Chipongian v Benitez

Facts:

The late Vicente Benitez was married to Isabel Chipongian (died in 1989), the petitioner's sister.
The couple had no offspring. After the death of Isabel, Vicente and the petitioner had executed a
deed of extrajudicial settlement respecting the estate of Isabel, whereby the latter waived all his
rights to the estate of Isabel in favor of Vicente. According to the petitioner, however, Vicente
executed an affidavit on the same date whereby he affirmed that the waiver did not extend to the
paraphernal properties of Isabel.

Upon the death of Vicente, Victoria Benitez Lirio (Victoria), a sister of Vicente, and Feodor
Benitez Aguilar (Feodor), a nephew of Vicente, initiated proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of Vicente in the RTC.  The RTC appointed Feodor the administrator of Vicente's estate.
The petitioner intervened in Special Proceedings. He sought the partial revocation of the order to
exclude the paraphernal properties of Isabel from inclusion in the estate of Vicente. He cited the
affidavit of Vicente in support of the partial revocation. Feodor countered with the request that
he be allowed to continue to administer all the properties.

The petitioner specifically moved for the exclusion of the paraphernal properties of Isabel from
Vicente's estate. However, he withdrew the motion even before the RTC could rule on it. Instead,
he filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Complaint-in-Intervention. Respondents
Victoria and Feodor opposed.

The RTC granted the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Complaint-in-Intervention, and
admitted the complaint-in-intervention of the petitioner.

Judgment of the RTC

The RTC dismissed the complaint-in-intervention.

The RTC later on issued its order whereby it conceded that the petitioner had timely filed the
notice of appeal, but still denied the Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that he had not
perfected his appeal because of his failure to pay the appellate court docket fees.

Decision of the CA

The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari saying that the failure to perfect an appeal renders
the decision of the trial court final and executory. This rule is founded upon the principle that the
right to appeal is not part of due process of law but is a mere statutory privilege to be exercised
only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law.

Issue:
Whether or not, the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint-in-intervention by the CA and the denial
of due course to his notice of appeal by the RTC on the ground of the late payment of the
appellate court docket fees was correct.

Ruling:

The appeal lacks merit.

Intervention is "a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings,
becomes a litigant therein to enable him, her or it to protect or preserve a right or interest which
may be affected by such proceedings." If an intervention makes a third party a litigant in the
main proceedings, his pleading-in-intervention should form part of the main case.  Accordingly,
when the petitioner intervened in Special Proceedings, his complaint-in-intervention, once
admitted by the RTC, became part of the main case, rendering any final disposition thereof
subject to the rules specifically applicable to special proceedings.

Section 1 of Rule 41 enunciates the final judgment  rule by providing that an appeal "may be
taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular
matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable." In the context of the  final
judgment rule, Section 1 of Rule 109 does not limit the appealable orders and judgments in
special proceedings to the final order or judgment rendered in the main case, but extends the
remedy of appeal to other orders or dispositions that completely determine a particular matter in
the case, to wit:

Rule 109. - Appeals in Special Proceedings. Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals
may be taken. - An interested person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or
judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court,
where such order or judgment:

(a) Allows or disallows a will;

(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive share of the
estate to which such person is entitled;
(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceased
person, or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it;
(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;
(e)  Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person,
or the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower court of
the rights of the party appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from the
appointment of a special administrator; and
(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial rights of the
person appealing, unless it be an order granting or denying a motion for a new trial or for
reconsideration.

The dismissal of the petitioner's intervention constituted "a final determination in the lower court
of the rights of the party appealing," that is, his right in the paraphernal properties of his
deceased sister. As such, it fell under paragraph (c) of Section 1, supra, because it had the effect
of disallowing his claim against the estate of Vicente, as well as under paragraph (e) of Section
1, supra, because it was a final determination in the trial court of his intervention. Conformably
with either or both paragraphs, which are boldly underscored above for easier reference, the
dismissal was the proper subject of an appeal in due course by virtue of its nature of completely
disposing of his intervention.

Under Section 3 of Rule 41. Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal shall be taken within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal
is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty
(30) days from notice of judgment or final order. However, an appeal in habeas corpus cases
shall be taken within forty-eight (48) hours from notice of the judgment or fmal order appealed
from.

The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No
motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed,
(n).

For the petitioner, therefore, the period for perfecting the appeal by record on appeal was 30 days
from notice of the final order dismissing the intervention. The start of the period of 30 days
happened on September 18, 1998, the date when his counsel received the decision dismissing his
intervention. However, the entire time from the filing of his Motion for Reconsideration on
October 2, 1998 until his receipt of the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration on March 18,
1999 should be deducted from the reckoning of the period to perfect his appeal. He filed the
notice of appeal on March 19, 1999, and paid the appellate court docket fees on March 31,
1999. Initially, the RTC denied due course to the notice of appeal on the ground that it had been
filed beyond the reglementary period; hence, the petitioner filed his Motion for
Reconsideration against the order denying due course. On July 5, 1999, the RTC issued its order
whereby it conceded that the petitioner had timely filed the notice of appeal, but still denied
the Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that he had not perfected his appeal because of his
failure to pay the appellate court docket fees. Hence, he filed a Motion to Set Aside Order, to
which he appended the copies of the official receipts of the payment of the appellate court docket
fees. Nonetheless, on August 13, 1999, the RTC denied the Motion to Set Aside Order, and a
copy of the order of denial was received by his counsel on August 27, 1999.

Considering that the petitioner did not submit a record on appeal, he did not perfect his appeal of
the judgment dismissing his intervention. As a result, the dismissal became final and immutable.
The right to appeal, being statutory in nature, required strict compliance with the rules regulating
the exercise of the right. As such, his perfection of his appeal within the prescribed period was
mandatory and jurisdictional, and his failure to perfect the appeal within the prescribed time
rendered the judgment final and beyond review on appeal.

In view of the foregoing, the petitioner lost his right to appeal through his failure to file the
record on appeal, and rendered the dismissal of his intervention final and immutable. With this
outcome, we no longer need to dwell on the denial of due course to his notice of appeal because
of the late payment of the appellate court docket fees.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on
October 30, 2002 subject to the foregoing clarification on the correct justification for the
dismissal of the appeal being upon the petitioner's failure to perfect his appeal in accordance with
Section 2(a) and Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay
the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.