Ebralinag vs division superintendent
Ruling:
No, they cannot be expelled for this reason. We hold that a similar exemption may be
accorded to the Jehovah's Witnesses with regard to the observance of the flag
ceremony out of respect for their religious beliefs, however "bizarre" those beliefs may
seem to others. Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the flag ceremony does not
give them a right to disrupt such patriotic exercises. Paraphrasing the warning cited by
this Court in Non vs. Dames II, 185 SCRA 523, 535, while the highest regard must be
afforded their right to the free exercise of their religion, "this should not be taken to
mean that school authorities are powerless to discipline them" if they should commit
breaches of the peace by actions that offend the sensibilities, both religious and
patriotic, of other persons. If they quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony
while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite
the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or
pose "a grave and present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public
health or any other legitimate public interest that the State has a right (and duty) to
prevent (German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 517).
Estrada vs. Escritor
Ruling:
Yes the act was grossly immoral. In a catena of cases, the Court has ruled that
government employees engaged in illicit relations are guilty of "disgraceful and immoral
conduct" for which he/she may be held administratively liable. In these cases, there was
not one dissent to the majority's ruling that their conduct was immoral. The respondents
themselves did not foist the defense that their conduct was not immoral, but instead
sought to prove that they did not commit the alleged act or have abated from committing
the act.
No, Escritor is not guilty of gross immorality and she cannot be penalized for her
freedom of religion justifies her conjugal arraignment. In interpreting the Free Exercise
Clause, the realm of belief poses no difficulty. The early case of Gerona v. Secretary of
Education is instructive on the matter, viz:
The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination
and thought. So is the freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless and without
bounds. One may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable
the same may appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy
or doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief,
there is quite a stretch of road to travel.
The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedom,
including religious freedom, may be enjoyed.
Taruc vs. Bishop Dela Cruz
Held:
No. The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is
a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said
institution/organization. It is not for the courts to exercise control over church authorities
in the performance of their discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for the
members of religious institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations.
“Civil Courts will not interfere in the internal affairs of a religious organization except for
the protection of civil or property rights. Those rights may be the subject of litigation in a
civil court, and the courts have jurisdiction to determine controverted claims to the title,
use, or possession of church property.” Obviously, there was no violation of a civil right
in the present case.
Ang ladlad vs COMELEC
Ruling:
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party’s application for registration should be granted.
Comelec’s citation of the Bible and the Koran in denying petitioner’s application was a
violation of the non-establishment clause laid down in Article 3 section 5 of the
Constitution. The proscription by law relative to acts against morality must be for a
secular purpose (that is, the conduct prohibited or sought to be repressed is
“detrimental or dangerous to those conditions upon which depend the existence and
progress of human society"), rather than out of religious conformity. The Comelec failed
to substantiate their allegation that allowing registration to Ladlad would be detrimental
to society.
The LGBT community is not exempted from the exercise of its constitutionally vested
rights on the basis of their sexual orientation. Laws of general application should apply
with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on
the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors. Discrimination
based on sexual orientation is not tolerated ---not by our own laws nor by any
international laws to which we adhere.
Imbong vs. Ochoa
Ruling: NO
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as
principally a population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards
the reduction of the country’s population. While it claims to save lives and keep our
women and children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated
earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and
the marginalized, with access to information on the full range of modem family planning
products and methods. These family planning methods, natural or modern, however,
are clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy. For said reason, the manifest
underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in the country. The
Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners’ contention that the whole idea of contraception
pervades the entire RH Law.
Letter of Tony Valenciano
Ruling:
The holding of Religious Rituals in the Hall of Justice does not amount to the union of
Church and State. The 1987 constitution provides that the separation of Church and the
State shall be inviolable; if further provides that the free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed. Allowing religion to flourish is not contrary to the principle of separation of
Church and state. In fact, these two principles are in perfect harmony with each other.
The Roman Catholic express their worship through the holy mass and to stop these
would be tantamount to repressing the right to the free exercise of their religion.
It is also the view of the Supreme Court that the holding of Catholic masses at the
basement of the Quezon City Hall of Justice is not a case of establishment but merely
accommodation wherein the government recognize the reality that some measures may
not be imposed on a certain portion of the population for the reason that these
measures are contrary to their religious beliefs. As long as it can be shown that the
exercise of the right does not impair the public welfare, the attempt of the State to
regulate or prohibit such right would be an unconstitutional encroachment.
No appropriation of Public money or property for the benefit of any Church. The
constitution provides that “No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied,
paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support any sect, church,
denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or any priest, preacher,
minister or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest,
preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or any penal institution,
or government orphanage or leprosarium.
The prohibition contemplates a scenario where the appropriation is primarily intended
for the furtherance of a particular church. The aforecited constitutional provision “does
not inhibit the use of public property for religious purposes when the religious character
of such use is merely incidental to a temporary use which is available indiscriminately to
the public in general. Thus, the basement of the Quezon City Hall of Justice has
remained to be a public property devoted for public use because the holding of Catholic
masses therein is a mere incidental consequence of its primary purpose.
Union international vs Dagdag
Jurisprudence has already set the standard of morality with which an act should be
gauged — it is public and secular, not religious. Whether a conduct is considered
disgraceful or immoral should be made in accordance with the prevailing norms of
conduct, which, as stated in Leus, refer to those conducts which are proscribed
because they are detrimental to conditions upon which depend the existence and
progress of human society. The fact that a particular act does not conform to the
traditional moral views of a certain sectarian institution is not sufficient reason to qualify
such act as immoral unless it, likewise, does not conform to public and secular
standards. More importantly, there must be substantial evidence to establish that
premarital sexual relations and pregnancy out of wedlock is considered disgraceful or
immoral.[26] (Citations and emphasis in the original omitted)
The totality of evidence in this case does not justify the dismissal of Dagdag from her
employment considering that there was no legal impediment to marry between Dagdag
and the father of her child at the time of the conception. To reiterate the ruling of this
Court in Leus and Capin-Cadiz, pregnancy of a school teacher out of wedlock is not a
just cause for termination of an employment absent any showing that the pre-marital
sexual relations and, consequently, pregnancy out of wedlock, are indeed considered
disgraceful or immoral.
Villavicencio vs. Lukban
HELD : Law defines power. No official, no matter how high, is above the law. Lukban
committed a grave abuse of discretion by deporting the prostitutes to a new domicile
against their will. There is no law expressly authorizing his action. On the contrary, there
is a law punishing public officials, not expressly authorized by law or regulation, who
compels any person to change his residence Furthermore, the prostitutes are still, as
citizens of the Philippines, entitled to the same rights, as stipulated in the Bill of Rights,
as every other citizen. Thei rchoice of profession should not be a cause for
discrimination. It may make some, like Lukban, quite uncomfortable but it does not
authorize anyone to compel said prostitutes to isolate themselves from the rest of the
human race. These women have been deprived of their liberty by being exiled to Davao
without even being given the opportunity to collect their belongings or, worse, without
even consenting to being transported to Mindanao. For this, Lukban etal must be
severely punished
Marcos vs. Manglapus
HELD:
1. Yes. Contrary to petitioners' view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom
executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the
grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties
under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are
expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered
provisions of the Constitution.
This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses
under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific power of the
President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a
diminution of the general grant of executive power. Among the duties of the President
under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath of office, is to protect and
promote the interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return of the
Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under
present circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty.
2. No, the residual powers of the President under the Constitution should not be
confused with the power of the President under the 1973 Constitution to legislate
pursuant to Amendment No. 6. Whereas the residual powers of the President under the
1987 Constitution are implied, Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution refers to an
express grant of power.
Office of administrative vs. Macarine
Issue:
Whether or not there exists a violation to the right to travel.
Ruling:
There is no violation on the right to travel. True, the right to travel is guaranteed by the
Constitution. However, the exercise of such right is not absolute. Section 6, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution allows restrictions on one’s right to travel provided that such
restriction is in the interest of national security, public safety or public health as may be
provided by law. This, however, should by no means be construed as limiting the
Court’s inherent power of administrative supervision over lower courts. OCA Circular
No. 49-2003 does not restrict but merely regulates, by providing guidelines to be
complied by judges and court personnel, before they can go on leave to travel abroad.
To "restrict" is to restrain or prohibit a person from doing something; to "regulate" is to
govern or direct according to rule.
Gunuino vs. De Lima
The right to travel is part of the "liberty" of which a citizen cannot be deprived without
due process of law.75 It is part and parcel of the guarantee of freedom of movement
that the Constitution affords its citizen. Pertinently, Section 6, Article III of the
Constitution provides:
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by
law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to
travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety or public
health, as maybe provided by law.
Liberty under the foregoing clause includes the right to choose one's residence, to leave
it whenever he pleases and to travel wherever he wills.76 Thus, in Zacarias
Villavicencio vs. Justo Lucban,77 the Court held illegal the action of the Mayor of Manila
in expelling women who were known prostitutes and sending them to Davao in order to
eradicate vices and immoral activities proliferated by the said subjects. It was held that
regardless of the mayor's laudable intentions, no person may compel another to change
his residence without being expressly authorized by law or regulation.
It is apparent, however, that the right to travel is not absolute. There are constitutional,
statutory and inherent limitations regulating the right to travel. Section 6 itself provides
that the right to travel may be impaired only in the interest of national security, public
safety or public health, as may be provided by law. In Silverio vs. Court of Appeals,78
the Court elucidated, thus:
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while
the liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate
executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to
impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of "national security, public
safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by law," a limitive phrase which did
not appear in the 1973 text (The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin G.,S.J., Vol. I, First
Edition, 1987, p. 263). Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a
reaction to the ban on international travel imposed under the previous regime when
there was a Travel Processing Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to travel
upon application of an interested party.79 (Emphasis ours)
Clearly, under the provision, there are only three considerations that may permit a
restriction on the right to travel: national security, public safety or public health. As a
further requirement, there must be an explicit provision of statutory law or the Rules of
Court80 providing for the impairment. The requirement for a legislative enactment was
purposely added to prevent inordinate restraints on the person's right to travel by
administrative officials who may be tempted to wield authority under the guise of
national security, public safety or public health. This is in keeping with the principle that
ours is a government of laws and not of men and also with the canon that provisions of
law limiting the enjoyment of liberty should be construed against the government and in
favor of the individual.
Stone vs. mississipi
A unanimous Court found that the Mississippi classification of lotteries as outlawed acts
was valid. The State legislature do not have the power to bind the decisions of the
people and future legislatures. The Court stated that no legislation had the authority to
bargain away the public health and morals. The Court viewed the lottery as a vice that
threatened the public health and morals. The contracts protected in the Constitution are
property rights, not governmental rights. Therefore, one can only obtain temporary
suspension of the governmental rights (in this case, the right to outlaw actions) in a
charter which can be revoked by the will of the people.
Rutter vs. Esteban
ISSUE:
Whether or not Republic Act No. 342 is unconstitutional being violative of the
constitutional provision forbidding the impairment of the obligation of contracts (Article
III, Section 1, 1935 Constitution).
HELD:
Yes. R.A. No. 342 was declared unconstitutional.
RATIO:
Consistent with what [the Supreme Court] believe to be as the only course dictated by
justice, fairness and righteousness, [the Supreme Court] feel that the only way open to
us under the present circumstances is to declare that the continued operation and
enforcement of Republic Act No. 342 x x x is unreasonable and oppressive, and should
not be prolonged a minute longer, and, therefore, the same should be declared null and
void and without effect.
PNB vs. CA
Right Against Non-Impairment of Contracts
Petitioners contend that the SEC’s approval of the Rehabilitation Plan impairs the MTI
by forcing them to release the real properties secured in their favor to become part of
the asset pool. They argue that the SEC’s approval of the Rehabilitation Plan is a state
action that impairs the remedies available to petitioners under the MTI, which essentially
abrogates the contract itself.
In the Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company Decision in G.R. No. 166197,22 Metrobank
likewise questioned the approval of the Rehabilitation Plan by the SEC and the CA,
particularly the provisions relating to the payment by dacion en pago and waiver of
interests and penalties. Metrobank asserted that the Rehabilitation Plan compelled it to
release part of the collateral and accept the mortgaged properties as payment by dacion
en pago based on the ASB Group’s transfer values, violating the constitutional right to
non-impairment of contracts.
On this issue, we adopt the ruling of the First Division in Metropolitan Bank & Trust
Company, to wit:
We are not convinced that the approval of the Rehabilitation Plan impairs petitioner
bank’s lien over the mortgaged properties. Section 6 [c] of P.D. No. 902-A provides that
"upon appointment of a management committee, rehabilitation receiver, board or body,
pursuant to this Decree, all actions for claims against corporations, partnerships or
associations under management or receivership pending before any court, tribunal,
board or body shall be suspended."
By that statutory provision, it is clear that the approval of the Rehabilitation Plan and the
appointment of a rehabilitation receiver merely suspend the actions for claims against
respondent corporations. Petitioner bank’s preferred status over the unsecured creditors
relative to the mortgage liens is retained, but the enforcement of such preference is
suspended. The loan agreements between the parties have not been set aside and
petitioner bank may still enforce its preference when the assets of ASB Group of
Companies will be liquidated. Considering that the provisions of the loan agreements
are merely suspended, there is no impairment of contracts, specifically its lien in the
mortgaged properties.
As we stressed in Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, such suspension "shall not prejudice or render ineffective the status of a secured
creditor as compared to a totally unsecured creditor," for what P.D. No. 902-A merely
provides is that all actions for claims against the distressed corporation, partnership or
association shall be suspended. This arrangement provided by law is intended to give
the receiver a chance to rehabilitate the corporation if there should still be a possibility
for doing so, without being unnecessarily disturbed by the creditors’ actions against the
distressed corporation. However, in the event that rehabilitation is no longer feasible
and the claims against the distressed corporation would eventually have to be settled,
the secured creditors, like petitioner bank, shall enjoy preference over the unsecured
creditors.23
Contrary to petitioners’ belief, they are not forced to accept the terms of the
Rehabilitation Plan. As held in Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company, they are merely
proposals for the creditors to accept.
SWS vs. COMELEC
For its part, COMELEC argues that "[t]he non-impairment clause of the Constitution
must yield to the loftier purposes sought to be achieved by the government."133 It adds
that "[petitioners' existing contracts with third parties must be understood to have been
made in reference to the possible exercise of the COMELEC's regulatory powers."134
It is settled that "the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment... is limited by the
exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, morals
and general welfare."135 "It is a basic rule in contracts that the law is deemed written
into the contract between the parties."136 The incorporation of regulations into contracts
is "a postulate of the police power of the State."137
The relation of the state's police power to the principle of non-impairment of contracts
was thoroughly explained in Ortigas and Co. V. Feati Bank:138
[W]hile non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not
absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e.,
"the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order or safety and general welfare of the people." Invariably described as "the
most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers" and "in a sense, the greatest and
most powerful attribute of government," the exercise of the power may be judicially
inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable,
there having been a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable
constitutional guarantee. As this Court held through Justice Jose P. Bengzon in
Philippine Long Distance Company vs. City of Davao, et al. police power "is elastic and
must be responsive to various social conditions; it is not confined within narrow
circumscriptions of precedents resting on past conditions; it must follow the legal
progress of a democratic way of life." We were even more emphatic in Vda. de Genuino
vs. The Court of Agrarian Relations, et al, when We declared: "We do not see why
public welfare when clashing with the individual right to property should not be made to
prevail through the state's exercise of its police power."139 (Citations omitted)
This case does not involve a "capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable"140
regulation. We have demonstrated that not only an important or substantial state
interest, but even a compelling one anchors Resolution No. 9674's requirement of
disclosing subscribers to election surveys. It effects the constitutional policy of
"guarantee[ing] equal access to opportunities for public service"141 and is impelled by
the imperative of "fair" elections.
As a valid exercise of COMELEC's regulatory powers, Resolution No. 9674 is correctly
deemed written into petitioners' existing contracts.
Parenthetically, the obligations of agreements manifested in the concept of contracts
are creations of law. This right to demand performance not only involves its requisites,
privileges, and regulation in the Civil Code or special laws, but is also subject to the
Constitution. The expectations inherent in a contract may be compelling, but so are the
normative frameworks demanded by law and the provisions of the Constitution.
