Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.

57757
FACTS:
During the lifetime of Clodualdo Vitug he married two times. The
second wife of Clodualdo Vitug was Donata Montemayor with
whom he had 8 children.
Clodualdo Vitug died intestate o his estate was settled and
distributed. Donata Montemayor executed a contract of lease of Lot
No. 24, in favor of her
children Pragmacio and Maximo both surnamed Vitug. Pragmacio
and
Maximo subject of the action is 30 parcels of land which they claim to
be the conjugal property of the spouses Donata Montemayor and
Clodualdo Vitug of
which they claim a share. They assailed the mortgage to the PNB and
the public auction of the properties as null and void. The lower court
dismissed
the complaint. The CA reversed. Hence, the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the presumption of conjugality of properties acquired by the
spouses during coverture provided for in Article 160 of the Civil
Code
apply to property in the name of the widow.
RULING:
The petition is impressed with merit. When the property is registered
in
 the name of a spouse only and there is no showing as to when the
property
was acquired by said spouse, this is an indication that the property
belongs exclusively to said spouse. And this presumption under
Article
160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when the title is in the name of
only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved.

ECETA VS. ECETA, 428 SCRA 928

FACTS:
Petitioner and her husband acquired several properties, among
which
is the disputed property. They begot a son who sired an
illegitimate
daughter, herein respondent. Upon his death, petitioner and
respon-dent are his compulsory heirs. Respondent filed a case
before RTC for Partition and Accounting with Damages
against petitioner alle- ging that by virtue of his father’s
death, she became petitioner’s co- heir and co-owner of the
disputed property.
ISSUE:
Whether the admission made by petitioner that respondent is
her
granddaughter is enough to prove respondent’s filiation with
the only
son of petitioner.
RULING:
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children,
is
established by:
1. the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment; or
2. an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document
or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned.
In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by:
1. the open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate
child; or
2. any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.
RODRIGUEZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 509 SCRA 113
FACTS:
On October 15, 1986, respondent Clarito Agbulos brought an action
for com- pulsory recognition and support before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 9,
Baguio-Benguet against Bienvenido Rodriguez, petitioner herein. At
the trial,
the plaintiff presented his mother, Felicitas Agbulos Haber, as first
witness.
The plaintiff filed before this Court a petition for review on
certiorari questioning the said order in UDK 8516.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner should be compelled to recognize the
natural child on the testimony of the mother on the identity of the
putative father.
RULING:
Under Article 172 of the Family Code, filiation of legitimate
children is
by any of the following:
"The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
1. The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
2. An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.'
"In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation
shall be proved by:
1. The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
2. Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws.
Of interest is that Article 172 of the Family Code adopts the rule
in Article 283 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that filiation
may be proven by "any evidence or proof that the defendant is his
father."

VERCELES VS. POSADA, 522 SCRA 518

FACTS:
Respondent Maria Clarissa Posada was offered work by petitioner
Teofisto I. Verceles,mayor of Pandan.
On December 22, 1986, she went to Catanduanes Hotel on
instructions
of petitioner who asked to be briefed on the progress of her
mission.
Sometime in January 1987, when she missed her menstruation,
she said
she wrote petitioner that she feared she was pregnant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not paternity and filiation can be resolved in an
action for damages with support pendente lite;
HELD:
The Court held that the due recognition of an illegitimate child in
a
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in
any
authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgement of
the child, and no further court action is required. A perusal of the
Complaint before the RTC shows that although its caption states
"Damages coupled with Support Pendente Lite," Clarissa's
averments
therein, her meeting with petitioner, his offer of a job, his amorous
advances, her seduction, their trysts, her pregnancy, birth of her
child, his letters, her demand for support for her child, all clearly
establish a case for recognition of paternity.
TAYAG V. TAYAG-GALLOR GR No. 174680 / MAR. 24,
2008
FACTS:
On September 7, 2000, Ismael Tayag died intestate, leaving
behind two real properties both of which are in the
possession of petitioner, and a motor vehicle which the latter
sold on October 10, 2000 preparatory to the settlement of the
decedent‘s estate.
On 15 January 2001, respondent Felicidad A. Tayag-Gallor,
filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration
over the estate of Ismael Tayag. She alleged in the petition that
she is one of the three illegitimate children of the late Ismael
Tayag and Ester C.
Angeles. The decedent was married to petitioner Victoria C.
Tayag, but the two allegedly did not have any children of their
own.
Petitioner asserts that respondent should not be allowed to
prove her filiation in the settlement of Ismael Tayag's estate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent's petition for the issuance of letters
of administration sufficiently states a cause of action
considering that respondent merely alleged therein that she is
an illegitimate child of the decedent, without stating that she
had been acknowledged or recognized as such by the latter.

RULING:
Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration must be filed by an
interested person.
Essentially, the petition for the issuance of letters of
administration
is a suit for the settlement of the intestate estate of Ismael
Tayag. The right of respondent to maintain such a suit is
dependent on whether she is entitled to successional rights as
an illegitimate child
of the decedent which, in turn, may be established through
voluntary
or compulsory recognition. Voluntary recognition must be
expressed such as that in a record of birth appearing in the civil
register, a final judgment, a public instrument or private
handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.
Judicial or compulsory
recognition, on the other hand, may be demanded by the
illegitimate
child of his parents and must be brought during the lifetime of
the presumed parents.
JOEY D. BRIONES VS. MARICEL P. MIGUELG.R. NO.
156343. OCTOBER 18, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner Joey D. Briones had an illegitimate son by Loreta P.
Miguel in the latter’s custody. In the school year 2000-2001, the
petitioner enrolled him at the nursery school of Blessed Angels
L.A. School, Inc.
Respondents came to the house of the petitioner in Caloocan
City .
They promised him that they will bring him back in the afternoon.
However, the respondents did not bring him back as promised.
After efforts to recover custody of the child proved futile,
Petitioner filed a
Petition for Habeas Corpus against respondents Maricel Pineda
Miguel
and Francisca Pineda Miguel, to obtain custody of his minor child
Michael Kevin Pineda.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner, as the natural father, should have
custody of the child.
RULING:
Pursuant to Article 176, parental authority over him resides in his
mother, Respondent Loreta, notwithstanding his father’s
recognition of him. Obviously, Michael is a natural ("illegitimate,"
under the Family Code) child. Both acknowledge that Michael is
their son.
There is no question that Respondent Loreta, is entitled to have
custody of him. She cannot be deprived of that right, and she
may not even
renounce or transfer it "except in the cases authorized by law.
Not to be ignored in Article 213 of the Family Code is the caveat
that, generally, no child under seven years of age shall be
separated from the
mother, except when the court finds cause to order otherwise.
Only the
most compelling of reasons, such as the mother's unfitness to
exercise sole parental authority, shall justify her deprivation of
parental
authority and the award of custody to someone else.
MACANDANG VS. CA, 100 SCRA 73
FACTS:
Elizabeth Mejias, married to Crispin Anahaw, had sex with
Antonio Macadangdang sometime in March 1967. Because of
the affair, she and
her husband allegedly separated. On October 30, 1967, she gave
birth to a baby boy named Rolando Macadangdang. Elizabeth
filed with the CFI a recognition and support against Antonio. The
lower court dismissed the
 complaint, applying the provisions of Articles 255 and 256 of the
Civil
Code. CA reversed the decision and declared Rolando to be an
illegitimate
son of Antonio. CA denied Vicente's motion for reconsideration
for lack of merit.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Rolando is conclusively presumed the legitimate
child of Elizabeth and Crispin.

RULING:
Under Art. 255 of the CC the child is conclusively presumed to be
the legitimate child of the spouses. (note the baby was not
premature). This
presumption becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that
there was
physical impossibility of access between the spouses in the first
120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child.
The presumption of legitimacy is based on the assumption that
there is sexual union in marriage, particularly during the period of
conception.
In order to overthrow the presumption it must be shown beyond
reasonable doubt that there was no access as could have enabled
the
husband to be the father of the child. Sexual intercourse is to be
presumed when personal access is not disproved.

Villaranda vs. Villaranda, G.R. No. 153447, February 23, 2004

FACTS:
On July 6, 1976, the two brothers executed the assailed Deed of
Exchange. Under this instrument, Vicente agreed to convey his
inherited portion to
Honorio, in exchange for a property in Macasandig, Cagayan de
Oro City, which was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 2138.7
Vicente averred that he was not bound thereby contending that
because
the property had not been delivered, the Deed had not been
consummated and had already been revoked by both parties.

ISSUE: Whether the Deed of Exchange which was not signed by

the wife of Respondent Honorio G. Villaranda is valid and
enforceable.

RULING:
The Deed was entered into on July 6, 1976, while the Family Code
took
effect only on August 3, 1998. Laws should be applied
prospectively only, unless a legislative intent to give them
retroactive effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied
from the language used.
Hence, the provisions of the Civil Code, not the Family Code, are
applicable to the present case. The Macasandig lot was part of
Honorio and Ana's conjugal properties.
According to Article 166, the husband cannot alienate or
encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without
the wife’s consent. This provision, however, must be read in
conjunction with Article 173 of the same Code. The latter states
that an action to annul an alienation or encumbrance may be
instituted by the wife during the marriage and within ten years
from the transaction questioned. Videlicet, the lack of consent on
her part will not make the husband’s alienation or

encumbrance of real property of the conjugal partnership void, but

merely voidable.49 Hence, the Deed is valid until and unless
annulled.
 In this case, the records show no evidence that any action to annul
the transfer made by Honorio was ever brought by Ana within ten
years from
"the transaction questioned." Her right to bring an action to
invalidate the contract has thus prescribed. Hence, the assailed
Deed is still valid and enforceable.
 Brigido Quiao vs. Rita Quiao, GR No. 176556, July 4, 2012
FACTS:
Brigido Quiao and Rita Quiao contracted marriage in 1977. They
had no separate properties prior to their marriage. In 2000, Rita
filed a
complaint against Brigido for legal separation for cohabiting
with another woman. Subsequently, the RTC rendered a decision
in 2005
declaring the legal separation of the parties pursuant to Article 55.
Save for one child (already of legal age), the three minor children
remains in the custody of Rita, who is the innocent spouse.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the regime of conjugal partnership of gains
governs the couple’s property relations.

HELD:
Yes. Brigido and Rita tied the knot on January 6, 1977. Since at
the time of exchange of marital vows, the operative law was the
NCC and since
they did not agree on a marriage settlement, the property
relations between them is the system of relative community or
the conjugal partnership of gains. Under this property relation,
“the husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their
separate property and the income from their work and industry.
The husband and wife also own in common all the property of
the conjugal partnership of gains.

Noveras vs. Noveras, GR No. 188289, August 20, 2014

Facts: In Dec. 1988, David and Leticia got married. They lived in
California and eventually were granted with American
citizenship. Out
of this marriage, they produce two children and also several
properties both in USA and Philippines.
In 2001, David returned to the Philippines to supervise their
business.
But after a year, Leticia learned that David had an extra-marital
affair. She filed a petition for divorce in California and in 2005
the
court granted the decree of nullification of their marriage and
granted her custody of her two minor children and couple’s
property in USA. In Aug. 2005, Leticia filed for Judicial
Separation of Conjugal property in Baler, Aurora. In his answer,
David filed for a petition to grant him all
of their properties in the Philippines considering that Leticia got
all of their properties in USA.

Issue: Whether or not David can claim all of their properties in the
Philippines?

Ruling: NO, David cannot claim all of the properties in the

Philippines.
Article 91 of this Code, provides that property owned before and
during marriage are under ACP of Absolute Community
Property. In this case
their marriage contracted in Dec. 1988, therefore ACP governs.
But, considering that they are both American citizen, the
California court
 decision with regards to their property in USA governs. The
property in the Philippines will be equally divided between them.

Wong vs. IAC, 200 SCRA 792

FACTS: Romario Henson married Katrina in January 1964. They
had 3 children; most of the time living separately. Katrina
consigned from
Anita Chan pieces of jewelry valued at P321,830.95. The spouses
Anita Chan and Ricky Wong filed action for collection of the sum
of money
against Katrina and her husband Romarico. The trial court ruled
in favor of the Wongs then a writ of execution was thereafter
issued upon the 4 lots in Angeles City all in the name of Romarico
Henson married to
Katrina Henson.
ISSUE: WON debt of the wife without the knowledge of the
husband can be satisfied through the conjugal property.
HELD: The spouses had in fact been separated when the wife
entered into the business deal with Anita. The husband had
nothing to do with the
business transactions of Katrina nor authorized her to enter into
such. The properties in Angeles were acquired during the marriage
with unclear
proof where the husband obtained the money to repay the loan.
Hence, it is presumed to belong in the conjugal partnership in the
absence of proof
that they are exclusive property of the husband and even though
they had been living separately. A wife may bind the conjugal
partnership only
when she purchases things necessary for support of the family.
The writ of execution cannot be issued against Romarico and the
execution of judgments extends only over properties belonging to
the judgment debtor. The conjugal properties cannot answer for
Katrina’s obligations as she exclusively incurred the latter
without the consent of her husband nor they did redound to the
benefit of the family. There was also no evidence
submitted that the administration of the partnership had been
trans-ferred to Katrina by Romarico before said obligations were
incurred. In
as much as the decision was void only in so far as Romarico and
the conjugal properties concerned, Spouses Wong may still
execute the debt against Katrina, personally and exclusively.
JOCSON vs. CA,170 SCRA 333
FACTS:
Petitioner Moises Jocson and respondent Agustina Jocson-
Vasquez are the
only surviving offsprings of the spouses Emilio Jocson and
Alejandra Poblete. Alejandra Poblete predeceased her husband
without her intestate estate being settled. Subsequently, Emilio
Jocson also died
intestate on April 1, 1972.
Petitioner Moises Jocson assails these documents and prays that
they be declared null and void and the properties subject matter
therein be partitioned between him and Agustina as the only heirs
of their deceased parents the properties in question being a
conjugal property of both.
ISSUE:

Are the properties involved conjugal properties of the parents,

therefore entitles Moises to claim his share and make the sale
void?

HELD:
Moises Jocson may validly invoke the presumption under Article
160 he
must first present proof that the disputed properties were acquired
during the marriage of the parents. The fact that the properties
were
registered in the name of “Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra
Poblete” is merely descriptive of the civil status of Emilio Jocson.
Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts.
Therefore, the Court ruled that the properties under Exhibit 3 are
the exclusive properties of
Emilio Jocson.

Dela Pena vs. Avila, et al., GR No. 187490, February 8, 2012

FACTS: Antonia Dela Pena, who was married to Antegono Dela
Pena, obtained a loan from Aguila Sons and Co. As a security for
the payment
of the said loan, Antonia executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage
in favour of Aguila on their residential lot in Marikina. However,
Antonia also executed a Deed Of absolute sale in favour of
Gemma Avila over the same property because of Antonia’s failure
to pay her obligation from Aguila. Gemma Avila also mortgaged
the same property to Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC-
BPI) to secure a loan from the bank.

ISSUE: W/N the said property that was sold is part of the
Conjugal Partnership

HELD: The presumption mentioned in the Art. 160 of the Civil

Code applies
only for the property acquired during marriage and does not
operate when there is no showing as to when the property was
acquired. Moreover,
the presumption in favour of the conjugality is rebuttable, but only
with strong, clear and convincing proof of exclusive ownership.
As the parties
invoking the presumption of conjugality under Art. 160 of the
Civil Code, the Dela Penas did not even come close to proving
that the subject
property was acquired during the Marriage between Antonia and
Antegono. The record is bereft of evidence that from which the
actual
acquisition of the property by Antonia was during the Marriage.
Although
the title stated in its registration that it is under the name of,
Antonia
“Dela Pena, married to Antegono dela Pena,” such is merely a
description of the civil status of the wife and cannot mean that
the husband is also a registered owner. The reason for the
inconclusiveness of the said des-
cription is that it is possible that the property was acquired when
she was single but only registered when she got married.

Fransisco Munoz, Jr. vs. Erlinda Ramirez, et.al., GR No.

156125
FACTS: Subject of the present case is residential house and lot,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 7650 in the
name of the petitioner.
The respondents then constructed a residential house on the lot.
On July 14, 1993, the title to the subject property was transferred
to the petitioner by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale, dated April
30, 1992,
executed by Erlinda, for herself and as attorney-in-fact of Eliseo
On September 24, 1993, the respondents filed a complaint with the
RTC for
the nullification of the deed of absolute sale, claiming that there
was no sale but only a mortgage transaction, and the documents
transferring the title to the petitioner’s name were falsified.
ISSUE: (1) whether the subject property is paraphernal or
conjugal; and,
(2) whether the contract between the parties was a sale or an
equitable mortgage.

RULING: As a general rule, all property acquired during the

marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made,
contracted or
registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be
conjugal unless the contrary is proved.
In the present case, clear evidence that Erlinda inherited the
residential lot from her father has sufficiently rebutted this
presumption of
conjugal ownership. Pursuant to Articles 9236 and 10937 of the
Family Code, properties acquired by gratuitous title by either
spouse, during the
marriage, shall be excluded from the community property and be
the exclusive property of each spouse. The residential lot,
therefore, is Erlinda’s exclusive paraphernal property.
Joe Ros And Estrella Aguete vs. PNB, GR No. 170166, April 6,
2011
FACTS: On January 13, 1983, spouses Joe A. Ros and Estrella
Aguete filed a complaint for the annulment of the Real Estate
Mortgage and all
legal proceedings taken thereunder against PNB. The averments in
the complaint disclosed that the husband obtained a loan from
PNB on
October 14, 1974 and executed a real estate mortgage involving a
parcel of land as security for the loan. Upon maturity, the loan
was unpaid and
PNB instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the
mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a
Certificate of Sale was
issued in favor of PNB. Claiming that wife (plaintiff-appellee
Estrella Aguete) has no knowledge of the loan obtained by her
husband nor she
consented to the mortgage instituted on the conjugal property -a
complaint was filed to annul the proceedings pertaining to the
mortgage,
sale and consolidation of the property - interposing the defense
that her
signatures affixed on the documents were forged and that the loan
did not redound to the benefit of the family.
ISSUE:How is the benefit to the family proven so as to render the
loan
contracted by the husband binding upon the conjugal property?

HELD: If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the

contract,
that contract falls within the term ''x x x x obligations for the
benefit
of the conjugal partnership. '' Here, no actual benefit may be
proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at
the signing of the
contract. Where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the
family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such
obligation
will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

Sps. Buado vs. CA And Nicol, GR No. 145222, April 24, 2009
FACTS: On April 30 1984, Spouses Roberto and Venus Buado,
petitioners, filed a complaint for damages against Erlinda Nicol
for her civil liability arising from criminal offense of slander filed
by
petitioners. Trial court rendered a decision to let Erlinda Nicol
pay for damages. Finding Erlinda Nicol‘s personal properties
insufficient to satisfy the judgment. The sheriff levied and
auctioned the property of Erlinda and sale was issued in favor of
Mr. and Mrs. Buado. After almost one year, the husband of
Erlinda, Romulo Nicol, filed a complaint
for the annulment of certificate of sale against petitioners and
deputy sheriff. He argued that there was no proper publication
and posting for
the auction sale. He also claimed that the judgment obligation of
Erlinda Nicol amounted to P40,000 only. The spouses Buado
obtained the
P500, 000 worth of property for only P51,685.

ISSUE: Whether or not the obligation of Erlinda Nicol arising

from her
criminal liability is chargeable to the conjugal partnership.
RULING: NO. Erlinda Nicol's liability is not chargeable to the
conjugal partnership. There is no dispute that contested property
is conjugal in
nature. Article 122 of the Family Code explicitly provides that
payment
of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or
during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal
partnership
except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the
family.Unlike in the system of absolute community where
liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-
delict is chargeable to the absolute
community of property, in the absence or insufficiency of the
exclusive property of the debtor'spouse, the same advantage is not
accorded in the
system of conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership
of gains has no duty to make advance payments for the liability of
the debtor'spouse.

Francisco vs. Gonzales, 565 SCRA 638

FACTS: Francisco Gonzales and Erminda Gonzales were living
as husband and wife and they have blessed 4 children. During the
times
they lived together they acquired properties. Erminda managed
their pizza business and work hard for its development. Erminda
filed for
annulment of marriage to Francisco on the grounds of
psychological incapacity. She prays for the declaration of the
nullity of their marriage
and for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains.

ISSUE: Whether or not, Francisco exclusively owns the

properties existing during their marriage.

RULING: No, The marriage of Francisco and Erminda is

declared null and void consequently; their property relation shall
be governed by the
provisions of Article 147 These provisions enumerate the two
instances when the property relations between spouses shall be
governed by the
rules on co-ownership. These are: (1) when a man and woman
capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage; and (2) when a
man and woman live
together under a void marriage. Under this property regime of co-
ownership, properties acquired by both parties during their union,
in the
absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been
obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned
by them in equal shares. Article 147 creates a presumption that
properties acquired
during the cohabitation of the parties have been acquired through
their joint efforts, work or industry and shall be owned by them in
equal
shares.

Alipio vs. CA, 341 SCRA 441

FACTS: Romeo Jaring (P) subleased a fishpond to spouses Alipio
(D) and spouses Bienvenido and Remedios Manuel for P485,600
payable in two
installments. The first installment was paid, but the second was
only partly paid. Despite due demand, the balance remain unpaid.
Jaring (P)
filed a case to collect the balance from the spouses Alipio (D) and
spouses Manuel with a prayer for the alternative of rescission.
Purita
Alipio (D) moved to dismiss the case because her husband died
and thus, dissolving their conjugal partnership. Alipio (D)
contended that the
proper action for Jaring (P) is to file a claim in the settlement of
the estate.

ISSUES: Is the surviving spouse a solidary debtor for a lease she

and her late husband entered into?

RULING: No. For marriages governed by the rules of conjugal

partnership of gains, an obligation entered into by the husband and
wife is
chargeable against their conjugal partnership and it is the
partnership
which is primarily bound for its repayment. Thus, when the
spouses are sued for the enforcement of an obligation entered into
by them, they are being impleaded in their capacity as
representatives of the conjugal
partnership and not as independent debtors such that the concept
of joint or solidary liability, as between them, does not apply.

A creditor cannot sue the surviving spouse of a decedent in an

ordinary proceeding for the collection of a sum of money
chargeable against the
conjugal partnership and that the proper remedy is for him to file a
claim in the settlement of estate of the decedent.
Ravina vs. Villa Abrille, et al., GR No. 160708, October 16,
2009
FACTS:
Respondent Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa
Abrille are
husband and wife. They have four children, who are also parties to
the instant case and are represented by their mother, Mary Ann.
In 1991, Pedro got a mistress and began to neglect his family.
Mary Ann was forced to sell or mortgage their movables to
support the family and
the studies of her children. By himself, Pedro offered to sell the
house and the two lots to herein petitioners, Patrocinia and
Wilfredo Ravina.
When Mary Ann and her daughter Ingrid Villa Abrille came
home, they were stopped from entering it. They waited outside the
gate until evening
under the rain. They sought help from the Talomo Police Station,
but police authorities refused to intervene, saying that it was a
family
matter. Mary Ann alleged that the incident caused stress, tension
and anxiety to her children, so much so that one flunked at school.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners Patrocinia Ravina And
Wilfredo Ravina are liable for damages, the same being contrary
to law and evidence.

RULING:
''Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty
and good faith.'' When a right is exercised in a manner that does
not conform with such norms and results in damages to another, a
legal
wrong is thereby committed for which the wrong doer must be
held responsible. Similarly, any person who willfully causes loss
or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damages caused.
It is patent
in this case that petitioners' alleged acts fall short of these
established civil law standards.

Melania Roxas vs. CA, et al., GR No. 92245, June 26, 1991
FACTS: Petitioner Melania Roxas ("Melania") is married to
Antonio Roxas ("Antonio"), although they are already estranged
and living
separately. Melania discovered that Antonio leased to
Respondent
Antonio Cayetano ("Mr. Cayetano") their conjugal lot in
Novaliches without her knowledge and consent. Thus, Melanie
filed a case before the RTC praying for the annulment of the
contract of lease between Antonio
and Mr. Cayetano. Mr. Cayetano moved to dismiss the complaint
on the sole ground that the complaint states no cause of action.The
RTC Judge
resolved said Motion by dismissing Melania's complaint.

ISSUE: W/N a husband, may legally enter into a long-term

contract of
lease involving conjugal real property without the consent of the
wife.

RULING: No. (Case remanded to the RTC by the SC) Even if

the husband is administrator of the conjugal partnership,
administration does not
include acts of ownership. For while the husband can administer
the conjugal assets unhampered, he cannot alienate or encumber
the
conjugal realty. Thus, in case the wife's consent is not secured by
the husband as required by law, the wife has the remedy of filing
an action for the annulment of the contract.

G.R. No. 176492, October 20, 2014, MARIETTA N.

BARRIDO, PETITIONER, VS. LEONARDO V. NONATO,
RESPONDENT
FACTS: Leonardo and Marrieta's marriage was dissolved by
reason of psychological incapacity in 1996, hence Leonardo filed
a complaint for
partition over their property consisting of a house and lot, since
 according to him, there was no more reason to maintain their co-
ownership. In her defense, Marrieta claimed that the property had
been
sold to their children Joseph Raymond and Joseph Leo. She also
moved for
dismissal of the action for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
MTCC Bacolod City, the action for partition being an action
incapable of
pecuniary estimation.

ISSUE: W/N the lot covered by tct no. t-140361 is conjugal after
being sold to the children, joseph leo nonato and joseph raymund
nonato.

HELD: The Supreme Court:“Contrary to Barrido's contention, the

MTCC has jurisdiction to take cognizance of real actions or those
affecting title to real property, or for the recovery of possession, or
for the partition or
condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on real property.
Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 provides:Section 33.
Jurisdiction of
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
exercise:x x x x(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil
actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or
any interest therein where the assessed
value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila,
where such
assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney's fees,

litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That value of such

property shall
be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. (as
amended by R.A. No. 7691)Here, the subject property's assessed
value was merely P8,080.00, an amount which certainly does not
exceed the required limit
of P20,000.00 for civil actions outside Metro Manila to fall within
the jurisdiction of the MTCC. Therefore, the lower court correctly
took cognizance of the instant case.
Toda, Jr. vs. CA, 183 SCRA 713
FACTS: Benigno Toda, Jr. (Benigno) and Rose Marie Tuason-
Toda (Rose
Marie) were married on 9 June 1951 and had two children.
Apparently, individual difference of the two came about, and an
alleged infidelity of Benigno prompted Rose Marie to file on 18
December 1979 a petition for
termination of conjugal partnership for alleged mismanagement
and dissipation of conjugal funds against Benigno. On 1 April
1981, a joint
petition for judicial approval of dissolution of conjugal partnership
under Article 191 of the Civil Code was consolidated with the
former civil case.

ISSUE: Whether the compromise agreement became effective on

its approved date of the trial court or when the parties signed it.

RULING: Article 190 of the Civil Code states, ''in the absence of
an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation
of
property between spouses during the marriage shall not take
place sae in virtue of a judicial order. '' Simply put, separation of
property is
affected by the decree of the court approving the same; mere
execution of contract or agreement of the parties does not suffice.
Without
judicial approval, it shall be deemed void. Therefore, the conjugal
partnership of Benigno and Rose Marie should be considered
dissolved
only on 9 June 1981 when the trial court approved their joint
voluntary dissolution of their conjugal partnership. .

Rodolfo Espinosa, et.al., vs. Atty. Julieta Omana, A.C. No.

FACTS: On 17 November 1997, Rodolfo Espinosa and his wife
Elena Marantal sought Omana's legal advice on whether they
could dissolve
their marriage and live separately. Omana prepared a document
entitled ''Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay. '' Espinosa and Marantal
started
implanting the conditions of the said contract. However, Marantal
took
custody of all their children and took possession of most of the
conjugal property.
Espinosa sought the advice of Glindo, his fellow employee who is
a law graduate, who informed him that the contract executed by
Omana was not
valid. They hired the services of a lawyer to file a complaint
against Omana before the IBP-CBD. Omana denied that she
prepared the contract. She admitted that Espinosa went to see her
and requested for the
notarization of the contract but she told him that it was illegal.
Omana
alleged that Espinosa returned the next day while she was out of
the office and managed to persuade her part-time office staff to
notarize the document. Her office staff forged her signature and
notarized the contract.

ISSUE: W/N Omana violated the CPR in notartizing the

''Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay. '' W/N the Kasunduaan ng
Paghihiwalay is valid.

HELD: SC has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the

conjugal partnership without judicial approval is void. The Court
has also ruled
that a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a
marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the
spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership,
which is exactly what Omana did in this case.
Valdes vs. RTC, 260 SCRA 221
FACTS: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in
1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for
a declaration
of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family
Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the
ground of their
mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed
under the custody of their mother while the other 3 siblings are
free to choose
which they prefer. Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in
the decision regarding the procedure for the liquidation of
common property in ''unions without marriage''. During the
hearing on the motion, the
children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their
father. The petitioner and the respondent are directed to start
proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as
defined by Article 147 of the Family Code
ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime should be based on
co-ownership.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage,

regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the
parties are governed by the
rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is
prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the
property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly
if said party's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family.

Juan Salas Jr., Eden Aguilar, GR No. 202370, September 23,

2013
FACTS: On September 7 1985, Juan Sevilla Salas Jr. and Eden
Villena Aguila were married. Aguila gave birth to their daughter
on June 7
1986. Five months later, Salas left their conjugal dwelling. Since
then, he no longer communicated with Aguila or their child. On
October 7,
2003, Aguila filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
Salas alleged that Aguila waived her rights to the Discovered
Properties in consideration of other properties waived by Salas in
favour of Aguila.

ISSUE: Whether or not the discovered properties are acquired

during the
marriage of Salas and Aguila, thus a conjugal property and
subject for
partition between them.

RULING: Yes. Aguila proved that the Discovered Properties

were acquired
by Salas during the validity of their marriage. The phrase
''married to'' in the title is merely descriptive of the civil status of
the registered owner, Salas. Article 147 of the Family Code
applies to the union of parties who are legally capacitated and not
barred by any impediment
to contract marriage, but whose marriage is declared void under
Article 36 of the Family Code. Under this property regime,
property acquired during marriage is prima facie presumed to
have been obtained through
the couple's joint efforts and governed by the rules of co-
ownership. Thus, the Discovered Properties should be partitioned
on the basis of co-ownership.