Binua v. Ong
Uploaded by
Jonathan BravaBinua v. Ong
Uploaded by
Jonathan BravaG.R. No.
207176 June 18, 2014
Spouses Victor And Euna Binua, petitioners
vs.
Lucia P. Ong, respondent
Ponente: Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes Jr.
FACTS:
Petitioner Edna (Euna Binua) was found guilty of estafa and was ordered to pay the
respondent 2,285,000.00Php, with 10% interest, and damages. She sought to avoid criminal
liability by settling her indebtedness through the execution of separate real estate mortgages over
petitioner Victor’s properties. Edna then filed a motion for new trial with RTC-Branch 2 which
rendered a decision, ordering petitioner to pay the respondent. It also ruled that the presentation of
a promissory note executed by Edna in favor of Lucia P. Ong novated the original agreement
between them into a civil obligation. Petitioner Edna, however, failed to settle her obligation,
forcing the respondent to foreclose the mortgage on the properties, with the latter as the highest
bidder during the public sale. The petitioners then filed the case for the Declaration of Nullity of
Mortgage Contracts, alleging that the mortgage documents were "executed under duress, as the
petitioners at the time of the execution of said deeds were still suffering from the effect of the
conviction of petitioner Edna, and could not have been freely entered into said contracts." The
RTC Branch 5 dismissed the complaint for lack of factual and legal merit. The CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC-Branch 5.
ISSUE:
Whether or not consent was vitiated with fear, duress and threat.
RULING:
NO. Article 1390(2) of the Civil Code provides that contracts where the consent is vitiated
by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud are voidable or annullable. Article
1335 of the Civil Code, meanwhile, states that "a threat to enforce one’s claim through competent
authority, if the claim is just or legal, does not vitiate consent." Based on the petitioners’ own
allegations, what the respondent did was merely inform them of petitioner Edna’s conviction in
the criminal cases for estafa. It might have evoked a sense of fear or dread on the petitioners’ part,
but certainly there is nothing unjust, unlawful or evil in the respondent's act. The petitioners also
failed to show how such information was used by the respondent in coercing them into signing the
mortgages. The petitioners must remember that Edna's conviction was a result of a valid judicial
process and even without the respondent allegedly "ramming it into petitioner Victor's throat,"
Edna's imprisonment would be a legal consequence of such conviction. WHEREFORE, the
petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
COMMENT:
The ruling of the Supreme Court is justified. The claim of petitioner that they executed the
real estate mortgages for fear that Edna would go to jail is obviously not the intimidation referred
to by law. Under Article 1355, the requisites for intimidation to vitiate consent are: (1) Reasonable
and well-grounded fear; (2) of an imminent and grave evil; (3) upon his person, property, or upon
the person or property of his spouse, descendants, or ascendants; (4) it must have been the reason
why the contract was entered into; (5) the threat must be an unjust act, an actionable wrong.
Moreover, in cases involving mortgages, a preponderance of the evidence is essential to establish
its invalidity, and in order to show fraud, duress, or undue influence of a mortgage, clear and
convincing proof is necessary. In the instant case, the petitioners failed to give a clear and
convincing proof that the respondent’s act is unjust, unlawful or evil.