I.

Actus Reus
a. Voluntary Acts
i. “Voluntary act requirement”
ii. Unconscious is involuntary
a. Sleep-walking, seizure, muscle spasm, hypnotism, sex-somnia
i. People v. Cogdon- killed daughter in sleep
ii. Decina; an epileptic drove—guilty; shouldn’t have driven
b. Unconsciousness is a complete defense to a charge of criminal
homicide because it is entirely involuntary (People v. Newton)
c. Acts done under duress or insanity are excuses- can be defenses
iii. You must be able to choose to not do it for it to be voluntary
iv. Certain habitual acts are voluntary; impulsive acts you can control; “I
couldn’t help myself”; not a defense
v. Common Law:
a. All acts must be voluntary (Martin)
vi. MPC
a. At least one act by the defendant must be voluntary
vii. Cases:
a. Martin; public drunkenness
i. Convicted under MPC because one act was voluntary
ii. Not convicted under CL because being dragged into public
was not voluntary
viii. Write on final: "the traditional rule in Martin is that all acts must be
voluntary; in contrast, MPC requires that at least one act of D must be
voluntary. Under common law approach, D cannot be convicted because
some of his acts were involuntary, but because one act was voluntary, he
can be convicted under MPC."
ix. Types of elements: (not every crime will have all three)
a. Conduct
b. Attendant circumstances (examples)
i. Something outside of your conduct causes the crime but is
an element of the crime
ii. Statutory rape- the girl is under 18
iii. Burglary- it is nighttime (if this is one of the elements)
iv. Property that is someone else’s, and over $500
c. Results (attempted murder v. murder) (need causation)
i. Results from your actions
b. Omissions
i. There is no general duty in America to save someone
ii. Moral duty is not enough; need a pre-existing legal duty
a. Can come from a statute, contract, special relationships, etc.
(contract would have to include explicitly, care)
iii. For death, probably involuntary MS found, because no intent to kill is you
failed to act and someone died
iv. CL and MPC are the same (MPC 2.02(3))
 a. You cannot be liable for omission unless the law requires you to
act
b. The duty must be legal, not moral
i. Statute imposes legal duty
ii. Relationship with legal duty (parent, spouses, in loco
parentis, innkeeper)
iii. Assumed contractual duty (babysitting)
iv. Voluntarily assumed the duty to care for them and they are
rendered helpless and too secluded to seek other aid
v. Cases:
a. Jones; infant died while under care of D; guilty
b. Pope; mother and child staying at person’s house; mother in a rage
killed the baby and person ultimately not held legally responsible
c. Distinguishing Acts and Omissions
i. Barber case: the doctors changed it from an act to an omission, so the
doctors were not liable; pulled the plug; as an act, it was murder, as an
omission to treat him further, because they had no obligation to because he
was terminally ill in a vegetative state
a. The intent to end his life; to describe doctors’ conduct as an action
is to condemn them as murderers; to describe it as an omission,
you ask, “was there a duty owed”? and if there wasn’t a duty owed,
as the court found because he was terminally ill, then they aren’t
culpable; they owed no duty because care wouldn’t help him
ii. Knocking off the pier example
a. Creating another’s peril
b. What was the MR at the time?
c. Was it an accident?
d. A runs into B, who accidentally knocks C into the pier
i. A voluntarily caused this, liable
ii. B knocked into C involuntarily, not liable
iii. Bystanders- if relation to C, then they might have duty to
rescue
e. "whenever the D's act, though without his knowledge, imperils the
person, liberty, or property of another, or any other interest
protected by the criminal law, and the D becomes aware of the
events creating the peril, he has a duty to take reasonable steps to
prevent the peril from resulting in the harm in question"
iii. Killing and letting die are so different- stark difference here; killing is
almost certainly punishable and letting someone die is not
II. Mens Rea
a. Basic Principles
i. Voluntary act and culpable MR must occur at the same time
a. And the result caused
ii. Break down each element of the statute and find MR for each, and if D
had the MR and the AR; find him guilty of each element
iii. Defenses: involuntary act, duress, legal insanity, accident, and mistake
 iv. Cases:
a. Regina v. Cunningham: court said he didn’t intend to hurt neighbor
by stealing the gas from next door
b. Elonis: even if statute is silent on MR you apply some level of MR
v. Transferred intent: “I tried to do X, but I did Y.”; if you did one bad thing,
then you are responsible for the subsequent bad things that happened
vi. Broad MR: does D have the culpable mental state? Is he blameworthy?
vii. Narrow MR: statute defining specific levels of MR to determine
culpability
viii. Material Elements (must be proven with respect to a level of culpability)
a. The nature of the forbidden conduct
b. The attendant circumstances
c. The result of conduct
ix. Willful blindness: choosing not to ask the question that makes you
practically certain or having knowledge: Jewell: not asking what is in the
trunk, even though it was copious amounts of marijuana
a. Two basic requirements of willful blindness:
i. The defendant must subjectively believe that there is a high
probability that a fact exists and
ii. The defendant must take deliberate actions to avoid
learning of that fact
b. MPC: how certain are you about a fact?
c. On exam: say “courts go lots of ways about this, but here…”
b. Common Law (MR Generally)
i. Many terms for mens rea; wickedly, maliciously, wantonly, etc.
ii. Presumption of MR, even if statute is silent, but there are exceptions:
a. strict liability
b. the statute is designed to protect vulnerable groups
c. the punishment provided is relatively light
d. the defendant is engaged in conduct that puts him in a position to
most easily avoid the harm
iii. Silent on MR: strict liability, no MR needed; or try to figure out the intent
of the legislature- did it want MR?
c. MPC (MR Generally)
i. Some level of MR must always be proven; no strict liability
ii. Four levels of mens rea: purpose, knowledge, recklessness, negligence
a. Can mix and match different MR with each element; take 4 as far
as it can go and then apply 3 if you need to
iii. 2.02 (3)  [statute silent on MR you read in at least recklessly] [if the
statute provides an MR with regard to some elements but not to others]-
apply at least R all the way through
iv. 2.02 (4)  [when the MR that is sufficient to find culpability does not
differentiate among the elements, we apply it to each of the elements
unless a contrary purpose appears]; if one MR is stated and it can be
applied to all, apply it to all
 v. Purposely: Element involves nature of his conduct or result thereof; it is
his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such
a result; and element involves the attendant circumstances; he is aware of
the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist
vi. Knowingly: If the element involves the nature of his conduct or the
attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or
that such circumstances exist; and if element involves a result of his
conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will
cause such a result.
a. Difference between K and R is certainty.
vii. Recklessly: A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of
an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his
conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the
nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to
him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct
that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation.
a. Difference between R and N is awareness.
i. Must be aware of the risk, aware that it is substantial, and
aware that it is justifiable.
b. Not enough to be aware that you might cause harm; you must be
aware that you will cause this specific harm (martial arts case)
viii. Negligently: A person acts negligently with respect to a material element
of an offense when he should be aware of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his
conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the actor's
failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of his conduct
and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the
standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's
situation. [this is criminal negligence; more than tort negligence]
ix. Defense: show that you were extremely careful
a. R requires conscious disregard, so if you truly believed, and the
jury believed you, that you were being careful, it is a defense and
you are not R
i. Kicking glass; if you truly believed you could kick at it and
not break it, and jury bought it, it is a defense
ii. No matter how stupid you are, if you are aware of the risk
you cannot be R
b. Difference from CL; no showing of carefulness in CL
d. Mistake of Fact
a. Bottom line- what needs to be proven and did D do those things
and have the MR?
ii. Common Law:
 a. Moral-wrong principle: you do something that is morally wrong in
the eyes of the community; could be liable
b. Lesser-crime principle: When a D commits a crime knowingly, he
runs the risk of his crime resulting is a greater crime; D cannot
make a mistake of fact defense in this situation
c. Both above principles common in crimes with minors, sexual
assault, and drugs (MOF won’t work when a statute is trying to
protect a very young minor)
i. CL saying it will impose strict liability for certain crimes
and do away with mens rea here
d. Cases: *Regina v. Prince; 14 year old girl ran away with D; guilty
because of statute- strict liability; what he thought didn’t matter
iii. MPC:
a. Mistake of fact is a subset of Mens Rea, not its own category
i. Either the D had the MR or not; this can fall into MR
categories
ii. Never does away with mens rea, but MR can be negated
b. Compare 2.04(1) and 2.02(9)
i. 2.04(1): ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact or law is
a defense if:
i. It negates the mens rea required by statute
ii. State of mind due to mistake can constitute a
defense
iii. Your claim of mistake or ignorance is a defense if it
shows that you DON'T have the mens rea the statute
requires (government didn’t prove burden)
iv. aggravating circumstances should trigger more
severe penalties only when the D was subjectively
aware of a risk that the circumstances existed.
ii. 2.02(9): No mens rea must generally be shown with regards
to the meaning or existence of a statute prohibiting your
conduct
i. It is not a defense under MPC to say- I didn't know
the statute existed
ii. 2.02(4) therefore ignorance isn't a defense because
there is no MR required regarding K of the statute
iii. 2.02 (9) says: govt doesn't need to prove any MR
with regard to the meaning or existence of the
statute; they just have to prove that you knowingly
stole; you knew you were stealing; but they only
have to prove that you were stealing; they don't
have to prove that you knew you shouldn't steal; the
state need not prove any MR with regard to the
meaning or existence of the statute
 c. Prince under MPC: read in at least R because statute is silent on
MR, if jury finds that he was aware of the risk that she was
underage or that this was against parents’ will, guilty of R
d. Olsen: if it was under MPC; the mistake of her age negates the R
read in, because he didn’t know her age and shouldn’t have been
aware because he was also a teenager. Example of negating MR.
e. Mistake of Law
i. Common law: mistake of the law is usually no defense
a. Doesn't negate the mens rea that the government must prove
b. If it is a strict liability offense, there is no MR to debate, mistake of
law/fact is no defense
i. Awareness or knowledge of legal standard is sometimes
part of the offense
c. If statute is silent on MR, first figure out the legislature’s intent
(did they mean for it to silent or do we have to read it in?); once
you have the MR, you can figure out if the defense negates the MR
d. Ignorance of the Law as a Defense
i. “I didn’t know I couldn’t destroy someone’s property.”
ii. Won’t work under MPC or CL
ii. MPC: says that MOF and MOL doctrines are unnecessary
a. A mistake of fact or law is a defense only if it negates the mens
rea required by statute; so if you needed to know to be guilty
(required MR), but you didn’t know, that would negate the MR
b. “Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact or law is a defense if
it negatives the purpose, belief, recklessness or negligence
required to establish a material element of the offense”
c. Immutable characteristics are sometimes taken into account like
youth and blindness…
d. Misreading a statute is your fault
iii. Cases:
a. Woods: “A person with another person's spouse"; I didn't know I
couldn't do that.
b. Same under MPC and CL: No defense. 2.02(9)
c. Marrero: MOL is no excuse unless you rely on a statute that ends
up being erroneous (2.04(3))
f. Strict Liability
i. MPC: no strict liability
a. If a statute is written without MR, you read in at least R
b. The legality of your conduct is not an element of the offense
i. Govt must prove the elements; they don’t need to prove
you knew your conduct was illegal when it happened
i. Exception to this is tax (toxic chemicals, food
stamps) cases- it is complicated so the government
will have to prove that you knew you were illegally
evading taxes, etc.
 ii. Common Law: strict liability exists; no MR required for certain crimes
under statute
a. when liability is imposed without any demonstrated culpability,
not even negligence, with respect to at least one of the material
elements of the offense
b. strict liability when the D neither knew nor had any reason to know
that anything about his behavior was legally or even morally
wrong
c. To protect certain groups
d. Strict liability usually enforced when the punishment is small;
don’t want to impose SL for severe, long sentences
e. Cases: Balint, Dotterweich, Morissette (govt property), Staples (in
possession of grenades), U.S. v. X-Citement Video (K applied to all
elements), Guminga (serving underage at restaurant)
i. Push people to be more careful, not negligent or R
ii. Staples: if you own a weapon you must check to make sure
that ownership is legal
iii. Morissette: he would be liable only if he knew govt still
had ownership over the metal
f. “I didn’t know this was illegal” is not a defense; it does not negate
the MR becaue there is no MR required
g. Vicarious Liability:
i. Employers, parents
ii. Defense: involuntary act; lack of an overt act
i. Example- unable to pay child support
iii. Middle of the road approach: burden to D to show they had
reasonable care when they acted, once govt proves they
acted
i. “I broke the window, but I was careful. I acted
reasonably under the circumstances.”
h. Exam: Read this statute grammatically; what is the clearest
reading of this statute? Does that reading make policy sense? How
would that statute be read under the MPC? If you were a judge
reading this how would you interpret it? If you were a legislator,
how would you change this to achieve XYZ?
i. Talk about modifying verbs, which words apply to which
elements, etc.
III. Homicide (see chart)
a. Common Law
i. Murder
a. First Degree Murder
i. Need premeditation and deliberation
i. Can be a very short time- one second, even
ii. Proof of reflection is not required
ii. Did D have time to reflect and think about it?
 i. Did he try to cover it up? Was there any
forethought?
1. Anderson- Court said no way it was planned
b. Second Degree Murder
i. Don’t need premeditation and deliberation
ii. Example: in jurisdiction where words alone are never
enough to be provocation; V says something to D, D shoots
V, no premeditation, but there was intent to kill; no
adequate provocation
iii. Case: Carroll: he fired two shots at his wife but argued it
wasn’t premeditated and deliberated
c. Malice Aforethought [think of it as a folder]
i. Dividing line between murder and manslaughter
ii. Intent to kill, do great bodily harm, commit an inherently
dangerous felony, etc.
iii. Difference between murder and manslaughter
iv. Needed to get to murder
v. Knowingly killing
vi. Intent to impose great and bodily harm
d. Extreme Recklessness
i. Abandoned and malignant heart
ii. Depravity of heart
iii. Person is so reckless that his action are equated to
intentional killing
iv. Implied malice: same thing as extreme indifference,
abandoned and malignant heart
i. Different way of saying that D, without intent to
kill, did such a dangerous thing that we can charge
her with murder; not because she intended to kill
but because her indifference to human life was so
profound; malice is implied from her recklessness
1. Examples: Russian roulette, shooting into a
crowd, drag racing, driving into a school or
playground
a. Doesn’t intent to kill anyone in
particular or in general
ii. Agency theory- co-felon dies, you are responsible
for all deaths during commission of felony; can be
guilty under implied malice
v. Malone: pointing gun at friend’s stomach; act was so
antisocial, so much disregard for human life that it can be
murder through extreme recklessness? CL says yes
i. He fired three times; knew what he was doing
ii. An unintended killing that became murder
iii. Under MPC- CNH (b/c no R would be found)
 vi. Fleming: drunk driving on GW Pkwy: malice aforethought
found because such an extreme indifference and conscious
disregard for human life
e. Voluntary Manslaughter
i. A killing that would be first-degree murder but is reduced
because of provocation
ii. Provocation:
i. A crime that would be murder can be
mitigated/reduced to manslaughter if the defendant
was acting from provocation
ii. Categorical approach: there are only certain types of
categories in which provocation is a defense; words
not enough (categories below iii)
iii. Let the jury decide approach: jury is better equipped
to the judge the adequacy of provocations
iii. Would be murder but mitigated for heat of passion
i. Discovering spouse’s adultery
ii. Extreme assault of battery on D
iii. Mutual combat
iv. D’s illegal arrest
v. Injury or abuse of close relative
iv. Partial justification:
i. Focusing on victim and if victim has done
something to partially justify their own death
ii. V greatly angered or threatened D; force is used
against D first by V, then D flies into rage and kills
victim; partial justification because V had heavy
hand in what happened (this is VMS)
iii. This is not self-defense-- but looks like it a bit
v. Partial excuse:
i. Focused on D; is there something about the D that
makes the killing more sympathetic?
ii. Example: insanity: I was not perceiving reality
correctly; it wasn’t right but “I am asking for your
understanding”
1. I was not free to choose, my decision-
making was impaired
2. I am still criminally culpable, just less so
iii. Question for the jury:
1. The question is: how likely is this conduct to
provoke such a response? (NOT-- would I
react in the same way, by killing; because if
we ask that, then that conduct is not criminal
at all; the question is- would a reasonable
person be provoked by such conduct; NOT
 that a reasonable person would KILL; but
would this conduct provoke someone)
iv. Cooling time
1. Historically there couldn’t be any cooling
time; now, it goes to a jury (Maher)
f. Involuntary Manslaughter
i. A less serious unintentional killing-- looks like second-
degree murder
ii. Accidental killings, done with recklessness or negligence;
but beyond negligence in a way to show disregard for
others
iii. Gross negligence and R grouped together; different from
MPC approach; no difference between IMS and CNH; it
is R and N grouped together; criminal/gross negligence
enough to get to MS conviction
iv. *Remember: An accidental killing- can be "nothing",
tortious- if negligent, involuntary manslaughter if it is
criminal negligence, culpable negligence, gross negligence,
or recklessness; or all the way to murder if it is bad enough
b. MPC
i. No degrees of murder; no malice aforethought, premeditation, or
deliberation – these words are not used; no voluntary or involuntary MS
ii. 210.1: Criminal Homicide
a. A person is guilty of criminal homicide if he P, K, R, or N causes
the death of another human being
b. Includes murder, manslaughter, or negligent homicide
iii. Murder:
a. 210.2: MR: criminal homicide that is completely P, K, or
extremely recklessly to manifest extreme indifference to the value
of human life
i. The extremity of recklessness distinguishes this from
manslaughter; the recklessness must be committed with
extreme indifference to the value of human life; awareness
of risk, proceeding anyway
ii. Such R and indifference are presumed if the actor is
engaged or is an accomplice in the commission of, or an
attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting
to commit robbery, rape or deviate sexual intercourse by
force or threat of force, arson, burglary, kidnapping or
felonious escape.
iii. State satisfies burden of extreme R by showing D engaged
in one of the enumerated felonies; D must refuse this by
showing evidence to the contrary (it is a rebuttable
presumption)
 iv. Jury cannot convict unless they find that D acted with
extreme indifference beyond a reasonable doubt
b. Must also find causation
c. First degree felony
d. Cases
i. Driving to a bar: would be a rare MPC exception; D was R
because he chose to be intoxicated; he drove to the bar
knowing he had to drive home so he would perceive the
risk and disregard it
ii. 2.08(2) MPC says that if D didn’t perceive the risk only
because he was voluntarily intoxicated, but reasonable
person would have, then we treat you as though you would
have perceived it and proceeded anyway  recklessness
iv. Manslaughter:
a. No involuntary MS and voluntary MS under MPC; just
manslaughter
b. 210.3: criminal homicide is bumped up to manslaughter when it is
committed recklessly; must perceive the risk
i. Ordinary R is the threshold here; mere R = manslaughter
c. *A homicide which would otherwise be murder is committed
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance
(EED) for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse. The
reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shall be determined
from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under the
circumstances as he believes them to be.
i. Situation is ambiguous
ii. Does not include the words- provocation, cooling time, heat
of passion, etc.
iii. Look inside the defendant's head- focus on mens rea; not
whether he was provoked or killed the right person
iv. Defense: Was he suffering from EED? For which there was
reasonable explanation or excuse? (Test below)
d. Reasonable test:
i. Was it reasonable for him to be so disturbed? Under the
circumstances as he believed them to be?
ii. Objective v. subjective perspective
i. Subjective – individual; some degree of
individualization
1. Think about age, blindness, drugs, abuse
2. MPC wants this to be a question for judges
and juries
ii. Objective-- more general- some things can be more
objective than others…MPC intentionally
ambiguous
iii. Cases: Williams (Native American baby died)
 e. Second degree felony
f. 2.02(2): R is separate from N
i. In order for it to be MS, a killing must be done recklessly;
if it is more than recklessness, it is murder
ii. MPC draws brighter line between MS and CNH
iii. Perceives risk and goes ahead anyway
g. Cases:
i. Casassa: there is no reasonable excuse; a reasonable person
wouldn’t have done this
v. Criminally Negligent Homicide
a. 210.4: Gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable
person would exercise under the circumstances; to be CNH,
conduct and failure to perceive risk and be a gross deviation from
SOC that a reasonable person would exercise
i. Very far away from reasonable person; way further away
than torts; can we criminally punish inadvertent crimes?
b. Disregard a substantial and unjustifiable risk; failure to perceive
that risk must be a gross deviation from what a reasonable person
would do under the circumstances; should have perceived risk
c. Without perception of risk, it is only CNH
d. Line between manslaughter and CNH is recklessness
i. Difference from CL here; R is separate from N
ii. CL doesn’t have this difference between MS and CNH
iii. CL calls this gross deviation- negligence
c. The Felony Murder Rule
i. Common Law
a. A killing is murder if it is done with intent to commit a felony and
known to be dangerous or cause death; it does in fact cause
death(s) in furtherance of the felony
i. After the felony counts, if he is fleeing, etc.
ii. Agency- D responsible for himself and agents
iii. D responsible for all deaths resulting from felony
(proximate cause)
b. Not limited to deaths that are foreseeable; strict liability
c. Inherently Dangerous Limitation: [Q for jury]
i. For FMR to apply, felony must be inherently
dangerous/inherent risk to life
i. Only the intent to commit an inherently
dangerous felony is sufficiently like the intent to
kill that it will satisfy the requirement of malice
aforethought (Kamin)
ii. Georgia approach (per se): “as applied/committed test”- in
the way D committed the crime, was there inherent danger
to human life? Or was it a freak accident? What did the D
actually do?
 iii. CA approach (abstract) (minority): “elemental test”- If we
look at the elements of the offense; can we look at someone
committing these elements and have them not dangerous to
human life? (a limit to FMR)
i. High probability that death will result
ii. Example: Phillips-grand theft can be committed in a
way that is not inherently dangerous (commit
fraud), so this means that FMR cannot apply for a
death resulting from grand theft
iii. Henderson; false imprisonment not inherently
dangerous because the statutory elements were not
life-endangering (violence, menace, fraud, deceit)
d. FMR applies when independent felonious purpose and
inherently dangerous meet
e. Merger Limitation:
i. even if it is inherently dangerous, Felony murder
instruction may not properly be given when it is based upon
a felony which is an integral part of the homicide and
which the evidence produced by the prosecution shows to
be an offense included in fact within the offense charged
i. Ex.- cannot charge murder based on assault with a
deadly weapon; that would make all assaults with
deadly weapon murder; we would never need to
prove anything; so murder and felony merge, cannot
charge both of them
ii. D must have an independent felonious purpose for FMR
to apply
i. Ex. armed robbery has independent felonious
purpose to get money; insurance fraud too
iii. Some felonies are included in fact in the killing; are
inseparable from the killing
iv. You cannot charge the means by which someone as killed
i. Example: man charged successfully with FMR for
shooting at kids to scare; no merger; he tried to
scare, and death resulted; not the same thing
f. Cases:
i. Hines v. Georgia: crime committed is inherently dangerous
to human life (turkey hunting)
ii. Serne: judge had difficulty explaining FMR to jury; jury
didn’t like it; govt argued FMR when it didn’t need to
iii. Stamp: heart attack during robbery; eggshell skull;
inappropriate to use FMR
ii. MPC
a. No FMR under MPC; no strict liability
b. 210.2: It is committed P or K; or
 i. It is committed R under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to the value of human life. Such R and
indifference are presumed if the actor is engaged or is an
accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit,
or flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery,
rape or deviate sexual intercourse by force or threat of
force, arson, burglary, kidnapping or felonious escape.
c. You always have to show extreme indifference to the value of
human life; one is guilty of murder if murder is committed K or P,
or with extreme R, and you can show this by proving D engaged in
one of the enumerated felonies but you must still show extreme
indifference to human life
d. The state usually meets its burden by showing that the defendant
was aware of and disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk of
death. This does not depend on his participation in an enumerated
felony (Kamin)
i. So basically if D didn’t participate in an enumerated felony
you can still prove extreme indifference to human life
e. Defense: say you were careful; defense to extreme R
d. Example: proving murder under CL and under MPC:
i. Bank robbery- guard dies of unexpected heart attack (the bank robber was
very careful)
a. CL: prosecution must prove that Ds intended to commit a felony
and the death foreseeably resulted; no MR required with the result
of death; you intended to commit felony and the death was
foreseeable and that is all the prosecution must prove
i. Argue bank robbery not inherently dangerous; you don’t
have to kill to commit a bank robbery
b. MPC: prosecution must prove that Ds intended to commit a felony
and Ds showed extreme indifference to human life of the guard;
they prove this extreme indifference that the Ds were engaged in
the bank robbery (robbery is one of the enumerated felonies)
i. If jury believes D was careful, he can be acquitted; if he
was really careful, then he didn’t show extreme
indifference to human life

IV. The Significance of Resulting Harm

a. Causation
i. If there is a result element of the crime, we must talk about causation.
ii. Foreseeability (Common Law)
a. Proximate Cause
i. Attenuation and fairness
ii. No intervening factors; actual causation- harm must be in
the realm of danger that D should have foreseen
iii. Proximate cause of others doesn’t matter; what did you do?
b. But-For Causation
 i. Low bar
ii. “___ would not have happened but for D’s behavior.”
c. Steps:
i. What is D’s mens rea in regard to the crime
ii. Was D a cause?
d. Arguments for Causation:
i. I didn’t cause it because it wasn’t foreseeable/attenuated to
the harm
ii. Even if I did cause it, I didn’t foresee it [did D appreciate
the risk?] [if murder conviction, was he extremely R?]
e. Intent transfers
f. Omissions as Causes
i. Babysitting saving drowning baby even if she didn’t push
baby in; contractual obligation might step in
i. Foreseeable- if she doesn’t save baby, baby will die
(but-for causation probably satisfied)
g. Cases:
i. Acosta: getaway chase, helicopters crashed; proximate
cause found but D didn’t consciously disregard the risk to
the pilots; malice for murder not found; crash foreseeable
even though it was in the air
i. Was not extremely R, didn’t appreciate the remote
risk, didn’t have the culpable mental state to be
guilty of murder
ii. Warner-Lambert: don’t know exact cause of explosion
therefore no culpability was found
iii. Subsequent Human Actions (Common Law)
a. D does something that could foreseeably cause harm but after he
acts, someone else acts to cause that harm
b. Courts more likely to maintain causation for R actions (V R drag
racing) than intentional, voluntary actions (like V deciding to
commit suicide) (and subsequently find D liable for the R actions
of V, but not for intentional, voluntary actions of V)
c. Reckless actions: [chain of causation does not break]
i. Drag racing: V chooses to be R; V drag raced and died
ii. Cases:
i. Root: D’s R conduct was not a sufficiently direct
cause of competing driver’s death to be liable
ii. McFadden: we want to preserve life and someone
must be held accountable; liable for death child’s
death but not competing driver’s
d. Intentional actions: [chain of causation breaks]
i. Voluntary intervening actor doctrine means that the first
actor in a sequence of events usually cannot be considered
responsible for subsequent human action when the
subsequent action is entirely voluntary.
 ii. Innocent Third party/Constrained actor:
i. Bailey: Bailey put the deceased in a position where
the police were duty-bound to disarm him; so the
deceased was shot; Bailey blameworthy, police
blameless; exposing V to homicidal 3rd parties
iii. Cases:
i. Campbell: handed friend gun at bar; had no
intention to kill, voluntary
ii. Kevorkian; suicide is free will and voluntary as
long as they weren’t forced or deceived and was
mentally responsible
iii. Stephenson: cruel kidnapper; her suicide was
deemed involuntary; he gave he no choice, he is
liable; her act was not free will; causal connection
not severed (chain doesn’t break)
iv. D causes car crash, V decides to take herself off life
support- D is liable (foreseeable based on D’s
conduct); involuntary because D caused crash
iv. MPC [little difference than with CL for causation]
a. Intent transfers- extreme R to human life can apply to all victims
involved, not just the intended victim [2.03(2)(a)]
b. If you intended a harm, and the actual result was a similar result
than what you wanted/intended and isn't too remote or accidental
in its occurrence, it will have a just bearing on the actor's liability
c. "too remote or accidental" are MPC words to describe whether or
not the occurrence is too weird; is it fair to hold D liable for this?
d. Omissions as causes:
i. Baby is pushed into pool by A, Bystander B jumps in and
drowns; is D liable for both deaths?
ii. Talk about the pusher
i. What crime is this?
ii. Actus reus/mens rea
iii. Talk about the babysitter
i. Obligation comes from contract
ii. Did their failure cause? Yes.
e. Subsequent Human Actions: no special rule
f. Suicides: permits convicting a person of criminal homicide for
causing another to take his life but only if he purposely causes such
suicide by force, duress, or deception
b. Attempt
i. Common Law:
a. Punishable as a fraction of the completed offense; punishable as a
felony
ii. MPC:
 a. 5.05(1) Attempt is punished at the same grade and seriousness as
the completed offense; attempt and completed get same
punishment
iii. Basics:
a. Figure out line between Preparation and Attempt
iv. Mens Rea (CL and MPC)
a. Purpose and intent
b. Specific intent: attempt requires a purpose or “specific intent” to
produce the proscribed result, even when recklessness of some
lesser MR would suffice for conviction of the completed offense
c. Higher MR required for attempted crime than completed crime
i. Because if we are going to charge with attempted crime, we
must be sure they intended to do that crime
ii. Example: attempted murder; did he intend to kill by
shooting into the tent?
iii. If you are being charged with attempted murder, govt must
prove you intended to kill/cause death; specific intent
d. Burglary Example
i. Breaking into a dwelling with the intent to commit a felony
i. Can’t convict of burglary
ii. Intent to break in
iii. MR for dwelling: recklessness. Whether reckless
depends on attendant circumstances
ii. If he says he was not aware of a risk may be a defense

v. Common Law
a. Mens Rea:
i. Conduct: Intent/purpose; must intend to engage in crime
and achieve results
ii. Attendant Circumstances (required outside of D’s conduct
as an element of the offense): must have the same MR for
the completed crime, this MR to be specified in statute
iii. Results: Intent/purpose
iv. Case: Khan; statutory rape; no MR needed in regard to AC
of her being underage
b. Actus Reus tests:
i. Last Act test: To constitute a criminal attempt, as opposed
to mere preparation, the accused must have taken the last
step which he was able to take along the road of his
criminal intent.
i. Matters in solicitation- the Ds believe they hired a
hit man to kill their wives; they did the last act that
is in their control, short of the commission of the
crime; if everything is as they believe it to be
ii. Replaced by dangerous proximity test: [most common]
i. Rizzo; court said they weren’t dangerously close
 ii. did the Ds get dangerously close to completing the
offense? The acts or acts must come or advance
very near to the accomplishment of the intended
crime
iii. Equivocality test: is D’s intent to commit the crime
unequivocal, unless she is stopped?
i. Looks not to how far the D has gone but to how
clearly his acts bespeak his intent; facial criminal
intent of the acts
ii. Case: McQuirter
c. No clear answer as to which test to use
i. Equivocality and last act require a lot to be done before we
can intervene- public policy question?
d. Statutory Rape:
i. Commonwealth v. Dunn; he said he didn't know she was
underage; the court said this would not have been a defense
to the completed crime; so it is not a defense to the
attempted crime
i. Here, no MR required for attendant circumstances
so he is guilty of attempt merely for attempting to
have sex with someone even if he thought they were
of age
vi. MPC
a. Substantial step that strongly corroborates criminal intent
b. Attempt is not a stand-alone crime. “The crime is attempted ___.”
c. Balance intervening too soon and too late
i. MPC allows earlier intervention- easier to convict for
attempt under the MPC
ii. It is about what D has done so far, not what remains to be
done
d. Statutory rape: less clear
i. Actor must have purpose to engage in sexual intercourse in
order to be charged with attempted statutory rape and must
engage in a substantial step in a course of conduct planned
to culminate in commission of that act
i. With respect to age, it is sufficient if D acts with the
kind of culpability otherwise required for the
commission of the crime
ii. Mistake of age is irrelevant with respect to the
substantive offense, it is likewise irrelevant with
respect to the attempt
e. Mens Rea:
i. Conduct: intend to engage in conduct
i. purposefully engages in conduct or does an act to
achieve a result with the belief that it will cause
 such results; he has done what he believes is
necessary to achieve an act but fails
ii. Attendant circumstances: as the D believed them to be;
same MR for completed offense; required under statute
iii. Results: intent
iv. Example: attempted murder:
i. have to prove he has a specific intent to take life;
not just R; we can't just go with a lesser MR; it must
meet the specific intent
f. Actus Reus:
i. Must be more than preparation but MPC does not say
how much more
vii. Renunciation: you have to show you had a change in heart before attempt
was completed; voluntary and total/complete renunciation
a. MPC 5.01(4)
i. Abandonment must be voluntary and complete (hard to
prove)
b. Common Law- renunciation can sometimes be a defense
c. Crimes of Preparation
i. Common Law
a. Substantive crimes of preparation let us arrest earlier
i. Gap filler when D is not liable for attempt
ii. A crime in itself to prepare to do a crime
iii. Getting in before the attempt happens, to prevent harm
b. Examples:
i. CA: harassing and threatening statutes
ii. Burglary
i. “breaking and entering with intent to steal”
ii. Any entry with bad motive can be punished as
burglary
iii. Get D before they do harm in the house/steal
iv. Criminalizing having burglary tools
d. Solicitation
a. Is a crime itself
b. Less serious than attempt
c. Soliciting someone else to commit a crime with you
i. If they agree, it becomes conspiracy
ii. Common Law
a. Soliciting another to commit a crime is a separate crime itself,
independent of what either party does
b. Cases:
i. Davis: hiring an undercover cop to kill wife: Mere
solicitation unaccompanied by an act moving towards the
commission of the crime is not enough to be an attempt
i. Last act: would be attempt
ii. Dangerous proximity: no attempt
 ii. Church: completely opposite ruling; his solicitation was
involved and detailed, even though the undercover cop
never intended to commit murder (Kamin doesn’t like this)
iii. MPC:
a. Crime of solicitation is of the same grade and degree as the most
serious offense which is solicited
b. Substantial step, in the solicitation, toward completing crime could
be attempt
c. 5.02: solicitation as crime itself
i. Could make certain speech a crime; “these bums deserve to
die” at a political rally
e. Impossibility
i. Common Law:
a. Factual Impossibility
i. An attempt to engage in prohibited conduct but is
precluded from doing so based on a fact out of the D’s
control (preventing completion and success)
ii. Cannot use as a defense
iii. Pick pocketer pick pocketing an empty pocket- still liable
for the attempt to steal
b. Legal Impossibility
i. Act, intent, and condition must be true
i. The condition is not true for legal impossibility
ii. Can use this as a defense
iii. Conduct by D was not illegal so it cannot be prosecuted;
the object is not illegal
iv. D cannot be guilty of the completed offense because the
attendant circumstance is not there
v. D engaged in conduct that she thought violated a criminal
statute but which does not in fact; D cannot be charged
with attempted violation of a statute, simply because she
wrongly believed that her conduct violated it
vi. Cases: Jaffe, Lady Eldon
i. Jaffe: Bought stolen fabric but fabric was not
legally stolen; so he couldn't be convicted for
attempt to receive stolen property
1. Not prosecuted because it was a legal
impossibility
ii. First Lady Eldon example: statute prohibiting
smuggling lace, can be charged with attempted
smuggling because as the situation as she believed it
to be, smuggling was illegal and she took a
substantial step towards smuggling
ii. MPC (5.01)
a. Impossibility is never a defense; consider what is in the D’s mind
at the time, what does he think?
 i. Under the circumstances as D believed they were- he took
substantial step toward crime; he should be guilty for crime
even if the completion of the offense was impossible
ii. Does your MR suggest knowledge or intent?
iii. Are acts strongly corroborative of criminal purpose?
b. Don’t look at conduct objectively, look at what D thought he was
doing
i. Kamin- Voodoo doll case- they would be guilty because
they thought they were attempting to murder him
c. Rejects Jaffe result
d. Removed distinction between legal and factual; illusory
e. Only allows a defense when there is a true legal impossibility
f. Cases: second Lady Eldon lace example
i. Cannot be prosecuted because there is no statute to charge
her for attempted to violate; under the circumstances as she
believed them to be, she did not come close to committing
a crime; thinking your conduct is illegal doesn’t make it
illegal
ii. You can try and fail to complete an offense that actually is
illegal; and be convicted for attempt; but you cannot be
convicted for attempt to do something that is not even
illegal

V. Group Criminality
a. Accomplice Liability/Aiding and Abetting
i. Basics:
a. Guilty for the substantive crime committed (like murder, robbery,
rape) under theory of accomplice liability; “you are guilty of
robbery under the theory of accomplice liability.”
b. Not a stand-alone crime
c. Accomplice subject to the same penalties as principal
d. Exam steps: what is the principal liable for?
i. Is D liable for accomplice liability?
ii. MPC v. CL (did the accomplice succeed or not- big
difference)
ii. Conduct- Common Law
a. A person is liable if they aid/encourage and intend to
aid/encourage the conduct of the principal (specific intent)
i. Actus reus: must successfully aid (a tiny bit at least)
ii. Mens rea: must intend to aid
i. Same MR required as principal
ii. True purpose (some jurisdictions)
b. If you attempt to aid and fail, you are not guilty because you failed
to aid; you must aid to be liable for accomplice liability
c. To be guilty as an accomplice, you do not need to be the but-for
causation of a crime to be liable
 i. You have to make the crime more likely to occur
d. Knowingly facilitate: Some CL jurisdictions say knowledge that
you are aiding is enough; for serious enough crimes like murder,
intent requirement may be done away with
e. Principal: if the principal did not commit a crime, accomplice
cannot be found guilty; principal can be charged and acquitted and
AC can still be guilty; but if there was no illegal crime committed
by principal, there is no accomplice liability
f. Innocent agent: if a child is used as principal, D is liable for using
an innocent agent but not as an accomplice
g. Victim cannot be held as accomplice when law is there to protect
them
i. Example: statutory rape: rape victim cannot be an
accomplice
h. Advanced knowledge: Rosemond; do you have advance knowledge
of the crime being committed? Or are you surprised but you stay?
i. Criminal facilitation: aid without a true purpose- lesser penalty
j. Merchant Liability: merchants not held liable as accomplices when
their clients are involved in criminal conduct; even if they have the
actus reus of aiding them they don’t have the MR- no intent to aid
k. Substantive crime of facilitation: if D not guilty of accomplice
liability, can be found to be guilty of a separate crime, like selling
guns to juveniles; gap filler, separate crime
l. Defense: entrapment: cops not allowed to do this
m. Cases:
i. Wilcox v. Jeffrey: accomplice does not need to be but-for
causation of a crime; very little aid is necessary for liability
ii. Hicks
i. Words of encouragement not enough to be aid and
intent to aid in the shooting
iii. Gladstone: he didn’t intend to aid Kent in selling marijuana
i. True intent v. mere knowledge
iv. People v. Russell
v. Drag racing example
vi. Hayes: stealing bacon; principal didn’t actually intend to
steal anything, no principal crime; no accomplice liability
vii. McVay: D must be aware of the attendant circumstances
that make the conduct criminal; he intended them to get
going, didn’t intend death; D charged with IVMS through
criminal negligence
viii. Vaden: guilty as accomplice because the crime of
shooting the birds actually happened; even though
undercover cop was not prosecuted
ix. Rosemond: D didn’t have advanced knowledge of the gun
but proceeded to aid crime; SCOTUS said not guilty
 x. Judge Tally: small amount of aid, liable, even if crime
would have happened anyway
iii. Conduct- MPC (2.06 (3))
a. Actus reus: an attempt to aid is sufficient; you have to attempt to
aid or successfully aid
b. Mens rea: must have true intent to aid (this is a strict line, CL is
not as strict) and believe you are aiding; and have “the purpose of
promoting or facilitating”
i. Even if you failed, what matters is your MR; you intended
to aid; success doesn’t matter; what is in your head
iv. Attendant Circumstances:
i. What needs to be true in the real world?
ii. Ambiguous standard; not clear the MR required
b. Common Law:
i. McVay: D must be aware of the facts that make the conduct
criminal
c. MPC: does not specify MR required for attendant circumstances
v. Results
a. Common Law:
i. Accomplice needs to have a sufficiently culpable mental
state in regard to the results (ex. a resulting death); D must
have the MR required for the result element of the
substantive offense
i. So for the drag racing death; accomplices can be
found to the conduct of drag racing more easily, but
to be an accomplice for the death of the bystander,
the accomplice needs to be at least grossly reckless
in regard to death (for IVMS) (PP)
ii. You would also need to be aware of the risk of
death drag racing creates
ii. Same MR required for the conduct
iii. There must be an actual crime committed to be liable
b. MPC: 2.06 (4)
i. Same as common law: The accomplice must have the same
mens rea as would be necessary to convict the principal
ii. EXCEPT there doesn’t have to be an actual completed
crime, he believed he was aiding so he can be liable
c. Cases: McVay (steam engine)
i. He did not have the required MR for the result; didn’t
intend death; Steam engine captain (on land) can be found
guilty of leaving steam in the engine, because he did that
and intended to, but he cannot be found guilty for murder
unless he had the culpable mental state with regard to death
i. He would need to have: Encouraged them to engage
in conduct while knowing that the conduct was
 negligent (MR required for completed crime) to be
liable for the results
ii. He would need to have a malignant heart or extreme
R, or such depraved disregard for human life, which
he didn’t, in order to be guilty
iii. If we are trying to charge for MS, he must be more
than N with respect to these elements; but he didn’t
have extreme R in regard to death (result)
ii. Drag racing example:
i. Aided by lending car, knew it was for drag racing,
at least liable for accomplice to drag racing
ii. For the results: more complicated
vi. Substantive Crimes:
a. Common Law:
i. Natural and Probable Consequences doctrine:
i. Extension of accomplice liability to not only crimes
the accomplice aided and abetted but also all crimes
that are a natural and probable consequence
(foreseeable) of the crime encouraged/aided/set in
motion (committed by the principal)
1. Also known as Luparello doctrine
ii. Cases: Luparello: D didn’t want/intend them to shoot the
man; he needed information from him; Court: this result
was foreseeable and D is liable for it
i. L is an accomplice in the kidnapping and battery,
probably not in the killing because he didn’t intent,
but under N&P consequences theory, he is liable for
consequences, even if they are unintended, because
they are foreseeable
iii. Roy: Court said robbery wasn’t foreseeable in the selling of
the handgun so Roy not guilty as accomplice for the
robbery; he didn’t intend the robbery nor was it foreseeable
i. Roy set up the sale; Ross robbed Miller
ii. Roy is accomplice to the sale, but not the robbery
b. MPC:
i. rejects Luparello (N&P) Theory – MPC holds a D liable
only for those crimes he intended to aid
vii. Example: D charged with homicide as an accomplice:
a. If D is an accomplice in drag race, and someone is killed, we
would examine three ways to get to homicide on these facts:
i. D is guilty of drag racing as an accomplice and because he
is guilty of drag racing, the FMR applies.
ii. He is guilty of reckless homicide as an accomplice because
he encouraged conduct that led to death and had culpable
mental state with respect to death
 i. he encouraged conduct that led to death and R with
regard to life
iii. N&P consequences doctrine; death was a foreseeable
(N&P) consequence of drag racing, therefore D can be
found guilty of being an accomplice to murder
b. Guilty as AC in the drag racing, and the death was the N&P
consequences of the crime he encourage, therefore he is liable as
well
b. Conspiracy
i. Basics
a. Conspiracy is a way to find someone guilty for another’s
substantive crimes as well as for the stand-alone crime of
conspiracy
i. So you can be guilty of conspiracy and;
ii. Guilty of murder under theory of conspiracy
b. You can have conspiracy without aiding and abetting and vice
versa
i. Aiding without conspiracy- Judge Tally
ii. Conspiracy without aiding- crime isn’t attempted

ii. Common Law

a. Most states fix the punishment for conspiracy at some term that is
tied to but less than the sentence provided for the object crime
i. But the punishment can be more serious for conspiracy
than the object crime
b. Some jurisdictions say that knowledge that you are a coconspirator
is enough
c. Can be charged with:
i. Conspiracy alone: definition: agreement by two or more
persons to commit a crime (even if conspiracy fails)
ii. The target offense, if conspiracy is completed
iii. And additional crimes completed by co-conspirators
d. Defense:
i. Renunciation as complete defense:
i. Some states follow MPC (below)
ii. Other states say the actor only needs to make a
substantial effort to prevent the crime, thwart
iii. Some states require you to be successful in
thwarting the crime
ii. Courts typically require D to disclose scheme to authorities
or communicate withdrawal to coconspirators
iii. Abandonment
e. Actus Reus:
i. The agreement itself: doesn’t have to be in writing; judge
the actions, circumstances, etc.
 ii. Over act requirement (more than just agreement): most
states have it but can be dispensed with for the most serious
crimes
i. Must have something else to prove that the
conspiracy is real and more than just talk
ii. If one person has no intent to complete the
conspiracy, then there is no conspiracy- there is no
agreement (Tiger King- Allen had no intent to kill
Baskin)
1. But asking is solicitation
2. Agreeing is conspiracy
iii. The target crime doesn’t have to end up happening to be
liable for conspiracy
iv. Watch out for concerted action; make sure it is an
agreement between two people to do something
i. You need proof of something preconcert;
beforehand; not just people doing something at the
same time
f. Mens Rea
i. Intent to agree required
i. For more serious crimes sometimes there is an
exception and intent can be inferred
ii. You have to distinguish intent from knowledge
i. Must the person joining the conspiracy intend to
join the conspiracy or is knowledge that they are
joining a conspiracy sufficient? Perry
iii. Three merchant situations where knowledge can infer
intent:
i. If merchant has a stake in the venture and makes
money from the illegal activity
ii. When there is no other legitimate purpose for the
business except the criminal purpose
iii. If the volume of profit is not proportionate to the
business; if someone was buying 300x the amount
of something illegal that they would need;
disproportionate sales related to need
iv. You can infer intent for a felony, not for a misdemeanor
v. Corrupt motive doctrine: to be guilty of conspiracy, you
have to know the conspiracy/target crime is criminal
g. Single or Multiple Conspiracies
i. The awareness that others are participating expands you
liability; makes you responsible for the conduct of others
(court in Bruno)
ii. Interdependence concept (Anderson) (drug dealing)
iii. Cases:
 i. Kotteakos: spokes and a central point, but no rim;
not one conspiracy; the spokes do not benefit from
each other engaging with central point; all single,
separate conspiracies
ii. Anderson: abortion referrals; she was part of a
larger conspiracy; she relied on the referrals
continuing and the doctor having good business
iii. Bruno: drug ring- chain conspiracy- they all know
they are part of one chain of drug conspiracy; the
dealers know they have to get it from somewhere,
and smugglers know the dealers eventually have to
sell it
1. Smugglers
2. Middlemen
3. Distributors
a. LA/TX
b. NYC
4. Court says one large conspiracy, at least for
middlemen- they knew both top and bottom
of conspiracy; but smugglers can argue they
don’t know about the distributors’ separate
conspiracy and vice versa
a. Guilty for sale, conspiracy to
distribute, killings, etc.
b. Would be liable for each other’s
substantive crimes, intended (selling
the drugs) or unintended (shootings)
i. Because of N&P and
coconspirator liability
c. Problematic piece is LA/TX dealers
liable for NYC dealers; do they hate
each other? Do they depend on each
other?
5. Are MM guilty under accomplice liability?
a. N&P consequences
6. Then apply FMR for the deaths
a. Drug dealing not inherently
dangerous
iv. McDermott: D didn’t know about the other guy she
was sleeping with, didn’t want him involved, didn’t
have a conspiracy with him; ends of chain are very
differently situated
iii. MPC (5.03)
a. No co-conspirator liability under the MPC
b. No natural and probable consequences under MPC
c. Crime of conspiracy is of the same grade and degree as the most
serious offense which is an object of the conspiracy; except maybe
for the most serious felonies (same as for attempts under MPC)
d. Each person's liability is limited to the crimes they agreed to and
conspired for; unless those they are agreeing with are agreeing
with others to commit the same crime
e. Actus Reus:
i. Liability kicks in as soon as the conspiracy agreement is
made
ii. Silent on overt act requirement
f. Mens Rea:
i. requires a real intent; you must not only join/know the
person is engaged in the conduct but also have a criminal
intent; benefit from the fact that you are joining the person
for criminal purposes
ii. you have to know/be aware that your conduct is criminal
g. D can be prosecuted for conspiracy or for the completed crime but
not both;
i. 1.07(1)- you cannot be convicted of more than one offense
if one of the offenses is conspiracy or mere preparation
h. Defense: complete defense for renunciation under certain
circumstances
i. Allows defense only if the circumstances manifest
renunciation of the actor's criminal purpose AND the actor
succeeds in preventing commission of the criminal
objectives (5.03-6)
i. Rejects the idea of one big conspiracy and everyone has an equal
role; MPC says there are limited and different roles to play in a
conspiracy [example below]
i. Nonreciprocal conspiracy applies
j. Bruno under MPC: [it is not one big conspiracy] [counter to actual
case ruling]
i. Ask what they explicitly agreed to do and with who
ii. Unless the same crime they agreed to is the same as
another conspirator's
iii. MM not liable for killings done in LA/TX because
there is no coconspirator and N&P consequences
doctrine
1. MM can be charged with the sale or
conspiracy to commit the sale, for acts done
in TX/LA for which they are an accomplice,
but that is where their liability ends
ii. 5.03 (1) & (2)
i. D guilty for crimes they had a purpose of
facilitating
 ii. Except when same crime you conspired to commit
is also the subject of another conspiracy of his
coconspirators
iii. Dealers in NY: agreed with middlemen to buy narcotics
i. 5.03(1) (2) limit NY dealers’ liability to the crimes
they agreed to commit and with those they agreed to
commit them with
ii. Their crime is limited to conspiracy to distribute
drugs with the middlemen
iv. Middlemen: agreed with smugglers to import drugs and to
sell them
i. Their conspiracy is different from the NY retailers'
conspiracy
v. Smugglers: conspired with middlemen and NY/TX/LA
dealers, because they know MM have conspired with
dealers
i. But NY dealers didn’t conspire with smugglers;
only with middlemen (this is the big difference-
nonreciprocal)
ii. Smugglers involved with those nonreciprocally
involved with them
vi. MPC: kingpins and little guys; little guys not working
upstream
iv. Vicarious Liability (Co-conspirator Liability) (CL only)
i. Coconspirators liable for each other’s substantive crimes
b. Common Law
i. Co-conspirator responsible for all additional crimes that
result from the crime you are a conspirator for, that are
foreseeable, and in furtherance of the original crime; there
must be a conspiracy; crimes must be done in
furtherance of the conspiracy; and the crime must be
reasonably foreseeable
i. Resulting crimes charged to everyone in the
conspiracy
ii. Can get to the same result with N&P theory from
accomplice liability
iii. Where Luparello doctrine and Pinkerton doctrine
come together
ii. Pinkerton doctrine: D can be held liable for crimes
committed by co-conspirators in furtherance of the
conspiracy and that are reasonably foreseeable
i. Scope: The awareness that others are participating
expands you liability; makes you responsible for the
conduct of others
 ii. Duration: SOL doesn’t run until last overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy, by coconspirators (as
long as someone is still working towards it)
iii. Cases:
i. Pinkerton: acts in furtherance of the conspiracy,
even though he was in jail, he is liable as a
coconspirator; he agreed to commit an offense
ii. Bridges: D didn’t agree to commit killings and did
not know about it; court said still liable; co-
conspirators acting in furtherance of conspiracy and
killing was reasonably foreseeable; he agreed to
commit a different offense
iii. Alvarez: drug ring, federal officer shot, someone
playing minor role charged with death; court said
still liable for drug dealing and death; he agreed to
commit a different offense (drug dealing) and
played a minor role
1. Because killing of officer was done in
furtherance and was foreseeable
iv. Bruno (above)