ENRIQUE LOPEZ vs. VICENTE OROSA, JR.

G.R. L-10817 February 28, 1958

Facts:
Petitioner Lopez supplied and delivered the lumber necessary for
the construction of the Plaza Theater, and at respondent Orosa's
request and assurance that the latter would be personally liable
for any account that the said construction might incur, Lopez
further agreed that payment therefore would be on demand and
not cash on delivery basis. Orosa and Rustia, corporation
president, promised Lopez to obtain a bank loan to satisfy the
balance, to which assurance Lopez had to accede. Unknown to
Lopez, Orosa and Rustia already secured a loan from the PNB
with the Luzon Surety Company as surety, and the corporation
in turn executed a mortgage on the land and building in favor of
said company as counter-security.

Persistent demand from Lopez caused Vicente Orosa, Jr. to

execute, on an alleged "deed of assignment" of his 420 shares of
stock of the Plaza Theater in favor of the creditor, and as the
obligation still remained unsettled, Lopez filed a complaint
against Vicente Orosa Jr. and Plaza Theatre, Inc., praying
among others that in case respondents fail to pay the same, the
building and the land owned by the corporation be sold at public
auction and the proceeds thereof be applied to said
indebtedness. Petitioner also caused the annotation of a notice
of lis pendens on said properties with the Register of Deeds.

The court ruled that Orosa and the Plaza Theatre, Inc., were
jointly liable for the unpaid balance of the cost of lumber used in
the construction of the building and the plaintiff thus acquired
the materialman's lien over the same; the lien being merely
confined to the building and did not extend to the land on which
the construction was made

Issue:
WON materialman’s lien for the value of the materials used in
the construction of a building attaches to the building alone and
does not extend to the land on which the building is adhered to.

Held:
NO. While it is true that generally, real estate connotes the
land and the building constructed thereon, it is obvious that

1
the inclusion of the building, separate and distinct from the
land, in the enumeration of what constitute real properties
(Art. 415 of the New Civil Code [Art. 334 of the old]) could mean
only one thing, that a building is by itself an immovable
property. A building is an immovable property irrespective of
whether or not said structure and the land on which it is
adhered to belong to the same owner.

Materialman’s lien attaches merely to the immovable property

for the construction or repair of which the obligation was
incurred and in the case at bar, the lien in favor of appellant
for the unpaid value of the lumber used in the construction
of the building attaches only to said structure and to no
other property of the obligor. Thus, the interest of the
mortgagee over the land is superior to and cannot be made
subject to the said materialman’s lien.

2
 ASSOCIATED INSURANCE vs. ISABEL IYA
G.R. Nos. L-10837-38             May 30, 1958

Facts:
Spouses Adriano and Lucia Valino, own a house which they
purchased on installment basis from the Philippine Realty
Corporation. To enable her to purchase on credit rice from the
NARIC, Lucia filed a bond subscribed by the plaintiff Associated
Insurance and Surety Co., Inc., and as counter-guaranty
therefor, the spouses Valino executed an alleged chattel
mortgage on the aforementioned house in favor of the surety
company. At the time of the mortgage, the parcel of land on
which the house is erected was still registered in the name of the
Philippine Realty Corporation. In 1958, the Valinos were able to
secure a title over the lot in their name. Subsequently, however,
in 1952, the Valinos executed a real estate mortgage over the
house and lot in favor of defendant Isabel Iya.

Lucia failed to satisfy her obligation to the NARIC, thus,

Associated Insurance paid the same pursuant to the
undertaking of the bond. In turn, petitioner demanded
reimbursement from the spouses Valino, and as the latter
likewise failed to do so, Associated Insurance foreclosed the
chattel mortgage over the house. The surety company then
caused the said house to be declared in its name for tax
purposes.

Learning about the existence of the REM over the lot, petitioner
filed a complaint against spouses Valino and prayed for the
exclusion of the residential house from the REM in favor of Iya
and the declaration and recognition of petitioner's right to
ownership over the same. In her answer, Iya alleged among other
things, that by virtue of the REM executed by her co-defendants,
she acquired a real right over the lot and the house constructed
thereon.

Issue:
WON the REM over the lot includes the building constructed
thereon.

Held:
NO. While it is true that generally, real estate connotes the land
and the building constructed thereon, it is obvious that the

3
inclusion of the building, separate and distinct from the land, in
the enumeration of what may constitute real properties could
only mean one thing — that a building is by itself an
immovable property.

In view of the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, a

building is an immovable property irrespective of whether or not
said structure and the land on which it is adhered to belong to the
same owner. It cannot be divested of its character of a realty
by the fact that the land on which it is constructed belongs
to another. If the status of the building were to depend on the
ownership of the land, a situation would be created where a
permanent fixture changes its nature or character as the
ownership of the land changes hands.

4
 GAVINO and GENEROSA TUMALAD vs. ALBERTA VICENCIO
G.R. No. L-30173 September 30, 1971

Facts:
Defendants-appellants Alberta Vicencio and Emiliano Simeon
executed a chattel mortgage in favor of plaintiffs-appellees
Gavino and Generosa Tumalad over their house, which were
being rented from Madrigal & Company, Inc. When Vicencio and
Simeon defaulted in paying, the mortgage was extra-judicially
foreclosed and the house was sold at public auction pursuant to
the said contract. As highest bidder, the Tumalads were issued
the corresponding certificate of sale.

The MTC decided in favor of Tumalad ordering Vicencio to vacate

the house and pay rent until they have completely vacated the
house. Vicencio is questioning the legality of the chattel
mortgage on the ground that 1) the signature on it was obtained
thru fraud and 2) the mortgage is a house of strong materials
which is an immovable therefore can only be the subject of a
REM. On appeal, the CFI found in favor of Tumalad, and since
the Vicencio failed to deposit the rent ordered, it issued a writ of
execution, however the house was already demolished pursuant
to an order of the court in an ejectment suit against Vicencio for
non-payment of rentals.

Issue:
WON the chattel mortgage was null and void ab initio because
only personal properties can be subject of a chattel mortgage.

Held:
NO. Although a building is by itself an immovable property,
parties to a contract may treat as personal property that which
by nature would be real property and it would be valid and good
only insofar as the contracting parties are concerned. By
principle of estoppel, the owner declaring his house to be a
chattel may no longer subsequently claim otherwise.

In the contract now before Us, the house on rented land is not
only expressly designated as Chattel Mortgage; it specifically
provides that "the mortgagor ... voluntarily CEDES, SELLS and
TRANSFERS by way of Chattel Mortgage the property together
with its leasehold rights over the lot on which it is constructed
and participation ..."

5
Although there is no specific statement referring to the subject
house as personal property, yet by ceding, selling or
transferring a property by way of chattel mortgage
defendants-appellants could only have meant to convey the
house as chattel, or at least, intended to treat the same as
such, so that they should not now be allowed to make an
inconsistent stand by claiming otherwise.

Moreover, the subject house stood on a rented lot to which

defendats-appellants merely had a temporary right as lessee,
and although this can not in itself alone determine the status of
the property, it does so when combined with other factors to
sustain the interpretation that the parties, particularly the
mortgagors, intended to treat the house as personalty.

6
 BOARD OF ASSESSMENT vs. MERALCO
G.R. No. L-15334             January 31, 1964

Facts:
Respondent Meralco constructed 40 steel towers within Quezon City, on
land belonging to it. Petitioner City Assessor of Quezon City declared
the aforesaid steel towers for real property tax. Meralco paid the tax
under protest and filed a petition for review in the Court of Tax Appeals
(CTA) which rendered a decision ordering the cancellation of the said
tax declarations and the petitioner City Treasurer of Quezon City to
refund to the respondent of the sum paid.

In upholding the cause of respondents, the CTA held that: (1) the steel
towers come within the term "poles" which are declared exempt from
taxes under part II paragraph 9 of respondent's franchise; (2) the steel
towers are personal properties and are not subject to real property tax;
and (3) the City Treasurer of Quezon City is held responsible for the
refund of the amount paid.

Issue:
WON the steel towers or poles of the MERALCO are considered personal
or real properties.

Held:
They are personal properties. The term "pole" refers to an upright
standard to the top of which something is affixed or by which something
is supported, and includes a steel tower of an electric power company,
like the Meralco. The steel towers of an electric company do not
constitute real property for the purpose of the real property tax.

The steel towers or supports do not come within the objects of

paragraph 1 of Article 415 because they do not constitute buildings
or constructions adhered to the soil. They are not construction
analogous to buildings nor adhering to the soil. As per description,
given by the lower court, they are removable and merely attached to a
square metal frame by means of bolts, which when unscrewed could
easily be dismantled and moved from place to place. They can not be
included under paragraph 3, as they are not attached to an immovable
in a fixed manner, and they can be separated without breaking the
material or causing deterioration upon the object to which they are
attached. Each of these steel towers or supports consists of steel bars or
metal strips, joined together by means of bolts, which can be
disassembled by unscrewing the bolts and reassembled by screwing the
same. These steel towers or supports do not also fall under paragraph
5, for they are not machineries, receptacles, instruments or
implements, and even if they were, they are not intended for industry or
works on the land. Petitioner is not engaged in an industry or works in
the land in which the steel supports or towers are constructed.

7
 B.H. BERKENKOTTER vs. CU UNJIENG E HIJOS
G.R. No. L-41643             July 31, 1935

Facts:
The Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., owner of the sugar central
situated in Mabalacat, Pampanga, obtained from the defendants,
Cu Unjieng e Hijos, a loan secured by a first mortgage
constituted on two parcels of land with all its buildings and
improvements. Shortly after the said mortgage has been
constituted, the Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., decided to increase
the capacity of its sugar central by buying additional machinery
and equipment. In order to carry out this plan, B.A. Green,
president of said corporation, proposed to the plaintiff, B.H.
Berkenkotter, to advance the necessary amount for the purchase
of said machinery and equipment, promising to reimburse him
as soon as he could obtain an additional loan from the
mortgagees, the herein defendants Cu Unjieng e Hijos.

B. A. Green, president of the Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., applied

to Cu Unjieng e Hijos for an additional loan offering as security
the additional machinery and equipment acquired by said B. A.
Green and installed in the sugar central after the execution of
the original mortgage deed, together with whatever additional
equipment acquired with said loan. B. A. Green failed to obtain
said loan.

The appellant contends that the installation of the machinery

and equipment claimed by him in the sugar central of the
Mabalacat Sugar Company, Inc., was not permanent in
character inasmuch as B.A. Green, in proposing to him to
advance the money for the purchase thereof, made it appear in
the letter that in case B.A. Green should fail to obtain an
additional loan from the defendants Cu Unjieng e Hijos, said
machinery and equipment would become security therefor, said
B.A. Green binding himself not to mortgage nor encumber them
to anybody until said plaintiff be fully reimbursed for the
corporation's indebtedness to him.

Issue:
WON the additional machines are part of the mortgaged.

8
Held:
YES. The installation of a machinery and equipment in a
mortgaged sugar central, in lieu of another of less capacity, for
the purpose of carrying out the industrial functions of the latter
and increasing production, constitutes a permanent
improvement on said sugar central and subjects said
machinery and equipment to the mortgage constituted
thereon. Inasmuch as the central is permanent in character, the
necessary machinery and equipment installed for carrying on
the sugar industry for which it has been established must
necessarily be permanent.

Furthermore, the fact that B.A. Green bound himself to the

plaintiff B.H. Berkenkotter to hold said machinery and
equipment as security for the payment of the latter's credit and
to refrain from mortgaging or otherwise encumbering them until
Berkenkotter has been fully reimbursed therefor, is not
incompatible with the permanent character of the
incorporation of said machinery and equipment with the
sugar central of the Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., as nothing
could prevent B.A. Green from giving them as security at least
under a second mortgage.

The sale of the machinery and equipment in question by the

purchaser who was supplied the money, after the incorporation
thereof with the mortgaged sugar central, does not vest the
creditor with ownership of said machinery and equipment but
simply with the right of redemption.

9
 DAVAO SAW MILL CO., INC., vs. APRONIANO G. CASTILLO
G.R. No. L-40411             August 7, 1935

Facts:
The Davao Saw Mill Co., Inc., is the holder of a lumber
concession from the Government of the Philippine Islands. It has
operated a sawmill in the sitio of Maa, barrio of Tigatu,
municipality of Davao, Province of Davao. However, the land
upon which the business was conducted belonged to another
person. On the land the sawmill company erected a building
which housed the machinery used by it.

In another action, wherein the Davao Light & Power Co., Inc.,
was the plaintiff and the Davao, Saw, Mill Co., Inc., was the
defendant, a judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff in
that action against the defendant in that action; a writ of
execution issued thereon, and the properties now in question
were levied upon as personalty by the sheriff.

Davao Saw Mill Co., Inc., has on a number of occasions treated

the machinery as personal property by executing chattel
mortgages in favor of third persons. One of such persons is the
appellee by assignment from the original mortgages.

Issue:
WON the equipments and machineries are personal in nature.

Held:
YES. Machinery which is movable in its nature only becomes
immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner of the property
or plant, but not when so placed by a tenant, a usufructuary, or
any person having only a temporary right, unless such person
acted as the agent of the owner.

10
 GOV’T OF THE PHIL. vs. CONSORCIA CABANGIS, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-28379             March 27, 1929

Facts:
The Government of the Philippine Islands appeal the judgment of
the Court of First Instance of Manila in cadastral proceeding
adjudicating the title and decreeing the registration certain lots
in favor of Consuelo, Consorcia, Elvira and Tomas, surnamed
Cabangis, in equal parts, and dismissing the claims presented
by the Government of the Philippine Islands and the City of
Manila.

The subject lots were formerly a part of a large parcel of land

belonging to the predecessor of the herein claimants and
appellees. From the year 1896 said land began to wear away,
due to the action of the waves of Manila Bay, until the year 1901
when the said lots became completely submerged in water in
ordinary tides, and remained in such a state until 1912 when
the Government undertook the dredging of Vitas Estuary in
order to facilitate navigation, depositing all the sand and silt
taken from the bed of the estuary on the low lands which were
completely covered with water, surrounding that belonging to
the Philippine Manufacturing Company, thereby slowly and
gradually forming the lots, the subject matter of this proceeding.
Up to the month of February, 1927 nobody had declared the
said lots for the purposes of taxation, and it was only in the year
1926 that Dr. Pedro Gil, in behalf of the claimants and
appellees, declared lot No. 40 for such purpose.

Issue:
WON the subject lots were part of public domain.

Held:
YES. The SC held that the lots in question having disappeared
on account of the gradual erosion due to the ebb and flow of the
tide, and having remained in such a state until they were
reclaimed from the sea by the filling in done by the Government,
they belong to the public domain for public use.

11
 MIAA vs. CITY OF PASAY
G.R. No. 163072               April 2, 2009

Facts:
Petitioner MIAA operates and administers the NAIA under Executive
Order No. 903, otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the Manila
International Airport Authority. Under EO 903, approximately 600
hectares of land, including the runways, the airport tower, and other
airport buildings, were transferred to MIAA. The NAIA Complex is
located along the border between Pasay City and Paranaque City. MIAA
received Final Notices of Real Property Tax Delinquency from the City of
Pasay for the taxable years 1992 to 2001.

Issue:
WON the land and buildings of MIAA are properties devoted to public
use, thus, are properties of public dominion.

Held:
YES. Properties of public dominion are owned by the State or the
Republic. The term "ports x x x constructed by the State" includes
airports and seaports. The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are
intended for public use, and at the very least intended for public
service. Whether intended for public use or public service, the
Airport Lands and Buildings are properties of public dominion. As
properties of public dominion, the Airport Lands and Buildings are
owned by the Republic and thus exempt from real estate tax under
Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code.

Thus, MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but a

government instrumentality which is exempt from any kind of tax from
the local governments. Furthermore, the airport lands and buildings
of MIAA are properties of public dominion intended for public use,
and as such are exempt from real property tax under Section 234(a)
of the Local Government Code. However, under the same provision, if
MIAA leases its real property to a taxable person, the specific property
leased becomes subject to real property tax. In this case, only those
portions of the NAIA Pasay properties which are leased to taxable
persons like private parties are subject to real property tax by the City
of Pasay.

12
 MIAA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 155650             July 20, 2006

Facts:
Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) is the operator of the
Ninoy International Airport located at Paranaque City. The Officers of
Paranaque City sent notices to MIAA due to real estate tax delinquency.
MIAA then settled some of the amount. When MIAA failed to settle the
entire amount, the officers of Paranaque city threatened to levy and
subject to auction the land and buildings of MIAA, which they did.

MIAA claims that although the charter provides that the title of the land
and building are with MIAA still the ownership is with the Republic of
the Philippines. MIAA also contends that it is an instrumentality of the
government and as such exempted from real estate tax. That the land
and buildings of MIAA are of public dominion therefore cannot be
subjected to levy and auction sale. On the other hand, the officers of
Paranaque City claim that MIAA is a government owned and controlled
corporation therefore not exempted to real estate tax.

Issue:
WON the land and buildings of MIAA are part of the public dominion
and thus cannot be the subject of levy and auction sale.

Held:
YES. No one can dispute that properties of public dominion mentioned
in Article 420 of the Civil Code, like "roads, canals, rivers, torrents,
ports and bridges constructed by the State," are owned by the State.
The term "ports" includes seaports and airports. The MIAA Airport
Lands and Buildings constitute a "port" constructed by the State.
Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the MIAA Airport Lands and
Buildings are properties of public dominion and thus owned by the
State or the Republic of the Philippines. As properties of public
dominion, the Airport Lands and Buildings are outside the
commerce of man. The Court has also ruled that property of public
dominion, being outside the commerce of man, cannot be the subject of
an auction sale.

Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject
to levy, encumbrance or disposition through public or private sale.
Any encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale of any property of
public dominion is void for being contrary to public policy.

13
 REPUBLIC vs. CARLOS R. VEGA
G. R. No. 177790               January 17, 2011

Facts:
Respondents Carlos R. Vega, et. al., filed an application for
registration of title covering a parcel of land. They alleged that
they inherited the subject land from their mother, who in turn
inherited it from her father. Their mother’s siblings died
intestate, all without leaving any offspring. Petitioner Republic
filed an opposition to respondents Vegas’ application for
registration on the ground, inter alia, that the subject land or
portions thereof were lands of the public domain and, as such,
not subject to private appropriation.

During the trial, investigation report stated that the subject land
was within alienable and disposable zone, and that there was no
public land application filed for the same land by the applicant
or by any other person. Thus, in its decision, the trial court
granted respondents Vegas’ application and directed the Land
Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the corresponding decree of
registration in the name of respondents Vegas and respondents-
intervenors Buhays’ predecessors, in proportion to their claims
over the subject land.

Issue:
WON the subject land was alienable and disposable.

Held:
YES. To prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, an applicant must conclusively
establish the existence of a positive act of the government,
such as any of the following: a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; other administrative actions; investigation
reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator; or a legislative act or
statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from
the government that the lands applied for are alienable and
disposable. Thus, as it now stands, aside from a CENRO
certification, an application for original registration of title over a
parcel of land must be accompanied by a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a
true copy by the legal custodian of the official records in order to
establish that the land indeed is alienable and disposable.

14
Applying these precedents, the Court finds that despite the
absence of a certification by the CENRO and a certified true copy
of the original classification by the DENR Secretary, there has
been substantial compliance with the requirement to show that
the subject land is indeed alienable and disposable.

In this case though, there was no effective opposition, except the

pro forma opposition of the OSG, to contradict the applicant’s
claim as to the character of the public land as alienable and
disposable. The absence of any effective opposition from the
government, when coupled with respondents’ other pieces of
evidence on record persuades this Court to rule in favor of
respondents.

In the instant Petition, petitioner Republic also assails the

failure of Mr. Gonzales to testify as to when the land was
declared as alienable and disposable. Indeed, his testimony in
open court is bereft of any detail as to when the land was
classified as alienable and disposable public land, as well as the
date when he conducted the investigation. In any event, the
Report, as well as the Subdivision Plan, readily reveals that the
subject land was certified as alienable and disposable as early as
31 December 1925 and was even classified as residential and
commercial in nature.

Thus, the Court finds that the evidence presented by

respondents Vegas, coupled with the absence of any
countervailing evidence by petitioner Republic, substantially
establishes that the land applied for is alienable and
disposable and is the subject of original registration
proceedings under the Property Registration Decree. There
was no reversible error on the part of either the trial court or the
appellate court in granting the registration.

15
 NATIVIDAD STA. ANA VICTORIA vs. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 179673               June 8, 2011

Facts:
Petitioner Victoria applied for registration under the law of a lot in
Taguig City, which was opposed by the OSG, as representative of the
respondent Republic of the Philippines. Victoria testified and offered
documentary evidence to show that the subject lot, is a portion of a
parcel of land originally owned by Victoria’s father Genaro Sta. Ana and
previously declared in his name for tax purposes. Upon Genaro’s death,
Victoria and her siblings inherited the land and divided it among
themselves via a deed of partition.

The Conversion/Subdivision Plan Victoria presented in evidence showed

that the land is inside the alienable and disposable area, as certified by
the Bureau of Forest Development. Victoria testified that she and her
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property
continuously, uninterruptedly, openly, publicly, adversely and in the
concept of owners since the early 1940s or for more than 30 years and
have been declared as owners for taxation purposes for the last 30
years. The Republic did not present any evidence in support of its
opposition.

Issue:
WON Victoria amply proved that the subject lot is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.

Held:
YES. To prove that the land subject of the application for registration is
alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive
act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of
Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or statute. The
applicant must also present a copy of the original classification of the
land into alienable and disposable, as declared by the DENR Secretary
or as proclaimed by the President. The record shows that the subject
property was covered by a cadastral survey of Taguig conducted by the
government at its expense. It does not make sense to raise an objection
after such a survey that the lands covered by it are inalienable land of
the public domain, like a public forest.

Victoria has, contrary to the Solicitor General’s allegation, proved that

she and her predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the
subject lot continuously, uninterruptedly, openly, publicly, adversely
and in the concept of owners since the early 1940s. In fact, she has
submitted tax declarations covering the land way back in 1948 that
appeared in her father’s name.

16
 SALVADOR H. LAUREL vs. RAMON GARCIA
G.R. No. 92013 July 25, 1990

Facts:
These two (2) petitions for prohibition seek to enjoin respondents from
proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of
land at 306 Roppongi, 5-Chrome Minato-ku Tokyo, Japan. The latter
case also, prays for a writ of mandamus to fully disclose to the public
the basis of their decision to push through with the sale of the Roppongi
property.

The Roppongi case is one of the four properties in Japan acquired by

the Philippine government under the Reparation Agreement entered into
with Japan. The other three (3) properties include Nampeidai Property
(present site of the Philippine Embassy Chancery), Kobe Commercial
Property (commercial lot being used as a warehouse and parking lot for
consulate staff) and Kobe Residential Property (resident lot which is now
vacant).

The Reparations Agreement provides that reparations valued at $550M

would be payable intwenty (20) years in accordance with annual
schedules of procurements to be fixed by the Philippine and Japanese
governments. The procurements are to be divided into government
sector and those for private parties in projects, the latter shall be made
available only to Filipino citizens or to 100% Filipino-owned entities in
national development projects.

The Roppongi property was acquired under the heading “Government

Sector” for the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was
transferred to Nampeida due to the need for major repairs. However, the
Roppongi property has remained underdeveloped since that time.

Although there was a proposal to lease the property with the provision
to have buildings built at the expense of the lessee, the same was not
acted favorably upon by the government. Instead, President Aquino
issued EO No. 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail
of separations’ capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or
dispositions. Thereafter, amidst the oppositions by various sectors, the
Executive branch of the government pushed for the sale of reparation
properties, starting with the Roppongi lot. The property has twice been
set for bidding at a minimum floor price of $225M. The first was a
failure, while the second has been postponed and later restrained by
the SC.

Amongst the arguments of the respondents is that the subject property

is not governed by our Civil Code, but rather by the laws of Japan
where the property is located. They relied upon the rule of  lex situs

17
which is used in determining the applicable law regarding the
acquisition, transfer and devolution of the title to a property.

Issue:
WON the Roppongi property and others of its kind can be alienated by
the Philippine Government?

Held:
NO. The Roppongi property is correctly classified under paragraph 2 of
Article 420 of the Civil Code as property belonging to the State and
intended for some public service. There can be no doubt that it is of
public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has
become patrimonial.

As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the

commerce of man. It cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a special
collective ownership for general use and enjoyment, an application to
the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in the social group. The
purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person, but the citizens;
it is intended for the common and public welfare and cannot be the
object of appropriation.

The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time
for actual Embassy service does not automatically convert it to
patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if the
property is withdrawn from public use. A property continues to be part
of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or
ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the
government to withdraw it from being such.

The SC emphasize, however, that an abandonment of the intention to

use the Roppongi property for public service and to make it
patrimonial property under Article 422 of the Civil Code must be
definite. Abandonment cannot be inferred from the non-use alone
specially if the non-use was attributable not to the government's own
deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack of financial support to
repair and improve the property. Abandonment must be a certain and
positive act based on correct legal premises.

A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai in 1976 is not

relinquishment of the Roppongi property's original purpose. Even the
failure by the government to repair the building in Roppongi is not
abandonment since as earlier stated, there simply was a shortage of
government funds. The recent Administrative Orders authorizing a
study of the status and conditions of government properties in Japan
were merely directives for investigation but did not in any way signify a
clear intention to dispose of the properties.

18
 REPUBLIC vs. TEODORO P. RIZALVO, JR.,
G.R. No. 172011               March 7, 2011

Facts:
Respondent Rizalvo, Jr. filed an application for the registration of a
parcel of land alleging that he is the owner in fee simple of the subject
parcel of land, that he obtained title over the land by virtue of a Deed of
Transfer in 1962, and that he is currently in possession of the land. In
support of his claim, he presented, among others, Tax Declaration for
the year 1994 in his name, and Proof of Payment of real property taxes
beginning in 1952 up to the time of filing of the application. He also
stated that he was the one who had the property surveyed; that no one
opposed the survey; and that during said survey, they placed concrete
markers on the boundaries of the property. Further, he stated that he
was not aware of any person or entity which questioned his mother’s
ownership and possession of the subject property.

The OSG filed an Opposition alleging that neither respondent nor his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject property since June
12, 1945 or earlier and that the tax declarations and tax payment
receipts did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of
ownership. The OSG also asserted that the subject property was a
portion of public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines
and hence not subject to private acquisition.

At the hearing of the application, no private oppositor came forth. After

conducting an investigation and verification of the records involving the
subject land, CENRO certified that indeed the subject parcel of land
was within the alienable and disposable zone and that the applicant
was indeed in actual occupation and possession of the land.

In its petition, the OSG argues that the Republic of the Philippines has
dominion over all lands of public domain and that the grant to private
individuals of imperfect title by the Republic over its alienable and
disposable lands is a mere privilege. Hence, judicial confirmation
proceeding is strictly construed against the grantee/applicant.

On the other hand, respondent counters that he has presented

sufficient proof that the subject property was indeed part of the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain. He also asserts that
his title over the land can be traced by documentary evidence wayback
to 1948 and hence, the length of time required by law for acquisition of
an imperfect title over alienable public land has been satisfied.

Issue:
WON respondent was able to acquire the land by prescription.

19
Held:
NO. It is well settled that prescription is one of the modes of
acquiring ownership and that properties classified as alienable
public land may be converted into private property by reason of
open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty years.

On this basis, respondent would have been eligible for application for
registration because his claim of ownership and possession over the
subject property even exceeds thirty (30) years. However, it is
jurisprudentially clear that the thirty (30)-year period of prescription for
purposes of acquiring ownership and registration of public land under
Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529 only begins from the moment the
State expressly declares that the public dominion property is no
longer intended for public service or the development of the
national wealth or that the property has been converted into
patrimonial.

In the case at bar, respondent merely presented a certification and

report from the DENR-CENRO dated July 17, 2001 certifying that the
land in question entirely falls within the alienable and disposable zone
since January 21, 1987; that it has not been earmarked for public use;
and that it does not encroach any area devoted to general public use.
Unfortunately, such certification and report is not enough in order to
commence the thirty (30)-year prescriptive period under Section 14 (2).
There is no evidence in this case indicating any express declaration by
the state that the subject land is no longer intended for public service or
the development of the national wealth. Thus, there appears no basis
for the application of the thirty (30)-year prescriptive period in this case.

Indeed, even assuming arguendo that the DENR-CENRO certification

and report is enough to signify that the land is no longer intended for
public service or the development of the national wealth, respondent is
still not entitled to registration because the land was certified as
alienable and disposable in 1987, while the application for registration
was filed on December 7, 2000, a mere thirteen (13) years after and far
short of the required thirty (30) years under existing laws on
prescription.

Although we would want to adhere to the State’s policy of encouraging

and promoting the distribution of alienable public lands to spur
economic growth and remain true to the ideal of social justice we are
constrained by the clear and simple requisites of the law to disallow
respondent’s application for registration.

20
 VIUDA DE TAN TOCO vs. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF ILOILO
G.R. No. L-24950             March 25, 1926

Facts:
It appears from the record that the widow of Tan Toco had sued the
municipal council of Iloilo for the purchase price of two strips of
land, which the municipality of Iloilo had appropriated for widening
said street. The Court of First Instance of Iloilo sentenced the said
municipality to pay the plaintiff the amount so claimed, plus the
interest, and the said judgment was on appeal affirmed by this
court.

On account of lack of funds the municipality of Iloilo was unable to

pay the said judgment, wherefore plaintiff had a writ of execution
issue against the property of the said municipality, by virtue of
which the sheriff attached two auto trucks used for street
sprinkling, one police patrol automobile, police stations and the
concrete structures, with the corresponding lots, used as markets
by Iloilo, Molo, and Mandurriao.

After notice of the sale of said property had been made, and a few
days before the sale, the provincial fiscal of Iloilo filed a motion
which the Court of First Instance praying that the attachment on
the said property be dissolved, that the said attachment be declared
null and void as being illegal and violative of the rights of the
defendant municipality.

Plaintiffs counsel objected o the fiscal's motion but the court, by

order declared the attachment levied upon the aforementioned
property of the defendant municipality null and void, thereby
dissolving the said attachment.

Issue:
WON the property levied upon is exempt from execution.

Held:
YES. The property of a municipality, whether real or personal,
necessary for governmental purposes cannot be attached and sold
at public auction to satisfy a judgment against the municipality.
Auto trucks used by a municipality in sprinkling its streets, its
police patrol automobile, police stations, and public markets,
together with the land on which they stand, are exempt from
execution. Where after judgment is entered against the
municipality, the latter has no property subject to execution the
creditor’s remedy for collecting his judgment is mandamus.

21
 ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE vs. CITY OF ZAMBOANGA
G.R. No. L-24440             June 30, 1969

Facts:
The appellant City seeks reconsideration of SC decision in so far as the
latter declares that Republic Act 3039 is unconstitutional and void in so
far as the same seeks to deprive the Province of Zamboanga del Norte of
its share in the 26 lots situated within the City of Zamboanga, without
just compensation, for the reason that said 26 lots are patrimonial
property of the old Province of Zamboanga. The movant City contends
that the 26 lots were not patrimonial property of the former Province of
Zamboanga, for the reason that said 26 lots have always been used for
public purposes, such as school sites, playgrounds and athletic fields
for schools. Appellant City of Zamboanga, therefore, prays that the main
decision be partly reconsidered and that all title to, and ownership of,
the 26 lots be declared to have been validly vested in said City free of
charge by Republic Act No. 3039.

The motion for reconsideration is vigorously opposed by plaintiff-

appellee Province of Zamboanga del Norte, which contends that the
evidence sought to be filed by the appellant City is not newly discovered
evidence and is, therefore, inadmissible at this stage of the proceedings.
Alternatively, the appellee Province of Zamboanga contends that the 26
lots are vacant, or that the buildings existing thereon were constructed
in bad faith; and that the said Province has additional evidence to show
that most of these properties are not actually devoted to public use or
governmental purposes.

Issue:
WON the subject properties are patrimonial.

Held:
Considering that both contending parties are actually subdivisions of
one entity, the Republic of the Philippines, so that public interest is
involved and demands that the issues presented be determined speedily
without regard to technicalities, the Court resolved that, in the interest
of justice and equity, its main decision and that of the court below be
reconsidered and set aside, in so far as they affect the twenty-six lots
heretofore enumerated, and the monetary indemnities awarded.
Instead, the records are ordered remanded to the court of origin for a
new trial, wherein the parties shall be given opportunity to adduce and
submit any evidence in their possession to show whether or not the 26
lots aforesaid were or were not actually devoted to public use or
governmental purposes prior to the enactment of Republic Act No.
3039. Thereafter, the Court of First Instance shall decide the issues
anew, taking into account the evidence submitted by the parties and
the principles of law laid down by this Supreme Court in its main
decision of the present case, dated 28 March 1968.

22
 CASIMIRO DEV’T CORP. vs. RENATO MATEO
G.R. No. 175485               July 27, 2011

Facts:
The subject registered parcel of land was originally owned by Isaias
Lara, respondent Mateo’s maternal grandfather. Upon the death of
Isaias Lara in 1930, the property passed on to his children. In 1962,
the co-heirs effected the transfer of the full and exclusive ownership
to Felicidad (whose married surname was Lara-Mateo) under an
agreement denominated as Pagaayos Na Gawa Sa Labas Ng
Hukuman.

One of Felicidad Lara-Mateo’s children was respondent Mateo. With

the agreement of the entire Lara-Mateo family, a deed of sale
covering the property was executed in favor of Laura, who, in 1967,
applied for land registration. After the application was granted, a
new title was issued in Laura’s sole name.

In due course, the property was used as collateral to secure a

succession of loans. These loans were also resulted to the transfer
of the title to different mortgagee. Subsequently, Laura recovered
the property by repaying the obligation with the proceeds of another
loan obtained from Rodolfo Pe. She later executed a deed of sale in
favor of Pe, who in turn constituted a mortgage on the property in
favor of China Banking Corporation (China Bank) as security for a
loan. In the end, China Bank foreclosed the mortgage, and
consolidated its ownership of the property after Pe failed to redeem.

CDC and China Bank negotiated and eventually came to terms on

the purchase of the property, with China Bank executing a deed of
conditional sale for the purpose. A new title was issued under the
name of CDC.

Defendants maintained that the MeTC did not have jurisdiction over
the action because the land was classified as agricultural; that the
jurisdiction belonged to the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB); that they had been in continuous and
open possession of the land even before World War II and had
presumed themselves entitled to a government grant of the land;
and that CDC’s title was invalid, considering that the land had been
registered before its being declared alienable.

Issue:
WON the subject property is agricultural land.

23
Held:
NO. There is no doubt that the land in question, although once
a part of the public domain, has already been placed under the
Torrens system of land registration. The Torrens system gives the
registered owner complete peace of mind, in order that he will be
secured in his ownership as long as he has not voluntarily disposed
of any right over the covered land.

Yet, registration under the Torrens system, not being a mode of

acquiring ownership, does not create or vest title. The Torrens
certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title in the
particular property described therein. In that sense, the issuance
of the certificate of title to a particular person does not
preclude the possibility that persons not named in the
certificate may be co-owners of the real property therein
described with the person named therein, or that the registered
owner may be holding the property in trust for another person.
Nonetheless, it is essential that title registered under the Torrens
system becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible.

The land in question has been covered by a Torrens certificate of

title (OCT No. 6386 in the name of Laura, and its derivative
certificates) before CDC became the registered owner by purchase
from China Bank. In all that time, neither the respondent nor his
siblings opposed the transactions causing the various transfers. In
fact, the respondent admitted in his complaint that the registration
of the land in the name of Laura alone had been with the knowledge
and upon the agreement of the entire Lara-Mateo family. It is
unthinkable, therefore, that the respondent, fully aware of the
exclusive registration in her sister Laura’s name, allowed more than
20 years to pass before asserting his claim of ownership for the first
time through this case in mid-1994. Making it worse for him is that
he did so only after CDC commenced the ejectment case against his
own siblings.

24
 ARRIOLA VS. ARRILOA
GR No. 177703, January 28, 2008

Facts:
Respondent John Nabor C. Arriola is the son of decedent Fidel
Arriola with his first wife Victoria C Calabia while petitioner
Anthony Ronald G Arriola is the son of Fidel with his second wife
petitioner Vilma G Arriola. When Fidel died, respondent filed for
judicial partition of the properties of the decedent Fidel.

Petitioners claimed that the house or improvement erected on

the property should not be included in the auction sale. On the
other hand, respondent argued that the house is considered
accessory to the land on which it is built is in effect to add to
respondent’s right which has never been considered or passed
upon during the trial on the merits.

The RTC and the CA differed in their views on whether the

public auction should include the subject house. The RTC
excluded the subject house because respondent never alleged its
existence in his complaint for partition or established his co-
ownership thereof. On the other hand, citing Articles 440, 445
and 446 of the Civil Code, the CA held that as the deceased
owned the subject land, he also owned the subject house which
is a mere accessory to the land. Both properties form part of the
estate of the deceased and are held in co-ownership by his heirs,
the parties herein. Hence, the CA concludes that any decision in
the action for partition of said estate should cover not just the
subject land but also the subject house.

Issue:
WON the subject house should be included in the partition.

Held:
YES. The right to accession is automatic (ipso jure), requiring no
prior act on the part of the owner or the principal. So that even if
the improvements including the house were not alleged in the
complaint for partition, they are deemed included in the lot on
which they stand, following the principle of accession.
Consequently, the lot subject of judicial partition in this case
includes the house which is permanently attached thereto,
otherwise, it would be absurd to divide the principal, i.e., the lot,

25
without dividing the house which is permanently attached
thereto.

That said notwithstanding, we must emphasize that, while

we treat the subject house as part of the co-ownership of
the parties, we stop short of authorizing its actual
partition by public auction at this time. It bears emphasis
that an action for partition involves two phases: first, the
declaration of the existence of a state of co-ownership; and
second, the actual termination of that state of co-ownership
through the segregation of the common property. What is settled
thus far is only the fact that the subject house is under the co-
ownership of the parties, and therefore susceptible of partition
among them.

26
 NICOLAS LUNOD, ET AL., vs. HIGINO MENESES
G.R. No. 4223            August 19, 1908

Facts:
Plaintiffs-appellees Nicolas Lunod, et. al., filed a written complaint
against Higino Meneses, alleging that they each owned and
possessed farm lands, situated in the places known as Maytunas
and Balot, near a small lake named Calalaran. On the other hand,
defendant Meneses is the owner of a fish-pond and a strip of land
situated in Paraanan, adjoining the said lake on one side, and the
River Taliptip on the other. From time immemorial, and
consequently for more than twenty years before 1901, there existed
and still exists in favor of the rice fields of the plaintiffs a statutory
easement permitting the flow of water over the said land in
Paraanan, which easement the said plaintiffs enjoyed until the year
1901 and consisted in that the water collected upon their lands and
in the Calalaran Lake flow through Paraanan into the Taliptip River.
From that year however, the defendant, without any right or reason,
converted the land in Paraanan into a fishpond and by means of a
dam and a bamboo net, prevented the free passage of the water
through said place into the Taliptip River, that in consequence the
lands of the plaintiff became flooded and damaged by the stagnant
waters, there being no outlet except through the land in Paraanan.
Their plantation were destroyed, causing the loss and damages,
which loss and damage will continue if the obstructions to the flow
of the water are allowed to remain, preventing its passage through
said land and injuring the rice plantations of the plaintiffs.

In his answer, defendant denied the allegations alleging that no

statutory easement existed nor could exist in favor of the lands
described in the complaint, permitting the waters to flow over the
fish pond that he, together with his brothers, owned in the sitio of
Bambang, the area and boundaries of which were stated by him,
and which he and his brothers had inherited from their deceased
mother.

In its decision, the court declared that the plaintiffs were entitled to
a decision in their favor, and sentenced the defendant to remove the
dam placed on the east of the Paraanan passage on the side of the
Taliptip River opposite the old dam in the barrio of Bambang, as
well as to remove and destroy the obstacles to the free passage of
the waters through the strip of land in Paraanan; to abstain in
future, and forever, from obstructing or closing in any manner the
course of the waters through the said strip of land.

27
Issue:
WON defendant has the right to enclose the subject property.

Held:
NO. The defendant, Meneses, had no right to construct the works,
nor the dam which blocks the passage, through his lands and the
outlet to the Taliptip River, of the waters which flood the higher
lands of the plaintiffs; and having done so, to the detriment of the
easement charged on his estate, he has violated the law which
protects and guarantees the respective rights and regulates the
duties of the owners of the fields in Calalaran and Paraanan.

It is true that article 388 of said code authorizes every owner to

enclose his estate by means of walls, ditches fences or any other
device, but his right is limited by the easement imposed upon his
estate.

The defendant Meneses might have constructed the works

necessary to make and maintain a fish pond within his own land,
but he was always under the strict and necessary obligation to
respect the statutory easement of waters charged upon his property,
and had no right to close the passage and outlet of the waters
flowing from the lands of the plaintiffs and the lake of Calalaran into
the Taliptip River. He could not lawfully injure the owners of the
dominant estates by obstructing the outlet to the Taliptip River of
the waters flooding the upper lands belonging to the plaintiffs.

It is perhaps useful and advantageous to the plaintiffs and other

owners of high lands in Calalaran, in addition to the old dike
between the lake of said place and the low lands in Paraanan, to
have another made by the defendant at the border of Paraanan
adjoining the said river, for the purpose of preventing the salt
waters of the Taliptip River flooding, at high tide, not only the
lowlands in Paraanan but also the higher ones of Calalaran and its
lake, since the plaintiffs can not prevent the defendant from
protecting his lands against the influx of salt water; but the
defendant could never be permitted to obstruct the flow of the
waters through his lands to the Taliptip River during the heavy
rains, when the high lands in Calalaran and the lake in said place
are flooded, thereby impairing the right of the owners of the
dominant estates.

28
 NAPOCOR vs. LUCMAN G. IBRAHIM
G.R. No. 168732              June 29, 2007

Facts:
Respondent Ibrahim, in his personal capacity and in behalf of his co-
heirs, instituted an action against petitioner NAPOCOR for recovery of
possession of land and damages. In their complaint, Ibrahim and his
co-heirs claimed that they were owners of several parcels of land where
the NAPOCOR, through alleged stealth and without respondents’
knowledge and prior consent, took possession of the sub-terrain area
and constructed therein underground tunnels. The tunnels were
apparently being used by NAPOCOR in siphoning the water of Lake
Lanao and in the operation of NAPOCOR’s certain projects.

Respondent Omar G. Maruhom requested for a permit to construct

and/or install a motorized deep well but his request was turned down
because the construction of the deep well would cause danger to lives
and property. Respondents demanded that NAPOCOR pay damages and
vacate the sub-terrain portion of their lands but the latter refused to
vacate much less pay damages. Respondents further averred that the
construction of the underground tunnels has endangered their lives and
properties as Marawi City lies in an area of local volcanic and tectonic
activity. Further, these illegally constructed tunnels caused them
sleepless nights, serious anxiety and shock thereby entitling them to
recover moral damages and that by way of example for the public good,
NAPOCOR must be held liable for exemplary damages.

In its answer, NAPOCOR asserted that respondents have no cause of

action because they failed to show proof that they were the owners of
the property, and the tunnels are a government project for the benefit of
all and all private lands are subject to such easement as may be
necessary for the same.

Both the RTC and the CA found that respondents owned and possessed
the property and that its substrata was possessed by petitioner since
1978 for the underground tunnels, cannot be disturbed. Moreover, the
Court sustains the finding of the lower courts that the sub-terrain
portion of the property similarly belongs to respondents.

Issue:
WON respondents were denied the beneficial use of their subject
properties, thus, entitled them to just compensation by way of damages.

Held:
YES. In the past, the Court has held that if the government takes
property without expropriation and devotes the property to public use,
after many years, the property owner may demand payment of just
compensation in the event restoration of possession is neither

29
convenient nor feasible. This is in accordance with the principle that
persons shall not be deprived of their property except by
competent authority and for public use and always upon payment
of just compensation.

Petitioner contends that the underground tunnels in this case

constitute an easement upon the property of respondents which does
not involve any loss of title or possession. The manner in which the
easement was created by petitioner, however, violates the due process
rights of respondents as it was without notice and indemnity to them
and did not go through proper expropriation proceedings. Petitioner
could have, at any time, validly exercised the power of eminent domain
to acquire the easement over respondents’ property as this power
encompasses not only the taking or appropriation of title to and
possession of the expropriated property but likewise covers even the
imposition of a mere burden upon the owner of the condemned
property. Significantly, though, landowners cannot be deprived of
their right over their land until expropriation proceedings are
instituted in court. The court must then see to it that the taking is for
public use, that there is payment of just compensation and that there is
due process of law.

In disregarding this procedure and failing to recognize respondents’

ownership of the sub-terrain portion, petitioner took a risk and exposed
itself to greater liability with the passage of time. It must be emphasized
that the acquisition of the easement is not without expense. The
underground tunnels impose limitations on respondents’ use of the
property for an indefinite period and deprive them of its ordinary use.
Based upon the foregoing, respondents are clearly entitled to the
payment of just compensation. Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner
only occupies the sub-terrain portion, it is liable to pay not merely an
easement fee but rather the full compensation for land. This is so
because in this case, the nature of the easement practically deprives the
owners of its normal beneficial use. Respondents, as the owners of the
property thus expropriated, are entitled to a just compensation which
should be neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the
assessment, than the money equivalent of said property.

30
 ANECO REALTY vs. LANDEX DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
G.R. No. 165952               July 28, 2008

Facts:
Fernandez Hermanos Development, Inc. (FHDI) is the original owner of
a tract of land and subdivided the land into several lots. It later sold
these lots to petitioner Aneco and respondent Landex. The dispute arose
when Landex started the construction of a concrete wall on one of its
lots. To restrain construction of the wall, Aneco filed a complaint for
injunction and seek for the demolition of the newly-built wall.

In its answer, Landex alleging, among others, that Aneco was not
deprived access to its lots due to the construction of the concrete wall.
Landex claimed that Aneco has its own entrance to its property, which
was rendered inaccessible when Aneco constructed a building on said
street. Landex also claimed that FHDI sold ordinary lots, not
subdivision lots, to Aneco based on the express stipulation in the deed
of sale that FHDI was not interested in pursuing its own subdivision
project.

The RTC granted the complaint for injunction and ordered Landex to
stop the completion of the concrete wall and excavation of the road lot
in question and if the same is already completed, to remove the same
and to return the lot to its original situation. In its motion for
reconsideration, the RTC reversed its decision.

Issue:
WON Aneco may enjoin Landex from constructing a concrete wall on its
own property.

Held:
NO. Article 430 of the Civil Code gives every owner the right to enclose
or fence his land or tenement by means of walls, ditches, hedges or any
other means. The right to fence flows from the right of ownership.
As owner of the land, Landex may fence his property subject only to the
limitations and restrictions provided by law. Absent a clear legal and
enforceable right, as here, the Court will not interfere with the exercise
of an essential attribute of ownership.

Aneco cannot rely on the road lot under the old subdivision project of
FHDI because it knew at the time of the sale that it was buying ordinary
lots, not subdivision lots, from FHDI. This is clear from the deed of sale
between FHDI and Aneco where FHDI manifested that it was no longer
interested in pursuing its own subdivision project. If Aneco wants to
transform its own lots into a subdivision project, it must make its own
provision for road lots. It certainly cannot piggy back on the road lot of
the defunct subdivision project of FHDI to the detriment of the new
owner Landex.

31
 SPOUSES JONEL & SARAH PADILLA vs. ISAURO A. VELASCO
G.R. No. 169956             January 19, 2009

Facts:
Respondents are the heirs of Dr. Artemio A. Velasco, who died single
and without any issue. During his lifetime, Artemio acquired Lot No.
2161 from spouses Brigido Sacluti and Melitona Obial, evidenced by a
deed of sale. In October 1987, petitioners entered the property as
trustees by virtue of a deed of sale executed by the Rural Bank of
Pagsanjan in favor of spouses Bartolome Solomon, Jr. and Teresita
Padilla.

Respondents demanded that petitioners vacate the property, but the

latter refused. The matter was referred to the barangay for conciliation;
however, the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. Thereafter,
respondents filed a complaint for accion publiciana, accounting and
damages against petitioners. They asked the court to order petitioners
to vacate the property.

Issue:
WON respondents are entitled to the possession of the subject land.

Held:
YES. Accion publiciana is also used to refer to an ejectment suit where
the cause of dispossession is not among the grounds for forcible entry
and unlawful detainer, or when possession has been lost for more than
one year and can no longer be maintained under Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court. The objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover
possession only, not ownership.

Based on the findings of facts of the RTC which were affirmed by the
CA, respondents were able to establish lawful possession of Lot No.
2161 when the petitioners occupied the property. It was proved during
trial that the land occupied by petitioners was Lot No. 2161 in the name
of Artemio, whereas the land sold by the bank to the petitioners was Lot
No. 76-pt. Given this factual milieu, it can readily be deduced that
respondents are legally entitled to the possession of Lot No. 2161.

In accion publiciana, the principal issue is possession, and ownership is

merely ancillary thereto. Only in cases where the possession cannot be
resolved without resolving the issue of ownership may the trial court
delve into the claim of ownership.

32
 DATU KIRAM SAMPACO vs. HADJI SERAD MINGCA LANTUD
G.R. No. 163551               July 18, 2011

Facts:
Respondent Lantud filed an action to quiet title with damages
against petitioner Datu Kiram Sampaco (deceased), who has been
substituted by his heirs, represented by Hadji Soraya Sampaco-
Macabando. Respondent alleged that he is the owner in fee simple
of a parcel of residential lot and Datu Kiram, through his daughter
Soraya Sampaco-Macabando with several armed men, forcibly and
unlawfully entered his property and destroyed the nursery
buildings, cabbage seedlings and other improvements therein.

Barangay Captain Hadji Hassan Abato and his councilmen prepared

and issued a decision in writing stating that petitioner Datu Kiram
is the owner of the subject parcel of land. Respondent stated that he
and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public and
exclusive possession of the subject property. He prayed that the
acts of petitioner and the decision of Barangay Captain Hadji
Hassan Abato and his councilmen be declared invalid.

In his Answer, Datu Kiram asserted that he and his predecessors-

in-interest are the ones who had been in open, public, continuous,
and exclusive possession of the property in dispute. Petitioner
alleged that the title of the respondent was secured in violation of
laws and through fraud, deception and misrepresentation,
considering that the subject parcel of land is a residential lot and
the title issued is a free patent. Moreover, respondent and his
predecessors-in-interest had never taken actual possession or
occupied the land under litigation. On the contrary, petitioner has
all the evidence of actual possession and ownership of permanent
improvements and other plants on the land in dispute.

Issue:
WON petitioner is the owner of the subject land.

Held:
NO. Under Article 434 of the Civil Code, to successfully maintain an
action to recover the ownership of a real property, the person who
claims a better right to it must prove two (2) things: first, the
identity of the land claimed; and second, his title thereto.

In regard to the first requisite, in an accion reinvindicatoria, the

person who claims that he has a better right to the property must

33
first fix the identity of the land he is claiming by describing the
location, area and boundaries thereof.

In this case, petitioner claims that the property in dispute is part of

his larger property. However, petitioner failed to identify his larger
property by providing evidence of the metes and bounds thereof, so
that the same may be compared with the technical description
contained in the title of respondent, which would have shown
whether the disputed property really formed part of petitioner’s
larger property. The appellate court correctly held in its Resolution
dated May 13, 2004 that petitioner’s claim is solely supported by
testimonial evidence, which did not conclusively show the metes
and bounds of petitioner’s larger property in relation to the metes
and bounds of the disputed property; thus, there is no sufficient
evidence on record to support petitioner’s claim that the disputed
property is part of his larger property.

In regard to the second requisite of title to property, both petitioner

and respondent separately claim that they are entitled to ownership
of the property by virtue of open, public, continuous and exclusive
possession of the same in the concept of owner. Petitioner claims
that he inherited the subject property from his father in 1952, while
respondent claims that he acquired the property from his
grandmother Intumo Pagsidan, a portion thereof from his
grandmother’s helper Totop Malacop pursuant to a court decision
after litigating with him. Respondent has OCT No. P-658 to prove
his title to the subject property, while petitioner merely claims that
the property is already his private land by virtue of his open, public,
continuous possession of the same in the concept of owner.

The Court holds that petitioner failed to prove the requisites of

reconveyance as he failed to prove the identity of his larger property
in relation to the disputed property, and his claim of title by virtue
of open, public and continuous possession of the disputed property
in the concept of owner is nebulous in the light of a similar claim by
respondent who holds a free patent title over the subject property.
As stated in Ybañez v. Intermediate Appellate Court, it is relatively
easy to declare and claim that one owns and possesses public
agricultural land, but it is entirely a different matter to affirmatively
declare and to prove before a court of law that one actually
possessed and cultivated the entire area to the exclusion of other
claimants who stand on equal footing under the Public Land Act
(Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended) as any other pioneering
claimants.

34
 RUBEN C. CORPUZ vs. Sps. HILARION and JUSTA AGUSTIN
G.R. No. 183822               January 18, 2012

Facts:
Petitioner Corpuz filed a complaint for ejectment against respondent
Spouses Agustin alleging that he is the registered owner of two parcels
of land covered by TCT No. 12980. Aforesaid parcels of land were
formerly owned by Elias Duldulao and were sold to Francisco D.
Corpuz, father of Ruben C. Corpuz. The elder Corpuz allowed spouses
Agustin to occupy subject properties, the latter being relatives. Despite
demand to vacate, the Agustins refused to leave the premises.

Ruben alleged further that he has the better right to possess subject
property having acquired the same from his father, Francisco, who
executed a Deed of Quitclaim in his favor in March 1971. Spouses
Agustin, in their Answer, claimed that Francisco Corpuz, Ruben's
father, disposed of subject property by executing a Deed of Absolute
Sale in their favor in June 1971.

Based on the above findings, the CA ruled that petitioner had

knowledge of the sale of the disputed real property executed between
Francisco Corpuz, petitioner's father, and respondents. Due to this
conveyance by the elder Corpuz to respondents, the latter's possession
thereof was in the nature of ownership. Thus, in the context of an
unlawful detainer case instituted by petitioner against respondents, the
appellate court concluded that respondents’ possession of the property
was not by mere tolerance of its former owner – petitioner's father – but
was in the exercise of ownership.

The CA noted that petitioner had knowledge of his father’s sale of the
properties to respondents as early as 1973. However, despite knowledge
of the sale, petitioner failed to initiate any action to annul it and oust
respondents from the subject properties. The appellate court rejected
his contention that, as registered owner of the disputed properties, he
had a better right to possession thereof, compared to the unregistered
Deed of Sale relied upon by respondents in their defense of the same
properties. The CA ruled that the inaction on his part despite knowledge
of the sale in 1973 was equivalent to registration of respondents’
unregistered deed. In dismissing his appeal, the CA concluded that
respondents’ possession was "not ... anchored on mere tolerance nor on
any of the grounds for forcible entry or unlawful detainer"; hence "the
complaint for ejectment must fail."

Issue:
WON petitioner is the owner of the subject property.

35
Held:
YES. A title issued under the Torrens system is entitled to all the
attributes of property ownership, which necessarily includes
possession. In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, even if the
defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the
question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership, the lower courts and the Court of Appeals, nonetheless,
have the undoubted competence to provisionally resolve the issue of
ownership for the sole purpose of determining the issue of Possession.
Such decision, however, does not bind the title or affect the ownership
of the land nor is conclusive of the facts therein found in a case
between the same parties upon a different cause of action involving
possession.

In the instant case, the evidence showed that as between the parties, it
is the petitioner who has a Torrens Title to the property.
Respondents merely showed their unregistered deeds of sale in support
of their claims. The Metropolitan Trial Court correctly relied on the
transfer certificate of title in the name of petitioner. It is settled that a
Torrens Certificate of title is indefeasible and binding upon the
whole world unless and until it has been nullified by a court of
competent jurisdiction. Under existing statutory and decisional law,
the power to pass upon the validity of such certificate of title at the first
instance properly belongs to the Regional Trial Courts in a direct
proceeding for cancellation of title.

As the registered owner, petitioner had a right to the possession of

the property, which is one of the attributes of his ownership.
Respondents' argument that petitioner is not an innocent purchaser for
value and was guilty of bad faith in having the subject land registered in
his name is a collateral attack on the title of petitioner, which is not
allowed. A certificate of title cannot be subject to a collateral attack and
can be altered, modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law.

The pronouncement in Co v. Militar was later reiterated in Spouses

Pascual v. Spouses Coronel and in Spouses Barias v. Heirs of Bartolome
Boneo, et al., wherein we consistently held the age-old rule "that the
person who has a Torrens Title over a land is entitled to possession
thereof."

36
 Sps EDRALIN vs. PHIL. VETERANS BANK
G.R. No. 168523               March 9, 2011

Facts:
Respondent Veterans Bank granted petitioner spouses Fernando
and Angelina Edralin a loan in the amount of Two Hundred
Seventy Thousand Pesos (P270,000.00). As security thereof,
petitioners executed a Real Estate Mortgage (REM) in favor of
Veterans Bank over a real property and registered in the name of
petitioner Fernando Edralin. The Edralins failed to pay their
obligation to Veterans Bank. Thus, Veterans Bank filed a
Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of the REM. In due course,
Veterans Bank emerged as the highest bidder at the said
foreclosure sale and was issued the corresponding Certificate of
Sale.

Upon the Edralins’ failure to redeem the property during the

one-year period provided under Act No. 3135, Veterans Bank
acquired absolute ownership of the subject property. Despite the
foregoing, the Edralins failed to vacate and surrender possession
of the subject property to Veterans Bank. Thus, Veterans Bank
filed an Ex-Parte Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Possession.

The trial court held that, assuming the contract allowed for the
issuance of a writ of possession, Veterans Bank’s right to seek
possession had already prescribed. Without citing authority and
adequate explanation, the court held that Veterans Bank had
only 10 years from February 24, 1983 to seek possession of the
property.

On appeal, the CA held that Veterans Bank, as the highest

bidder, has the right to a writ of possession. This right may be
availed of any time after the buyer consolidates ownership. In
fact, the issuance of the writ of possession is a ministerial
function, the right to which cannot be enjoined or stayed, even
by an action for annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure
sale itself.

Issue:
WON respondent Veteran’s Bank, as owner of the subject
property, entitled to the writ of possession.

37
Held:
YES. The purchaser, who has a right to possession after the
expiration of the redemption period, becomes the absolute owner
of the property when no redemption is made. The purchaser can
demand possession at any time following the consolidation of
ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new TCT.
After consolidation of title in the purchaser’s name for
failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property, the
purchaser’s right to possession ripens into the absolute
right of a confirmed owner. At that point, the issuance of a
writ of possession, upon proper application and proof of title
becomes merely a ministerial function. Therefore, the issuance
by the RTC of a writ of possession in favor of the respondent in
this case is proper.

With the consolidated title, the purchaser becomes entitled to a

writ of possession and the trial court has the ministerial duty to
issue such writ of possession. Thus, "the remedy of mandamus
lies to compel the performance of this ministerial duty."

The Court held that the purchaser’s right "to request for the
issuance of the writ of possession of the land never
prescribes." "The right to possess a property merely follows
the right of ownership," and it would be illogical to hold that a
person having ownership of a parcel of land is barred from
seeking possession thereof.

38
 JUANITA ERMITAÑO vs. LAILANIE M. PAGLAS
G.R. No. 174436               January 23, 2013

Facts:
Respondent Lailanie, as lessee, and petitioner Juanita, lessor, through
her representative, Isabelo Ermitano, entered into a Contract of Lease
for a period of one (1) year over a residential lot and house. Subsequent
to the execution of the lease contract, petitioner mortgaged the subject
property in favour of Charlie Yap and that the same was foreclosed with
Yap as the purchaser of the disputed lot.

Later on, respondent was able to acquire the subject property through
Yap’s brother. However, it was made clear in their Deed of Sale that the
property was still subject to petitioner’s right of redemption.

Prior to respondent's purchase of the subject property, petitioner filed a

suit for the declaration of nullity of the mortgage in favor of Yap as well
as the sheriff's provisional certificate of sale which was issued after the
disputed house and lot were sold on foreclosure. Meanwhile, petitioner
sent a letter demanding respondent to pay the rentals which are due
and to vacate the leased premises. Respondent ignored the said
demand.

Thus, petitioner filed a case of unlawful detainer against respondent

which was dismissed by the MTCC. In the RTC, the court held that
respondent possesses the right to redeem the subject property and that
pending expiration of the redemption period, she is entitled to receive
the rents, earnings and income derived from the property. On appeal,
the CA ruled that respondent did not act in bad faith when she bought
the property in question because she had every right to rely on the
validity of the documents evidencing the mortgage and the foreclosure
proceedings.

Issue:
WON petitioner possesses the right to redeem the property and entitled
to receive the rents, earnings and income.

Held:
YES. It bears to reiterate the settled rule that the only question that the
courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the
physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de
facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not even matter if a
party's title to the property is questionable. In an unlawful detainer
case, the sole issue for resolution is the physical or material
possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of
ownership by any of the party litigants. Where the issue of ownership
is raised by any of the parties, the courts may pass upon the same in
order to determine who has the right to possess the property. The

39
adjudication is, however, merely provisional and would not bar or
prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the
property.

It is settled that in unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds

possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold
possession under any contract, express or implied. In such case, the
possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration
or termination of the right to possess; hence, the issue of rightful
possession is decisive for, in such action, the defendant is in actual
possession and the plaintiff’s cause of action is the termination of the
defendant’s right to continue in possession.

What a tenant is estopped from denying is the title of his landlord at the
time of the commencement of the landlord-tenant relation. If the title
asserted is one that is alleged to have been acquired subsequent to the
commencement of that relation, the presumption will not apply. Hence,
the tenant may show that the landlord's title has expired or been
conveyed to another or himself; and he is not estopped to deny a
claim for rent, if he has been ousted or evicted by title paramount.

Even if respondent is not estopped from denying petitioner's claim for

rent, her basis for such denial, which is her subsequent acquisition of
ownership of the disputed property, is nonetheless, an insufficient
excuse from refusing to pay the rentals due to petitioner.

There is no dispute that at the time that respondent purchased Yap's

rights over the subject property, petitioner's right of redemption as a
mortgagor has not yet expired. It is settled that during the period of
redemption, it cannot be said that the mortgagor is no longer the
owner of the foreclosed property, since the rule up to now is that
the right of a purchaser at a foreclosure sale is merely inchoate
until after the period of redemption has expired without the right
being exercised. The title to land sold under mortgage foreclosure
remains in the mortgagor or his grantee until the expiration of the
redemption period and conveyance by the master's deed. Indeed, the
rule has always been that it is only upon the expiration of the
redemption period, without the judgment debtor having made use of his
right of redemption, that the ownership of the land sold becomes
consolidated in the purchaser.

40
 HEIRS OF ROGELIO ISIP, SR., vs. RODOLFO QUINTOS
G.R. No. 172008               August 1, 2012

Facts:
Rogelio Isip, Sr. occupied and took possession of a parcel of land, where
he constructed a small house to serve as his place of residence. He
allowed the construction of a water distribution system and car repair
shop in the said land. However, despite the completion of the repair
shop, they were not able to start the business due to Rogelio Sr.’s
illness. When Rogelio Sr. died in 1998, his son Rolando was appointed
General Manager of the water distribution system of Sunrise
Management Corporation.

Rodolfo Quintos then revived to Rolando the proposal to establish the

car repair shop. He allegedly told Rolando that there was a need for
accreditation from the insurance companies before the car repair shop
could commence operation. In line with such accreditation, Quintos told
Rolando that inspectors from the insurance companies will conduct
ocular inspection to see if the building is being used for commercial or
business purposes and not for residential use. Hence, Rolando had to
temporarily vacate the premises. Relying on the representations of
Quintos, who was their legal counsel and the godfather of Rogelio Jr.,
Rolando and Rogelio Jr. agreed to temporarily vacate the compound.

When Rolando returned to the compound, however, he was refused

entry by three armed security guards allegedly upon the instructions of
Quintos, Rodolfo De Guzman, and Isagani Isip. A notice was also posted
at the gates of the compound that Sunrise Management Corporation
had been dissolved and that the deep well compound was already under
the management of Roniro Enterprises Company (Roniro Enterpises).

Thus, petitioners Celedonia Isip, Rolando, Rogelio Jr. and Irene Isip-
Silvestre, claiming to be the legitimate children and legal heirs of
Rogelio Sr., filed a complaint for forcible entry against respondents
Quintos, De Guzman, and Isip, all doing business under the name
Roniro Enterprises. Petitioners claimed that respondents, through
deceit, strategy, and stealth, succeeded in entering the deep well
compound and once inside the premises, prevented the petitioners from
re-entering the same through the use of force, intimidation, and threat.
Respondents vehemently denied the charge. They asserted that the
subject lot was transferred to De Guzman by Jedco Corporation, who
acquired the right of possession over the premises in question and the
control over the operation of the water distribution system.

Respondents claimed that Rogelio Sr., was an employee of Sunrise

Management Corporation. After the death of Rogelio Sr., De Guzman
wrote a letter dated August 14, 1998 addressed to the president and
chairman of the board of Sunrise Management Corporation stating that

41
he is terminating the services of the said corporation because of the
unfortunate death of Rogelio Sr. In the same letter, De Guzman likewise
held Sunrise Management Corporation, together with the sons of
Rogelio Sr., responsible to render an accounting relative to the
operation of the said deep well.

Issue:
WON the petitioner was deprive of possession.

Held:
NO. Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, a case of forcible
entry may be filed by, "a person deprived of the possession of any
land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth
x x x." In cases of forcible entry, "the possession is illegal from the
beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior
possession de facto."

It is clear that respondents have prior possession de facto. While

petitioners allege that their predecessor-in-interest Rogelio Sr. was in
possession of the subject lot in 1986, evidence on record supports the
respondents’ claim that as early as 1984, Pontino not only possessed
and occupied the lot but also had a title over the disputed property. And
by virtue of a Deed of Assignment between Pontino and Jedco
Corporation, which the latter relinquished in favor of De Guzman,
respondents enjoy the right of prior possession de facto. In addition, the
possession of respondents was lawful from the beginning since it was
acquired through lawful means and thus no forcible entry was
committed.

It is clear from the facts that when the rights over the subject lot were
relinquished in favor of De Guzman, Rogelio Sr. was employed in order
to help the respondents run the water distribution system. Hence, it
was actually through the respondents that the petitioners’ predecessor-
in-interest was able to enter the disputed lot. And although Rogelio Sr.
was able to occupy the lot, he was in fact possessing the same in the
name of the respondents. Verily, whatever right to possess
petitioners have in this case cannot be superior to that of the
respondents since it was from the latter that their predecessor-in-
interest derived his claim of possession.

42
 VALERIANA VILLONDO vs. CARMEN QUIJANO
G.R. No. 173606               December 3, 2012

Facts:
Petitioner Valeriana filed a complaint for forcible entry claiming that
respondent Carmen Quijano (Carmen) and her farm laborers,
respondents Adriano Alcantara and Marcelino Ebena, intruded into her
land with the help of three policemen and other barangay officials. They
destroyed the plants therein, harvested the root crops, corn, and
banana, built a hut, fenced off the area, and posted a "NO
TRESPASSING" sign, thus preventing Valeriana and her family from
entering the premises where they have always resided and depriving
them of their harvest.

Valeriana argued that Carmen can never assert ownership over the
property because it is a government land. She claimed that Carmen’s
parents, Rufo and Constancia Bacalla, were themselves aware that an
ownership claim is worthless. Thus, they ceded their plantations on the
subject land to her husband Daniel Villondo. She based her and her
family’s right of possession on Certificate of Stewardship, which she
claimed to have been awarded to her now-deceased husband by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources. Valeriana averred
that her family had prior possession of the land as her husband started
tilling the same even before the war. When she married him in 1948,
they continued to occupy and cultivate the land together with their five
children.

On the other hand, Carmen interposed that the alleged "Kasabutan"

was never brought to her attention by her parents. In any case, she
asserted that such allegation of Valeriana even supports her claim of
prior possession. Carmen tacked her possessory right to that of her
parents Rufo and Constancia Bacalla who in 1948 purchased from
Liberato and Vicente Abellanosa. According to her, said 4.51 hectare
land includes the disputed area which her parents also cultivated and
developed. Carmen submitted to the court her tax declarations over the
land.

Issue:
WON Valeriana is a real party-in-interest in the forcible entry case she
filed.

Held:
YES. Even public lands can be the subject of forcible entry cases as it
has already been held that ejectment proceedings may involve all kinds
of land. Thus, in the case at bench, while the parties are fighting over
the possession of a government land, the courts below are not deprived
of jurisdiction to render judgment thereon. Courts must resolve the

43
issue of possession even if the parties to the ejectment suit are mere
informal settlers.

For a court to restore possession, two things must be proven in a

forcible entry case: prior physical possession of the property and
deprivation of the property by means of force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth. "Possession de facto, [i.e., the physical
possession of a property,] and not possession de jure is the only
issue in a forcible entry case. This rule holds true regardless of the
character of a party’s possession, provided that he has in his favor
priority in time. x x x As used in forcible entry and unlawful detainer
cases, ‘possession’ refers to "physical possession, not legal possession
in the sense contemplated in civil law."

Here, Valeriana is one of those in prior physical possession of the land

who was eventually dispossessed. Carmen failed to present evidence
that she was in actual physical possession of the land she claims. Her
"tax declarations are not conclusive proofs of ownership, or even of
possession." They only constitute proofs of a claim of title over the
declared property. Her acts betray her claim of prior possession.

Sans the presence of the awardee of the Certificate of Stewardship,

the provision clearly allows Valeriana to institute the action for the
recovery of the physical possession of the property against the
alleged usurper. She has a right or interest to protect as she was the
one dispossessed and thus, she can file the action for forcible entry.
Any judgment rendered by the courts below in the forcible entry action
will bind and definitely affect her claim to possess the subject property.
The fact that Valeriana is not the holder of the Certificate of
Stewardship is not in issue in a forcible entry case. This matter already
delves into the character of her possession. We emphasize that in
ejectment suits, it does not even matter if the party’s title to the
property is questionable.

44
 TOP MANAGEMENT vs. LUIS FAJARDO
G.R. No. 150462               June 15, 2011

Facts:
Emilio Gregorio and Jose T Veleasquez were involved in a dispute
regarding the overlapping of lots owned by them. LRA informed the CFI
that Lots 1 and 7 had been amended by the Bureau of Lands to exclude
therefrom portions of the lots of Gregorio. Velasquez petitioned the CFI
to set aside the award earlier made in favor of Gregorio. The CFI issued
an Order declaring that the application of Velasquez be given due
course insofar as Lots 1 and 7 which are identical to Lots 1 to 4 in favor
of Gregorio respecting the same lots as null and void.

Certificates of Title were issued in favor of Velasquez. Gregorio appealed

the decision of the CFI to the CA. Sometime after this, he entered into
an agreement with Tomas Trinidad (Trinidad) and Luis Fajardo
(Fajardo) entitled “Kasunduan namay Pambihirang Kapangyarihan.” By
virtue of this agreement, Fajardo would finance the cost of the litigation
and in return he would be entitled to one-half of the subject property
after deducting 20% of the total land area as attorney’s fees for Trinidad
if the appeal is successful. Fajardo and Trinidad filed Civil Case before
the RTC of Pasig to enforce their agreement with Gregorio. The court
rendered judgment in their favor.

Petitioner Top management sought the annulment of the said order on

the ground of extrinsic fraud claiming that the heirs of Gregorio sold a
portion of the land to it. The CA rendered its decision dismissing the
petition for annulment holding that there existed no extrinsic fraud
which would justify the annulment of the questioned orders. Petitioner
then filed for Quieting of Title alleging that the issuance of title in the
name of Fajardo -- who obtained the same from the court in a case
without the knowledge of petitioner who was not a party therein --
despite the existence of a title in its name constitutes a cloud upon the
title of petitioner. Petitioner claimed that it acquired the same property
in good faith and for value from the original owners thereof.

Issue:
WON petitioner can quiet the title issued in favor of Fajardo.

Held:
NO. Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any
cloud, doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real property. In an action
for quieting of title, the plaintiffs must show not only that there is
a cloud or contrary interest over the subject real property, but that
they have a valid title to it. The court is tasked to determine the
respective rights of the complainant and the other claimants, not only
to place things in their proper places, and to make the claimant, who

45
has no rights to said immovable, respect and not disturb the one so
entitled, but also for the benefit of both, so that whoever has the right
will see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he can
thereafter fearlessly introduce the improvements he may desire, as well
as use, and even abuse the property as he deems fit.

Lis pendens, which literally means pending suit, refers to the

jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over property
involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until
final judgment. Founded upon public policy and necessity, lis pendens
is intended to keep the properties in litigation within the power of the
court until the litigation is terminated, and to prevent the defeat of the
judgment or decree by subsequent alienation. Its notice is an
announcement to the whole world that a particular property is in
litigation and serves as a warning that one who acquires an interest
over said property does so at his own risk or that he gambles on the
result of the litigation over said property.

The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect: (1) to keep the
subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the
entry of the final judgment to prevent the defeat of the final judgment
by successive alienations; and (2) to bind a purchaser, bona fide or not,
of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the
court will promulgate subsequently. Once a notice of lis pendens has
been duly registered, any subsequent transaction affecting the land
involved would have to be subject to the outcome of the litigation.

Petitioner being a mere transferee at the time the decision of the RTC of
Pasig in Civil Case No. 35305 had become final and executory on
December 6, 1988, it is bound by the said judgment which ordered the
heirs of Emilio Gregorio to convey Lots 1, 2, 3 & 4, Psu-204875 in favor
of private respondent and Trinidad. As such buyer of one of the lots to
be conveyed to private respondent pursuant to the court’s decree with
notice that said properties are in litigation, petitioner merely stepped
into the shoes of its vendors who lost in the case. Such vested right
acquired by the private respondent under the final judgment in his
favor may not be defeated by the subsequent issuance of another
certificate of title to the heirs of Gregorio respecting the same
parcel of land. For it is well-settled that being an involuntary
transaction, entry of the notice of lis pendens in the primary entry book
of the Register of Deeds is sufficient to constitute registration and such
entry is notice to all persons of such claim.

46
 DIONISIO MANANQUIL vs. ROBERTO MOICO
G.R. No. 180076               November 21, 2012

Facts:
Lots 18 and 19 in Dagat-Dagatan, Navotas form part of the land
previously expropriated by the NHA and placed under its Tondo Dagat-
Dagatan Foreshore Development Project – where occupants, applicants
or beneficiaries may purchase lots on installment basis. Lot 18 was
awarded to spouses Iluminardo and Prescilla Mananquil and Lot 19 was
sold to Prescilla in February 1980 by its occupant.

When Iluminardo and Prescilla died supposedly without issue, it turned

out that Eulogio Francisco Maypa was Prescilla’s from her previous
marriage. After the spouses’ death, Iluminardo’s supposed heirs
executed an Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs and adjudicated
ownership over Lots 18 and 19 in favor of Dianita. They took possession
of Lots 18 and 19 and leased them out to third parties.

Sometime later, the Mananquil heirs discovered that in 1997, Eulogio

and two others, on the claim that they are surviving heirs of Iluminardo
and Prescilla, had executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with
Waiver of Rights and Sale, and a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
Roberto Moico. In May 1997, Moico began evicting the Mananquils’
tenants and demolishing the structures they built on Lots 18 and 19. In
June, the Mananquils instituted a civil case for quieting of title and
injunctive relief.

In its decision, the RTC ordered a permanent injunction enjoining

defendant Roberto Moico to refrain from threatening the tenants and
destroying the improvements standing on the subject properties and
from filing the ejectment suits against the tenants.

On appeal, the CA noted that Lots 18 and 19 must still belong to the
NHA, in the absence of proof that Iluminardo and Prescilla have
completed installment payments thereon, or were awarded titles to the
lots. And if the couple disposed of these lots even before title could be
issued in their name, then they may have been guilty of violating
conditions of the government grant, thus disqualifying them from the
NHA program. Consequently, there is no right in respect to these
properties that the Mananquils may succeed to. If this is the case, then
no suit for quieting of title could prosper, for lack of legal or equitable
title to or interest in Lots 18 and 19.

Issue:
WON the Mananquil heirs are qualified to succeed over the subject lot.

47
Held:
NO. From the evidence adduced, it appears that the petitioners have
failed to show their qualifications or right to succeed Iluminardo in his
rights under the NHA program/project. They failed to present any title,
award, grant, document or certification from the NHA or proper
government agency which would show that Iluminardo and Prescilla
have become the registered owners/beneficiaries/ awardees of Lots 18
and 19, or that petitioners are qualified successors or beneficiaries
under the Dagat-Dagatan program/project, taking over Iluminardo’s
rights after his death. They did not call to the witness stand competent
witnesses from the NHA who can attest to their rights as successors to
or beneficiaries of Lots 18 and 19. They failed to present proof, at the
very least, of the specific law, provisions, or terms that govern the
Tondo Dagat-Dagatan Foreshore Development Project which would
indicate a modicum of interest on their part. For this reason, their
rights or interest in the property could not be established.

Proof of heirship alone does not suffice; the Mananquils must prove to
the satisfaction of the courts that they have a right to succeed
Iluminardo under the law or terms of the NHA project, and are not
disqualified by non-payment, prohibition, lack of qualifications, or
otherwise.

An action for quieting of title is essentially a common law remedy

grounded on equity. The competent court is tasked to determine the
respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, not only to
place things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights to
said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for the
benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of
doubt over the property dissipated, and he could afterwards without
fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to use, and even to
abuse the property as he deems best. But "for an action to quiet title to
prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the
plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or
interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed,
claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on
his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite
its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy."

48
 JOAQUIN G. CHUNG, JR., vs. JACK DANIEL MONDRAGON
G.R. No. 179754               November 21, 2012

Facts:
Petitioners Joaquin G. Chung, Jr., et. al., are descendants of Rafael
Mondragon by his first wife, Eleuteria Calunia, while respondent Jack
Daniel Mondragon is Rafael’s descendant by his second wife, Andrea
Baldos. The title of the subject land in Southern Leyte is registered in
the name of "Heirs of Andrea Baldos represented by Teofila G. Maceda."
It was claimed that from 1921 up to 2000, Rafael appeared as owner of
the land in its tax declaration, and that a free patent was issued in
1987 in the name of Andrea’s heirs upon application of Teofila G.
Maceda, who is petitioners’ sister.

On the other hand, respondents claim that Andrea is the exclusive

owner of the land, having inherited the same from her father Blas
Baldos. They add that during Andrea’s lifetime, she was in lawful,
peaceful and continuous possession thereof in the concept of owner;
that in 1954, Andrea conveyed a portion thereof to one Crispina Gloria
de Cano. After Andrea died in 1955, her son Fortunato Mondragon
took over, paying taxes thereon religiously; and when Fortunato died,
his son Jack Daniel came into possession and enjoyment thereof.

Jack Daniel sold a portion of the subject land to co-respondent Clarinda

Regis-Schmitz. Thus, petitioners filed a case with a prayer that Jack
Daniel be declared without right to sell the land or a portion thereof;
that their rights and those belonging to the legitimate heirs of Rafael
and Eleuteria be declared valid and binding against the whole world;
that the respondents be restrained from creating a cloud upon OCT No.
22447; and that Jack Daniel’s sale to Regis-Schmitz be declared null
and void.

After trial, the court a quo dismissed the case holding that with the
admission that Jack Daniel is an heir of Andrea, he being the latter’s
grandson and therefore her heir, he is thus a co-owner of the land
which forms part of Andrea’s estate, and thus possesses the right to
dispose of his undivided share therein. The trial court held that
petitioners’ remedy was to seek partition of the land in order to obtain
title to determinate portions thereof.

Issue:
WON Jack Daniel possessed the right to dispose a portion of the land

Held:
YES. The issues in a case for quieting of title are fairly simple; the
plaintiff need to prove only two things, namely: "(1) the plaintiff or
complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the
real property subject of the action; and (2) that the deed, claim,

49
encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting a cloud on his
title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its
prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. Stated
differently, the plaintiff must show that he has a legal or at least an
equitable title over the real property in dispute, and that some deed or
proceeding beclouds its validity or efficacy."

It is evident from the title that the land belongs to no other than
the heirs of Andrea Baldos, Rafael’s second wife. The land could not
have belonged to Rafael, because he is not even named in the title. With
greater reason may it be said that the land could not belong to
petitioners, who are Rafael’s children by his first wife Eleuteria.
Moreover, the fact that Rafael died ahead of Andrea, and that he is
not even named in the title, give the impression that the land
belonged solely to the heirs of Andrea, to the exclusion of Rafael. If
this were not true, then the title should have as registered owners the
"Heirs of Rafael and Andrea Mondragon", in which case the petitioners
certainly would possess equitable title, they being descendants-heirs of
Rafael. Yet OCT No. 22447 is not so written. Add to this is the fact
that petitioners are not in possession of the land. Indeed, not even
the fact that their sister Teofila Maceda’s name appears in OCT No.
22447 could warrant a different conclusion. Her name appears therein
only a representative of Andrea’s heirs. As mere representative, she
could have no better right.

Petitioners do not possess legal or equitable title to the land, such that
the only recourse left for the trial court was to dismiss the case. Thus,
said although they both arrived at the correct conclusion, the trial court
and the CA did so by an erroneous appreciation of the facts and
evidence.

Petitioners cannot, on the pretext of maintaining a suit for quieting of

title have themselves declared as Andrea’s heirs so that they may claim
a share in the land. If they truly believe that they are entitled to a share
in the land, they may avail of the remedies afforded to excluded heirs
under the Rules of Court, or sue for the annulment of OCT No. 22447
and seek the issuance of new titles in their name, or recover damages in
the event prescription has sent.

50
 MARY McDONALD BACHRACH vs. SOPHIE SEIFERT
G.R. No. L-2659             October 12, 1950

Facts:
The deceased E. M. Bachrach left no forced heir except his widow Mary
McDonald Bachrach, with whom he bequeath all the fruits and usufruct
of the remainder of his estate and to enjoy said usufruct and use or
spend such fruits as she may in any manner wish.

The estate of E. M. Bachrach, as owner of 108,000 shares of stock of

the Atok-Big Wedge Mining Co., Inc., received from the latter 54,000
shares representing 50 per cent stock dividend on the said 108,000
shares. Mary McDonald Bachrach, as usufructuary or life tenant of the
estate, petitioned the lower court to authorize the Peoples Bank and
Trust Company, as administrator of the estate of E. M. Bachrach, to
transfer to her the said 54,000 shares of stock dividend by indorsing
and delivering to her the corresponding certificate of stock, claiming
that said dividend, although paid out in the form of stock, is fruit or
income and therefore belonged to her as usufructuary or life tenant.
Sophie Siefert and Elisa Elianoff, legal heirs of the deceased, opposed
said petition on the ground that the stock dividend in question was not
income but formed part of the capital and therefore belonged not to the
usufructuary but to the remainderman. And they have appealed from
the order granting the petition and overruling their objection.

Issue:
WON the stock dividends belong to the usufructuary.

Held:
YES. Under the Massachusetts rule, a stock dividend is considered part
of the capital and belongs to the remainderman; while under the
Pennsylvania rule, all earnings of a corporation, when declared as
dividends in whatever form, made during the lifetime of the
usufructuary, belong to the latter.

The Pennsylvania rule is more in accord with our statutory laws than
the Massachusetts rule. Under section 16 of our Corporation Law, no
corporation may make or declare from its business. Any dividend,
therefore, whether cash or stock, represent surplus profits. Article 471
of the Civil Code provides that the usufructuary shall be entitled to
receive all the natural, industrial, and civil fruits of the property in
the usufruct. The stock dividend in question in this case is a civil
fruit of the original investment. The shares of stock issued in
payment of said dividend may be sold independently of the original
shares just as the offspring of a domestic animal may be sold
independently of its mother.

51
 BACHRACH MOTOR CO., INC., vs. TALISAY-SILAY MILLING
G.R. No. 35223           September 17, 1931

Facts:
On 22 December 1923, the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., was indebted
to the PNB. To secure the payment of its debt, it succeeded in inducing
its planters, among whom was Mariano Lacson Ledesma, to mortgage
their land to the bank. And in order to compensate those planters for
the risk they were running with their property under that mortgage, the
aforesaid central, by a resolution passed on the same date, and
amended on 23 March 1928, undertook to credit the owners of the
plantation thus mortgaged every year with a sum equal to 2% of the
debt secured according to the yearly balance, the payment of the bonus
being made at once, or in part from time to time, as soon as the central
became free of its obligations to the bank, and of those contracted by
virtue of the contract of supervision, and had funds which might be so
used, or as soon as it obtained from said bank authority to make such
payment.

Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. filed a complaint against the Talisay-Silay

Milling Co., Inc., for the delivery of the amount of P13,850 or
promissory notes or other instruments of credit for that sum payable on
30 June 1930, as bonus in favor of Mariano Lacson Ledesma. The
complaint further prays that the sugar central be ordered to render an
accounting of the amounts it owes Mariano Lacson Ledesma by way of
bonus, dividends, or otherwise, and to pay Bachrach Motors a sum
sufficient to satisfy the judgment mentioned in the complaint, and that
the sale made by said Mariano Lacson Ledesma be declared null and
void. The PNB filed a third-party claim alleging a preferential right to
receive any amount which Mariano Lacson Ledesma might be entitled
from Talisay-Silay Milling as bonus. Talisay-Silay answered the
complaint that Mariano Lacson Ledesma’s credit (P7,500) belonged to
Cesar Ledesma because he had purchase it. Cesar Ledesma claimed to
be an owner by purchase in good faith. At the trial all the parties agreed
to recognize and respect the sale made in favor of Cesar Ledesma of the
P7,500 part of the credit in question, for which reason the trial court
dismissed the complaint and cross-complaint against Cesar Ledesma
authorizing the central to deliver to him the sum of P7,500. And upon
conclusion of the hearing, the court held that the Bachrach Motor Co.,
Inc., had a preferred right to receive the amount of P11,076.02 which
was Mariano Lacson Ledesma’s bonus, and it ordered the central to
deliver said sum to Bachrach Motors. PNB appealed.

Issue:
WON the bonus in question is civil fruits.

52
Held:
NO. The bonus which the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., had to pay the
planters who had mortgaged their lands to the Philippine National Bank
in order to secure the payment of the company’s debt to the bank, is not
a civil fruit of the mortgaged property.

Article 355 of the Civil Code considers three things as civil truths; (1)
rents from building, (2) proceeds from leases of lands, and (3) the
income from perpetual or life annuities or similar sources of revenue.
That is why we say that by "civil fruits" the Civil Code understands one
of three and only three things, to wit: the rent of a building, the rent of
land, and certain kinds of income.

As the bonus in question is not rent of a building or of land, the only

meaning of "civil fruits" left to be examined is that of "income."

Assuming that in broad juridical sense of the word "income" it might be

said that the bonus in question is "income" under article 355 of the
Civil Code, it is obvious to inquire whether it is derived from the land
mortgaged by Mariano Lacson Ledesma to the appellant bank for the
benefit of the central; for it is not obtained from that land but from
something else, it is not civil fruits of that land, and the bank's
contention is untenable.

It is to be noted that the said bonus bears no immediate, but only a

remote accidental relation to the land mentioned, having been granted
as compensation for the risk of having subjected one's land to a lien in
favor of the bank, for the benefit of the entity granting said bonus. If
this bonus be income or civil fruits of anything, it is income arising from
said risk, or, if one chooses, from Mariano Lacson Ledesma's generosity
in facing the danger for the protection of the central, but certainly it is
not civil fruits or income from the mortgaged property, which, as far as
this case is concerned, has nothing to do with it. Hence, the amount of
the bonus, according to the resolution of the central granting it, is not
based upon the value, importance or any other circumstance of the
mortgaged property, but upon the total value of the debt thereby
secured, according to the annual balance, which is something quite
distinct from and independent of the property referred to.

53
 OPHELIA L. TUATIS vs. SPOUSES ELISEO & VISMINDA ESCOL
G.R. No. 175399               October 27, 2009

Facts:
Tuatis filed a Complaint for Specific Performance against respondent
Visminda alleging that the latter as seller, and he, as buyer, entered
into a Deed of Sale by Installment over a piece of real property situated
in Poblacion, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte. She also claimed that
he paid Visminda P3,000 downpayment of the P10,000 purchase price
and the balance she paid in three instalments.

In the meantime, Tuatis already took possession of the subject property

and constructed a residential building thereon. She then requested
Visminda to sign a prepared absolute deed of sale covering the subject
property, but the latter refused, contending that the purchase price had
not yet been fully paid. The parties tried to amicably settle the case
before the Lupon Barangay, to no avail. Thus, Tuatis prayed that the
RTC order Visminda to do all acts for the consummation of the contract
sale, sign the absolute deed of sale and pay damages, as well as
attorney’s fees.

In her Answer, Visminda countered that, except for the P3,000.00

downpayment and P1,000.00 installment paid by Tuatis, she made no
other payment. Despite repeated verbal demands, Tuatis failed to
comply with the conditions that she and Visminda agreed upon in the
Deed of Sale by Installment for the payment of the balance of the
purchase price for the subject property.

After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in Visminda’s favor. Tuatis

thereafter filed a Motion to Exercise Right under Article 448 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. She moved that the RTC issue an order
allowing her to buy the subject property from Visminda. While Tuatis
indeed had the obligation to pay the price of the subject property, she
opined that such should not be imposed if the value of the said property
was considerably more than the value of the building constructed
thereon by Tuatis. Tuatis alleged that the building she constructed was
more valuable than the subject property. Tuatis maintained that she
then had the right to choose between being indemnified for the value of
her residential building or buying from Visminda the parcel of land
subject of the case. Tuatis stated that she was opting to exercise the
second option.

Issue:
WON Tuatis can avail Art. 448 of the Civil Code.

Held:
NO. Under Article 448 of the Civil Code, the landowner can choose
between appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity for

54
the same, as provided for in Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code; or
obliging the builder to pay the price of the land, unless its value is
considerably more than that of the structures, in which case the builder
in good faith shall pay reasonable rent.

Taking into consideration the provisions of the Deed of Sale by

Installment and Article 448 of the Civil Code, Visminda has the
following options:

Under the first option, Visminda may appropriate for herself the building
on the subject property after indemnifying Tuatis for the necessary and
useful expenses the latter incurred for said building, as provided in
Article 546 of the Civil Code. Until Visminda appropriately indemnifies
Tuatis for the building constructed by the latter, Tuatis may retain
possession of the building and the subject property.

Under the second option, Visminda may choose not to appropriate the
building and, instead, oblige Tuatis to pay the present or current fair
value of the land. The P10,000.00 price of the subject property, as
stated in the Deed of Sale on Installment executed in November 1989,
shall no longer apply, since Visminda will be obliging Tuatis to pay for
the price of the land in the exercise of Visminda’s rights under Article
448 of the Civil Code, and not under the said Deed. Tuatis’ obligation
will then be statutory, and not contractual, arising only when Visminda
has chosen her option under Article 448 of the Civil Code.

Still under the second option, if the present or current value of the land,
the subject property herein, turns out to be considerably more than
that of the building built thereon, Tuatis cannot be obliged to pay for
the subject property, but she must pay Visminda reasonable rent
for the same. Visminda and Tuatis must agree on the terms of the
lease; otherwise, the court will fix the terms.

****************************
That failure of the BUYER [Tuatis] to pay the remaining balance within
the period of three months from the period stipulated above, then the
BUYER [Tuatis] shall return the land subject of this contract to the
SELLER [Visminda] and the SELLER [Visminda] [shall] likewise return
all the amount paid by the BUYER [Tuatis].

55
MERCY VDA. DE ROXAS vs. OUR LADY'S FOUNDATION, INC.,
G.R. No. 182378               March 6, 2013

Facts:
Atty. Henry Amado Roxas, as represented by petitioner Mercy
vda De Roxas, was accused by Salve Latosa of encroaching on a
quarter of her property by arbitrarily extending his concrete
fence beyond the correct limits. In his answer, Roxas imputed
the blame to respondent Our Lady’s Foundation, Inc. (OLFI). He
then filed a Third-Party Complaint against respondent and
claimed that he only occupied the adjoining portion in order to
get the equivalent area of what he had lost when OLFI trimmed
his property for the subdivision road.

After considering the evidence of all the parties, the trial court
held that Latosa had established her claim of encroachment by a
preponderance of evidence. It found that Roxas occupied a total
of 112 square meters of Latosa’s lots, and that, in turn, OLFI
trimmed his property by 92 square meters.

The RTC issued a Writ of Execution to implement the ruling

ordering OLFI to reimburse Roxas for the value of the 92-square-
meter property plus legal interest to be reckoned from the time
the amount was paid to the third-party defendant. Opposing
the valuation of the subject property, OLFI insisted that it
should reimburse Roxas only at the rate of P40 per square
meter, the same rate that Roxas paid when the latter first
purchased the property. Nevertheless, before resolving the
Motions filed by OLFI, the trial court approved an Amended
Sheriff’s Bill, which reduced the valuation to P1,800 per square
meter.

Issue:
WON the valuation of the property should be reckoned from the
rate the property first purchase and not on its current fair price.

Held:
NO. Under Article 448 pertaining to encroachments in good
faith, as well as Article 450 referring to encroachments in bad
faith, the owner of the land encroached upon – petitioner herein
– has the option to require respondent builder to pay the price of
the land.

56
Although these provisions of the Civil Code do not explicitly state
the reckoning period for valuing the property, Ballatan v. Court
of Appeals already specifies that in the event that the seller
elects to sell the lot, "the price must be fixed at the prevailing
market value at the time of payment." More recently, Tuatis v.
Spouses Escol illustrates that the present or current fair value
of the land is to be reckoned at the time that the landowner
elected the choice, and not at the time that the property
was purchased.

From these cases, it follows that the CA incorrectly pegged the

reimbursable amount at the old market value of the subject
property – P40 per square meter – as reflected in the Deed of
Absolute Sale between the parties. On the other hand, the RTC
properly considered in its 2 December 2004 Order the value of
the lot at P1,800 per square meter, the current fair price as
determined in the Amended Sheriff’s Bill.

57
 BARTOLOME ORTIZ vs. HON. UNION C. KAYANAN
G.R. No. L-32974 July 30, 1979

Facts:
The lot in controversy was formerly the subject of Homestead
Application of Martin Dolorico II, petitioner's ward who died on August
20, 1931. Since then it was petitioner who continued the cultivation
and possession of the property, without however filing any application
to acquire title thereon. In his application, Martin Dolorico II named his
uncle, Martin Dolorico I as his heir and successor in interest, thus,
Martin Dolorico I executed an affidavit relinquishing his rights over the
property in favor of defendants Quirino Comintan and Eleuterio
Zamora, his grandson and son-in-law, respectively, and requested the
Director of Lands to cancel the homestead application.

On the strength of the affidavit, Homestead Application No. 122417 was

cancelled and thereafter, respondents Comintan and Zamora filed their
respective sales applications. Petitioner filed his protest alleging that he
should be given preference to purchase the lot inasmuch as he is the
actual occupant and has been in continuous possession of the same
since 1931. Inspite of petitioner's opposition, the portion of the subject
property was sold at public auction wherein defendant Comintan was
the only bidder.

Respondent court rendered a decision in favour of the respondents. Two

(2) years after the rendition of the judgment by the court a quo, while
the case was pending appeal and upon petition of private respondents
Comintan and Zamora, respondent Court appointed respondent Vicente
Ferro, Clerk of Court, as Receiver to collect tolls on a portion of the
property used as a diversion road.

Issue:
WON petitioner is still entitled to retain for his own exclusive benefit all
the fruits of the property.

Held:
NO. Petitioner cannot appropriate for his own exclusive benefit the tolls
which he collected from the property retained by him. It was his duty
under the law, after deducting the necessary expenses for his
administration, to apply such amount collected to the payment of the
interest, and the balance to the payment of the obligation.

The Court held, therefore, that the disputed tolls, after deducting
petitioner's expenses for administration, belong to Quirino Comintan,
owner of the land through which the toll road passed, further
considering that the same was on portions of the property on which
petitioner had not introduced any improvement. The trial court itself
clarified this matter when it placed the toll road under receivership. The

58
omission of any mention of the tolls in the decision itself may be
attributed to the fact that the tolls appear to have been collected after
the rendition of the judgment of the trial court.

There is no question that a possessor in good faith is entitled to the

fruits received before the possession is legally interrupted. Possession
in good faith ceases or is legally interrupted from the moment
defects in the title are made known to the possessor, by extraneous
evidence or by the filing of an action in court by the true owner for
the recovery of the property. Hence, all the fruits that the
possessor may receive from the time he is summoned in court, or
when he answers the complaint, must be delivered and paid by him
to the owner or lawful possessor.

However, even after his good faith ceases, the possessor in fact can
still retain the property, pursuant to Article 546 of the New Civil
Code, until he has been fully reimbursed for all the necessary and
useful expenses made by him on the property. This right of retention
has been considered as one of the conglomerate of measures devised by
the law for the protection of the possessor in good faith. Its object is to
guarantee the reimbursement of the expenses, such as those for the
preservation of the property, or for the enhancement of its utility or
productivity. It permits the actual possessor to remain in possession
while he has not been reimbursed by the person who defeated him in
the possession for those necessary expenses and useful improvements
made by him on the thing possessed. The principal characteristic of the
right of retention is its accessory character. It is accessory to a principal
obligation.

59
 SPS. DOMINADOR & LILIA W. NARVAEZ vs.
SPS. ROSE & ANTONIO ALCISO
G.R. No. 165907               July 27, 2009

Facts:
Larry A. Ogas owned a parcel land where a portion of it was subject to a
30-year lease agreement with Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. Ogas sold the
property to his daughter respondent Rose Alciso and a new title was
issued in her name. In 1979, Rose entered into a Deed of Sale with
Right to Repurchase, selling the property to Jaime Sansano. Alciso later
repurchased the property from Sansano and in 1980 sold again the
same property to Celso S. Bate. A new title was issued in the name of
Bate. In 1981, Bate entered into a Deed of Sale of Realty, selling the
property to the spouses Narvaez, thus, a new title was issued in the
name of the Spouses Narvaez. In 1982, the Spouses Narvaez built a
commercial building on the property amounting to P300,000.

Alciso demanded that a stipulation be included in the 14 August 1981

Deed of Sale of Realty allowing her to repurchase the property from the
Spouses Narvaez. Alciso alleged that she informed the Spouses Narvaez
that she wanted to repurchase the property. The Spouses Narvaez
demanded P300,000, but Alciso was willing to pay only P150,000.
Alciso and the Spouses Narvaez failed to reach an agreement on the
repurchase price.

The CA held that Bate and the Spouses Narvaez entered into a sale with
right of repurchase and that, applying Article 448 of the Civil Code,
Alciso could either appropriate the commercial building after payment
of the indemnity or oblige the Spouses Narvaez to pay the price of the
land, unless the price was considerably more than that of the building.

Issue:
WON the CA erred in applying Art. 448 in a sale with right to
repurchase.

Held:
YES. Article 448 is inapplicable in cases involving contracts of sale with
right of repurchase — it is inapplicable when the owner of the land is
the builder, sower, or planter. In Pecson v. Court of Appeals, the Court
held that: Article 448 does not apply to a case where the owner of
the land is the builder, sower, or planter who then later loses
ownership of the land by sale or donation.

Article 448 is inapplicable in the present case because the Spouses

Narvaez built the commercial building on the land that they own.
Besides, to compel them to buy the land, which they own, would be
absurd.

60
 NEW REGENT SOURCES vs. TEOFILO TANJUATCO, JR.,
G.R. No. 168800               April 16, 2009

Facts:
Petitioner New Regent Sources, Inc. (NRSI) filed a Complaint for
Rescission/Declaration of Nullity of Contract, Reconveyance and
Damages against respondent Tanjuatco alleging that in 1994, it
authorized Vicente P. Cuevas III, its Chairman and President, to apply
on its behalf, for the acquisition of two parcels of land by virtue of its
right of accretion. Cuevas purportedly applied for the lots in his name.

In 1995, Cuevas and his wife executed a Voting Trust Agreement over
their shares of stock in the corporation. Cuevas then assigned his right
to Tanjuatco, after which a title was issued in his name. In his Answer
with Counterclaim, Tanjuatco claimed that it was Cuevas who was
alleged to have defrauded the corporation and averred further that the
complaint did not charge him with knowledge of the agreement between
Cuevas and NRSI. The trial court held that Tanjuatco is an innocent
purchaser for value.

Issue:
WON NRSI can claim the subject property base on the right of accretion

Held:
NO. Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the
Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that
the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that
it be the result of the action of the waters of the river; and (3) that the
land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.
Thus, it is not enough to be a riparian owner in order to enjoy the
benefits of accretion. One who claims the right of accretion must
show by preponderant evidence that he has met all the conditions
provided by law. Petitioner has notably failed in this regard as it did
not offer any evidence to prove that it has satisfied the foregoing
requisites.

61
 JOSE FERNANDO vs. LEON ACUNA
G.R. No. 161030               September 14, 2011

Facts:
The case involves a parcel of land registered in the names of Jose A.
Fernando, married to Lucila Tinio, and Antonia A. Fernando,
married to Felipe Galvez. When they died intestate, the property
remained undivided. Petitioners herein are the heirs and
successors-in-interest of the deceased registered owners. However,
petitioners failed to agree on the division of the subject property
amongst themselves, even after compulsory conciliation before the
Barangay Lupon. When petitioners filed a complaint for partition,
respondent Acuna filed an intervention alleging that the portion of
the property identified as Lot 1303.

Petitioner Norma Fernando claimed that they were only claiming Lot
1303 and Sapang Bayan and further testifying that Sapang Bayan
was supposedly included in Lot 1302 and was previously a river
until it dried up.

As for the ownership of Sapang Bayan, the trial court found that the
same had not been alleged in the pleadings nor raised as an issue
during the pre-trial conference. Also, according to the trial court,
the parties failed to clearly show whether Sapang Bayan was
previously a dry portion of either Lot 1302 or Lot 1303. Neither was
there any proof that Sapang Bayan was a river that just dried up or
that it was an accretion which the adjoining lots gradually received
from the effects of the current of water. It was likewise not
established who were the owners of the lots adjoining Sapang
Bayan. The trial court concluded that none of the parties had
clearly and sufficiently established their claims over Sapang Bayan.

Issue:
WON petitioner can claim Sapang Bayan by right of accretion.

Held:
NO. The SC held that petitioners failed to substantiate their
ownership over said area. However, we find that the Court of
Appeals erred in ruling that the principle of accretion is applicable.
The said principle is embodied in Article 457 of the Civil Code which
states that "to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers
belongs the accretion which they gradually receive from the
effects of the current of the waters." For Article 457 to apply
the following requisites must concur: (1) that the deposit be
gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the

62
effects of the current of the water; and (3) that the land where
accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers. The
character of the Sapang Bayan property was not shown to be of the
nature that is being referred to in the provision which is an
accretion known as alluvion as no evidence had been presented to
support this assertion.

Even assuming that Sapang Bayan was a dried-up creek bed, under
Article 420, paragraph 1 and Article 502, paragraph 1 of the Civil
Code, rivers and their natural beds are property of public dominion.
In the absence of any provision of law vesting ownership of the
dried-up river bed in some other person, it must continue to belong
to the State.

63
 REPUBLIC vs. ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS III,
G.R. No. 160453               November 12, 2012

Facts:
Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years,
respondent Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III applied for the registration of
Lot 4998-B. The property was bounded in the Northeast by Lot
4079 belonging to respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., in the
Southeast by the Parañaque River, in the Southwest by an
abandoned road, and in the Northwest by Lot 4998-A also owned by
Arcadio Ivan.

Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land registration to

include Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant because of the latter’s co-
ownership of the property. He alleged that the property had been
formed through accretion and had been in their joint open,
notorious, public, continuous and adverse possession for more than
30 years.

The City of Parañaque opposed the application for land registration,

stating that it needed the property for its flood control program; that
the property was within the legal easement of 20 meters from the
river bank; and that assuming that the property was not covered by
the legal easement, title to the property could not be registered in
favor of the applicants for the reason that the property was an
orchard that had dried up and had not resulted from accretion.

Issue:
WON respondents can acquire the subject land by right of accretion.

Held:
NO. Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that "to the owners of
lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the currents of the waters."
Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the
banks of rivers. The deposit of soil, to be considered accretion,
must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b) made through the effects
of the current of the water; and (c) taking place on land adjacent to
the banks of rivers.

Accordingly, respondents should establish the concurrence of the

elements of accretion to warrant the grant of their application for
land registration. However, respondents did not discharge their
burden of proof. They did not show that the gradual and

64
imperceptible deposition of soil through the effects of the current of
the river had formed Lot 4998-B. Instead, their evidence revealed
that the property was the dried-up river bed of the Parañaque River,
leading both the RTC and the CA to themselves hold that Lot 4998-
B was "the land which was previously part of the Parañaque River
xxx and became an orchard after it dried up."

The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up river bed
as an accretion that became respondents’ property pursuant to
Article 457 of the Civil Code. That land was definitely not an
accretion. The process of drying up of a river to form dry land
involved the recession of the water level from the river banks, and
the dried-up land did not equate to accretion, which was the
gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil on the river banks
through the effects of the current. In accretion, the water level did
not recede and was more or less maintained. Hence, respondents as
the riparian owners had no legal right to claim ownership of Lot
4998-B.

*****************************************

By law, accretion - the gradual and imperceptible deposit made

through the effects of the current of the water- belongs to the owner
of the land adjacent to the banks of rivers where it forms. The
drying up of the river is not accretion. Hence, the dried-up river bed
belongs to the State as property of public dominion, not to the
riparian owner, unless a law vests the ownership in some other
person.

65
 RICARDO PARDELL vs. GASPAR DE BARTOLOME
G.R. No. L-4656            November 18, 1912

Facts:
Defendant Bartolome alleged in his complaint that plaintiff, Vicenta
Ortiz, and the defendant, Matilde Ortiz, are the duly recognized natural
daughters of the spouses Miguel and Calixta Ortiz. They inherited from
their mother Calixta some personal property, jewelry and real property.

The defendants, without judicial authorization, nor friendly or

extrajudicial agreement, took upon themselves the administration and
enjoyment of the said properties and collected the rents, fruits, and
products thereof, to the serious detriment of the plaintiffs' Pardell
interest. Notwithstanding the different and repeated demands
extrajudicially made upon Matilde Ortiz to divide the aforementioned
properties with the plaintiff Vicenta and to deliver to the latter the one-
half thereof, together with one-half of the fruits and rents collected
therefrom, the said defendant and her husband, the self-styled
administrator of the properties mentioned, had been delaying the
partition and delivery of the said properties by means of unkept
promises and other excuses; and that the plaintiffs, on account of the
extraordinary delay in the delivery of one-half of said properties, or their
value in cash, as the case might be, had suffered losses and damages.

Matilde Ortiz and her husband occupied the upper story, designed for
use as a dwelling, in the house of joint ownership; but the record shows
no proof that, by so doing, the said Matilde occasioned any detriment to
the interest of the community property, nor that she prevented her
sister Vicenta from utilizing the said upper story according to her rights.
It is to be noted that the stores of the lower floor were rented and
accounting of the rents was duly made to the plaintiffs.

Issue:
WON

Held:
Each co-owner of realty held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the
whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no other
limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners,
for the reason that, until a division be made, the respective part of each
holder can not be determined and every one of the co-owners exercises,
together with his other co-participants, joint ownership over the pro
indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same.

The defendant Matilde, therefore, in occupying with her husband

the upper floor of the said house, did not injure the interests of her
co-owner, her sister Vicenta, nor did she prevent the latter from

66
living therein, but merely exercised a legitimate right pertaining to
her as co-owner of the property. Notwithstanding the above
statements relative to the joint-ownership rights which entitled the
defendants to live in the upper story of the said house, yet in view of the
fact that the record shows it to have been proved that the defendant
Matilde's husband, Gaspar de Bartolome, occupied for four years a
room or a part of the lower floor of the same house on Calle Escolta,
using it as an office for the justice of the peace, a position which he held
in the capital of that province, strict justice, requires that he pay his
sister-in-law, the plaintiff, one half of the monthly rent which the said
quarters could have produced, had they been leased to another person.

Even as the husband of the defendant co-owner of the property, he had

no right to occupy and use gratuitously the said part of the lower floor
of the house in question, where he lived with his wife, to the detriment
of the plaintiff Vicenta who did not receive one-half of the rent which
those quarters could and should have produced, had they been
occupied by a stranger, in the same manner that rent was obtained
from the rooms on the lower floor that were used as stores. Therefore,
the defendant Bartolome must pay to the plaintiff Vicenta P384, that is,
one-half of P768, the total amount of the rents which should have been
obtained during four years from the quarters occupied as an office by
the justice of the peace of Vigan.

67
 JOSE S. DAILISAN, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 176448               July 28, 2008

Facts:
Petitioner filed a Complaint for partition alleging that he
purchased 1/4 of the land of Federico Pugao identified as Lot 16
in Bago Bantay, Quezon City covered by a TCT. According to
petitioner, he had paid Federico several installments which
totaled to P6,000. When the mortgage was released, petitioner
demanded the execution of adeed of absolute sale. Instead,
Federico proposed to mortgage the property to petitioner as
security for a P10,000 loan, payable in 3 months, and upon
payment of the loanthe deed of absolute sale would be executed.

When petitioner asked for the partition of the lot Federico

refused and even sent a notice of eviction against petitioner.
According to Federico, he allowed petitioner and his niece to
occupy one 1/4 of his lot, and admitted that he executed in favor
of petitioner a deed of real estate mortgage. The loan was paid,
mortgage cancelled.

Federico alleged that petitioner made him sign pages of what the
former told him to be parts of the real estate mortgage. He filed a
complaint for falsification and ejectment against petitioner. He
passed away while this case was pending before the trial court.

RTC found that respondents failed to disprove the validity of the

deed of absolute sale, ruled in favor of petitioner and ordered the
partition of the subject property. MR was denied. On appeal, CA
granted and noted that petitioner should have filed an action for
specific performance to compel Federico to honor the deed of
absolute sale; but had already expired. CA noted that petitioner"
filed the instant action for partition simply because it is not
barred by prescription. "It ruled that the sale was void because
there is no consent and that there was no proof of payment of
the price or consideration. MR was denied.

Issue:
WON the deed of absolute sale is valid.

Held:

68
The notarized deed of absolute sale is a public document, and
has in its favor the presumption of regularity which may only be
rebutted by evidence so clear, strong and convincing as to
exclude all controversy as to the falsity of the certificate. The
burden of proof to overcome the presumption of due execution of
a notarized document lies on the party contesting such
execution.

Petitioner’s action before the trial court was properly captioned

as one for partition because there are sufficient allegations in
the complaint that he is a co-owner of the property. The regime
of co-ownership exists when ownership of an undivided thing or
right belongs to different persons. By the nature of a co-
ownership, a co-owner cannot point to a specific portion of the
property owned in common as his own because his share therein
remains intangible.

The description "undivided 1/4 portion" shows that the portion

sold is still undivided and not sufficiently identified. While the
description provides a guide for identifying the location of the lot
sold, there was no indication of its exact metes and bounds. This
is the reason why petitioner was constrained to cause the survey
of the property. As a co-owner of the property, therefore,
petitioner has the right to demand partition, aright which does
not prescribe.
 
Ownership of the thing sold is acquired only from the time
of delivery, either actual or constructive. Article 1498 provides
that when the sale is made through a public instrument, the
execution shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is
the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not
appear or cannot be inferred. The Court notes that Federico had
already delivered the portion he sold to petitioner, subject to the
execution of a technical survey, when he executed the deed of
absolute sale, which is a public instrument.

69
 LEONOR B. CRUZ vs. TEOFILA M. CATAPANG
G.R. No. 164110             February 12, 2008

Facts:
Petitioner Leonor B. Cruz, Luz Cruz and Norma Maligaya are the
co-owners of a parcel of land. With the consent of Norma
Maligaya, one of the aforementioned co-owners, respondent
Catapang built a house on a lot adjacent to the abovementioned
parcel of land. The house intruded, however, on a portion of the
co-owned property.

Petitioner Leonor visited the property and was surprised to see a

part of respondent’s house intruding unto a portion of the co-
owned property. Despite several demands to demolish the
intruding structure and to vacate the portion encroaching on
their property, respondent refused and disregarded the same.

Petitioner filed a complaint for forcible entry against respondent

before MCTC. The MCTC decided in favor of petitioner, ruling
that consent of only one of the co-owners is not sufficient to
justify defendant’s construction of the house and possession of
the portion of the lot in question.

On appeal, the CA held that there is no cause of action for

forcible entry in this case because respondent’s entry into the
property, considering the consent given by co-owner Norma
Maligaya, cannot be characterized as one made through strategy
or stealth which gives rise to a cause of action for forcible entry.
The Court of Appeals’ decision further held that petitioner’s
remedy is not an action for ejectment but an entirely different
recourse with the appropriate forum.

Issue:
WON consent given by a co-owner of a parcel of land to a person
to construct a house on the co-owned property warrants the
dismissal of a forcible entry case filed by another co-owner
against that person.

Held:
NO. The SC held that a co-owner cannot devote common
property to his or her exclusive use to the prejudice of the co-

70
ownership. In our view, a co-owner cannot give valid consent to
another to build a house on the co-owned property, which is an
act tantamount to devoting the property to his or her exclusive
use

Article 486 states each co-owner may use the thing owned in
common provided he does so in accordance with the purpose for
which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the
interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from
using it according to their rights. Giving consent to a third
person to construct a house on the co-owned property will
injure the interest of the co-ownership and prevent other co-
owners from using the property in accordance with their
rights.

Under Article 491, none of the co-owners shall, without the

consent of the others, make alterations in the thing owned in
common. It necessarily follows that none of the co-owners can,
without the consent of the other co-owners, validly consent
to the making of an alteration by another person, such as
respondent, in the thing owned in common. Alterations
include any act of strict dominion or ownership and any
encumbrance or disposition has been held implicitly to be an act
of alteration. The construction of a house on the co-owned
property is an act of dominion. Therefore, it is an alteration
falling under Article 491 of the Civil Code. There being no
consent from all co-owners, respondent had no right to
construct her house on the co-owned property.

Consent of only one co-owner will not warrant the dismissal

of the complaint for forcible entry filed against the builder.
The consent given by Norma Maligaya in the absence of the
consent of petitioner and Luz Cruz did not vest upon respondent
any right to enter into the co-owned property. Her entry into the
property still falls under the classification "through strategy or
stealth."

71
 NIEVES PLASABAS & MARCOS MALAZARTE vs. CA
G.R. No. 166519               March 31, 2009

Facts:
Petitioners filed a complaint for recovery of title to property
against respondents Dominador Lumen and Aurora Aunzo. The
property subject of the case was a parcel of coconut land
declared under Tax Declaration in the name of petitioner Nieves.
In their complaint, petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered
confirming their rights and legal title to the subject property and
ordering the respondents to vacate the occupied portion.

Respondents, for their part, denied petitioners’ allegation of

ownership and possession of the premises, and interposed, as
their main defense, that the subject land was inherited by all the
parties from their common ancestor, Francisco Plasabas.

Revealed in the course of the trial was that petitioner Nieves,

contrary to her allegations in the complaint, was not the sole
and absolute owner of the land. Based on the testimonies of
petitioners’ witnesses, the property passed on from Francisco to
his son, Leoncio; then to Jovita Talam, petitioner Nieves’
grandmother; then to Antonina Talam, her mother; and then to
her and her siblings—Jose, Victor and Victoria.

In its decision, the trial court held that Marcos Malazarte and
Nieves Plasabas Malazarte have no complete legal personality to
sue by themselves alone without joining the brothers and sisters
of Nieves who are as INDISPENSABLE as the latter in the final
determination of the case. They are that indispensable that a
final decree would necessarily affect their rights, so that the
Court cannot proceed without their presence.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC explaining

that the non-joinder of the indispensable parties would violate
the principle of due process, and that Article 487 of the Civil
Code could not be applied considering that the complaint was
not for ejectment, but for recovery of title or a reinvindicatory
action.

Issue:

72
WON Article 487 of the Civil Code is applicable.

Held:
YES. Article 487 of the Civil Code provides that any one of
the co-owners may bring an action for ejectment. The article
covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession,
including an accion publiciana and a reinvindicatory action. A
co-owner may file suit without necessarily joining all the
other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed
to be instituted for the benefit of all. Any judgment of the
court in favor of the plaintiff will benefit the other co-owners, but
if the judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights
of the unimpleaded co-owners.

Thus, petitioners, in their complaint, do not have to implead

their co-owners as parties. The only exception to this rule is
when the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who
claims to be the sole owner and is, thus, entitled to the
possession thereof. In such a case, the action will not prosper
unless the plaintiff impleads the other co-owners who are
indispensable parties.

Here, the allegation of petitioners in their complaint that they

are the sole owners of the property in litigation is immaterial,
considering that they acknowledged during the trial that the
property is co-owned by Nieves and her siblings, and that
petitioners have been authorized by the co-owners to pursue the
case on the latter’s behalf. Impleading the other co-owners is,
therefore, not mandatory, because, as mentioned earlier, the suit
is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all.

73
 REPUBLIC vs. HEIRS OF FRANCISCA DIGNOS-SORONO
G.R. No. 171571               March 24, 2008

Facts:
The case involves two (2) lots which were adjudicated by the courts in
four (4) equal shares. However, the subject lots were not partitioned by
the adjudicatees. It appears that the heirs of Tito Dignos, one of the
adjudicates, sold their share to Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA)
via a public instrument entitled "Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale"
executed, without the knowledge of respondents whose predecessors-in-
interest were the adjudicatees of the rest of the - portion of the two lots.

In 1996, CAA's successor-in-interest, the Mactan Cebu International

Airport Authority (MCIAA), erected a security fence traversing Lot No.
2316 and relocated a number of families, who had built their dwellings
within the airport perimeter, to a portion of said lot to enhance airport
security in line with the standards set by the International Civil Aviation
Organization and the Federal Aviation Authority. Respondents soon
asked the agents of MCIAA to cease giving third persons permission to
occupy the lots but the same was ignored.

Thereupon, respondents filed a complaint for Quieting of Title, Legal

Redemption with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against
MCIAA alleging that the existence of the tax declarations "would cast a
cloud on their valid and existing titles" to the lots. Respondents further
alleged that neither they nor their predecessors-in-interests sold,
alienated or disposed of their shares in the lots of which they have been
in continuous peaceful possession. Respondents furthermore alleged
that neither petitioner nor its predecessor-in-interest had given them
any written notice of its acquisition of the - share of Tito Dignos.

Issue:
WON petitioner can dispose their share.

Held:
YES. Under Article 493 of the Civil Code, it provides that “each co-
owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment,
except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation
of the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the
portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership.”

74
Petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest CAA thus acquired only the rights
pertaining to the sellers-heirs of Tito Dignos, which is only ¼ undivided
share of the two lots.

TIRSO D. MONTEROSO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 105608             April 30, 2008

Facts:
Don Fabian B. Monteroso, Sr., a former justice of the peace and
municipal mayor of Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, married twice
and sired eight children, four from each union. Out of this marriage
were born Soledad, Reygula, Benjamin, and Tirso. While from his
second marriage, his children were Florenda, Reynato, Alberto, and
Fabian, Jr. Don Fabian passed away on October 26, 1948.

The children of the late Benjamin D. Monteroso, filed a Complaint

for Recovery of Property with Damages against their uncle, Tirso D.
Monteroso alleging that Tirso, was entrusted with the above-
described one-fourth portion of Parcel F-4 as part of the share from
the estate of Soledad D. Monteroso allotted to their father. However,
their uncle refused to surrender and deliver the same when they
demanded such delivery upon their reaching the majority age. Tirso
countered that the portion pertaining to Benjamin was never
entrusted to him; it was in the possession of their sister, Soledad
Monteroso-Cagampang, who was not entitled to any share in Parcel
F-4, having previously opted to exchange her share in said property
for another parcel of land, then being occupied by her.

Tirso, in turn, filed a Complaint for Partition and Damages with

Receivership involving 12 parcels of land against his stepmother,
Pendejito, and all his full and half-siblings and/or their
representatives. The complaint was subsequently amended to
include Perfecto, as co-defendant, and Pendejito, as guardian ad
litem for the minor children of Fabian P. Monteroso, Jr., who died in
1970 after the filing of the complaint.

Issue:
WON Tirso can demand partition.

Held:
YES. Partition is the proper remedy for compulsory or legal heirs to
get their legitime or share of the inheritance from the decedent. An
action for partition is at once an action for declaration of co-
ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate
portion of the properties involved.

75
Being a compulsory heir of Don Fabian, Tirso has the right to
compel partition of the properties comprising the intestate
estate of Don Fabian as a measure to get his hereditary share.
His right as an heir to a share of the inheritance covers all the
properties comprising the intestate estate of Don Fabian at the
moment of his death. Before partition and eventual distribution of
Don Fabian’s intestate estate, a regime of co-ownership among the
compulsory heirs existed over the undivided estate of Don Fabian.
Being a co-owner of that intestate estate, Tirso’s right over a
share thereof is imprescriptible. As a matter of law, acquisitive
prescription does not apply nor set in against compulsory heirs
insofar as their pro-indiviso share or legitime is concerned,
unless said heirs repudiate their share. Contrary to petitioners’
stance, reconveyance is not the proper remedy available to Tirso. Be
it remembered in this regard that Tirso is not asserting total
ownership rights over the subject properties, but only insofar as his
legitime from the intestate estate of his father, Don Fabian, is
concerned.

Acquisitive prescription, however, may still set in in favor of a co-

owner, "where there exists a clear repudiation of the co-
ownership, and the co-owners are apprised of the claim of
adverse and exclusive ownership." In the instant case, however,
no extinctive or acquisitive prescription has set in against Tirso and
other compulsory heirs in favor of the Cagampang spouses because
effective repudiation had not timely been made against the former.
As aptly put by the appellate court, the repudiation which must be
clear and open as to amount to an express disavowal of the co-
ownership relation happened not when the deeds of absolute sale
were executed in 1939, as these could not have amounted to a clear
notice to the other heirs, but in 1961 when the Cagampang spouses
refused upon written demand by Tirso for the partition and
distribution of the intestate estate of Don Fabian. Since then, Tirso
was deemed apprised of the repudiation by the Cagampang
spouses.

76
 JOAQUIN QUIMPO, SR., vs. CONSUELO ABAD
G.R. No. 160956             February 13, 2008

Facts:
Eustaquia Perfecto-Abad (Eustaquia) was the owner of several
parcels of land in Goa, Camarines Sur. She died intestate in
1948 and leaving these parcels of land to her grandchild and
great grandchildren, namely, Joaquin Quimpo and respondents
Consuelo, Ireneo, Danilo, Marites, Anita and Helen, all
surnamed Abad. In 1966, Joaquin and respondents undertook
an oral partition of San Jose property and parcel IV. However, no
document of partition was executed, because Joaquin refused to
execute a deed. Consuelo and Ireneo occupied their respective
shares in the San Jose property, and installed several tenants
over their share in parcel IV. Joaquin, on the other hand,
became the administrator of the remaining undivided properties
and of the shares of respondents Danilo, Marites, Anita and
Helen, who were still minors at that time.

In 1989, Danilo, Marites, Anita and Helen wanted to take

possession of the portions allotted to them, but Joaquin
prevented them from occupying the same. Joaquin also refused
to heed respondents’ demand for partition of parcels I and II,
prompting respondents to file a complaint for judicial partition
and/or recovery of possession with accounting and damages.

Joaquin denied the material allegations in the complaint, and

averred, as his special and affirmative defenses, lack of cause of
action and prescription. He asserted absolute ownership over
parcels III and IV, claiming that he purchased these lands from
Eustaquia in 1946 and that he has been in continuous, peaceful
and adverse possession of these lots since 1946, and alleged
that Consuelo’s occupation of the portion of the San Jose
property was by mere tolerance.

The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondents, declaring

them as co-owners of all the properties left by Eustaquia. It
rejected Joaquin’s claim of absolute ownership over parcels III
and IV, and declared void the purported deeds of sale executed
by Eustaquia for lack of consideration and consent. The court

77
found that at the time of the execution of these deeds, Joaquin
was not gainfully employed and had no known source of income,
which shows that the deeds of sale state a false and fictitious
consideration. Likewise, Eustaquia could not have possibly given
her consent to the sale because she was already 91 years old at
that time. The RTC also sustained the oral partition among the
heirs in 1966. It held that Joaquin and his heirs are now
estopped from claiming ownership over the entire San Jose
property as well as over parcel IV.

Issue:
WON laches has time–barred the respondents from assailing the
absolute ownership over the subject parcels of land.

Held:
NO. The SC affirmed the CA ruling that respondents are co-
owners of the subject four (4) parcels of land, having inherited
the same from a common ancestor – Eustaquia Perfecto-Abad.
Petitioners’ assertion that respondents failed to prove their
relationship to the late Eustaquia deserves scant consideration.

Consuelo was the grandchild of Eustaquia, while respondents

Danilo, Helen, Marites, Anita and also Joaquin Quimpo were
Eustaquia’s great grandchildren. As such, respondents can
rightfully ask for the confirmation of the oral partition over
parcels III and IV, and the partition of parcels I and II.
Jurisprudence is replete with rulings that any co-owner may
demand at any time the partition of the common property
unless a co-owner has repudiated the co-ownership. This
action for partition does not prescribe and is not subject to
laches.

78
 BETTY B. LACBAYAN vs. BAYANI S. SAMOY, JR.
G.R. No. 165427               March 21, 2011

Facts:
During their illicit relationship, petitioner Lacbayan and
respondent Samoy Jr., together with three more incorporators,
were able to establish a manpower services company. Five
parcels of land were also acquired during the said period and
were registered in petitioner and respondent’s names, ostensibly
as husband and wife. Eventually, however, their relationship
turned sour and they decided to part ways sometime in 1991.

In 1998, both parties agreed to divide the said properties and

terminate their business partnership by executing a Partition
Agreement. However, when petitioner wanted additional
demands to be included in the partition agreement, respondent
refused. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for
judicial partition.

In resolving the issue on ownership, the RTC decided to give

considerable weight to petitioner’s own admission that the
properties were acquired not from her own personal funds but
from the income of the manpower services company over which
she owns a measly 3.33% share.

Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA asserting that

she is the pro indiviso owner of one-half of the properties in
dispute. Petitioner argued that the trial court’s decision
subjected the certificates of title over the said properties to
collateral attack contrary to law and jurisprudence. Petitioner
also contended that it is improper to thresh out the issue on
ownership in an action for partition.

Issue:
WON petitioner is a co-owner of the property sought to be
partitioned.

Held:
NO. There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot
be collaterally attacked, but that rule is not material to the case

79
at bar. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate
of title and not the title itself. The certificate referred to is
that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the
TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by law means ownership
which is, more often than not, represented by that document.
Petitioner apparently confuses title with the certificate of title.
Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the
certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both
are interchangeably used.

Moreover, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the

Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no
longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate
of title, the latter only serving as the best proof of
ownership over a piece of land. The certificate cannot always
be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership. In fact, mere
issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does
not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under
co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate, or that
the registrant may only be a trustee, or that other parties may
have acquired interest over the property subsequent to the
issuance of the certificate of title. Needless to say, registration
does not vest ownership over a property, but may be the
best evidence thereof.

80
 AURORA L. TECSON vs. MINERVA & MARIA FRANCISCO
G.R. No. 180683               June 1, 2011

Facts:
Atty. Agustin Fausto acquired in co-ownership with his sister,
Waldetrudes Fausto-Nadela a certain parcel of land (Lot 2189) in
Pagadian City, Zamboanga Del Sur. Atty. Fausto constructed his house
on a portion of the said lot. Following a cadastral proceeding, Atty.
Fausto and Waldetrudes were recognized as co-owners of the subject
lot, but not long after, they decided to partition Lot 2189. To formalized
their decision, they executed an Agreement of Partition stating that
Waldetrudes was to be given absolute ownership over Lot 2189-A, while
Atty. Fausto was to be conferred separate dominion over Lot 2189-B.
This Partition Agreement, however, was never registered with the
Register of Deeds.

When Atty. Fausto died, he was survived by herein respondents, who

are his wife and children. After which, Waldetrudes entered into a
Contract to Sell with herein petitioner Tecson. In it, Waldetrudes
undertook to sell, among others, her "ideal share" in Lot 2189 to Aurora
upon full payment of the purchase price. In 1980, a new title on the
subject property was issued in the name of Atty. Tecson.

In 1987, respondents filed a Complaint for the Declaration of Nullity of

Documents, Titles, Reconveyance against Waldetrudes and the
petitioners. In essence, the respondents seek the recovery of four
hundred fifty-seven (457) square meters of land, which they believe was
unlawfully taken from the lawful share of their predecessor-in-interest,
Atty. Fausto, in Lot 2189.

Issue:
WON Atty. Fausto and Waldetrudes were co-owners of the subject
property.

Held:
YES. The SC held that Waldetrudes and Atty. Fausto are, indeed, co-
owners of Lot 2189, thus, have equal shares in the said lot. There was
likewise no evidence behind the petitioners’ allegation that the
registered co-ownership between Waldetrudes and Atty. Fausto was
based on their actual occupancy of Lot 2189. On the contrary, OCT No.
734 categorically states that Waldetrudes and Atty. Fausto are co-
owners "in undivided share" of Lot 2189. The conspicuous silence of
OCT No. 734 as to the definite extent of the respective shares of Atty.
Fausto and Waldetrudes in Lot 2189 gives rise to a presumption that

81
they are in equal measure. Under Article 485 of the Civil Code, the
portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership shall be
presumed equal, unless the contrary is proved.

HEIRS OF ALBINA G. AMPIL vs. TERESA & MARIO MANAHAN

G.R. No. 175990               October 11, 2012

Facts:
Exequiel G. Ampil, as representative of the heirs of the late Albina G.
Ampil, filed a complaint for ejectment against spouses Manahan,
Teresita Manahan, Almario Manahan, Irene Manahan and all persons
claiming rights under them. In the complaint, it was alleged that Albina
was the owner of two (2) adjoining residential lots and asserted that
during her lifetime, Albina allowed Perfecto and his family to occupy a
portion of the said properties on the condition that they would vacate
the same should the need to use it arise. After the death of Albina in
1986, her heirs, represented by Exequiel, requested Perfecto and family
to vacate the property in question but the latter refused.

Respondents averred that the lots they had been occupying belonged to
them, their predecessor-in-interest having been in peaceful and
continuous possession thereof in the concept of an owner since time
immemorial and that Albina was never the owner of the property.

Aggrieved, respondents Teresa Manahan and Mario Manahan appealed

their case before the CA who then reversed and set aside the RTC
Decision and dismissed the case for unlawful detainer. It ruled that tax
declarations and receipts are not conclusive proof of ownership or right
of possession over a piece of land and it only becomes strong evidence
of ownership when accompanied by proof of actual possession.

Petitioners aver that their claim of ownership over the disputed lots was
not solely based on tax declarations but also anchored on the
Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by Perfecto, where he categorically
admitted that the said lots were owned by Albina Ampil. Respondents,
on the other hand, move for the dismissal of the petition for being
defective in form. They question the special power of attorney submitted
by Exequiel because it neither shows that the persons who executed the
said affidavit were the real heirs of Albina nor does it authorize him to
institute the petition.

Issue:
WON Exequiel can file the complaint on behalf of his co-heirs.

Held:
YES. Article 487 of the Civil Code provides that anyone of the co-owners
may bring an action for ejectment without joining the others. The action
is not limited to ejectment cases but includes all kinds of suits for

82
recovery of possession because the suit is presumed to have been
instituted for the benefit of all.

In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties

in interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and the
relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind
of action for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of
the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery
of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other
co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary
parties, for a complete relief can be afforded in the suit even without
their participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the
benefit of all co-owners.

In the case at bench, the complaint clearly stated that the disputed
property was held in common by the petitioners; and that the action
was brought to recover possession of the lots from respondents for the
benefit of all the heirs of Albina. Hence, Exequiel, a co-owner, may
bring the action for unlawful detainer even without the special
power of attorney of his co-heirs, for a complete relief can be
accorded in the suit even without their participation because the
suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all the co-owners.

*******************************************

Well established is the rule that ownership over the land cannot be
acquired by mere occupation. While it is true that tax declarations are
not conclusive evidence of ownership, they, nevertheless, constitute at
least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. It
strengthens one's bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.

83
 CAROLINA (CARLINA) VDA. DE FIGURACION vs.
EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA,
G.R. No. 151334               February 13, 2013

Facts:
Petitioner Carolina is the surviving spouse of Leandro Figuracion who
died intestate in May 1958. The other petitioners and respondent Emilia
were Carolina and Leandro’s children. Subject of the dispute are two
parcels of land which were acquired by Leandro during his lifetime.
Leandro executed a Deed of Quitclaim over the above real properties in
favor of his six (6) children. Their shares, however, were not delineated
with particularity because spouses Leandro and Carolina reserved the
lots and its fruits for their expenses. On the other hand, Lot No. 707
was originally owned by Eulalio Adviento. From his first marriage, he
begot Agripina Adviento with his first wife Marcela Estioko, whom
Eulalio survived. When he remarried, Eulalio had another daughter,
herein petitioner Carolina, with his second wife, Faustina Escabesa.

In 1961, Agripina executed a Deed of Quitclaim over the eastern half of

Lot No. 707 in favor of her niece, herein respondent Emilia. Petitioner
Carolina then executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication adjudicating
unto herself the entire Lot No. 707 as the sole and exclusive heir of her
deceased parents, Eulalio and Faustina. On the same date, Carolina
also executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over Lot No. 707 in favor of
petitioners Hilaria and Felipa, who in turn immediately the issuance of
new title in their names.

In 1971, Emilia and her family went to the United States and returned
to the Philippines only in 1981. Upon her return and relying on the
Deed of Quitclaim, she built a house on the eastern half of Lot No. 707.
However, in 1994, Hilaria and her agents threatened to demolish the
house of Emilia who, in retaliation, was prompted to seek the partition
of Lot No. 707 as well as Lot Nos. 2299 and 705.

In opposition, the petitioners averred that respondent’s cause of action

had long prescribed and that she is guilty of laches hence, now
estopped from bringing the suit and an action for partition is no longer
tenable because Felipa and Hilaria have already acquired rights adverse
to that claimed by respondent Emilia and the same amount to a
repudiation of the alleged co-ownership.

Issue:
WON respondent’s right to demand for partition was barred by
acquisitive prescription or laches.

84
Held:
NO. Co-heirs or co-owners cannot acquire by acquisitive
prescription the share of the other co-heirs or co-owners absent a
clear repudiation of the co ownership. The act of repudiation, as a
mode of terminating co-ownership, is subject to certain conditions, to
wit: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of
repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners; (3) the
evidence thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in
possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession of the property for the period required by law.

The respondent built her house on the eastern portion of the lot in
1981 without any opposition from the petitioners. Hilaria also paid
realty taxes on the lot, in behalf of the respondent, for the years 1983-
1987. These events indubitably show that Hilaria and Felipa failed to
assert exclusive title in themselves adversely to Emilia. Their acts
clearly manifest that they recognized the subsistence of their co-
ownership with respondent Emilia despite the issuance of TCT No.
42244 in 1962. Their acts constitute an implied recognition of the
co-ownership which in turn negates the presence of a clear notice
of repudiation to the respondent. To sustain a plea of prescription, it
must always clearly appear that one who was originally a joint
owner has repudiated the claims of his co-owners, and that his co-
owners were apprised or should have been apprised of his claim of
adverse and exclusive ownership before the alleged prescriptive
period began to run.

Prescription can only produce all its effects when acts of ownership, or
in this case, possession, do not evince any doubt as to the ouster of the
rights of the other co-owners. Hence, prescription among co-owners
cannot take place when acts of ownership exercised are vague or
uncertain. Moreover, the evidence relative to the possession, as a fact
upon which the alleged prescription is based, must be clear,
complete and conclusive in order to establish said prescription
without any shadow of doubt; and when upon trial it is not shown
that the possession of the claimant has been adverse and exclusive and
opposed to the rights of the others, the case is not one of ownership,
and partition will lie. The petitioners failed to muster adequate
evidence of possession essential for the reckoning of the 10-year
period for acquisitive prescription.

Anent laches, the Court finds it unavailing in this case in view of the
proximity of the period when the co-ownership was expressly
repudiated and when the herein complaint was filed. It cannot be used
to defeat justice or perpetrate fraud and injustice. Neither should its
application be used to prevent the rightful owners of a property from

85
recovering what has been fraudulently registered in the name of
another.

RAMON ARANDA vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 172331               August 24, 2011

Facts:
The ICTSI Warehousing Inc. (ICTSI-WI) represented by its Chairman,
Enrique K Razon, filed for a petition for the original registration of a
parcel of land situated in San Andres, Malvar, Batangas known as the
Malvar Cadastre. The Republic through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) filed its opposition on grounds that the land applied for
is part of the public domain and the applicant has not acquired a
registrable title thereto under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No.
141 as amended by Republic Act No. 6940.

ICTSI-WI sought leave of court to amend the application. The trial court
admitted the Amended Application for Registration of Title, this time
filed in the name of Ramon Aranda, herein petitioner. Petitioner prayed
that should the Land Registration Act be not applicable to this case, he
invokes the liberal provisions of Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No.
141, as amended, having been in continuous possession of the subject
land in the concept of owner, publicly, openly and adversely for more
than thirty (30) years prior to the filing of the application.

In support of the application, petitioner’s sister testified that in 1965

her father donated the subject land to his brother (petitioner), as
evidenced by documents "Pagpapatunay ng Pagkakaloob ng Lupa"
which she and her siblings executed. His brother did not introduce any
permanent improvement and also did not hire a tenant to work on the
land. As to the donation made by his father to his brother Ramon, she
recalled there was such a document but it was eaten by rats.

Issue:
WON petitioner has proved its possession over the subject land.

Held:
NO. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive
act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of
Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The
applicant may also secure a certification from the Government that the
lands applied for are alienable and disposable.

Petitioner has not explained the discrepancies in the dates of

classification mentioned in the foregoing government certifications.

86
Consequently, the status of the land applied for as alienable and
disposable was not clearly established.

Petitioner presented tax declarations and the deeds of confirmation of

the 1946 sale from the original owner (Lucio Olan) to Anatalio Aranda
and the 1965 donation made by the latter in favor of petitioner. While,
as a rule, tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not
conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless they are good indicia of
possession in the concept of owner, for no one in his right mind would
be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive
possession – they constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of
title over the property.

Petitioner likewise failed to prove the alleged possession of his

predecessors-in-interest. There is also no showing that Anatalio Aranda
declared the property in his name from the time he bought it from Lucio
Olan. And even assuming that Lucio actually planted rice and corn on
the land, such statement is not sufficient to establish possession in the
concept of owner as contemplated by law. Mere casual cultivation of the
land does not amount to exclusive and notorious possession that would
give rise to ownership. Specific acts of dominion must be clearly shown
by the applicant.

We have held that a person who seeks the registration of title to a piece
of land on the basis of possession by himself and his predecessors-in-
interest must prove his claim by clear and convincing evidence,
i.e., he must prove his title and should not rely on the absence or
weakness of the evidence of the oppositors. Furthermore, the court has
the bounden duty, even in the absence of any opposition, to require the
petitioner to show, by a preponderance of evidence and by positive and
absolute proof, so far as possible, that he is the owner in fee simple of
the lands which he is attempting to register. Since petitioner failed to
meet the quantum of proof required by law, the CA was correct in
reversing the trial court and dismissing his application for judicial
confirmation of title.

87
 SPS. DECALENG vs. BISHOP OF THE MISSIONARY
G.R. No. 171209               June 27, 2012

Facts:
Respondent Bishop of the Missionary otherwise known as the Philippine
Episcopal Church (PEC) was previously composed of five (5) dioceses,
one of them was the Episcopal Diocese of Northern Philippines. In 1992,
PEC-EDNP filed a complaint for Accion Reinvindicatoria and Accion
Publiciana against petitioner Spouses Decaleng alleging that it is the
owner of two (2) parcels of land known as Ken-geka and Ken-gedeng.

According to PEC-EDNP, Ken-geka property was acquired by virtue of a

sales patent issued by the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands
and under Land Registration Act, both in 1915. On the other hand,
Ken-gendeng has been occupied by its predecessors-in-interest openly,
adversely, continuously and notoriously since 1901.

In their answer, spouses Decaleng claimed that they acquired the

subject properties as inheritance from their parents on the occasion of
their marriage. They also asserted that their predecessors-in-interest
had been in possession of the subject properties continuously, actually,
notoriously, publicly, adversely and in the concept of an owner, since
time immemorial or at least, certainly for more than 50 years. Moreover,
spouses Decaleng had been in peaceful and undisturbed possession of
the subject properties until PEC-EDNP surreptitiously moved the
existing perimeter fence and encroached upon 240 square meters of
their properties.

The RTC held that respondent Church is not the owner of the subject
properties and has no right of possession of the subject parcels better
than that of the petitioners who are the present de facto possessors.
Corollarily, the former can neither recover ownership, which said right
it never had from the very beginning, of the lots in question from the
latter; nor possessions thereof, by the same token, either as an element
of, or independent of ownership.

On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC’s decision and declared PEC-EDNP

the true and real owner of the Ken-geka and Ken-gedeng properties.

Issue:
WON PEC-EDNP was able to establish its ownership over the subject
properties

Held:

88
YES. An accion reinvindicatoria is an action to recover ownership
over real property. Article 434 of the New Civil Code provides that to
successfully maintain an action to recover the ownership of a real
property, the person who claims a better right to it must prove two
things: first, the identity of the land claimed by describing the location,
area, and boundaries thereof; and second, his title thereto. The Court
finds that PEC-EDNP was able to successfully prove both requisites by
preponderance of evidence, both documentary and testimonial.

The identity of the properties over which PEC-EDNP asserts ownership

is well-established. The Ken-geka property is covered by Certificate of
Title No. 1, while the Ken-gedeng property is identified as Lot 3 of
Survey Plan PSU-118424. PEC-EDNP likewise proved its title to the
Ken-geka and Ken-gedeng properties. PEC-EDNP’s officers, priests, and
employees, as well as the Sagada residents testified as to actual
possession by PEC-EDNP of the Ken-geka and Ken-gedeng properties by
the introduction of improvements such as permanent buildings, pine
trees, fruit trees, and vegetable gardens thereon.

The testimonial and documentary evidence of the respondent was

sufficient, clear and competent in establishing its absolute ownership
and actual possession of the disputed areas which were within its
properties. Moreover, the respondent’s tax declarations, although not
proof of ownership, were strong evidence of ownership for being coupled
with possession for a period sufficient for prescription. In sum, the
respondent’s documentary evidence was overwhelming.

It is apt to observe that actual possession of an owner did not need

to be the actual and physical possession and occupation of every
inch or portion of the property. Constructive possession is sufficient,
for, according to Ramos v. Director of Lands: "The claimant has color of
title; he acted in good faith; and he has had open, peaceable, and
notorious possession of a portion of the property, sufficient to apprise
the community and the world that the land was for his enjoyment.
Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have
his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is
in possession. x x x"

89
 NUMERIANO P. ABOBON vs. FELICITAS ABATA ABOBON
G.R. No. 155830               August 15, 2012

Facts:
Respondents Felicitas and Gelima Abobon filed an action for
recovery of possession and damages against petitioner
Numeriano. They averred that they were the registered owners of
that parcel of unirrigated riceland situated in Poblacion,
Labrador, Pangasinan, and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 201367 of the Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan.
They had allowed Numeriano, their first cousin, the free use of
the land out of benevolence; and that they now immediately
needed the parcel of land for their own use and had accordingly
demanded that Numeriano should vacate and return it to them
but he had refused.

In his answer, Numeriano admitted that he did not vacate

because he was the owner of the land in question. He asserted
that if the land in question related to the unirrigated riceland
with an area of 3,000 square meters that he was presently tilling
and covered by tax declaration no. 2 in the name of his father,
then the respondents did not have a valid cause of action
against him because he had inherited that portion from his
parents; that he and his predecessors-in-interest had also
continuously, publicly and adversely and in the concept of owner
possessed the parcel of land for more than 59 years; that
assuming that the respondents were the true owners of the land,
they were already estopped by laches from recovering the portion
of 3,000 square meters from him.

The MCTC further found that the 3,000 square-meter land

Numeriano referred to as donated to his parents was not the
same as the land in question due to their boundaries being
entirely different.

Issue:
WON petitioner is the owner of the land in question.

Held:

90
NO. A fundamental principle in land registration under the
Torrens system is that a certificate of title serves as evidence
of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property
in favor of the person whose name appears therein. The
certificate of title thus becomes the best proof of ownership
of a parcel of land; hence, anyone who deals with property
registered under the Torrens system may rely on the title and
need not go beyond the title. This reliance on the certificate of
title rests on the doctrine of indefeasibility of the land title,
which has long been well-settled in this jurisdiction. It is only
when the acquisition of the title is attended with fraud or bad
faith that the doctrine of indefeasibility finds no application.

Accordingly, we rule for the respondents on the issue of the

preferential right to the possession of the land in question. Their
having preferential right conformed to the age-old rule that
whoever held a Torrens title in his name is entitled to the
possession of the land covered by the title. Indeed, possession,
which is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right, was
but an attribute of their registered ownership.

It is beyond question under the law that the owner has not only
the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing without other
limitations than those established by law, but also the right of
action against the holder and possessor of the thing in order to
recover it. He may exclude any person from the enjoyment and
disposal of the thing, and, for this purpose, he may use such
force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an
actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of
his property.

91
 CASIMIRO DEVELOPMENT CORP., vs. RENATO L. MATEO
G.R. No. 175485               July 27, 2011

Facts:
In 1988, petitioner CDC purchased from China Bank the land in
question which was previously sold by the mother of Mateo to
Rodolfo Pe who in turn constituted a mortgage on the property in favor
of China Bank as security for a loan. China Bank foreclosed the
mortgage and consolidated its ownership of the property after Rodolfo
failed to redeem. A TCT was issued in the name of China Bank. 

In 1991, CDC brought an action for unlawful detainer against the

respondent’s siblings and the other occupants of the property. Therein,
the respondents claimed that they had been in continuous and open
possession of the land even before World War II and had presumed
themselves entitled to a government grant of the land; and that CDC’s
title was invalid, considering that the land had been registered before its
being declared alienable.

Issue:
WON CDC has acquired ownership over the subject land.

Held:
YES. Registration under the Torrens system, not being a mode of
acquiring ownership, does not create or vest title. The Torrens
certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title in the
particular property described therein. In that sense, the issuance of
the certificate of title to a particular person does not preclude the
possibility that persons not named in the certificate may be co-
owners of the real property therein described with the person
named therein, or that the registered owner may be holding the
property in trust for another person. Nonetheless, it is essential that
title registered under the Torrens system becomes indefeasible and
incontrovertible.

The land in question has been covered by a Torrens certificate of title in

the name of Laura, and its derivative certificates before CDC became
the registered owner by purchase from China Bank. In all that time,
neither the respondent nor his siblings opposed the transactions
causing the various transfers. In fact, the respondent admitted in his
complaint that the registration of the land in the name of Laura alone
had been with the knowledge and upon the agreement of the entire
Lara-Mateo family. It is unthinkable, therefore, that the respondent,

92
fully aware of the exclusive registration in her sister Laura’s name,
allowed more than 20 years to pass before asserting his claim of
ownership for the first time through this case in mid-1994. Making it
worse for him is that he did so only after CDC had commenced the
ejectment case against his own siblings.
The respondent’s attack against the title of CDC is likewise anchored on
his assertion that the only purpose for having OCT No. 6386 issued in
the sole name of Laura was for Laura to hold the title in trust for their
mother. This assertion cannot stand, however, inasmuch as Laura’s
title had long ago become indefeasible.

Moreover, the respondent’s suit is exposed as being, in reality, a

collateral attack on the title in the name of Laura, and for that reason
should not prosper. Registration of land under the Torrens System,
aside from perfecting the title and rendering it indefeasible after
the lapse of the period allowed by law, also renders the title
immune from collateral attack. A collateral attack occurs when, in
another action to obtain a different relief and as an incident of the
present action, an attack is made against the judgment granting the
title. This manner of attack is to be distinguished from a direct attack
against a judgment granting the title, through an action whose main
objective is to annul, set aside, or enjoin the enforcement of such
judgment if not yet implemented, or to seek recovery if the property
titled under the judgment had been disposed of

One who deals with property registered under the Torrens system need
not go beyond the certificate of title, but only has to rely on the
certificate of title. He is charged with notice only of such burdens and
claims as are annotated on the title. In short, considering that China
Bank’s TCT No. 99527 was a clean title, that is, it was free from any lien
or encumbrance, CDC had the right to rely, when it purchased the
property, solely upon the face of the certificate of title in the name of
China Bank.

93
 HEIRS OF NICOLAS S. CABIGAS vs. MELBA L. LIMBACO
G.R. No. 175291               July 27, 2011

Facts:
Petitioners filed a complaint for the annulment of titles of various
parcels of land registered in the names of Melba Limbaco, et. al.,
alleging that petitioner Lolita Cabigas and her late husband, Nicolas
Cabigas, purchased two lots from Salvador Cobarde in 1980.
Cobarde in turn had purchased these lots from Ines Ouano in1948.

Notwithstanding the sale between Ouano and Cobarde, and because

the two lots remained registered in her name, Ouano was able to
sell these same lots to the National Airports Corporation in 1952 for
its airport expansion project. The National Airports Corporation
promptly had the titles of these properties registered in its name.

When the airport expansion project fell through, respondents Melba

Limbaco, Ramon Logarta, and Linda Logarta, the legal heirs of
Ouano, succeeded in reclaiming title to the two lots and the titles
over these lots were thereafter registered in their names. They then
subdivided the two lots and sold them to herein private
respondents. All the buyers registered the titles over their respective
lots in their names.

In its decision, the RTC hold that, while the petitioners alleged bad
faith and malice on the part of Ouano when she sold the same
properties to the National Airports Corporation, they never alleged
bad faith on the part of the buyer, the National Airports
Corporation. Since good faith is always presumed, the RTC
concluded that the National Airports Corporation was a buyer in
good faith and its registration of the properties in its name
effectively transferred ownership over the two lots, free from all the
unrecorded prior transactions involving these properties, including
the prior sale of the lots to Cobarde.

Issue:
WON spouses Cabigas are buyers in good faith.

Held:

94
NO. A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of
another without notice that some other person has a right to or
interest in such property, and pays a full and fair price for the same
at the time of such purchase or before he has notice of the claim of
another person. It is a well-settled rule that a purchaser cannot
close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon
his guard, and then claim that he acted in good faith under the
belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor. His
mere refusal to believe that such defect exists, or his willful closing
of his eyes to the possibility of the existence of a defect in his
vendor’s title, will not make him an innocent purchaser for value, if
it afterwards develops that the title was in fact defective, and it
appears that he had such notice of the defect as would have led to
its discovery had he acted with that measure of precaution which
may reasonably be required of a prudent man in a like situation.

We are dealing with registered land, a fact known to the Cabigas

spouses since they received the duplicate owner’s certificate of title
from Cobarde when they purchased the land. At the time of the sale
to the Cabigas spouses, however, the land was registered not in
Cobarde’s name, but in Ouano’s name. By itself, this fact should
have put the Cabigas spouses on guard and prompted them to
check with the Registry of Deeds as to the most recent certificates of
title to discover if there were any liens, encumbrances, or other
attachments covering the lots in question.

Instead, the Cabigas spouses relied completely on Cobarde’s

representation that he owned the properties in question, and did
not even bother to perform the most perfunctory of investigations by
checking the properties’ titles with the Registry of Deeds. Had the
Cabigas spouses only done so, they would easily have learned that
Cobarde had no legal right to the properties they were acquiring
since the lots had already been registered in the name of the
National Airports Corporation in 1952. Their failure to exercise the
plain common sense expected of real estate buyers bound them to
the consequences of their own inaction.

95
 LORETO LUGA vs. SPS. ELENA AND ROGELIO ARCIAGA
G.R. No. 175343               July 27, 2011

Facts:
The case involves a 911 sq. m. parcel of land in Davao City. The
property was initially owned by Y. Furukawa Daliao Plantation
before being turned over to the Philippine government, pursuant to
which the land came under the administration of the National
Abaca and Other Fibers Corporation (NAFCO), and later by the
Board of Liquidators (BOL).

In 1957, Loreto Luga (Luga), a former tenant of NAFCO and after

that of BOL, occupied the parcel of land and built a house of light
materials thereon. However, in 1960, a certain Honorio Romero
(Romero), an employee of NAFCO, executed an Occupant’s Affidavit
over a 2.5 hectare property in the same area, including the lot Luga
was occupying. Romero later sold the land to Elena Arciaga, who, in
1988, upon a favorable indorsement by the BOL to the Registry of
Deeds, was able to register a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) over
the property in her name.

Upon learning about Arciaga’s title, Luga filed a complaint for

reconveyance of title. Arciaga countered this by saying that Luga’s
occupation of the property was only through the mere tolerance of
their predecessor-in-interest.

The RTC ruled in favor or Luga, reasoning that Arciaga obtained

title through fraud and falsification of document with the BOL. The
Court of Appeals reversed the RTC, holding that Luga did not
occupy the land in the concept of an owner but was merely allowed
to stay there by Romero

Issue:
WON Luga occupied the land in the concept of an owner.

Held:
NO. The disposition of the land in litigation is governed by Republic
Act No. 477, as amended, which provides that “such lands of the
public domain, except commercial and industrial lots, shall be sold
by the BOL to persons who are qualified to acquire public lands,

96
giving preference first to bona fide occupants thereof on or before 12
December 1946 but not later than 31 October 1960 and who shall
be limited to the area they have actually and continuously improved
and maintained.”

Luga failed to prove that he was a bona fide occupant of the land in
litigation. Despite his testimony and that elicited from his witnesses
to the effect that he occupied the subject parcel in 1957, Luga’s
documentary evidence consisting of receipts issued by the NAFCO
and BOL simply showed that he was a tenant on the plantation
from 1955 to 1957, remitting a portion of the produce harvested
therefrom to said government agencies. On cross-examination,
Loreto also admitted that he did not file any application for the land
and/or declare the same for taxation purposes because he knew
that he was not the owner thereof.

Since possession may be exercised in one's own name or in that

of another and it is not necessary for the owner or holder of the
thing to personally exercise his possessory rights, Loreto’s
tolerated occupancy of the land cannot be said to have ousted
the possession claimed by Arciaga.

97
 REPUBLIC vs. ZENAIDA GUINTO-ALDANA
G.R. No. 175578               August 11, 2010

Facts:
Respondents filed an application for registration of title over 2
pieces of land, professing themselves to be co-owners of these
lots having acquired them by succession from their
predecessors. That until the time of the application, they and
their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, open,
peaceful, adverse, exclusive and continuous possession of these
lots in the concept of an owner and that they had consistently
declared the property in their name for purposes of real estate
taxation. In support of their application, respondents submitted
to the court the pertinent tax declarations, together with the
receipts of payment thereof. Petitioner opposed the application
for the reason that the tax declaration submitted to the court did
not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide
acquisition in good faith or of prior possession in the concept of
an owner.

Issue:
WON respondents have occupied and possessed the property
openly, continuously, exclusively and notoriously under a bona
fide claim of ownership.

Held:
YES. It is clear that respondents’ possession through their
predecessor-in-interest dates back to as early as 1937.
Respondents could have produced more proof of this kind had it
not been for the fact that, as certified by the Office of the Rizal
Provincial Assessor, the relevant portions of the tax records on
file with it had been burned when the assessor’s office was razed
by fire in 1997. Of equal relevance is the fact that with these tax
assessments, there came next tax payments. Respondents’
receipts for tax expenditures on Lot Nos. 4 and 5 between 1977
and 2001 are likewise fleshed out in the records and in these
documents, Sergio, Toribia and Romualdo are the named owners

98
of the property with Zenaida being identified as the one who
delivered the payment in the 1994 receipts.

The foregoing evidentiary matters and muniments clearly show

that Zenaida’s testimony in this respect is no less believable.
And the unbroken chain of positive acts exercised by
respondents’ predecessors, as demonstrated by these pieces of
evidence, yields no other conclusion than that as early as 1937,
they had already demonstrated an unmistakable claim to the
property. Not only do they show that they had excluded all
others in their claim but also, that such claim is in all good
faith.

While tax declarations and realty tax payment are not

conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are a
good indication of possession in the concept of owner. These
documents constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim
of title over the property, for no one in his right mind would be
paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least
constructive possession. The voluntary declaration of a piece of
property for taxation purposes manifests not only one’s sincere
and honest desire to obtain title to the property. It also
announces his adverse claim against the state and all other
parties who may be in conflict with his interest. More
importantly, it signifies an unfeigned intention to contribute to
government revenues—an act that strengthens one’s bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership.

Indeed, that respondents herein have been in possession of the

land in the concept of owner—open, continuous, peaceful and
without interference and opposition from the government or from
any private individual—itself makes their right thereto
unquestionably settled and, hence, deserving of protection under
the law.

99
 JOSEFA FABIE vs. JUDGE JOSE GUTIERREZ DAVID
G.R. No. L-123              December 12, 1945

Facts:
Petitioner Josefa Fabie is the usufructuary of the income of certain
houses in Santo Cristo, Binondo and Ongpin. In June 1945,
petitioner commenced an action of unlawful detainer against the
respondent Ngo Boo Soo demanding to latter to vacate the premises
since she very badly needs the said house to live in, as her house
was burned during the war. She prayed for judgment of eviction and
for unpaid rentals.

The defendant answered alleging that he was and since 1908 had
been a tenant of the premises in question, which he was using and
had always used principally as a store and secondarily for living
quarters; that he was renting it from its owner and administrator
Juan Grey; that plaintiff is merely the usufructuary of the income
therefrom, and by agreement between her and said owner, thus, her
only right as usufructuary of the income is to receive the whole of
such income; that she has no right or authority to eject tenants,
such right being in the owner and administrator of the house. The
reason that petitioner desires to eject respondent from the property
is that she wishes to lease the same to other persons for a higher
rent, ignoring the fact that as usufructuary of the income of the
property she has no right to lease the property; that the defendant
has subleased no part of the house to any person whomsoever.

Issue:
WON petitioner as usufructuary of rents can occupy the property.

Held:
YES. A usufructuary of the rents, as a corollary to the right to all
the rents, to choose the tenant, and to fix the amount of the rent,
necessarily has the right to choose himself as the tenant, provided
that the obligations he has assumed towards the owner of the
property are fulfilled.

100
 AVELINO BALURAN vs. JUDGE RICARDO Y. NAVARRO
G.R. No. L-44428 September 30, 1977

Facts:
Baluran and Paraiso (ancestor of Obedencio) entered into a contract
which they called barter, but in fact stipulated that they would only
transfer the material possession of their respective properties to each
other. Thus, Baluran will be allowed to construct a residential house on
the land of Paraiso while Paraiso is entitled to reap the fruits of the
riceland of Baluran. The contract prohibited them from alienating the
properties of the other and contained a stipulation that should the heirs
of Paraiso desire to re-possess the residential lot, Baluran is obliged to
return the lot. Indeed, years after, Obedencio (grandchild of Paraiso)
acquired the ownership of the residential lot from his mother and
demanded that Baluran, who was in possession, vacate. Baluran now
counters that the barter already transferred ownership

Issue:
WON the contract was a barter.

Held:
No, it is a Usufruct. First, the contract is what the law defines it to be
and not what the parties call it. It is very clear that what the parties
exchanged was not ownership, but merely material possession or the
right to enjoy the thing.

Now, because it is usufruct, the law allows the parties to stipulate the
conditions including the manner of its extinguishment. In this case, it
was subject to a resolutory condition which is in case the heir of Paraiso
(a third party) desires to repossess the property. Upon the happening of
the condition, the contract is extinguished.

Therefore, Baluran must return the land to Obedencia. But since Art.
579 allows the usufructuary to remove improvements he made, Baluran
may remove the house he constructed. One last point, at the time of
this case, the Obedencias were also in possession of the riceland of
Baluran. Although it was not proper to decide the issue of possession in
this case, the Court nevertheless decided on the matter and order the
Obedencias to vacate the property inasmuch as there was an
extinguishment of a reciprocal obligations and rights

101
Art. 579. The usufructuary may make on the property held in usufruct
such useful improvements or expenses for mere pleasure as he may
deem proper, provided he does not alter its form or substance; but he
shall have no right to be indemnified therefor. He may, however. He
may, however, removed such improvements, should it be possible to do
so without damage to the property. (Emphasis supplied)

JESUS M. GABOYA vs. ANTONIO MA. CUI

G.R. No. L-19614 March 27, 1971

Facts:
Don Mariano sold his three lots prodiviso to his three children. One of
his children, due to lack of funds, wasn’t able to purchase part of the
land. This reverted back to the father. As part of the sale, the father
reserved for himself the usufruct of the property. He co-owned the land
with his children then. A building was then constructed in a portion of
the land, wherein rentals was given to the father. Thereafter, the two
children who were co-owners obtained a loan, secured by a mortgage,
with authority of the father, to construct a commercial building. The
father alleges that since he has usufruct over the land, he has usufruct
or share in the rentals earned through the constructed building.

Issue:
WON Don Mariano is entitled to all the rents.

Held:
NO. The reserved usufruct in favor of the vendor, Mariano Cui, was
limited to the rentals of the land alone. Had it been designed to include
also the rents of the buildings intended to be raised on the land, an
express provision would have been included to the effect, since in both
documents (heretofore quoted) the possibility of such construction was
clearly envisaged and mentioned.

There was no adequate proof that the vendor, Don Mariano Cui, ever
renounced his usufruct. The alleged waiver was purely verbal, and is
supported solely by the testimony of Antonio Cui, one of the alleged
beneficiaries thereof. As a gratuitous renunciation of a real right over
immovable property that as created by public document, the least to be
expected in the regular course of business is that the waiver should also
appear in writing. Moreover, as pointed out in the appealed decision, in
previous pleadings sworn to by Antonio Cui himself, in Civil Case No.
599 and Special Proceeding 481-R of the Cebu Court of First Instance,
he and his sister Mercedes had contended that Don Mariano Cui had
been receiving from them P400.00 per month as the value of his
usufruct, and never claimed that the real right had been renounced or
waived. The testimony of Antonio Cui on the alleged waiver, given after
the usufructuary had been declared incompetent and could no longer
contradict him, is obviously of negligible probative value.

102
 EVANGELINE RIVERA-CALINGASAN vs. WILFREDO RIVERA
G.R. No.171555               April 17, 2013

Facts:
Respondent Wilfredo Rivera and his two daughters, Evangeline and
Brigida Liza, inherited several parcels of land from his wife. They
executed an extra-judicial settlement of the wife’s one-half share of the
conjugal estate, adjudicating all the properties in favor of Evangeline
and Brigida Liza; Wilfredo waived his rights to the properties, with a
reservation of his usufructuary rights during his lifetime. New titles
were issued in the names of Evangeline and Brigida Liza, with an
annotation of Wilfredo’s usufructuary rights.

In 2003, Wilfredo filed a complaint for forcible entry against the

petitioners and Star Honda, Inc., claiming that he lawfully possessed
and occupied the two (2) parcels of land located along C.M. Recto
Avenue, Lipa City, Batangas, with a building used for his furniture
business. Taking advantage of his absence due to his hospital
confinement in September 2002, the petitioners and Star Honda, Inc.
took possession and caused the renovation of the building on the
property. In December 2002, the petitioners and Star Honda, Inc., with
the aid of armed men, barred him from entering the property.

Both the petitioners and Star Honda, Inc. countered that Wilfredo
voluntarily renounced his usufructuary rights in a petition. On
December 27, 2006, Wilfredo died and has been substituted by his
second wife, Ma. Lydia S. Rivera, and their children, Freida Leah S.
Rivera and Wilfredo S. Rivera, Jr.

Issue:
WON the death of Wilfredo extinguished the usufruct.

Held:
YES. Wilfredo was holding the property as usufructuary, although this
right to de jure possession was also disputed before his death, hand in
hand with the de facto possession that is subject of the present case.
Without need, however, of any further dispute or litigation, the right to
the usufruct is now rendered moot by the death of Wilfredo since
death extinguishes a usufruct under Article 603(1) of the Civil
Code. This development deprives the heirs of the usufructuary the right

103
to retain or to reacquire possession of the property even if the ejectment
judgment directs its restitution.

ROSARIO GREY VDA.DE ALBAR vs. JOSEFA FABIE DE CARANDANG

G.R. No. L-18003             September 29, 1962

Facts:
Doña Rosario Fabie y Grey bequeathed the naked ownership of a parcel
of land and of the building and other improvements existing thereon, to
petitioners Rosario and Jose Grey, and the usufruct thereof to
respondent Carandang for life. Because the improvements were
destroyed during the war, the Philippine War Damage Commission paid
petitioners a certain sum of money war damage. It was respondent,
however, who paid the real estate taxes due on the land for the years
1945 to 1954. Petitioners filed a civil case to limit respondent's usufruct
to the legal interest on the value of the land.

One Au Pit, a Chinaman, offered to lease the property for a period of five
years, at the same time agreeing to construct on the lot a new building
provided the naked owners as well as the usufructuary sign the
agreement of the lease. As the usufructuary maintains that she has the
exclusive right to cede the property by lease and to receive the full
rental value by virtue of her right to usufruct while on the other hand
the naked owners maintain that the right of usufruct was extinguished
when the building was destroyed, the right of the usufructuary being
limited to the legal interest on the value of the lot and the materials, in
order that the agreement of lease may be affected.

Issue:
WON respondent as usufrustuary should undertake the reconstruction.

Held:
The usufructuary has the discretion to reconstruct the building. Of
course, this is addressed to the wisdom and discretion of the
usufructuary who, to all intents and purposes is deemed as the
administrator of the property.

The usufructuary should pay the taxes. We find, however, merit in

the contention that the real estate taxes paid by respondent in her
capacity as usufractuary for several years previous to the present
litigation should be paid by her, as she did, instead of by petitioners not
only because she bound herself to pay such taxes in a formal agreement
approved by the court.

104
 CAMILO F. BORROMEO vs. ANTONIETTA O. DESCALLAR
G.R. No. 159310               February 24, 2009

Facts:
Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian citizen, arrived in the Philippines in
1983 after he was assigned by his employer, Simmering-Graz Panker
A.G., an Austrian company, to work at a project in Mindoro. He was
then transferred in Cebu in 1984. During that time, he met respondent
Antonietta Opalla-Descallar, a separated mother of two boys who was
working as a waitress at St. Moritz Hotel. Jambrich befriended
respondent and asked her to tutor him in English. In due time
Jambrich and respondent fell in love started to live together.

After which, they bought their own house in Cabancalan, Mandaue

City. In the Contracts to Sell covering the properties, Jambrich and
respondent were referred to as the buyers. A Deed of Absolute Sale was
likewise issued in their favor. However, when the Deed of Absolute Sale
was presented for registration before the Register of Deeds, registration
was refused on the ground that Jambrich was an alien and could not
acquire alienable lands of the public domain. Consequently, Jambrich’s
name was erased from the document. But it could be noted that his
signature remained on the left hand margin of page 1, beside
respondent’s signature as buyer, and at the bottom of the last page.
Transfer Certificate of Title over the properties were issued in
respondent’s name alone.

Issue:
WON respondent is the owner of the subject property.

Held:
NO. It is settled that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership.
It is only a means of confirming the fact of its existence with notice to
the world at large. Certificates of title are not a source of right. The mere
possession of a title does not make one the true owner of the property.

Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed
properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively and
absolutely make her the owner. The rule on indefeasibility of title
likewise does not apply to respondent. A certificate of title implies that
the title is quiet, and that it is perfect, absolute and indefeasible.

105
However, there are well-defined exceptions to this rule, as when the
transferee is not a holder in good faith and did not acquire the subject
properties for a valuable consideration. This is the situation in the
instant case. Respondent did not contribute a single centavo in the
acquisition of the properties. She had no income of her own at that
time, nor did she have any savings. She and her two sons were then
fully supported by Jambrich.

PRIVATIZATION & MGM’T OFFICE vs. LEGASPI TOWERS

G.R. No. 147957               July 22, 2009

Facts:
Caruff Development Corporation (now Liberty Towers 300, Inc.)
owned several parcels of land. It obtained a loan from the PNB
which was secured by a real estate mortgage over three (3)
parcels of land, where Caruff planned to erect the condominium.
In 1979, Caruff started constructing a multi-storey building on
the mortgaged parcels of land. Along with the other
appurtenances of the building constructed by Caruff, it built a
powerhouse (generating set) and two sump pumps. However, for
Caruff’s failure to pay its loan with PNB, the latter foreclosed the
mortgage and acquired some of the properties of Caruff at the
sheriff’s auction sale.

By virtue of Administrative Order No. 14 and the Deed of

Transfer executed by PNB, the National Government, thru the
Asset Privatization Trust (APT) became the assignee and
transferee of all its rights and titles to and interests in its
receivables with Caruff, including the properties it acquired from
the foreclosure of Caruff’s mortgage. Caruff filed a case against
PNB whereby Caruff sought the nullification of PNB’s foreclosure
of its properties.

Under a Compromise Agreement entered into by Caruff, PNB,

and the National Government thru APT, Caruff transferred and
conveyed in favor of the National Government, thru the APT, the
lot where it built the generating set and sump pumps. The RTC
approved the said Compromise Agreement.

On the other hand, Caruff filed a case for Declaration of the

existence of an easement alleging that the act of Caruff of
constructing the powerhouse and sump pumps on its property
constituted a voluntary easement in favor of the respondent. In

106
its Answer, APT alleged that respondent had no cause of action
against it, because it was but a mere transferee of the land.

Issue:
WON the construction of a generator set and 2 sump pumps
constitutes as easement of the property.

Held:
NO. An easement or servitude is "a real right constituted on
another’s property, corporeal and immovable, by virtue of which
the owner of the same has to abstain from doing or to allow
somebody else to do something on his property for the benefit of
another thing or person."

In the present case, neither type of easement was constituted

over the subject property.

In its allegations, respondent claims that Caruff constituted a

voluntary easement when it constructed the generating set and
sump pumps over the disputed portion of the subject property
for its benefit. However, it should be noted that when the
appurtenances were constructed on the subject property, the
lands where the condominium was being erected and the subject
property where the generating set and sump pumps were
constructed belonged to Caruff. Therefore, Article 613 of the
Civil Code does not apply, since no true easement was
constituted or existed, because both properties were owned
by Caruff.

107
 NICOLAS VALISNO vs. FELIPE ADRIANO
G.R. No. L-37409 May 23, 1988

Facts:
Plaintiff is the absolute owner and actual possessor of a land in
Nueva Ecija, with TCT No. NT-16281. He bought the land from
the respondent’s sister, Honorata Adriano Francisco. The land
which is planted with watermelon, peanuts, corn, tobacco, and
other vegetables adjoins that of the respondent Adriano on the
bank of the Pampanga River. Both parcels of land had been
inherited by Honorata and Felipe from their father. At the time of
the sale of the land to Valisno, the land was irrigated by water
from the Pampanga River through a canal about seventy (70)
meters long, traversing the Respondent's land. In 1959,
Respondent levelled a portion of the irrigation canal so that
Plaintiff was deprived of the irrigation water and prevented from
cultivating his 57-hectare land. Plaintiff filed in the Bureau of
Public Works and Communications a complaint for deprivation
of water rights.

A decision was rendered ordering Adriano to reconstruct the

irrigation canal. Instead of restoring the irrigation canal, the
appellee asked for a reinvestigation of the case by the Bureau of
Public Works and Communications. A reinvestigation was
granted.

In the meantime, Plaintiff rebuilt the irrigation canal at his own

expense because his need for water to irrigate his watermelon
fields was urgent.

Later, he filed a complaint for damages in the RTC claiming that

he suffered damages when he failed to plant his fields that
yearfor lack of irrigation water, and when he reconstructed the
canal.

108
Meanwhile, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
reversed the Bureau's decision by issuing a final resolution
dismissing Valisno's complaint. The Secretary held that Eladio
Adriano's water rights which had been granted in 1923 ceased to
be enjoyed by him in 1936 or 1937, when his irrigation canal
collapsed. His non-use of the water right since then for a period
of more than five years extinguished the grant by operation of
law, hence the water rights did not form part of his hereditary
estate which his heirs partitioned among themselves

Issue:
WON plaintiff has acquired the easement of water over
Respondent’s land.

Held:
YES. The existence of the irrigation canal on Respondent’s land
for the passage of water from the Pampanga River to Honorata's
land prior to and at the time of the sale of Honorata's land to the
plaintiff was equivalent to a title for the vendee of the land to
continue using it as provided in Article 624 of the Civil Code
(Doctrine of Apparent Sign):

The deed of sale in favor of Plaintiff included the "conveyance

and transfer of the water rights and improvements" appurtenant
to Honorata's property. According to the Plaintiff, the water right
was the primary consideration for his purchase of Honorata's
property, for without it the property would be unproductive.

Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for

irrigation purposes, which are appurtenant to a parcel of land,
pass with the conveyance of the land, although not specifically
mentioned in the conveyance. The purchaser's easement of
necessity in a water ditch running across the grantor's land
cannot be defeated even if the water is supplied by a third
person. The fact that an easement by grant may also have
qualified as an easement of necessity does detract from its
permanency as property right, which survives the determination
of the necessity.

As an easement of waters in favor of the appellant has been

established, he is entitled to enjoy it free from obstruction,
disturbance or wrongful interference, such as the appellee's act

109
of levelling the irrigation canal to deprive him of the use of water
from the Pampanga River.

FE P. VELASCO, vs. HON. VICENTE N. CUSI, JR

G.R. No. L-33507 July 20, 1981

Facts:
Petitioner filed an action against Davao City to quiet title to her lot, a
portion of which she claims to having been occupied illegally as part of
Bolton Street, Davao City. When petitioner bought the said lot from the
original owner in 1956, the Bolton Street was already existing and
without ascertaining the monuments along Bolton Street, she had her
house constructed on her said lot and built fence along said Bolton
Street which she believed to be the boundary between her lot and said
street and in line with other fences already existing when she bought
said lot.

The court a quo ruled that there is no cloud of doubt on the title of the
plaintiff over said portion which would justify this action.

Issue:
WON there exist an easement on the subject lot.

Held:
YES. Where it indubitably appears as it does from the allegations of the
complaint itself, that Bolton Street constituted an easement of public
highway on Lot No. 77 from which petitioner’s lot was taken when the
said bigger lot was originally registered, it remained as such legal
encumbrance, as effectively as if it had been duly noted on the
certificate of title, by virtue of the clear and express provision of Section
39 of Act 496, is being admitted that at the time of the registration of
Lot 77, the public highway was already in existence or subsisting. This
fact erases whatever cause of action petitioner may have to bring the
complaint she filed in the court a quo for quieting of title on a portion of
the street which she claims to be part of her lot, free from encumbrance
of any kind.

Bolton Street cannot be a discontinuous easement as she claims it to

be, which may not be acquired by prescription. Nonetheless, whether
the mode of acquisition of the easement that Bolton Street is, would be
only by virtue of title, as petitioner contends, this is not material or of

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any consequence. The action is to quiet title and damages; but the
complaint does not allege any cloud or doubt on the title.

LA VISTA ASSOCIATION, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 95252 September 5, 1997

Facts:
The controversy in this case is regarding the right of way in
Manyan road. The road is a 15 meter wide road abutting
Katipunan Avenue on the west, traverses the edges of La Vista
Subdivision on the north and of the Ateneo de Manila University
and Maryknoll College on the south. The said road was originally
owned by the Tuasons sold a portion of their land to Philippine
Building Corporation. Included in such sale was half or 7.5
meters width of the Mangyan road. The said corporation
assigned its rights, with the consent of the tuasons, to AdMU
through a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Mortgage.
Ateneo later on sold to Maryknoll the western portion of the
land. Tuason developed their land which is now known as La
Vista. On January, 1976, Ateneo and La Vista acknowledged the
voluntary easement or a Mutual right of way wherein the parties
would allow the other to use their half portion of the Manyan
road (La Vista to use AdMU’s 7.5 meters of the mangyan road
and also the other way around.) Ateneo auctioned off the
property wherein Solid Homes Inc., the developer of Loyola
Grand Villas, was the highest bidder.

ADMU transferred not only the property, but also the right to
negotiate the easement on the road. However, La Vista did not
want to recognize the easement thus they block the road using 6
cylindrical concrete and some guards over the entrance of the
road blocking the entrance of the residents of Loyola Grand
Villas. Solid Homes Inc. filed for injunction and La vista in turn
filed a third party complaint against AdMU. Some of the
arguments of the petitioner were that Loyola residents had
adequate outlet to a public highway using other roads and also
that AdMU has not yet finalized the negotiation of the easement.

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Issue:
WON there is an easement of right of way

Held:
YES. There was a voluntary easement of right of way which was
acknowledged on January 1976 by the Tuasons and Admu.
Being such, the 4 requisites for a compulsory easement need not
be met. And like any other contractual stipulation, the same
cannot be extinguished except by voluntary recession of the
contract establishing the servitude or renunciation by the owner
of the dominant lots. In the case at bar, all the predecessors-in-
interest of both parties recognized the existence of such
easement and there was no agreement yet to revoke the same.
The free ingress and egress along Mangyan Road created by the
voluntary agreement is thus demandable.

The Court also emphasized that they are not creating an

easement but merely declaring one (there no such thing as a
judicial easement)

Like any other contractual stipulation, a voluntary easement

cannot be extinguished except by voluntary recession of the
contract establishing the servitude or renunciation by the owner of
the dominant lots.

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 EMETERIA LIWAG vs. HAPPY GLEN LOOP HOMEOWNERS
G.R. No. 189755               July 4, 2012

Facts:
Sometime in 1978, F.G.R. Sales, the original developer of Happy
Glen Loop, obtained a loan from Ernesto Marcelo (Marcelo), the
owner of T.P. Marcelo Realty Corporation. To settle its debt after
failing to pay its obligation, F.G.R. Sales assigned to Marcelo all
its rights over several parcels of land in the Subdivision, as well
as receivables from the lots already sold.

As the successor-in-interest of the original developer, Marcelo

represented to subdivision lot buyers, that a water facility was
available in the Subdivision.

For almost 30 years, the residents of the Subdivision relied on

this facility as their only source of water. This fact was
acknowledged by Marcelo and Hermogenes Liwag, petitioner’s
late husband who was then the president of respondent Happy
Glen Loop Homeowners Association.

Sometime in September 1995, Marcelo sold a lot to Hermogenes.

When Hermogenes died in 2003, petitioner Emeteria P. Liwag
subsequently wrote a letter to respondent Association,
demanding the removal of the overhead water tank from the
subject parcel of land. Respondent refused to comply with
petitioner’s demand and filed an action for specific performance.

Issue:
WON

Held:
Easements or servitudes are encumbrances imposed upon an
immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a

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different owner, for the benefit of a community, or for the benefit
of one or more persons to whom the encumbered estate does not
belong.

In this case, the water facility is an encumbrance on Lot 11,

Block 5 of the Subdivision for the benefit of the community. It is
continuous and apparent, because it is used incessantly without
human intervention, and because it is continually kept in view
by the overhead water tank, which reveals its use to the public.
Contrary to petitioner’s contention that the existence of the
water tank on Lot 11, Block 5 is merely tolerated, we find that
the easement of water facility has been voluntarily established
either by Marcelo, the Subdivision owner and developer; or by
F.G.R. Sales, his predecessor-in-interest and the original
developer of the Subdivision. For more than 30 years, the facility
was continuously used as the residents’ sole source of water.

The Civil Code provides that continuous and apparent

easements are acquired either by virtue of a title or by
prescription of 10 years. It is therefore clear that an easement
of water facility has already been acquired through prescription.

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 CATALINO VALDERRAMA vs. NORTH NEGROS SUGAR
G.R. No. L-23810        December 18, 1925

Facts:
Several hacienda owners in Manapla, Occidental Negros, entered
into a milling contract with Miguel Osorio wherein the latter
would build a sugar central of a minimum capacity of 300 tons
for the milling and grinding of all the sugar cane to be grown by
the hacienda owners who in turn would furnish the central with
all the cane they might produce in their estates for 30 years from
the execution of the contract. Later on, Osorio’s rights and
interests were acquired by the North Negros Sugar Co., Inc.
2 years after, the current petitioners, Catalino Valderrama,
Emilio Rodriguez, Santos Urra et. al, made other milling
contracts identical to the first one with the North Negros Sugar,
Co., Inc. The hacienda owners, however, could not furnish the
central sufficient cane for milling as required by its capacity, so
the North Negros made other milling contracts with the various
hacienda owners of Cadiz, Occidental Negros. This prompted
Valderrama et. al to each file a complaint against North Negros.

The CFI entered 1 single judgment for all of them, ruling in

Valderrama et. al’s favor finding that North Negros had no right
to pass through the lands of the hacienda owners for the
transportation of sugar cane not grown from their lands. Thus
the appeal to the SC.

Issue:
WON the easement of way established was restricted to
transporting only sugar cane from the hacienda owners’ lands

HELD:
NO. The contract entered into by each of the hacienda owners
contained a clause that granted the North Negros an easement of

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way 7 meters wide for the period of 50 years upon their
properties for the construction of a railroad. The owners allege
ambiguity since it could permit the transportation of sugar cane
which they did not produce which is contrary to their intent but
the SC held that it is clear that the easement was established for
the benefit of all producers and of the corporation as it is the
intent of the milling contract.

Since the easement is a voluntary, apparent, continuous

easement of way in favor of the corporation, it is contrary to the
nature of the contract that it is only limited to canes produced
by the servient estates since it is a well settled rule that things
serve their owner by reason of ownership and not by reason of
easement. The owners also cannot limit its use for there is
nothing in the contract prohibiting the central from obtaining
other sources.

Transporting cane from Cadiz also does not make it more

burdensome since what is prohibited in Art. 543 of the CC is
that in extending the road or in repairing it, it should occupy a
greater area or deposit excavations outside the granted 7 meters.
This does not happen in this case when the North Negros
transports sugar cane from Cadiz, crossing the servient estates,
since it continues to occupy the same area and the
encumbrance is still the same regardless of the number of times
it passes through the estates.

Also the period of the easement is longer than the period of the
milling contracts, so even if the owners no longer desire to
furnish the central canes for milling, the North Negros still has
the right to the easement for the remaining period so the
contention that it should be limited to the canes produced by the
owners has no basis.

116
 GOLDCREST REALTY CORP vs. CYPRESS GARDENS
G.R. No. 171072               April 7, 2009

Facts:
Petitioner Goldcrest is the developer of Cypress Gardens, a ten-
storey building in Makati City. On April 26, 1977, Goldcrest
executed a Master Deed and Declaration of Restrictions which
constituted Cypress Gardens into a condominium project and
incorporated respondent Cypress Gardens Condominium
Corporation to manage the condominium project and to hold
title to all the common areas. Title to the land on which the
condominium stands was transferred to Cypress. But Goldcrest
retained ownership of the two-level penthouse unit on the ninth
and tenth floors of the condominium registered under
Condominium Certificate of Title. Goldcrest and its directors,
officers, and assigns likewise controlled the management and
administration of the Condominium until 1995.

Following the turnover of the administration and management of

the Condominium to the board of directors of Cypress in 1995, it
was discovered that certain common areas pertaining to Cypress
were being occupied and encroached upon by Goldcrest. Thus,
in 1998, Cypress filed a complaint against Goldcrest seeking to
compel the latter to vacate the common areas it allegedly
encroached on and to remove the structures it built thereon.
Cypress sought to remove the door erected by Goldcrest along
the stairway between the 8th and 9th floors, as well as the door
built in front of the 9th floor elevator lobby, and the removal of
the cyclone wire fence on the roof deck. Cypress likewise prayed
that Goldcrest pay damages for its occupation of the said areas
and for its refusal to remove the questioned structures.

For its part, Goldcrest averred that it was granted the exclusive
use of the roof deck’s limited common area by Section 4(c) of the

117
condominium’s Master Deed. It likewise argued that it
constructed the contested doors for privacy and security
purposes, and that, nonetheless, the common areas occupied by
it are unusable and inaccessible to other condominium unit
owners.

Issue:
WON petitioner impaired the easement on the portion of the roof
deck designated as a limited common area,
Held:
YES. The owner of the dominant estate cannot violate any of the
following prescribed restrictions on its rights on the servient
estate, to wit: (1) it can only exercise rights necessary for the use
of the easement; (2) it cannot use the easement except for the
benefit of the immovable originally contemplated; (3) it cannot
exercise the easement in any other manner than that previously
established; (4) it cannot construct anything on it which is not
necessary for the use and preservation of the easement; (5) it
cannot alter or make the easement more burdensome; (6) it
must notify the servient estate owner of its intention to make
necessary works on the servient estate; and (7) it should choose
the most convenient time and manner to build said works so as
to cause the least convenience to the owner of the servient
estate. Any violation of the above constitutes impairment of
the easement.

Here, a careful scrutiny of Goldcrest’s acts shows that it

breached a number of the aforementioned restrictions. First, it is
obvious that the construction and the lease of the office
structure were neither necessary for the use or preservation of
the roof deck’s limited area. Second, the weight of the office
structure increased the strain on the condominium’s foundation
and on the roof deck’s common limited area, making the
easement more burdensome and adding unnecessary safety risk
to all the condominium unit owners. Lastly, the construction of
the said office structure clearly went beyond the intendment of
the easement since it illegally altered the approved condominium
project plan and violated Section 4 of the condominium’s
Declaration of Restrictions.

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 NPC vs. HEIRS OF MACABANGKIT SANGKAY
G.R. No. 165828               August 24, 2011

Facts:
Pursuant to its legal mandate under Republic Act No. 6395, NPC
undertook the Agus River Hydroelectric Power Plant Project in the
1970s to generate electricity for Mindanao. The project included the
construction of several underground tunnels to be used in diverting the
water flow from the Agus River to the hydroelectric plants. In 1997,
respondents Heirs of Macabangkit, as owners of land situated in
Ditucalan, Iligan City, sued NPC for the recovery of damages and of the
property, with the alternative prayer for the payment of just
compensation. They alleged that they had belatedly discovered that one
of the underground tunnels of NPC that diverted the water flow of the
Agus River for the operation of the Hydroelectric Project in Agus V, Agus
VI and Agus VII traversed their land. The said underground tunnel had
been constructed without their knowledge and consent and its presence
deprived them of the agricultural, commercial, industrial and
residential value of their land; and that their land had also become an
unsafe place for habitation because of the loud sound of the water
rushing through the tunnel and the constant shaking of the ground,
forcing them and their workers to relocate to safer grounds.

In its answer, NPC countered that the Heirs of Macabangkit had no

right to compensation, under which a mere legal easement on their land
was established; that their cause of action, should they be entitled to
compensation, already prescribed due to the tunnel having been
constructed in 1979; and that by reason of the tunnel being an
apparent and continuous easement, any action arising from such
easement prescribed in five years.

Issue:
WON the underground tunnel constitute a legal easement.

Held:
NO. The manner in which the easement was created by petitioner,
however, violates the due process rights of respondents as it was
without notice and indemnity to them and did not go through proper

119
expropriation proceedings. Petitioner could have, at any time, validly
exercised the power of eminent domain to acquire the easement over
respondents’ property as this power encompasses not only the taking or
appropriation of title to and possession of the expropriated property but
likewise covers even the imposition of a mere burden upon the owner of
the condemned property. Significantly, though, landowners cannot
be deprived of their right over their land until expropriation
proceedings are instituted in court. The court must then see to it
that the taking is for public use, that there is payment of just
compensation and that there is due process of law.
SPOUSES CABAHUG vs. NPC
G.R. No. 186069               January 30, 2013

Facts:
In 1996, Jesus Cabahug executed two (2) documents denominated as
Right of Way Grant in favour of NPC for and in consideration of the
easement fees. He also granted NPC a continuous easement of right of
way for the latter’s transmissions lines and their appurtenances. By
said grant, Jesus Cabahug agreed not to construct any building or
structure whatsoever, nor plant in any area within the Right of Way
that will adversely affect or obstruct the transmission line of NPC,
except agricultural crops, the growth of which will not exceed three
meters high. Under paragraph 4 of the grant, however, Jesus Cabahug
reserved the option to seek additional compensation for easement fee.

In September 1998, the Spouses Cabahug filed the complaint for the
payment of just compensation against NPC claiming to have been totally
deprived of the use of the portions of their land. The Spouses Cabahug
alleged, among other matters, that in accordance with the reservation
provided under paragraph 4 of the aforesaid grant, they have demanded
from NPC payment of the balance of the just compensation for the
subject properties.

In its answer, on the other hand, NPC averred that it already paid the
full easement fee and that the reservation in the grant referred to
additional compensation for easement fee, not the full just
compensation sought by the Spouses Cabahug.

Brushing aside NPC’s reliance on Section 3-A of RA 6395, the RTC

applied the ruling handed down by this Court in Gutierrez to the effect
that NPC’s easement of right of way which indefinitely deprives the
owner of their proprietary rights over their property falls within the
purview of the power of eminent domain.

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s decision holding
that the Spouses Cabahug had already accepted the payment of
easement fee, therefore, NPC’s easement of right of way has for all legal
intents and purposes, been established as far back as 1996. Since

120
vested right has already accrued in favor of NPC, to allow the Spouses
Cabahug to pursue this case when the easement of right of way had
already been consummated would be in violation of the contract.

Issue:
WON spouses Cabahug is still entitled to just compensation.

Held:
YES. It is evident that the Spouses Cabahug’s receipt of the easement
fee did not bar them from seeking further compensation from NPC.
Even by the basic rules in the interpretation of contracts, the Court find
that the CA erred in holding that the payment of additional sums to the
Spouses Cabahug would be violative of the parties’ contract and
amount to unjust enrichment. Indeed, the rule is settled that a contract
constitutes the law between the parties who are bound by its
stipulations which, when couched in clear and plain language, should
be applied according to their literal tenor.

In upholding the landowners’ right to full just compensation, the Court

ruled that the power of eminent domain may be exercised although title
is not transferred to the expropriator in an easement of right of way.
Just compensation which should be neither more nor less than the
money equivalent of the property is, moreover, due where the nature
and effect of the easement is to impose limitations against the use of the
land for an indefinite period and deprive the landowner its ordinary use.

Where the right of way easement, as in this case, similarly involves

transmission lines which not only endangers life and limb but restricts
as well the owner's use of the land traversed thereby, the ruling in
Gutierrez remains doctrinal and should be applied. It has been ruled
that the owner should be compensated for the monetary equivalent of
the land if, as here, the easement is intended to perpetually or
indefinitely deprive the owner of his proprietary rights through the
imposition of conditions that affect the ordinary use, free enjoyment and
disposal of the property or through restrictions and limitations that are
inconsistent with the exercise of the attributes of ownership, or when
the introduction of structures or objects which, by their nature, create
or increase the probability of injury, death upon or destruction of life
and property found on the land is necessary. Measured not by the
taker’s gain but the owner’s loss, just compensation is defined as the
full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator.

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 SPOUSES VALDEZ vs. SPOUSES TABISULA
G.R. No. 175510               July 28, 2008

Facts:
Spouses Victor and Jocelyn Valdez bought from Spouses Francisco and
Caridad Tabisula a parcel of land located in San Fernando, La Union.
The absolute sale indicated a right of way. 

Spouses Tabisula subsequently built a concrete wall on the western

side of the subject property. Believing that that side is the intended
road right of way mentioned in the deed, Spouses Valdez opposed such
act. Conciliation was then initiated. Spouses Tabisula failed to attend
the conferences scheduled. This prompted Spouses Valdez to file, after
more than six years of execution of the deed, a complaint for Specific
Performance with Damages. 

Spouses Valdez contended that they purchased the subject property on

the assurance of providing them a road right of way. On the other hand,
spouses Tabisula averred that the 2-meter easement should be taken
from the western portion of the subject property and not theirs. 

The trial court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the dismissal. 

Issue:
WON Spouses Valdez are entitled to the right of way as indicated in the
absolute sale 

Held:
NO. To be conferred a legal easement of right of way under Article 649,
the following requisites must be complied with: (1) the property is
surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a
public highway; (2) proper indemnity must be paid; (3) the isolation
is not the result of the owner of the dominant estates own acts; (4)
the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the
servant estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with the foregoing
rule, the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway
may be the shortest. The onus of proving the existence of these

122
prerequisites lies on the owner of the dominant estate, herein the
spouses Valdez. 

Since Spouses Valdez then have more than adequate passage to two
public roads, they have no right to demand the grant by spouses
Tabisula of an easement on the western side of Spouses Tabisula‘s lot.

ST. MICHAEL SCHOOL OF CAVITE vs. MASAITO DEV’T CORP

G.R. No. 166301             February 29, 2008

Facts:
Petitioner St. Michael School is owned by petitioners-spouses Claveria.
It is located outside the northern perimeter fence of Citihomes and its
passageway occupies a portion of the 61-square meter lot of Citihomes.
The gate to the school is located at the subdivision’s northern perimeter
fence and is the only entrance and exit for the entire school population.

Respondent Rexlon informed petitioners that the value of the Citihomes

lots when fully developed was PhP 3,872 per square meter as appraised
by the Home Insurance and Guarantee Corporation. Masaito advised
petitioners to purchase the lots fronting the school and another letter
offering to sell another lot with the right-of-way through the private
roads/drainage facilities of Citihomes at the price of PhP 2 Million.
Petitioners refused both proposals, reasoning that the school did not
need the entire area mentioned in the first proposal. St. Michael also
said that the second offer was grossly overpriced.

Petitioners, with four other homeowners, filed a complaint against

respondents for easement of right-of-way with damages under Article
649 of the Civil Code and preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order (TRO).

Issue:
WON petitioners have a cause of action to file the complaint for right-of-
way.

Held:
YES. For a complaint to state a cause of action in an easement case,
more specifically, Art. 649 of the Civil Code has laid down the following
requirements: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other
immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) there is
payment of proper indemnity; and (3) the isolation is not due to the acts
of the proprietor of the dominant estate.

123
The Court ruled that the Complaint satisfies these three elements and
thus sufficiently alleges a cause of action. The Complaint, first, asserts
that petitioners have a right to an easement of right-of-way that cuts
across respondents’ property; second, it refers to respondents’
correlative obligation not to fence off and close the single gate which is
used as the only entry and exit points of the school population; and
third, it refers to respondents’ expansion and excessive terms and
conditions, constituting the acts violating petitioners’ right. We thus
hold that the Complaint’s material allegations are enough to entitle
petitioners to a favorable judgment if these are assumed to be true.

APOLINARDITO C. QUINTANILLA vs. PEDRO ABANGAN

G.R. No. 160613             February 12, 2008

Facts:
Sometime in the 1960s, Perfecta bought the subject lot (the
dominant estate) from one Dionisio Abasolo, who formerly owned
all the properties therein. Thereafter, Perfecta donated the
dominant estate to Apolinardito, who is now the registered
owner thereof. Petitioners own QC Rattan Inc., a domestic
corporation engaged in the manufacture and export of rattan-
made furniture. In the conduct of their business, they use vans
to haul and transport raw materials and finished products. As
they wanted to expand their business and construct a
warehouse on their property (the dominant estate), they asked
for a right of way from Pedro sometime in April 1994.

However, it appears that Pedro, who was the owner the servient
estate and a lot near the dominant estate, sold the same to
DARYL'S and thereafter, DARYL'S constructed a warehouse over
the servient estate, enclosing the same with a concrete fence.

Petitioners, thus, sought the imposition of an easement of right

of way. The RTC held that petitioners failed to establish that the
imposition of the right of way was the least prejudicial to the
servient estate. Moreover, the RTC observed that petitioners'
insistence on passing through the servient estate would make
for easy and convenient access to the main thoroughfare for
their vans. Otherwise, if the right of way were to be constituted
on any of the other surrounding properties, their vans would
have to make a turn. On this premise, the RTC opined that mere
convenience to the dominant estate was not necessarily the
basis for setting up a compulsory easement of right of way.

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Issue:
WON petitioner as owner of the dominant estate prove the
existence of a compulsory of right of way.

Held:
NO. The SC hold that Apolinardito as owner of the dominant
estate together with Perfecta failed to discharge the burden of
proving the existence and concurrence of all the requisites in
order to validly claim a compulsory right of way against
respondents. It should be remembered that to be entitled to a
legal easement of right of way, the following requisites must be
satisfied: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other
immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2)
proper indemnity has been paid; (3) the isolation was not due to
acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; and (4) the right of
way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient
estate. The fourth requisite is absent.

As ruled by the CA, the easement of right of way shall be

established at the point least prejudicial to the servient
estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the
distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may
be the shortest. Where there are several tenements
surrounding the dominant estate, and the easement may be
established on any of them, the one where the way is shortest
and will cause the least damage should be chosen. But if
these two circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, as in
the instant case, the way which will cause the least damage
should be used, even if it will not be the shortest. The criterion of
least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the
criterion of shortest distance. A longer way may be established to
avoid injury to the servient tenement, such as when there are
constructions or walls which can be avoided by a round-about
way, as in the case at bar.

As between a right of way that would demolish a fence of strong

materials to provide ingress and egress to a public highway and
another right of way which although longer will only require a
van or vehicle to make a turn, the second alternative should be
preferred. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what
is required by law as the basis for setting up a compulsory
easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it can be satisfied

125
without imposing the easement, the same should not be
imposed.

RESURRECCION OBRA vs. SPS. BADUA

G.R. No. 149125               August 9, 2007

Facts:
Anacleto Obra was the husband of petitioner Resurreccion.
Respondents alleged that their residential houses, erected on a lot
commonly owned by them situated in Galongen, Bacnotan, La Union,
were located west of the properties of the Obras, Bucasases, and
Baduas. Their only access to the national highway was a pathway
traversing the northern portion of petitioner’s property and the
southern portion of the properties of the Bucasases and Baduas. The
pathway was more than one meter wide and sixteen meters long. They
claimed that this pathway had been established as early as 1955. In
1995, however, petitioner Obra constructed a fence on the northern
boundary of their property; thus, blocking respondents’ access to the
national highway. Respondents demanded the demolition of the fence,
but petitioner refused.

In her Answer, petitioner averred that respondents had not established

any easement of right-of-way either by law or agreement. She claimed
that respondents failed to satisfy the requisites provided in Articles 649
and 650 of the Civil Code in order to establish an easement of right-of-
way on the northern portion of her property. Moreover, she alleged that
respondents had another access as ingress and egress to the public
road other than the one traversing her property.

Issue:
WON respondents are entitled to an easement of right of way.

Held:
NO. Granting for the sake of argument that the issue of voluntary
easement of right-of-way, subject of the assailed March 20, 2001 Order,
was proper, relevant, and material to the issue of right-of-way as
averred in the complaint in Civil Case No. 5033, still, the conclusion
that there was an agreed or voluntary easement of right-of-way had

126
no basis. The records of Civil Case No. 5033 do not reveal any
agreement executed by the parties on the claimed right-of-way. Glaring
is the fact that the terms of the arrangement were not agreed upon by
the parties, more particularly, the payment of the proper indemnity. The
evidence is not ample enough to support the conclusion that there was
a verbal agreement on the right-of-way over the southern portion.

More so, since a right-of-way is an interest in the land, any

agreement creating it should be drawn and executed with the same
formalities as a deed to a real estate, and ordinarily must be in
writing. No written instrument on this agreement was adduced by
respondents.

CRISPIN DICHOSO, JR., vs. PATROCINIO L. MARCOS

G.R. No. 180282               April 11, 2011

Facts:
Petitioners Dichoso, et. al., filed a Complaint for Easement of Right of
Way against respondent Marcos alleging that they are the owners of Lot
No. 21553; while respondent is the owner of Lot No. 1. As petitioners
had no access to a public road to and from their property, they claimed
to have used a portion of Lot No. 1 in accessing the road since 1970.
Respondent, however, blocked the passageway with piles of sand.
Though petitioners have been granted another passageway by the
spouses Arce, the owners of another adjacent lot, the former instituted
the complaint before the RTC and prayed for the grant of petitioner’s
(plaintiff) right of way over an area of 54 square meters more or less of
Lot 01.

In his Answer, respondent denied that he allowed anybody to use Lot

No. 1 as passageway. He stated that petitioners’ claim of right of way is
only due to expediency and not necessity. He also maintained that there
is an existing easement of right of way available to petitioners granted
by the Spouses Arce. Thus, there is no need to establish another
easement over respondent’s property.

The RTC found that petitioners adequately established the requisites to

justify an easement of right of way in accordance with Articles 649 and
650 of the Civil Code. The trial court likewise declared petitioners in
good faith as they expressed their willingness to pay proper indemnity.

Issue:
WON petitioners are entitled to a legal easement.

Held:
NO. In case the right of way is limited to the necessary passage for the
cultivation of the estate surrounded by others and for the gathering of
its crops through the servient estate without a permanent way, the

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indemnity shall consist in the payment of the damages caused by such
encumbrance. This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the
immovable is due to the proprietor’s own acts.

To be entitled to an easement of right of way, the following requisites

should be met:

1. The dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has

no adequate outlet to a public highway;
2. There is payment of proper indemnity;
3. The isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the
dominant estate; and
4. The right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the
distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest.

Petitioners may be correct in the theoretical reading of Articles 649 and

650 of the Civil Code, but they nevertheless failed to show sufficient
factual evidence to satisfy the above-enumerated requirements. It must
be stressed that, by its very nature, and when considered with
reference to the obligations imposed on the servient estate, an
easement involves an abnormal restriction on the property rights
of the servient owner and is regarded as a charge or encumbrance
on the servient estate. It is incumbent upon the owner of the
dominant estate to establish by clear and convincing evidence the
presence of all the preconditions before his claim for easement of right
of way may be granted. Petitioners failed in this regard.

Admittedly, petitioners had been granted a right of way through the

other adjacent lot owned by the Spouses Arce. In fact, other lot owners
use the said outlet in going to and coming from the public highway.
Clearly, there is an existing outlet to and from the public road.

However, petitioners claim that the outlet is longer and circuitous, and
they have to pass through other lots owned by different owners before
they could get to the highway. We find petitioners’ concept of what is
"adequate outlet" a complete disregard of the well-entrenched doctrine
that in order to justify the imposition of an easement of right of
way, there must be real, not fictitious or artificial, necessity for it.
Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required
by law as the basis of setting up a compulsory easement. Even in
the face of necessity, if it can be satisfied without imposing the
easement, the same should not be imposed.

The convenience of the dominant estate has never been the gauge for
the grant of compulsory right of way. To be sure, the true standard for
the grant of the legal right is "adequacy." Hence, when there is already

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an existing adequate outlet from the dominant estate to a public
highway, as in this case, even when the said outlet, for one reason or
another, be inconvenient, the need to open up another servitude is
entirely unjustified.

RODOLFO REGALA vs. FEDERICO P. CARIN

G.R. No. 188715               April 6, 2011

Facts:
Petitioner and respondent are adjacent neighbors. When
petitioner decided to renovate his one storey residence by
constructing a second floor, he under the guise of merely
building an extension to his residence, approached respondent
for permission to bore a hole through a perimeter wall shared by
both their respective properties, to which respondent verbally
consented on condition that petitioner would clean the area
affected by the work.

In the course of the construction of the second floor, respondent

and his wife Marietta suffered from the dust and dirt which fell
on their property. As petitioner failed to address the problem to
respondent’s satisfaction, respondent filed a complaint alleging
that instead of boring just one hole as agreed upon, petitioner
demolished the whole length of the wall from top to bottom into
five parts for the purpose of constructing a second floor with
terrace; and that debris and dust piled up on respondent’s
property ruining his garden and forcing him to, among other
things, shut some of the windows of his house. Respondent thus
prayed for the award of moral and exemplary damages.

Petitioner, denying respondent’s allegations, claimed in his that

he was the sole and exclusive owner of the wall referred to as a
perimeter wall, the same having been built within the confines of
his property and being part and parcel of the house and lot
package he purchased from the developer, BF Homes, Inc., in
1981; that the issue of its ownership has never been raised by
respondent or his predecessor; and that securing the consent of

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respondent and his neighbors was a mere formality in
compliance with the requirements of the Building Official to
facilitate the issuance of a building permit, hence, it should not
be taken to mean that he (petitioner) acknowledges respondent
to be a co-owner of the wall. He added that he eventually
secured the requisite building permit in March 1999 and had
duly paid the administrative fine.

In its decision, the RTC rendered a decision in favour of

respondent holding that, apart from the fact that petitioner
knowingly commenced the renovation of his house without the
requisite building permit, he misrepresented to respondent his
true intent of introducing renovations.

Issue:
WON petitioner was the exclusive owner of the perimeter wall.

Held:
It bears noting that petitioner was engaged in the lawful exercise
of his property rights to introduce renovations to his abode. 
While he initially did not have a building permit and may have
misrepresented his real intent when he initially sought
respondent's consent, the lack of the permit was inconsequential
since it only rendered petitioner liable to administrative
sanctions or penalties.

Petitioner, however, cannot steer clear from any liability

whatsoever. Respondent and his family's rights to the peaceful
enjoyment of their property have, at the very least, been
inconvenienced from the incident borne of petitioner's
construction work. Any pecuniary loss or damage suffered by
respondent cannot be established as the records are bereft of
any factual evidence to establish the same.  Nominal damages
may thus be adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff,
respondent herein, which has been violated or invaded by the
defendant, petitioner herein, may be vindicated or recognized,
and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss
suffered by him.

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 MIGUEL FABIE Y GUTIERREZ vs. JULITA LICHAUCO
G.R. No. L-3598            July 24, 1908

Facts:
Respondent Lichauco and petitioner Fabie derived their property from
Juan Coloma, the original owner of both estates, who, at the time of
constructing them, establish upon the latter estate, not only an
easement of right of way, which the petitioner admits, but also the
easement of light; and that when both properties were alienated that of
petitioner and that of the respondents (Julita Lichauco), the apparent
sign of the existence of said easement was not removed, nor was it
expressed in the instrument of the alienation of the estates that such
easement should be abolished.

The apparent sign of the easements claimed in this case is made to

consist of a gallery with windows through which light is admitted. In
her written opposition Lichauco states that the said gallery is supported
on columns erected on the ground belonging to the petitioner, and tates
that the balcony of her building is supported by uprights erected on
land owned by the petitioner. The parties to the suit having admitted
the actual existence of the aforesaid gallery, the question now to be
decided is whether or not it existed when the ownership of the two
estates of Juan Bautista Santa Coloma was divided by the alienation of
the one which now belongs to the respondent (Lichauco) and which was
the first sold on October 31, 1848.

Issue:
WON the easement of light and view existed when the ownership of the
subject property where transferred to them.

Held:
NO. It is a settled rule that real estate shall be presumed to be free from
encumbrance unless and until the contrary is shown. When the
construction of windows and balconies does not constitute an actual
invasion of the rights of another, but is a lawful exercise of an inherent

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right, the easement of light and view is negative. One who opposes the
registration of title to land upon which he claims all easement in the
name of another, basing his claim on the provisions of article 541 of the
Civil Code, must show that the "apparent sign of the easement," upon
which he relies, was in existence at the time the servitude was
established.

When an easement of light and view is negative, the period for

prescription begins to run from the date on which the owner of the
dominant estate, by a formal act, prohibited the owner of the servient
estate to do something which he might properly do if the easement did
not exist.

RESTITUTO CALMA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 78447 August 17, 1989

Facts:
Spouses Restituto and Pilar Calma purchased a lot in respondent
Pleasantville Development Corporation's. In 1976, they built a house on
said lot and established residence therein. Fabian and Nenita Ong also
purchased from PLEASANTVILLE a lot fronting that of the Calma
spouses sometime in the years 1979-1980, and constructed their own
buildings where they resided and conducted their business.

Petitioner Calma filed a complaint for damages against the Ong spouses
and PLEASANTVILLE alleging inter alia that were it not for
PLEASANTVILLE's act of selling the lot to the Ongs and its failure to
exercise its right to cause the demolition of the alleged illegal
constructions, the nuisance could not have existed and petitioner and
his family would not have sustained damage.

Issue:
WON

Held:
The spouses Ong were not party to the proceedings before the
Commission which culminated in the order for the prevention or
abatement of the alleged nuisance. The parties before the Commission
were petitioner and PLEASANTVILLE only, although the persons who
would be directly affected by a decision favorable to petitioner would be
the Ong spouses. Certainly, to declare their property or the activities
being conducted therein a nuisance, and to order prevention and
abatement, without giving them an opportunity to be heard would be in
violation of their basic right to due process. We find in this case a
complete disregard of the cardinal primary rights in administrative
proceedings, which had been hornbook law since the leading case of
Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940).

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The Commission gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it ordered PLEASANTVILLE to "take
appropriate measure for the prevention/abatement of the nuisance
complained of" against the property of the Ong spouses who were not a
party to the proceedings.

EMILIO GANCAYCO vs. QUEZON CITY

G.R. No. 177807               October 11, 2011

Facts:
The MMDA then sent a notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco
alleging that a portion of his building violated the National Building
Code of the Philippines in relation to Ordinance No. 2904. He did not
comply with the notice. Thelma then proceeded to demolish the party
wall of the ground floor structure. The City Government of Quezon City
claimed that the ordinance was a valid exercise of police power,
regulating the use of property in a business zone. Justice Gancayco
filed a Petition with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ
of preliminary injunction. The RTC ruled that the ordinance was
unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC’s decision and
ruled that the ordinance was a valid exercise of the right of the local
government unit to promote the general welfare of its constituents
pursuant to its police powers

Issue:
WON the portion of the said building is a nuisance per se.

Held:
No. The fact that in 1966 the City Council gave Justice Gancayco an
exemption from constructing an arcade is an indication that the wing
walls of the building are not nuisances per se. The wing walls do not per
se immediately and adversely affect the safety of persons and property.
The fact that an ordinance may declare a structure illegal does not
necessarily make that structure a nuisance.

Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as any act, omission,
establishment, business, condition or property, or anything else that (1)
injures or endangers the health or safety of others; (2) annoys or offends
the senses; (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; (4)
obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or
street, or any body of water; or, (5) hinders or impairs the use of

133
property. A nuisance may be per se or per accidens. A nuisance per se
is that which affects the immediate safety of persons and property
and may summarily be abated under the undefined law of
necessity.

Clearly, when Justice Gancayco was given a permit to construct the

building, the city council or the city engineer did not consider the
building, or its demolished portion, to be a threat to the safety of
persons and property. This fact alone should have warned the MMDA
against summarily demolishing the structure. Neither does the MMDA
have the power to declare a thing a nuisance. Only courts of law have
the power to determine whether a thing is a nuisance.

UNISOURCE COMMERCIAL vs. JOSEPH CHUNG

G.R. No. 173252               July 17, 2009

Facts:
Petitioner Unisource Commercial and Development Corporation is the
registered owner of a parcel of land covered by a TCT title which
contains a memorandum of encumbrance of a voluntary easement that
has been carried over from the Original Certificate of Title of
Encarnacion S. Sandico. As Sandico’s property was transferred to
several owners, the memorandum of encumbrance of a voluntary
easement in favor of Francisco M. Hidalgo was consistently annotated at
the back of every title covering Sandico’s property until a new title was
issued in petitioner’s favor. On the other hand, Hidalgo’s property was
eventually transferred to respondents Joseph Chung, Kiat Chung and
Cleto Chung.

Petitioner filed a Petition to Cancel the Encumbrance of Voluntary

Easement of Right of Way on the ground that the dominant estate has
an adequate access to a public road which is Matienza Street. The trial
court dismissed the petition on the ground that it is a land registration
case. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. It is therefore found that the
dominant estate has an egress to Matienza St. and does not have to use
the servient estate. In their Answer, respondents countered that the
extinguishment of the easement will be of great prejudice to the locality
and that petitioner is guilty of laches since it took petitioner 15 years
from acquisition of the property to file the petition.

In its decision, the trial court ordered the cancellation of the

encumbrance of voluntary easement of right of way in favor of the
dominant estate owned by respondents. It found that the dominant
estate has no more use for the easement since it has another adequate
outlet to a public road which is Matienza Street. On appeal, the CA
reversed the decision of the trial court and ruled that Article 631(3) of
the Civil Code, which was cited by the trial court, is inapplicable since
the presence of an adequate outlet to a highway extinguishes only legal

134
or compulsory easements but not voluntary easements like in the
instant case. There having been an agreement between the original
parties for the provision of an easement of right of way in favor of the
dominant estate, the same can be extinguished only by mutual
agreement or by renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate.

Issue:
WON the easement is personal and not binding on the heirs or assigns
of Sandico.

Held:
NO. As defined, an easement is a real right on another’s property,
corporeal and immovable, whereby the owner of the latter must
refrain from doing or allowing somebody else to do or something to
be done on his property, for the benefit of another person or
tenement. Easements are established either by law or by the will of the
owner. The former are called legal, and the latter, voluntary easements.

In this case, petitioner itself admitted that a voluntary easement of right

of way exists in favor of respondents. Having made such an admission,
petitioner cannot now claim that what exists is a legal easement and
that the same should be cancelled since the dominant estate is not an
enclosed estate as it has an adequate access to a public road which is
Callejon Matienza Street. As we have said, the opening of an adequate
outlet to a highway can extinguish only legal or compulsory
easements, not voluntary easements like in the case at bar. The fact
that an easement by grant may have also qualified as an easement of
necessity does not detract from its permanency as a property right,
which survives the termination of the necessity. A voluntary easement
of right of way, like any other contract, could be extinguished only
by mutual agreement or by renunciation of the owner of the
dominant estate.

Neither can petitioner claim that the easement is personal only to

Hidalgo since the annotation merely mentioned Sandico and Hidalgo
without equally binding their heirs or assigns. That the heirs or assigns
of the parties were not mentioned in the annotation does not mean that
it is not binding on them. Again, a voluntary easement of right of way
is like any other contract. As such, it is generally effective between
the parties, their heirs and assigns, except in case where the rights
and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by
their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.

We also hold that although the easement does not appear in

respondents’ title over the dominant estate, the same subsists. It is
settled that the registration of the dominant estate under the Torrens
system without the annotation of the voluntary easement in its favor
does not extinguish the easement. On the contrary, it is the registration

135
of the servient estate as free, that is, without the annotation of the
voluntary easement, which extinguishes the easement.

Finally, the mere fact that respondents subdivided the property does
not extinguish the easement. Article 618 of the Civil Code provides that
if the dominant estate is divided between two or more persons, each of
them may use the easement in its entirety, without changing the place
of its use, or making it more burdensome in any other way.

TEODORO ACAP vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 118114 December 7, 1995

Facts:
Felixberto Oruma sold his inherited land to Cosme Pido, which
land is rented by petitioner Teodoro Acap. When Cosme died
intestate, his heirs executed a “Declaration of Heirship and
Waiver of Rights” in favor of private respondent Edy delos Reyes.
Respondent informed petitioner of his claim over the land, and
petitioner paid the rental to him in 1982. However in subsequent
years, petitioner refused to pay the rental, which prompted
respondent to file a complaint for the recovery of possession and
damages. Petitioner averred that he continues to recognize Pido
as the owner of the land, and that he will pay the accumulated
rentals to Pido’s widow upon her return from abroad. The lower
court ruled in favor of private respondent.

Issue:
WON the subject declaration of heirship and waiver of rights is a
recognized mode of acquiring ownership by private respondent
over the lot in question.

Held:
NO. An asserted right or claim to ownership or a real right
over a thing arising from a juridical act, however justified, is
not per se sufficient to give rise to ownership over the res.
That right or title must be completed by fulfilling certain
conditions imposed by law. Hence, ownership and real rights
are acquired only pursuant to a legal mode or process. While
title is the juridical justification, mode is the actual process of
acquisition or transfer of ownership over a thing in question.

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Under Article 712 of the Civil Code, the modes of acquiring
ownership are generally classified into two (2) classes, namely,
the original mode (i.e., through occupation, acquisitive
prescription, law or intellectual creation) and the derivative
mode (i.e., through succession mortis causa or tradition as a
result of certain contracts, such as sale, barter, donation,
assignment or mutuum).

In the case at bench, the trial court was obviously confused as to

the nature and effect of the Declaration of Heirship and Waiver
of Rights, equating the same with a contract (deed) of sale. They
are not the same. In a Contract of Sale, one of the contracting
parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to
deliver a determinate thing, and the other party to pay a price
certain in money or its equivalent. Upon the other hand, a
declaration of heirship and waiver of rights operates as a public
instrument when filed with the Registry of Deeds whereby the
intestate heirs adjudicate and divide the estate left by the
decedent among themselves as they see fit. It is in effect an
extrajudicial settlement between the heirs under Rule 74 of the
Rules of Court.
Hence, there is a marked difference between a sale of hereditary
rights and a waiver of hereditary rights. The first presumes the
existence of a contract or deed of sale between the parties. The
second is, technically speaking, a mode of extinction of
ownership where there is an abdication or intentional
relinquishment of a known right with knowledge of its existence
and intention to relinquish it, in favor of other persons who are
co-heirs in the succession. Private respondent, being then a
stranger to the succession of Cosme Pido, cannot
conclusively claim ownership over the subject lot on the
sole basis of the waiver document which neither recites the
elements of either a sale, or a donation, or any other
derivative mode of acquiring ownership.

137
 EDNA PALERO-TAN vs. CIRIACO I. URDANETA, JR.,
A.M. No. P-07-2399             June 18, 2008

Facts:
Complainant Palero-Tan, Court Stenographer III of the RTC
charged respondent Urdaneta, Jr., Utility Worker I of the same
court, with Conduct Unbecoming a Court Personnel, for stealing
her ring and bracelet. Complainant claimed that it has been her
practice to keep her and her sister’s pieces of jewelry in the
locked drawer of her table at her RTC office because she fears
that they might be lost at the boarding house she is renting.
However, one day, she discovered that her ring and bracelet were
missing. She maintained that the only person who was present
and saw her take out the jewelry from her table drawer was
respondent, whose table is adjacent to hers. An officemate,
confided to her that he heard from his landlady, that respondent
and his wife, had a quarrel because the latter discovered a ring
and a bracelet in respondent’s coin purse.

In a separate meeting with Judge Fulache, respondent confessed

that he found complainant’s jewels in the court’s premises, but
he could no longer return them because he already threw them
away. Respondent denied that he stole complainant’s jewelry. He
claimed, instead, that he found a small plastic sachet containing
a ring and a bracelet under his table and thinking that the
jewelry belonged to one of the litigants and took them for
safekeeping with the intention of returning them to whoever was
the owner.

Issue:
WON

Held:

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When a person who finds a thing that has been lost or
mislaid by the owner takes the thing into his hands, he
acquires physical custody only and does not become vested
with legal possession. In assuming such custody, the finder is
charged with the obligation of restoring the thing to its
owner. It is thus respondent’s duty to report to his superior or
his officemates that he found something. The Civil Code, in
Article 719, explicitly requires the finder of a lost property to
report it to the proper authorities.

Contrary to respondent’s claim, this Court is convinced that

respondent had the intention to appropriate the jewelry to
himself had these not been discovered by his wife. His claim that
the ring and bracelet were worthless "fancy" jewelry is
immaterial because the basis for his liability is his act of taking
something which does not belong to him.

By admittedly finding complainant’s ring and bracelet without

returning them to the rightful owner, respondent blatantly
degraded the judiciary and diminished the respect and regard of
the people for the court and its personnel. Every employee of the
judiciary should be an example of integrity, morality and
honesty. Like any other public servant, respondent must exhibit
the highest sense of trustworthiness and rectitude not only in
the performance of his official duties but also in his personal
and private dealings with other people, to preserve the court’s
good name and standing as a true temple of justice. It cannot be
overstressed that the image of a court of justice is mirrored in
the conduct, official and otherwise, of the personnel who work
there, from the judge to the lowest employee.

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 JARABINI G. DEL ROSARIO vs. ASUNCION G. FERRER
G.R. No. 187056               September 20, 2010

Facts:
Spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe Gonzales executed a document
entitled "Donation Mortis Causa" in favor of their two children, Asuncion
and Emiliano, and their granddaughter, Jarabini covering the spouses’
lot and the house on it in equal shares. Although denominated as a
donation mortis causa, which in law is the equivalent of a will, the deed
had no attestation clause and was witnessed by only two persons. The
named donees, however, signified their acceptance of the donation on
the face of the document.

Guadalupe, the donor wife, died in September 1968. A few months later
or on December 19, 1968, Leopoldo, the donor husband, executed a
deed of assignment of his rights and interests in subject property to
their daughter Asuncion. Leopoldo died in June 1972.

After trial, the RTC ruled that the donation was in fact one made inter
vivos, the donors’ intention being to transfer title over the property to
the donees during the donors’ lifetime, given its irrevocability. The CA
held the donation, being one given mortis causa, did not comply with
the requirements of a notarial will, rendering the same void. Following
the CA’s denial of Jarabini’s motion for reconsideration, she filed the
present petition with this Court.

Issue:
WON the disposition of the property is a donation mortis causa as in
fact designated, or actually a donation inter vivos.

Held:
That the document in question in this case was captioned "Donation
Mortis Causa" is not controlling. This Court has held that, if a donation
by its terms is inter vivos, this character is not altered by the fact that
the donor styles it mortis causa. Here, the donors plainly said that it is
"our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and shall
be respected by the surviving spouse." The intent to make the donation

140
irrevocable becomes even clearer by the proviso that a surviving donor
shall respect the irrevocability of the donation. Consequently, the
donation was in reality a donation inter vivos.

The donors in this case of course reserved the "right, ownership,

possession, and administration of the property" and made the donation
operative upon their death. But this Court has consistently held that
such reservation (reddendum) in the context of an irrevocable donation
simply means that the donors parted with their naked title, maintaining
only beneficial ownership of the donated property while they lived.

Notably, the three donees signed their acceptance of the donation,

which acceptance the deed required. This Court has held that an
acceptance clause indicates that the donation is inter vivos, since
acceptance is a requirement only for such kind of donations. Donations
mortis causa, being in the form of a will, need not be accepted by the
donee during the donor’s lifetime.

Finally, as Justice J. B. L. Reyes said in Puig v. Peñaflorida, in case of

doubt, the conveyance should be deemed a donation inter vivos rather
than mortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of
the property subject of the deed. Since the donation in this case was
one made inter vivos, it was immediately operative and final. The reason
is that such kind of donation is deemed perfected from the moment the
donor learned of the donee’s acceptance of the donation. The
acceptance makes the donee the absolute owner of the property
donated.

Given that the donation in this case was irrevocable or one given inter
vivos, Leopoldo’s subsequent assignment of his rights and interests in
the property to Asuncion should be regarded as void for, by then, he
had no more rights to assign. He could not give what he no longer had.
Nemo dat quod non habet.

The trial court cannot be faulted for passing upon, in a petition for
probate of what was initially supposed to be a donation mortis causa,
the validity of the document as a donation inter vivos and the nullity of
one of the donor’s subsequent assignment of his rights and interests in
the property. The Court has held before that the rule on probate is not
inflexible and absolute. Moreover, in opposing the petition for probate
and in putting the validity of the deed of assignment squarely in issue,
Asuncion or those who substituted her may not now claim that the trial
court improperly allowed a collateral attack on such assignment.

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 EUFEMIA PAJARILLO vs. IAC
G.R. No. 72908 August 11, 1989

Facts:
Juana Balane de Suterio had a brother named Felipe Balane and a
sister named Perfecta Balane de Cordero. When Perfecta died, she left a
tract of land. Juana and Felipe then executed a public instrument
entitled "Extra-judicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Perfecta
Balane de Cordero." The said instrument was never registered nor was
title transferred in Salud's name although she says she immediately
took possession of the land.

Meantime, intestate proceedings were instituted on the estate of

Perfecta and the said land was among those included in the inventory of
the properties belonging to the decedent. Salud interposed no objection
to its inclusion nor did she oppose its subsequent adjudication to her
mother Juana in the project of partition. It is not clear if the land was
ever registered in Juana's name.

Salud says she transferred the possession of the land to her mother,
who was then staying with Claudio and his family. During the period
they were occupying the land, Claudio paid the realty taxes thereon.
Juana executed a deed of absolute sale conveying the land to Claudio.
Two years later, Claudio had the land registered in its name and was
issued TCT.

Claudio died in 1961 and his mother in 1963. In 1965, the private
respondents filed a complaint for the reconveyance of the property on
the ground that the deed of sale in favor of Claudio was fictitious and its
registration in his name was null and void. Salud alleged that she was
unaware until later of the supposed sale of the land to Claudio. She
faulted it as having been procured through fraud and improper
influence on her sick and aged mother. She claimed that no
compensation was actually paid by Claudio and that the transaction
was deliberately concealed from her by her brother and the defendants.
For their part, the defendants assailed the donation to Salud as legally
inefficacious and defective and contended that her complaint was

142
barred by prescription, estoppel and res judicata. They also filed a
counterclaim questioning the sale to Salud by her mother of another
tract of land, in which they said they were entitled to share as Juana's
heirs.

Issue:
WON the donation is valid and effective.

Held:
NO. The donation is defective in form because of non-compliance with
the requirements of the law regarding its acceptance. There is no
question that the donation was accepted in a separate public
instrument and that it was duly communicated to the donors. Even the
petitioners cannot deny this. But what they do contend is that such
acceptance was not "noted in both instruments," meaning the
extrajudicial partition itself and the instrument of acceptance, as
required by the Civil Code.

In the case at bar, it is not even suggested that Juana was unaware of
the acceptance for she in fact confirmed it later and requested that the
donated land be not registered during her lifetime by Salud. Given this
significant evidence, the Court cannot in conscience declare the
donation ineffective because there is no notation in the extrajudicial
settlement of the donee’s acceptance. That would be placing too much
stress on mere form over substance. It would also disregard the clear
reality of the acceptance of the donation as manifested in these separate
instrument dated June 20, 1946, and as later acknowledged by Juana.

It is pointed out that the donation is defective in form because of non-

compliance with the requirements of the law regarding its acceptance.
As it was executed in 1946, the applicable rule is Article 633 of the old
Civil Code reading as follows: Art. 633. In order that a donation of
real property be valid it must be made by public instrument in
which the property donated must be optically described and the
amount of the charges to be assumed by the donee expressed. The
acceptance may be made in the deed of gift or in a separate public
writing; but it shall produce no effect if not made during the lifetime of
the donor. If the acceptance is made by separate public instrument,
authentic notice thereof shall be given the donor, and this proceeding
shall be noted in both instruments. A strict interpretation of Article 633
can lead to no other conclusion than the annulment of the donation for
being defective in form as urged by the petitioners. This would be in
keeping with the unmistakable language of the above-quoted provision.
However, we find that under the circumstances of the present case, a
literal adherence to the requirement of the law might result not in
justice to the parties but conversely a distortion of their intentions. It is
also a policy of the Court to avoid such an interpretation.

143
There is nothing in the subject instrument to suggest that the donation
was to take effect upon the death of the donors as to make it a donation
mortis causa, as urged by the petitioners. The donation became
effective upon acceptance by Salud except that, in obedience to her
mother’s request, she chose not to register the land in the meantime
and to allow her mother to enjoy its fruits. What was deferred was not
its effectivity but only its enjoyment by Salud. Registration was not
necessary to make the donation a binding commitment insofar as the
donors and the donee were concerned.

MANUEL A. ECHAVEZ vs. DOZEN CONSTRUCTION

G.R. No. 192916               October 11, 2010

Facts:
Vicente Echavez was the absolute owner of several lots. He
donated the subject lots to petitioner Manuel Echavez through a
Deed of Donation Mortis Causa. Manuel accepted the donation.
In March 1986, Vicente executed a Contract to Sell over the
same lots in favor of Dozen Construction and Development
Corporation. In October 1986, they executed two Deeds of
Absolute Sale over the same properties covered by the previous
Contract to Sell.

When Vicente died, Emiliano Cabanig, Vicente’s nephew, filed a

petition for the settlement of Vicente’s intestate estate. On the
other hand, Manuel filed a petition to approve Vicente’s donation
mortis causa in his favor and an action to annul the contracts of
sale Vicente executed in favor of Dozen Corporation. These cases
were jointly heard.

The RTC dismissed Manuel’s petition to approve the donation

and his action for annulment of the contracts of sale holding
that the execution of a Contract to Sell in favor of Dozen
Corporation, after Vicente had donated the lots to Manuel, was
an equivocal act that revoked the donation. The Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed the RTC’s decision. The CA held that since the
donation in favor of Manuel was a donation mortis causa,
compliance with the formalities for the validity of wills should
have been observed. The CA found that the deed of donation did
not contain an attestation clause and was therefore void.

Issue:
WON the donation mortis causa is valid as to its form.

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Held:
NO. A donation mortis causa must comply with the formalities
prescribed by law for the validity of wills, "otherwise, the
donation is void and would produce no effect." Articles 805 and
806 of the Civil Code should have been applied. The purported
attestation clause embodied in the Acknowledgment portion
does not contain the number of pages on which the deed
was written. The exception to this rule in Singson v. Florentino
and Taboada v. Hon. Rosal, cannot be applied to the present
case, as the facts of this case are not similar with those of
Singson and Taboada. In those cases, the Court found that
although the attestation clause failed to state the number of
pages upon which the will was written, the number of pages was
stated in one portion of the will. This is not the factual situation
in the present case.

Even granting that the Acknowledgment embodies what the

attestation clause requires, we are not prepared to hold that an
attestation clause and an acknowledgment can be merged in one
statement.

That the requirements of attestation and acknowledgment are

embodied in two separate provisions of the Civil Code (Articles
805 and 806, respectively) indicates that the law contemplates
two distinct acts that serve different purposes. An
acknowledgment is made by one executing a deed, declaring
before a competent officer or court that the deed or act is his
own. On the other hand, the attestation of a will refers to the act
of the instrumental witnesses themselves who certify to the
execution of the instrument before them and to the manner of its
execution.
Although the witnesses in the present case acknowledged the
execution of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa before the
notary public, this is not the avowal the law requires from the
instrumental witnesses to the execution of a decedent’s will. An
attestation must state all the details the third paragraph of
Article 805 requires. In the absence of the required avowal by
the witnesses themselves, no attestation clause can be deemed
embodied in the Acknowledgement of the Deed of Donation
Mortis Causa.

145
 INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE vs. CARPONIA T. EBRADO
G.R. No. L-44059 October 28, 1977

Facts:
Buenaventura Cristor Ebrado was issued by the plaintiff Insural
Life a policy on a whole-life for P5,882.00 with a, rider for
Accidental Death for the same amount. He designated Carponia
T. Ebrado as the revocable beneficiary in his policy. He to her as
his wife.

When Buenaventura C. Ebrado died, Carponia T. Ebrado filed

with the insurer a claim for the proceeds of the Policy as the
designated beneficiary therein, although she admits that she
and the insured Buenaventura C. Ebrado were merely living as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. Pascuala Vda.
de Ebrado also filed her claim as the widow of the deceased
insured. She asserts that she is the one entitled to the insurance
proceeds, not the common-law wife, Carponia T. Ebrado.

Issue:
WON a common law wife is entitled to the insurance proceeds.

Held:
NO. Under Article 2012 of the same Code, "any person who is
forbidden from receiving any donation under Article 739 cannot
be named beneficiary of a fife insurance policy by the person
who cannot make a donation to him. Common-law spouses are,
definitely, barred from receiving donations from each other.
Article 739 of the new Civil Code provides:

The following donations shall be void:

1. Those made between persons who were guilty of

adultery or concubinage at the time of donation;

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 2. Those made between persons found guilty of the
same criminal offense, in consideration thereof;

3. Those made to a public officer or his wife,

descendants or ascendants by reason of his office.

In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of

nullity may be brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and
the guilt of the donee may be proved by preponderance of
evidence in the same action.

In essence, a life insurance policy is no different from a civil

donation insofar as the beneficiary is concerned. Both are
founded upon the same consideration: liberality. A beneficiary is
like a donee, because from the premiums of the policy which the
insured pays out of liberality, the beneficiary will receive the
proceeds or profits of said insurance. As a consequence, the
proscription in Article 739 of the new Civil Code should
equally operate in life insurance contracts. The mandate of
Article 2012 cannot be laid aside: any person who cannot receive
a donation cannot be named as beneficiary in the life insurance
policy of the person who cannot make the donation. Under
American law, a policy of life insurance is considered as a
testament and in construing it, the courts will, so far as possible
treat it as a will and determine the effect of a clause designating
the beneficiary by rules under which wins are interpreted.

On the contrary, the law plainly states that the guilt of the party
may be proved "in the same acting for declaration of nullity of
donation. And, it would be sufficient if evidence preponderates
upon the guilt of the consort for the offense indicated. The
quantum of proof in criminal cases is not demanded.

147
 REPUBLIC vs. AFP RSBS
G.R. No. 180463               January 16, 2013

Facts:
Lots X, Y-1 and Y-2 – lands of the public domain were reserved
for recreation and health purposes by virtue of Proclamation No.
168 which was issued in 1963. In 1983, Proclamation No. 2273
removing and segregating Lots Y-1 and Y-2 from the reservation
and declaring them open for disposition to qualified applicants.
As a result, only Lot X remained part of the reservation now
known as Magsaysay Park.

In 1997, respondents-intervenors filed applications for the

issuance of individual miscellaneous sales patents over the
whole of Lot X with the DENR regional office in General Santos
City, which approved them. Consequently, 16 original
certificates of title (OCTs) covering Lot X were issued in the
names of respondents-intervenors and several others. In
September 1997, these 16 titles were simultaneously conveyed
to herein respondent AFP-RSBS, resulting in the issuance of 16
new titles.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines instituted a Complaint for

reversion, cancellation and annulment of the AFP-RSBS titles,
on the thesis that they were issued over a public park which is
classified as inalienable and non-disposable public land.

Respondents-intervenors intervened and, together with the

defendant AFP-RSBS, argued that their predecessor-in-interest
Kusop had acquired vested interests over Lot X even before Proc.
168 was issued, having occupied the same for more than 30
years. They claimed that these vested rights, taken together with
the favorable recommendations and actions of the DENR and
other government agencies to the effect that Lot X was alienable
and disposable land of the public domain, as well as the

148
subsequent issuance of sales patents and OCTs in their names,
cannot be defeated by Proc. 168.

Respondents-intervenors filed an urgent motion to dismiss the

Complaint claiming, among others, the "invalidity of the
donation as the subject thereof had not yet been excluded from
the Magsaysay Park."

Issue:
WON the donation is valid.

Held:
NO. There are three essential elements of donations: [1] the
reduction of the patrimony of the donor, [2] the increase in the
patrimony of the donee, and [3] the intent to do an act of
liberality (animus donandi). Granting that there is an animus
donandi, we find that the alleged donation lacks the first two
elements which presuppose the donor's ownership rights over
the subject of the donation which he transmits to the donee
thereby enlarging the donee's estate. This is in consonance with
the rule that a donor cannot lawfully convey what is not his
property. In other words, a donation of a parcel of land the
dominical rights of which do not belong to the donor at the
time of the donation, is void. This holds true even if the
subject of the donation is not the land itself but the possessory
and proprietary rights over said land.

In this case, although they allegedly declared Magsaysay Park as

their own for taxation purposes, the heirs of Cabalo Kusop did
not have any transmissible proprietary rights over the donated
property at the time of the donation. In fact, with respect to Lot
Y-2, they still had to file a free patents application to obtain an
original certificate of title thereon. This is because Proclamation
No. 2273 declaring as ‘open to disposition under the provisions
of the Public Land Act’ some portions of the Magsaysay Park, is
not an operative law which automatically vests rights of
ownership on the heirs of Cabalo Kusop over their claimed
parcels of land.

149
 CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSITY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 112127 July 17, 1995

Facts:
Sometime in 1939, the late Don Ramon Lopez, Sr., who was then a
member of the Board of Trustees of the Central Philippine University
(CPU), executed a deed of donation in favor of the latter of a parcel of
land with the following annotations copied from the deed of donation —

1. The land described shall be utilized by the CPU exclusively for

the establishment and use of a medical college with all its buildings
as part of the curriculum;

2. The said college shall not sell, transfer or convey to any third
party nor in any way encumber said land;

3. The said land shall be called "RAMON LOPEZ CAMPUS", and the
said college shall be under obligation to erect a cornerstone bearing
that name. Any net income from the land or any of its parks shall
be put in a fund to be known as the "RAMON LOPEZ CAMPUS
FUND" to be used for improvements of said campus and erection of
a building thereon.

On 31 May 1989, private respondents, who are the heirs of Don Ramon
Lopez, Sr., filed an action for annulment of donation, reconveyance and
damages against CPU alleging that since 1939 up to the time the action
was filed the latter had not complied with the conditions of the
donation. Private respondents also argued that petitioner had in fact
negotiated with the National Housing Authority (NHA) to exchange the
donated property with another land owned by the latter.

In its answer petitioner alleged that the right of private respondents to

file the action had prescribed; that it did not violate any of the
conditions in the deed of donation because it never used the donated
property for any other purpose than that for which it was intended;
and, that it did not sell, transfer or convey it to any third party.

The trial court held that petitioner failed to comply with the conditions
of the donation and declared it null and void. The court a quo further

150
directed petitioner to execute a deed of the reconveyance of the property
in favor of the heirs of the donor, namely, private respondents herein.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which ruled that the
annotations at the back of petitioner's certificate of title were resolutory
conditions breach of which should terminate the rights of the donee
thus making the donation revocable.

Issue:
WON the said donation can be revoked.
Held:
YES. Under Art. 1181 of the Civil Code, on conditional obligations, the
acquisition of rights, as well as the extinguishment or loss of those
already acquired, shall depend upon the happening of the event which
constitutes the condition. Thus, when a person donates land to
another on the condition that the latter would build upon the land
a school, the condition imposed was not a condition precedent or a
suspensive condition but a resolutory one. It is not correct to say
that the schoolhouse had to be constructed before the donation became
effective, that is, before the donee could become the owner of the land,
otherwise, it would be invading the property rights of the donor. The
donation had to be valid before the fulfillment of the condition. If there
was no fulfillment or compliance with the condition, such as what
obtains in the instant case, the donation may now be revoked and
all rights which the donee may have acquired under it shall be
deemed lost and extinguished.

Moreover, the time from which the cause of action accrued for the
revocation of the donation and recovery of the property donated cannot
be specifically determined in the instant case. this case, the starting
point begins with the expiration of a reasonable period and opportunity
for petitioner to fulfill what has been charged upon it by the donor.

The period of time for the establishment of a medical college and the
necessary buildings and improvements on the property cannot be
quantified in a specific number of years because of the presence of
several factors and circumstances involved in the erection of an
educational institution, such as government laws and regulations
pertaining to education, building requirements and property restrictions
which are beyond the control of the donee.

Finally, since the questioned deed of donation herein is basically a

gratuitous one, doubts referring to incidental circumstances of a
gratuitous contract should be resolved in favor of the least transmission
of rights and interests. Records are clear and facts are undisputed that
since the execution of the deed of donation up to the time of filing of the
instant action, petitioner has failed to comply with its obligation as
donee. Petitioner has slept on its obligation for an unreasonable length
of time. Hence, it is only just and equitable now to declare the subject

151
donation already ineffective and, for all purposes, revoked so that
petitioner as donee should now return the donated property to the heirs
of the donor, private respondents herein, by means of reconveyance.

ELOY IMPERIAL vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 112483 October 8, 1999

Facts:
Leoncio Imperial was the registered owner of a parcel of land which he
sold for P1.00 to his acknowledged natural son, petitioner Eloy
Imperial, who then acquired title over the land and proceeded to
subdivide it into several lots. Petitioner and private respondents admit
that despite the contract's designation as one of "Absolute Sale", the
transaction was in fact a donation.

On July 28, 1953, or barely two years after the donation, Leoncio filed a
complaint for annulment of the said Deed of Absolute Sale on the
ground that he was deceived by petitioner herein into signing the said
document. The dispute, however, was resolved through a compromise
agreement. On January 8, 1962, Leoncio died, leaving only two heirs —
the herein petitioner, who is his acknowledged natural son, and an
adopted son, Victor Imperial. Victor was substituted in place of Leoncio
and it was he who moved for execution of judgment. The motion for
execution was duly granted. In 1977, Victor died single and without
issue, survived only by his natural father, Ricardo Villalon, who was a
lessee of a portion of the disputed land. Four years hence, or on
September 25, 1981, Ricardo died, leaving as his only heirs his two
children, Cesar and Teresa Villalon.

Sometime in 1986, Cesar and Teresa filed a complaint for annulment of

the donation. In 1989, they filed an amended for "Annulment of
Documents, Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession" seeking the
nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale on grounds of fraud, deceit
and inofficiousness. In the amended complaint, it was alleged that
petitioner caused Leoncio to execute the donation by taking undue
advantage of the latter's physical weakness and mental unfitness, and
that the conveyance of said property in favor of petitioner impaired the
legitime of Victor Imperial, their natural brother and predecessor-in-
interest. In his Answer, petitioner alleged that Leoncio had conveyed
sufficient property to Victor to cover his legitime.

The RTC held the donation to be inofficious and impairing the legitime
of Victor, on the basis of its finding that at the time of Leoncio's death,

152
he left no property other than the 32,837-square meter parcel of land
which he had donated to petitioner. The RTC went on further to state
that petitioner's allegation that other properties existed and were
inherited by Victor was not substantiated by the evidence.

Issue:
WON the donation is inofficious, thus, can be revoked.

Held:
YES. It must be remembered that at the time of the substitution, the
judgment approving the compromise agreement has already been
rendered. Victor merely participated in the execution of the compromise
judgment. He was not a party to the compromise agreement. More
importantly, our law on succession does not countenance tacit
repudiation of inheritance. Rather, it requires an express act on the
part of the heir.

Thus, when Victor substituted Leoncio upon the latter's death, his act
of moving for execution of the compromise judgment cannot be
considered an act of renunciation of his legitime. He was, therefore, not
precluded or estopped from subsequently seeking the reduction of the
donation, under Article 772. Nor are Victor's heirs, upon his death,
precluded from doing so, as their right to do so is expressly recognized
under Article 772, and also in Article 1053.

The Civil Code specifies the following instances of reduction or

revocation of donations: (1) four years, in cases of subsequent birth,
appearance, recognition or adoption of a child; (2) four years, for non-
compliance with conditions of the donation; and (3) at any time during
the lifetime of the donor and his relatives entitled to support, for failure
of the donor to reserve property for his or their support. Interestingly,
donations as in the instant case, the reduction of which hinges upon
the allegation of impairment of legitime, are not controlled by a
particular prescriptive period, for which reason we must resort to the
ordinary rules of prescription.

Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actions upon an obligation created
by law must be brought within ten years from the time the right of
action accrues. Thus, the ten-year prescriptive period applies to the
obligation to reduce inofficious donations, required under Article 771 of
the Civil Code, to the extent that they impair the legitime of compulsory
heirs. It took private respondents 24 years since the death of Leoncio to
initiate this case. The action, therefore, has long prescribed.

153
 ANTONIO SOLIS & ANGELA SOLIS CALIMLIM vs. CA
G.R. No. L-46753-54 August 25, 1989

Facts:
Plaintiffs Antonio Solis and Angela Solis Calimlim alleged that
they are co-owners of a parcel of residential land which they
inherited from their parents. In 1939, they allowed defendants
Jose Solis and his wife Florencia Dioquino to construct a house
on the eastern portion of plaintiffs' parcel of with the
understanding that they should vacate the premises as soon as
their financial conditions would permit them. In 1965, plaintiffs
demanded that the defendants vacate the premises but the latter
refused.

In their answer, defendants raised as affirmative defense the fact

of their ownership of the property in question having acquired
the same by way of donacion proper nuptias from spouses Tomas
Solis and Hermenegilda Jimenez, way back in 1931. They also
alleged that since 1931, they were in possession of said property
openly, continuously and adversely, to the exclusion of all
others, and in the concept of owners and that since 1931 they
have paid the taxes due on the property.

On November 21, 1968, plaintiffs filed a Motion for the Issuance

of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction praying that the
defendants or their agents be enjoined from commencing and
continuing the construction of a residential house on the land in
question.

The trial court found that indeed, herein private respondents

spouses Jose Solis and Florencia Dioquino were in possession of
the eastern half portion of the property described in the
complaint for more than thirty years. However, it ruled that such
possession cannot be held adversely against the plaintiffs who
had shown a better title thereto. On appeal, the CA reversed the

154
decision of the trial court and declared the appellants the lawful
owners of the eastern half of the parcel of land described in the
complaint.

Issue:
WON private respondents acquired ownership of the subject
land thru donation.

Held:
YES. A void donation may be the basis of claim of ownership
which may ripen into title by prescription. It is the essence of
the statute of limitations that, whether the party had a right to
the possession or not, if he entered under the claim of such right
and remained in possession for the period (ten years) named in
the statute of limitations, the right of action of the plaintiff who
had the better title is barred by that adverse possession. The
right given by the statute of limitations does not depend upon,
and has no necessary connection, with the validity of the claim
under which the possession is held. . . ." The "just title" required
for acquisitive prescription to set in is not "titulo verdadero y
valido" — or such title which by itself is sufficient to transfer
ownership without necessity of letting the prescriptive period
elapse but only "titulo colorado" — or such title where, although
there was a mode of transferring ownership, still something is
wrong because the grantor is not the owner.

The donacion was made in 1931 and spouses Jose Solis and
Florencia Dioquino took possession of the land in 1933 by virtue
of the donacion. It was the Code of Civil Procedure which was
then in force. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, ten years of
adverse possession by a person claiming to be the owner, in
whatever way such occupancy may have commenced shall vest
in every actual possessor of such land a full complete title. In
Ongsiaco v. Dallo, (27 SCRA 161) the Supreme Court said: ‘Under
the Code of Civil Procedure formerly in force, good or bad faith
was immaterial for purposes of acquisitive prescription. Adverse
possession in either character ripened into ownership after the
lapse of ten years.

155
 REPUBLIC vs. TEODORO P. RIZALVO, JR.,
G.R. No. 172011               March 7, 2011

Facts:
Respondent Rizalvo, Jr. filed an application for the registration of a
parcel of land alleging that he is the owner in fee simple of the subject
parcel of land, that he obtained title over the land by virtue of a Deed of
Transfer in 1962, and that he is currently in possession of the land. In
support of his claim, he presented, among others, Tax Declaration for
the year 1994 in his name, and Proof of Payment of real property taxes
beginning in 1952 up to the time of filing of the application. He also
stated that he was the one who had the property surveyed; that no one
opposed the survey; and that during said survey, they placed concrete
markers on the boundaries of the property. Further, he stated that he
was not aware of any person or entity which questioned his mother’s
ownership and possession of the subject property.

The OSG filed an Opposition alleging that neither respondent nor his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject property since June
12, 1945 or earlier and that the tax declarations and tax payment
receipts did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of
ownership. The OSG also asserted that the subject property was a
portion of public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines
and hence not subject to private acquisition.

At the hearing of the application, no private oppositor came forth. After

conducting an investigation and verification of the records involving the
subject land, CENRO certified that indeed the subject parcel of land
was within the alienable and disposable zone and that the applicant
was indeed in actual occupation and possession of the land.

In its petition, the OSG argues that the Republic of the Philippines has
dominion over all lands of public domain and that the grant to private
individuals of imperfect title by the Republic over its alienable and
disposable lands is a mere privilege. Hence, judicial confirmation
proceeding is strictly construed against the grantee/applicant.

156
On the other hand, respondent counters that he has presented
sufficient proof that the subject property was indeed part of the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain. He also asserts that
his title over the land can be traced by documentary evidence wayback
to 1948 and hence, the length of time required by law for acquisition of
an imperfect title over alienable public land has been satisfied.

Issue:
WON respondent was able to acquire the land by prescription.

Held:
NO. It is well settled that prescription is one of the modes of
acquiring ownership and that properties classified as alienable
public land may be converted into private property by reason of
open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty years.

On this basis, respondent would have been eligible for application for
registration because his claim of ownership and possession over the
subject property even exceeds thirty (30) years. However, it is
jurisprudentially clear that the thirty (30)-year period of prescription for
purposes of acquiring ownership and registration of public land under
Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529 only begins from the moment the
State expressly declares that the public dominion property is no
longer intended for public service or the development of the
national wealth or that the property has been converted into
patrimonial.

In the case at bar, respondent merely presented a certification and

report from the DENR-CENRO dated July 17, 2001 certifying that the
land in question entirely falls within the alienable and disposable zone
since January 21, 1987; that it has not been earmarked for public use;
and that it does not encroach any area devoted to general public use.
Unfortunately, such certification and report is not enough in order to
commence the thirty (30)-year prescriptive period under Section 14 (2).
There is no evidence in this case indicating any express declaration by
the state that the subject land is no longer intended for public service or
the development of the national wealth. Thus, there appears no basis
for the application of the thirty (30)-year prescriptive period in this case.

Indeed, even assuming arguendo that the DENR-CENRO certification

and report is enough to signify that the land is no longer intended for
public service or the development of the national wealth, respondent is
still not entitled to registration because the land was certified as
alienable and disposable in 1987, while the application for registration
was filed on December 7, 2000, a mere thirteen (13) years after and far
short of the required thirty (30) years under existing laws on
prescription.

157
Although we would want to adhere to the State’s policy of encouraging
and promoting the distribution of alienable public lands to spur
economic growth and remain true to the ideal of social justice we are
constrained by the clear and simple requisites of the law to disallow
respondent’s application for registration.

POTENCIANO SUNGA, ET AL, vs. BENITO DE GUZMAN, ET AL

G.R. No. L-25847 June 19, 1979

Facts:
Five (5) of the nine (9) legitimate heirs of spouses Juan de Guzman
and Lucia Montemayor signed a private Contract of Sale involving a
fishpond. The said five (5) heirs sold their respective shares to
Feliciano Sibug. However, the said deed of sale on July 1, 1947 is
not notarized nor registered in the Register of Deeds. The records
also disclosed that according to the declaration of real estate the
said property was still registered in the name of the father of the
aforesaid plaintiffs-appellees. The records further disclosed that the
De Guzman couple died in 1935 and 1937, respectively, hence by
operation of law, the nine (9) children succeeded in the ownership of
the property in question. Demands were made by plaintiffs-
appellees for the delivery of their respective shares from the
defendants-appellants since 1955, but the latter refused to comply
with their Lawful demands. From the execution of the deed of sale,
defendants-appellants were in physical possession of the fishpond
in question, hence an action was instituted against them.

Issue:
WON petitioner Sunga, et.al., have acquired ownership of the land
in question thru acquisitive and extinctive prescription.

Held:
NO. The respondents, while they knew of the possession of
petitioners commencing in the year 1948, they knew of the sale only
when they were told by their brothers who sold their share. Had the
information been given upon the execution of the document, and if
the sale included the whole fishpond, not only the share of the
vendors, there is no reason why respondents did not similarly sign
as vendors on the private instrument of sale. What this proves is
that respondents were not definitely aware that petitioner's
possession extended over the whole fishpond, including that
which pertained to them as their share. In that state of their

158
knowledge as to the extent and nature of petitioners-appellant's
possession, said possession cannot be said to be adverse and
open as to give rise to title by prescription in favor of
petitioners-appellants.

A fishpond is not as physically or actually occupied or held in

possession as a parcel of land, in that the signs of possession in the
latter are more visible, and the extent of its exercise or enjoyment,
more manifest and easily determined. Hence, the adverse nature of
the possession of parcel of land is more overt as to satisfy also
the other element of proscription that the possession must be
open and public. In the case of a fishpond, owned in common, one
or some of whose co-owners sell their undivided share to another,
the only way the whole fishpond, including the shares of the
other co-owners may be said to have been held in adverse
possession by the vendee, as against the co-owners who did not
sell is if he harvests all the fish in the fishpond, leaving nothing
for the other co-owners who did not sell their share. This is not
as easily ascertained as in the exercise of possession over a piece of
land, which is relatively quite easy to show that the possession is to
the exclusion of the other co-owners by the extent of the possession,
as by actual occupation or the land is for occupancy, or the extent
of the enjoyment of the produce of said land, as when it is for
cultivation or raising of products sustained by the soil. When one
harvests from a fishpond, of which he is only a part-owner, it must
be assumed that his harvest is only to the extent he is rightfully
entitled to, until the contrary is positively shown, which was not
done in the present case.

Likewise, against appellants' pretension is the fact that the tax

declaration over the land has remained up to the present in the
name of the original owners, the deceased parents of respondents-
appellees. The possession of petitioners-appellants, was, therefore,
not completely adverse or open, nor was it truly in the concept of an
owner, which are indispensable elements for prescription to become
legally effective as a means of acquiring real property.

159
 OVERSEAS BANK OF MANILA vs. JUDGE GERALDEZ
G.R. No. L-46541 December 28, 1979

Facts:
On October 15, 1976, petitioner Overseas Bank filed a complaint for the
recovery of a sum of money against private respondents Teodocio
Valenton and Andres Juan. Petitioner alleged that Valenton and Juan
obtained a bank credit accommodation on February 16, 1966 which
was secured by a chattel mortgage. Extrajudicial demands were made
upon the debtors but they refused to pay on the ground that their
obligation was assumed by a third party. The bank alleged that the
supposed assumption of obligation was made without its consent.

In dismissing the complaint, the trial court reasoned out that, because
the bank's cause of action accrued on February 16, 1966 and as the
complaint was filed on October 22, 1976 or more than ten years from
the accrual of the cause of action, the complaint was barred by the
statute of limitations.

As to the interruption of the ten-year period by the written extrajudicial

demands, the trial court held that a demand letter tolls the prescriptive
period only for the period of time indicated in the letter within which
payment should be made and prescription commences to run again
after the expiration of that period and no payment is made.

Issue:
WON the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground of
prescription.

Held:
YES. The Court held that the lower court erred in holding that each of
the demand letters suspended the prescriptive period for one day only.
The interruption of the prescriptive period by written extrajudicial
demand means that the said period would commence anew from
the receipt of the demand. That is the correct meaning of interruption
as distinguished from mere suspension or tolling of the prescriptive
period.

160
An action upon a written contract must be brought within ten years
from the tune the right of action accrues. "The prescription of actions
is interrupted when they are filed before the court, when there is a
written extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there is
any written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor" Interruption
of the prescription of actions by means of a written extrajudicial
demand by the creditor is a rule of civil law origin. Article 1155 specifies
that the extrajudicial demand and the acknowledgment should be in
writing.

JAIME LEDESMA vs. CA & RCBC

G.R. No. 106646 June 30, 1993

Facts:
On August 21, 1980, private respondent RCBC filed a case against
petitioner to enforce the terms of Trust Receipt Agreement executed
by them on April 1, 1974 but which petitioner had failed to comply
with. As summons could not be served on the latter, said case was
dismissed without prejudice on March 3, 1981. On December 2,
1988, private respondent bank instituted a civil case against
petitioner on the same cause of action and subject matter.

Petitioner's motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription was

denied and judgment was rendered in favor of private respondent by
the court a quo. On appeal, petitioner contends that the second
action filed by private respondent bank had already prescribed.

Issue:
WON the second action has already prescribed.

Held:
NO. Article 1155 of the Civil Code provides that the prescription of
an action, involving in the present case the 10-year prescriptive
period for filing an action on a written contract under Article
1144(1) of the Code, is interrupted by (a) the filing of an action, (b) a
written extrajudicial demand by the creditor, and (c) a written
acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor. The effects of the last
two instances have already been decided by this Court, the rationale
wherein should necessarily apply to the first.

The matter of the interruption of the prescriptive period by reason of

a written extrajudicial demand by the creditor was decided in
Overseas Bank of Manila v. Geraldez, Et. Al. in this wise: ". . . The
interruption of the prescriptive period by written extrajudicial
demand means that the said period would commence anew from the
receipt of the demand. That is the correct meaning of interruption

161
as distinguished from mere suspension or tolling of the prescriptive
period . . . "A written extrajudicial demand wipes out the period that
has already elapsed and starts anew the prescriptive period . . .
"That same view as to the meaning of interruption was adopted in
Florendo v. Organo, 90 Phil 483, 488, where it was ruled that the
interruption of the ten-year prescriptive period through a judicial
demand means that ‘the full period of prescription commenced to
run anew upon the cessation of the suspension.’ When prescription
is interrupted by a judicial demand, the full time for the
prescription must be reckoned from the cessation of the
interruption . . ."

The interruption of the prescriptive period by reason of a written

acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor was dealt with in
Philippine National Railways v. National Labor Relations
Commission, Et Al., thus: "Article 1155 of the Civil Code provides
that the ‘prescription of actions is interrupted’ inter alia, ‘when
there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.’ This
simply means that the period of prescription, when interrupted by
such a written acknowledgment, begins to run anew; and whatever
time of limitation might have already elapsed from the accrual of the
cause of action is thereby negated and rendered inefficacious... The
effect of the interruption spoken of in Article 1155 is to renew the
obligation, to make prescription run again from the date of the
interruption ..."

Article 1155 has twice been interpreted to mean that upon the
cessation of the suspension of the prescriptive period, the full period
of prescription commences to run anew. We are convinced and so
hold that the correct interpretations of Article 1155 of the Civil Code
are reflected in and furnished by the doctrinal pronouncements in
Overseas Bank of Manila and Philippine National Railways
Company, not only because they are later in point of time but
because the issue is squarely resolved in a decisive and logical
manner therein.

162
 HEIRS OF TANYAG vs. SALOME E. GABRIEL
G.R. No. 175763               April 11, 2012

Facts:
Subject of controversy are two adjacent parcels of land. For several
years, these lands lined with bamboo plants remained undeveloped and
uninhabited. Petitioners claimed that Lot 1 was owned by Benita
Gabriel, sister of Jose Gabriel, as part of her inheritance as declared by
her in a 1944 notarized instrument whereby she sold the said property
to spouses Gabriel Sulit and Cornelia Sanga. Florencia Sulit sold the
same lot to Bienvenido S. Tanyag, father of petitioners, as evidenced by
a notarized deed of sale dated October 14, 1964. Petitioners then took
possession of the property, paid the real estate taxes due on the land
and declared the same for tax purposes.

As to Lot 2, petitioners averred that it was sold by Agueda

Dinguinbayan to Araceli Tanyag under Deed of Sale executed on
October 22, 1968. Thereupon, petitioners took possession of said
property and declared the same for tax purposes. Petitioners claimed to
have continuously, publicly, notoriously and adversely occupied both
Lots 1 and 2 through their caretaker Juana Quinones; they fenced the
premises and introduced improvements on the land.

Sometime in 1979, Jose Gabriel, father of respondents, secured a title

in his name over Lot 1 indicating therein an increased area of 1,763
square meters. Said tax declaration supposedly cancelled the original
title over Lot 1.

On March 20, 2000, petitioners instituted an action alleging that

respondents never occupied the whole 686 square meters of Lot 1 and
fraudulently caused the inclusion of Lot 2 in the said title. They
contended that the issuance of OCT No. 1035 on October 28, 1998 over
the subject land in the name of respondent’s heirs of Jose Gabriel was
null and void from the beginning.

On the other hand, respondents asserted that petitioners have no cause

of action against them for they have not established their ownership
over the subject property covered by a Torrens title in respondents’
name. They further argued that OCT No. 1035 had become unassailable

163
one year after its issuance and petitioners failed to establish that it was
irregularly or unlawfully procured.

Issue:
WON petitioners acquired the property through acquisitive prescription.

Held:
NO. Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership by a
possessor through the requisite lapse of time. In order to ripen into
ownership, possession must be in the concept of an owner, public,
peaceful and uninterrupted. Possession is open when it is patent,
visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine. It is continuous when
uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive
when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land
and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious
when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by
the public or the people in the neighborhood. The party who asserts
ownership by adverse possession must prove the presence of the
essential elements of acquisitive prescription.

Petitioners’ adverse possession is reckoned from 1969 with the issuance

of TD No. 1145 in the name of Araceli Tanyag, which tax declaration
cancelled TD No. 6425 in the name of Jose Gabriel. It is settled that tax
receipts and declarations are prima facie proofs of ownership or
possession of the property for which such taxes have been paid.
Coupled with proof of actual possession of the property, they may
become the basis of a claim for ownership. Petitioners’ caretaker, Juana
Quinones, has since lived in a nipa hut, planted vegetables and tended
a piggery on the land. Aside from paying taxes due on the property,
petitioners also exercised other acts of ownership such as selling the
468-square meter portion to Sta. Barbara who had constructed thereon
a nine-door apartment building.

It was only in 1979 that respondents began to assert a claim over the
property by securing a tax declaration in the name of Jose Gabriel albeit
over a bigger area than that originally declared. In 1998, they finally
obtained an original certificate of title covering the entire 1,763 square
meters which included Lot 1. Did these acts of respondents effectively
interrupt the possession of petitioners for purposes of prescription?

164
 CELERINO E. MERCADO vs. BELEN* ESPINOCILLA
G.R. No. 184109               February 1, 2012

Facts:
Doroteo Espinocilla owned a parcel of land and when he died, his
five (5) children, Salvacion, Aspren, Isabel, Macario, and Dionisia
divided the lot equally among themselves. Later, Dionisia died
without issue ahead of her four siblings, and Macario took
possession of Dionisia’s share. In an affidavit of transfer of real
property, Macario claimed that Dionisia had donated her share to
him in May 1945. Thereafter, on August 9, 1977, Macario and his
daughters Betty Gullaba and Saida Gabelo sold 225 sq. m. to his
son Roger Espinocilla, husband of respondent Belen Espinocilla and
father of respondent Ferdinand Espinocilla. On March 8, 1985,
Roger Espinocilla sold 114 sq. m. to Caridad Atienza.

Petitioner sued the respondents to recover two portions of the

subject lot claiming that he own and possess the said portion of the
land having inherited it from his mother Salvacion and bought the
other portion from his aunt Aspren. Since the area he occupies is
only 132 sq. m., he claims that respondents encroach on his share
by 39 sq. m.

Respondents agree that Doroteo’s five children each inherited 114

sq. m. of Lot No. 552. However, Macario’s share increased when he
received Dionisia’s share. Macario’s increased share was then sold
to his son Roger, respondents’ husband and father. Respondents
claim that they rightfully possess the land they occupy by virtue of
acquisitive prescription and that there is no basis for petitioner’s
claim of encroachment.

On May 15, 2006, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of
petitioner and held that he is entitled to 171 sq. m. There being no
public document to prove Dionisia’s donation, the RTC also held
that Macario’s 1948 affidavit is void and is an invalid repudiation of
the shares of his sisters Salvacion, Aspren, and Isabel in Dionisia’s
share. Accordingly, Macario cannot acquire said shares by
prescription.

165
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision and dismissed
petitioner’s complaint on the ground that extraordinary acquisitive
prescription has already set in in favor of respondents. The CA
found that Doroteo’s four remaining children made an oral partition
of the subject lot after Dionisia’s death in 1945 and occupied
specific portions. The oral partition terminated the co-ownership of
the said lot in 1945. Said partition also included Dionisia’s share
because the lot was divided into four parts only. And since
petitioner’s complaint was filed only on July 13, 2000, the CA
concluded that prescription has set in.

Issue:
WON petitioner’s action to recover the subject portion is barred by
prescription.

Held:
YES. Prescription, as a mode of acquiring ownership and other real
rights over immovable property, is concerned with lapse of time in
the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that
the possession should be in the concept of an owner, public,
peaceful, uninterrupted, and adverse. Acquisitive prescription of
real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary
acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and
with just title for 10 years. In extraordinary prescription,
ownership and other real rights over immovable property are
acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession for 30 years
without need of title or of good faith.

Here, petitioner himself admits the adverse nature of respondents’

possession with his assertion that Macario’s fraudulent acquisition
of Dionisia’s share created a constructive trust. In a constructive
trust, there is neither a promise nor any fiduciary relation to speak
of and the so-called trustee (Macario) neither accepts any trust nor
intends holding the property for the beneficiary (Salvacion, Aspren,
Isabel). The relation of trustee and cestui que trust does not in fact
exist, and the holding of a constructive trust is for the trustee
himself, and therefore, at all times adverse. Prescription may
supervene even if the trustee does not repudiate the
relationship.

Then, too, respondents’ uninterrupted adverse possession for 55

years of 109 sq. m. of Lot No. 552 was established. Macario
occupied Dionisia’s share in 1945 although his claim that Dionisia
donated it to him in 1945 was only made in a 1948 affidavit. We

166
also agree with the CA that Macario’s possession of Dionisia’s share
was public and adverse since his other co-owners, his three other
sisters, also occupied portions of Lot No. 552. Indeed, the 1977 sale
made by Macario and his two daughters in favor of his son Roger
confirms the adverse nature of Macario’s possession because said
sale of 225 sq. m. was an act of ownership over Macario’s original
share and Dionisia’s share. In 1985, Roger also exercised an act of
ownership when he sold 114 sq. m. to Caridad Atienza.

It was only in the year 2000, upon receipt of the summons to

answer petitioner’s complaint, that respondents’ peaceful
possession of the remaining portion (109 sq. m.) was interrupted.
By then, however, extraordinary acquisitive prescription has already
set in in favor of respondents. That the RTC found Macario’s 1948
affidavit void is of no moment. Extraordinary prescription is
unconcerned with Macario’s title or good faith. Accordingly, the RTC
erred in ruling that Macario cannot acquire by prescription the
shares of Salvacion, Aspren, and Isabel, in Dionisia’s 114-sq. m.
share from Lot No. 552.

Moreover, the CA correctly dismissed petitioner’s complaint as an

action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust
prescribes in 10 years from the time the right of action accrues.
This is the other kind of prescription under the Civil Code, called
extinctive prescription, where rights and actions are lost by the
lapse of time. Petitioner’s action for recovery of possession having
been filed 55 years after Macario occupied Dionisia’s share, it is also
barred by extinctive prescription. The CA while condemning
Macario’s fraudulent act of depriving his three sisters of their shares
in Dionisia’s share, equally emphasized the fact that Macario’s
sisters wasted their opportunity to question his acts.

167
 SIMEON B. MIGUEL, ET AL., vs. FLORENDO CATALINO
G.R. No. L-23072      November 29, 1968

Facts:
On January 22, 1962, appellants Simeon, Emilia and Marcelina
Miguel, and appellant Grace Ventura brought suit against Florendo
Catalino for the recovery of the land above-described, plaintiffs
claiming to be the children and heirs of the original registered
owner, and averred that defendant, without their knowledge or
consent, had unlawfully taken possession of the land, gathered its
produce and unlawfully excluded plaintiffs therefrom. Defendant
answered pleading ownership and adverse possession for 30 years.

After trial the Court dismissed the complaint, declared defendant to

be the rightful owner, and ordered the Register of Deeds to issue a
transfer certificate in lieu of the original. Plaintiffs appealed directly
to this Court, assailing the trial Court's findings of fact and law. As
found by the trial Court, the land in dispute is covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 31, which was issued on 28 December 1927
in the name of Bacaquio (or Bakakew), a widower. No encumbrance
or sale has ever been annotated in the certificate of title.

The plaintiff-appellant Grace Ventura is the only child of Bacaquio

by his first wife, Debsay, and the other plaintiffs-appellants,
Simeon, Emilia and Marcelina, all surnamed "Miguel", are his
children by his third wife, Cosamang. He begot no issue with his
second wife, Dobaney. The three successive wives have all died.

Bacaquio, who died in 1943, acquired the land when his second
wife died and sold it to Catalino Agyapao, father of the defendant
Florendo Catalino in 1928. No formal deed of sale was executed, but
since the sale in 1928, or for more than 30 years, vendee Catalino
Agyapao and his son, defendant-appellee Florendo Catalino, had
been in possession of the land, in the concept of owner, paying the
taxes thereon and introducing improvements.

On 1 February 1949, Grace Ventura, by herself alone, "sold” anew

the same land to defendant Florendo Catalino. In 1961, Catalino

168
Agyapao in turn sold the land to his son, the defendant Florendo
Catalino.

Issue:
WON plaintiffs-appellants can still recovery the said property.

Held:
NO. The four elements of laches are present in the case at bar,
namely: (a) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one
under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which
complaint is made and for which the complaint seeks a remedy;
(b) delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant
having had knowledge or notice, of the defendant's conduct and
having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (c) lack
of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the
complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit;
and (d) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is
accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be
barred. In the case at bar, Bacaquio sold the land in 1928 but the
sale is void for lack of the governor's approval. The vendor, and also
his heirs after him, could have instituted an action to annul the sale
from that time, since they knew of the invalidity of the sale, which is
a matter of law; they did not have to wait for 34 years to institute
suit. The defendant was made to feel secure in the belief that no
action would be filed against him by such passivity, and also
because he "bought" again the land in 1949 from Grace Ventura
who alone tried to question his ownership; so that the defendant
will be plainly prejudiced in the event the present action is not held
to be barred.

The defense of laches applies independently of prescription. Laches

is different from the statute of limitations. Prescription is concerned
with the fact of delay, whereas laches is concerned with the effect of
delay. Prescription is a matter of time; laches is principally a
question of inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced, this
inequity being founded on some change in the condition of the
property or the relation of the parties. Prescription is statutory;
laches is not. Laches applies in equity, whereas prescription applies
at law. Prescription is based on fixed time laches is not.

169
 REV. FR. PABLO B. LOLA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-46573 November 13, 1986

Facts:
In a complaint for recovery of real property, private respondent Dolores
S. Zabala alleged that she is the registered owner of a parcel of land. By
virtue of "Escritura de Venta Absolute" executed on June 29, 1936,
petitioners, Fr. Pablo B. Lola and his sister Maxima B. Lola, bought
from her Lot No. 5516 and adjoining Lot 5517 to the East, which the
petitioners immediately occupied upon consummation of the sale. Well
aware of such alienation covering only Lot No. 5516, the petitioners,
with deliberate bad faith, also occupied Lot No. 5517.

In their answer, the petitioners averred that when the respondent

offered to petitioner Fr. Pablo B. Lola in writing the sale of the
residential lot located at Sto. Niño Street, Tacloban City, she never
mentioned any lot or lots; that more than thirty (30) years have elapsed
since the document of sale was executed and petitioner Pablo B. Lola
has been in possession thereof, as well as the land described in the
respondent's complaint, which formed part of the latter's offer,
peacefully, publicly, adversely, and in the concept of owner and that the
respondent should be estopped from asserting any right or rights after
she had slept on them for thirty (30) years.

After trial on the merits, the Court of First Instance of Leyte rendered a
decision dismissing the respondents' complaint.

Issue:
WON laches barred the respondent from recovering the land.

Held:
YES. Although the defense of prescription is unavailing to the
petitioners because, admittedly, the title to Lot No. 5517 is still
registered in the name of the respondent, still the petitioners have
acquired title to it by virtue of the equitable principle of laches due to
the respondent's failure to assert her claims and ownership for thirty
two (32) years.

170
In the following cases, we upheld the equitable defense of laches and
ruled that the long inaction and delay of the title holder in asserting his
right over the disputed lot bars him from recovering the same.

MARIA SAN MIGUEL VDA. DE ESPIRITU vs. CFI OF CAVITE

G.R. No. L-30486 October 31, 1972

Facts:
Sometime in 1948 the defendants verbally sold to her the two parcels of
land in question for P3,000.00 Pesos and, inconsequence, delivery
thereof together with the corresponding transfer certificates of title (TCT)
was made to her, but no deed of sale was executed at the time because
private respondents promised they would do so as soon as the titles
which were then in the name of their predecessor in interest were
transferred to their names, and that despite demands made by her for
the execution of such deed, said respondents, "without justifiable cause
therefor adamantly failed and refused to comply with (such) just and
valid demand."

In their answer, defendants denied that the transaction was a sale and
alleged that it was merely a contract of antichresis whereby petitioner
had loaned to them P1, 500.00, for which she demanded the delivery of
the lands in question and the titles thereto as security, with the right to
collect or receive the income therefrom pending the payment of the loan.
And by way of affirmative defenses, respondents interposed (1)
unenforceability by action of the alleged sale, under the statute of
frauds, and(2) prescription of petitioner's action, the same having
allegedly accrued in 1948. Subsequently, respondents reiterated their
said affirmative defense of prescription in a formal motion to dismiss
and as no opposition thereto was filed by petitioner, on July 31,1967,
respondent court issued the impugned order of dismissal

Issue:
WON petitioner’s right to demand the execution of the TCTs already
prescribed.

Held:
YES. The right to demand the execution of the document required
under Article 1358 is not imprescriptible. The nature of petitioner’s
action may be said to be one founded on an oral contract, which, to be
sure, cannot be considered among those rendered unenforceable by the
statute of frauds, for the simple reason that it has already been, from

171
petitioner’s own point of view, almost fully consummated by the delivery
of the lands and the corresponding titles to her. The petitioner’s action,
based as it is upon oral contract, prescribes in 6 years according to
Article 1145 of the Civil Code. Assuming otherwise, the only other
possibility is that petitioner’s case comes under Article 1149 and the
action prescribes in 5 years. In either case, since the cause of action of
petitioner accrued in 1948 and the present suit was instituted in 1964
or sixteen years later, and none interrupting circumstances enumerated
in Article 1155 has been shown to have intervened, it is unquestionable
that petitioner’s action filed in the court below has already prescribed.
Spouses SOLIDARIOS vs. Judge NESTOR ALAMPAY
G.R. No. L-39592 January 28, 1975

Facts:
On November 29, 1972, petitioners-spouses filed a complaint against
private respondent for reformation of instrument and praying that the
deed of absolute sale of the parcel of land executed by them on
December 24, 1964 in favor of private respondent which did not
embody their true agreement be reformed and declared a contract of
mortgage and that their property be returned to them upon their
payment of the loan.

In their complaint, petitioners allege that "on December 24, 1964 the
plaintiffs and the defendant Ong entered into an agreement whereby
they agreed that the plaintiffs will borrow from the defendant the sum of
P16,500.00 on the security of the parcel of land. Respondent filed his
answer with counterclaim and raised the defense of prescription in his
answer. No evidence on the sole issue of prescription was received by
respondent court at the hearing of the dismissal motion.

Issue:
WON the action for the reformation of a written contract has already
prescribed.

Held:
NO. An action for the reformation of a written contract prescribes in ten
(10) years (Article 1144, Civil Code). Where two parties agreed upon the
mortgage or pledge of real or personal property but the instrument state
that the property is sold absolutely or with a right to repurchase,
reformation of the instrument is proper.

Considering that petitioners action for reformation and recovery of title

was brought on November 29, 1972 less than eight years after
execution of the questioned deed of sale on December 24, 1964, the
same has therefore not yet prescribed. Respondent’s counter-theory
that the questioned contract was in truth and in reality a bona fide sale
is clearly a matter of defense, which has yet to be established at the

172
trial and could not be availed of at the pre-trial stage to dismiss the
case as if it were already a proven fact.

EDUARDO JALANDONI vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK

G.R. No. L-47579 October 9, 1981

Facts:
On March 31, 1959 the CFI of Manila rendered a judgment ordering
petitioner Jalandoni to pay the respondent PNB together with daily
interest from March 6, 1959 until fully paid.
That judgment became final and executory. Within five years from
the entry of judgment in that case, or on March 9, 1964, the sheriff
of Silay City, pursuant to an alias writ of execution, levied upon a
lot under the name of petitioner. On April 22, 1974, or more than
ten years after the levy was made, Jalandoni filed a petition for the
cancellation of the levy on the ground of prescription. The petition
was opposed by the bank contending that the execution sale can be
made beyond the ten-year period for enforcing the judgment as long
as the levy was effected within five years from the entry of judgment.
The Negros Occidental court directed Jalandoni to ask the Manila
court to quash the writ of execution on the ground of prescription
and thereafter to refile his petition. Jalandoni filed in the same
court, an action to quiet title or for the cancellation of the notice of
embargo on the ground that, although more than ten years had
elapsed from the time the levy was made, no execution sale had
been held making the levy inefficacious and constituting a cloud on
his title. Judgment was rendered dismissing the complaint. Hence,
this appeal by his heirs under Republic Act 5440.

The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in not applying
the ruling in Ansaldo v. Fidelity Surety Co. of the Phil., 88 Phil. 547,
that "properties levied upon by execution must be sold in public
auction within the period of ten years during which the judgment
can be enforced by action" and that the bank’s negligence in not
requiring the sheriff to sell the property at public auction within the
required period militates against their case. Judgment reversed and
the Register of Deeds was directed to cancel the Notice of Embargo
annotation on the title.

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Issue:
WON the action to levy the land/writ of execution has prescribed.

Held:
YES. For laches and neglect on the part of those, who, under the
law are entitled to require of others the fulfillment of their
obligations, the statute of limitations has been enacted, which
provides that such rights prescribe after a certain period of time, in
order that it may serve alike as a punishment for those who do not
know how to look after their own interests, and as a source of
reassurance to those who may have rested in the belief that their
creditors had waived their rights, and also to insure economic
stability and the certainty of rights."

The employees of the bank were negligent. They did not require the
sheriff to sell the judgment debtor’s land at public auction. The
bank is bound by its employees’ negligence. This case should teach
the responsible officers of the bank to be more vigilant in exercising
its rights and in supervising its employees. The law helps the
diligent and vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights.

The notice of embargo annotated in 1964 on the judgment debtor’s

title it no longer enforceable and has become a cloud upon his title.
Following the rule in Ansaldo v. Fidelity and Surety Co. of P.I., 88
Phil. 547, he and his heirs have a good cause of action under Article
476 of the Civil Code for the removal of that stale encumbrance.

Article 478 of the Civil Code provides that "there may also be an
action to quiet title or remove a cloud there from when the contract,
instrument of other obligation has been extinguished or has
terminated, or has been barred by extinctive prescription." A court
of equity will remove a cloud cast upon title to property by a lien,
interest, or title which has become barred by reason of laches or the
running of the statute of limitations or by delay in enforcing them,
and sales based on such liens, have been held to be removable as
clouds."

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 REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
G.R. No. L-29725 January 27, 1983

Facts:
In 1943 defendant Dolores Infante obtained loans from the Bank of
Taiwan, Ltd., with interest at the rate of six percent per annum,
compounded quarterly. On September 15, 1961, plaintiff Republic filed
a complaint to collect from the defendant the said amount of loan. The
defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of
prescription. The Justice of the Peace of Villadolid, after hearing,
dismissed the case on the ground that the action had prescribed.

Issue:
WON the case has prescribed.

Held:
YES. Ordinarily, the counting of the prescriptive period should be
reckoned from the date the debt became due and demandable. In the
case at bar, the loans which had no maturity dates were contracted in
1943, or during the period of the Japanese occupation of the
Philippines.

However, the moratorium decrees supervene suspending the

enforcement of payments of all debts and other monetary obligations
contracted during the war, the moratorium laws were declared
unconstitutional. Nevertheless, said laws were in effect from the time of
their respective promulgations until May 18, 1953. As a consequence,
before they were declared unconstitutional, they suspended the running
of the prescriptive period during their effectivity. Thus, the 10-year
period within which to institute the action against herein appellee
began the day after the moratorium laws were declared unconstitutional
or, to be precise, on May 19, 1953.

It was on September 27, 1954 when plaintiff made extra-judicial written

demand on defendant. As the loans in question did not have any
maturity dates and, therefore, payable on demand, prescription could
have accrued, if at all, only on September 27, 1954 when petitioner
made the extra-judicial demand. Plaintiff's cause of action will therefore

175
prescribe only on September 27, 1964. And, since the complaint in this
case was filed on September 15, 1961, which is within the 10-year
period, the action has not yet prescribed.

176