CORONEL, Juan Paulo R.

Criminal Procedure
2019133643 - 2E, UST FCL Atty. Christian Villasis

G.R. No. 174461   September 11, 2013

FACTS:

The prosecution's evidence revealed that on June 19, 1988, between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m., Jesus
Mallo, Jr., accompanied by Amiel Malana, went to the house of the petitioner. Mallo knocked at
the front door with a stone and identified himself by saying, "Auntie, ako si Boy Mallo."

The petitioner opened the door and at this point, her son and co-accused, Johan, using his left
hand, shot Mallo twice using a gun about six (6) inches long. Malana, who was with Mallo and
who witnessed the shooting, immediately ran towards the west, followed by Mallo. When
Malana turned his back, he saw the petitioner leveling and firing her long gun at Mallo, hitting
the latter’s back and causing him to fall flat on the ground.

Thereafter, the petitioner went inside the house and came out with a flashlight. Together with her
co-accused, she scoured the pathway up to the place where Mallo was lying flat. At that point,
the petitioner uttered, "Johan, patay na," in a loud voice. The petitioner and her co-accused put
down the guns and the flashlight they were holding, held Mallo’s feet and pulled him to about
three (3) to four (4) meters away from the house. Thereafter, they returned to the house and
turned off all the lights. Mallo was found dead by a policeman the following morning.

Decision of the RTC: The RTC found both petitioner and Johan guilty by relying on the
testimonies of prosecution eyewitnesses Ramon Cuntapay and Malana who both testified that the
petitioner shot Mallo. There were also positive findings of gunpowder nitrates on the left hand of
Johan and on the petitioner’s right hand, as well as the corroborative testimony of the other
prosecution witnesses.

Decision of the CA: The CA affirmed the RTC judgment, holding that the discrepancies
between the sworn statement and the direct testimony of the witnesses do not necessarily
discredit them because the contradictions are minimal and reconcilable. The petitioner’s positive
identification by the eyewitnesses as one of the assailants remained unrefuted.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an arraignment is required when a formal amendment, such as a change in the
date, is introduced to the criminal information filed

RULING:

NO. A change in the date of the commission of the crime, where the disparity is not great, is
merely a formal amendment, thus, no arraignment is required.
CORONEL, Juan Paulo R. Criminal Procedure
2019133643 - 2E, UST FCL Atty. Christian Villasis

The petitioner claims that she was not arraigned on the amended information for which she was
convicted. However, we do not see any merit in this claim.

Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court permits a formal amendment of a complaint even
after the plea but only if it is made with leave of court and provided that it can be done without
causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. However, any amendment before plea, which
downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or
information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party
and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its
order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party.

A mere change in the date of the commission of the crime, if the disparity of time is not great, is
more formal than substantial. Such an amendment would not prejudice the rights of the accused
since the proposed amendment would not alter the nature of the offense.

The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a
complaint or information is when a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally
stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made, when any evidence the
accused might have would no longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any
evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the complaint or information, as
amended.

Moreover, it is not even necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at
which the offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense.

Having established that a change of date of the commission of a crime is a formal

Arraignment is indispensable in bringing the accused to court and in notifying him of the nature
and cause of the accusations against him. The importance of arraignment is based on the
constitutional right of the accused to be informed. The need for arraignment is equally
imperative in an amended information or complaint. This however, we hastily clarify, pertains
only to substantial amendments and not to formal amendments that, by their very nature, do
not charge an offense different from that charged in the original complaint or information; do not
alter the theory of the prosecution; do not cause any surprise and affect the line of defense; and
do not adversely affect the substantial rights of the accused, such as an amendment in the date of
the commission of the offense.

An amendment done after the plea and during trial, in accordance with the rules, does not call for
a second plea since the amendment is only as to form. The purpose of an arraignment, that is, to
inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, has already been
attained when the accused was arraigned the first time.
CORONEL, Juan Paulo R. Criminal Procedure
2019133643 - 2E, UST FCL Atty. Christian Villasis

Applying these rules and principles to the prevailing case, the records of the case evidently show
that the amendment in the complaint was from July 19, 1988 to June 19, 1988, or a difference of
only one month. The change in the date of the commission of the crime of homicide is a formal
amendment - it does not change the nature of the crime, does not affect the essence of the offense
nor deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment, and is not prejudicial to the
accused.