snapdeal in August 2015
• Snapdeal had a peak valuation of $ 6.5 bn in 2015.
•In April 2017, Softbank which was the largest investor in Snapdeal was trying to
• Freecharge was acquired by Snapdeal in 2015 for $450 mn. In July 2017, Axis Bank
bought Freecharge for Rs. 385 crores (almost 90% lower than what Snapdeal had
paid
99
to acquire Freecharge).
What led to Snapdeal’s downfall?
100
What led to Snapdeal’s downfall?
•From the time it pumped $627 million into Snapdeal in October 2014, SoftBank
encouraged the online marketplace to go all out and spend heavily on marketing,
discounts, logistics and warehouses, without caring about cash burn rates.
•Though spending heavily, the company rejected at least two funding offers
because of differences at the board between SoftBank on one hand, and Kalaari
and Nexus on the other.
• Even as late as January 2017, Snapdeal was spending heavily, expecting funds
from new investors or SoftBank.
• But no such deal materialized. Sales crashed in February and March 2017 as it
cut spending.
•It cut hundreds of jobs and shut Shopo, a consumer-to-consumer marketplace.
101
INVESTORY DIFFERENCES
102
SOFTBANK’S STRATEGY
•Softbank is a major investor in Snapdeal, Paytm and Grofers among other small
e-commerce companies. (prior to investing in Flipkart)
• In May 2017, it invested $1.4 bn in Paytm.
• The company felt that they Paytm was a winner, and they could give more time
to Grofers, but Snapdeal have lost out on the race.
• Hence the company wanted to Sell Snapdeal to Flipkart and get a stake in
Flipkart
•Since they could not sell Snapdeal to Flipkart due to differences with other
investors, in August 2017 the company invested $2.6bn in Flipkart which they
later sold to Walmart.
103
After FY 2017, Snapdeal managed a mini-turnaround when
nobody thought it will survive.
• It’s very rare that a start-up turnaround after failure and that too when it is
starved of cash.
• Between FY 2017 and FY 2019, Snapdeal’s losses dropped by 96% while the
revenue dropped by 22%
• Between FY 2018 and FY 2019, Snapdeal’s revenue jumped 73%
• The company got a new investor Mr. Anand Piramal in July 2019.
Source:
• https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/small-
biz/startups/newsbuzz/snapdeals-revenue-soars-73-losses-drop-by-71-in-
fy19/articleshow/70243470.cms?from=mdr
• https://entrackr.com/2018/11/snapdeal-2-0-revenue-loss-fy18/
104
SNAP DEAL : INVESTORS WROTE OFF THEIR INVESTMENTS
• In May 2017, Japanese investor Softbank had written off its investments in
Snapdeal.
• Since then, others have followed suit.
• Early in 2018, FIH Mobile, a subsidiary of Taipei-headquartered Foxconn
Technology Group, had written down the remaining $40 million of its $200
million investment in Jasper Infotech, the parent company of Snapdeal. The
contract electronics manufacturer has effectively declared its entire investment
irrecoverable as it had already written down $160 million of its stake in the e-
tailer last year.
• In February 2018, eBay reportedly wrote off close to $61 million on its
investment in Snapdeal.
105
TURNAROUND STRATEGY
Source:
https://entrackr.com/2018/11/snapdeal-2-0-revenue-loss-fy18/
TURNAROUND STRATEGY
Source:
https://entrackr.com/2018/11/snapdeal-2-0-revenue-loss-fy18/
TURNAROUND STRATEGY
110
Amazon has better engagement compared to Flipkart. It gets more
customer visits per month than Flipkart , Myntra and Jabong put
together.
Source:https://www.similarweb.com/website/flipkart.com?competitors=a
111 mazon.in
112
Source: Redseer Analysis
Flipkart has got huge lead in Fashion due to it’s acquisition of
Myntra and Jabong.
Source:
https://www.bloomb
ergquint.com/busines
s/2018/03/23/this-is-
why-amazon-hasnt-
beaten-flipkart-in-
india-yet#gs.X_Le_mc
113
MARKET SHARE: CONCENTRATION AND RANGE
FESTIVE SALE
Source: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/small-
biz/startups/newsbuzz/amazon-flipkart-sales-generate-rs-19000-crore-in-6 -
days/articleshow/71491146.cms?from=mdr
115
While Amazon had higher GMV, Flipkart had higher revenues in
2018.
116
Amazon scores better in terms of Customer Service and Seller
Service.
CUSTOMER SERVICE
Qikpod Logistics
Mechmocha Mobile Gaming
Appiterate Mobile Tech
FX Mart Fintech
Amazon Prime Rs. 999/year • Unlimited free One-Day and Two-Day Delivery on
or Rs. eligible items
129/month • Unlimited video streaming on PrimeVideo.com
• Unlimited, Ad-free music streaming with Amazon
Prime.
• Read as much as you want on Kindle apps.
• 30-minute early access to Lightning Deals.
119
FLIPKART PLUS :
What are the benefits of Super Coins?
• For every Rs.100 you spend, you
plus members)
120
ILLUSTRATIVE: EXCLUSIVE DEALS FOR PLUS MEMBERS
AMAZON PRIME:
• Amazon Prime was launched in July 2016 while the Video content was launched 5
• Number of products under Prime has increased 40 million since the launch.
•Flipkart Plus so far have not made as much an impact like Amazon Prime
122
Amazon prime has a huge upside potential.
123
Last mile delivery pose a big challenge for e-tailers in India.
• Last mile delivery costs is about 45-50% of the overall logistics costs
Source: https://redseer.com/articles/amazon-ihs-program-disrupting-the-last-mile-of-e-commerce-
logistics-in-india/
124
Amazon has roped in local retailers to improve last mile
delivery.
Source: https://redseer.com/articles/amazon-ihs-program-disrupting-the-last-mile-of-e-commerce-
logistics-in-india/
https://yourstory.com/2019/09/amazon-india-space-initiative-kiranas-delivery-partners
126
IHS has improved the delivery rate, reduced costs and more
importantly help in managing volume spikes.
IHS:IMPACT
AMFLEX
• An Amazon flex delivery partner can earn Rs. 500 per day (Rs. 120 – Rs.
• More than 30,000 delivery partners have been enrolled through Amflex
program.
128
MENSA network of Myntra involve kirana store in last mile
delivery.
• Myntra has increased the number of its Mensa Network to 6,200 across 50
129
Udaan
130
UDAAN VALUATION
Source: https://entrackr.com/2020/02/udaan-valued-at-7-5-bn/
131
OVERVIEW
• Udaan is a B2B e-commerce portal bringing together all participants onto a single
platform - be it the wholesaler, distributor, producer, and the small retail shop
owner. While other major e-commerce companies focus on B2C.
• Poor Distribution efficiency has been one of India’s perennial problems. Udaan’s
value proposition is to solve core trade problems for small, medium and large
businesses across India.
• Its categories include variety of categories - foodgrains, fruits and vegetables,
electronics, apparel, footwear etc.
• It’s website claims to have 20,000 sellers and 10 lakh retailers from 900 cities and
towns in India, selling 15 lakh products.
Source: https://yourstory.com/2019/09/startup-b2b-ecommerce-retail-udaan
132
OVERVIEW
transaction is more than 6,000 tonnes including 500 tonnes of Fruits and
• The company received NBFC licence through which it provides loans and credit
Source: https://yourstory.com/2019/09/startup-b2b-ecommerce-retail-udaan
133
Paytm Mall
134
Though there was lot of expectations, Paytm mall is yet to live upto
its promise.
• Adopted o2o model which brings physical stores into E-commerce space
• The business strategy involves finding consumers online and brings them
into the realworld to make purchases in physical stores.
• Many global and Indian players incorporate o2o model as a part of their
strategy (Alibaba, Amazon, Flipkart etc)
• Paytm Mall saw revenue jump 25% to Rs 968 crore in FY19 and reduce it’s
losses by 35% to Rs. 1171 crs
• The company still lost more money than it’s— Rs 1.21 for every rupee in
revenue it made in FY19.
• Its loss percentage is much higher than that of Amazon and Flipkart.
Source: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/small-biz/startups/newsbuzz/paytm-e-
commerce-narrows-losses-to-rs-1171-crore-in-fy19/articleshow/71843176.cms?from=mdr
135
Infi-beam
136
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
138
MAJOR BUSINESS SEGMENTS
139
More than 800,000 merchants use Infibeam‘s e-commerce and
payment solutions.
CC AVENUE
BILL AVENUE
• BillAvenue is a paymen
platform built on the Bharat
BillPay System (BBPS) Key Billers onboarded
infrastructure, which is
developed by the National
Payments Corporation of India
(NPCI).
• The company has been
building a series of strategic
partnerships with billers, to
fetch bills and digitise them for
electronic presentment to
customers.
Source: Company’s Annual Report for FY 2019
142
The company has recently forayed into bill payments where it had
a negligible presence earlier.
BILL AVENUE
144
CHANGE IN THE REVENUE MODEL OF IWS
• Infibeam used to follow the subscription model for it’s IWS where they
charged a fixed amount from each online store.
• Disadvantages of subscription model
• No upside potential for the company from the merchant’s revenue growth.
• Only avenue for growth was through increasing the number of merchants
enrolled in the platform
• In early 2018, the company moved from “Subscription” based to
“Subscription + transaction “ model in which apart from monthly
subscription, they charge 1 to 2% of the transaction values.
• In Q3, 2018-19, Volume of transactions processed was 30 mn (up 28% YOY)
and the value of transactions processed was Rs. 114.70 bn (up 112% YOY)
145
Government e-Marketplace (GeM)
• The Company will run the captive workload through this data centre and will
also open additional capacity as public cloud with the following services:
• The data centre business will offer storage as well as compute services.
147
Despite it’s stated growth and profitability, Infibeam’s market
capitalization has been stagnant.
MARKET CAPITALIZATION
1600 $1406
1400 mn
1200
1000
800
600
400
$424 $467
200 $363 mn mn
0 mn
April 5, May 14, May 18, May 18,
2016 2018 2019 2020
Source:
https://www.moneycontrol.com/india/stockpricequote/miscellaneous/infibeamavenue
s/IIL03
148
Amazon Vs Walmart
149
In 2019, Walmart’s revenue was 80% more than that of Amazon.
600
510.34 Annual revenue for
500 2019 in $bn
400
300 280.5
200
100
0
Walmart Amazon
Source: https://www.macrotrends.net/stocks/charts/
150
In 2017, Amazon’s profit exceeded Walmart for the first time ever.
16 10.07
$14.5bn
14 FY 2019
12
$11.58 bn
10
8 9.68
6
0
Walmart Amazon
Source: https://www.macrotrends.net/stocks/charts/
151
Amazon’s market capitalization was more than 3 times that of
Walmart in May 2020.
1400
1200 1200
1000
920
800 777
Walmart
600
Amazon
400
356
247 289
200 197 236
117
0 29
2008 February
2013 February
2018 May2019 May2020 May
Source: https://www.statista.com/statistics/672747/amazons-consolidated-net-
revenue-by-segment/
KEY POLICIES AND THEIR
IMPACT
155
Policy Impact
Maximum limit of 25% of • Discount reduction
revenues from a single seller • Electronics and Apparel to be impacted most
• Growth to be impacted negatively by 10 to
15%
Marketplaces to not mandate • No major impact as there is no restriction of
exclusive tie-ups brands to choose a particular platform (Ex:
oneplus)
Submission of compliance report • No major impact on operations
• Add to compliance costs
Services to all vendors should be • Policy is ambiguous
provided in a non-discriminatory • E-tailer can still incentivize performance
manner
156
E-COMMERCE : ROUTE
TO PROFITABILITY
157
ROUTE TO PROFITABILITY
• Consolidation
•Private Labels
•Exclusive Launches
• Distribution Efficiencies
• Increasing Loyalty
158
FOCUSSED FUNDING
160
Players focus on weaning customers away from high cost
cash-on-delivery payments
161
Discounts are coming down and becoming more focussed
Gone are the days when e-tailers used to give over 50% discount on
majority of the products.
162
Exclusive launches and offers give competitive edge to several
players
163
GST – A MIXED BAG
Benefit
• With the Goods and Services Tax (GST) being implemented, inter-state taxes
has been abolished.
• Online players can consolidate the warehouse and look for the cost-effective
source from anywhere in the country.
Disadvantages
• Under GST regime, the online players have to deduct 2% of the amount as the
GST liability of the seller and deposit it with the government.
• The seller will then have to claim credit of TDS at a later stage.
• The working capital requirement of the seller will also increase
• The online players will have to register in each state and file the reports
separately on a monthly basis.
• This will increase hassles for compliance and hike the cost of running the
business for e-commerce players.
164
UPSCALING AND SEGMENT DIVERSIFICATION
Thus, a player needs to have the right mix of both high-volume, low-
margin products and low-volume high-margin products.
166