Tijing vs.
CA, March 8, 2001
FACTS:
Edgardo and Bienvenida Tijing are husband and wife, they have sixchildren, youngest of
whom is Edgardo Tijing Jr. In August 1989, AngelitaDiamante fetched Bienvenida for an
urgent laundry job. Bienvenida left toAngelita her 4-month old child, Edgardo Jr. as she
usually let Angelita takecare of her child while she was doing laundry. When Bienvenida
returnedfrom work to get her son, Angelita was nowhere to be found, and despiteher and her
husband’s efforts, they could not locate Angelita and theirchild’s whereabouts.
Edgardo and Bienvenida Tijing filed a petition for habeas corpus in order to recover their
youngest child, Edgardo Jr., whom they did not see for 4 years. Trial court granted the
petition and ordered Angelita Diamante to immediately release the child, now named John
Thomas D. Lopez, and turn him over to his parents. CA reversed and set aside the decision
rendered by the lower court. It questioned the propriety of the habeas corpus in this case.
Issue: Whether or not facial similarity may be used by courts to prove kinship.
Held:
Yes. The SC upheld the trial court’s decision.
The trial court was correct in its judgment based on the evidence established by the parents
and by the witness who is the brother of the late common-law husband of Angelita.
Furthermore, there are no clinical records, log book or discharge from the clinic where John
Thomas was allegedly born were presented. Strong evidence directly proves that Thomas
Lopez, Angela's "husband", was not capable of siring a child. Moreover, his first marriage
produced no offspring even after almost 15 years of living together with his legal wife. His
14 year affair with Angelita also bore no offspring.
Trial court also observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida were both in
court, the two had strong similarities in their faces. Resemblance between a minor and his
alleged parent is competent and material evidence to establish parentage. Lastly, the spouses
presented clinical records and testimony of the midwife who attended Bienvenida's
childbirth.
In this case the SC also opened the possibility of admitting DNA as evidence of parentage.
All these considered, we are constrained to rule that subject minor is indeed the son of
petitioners. The writ of habeas corpus is proper to regain custody of said child.
People vs. Rulepa, March 5, 2003
Ronnie Rullepa y Guinto (Rullepa), a houseboy, was charged with Rape before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City for allegedly having carnal knowledge with “AAA”, three
(3) years of age, a minor and against her will and without her consent.
“AAA” described her abuse under the hands of Rullepa in a plain and matter-of-fact manner
in her testimony. The victim and her mother testified that she was only three years old at the
time of the rape. However, the prosecution did not offer the victim‘s certificate of live birth
or similar authentic documents in evidence.
Finding for the prosecution, the RTC rendered judgment finding Rullepa guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape and accordingly sentenced him to death. The case was placed
for automatic review of the Supreme Court
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in imposing the supreme penalty of death upon Rullepa
HELD:
A person‘s appearance, where relevant, is admissible as object evidence, the same being
addressed to the senses of the court. As to the weight to accord such appearance, especially in
rape cases, the Court in People v. Pruna laid down the guideline.
Under the guideline, the testimony of a relative with respect to the age of the victim is
sufficient to constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt in cases (a) and (b) above. In such
cases, the disparity between the allegation and the proof of age is so great that the court can
easily determine from the appearance of the victim the veracity of the testimony. The
appearance corroborates the relative‘s testimony.
As the alleged age approaches the age sought to be proved, the person‘s appearance,
as object evidence of her age, loses probative value. Doubt as to her true age becomes greater
and, following United States v. Agadas, such doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused.
Because of the vast disparity between the alleged age (three years old) and the age sought to
be proved (below twelve years), the trial court would have had no difficulty ascertaining the
victim‘s age from her appearance. No reasonable doubt, therefore, exists that the second
element of statutory rape is present.
Whether the victim was below seven years old, however, is another matter. Here, reasonable
doubt exists. A mature three and a half-year old can easily be mistaken for an underdeveloped
seven-year old. The appearance of the victim, as object evidence, cannot be accorded much
weight and the testimony of the mother is, by itself, insufficient.
As it has not been established with moral certainty that “AAA” was below seven years old at
the time of the commission of the offense, Rullepa cannot be sentenced to suffer the
death penalty. Only the penalty of reclusion perpetua can be imposed upon him.
People vs. Ulzoron, March 2, 1998
FACTS:
Samuel Ulzoron was charged with rape with the use of a deadly weapon.
On the strength of the testimony of the complaining witness Emily Gabo, the trial court
convicted the accused. It found the latter’s testimony straightforward and credible. It
rationalized that she would not have filed her complaint for rape if her accusations were not
true, for to do so would only expose herself to public shame or ridicule. No improper motive
on her part to file the case had been shown. The findings of the examining physician also lent
credence to her claim. On the other hand, the trial court found the defense of the accused too
weak, anemic.
Appellant concedes, even as he assails his conviction, that his defense is inherently weak.
Nevertheless, he faults the trial court for convicting him on the basis of his defense. He
argues that the undisputed facts and circumstances made it more likely that Emily was
involved in an adulterous relationship with him. He also invites attention to the circumstance
that the judge who wrote the decision did not personally try the case hence appellant claims
that the former lacked the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the parties and their
witnesses.
ISSUE: W/N accused-appellant’s guilt was sufficiently established
HELD:
Contrary to accused-appellant’s claim that he was convicted because of his weak defense, his
conviction was actually founded on the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution.
The circumstances of force and intimidation attending the instant case were manifested
clearly not only in the victim’s testimony but also in the physical evidence presented during
the trial consisting of her torn dress and underwear as well as the medico-legal report. Such
pieces of evidence indeed are more eloquent than a hundred witnesses. The fact of carnal
knowledge is not disputed. It was positively established through the offended party’s own
testimony and corroborated by that of her examining physician.
Moreover, the conduct of the complaining witness immediately following the assault clearly
established the truth of her charge that she was raped by accused-appellant.
Abalos vs. CA, Dec. 22, 1999
FACTS: Petitioner was charged with murder. During trial, he was positively identified by
Veronica Bulatao, the prosecution’s lone witness. The trial court, not convinced of his alibi,
found him guilty of murder.
On appeal petitioner argues that the testimony of the lone witness, Veronica Bulatao, was not
credible; that the Court of Appeals erred in considering his three (3) prior convictions as basis
for finding him guilty of homicide; and, his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
In an apparent attempt to destroy Veronica’s credibility, petitioner asserts that her actions
prior to the shooting were highly questionable. If indeed he had threatened her life, then why
did she still allow him to enter their house that night? If she really saw him suspiciously
walking back and forth near their house, why did she not warn Liberato of the impending
danger?
Petitioner also cites inconsistencies in her testimony, such as her assessment of the time
frame when he courted her and her statements as to when she last saw him prior to the
commission of the crime. He even went to the extent of saying that Veronica’s act of
allowing him to court her despite her existing relationship with Liberato showed her deceitful
character, hence, her unreliability as a witness.
ISSUE:
W/N the trial court erred in not considering his alibi.
HELD:
For alibi to prosper, petitioner must not only prove that he was not at the crime scene but that
it was also physically impossible for him to have been present there at the time the offense
was committed. He miserably failed to satisfy the second requisite. Delfin himself testified
that the distance between the tobacco fields to Veronica’s house was only around 400 meters
and it only took eight (8) minutes to traverse such path. Evidently, it was not impossible for
Delfin to be present at the locus criminis.
Further, it has been long established that alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification
of the accused by a credible witness who had no ill motive to falsely testify. The absence of
ill motive on Veronica’s part was even substantiated by petitioner in his testimony.
Anent the paraffin test, it is true that it produced a negative result but such fact does not ipso
facto merit Delfins acquittal. This Court acknowledges that the absence of powder burns in a
suspects hand is not conclusive proof that he has not fired a gun. In fact, the traces of nitrates
can easily be removed by the simple act of washing ones hand.
SISON VS. PEOPLE
G.R. Nos. 108280-83 November 16, 1995
FACTS:
Several informations were filed in court against eleven persons identified as Marcos loyalists
charging them with the murder of Salcedo.
The cases were consolidated and raffled to the Regional Trial Court. All of the accused
pleaded not guilty to the charge and trial ensued accordingly. The prosecution presented
twelve witnesses, including two eyewitnesses, Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo, and
the police officers who were at the Luneta at the time of the incident. In support of their
testimonies, the prosecution likewise presented documentary evidence consisting of
newspaper accounts of the incident and various photographs taken during the mauling.
The trial court rendered a decision finding Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan, Richard de
los Santos and Joselito Tamayo guilty as principals in the crime of murder qualified by
treachery.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals on December 28, 1992, modified the decision of the trial
court by acquitting Annie Ferrer but increasing the penalty of the rest of the accused, except
for Joselito Tamayo, to reclusion perpetua. The appellate court found them guilty of murder
qualified by abuse of superior strength, but convicted Joselito Tamayo of homicide because
the information against him did not allege the said qualifying circumstance.
Hence, this petition.
One of the issues raised by the petitioner is that the Ca erred in admitting the photographs
which were not properly identified.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in admitting the photographs which were not proprly identified.
RULING:
The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence, must be
identified by the photographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances under
which they were produced.The value of this kind of evidence lies in its being a correct
representation or reproduction of the original, and its admissibility is determined by its
accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the crime. The photographer, however, is not
the only witness who can identify the pictures he has taken. The correctness of the
photograph as a faithful representation of the object portrayed can be proved prima facie,
either by the testimony of the person who made it or by other competent witnesses, after
which the court can admit it subject to impeachment as to its accuracy. Photographs,
therefore, can be identified by the photographer or by any other competent witness who can
testify to its exactness and accuracy.
This court notes that when the prosecution offered the photographs as part of its evidence,
appellants, through counsel Atty. Alfredo Lazaro, Jr. objected to their admissibility for lack
of proper identification. However, when the accused presented their evidence, Atty. Winlove
Dumayas, counsel for accused Joselito Tamayo and Gerry Neri used the photographs to prove
that his clients were not in any of the pictures and therefore could not have participated in the
mauling of the victim.
The objection of Atty. Lazaro to the admissibility of the photographs is anchored on the fact
that the person who took the same was not presented to identify them. We rule that the use of
these photographs by some of the accused to show their alleged non-participation in the crime
is an admission of the exactness and accuracy thereof. That the photographs are faithful
representations of the mauling incident was affirmed when appellants Richard de los Santos,
Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan identified themselves therein and gave reasons for their presence
thereat.
An analysis of the photographs vis-a-vis the accused's testimonies reveal that only three of
the appellants, namely, Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan could be readily
seen in various belligerent poses lunging or hovering behind or over the victim. Appellant
Romeo Sison appears only once and he, although afflicted with hernia is shown merely
running after the
victim. Appellant Joselito Tamayo was not identified in any of the pictures. The absence of
the two appellants in the photographs does not exculpate them. The photographs did not
capture the entire sequence of the killing of Salcedo but only segments thereof. While the
pictures did not record Sison and Tamayo hitting Salcedo, they were unequivocally identified
by Sumilang and Banculo.
Veleroso vs. People
FACTS:
On July 10, 1996, a duly issued warrant of arrest to the petitioner in a case of kidnapping for
ransom was released. Valeroso was found and arrested and was bodily searched and after
which a firearm with live ammunition was found tucked in his waist. The subject firearm was
later confirmed and revealed to have not been issued to the petitioner but to another person.
The defense on the other hand claimed that Valeroso was arrested and searched (without a
search warrant) in the boarding house of his children. They pointed their guns on him and
tied him and pulled him out of the room as the raiding team went back inside, searched and
ransacked the room. Later, an operative came out of the room exclaiming that he has found
a gun inside. The firearm according to the petitioner was issued to Jerry Valeroso by virtue of
a Memorandum Receipt.
Jerry C. Valeroso was then charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for
illegally possessing a revolver bearing serial number 52315 without securing the necessary
license/permit. The petitioner through a letter of appeal asked the court to be reconsidered.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the warrantless search and seizure of the firearm and ammunition has merit and
valid
HELD/DECISION:
Some valid grounds for a warrantless search and seizure are as follows: A person who was
arrested lawfully may be searched so that the officer may remove any weapons that the
accused may be used to resist arrest. This is to protect the welfare of the officers and to make
sure that the arrest will happen. This is also to find evidence that otherwise can be destroyed
by the accused. Further, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or any weapons either on
the person or within the area of his immediate control. Based on the statement of the
petitioner, the petitioner did not resist arrest, He was tied and placed outside the room where
the gun was found; therefore the room where the gun was found could not be “in his
immediate control.” Incidental searches without a warrant states that officers are permitted to
seize any weapon that they can inadvertently found during the arrest under the “plain view
doctrine.” However, the firearm was not found accidentally but was actually searched and
therefore not incidental. Clearly, the search was illegal, a violation of Veloroso’s right against
unreasonable search and seizure. Therefore, the evidence obtained is inadmissible to court
and cannot be used against him.
Facts:
(PO3) Celso Pang-ag of the Intelligence and Operation Section received a telephone call
from an informant about a drug session being held inside Room 5 of the Starlight Hotel
located at Barangay 5, Ablan Avenue, Laoag City.
Acting on the information, PO3 Pang-ag, together with PO2 Jonel Mangapit, went
immediately to the Starlight Hotel to determine the veracity of the report. Upon arrival at the
target area, PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit approached the lady clerk manning the
information counter of Starlight Hotel and inquired about the alleged drug session at Room 5
of the hotel.
The lady clerk informed PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit that the roomboy of the hotel was
about to deliver a softdrink to Room 5 and they could follow him if they [so wish]. Thus,
PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit followed the roomboy to Room 5. Upon arrival, the
roomboy knocked at the door and a woman, later identified as Mylene, opened the door wide
enough to enable the police officers to look inside.
PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit saw petitioner seated on top of the bed sniffing shabu while
Joseph Canlas was on the floor assisting petitioner sniffing shabu. At this juncture, PO3
Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit arrested petitioner and Joseph and confiscated from them the
drug paraphernalia, glass tooter, scissors, lighters and plastic sachets.
PO2 Mangapit frisked petitioner and recovered from him one plastic sachet containing
shabu.
After informing petitioner and Joseph of their constitutional rights, PO3 Pang-ag and PO2
Mangapit brought them to the Laoag City Police Station and turned them over to the police
officer on duty while the confiscated items were turned over to SPO3 Loreto Ancheta.
The Philippine National Police (PNP) laboratory conducted an examination on the specimen
recovered from appellant and his companion which tested positive for shabu.
On October 15, 2004, two separate informations were filed against Joseph Canlas y Naguit
and Cacao indicting them for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 before the RTC
of Laoag City.
Both RTC and CA convicted petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not the lower courts gravely erred in ruling that the guilt of the accused
was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Held: As a general rule, factual findings and conclusions of the trial court and the CA are
entitled to great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. However, if there is
any indication that the trial court overlooked certain facts or circumstances which would
substantially affect the disposition of the case, the Supreme Court will not hesitate to review
the same. In this case, the Court finds it imperative to review the factual findings of the trial
court because of certain inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on
material points.
A. The testimonies of the prosecutions principal witnesses are inconsistent as to who
delivered the prohibited drug to the evidence custodian.
In this case, PO3 Celso Pang-ag (Pang-ag) and PO2 Jonel Mangapit (Mangapit) both testified
that it was the latter who brought the item confiscated from petitioner to the evidence
custodian, SPO3 Loreto Ancheta (Ancheta). However, the foregoing assertions are totally at
odds with the testimony of Ancheta, the evidence custodian. The latter denied that it was
Mangapit who delivered the item allegedly recovered from Cacao. Instead, he repeatedly and
categorically declared that it was SP03 Balolong (Balolong) from whom he received the
plastic sachet of shabu.
Contrary to the findings of the appellate court, The Court is of the considered view that this
contradiction is not so inconsequential or minor but a discrepancy touching on substantial and
significant matter which could well affect the credibility of the witnesses.
B. The prosecution failed to satisfactorily establish that the item presented in court was the
same item confiscated from Cacao.
The patent inconsistency between the testimonies of Mangapit and Pang-ag, on one
hand, and the testimony of Ancheta on the other hand, necessarily leads us to doubt that the
plastic sachet of shabu identified in court is the same item that was allegedly seized and
confiscated from petitioner. If the version of Mangapit is to be believed, then the most
lamentable aspect pertains to his failure to identify the seized item with certainty. For sure
Mangapit, who is the most competent person to make the proper identification being the
officer who confiscated the item from Cacao, never actually identified the same.
The only other person who could have identified the subject drug is Pang-ag. However,
the Court cannot lend credence to his supposed identification, the same not being also
positive, certain and unequivocal. Besides, there is no showing that this witness actually saw
the shabu at the time it was allegedly seized from petitioner. In fact, Pang-ag is even
incompetent to make the identification since from all indications, he has never been in
possession of it.
Moreover, considering the testimony of Ancheta, it was Balolong who forwarded the
seized item. It must be noted that Balolong was never presented to testify in this case. Thus,
there is no evidence to prove that what was turned over to the evidence custodian by
Balolong and later presented in court was the same substance recovered from petitioner. The
failure to establish the chain of custody is fatal to the prosecution’s case.
Arceo vs. People, GR No. 142641, July 17, (2006)
FACTS:
Pacifico Arceo obtained a loan from Josefino Cenizal. He then issued a check in favor of
Cenizal, in which he promised verbally seven times that he would replace it with cash. After
not replacing the check, he encashed the check but was dishonored due to insufficient funds.
Cenizal went to Arceo's house to inform him of the dishonor but he was not around anymore
so he went to Arceo's lawyer and gave him a letter giving him three days to pay the check.
When Arceo failed, Cenizal charged him in violation of BP 22.
The lower court found him guilty.
Arceo contends that he should not be held liable because it was presented beyond the 90-day
period provided under the law; that he only given three days to pay and not five banking days
as per law; and that he paid his obligation.
ISSUE:
Whether the presentation of the check in evidence is a condition for conviction under B.P. 22
HELD:
No. Petitioner’s insistence on the presentation of the check in evidence as a condition sine
qua non for conviction under BP 22 is wrong. Rule 130, Section 3, of the Rules of Court,
otherwise known as the best evidence rule, applies only where the content of the document is
the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is the execution or existence of the document or
the circumstances surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and
testimonial evidence is admissible.
The fact in issue is the act of drawing and issuing a worthless check. Hence, the subject of the
inquiry is the fact of issuance or execution of the check, not its content. Although the check
and the return slip were among the documents lost, Cenizal was nevertheless able to
adequately establish the due execution, existence and loss of the check and the return slip in
an affidavit of loss as well as in his testimony during the trial of the case.
Moreover, Arceo himself admitted that he issued the check. He never denied that the check
was presented for payment to the drawee bank and was dishonored for having been drawn
against insufficient funds.
Magdayao vs. People, 436 SCRA 677
Facts:
An information was filed, charging Engr. Bayani Magdayao with violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
When the case for trial was called for the prosecution to adduce its evidence, Magdayao and
his counsel were absent. On motion of the prosecution, the court allowed it to adduce
evidence.
Ricky Olvis, a witness for prosecution, testified on direct examination that Magdayao drew
and issued to him Philippine National Bank (PNB) check in the amount of P600, 000.00. The
said check was drawn against the latter’s account with the PNB, Dipolog City Branch, and
issued in payment of Magdayao’s obligation with Olvis.
The latter deposited the check in his account with the BPI-Family Bank, Dipolog City
Branch, but the drawee bank dishonored the check as it was drawn against insufficient funds.
When informed that his check was dishonored, the Magdayao pleaded for time to pay the
amount thereof, but reneged on his promise. Magdayao again offered to repay Olvis the
amount of the obligation by retrieving the dishonored check and replacing the same with two
other checks: one for P400, 000.00 and another for P200, 000.00 payable to Olvis; he agreed.
Olvis then returned the original copy of the check to Magdayao, but the latter again failed to
make good on his promise and failed to pay the P600, 000.00.
The prosecution wanted Olvis to identify Magdayao, as the drawer of the check, but because
of the latter’s absence and that of his counsel, the direct examination on the witness could not
be terminated.
The prosecution moved that such direct examination of Olvis be continued on another date,
and that Magdayao be ordered to appear before the court so that he could be identified as the
drawer of the subject check; the motion was Magdayao and his counsel still failed to appear
on the scheduled continuation of direct examination. The prosecution offered in evidence the
photocopy of the PNB check, which the court admitted.
Magdayao argued that the photocopy of the subject check was inadmissible in evidence
because of the prosecution’s failure to produce the original thereof. The prosecution averred
that it dispensed with the presentation of the original of the dishonored check because the
same had been returned to the petitioner. It also pointed out that the petitioner failed to object
to the presentation of the photocopy of the dishonored check.
Issue:
Whether the photocopy of the PNB check is inadmissible in evidence against Magdayao.
Held:
No, the PNB check is notinadmissible in evidence against Magdayao.
We agree with the petitioner that it was incumbent upon the prosecution to adduce in
evidence the original copy of PNB Check No. 399967 to prove the contents thereof, more
specifically the names of the drawer and endorsee, the date and amount and the dishonor
thereof, as well as the reason for such dishonor. Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence specifically provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of the
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original thereof.
The purpose of the rule requiring the production by the offeror of the best evidence is the
prevention of fraud, because if a party is in possession of such evidence and withholds it and
presents inferior or secondary evidence in its place, the presumption is that the latter evidence
is withheld from the court and the adverse party for a fraudulent or devious purpose which its
production would expose and defeat. As long as the original evidence can be had, the court
should not receive in evidence that which is substitutionary in nature, such as photocopies, in
the absence of any clear showing that the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot
be produced in court. Such photocopies must be disregarded, being inadmissible evidence
and barren of probative weight.
Furthermore, under Section 3(b), Rule 130 of the said Rules, secondary evidence of a writing
may be admitted when the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against
whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice. To
warrant the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original of a writing is in the
custody or control of the adverse party, Section 6 of Rule 130 provides that the adverse party
must be given reasonable notice, that he fails or refuses to produce the same in court and that
the offeror offers satisfactory proof of its existence.
The mere fact that the original of the writing is in the custody or control of the party against
whom it is offered does not warrant the admission of secondary evidence. The offeror must
prove that he has done all in his power to secure the best evidence by giving notice to the said
party to produce the document. The notice may be in the form of a motion for the production
of the original or made in open court in the presence of the adverse party or via a subpoena
duces tecum, provided that the party in custody of the original has sufficient time to produce
the same. When such party has the original of the writing and does not voluntarily offer to
produce it or refuses to produce it, secondary evidence may be admitted.
In this case, Olvis, the private complainant, testified that after the check was dishonored by
the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds, he returned it to the petitioner upon the latterÊs
offer to pay the amount of the check by drawing and issuing two checks, one for P400,000.00
and the other for P200,000.00. However, the petitioner still failed to satisfy his obligation to
Olvis.
