ILOILO JAR CORPORATION, Petitioner, v.

 COMGLASCO CORPORATION/AGUILA
GLASS, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari  seeks to reverse and set aside the January 30,2015
Decision1 and June 17,2015 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 01475, which
overturned the February 17, 2005 Amended Order3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Iloilo City
(RTC).

The Antecedents:

On August 16, 2000, petitioner Iloilo Jar Corporation (Iloilo Jar), as lessor, and respondent
Comglasco Corporation/Aguila Glass (Comglasco), as lessee, entered into a lease contract over a
portion of a warehouse building, with an estimated floor area of 450 square meters, located on a
parcel of land identified as Lot 2-G-1-E-2 in Barangay Lapuz, La Paz District, Iloilo City. The term of
the lease was for a period of three (3) years or until August 15, 2003.4

On December 1, 2001, Comglasco requested for the pre-termination of the lease effective on the
same date. Iloilo Jar, however, rejected the request on the ground that the pre-termination of the
lease contract was not stipulated therein.

Despite the denial of the request for pre-termination, Comglasco still removed all its stock,
merchandise and equipment from the leased premises on January 15, 2002. From the time of the
withdrawal of the equipment, and notwithstanding several demand letters, Comglasco no longer paid
all rentals accruing from the said date.5

On September 14, 2003, Iloilo Jar sent a final demand letter to Comglasco, but it was again ignored.
Consequently, Iloilo Jar filed a civil action for breach of contract and damages before the RTC on
October 10, 2003.6

On June 28, 2004, Comglasco filed its Answer7 and raised an affirmative defense, arguing that by
virtue of Article 1267 of the Civil Code (Article 1267),8 it was released from its obligation from the
lease contract. It explained that the consideration thereof had become so difficult due to the global
and regional economic crisis that had plagued the economy. Likewise, Comglasco admitted that it
had removed its stocks and merchandise but it did not refuse to pay the rentals because the lease
contract was already deemed terminated. Further, it averred that though it received the demand
letters, it did not amount to a refusal to pay the rent because the lease contract had been pre-
terminated in the first place.

On July 15, 2004, Iloilo Jar filed its Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings9 arguing that Comglasco
admitted all the material allegations in the complaint. It insisted that Comglasco's answer failed to
tender an issue because its affirmative defense was unavailing.

The RTC Order

In its August 18, 2004 Order,10 the RTC granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings. It opined
that Comglasco's answer admitted the material allegations of the complaint and that its affirmative
defense was unavailing because Article 1267 was inapplicable to lease contracts.

Comglasco moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied by the RTC in its January 24, 2005
Order.11 After formal defects in the original order were raised, the RTC issued the assailed February
17, 2005 Amended Order wherein the total amount of unpaid rentals to be paid was modified from
P1,333,200.00 to P333,300.00. Further, it changed the following: (a) award of attorney's fees from
P200,000.00 to P75,000.00; (b) litigation expenses from P50,000.00 to P30,000.00; and (c)
exemplary damages from P400,000.00 to P200,000.00.

Aggrieved, Comglasco appealed before the CA.

The CA Ruling

In its January 30, 2015 decision, the CA  reversed the amended order of the RTC. The appellate court
was of the view that judgment on the pleadings was improper as Comglasco's answer tendered an
issue considering that Iloilo Jar's material allegations were specifically denied therein. Further, the CA
opined that even if the same were not specifically denied, the answer raised an affirmative issue
which was factual in nature. It disposed:

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Order dated August 18,
2004; the Order dated January 24, 2005; and the Order dated February 17, 2005 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 37, Iloilo City, in Civil Case No. 03- 27960, are REVERSED.

Let the records be REMANDED to the RTC for the conduct of further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.12

Iloilo Jar moved for reconsideration, but its motion was denied by the CA in its assailed June 17,
2015 resolution.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUES

WHETHER OR NOT A DEFENSE RAISED IN THE ANSWER THAT IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE
CASE AT BAR CAN BE CONSIDERED AS APPROPRIATELY TENDERING AN ISSUE THAT NEED
TO BE TRIED BY THE TRIAL COURT; AND

II

WHETHER OR NOT A JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS IS APPROPRIATE AND VALID WHEN

Iloilo Jar argues that Comglasco's answer materially admitted the allegations of the former's
complaint, particularly, that the latter had removed its merchandise from the lease premises and
failed to pay subsequent rentals, after it had received the demand letters sent. It points out that
Comglasco brushed aside its obligation by merely claiming that it was no longer bound by the lease
contract because it was terminated due to the financial difficulties it was experiencing in light of the
economic crisis. Iloilo Jar insisted that Comglasco cannot rely on Article 1267 because it does not
apply to lease contracts, which involves an obligation to give, and not an obligation to do.

In its Comment,14 dated February 11, 2016, Comglasco countered that its answer raised material
defenses which rendered judgment on the pleadings improper. It asserted that judgment on the
pleadings may be had only when the answer fails to tender an issue or otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse party's pleading. Comglasco argued that even if the allegations in the
complaint were deemed admitted, the affirmative defenses it raised may give rise to factual
controversies or issues which should be subject to a trial.
In its Reply,15 dated September 28, 2016, Iloilo Jar reiterated that judgment on the pleadings was
warranted because Comglasco's answer failed to specifically deny the allegation in the complaint, and
that the affirmative defense alleged therein was improper because Article 1267 is inapplicable to a
lease contract. As such, it stressed that Comglasco's answer failed to tender an issue.

The Court's Ruling

The Court finds merit in the petition.

Rules of Procedure
strictly complied with;
Exceptions

It must be remembered that the right to appeal is not a natural right but merely a statutory
privilege; a party appealing is, thus, expected to comply with the requirements of relevant rules
otherwise he would lose the statutory right to appeal.16

A review of the records reveals that Iloilo Jar received the Notice of Resolution of the assailed CA
resolution on July 9, 2015. Pursuant to Section 2 Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,17 it had fifteen (15)
days from receipt of the resolution or until July 24, 2015 to file its petition for review
on certiorari before the Court.

On the said date, however, Iloilo Jar filed a motion for extension to file the said petition. In its
September 2, 2015 Resolution,18 the Court granted that same and extended for thirty (30) days
reckoned from the expiration of the reglementary period within which to file the petition, with a
warning that it would be the last extension to be given. In other words, Iloilo Jar had until August 23,
2015 to file its petition for review on certiorari.

On August 24, 2015, Iloilo Jar again filed another motion for extension19 requesting an additional
thirty (30) days. In its November 25, 2015 Resolution,20 the Court again granted the same and gave
another 30- day extension reckoned from August 24, 2015. Thus, it had until September 23, 2015 to
file its petition.

Iloilo Jar, unfortunately, filed its petition for review only on September 24, 2015,21 one day past the
twice extended filing period. Again, procedural rules are not lightly brushed aside as its strict
compliance is necessary for the orderly administration of justice. Thus, even if the filing of the
petition was merely late for a day, it is still a violation of the rules on appeal, which generally leads to
its outright denial.

The tardy filing, notwithstanding, the Court may still entertain the present appeal. Procedural rules
may be disregarded by the Court to serve the ends of substantial justice. When a petition for review
is filed a few days late, application of procedural rules may be relaxed, where strong considerations
of substantial justice are manifest in the petition, in the exercise of the Court's equity
jurisdiction.22 In CMTC International Marketing Corporation v. Bhagis International Trading
Corporation,23 the Court did not strictly apply procedural rules as it would serve the interest of
justice, elucidating:

Time and again, this Court has emphasized that procedural rules should be treated with utmost
respect and due regard, since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the
worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice. From
time to time, however, we have recognized exceptions to the Rules, but only for the most
compelling reasons where stubborn obedience to the Rules would defeat rather than serve
the ends of justice.

xxxx
Ergo, where strong considerations of substantive justice are manifest in the petition, the
strict application of the rules of procedure may be relaxed, in the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction. Thus, a rigid application of the rules of procedure will not be entertained if it will
obstruct rather than serve the broader interests of justice in the light of the prevailing circumstances
in the case under consideration.24 [Emphases supplied]

The merits of Iloilo Jar's petition for review warrant a relaxation of the strict rules of procedure if only
to attain justice swiftly. A denial of its petition will cause the remand of the case, which based on the
circumstances, will unnecessarily delay the proceedings. Thus, the Court deems it wise to let Iloilo
Jar's procedural lapse pass.

Judgment on the
pleadings vis-a-vis
Summary Judgment

Section 1, Rule 34 of the Revised Rules of Court governs motions for judgment on the pleadings. It
reads:

SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answers fails to tender an issue, or

On the other hand, under Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, a party may move for summary judgment if
there are no genuine issues raised.

In Basbas v. Sayson,25 the Court differentiated judgment on the pleadings from summary judgment
in that the former is appropriate if the answer failed to tender an issue and the latter may be
resorted to if there are no genuine issues raised, to wit:

Simply stated, what distinguishes a judgment on the pleadings from a summary judgment
is the presence of issues in the Answer to the Complaint. When the Answer fails to tender any
issue, that is, if it does not deny the material allegations in the complaint or admits said material
allegations of the adverse party's pleadings by admitting the truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to
deal with them at all, a judgment on the pleadings is appropriate. On the other hand, when the
Answer specifically denies the material averments of the complaint or asserts affirmative
defenses, or in other words raises an issue, a summary judgment is proper provided that
the issue raised is not genuine. "A 'genuine issue' means an issue of fact which calls for the
presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived or which does
not constitute a genuine issue for trial."

xxx

In this case, we note that while petitioners' Answer to respondents' Complaint practically admitted all
the material allegations therein, it nevertheless asserts the affirmative defences that the action for
revival of judgment is not the proper action and that petitioners are not the proper parties. As
issues obviously arise from these affirmative defenses, a judgment on the pleadings is
clearly improper in this case.26 [Emphases supplied]

In the case at bench, Comglasco interposed an affirmative defense in its answer. While it admitted
that it had removed its stocks from the leased premises and had received the demand letter for
rental payments, it argued that the lease contract had been pre-terminated because the
consideration thereof had become so difficult to comply in light of the economic crisis then existing.
Thus, judgment on the pleadings was improper considering that Comglasco's Answer raised an
affirmative defense.

Although resort to judgment on the pleadings might have been improper, there was still no need to
remand the case to the RTC for further proceedings. In Wood Technology Corporation v. Equitable
Banking Corporation (Wood Technology),27 the Court ruled that summary judgment may be availed if
no genuine issue for trial is raised, viz:

Summary judgment is a procedure aimed at weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage
of the litigation. The proper inquiry in this regard would be whether the affirmative defenses offered
by petitioners constitute genuine issues of fact requiring a full-blown trial. In a summary judgment,
the crucial question is: are the issues raised by petitioners not genuine so as to justify a summary
judgment? A "genuine issue" means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of
evidence, as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived, an issue that does
not constitute a genuine issue for trial.28 [Emphasis supplied]

It bears noting that in Wood Technology, the RTC originally rendered a judgment on the pleadings
but was corrected by the Court to be a summary judgment because of the issue presented by the
affirmative defense raised therein. In the said case, the Court, nonetheless, ruled in favor of the
complainant therein because there was no genuine issue raised.

Similar to Wood Technology, the judgment rendered by the RTC in this case was a summary
judgment, not a judgment on the pleadings, because Comglasco's answer raised an affirmative
defense. Nevertheless, no genuine issue was raised because there is no issue of fact which needs
presentation of evidence, and the affirmative defense Comglasco invoked is inapplicable in the case
at bench.

A full blown trial would needlessly prolong the proceedings where a summary judgment would
suffice. It is undisputed that Comglasco removed its merchandise from the leased premises and
stopped paying rentals thereafter. Thus, there remains no question of fact which must be resolved in
trial. What is to be resolved is whether Comglasco was justified in treating the lease contract
terminated due to the economic circumstances then prevalent.

To evade responsibility, Comglasco explained that by virtue of Article 1267, it was released from the
lease contract. It cited the existing global and regional economic crisis for its inability to comply with
its obligation.

Comglasco's position fails to impress because Article 1267 applies only to obligations to do and not to
obligations to give. Thus, in Philippine National Construction Corporation v. Court of Appeals,29 the
Court expounded:

Petitioner cannot, however, successfully take refuge in the said article, since it is
applicable only to obligations "to do," and not to obligations "to give." An obligation "to do"
includes all kinds of work or service; while an obligation "to give" is a prestation which consists in the
delivery of a movable or an immovable thing in order to create a real right, or for the use of the
recipient, or for its simple possession, or in order to return it to its owner.

The obligation to pay rentals or deliver the thing in a contract of lease falls within the
prestation "to give"; xxx

The principle of  rebus sic stantibus neither fits in with the facts of the case. Under this theory, the
parties stipulate in the light of certain prevailing conditions, and once these conditions cease to exist,
the contract also ceases to exist. xxx
This article, which enunciates the doctrine of unforeseen events, is not, however, an absolute
application of the principle of  rebus sic stantibus, which would endanger the security of contractual
relations. The parties to the contract must be presumed to have assumed the risks of unfavorable
developments. It is therefore only in absolutely exceptional changes of circumstances that
equity demands assistance for the debtor.30 [Emphases and Underscoring supplied]

Considering that Comglasco's obligation of paying rent is not an obligation to do, it could not
rightfully invoke Article 1267 of the Civil Code. Even so, its position is still without merit as financial
struggles due to an economic crisis is not enough reason for the courts to grant reprieve from
contractual obligations.

In COMGLASCO Corporation/Aguila Glass v. Santos Car Check Center Corporation,31 the Court ruled
that the economic crisis which may have caused therein petitioner's financial problems is not an
absolute exceptional change of circumstances that equity demands assistance for the debtor. It is
noteworthy that Comglasco was also the petitioner in the above-mentioned case, where it also
involved Article 1267 to pre-terminate the lease contract.

Thus, the RTC was correct in ordering Comglasco to pay the unpaid rentals because the affirmative
defense raised by it was insufficient to free it from its obligations under the lease contract. In
addition, Iloilo Jar is entitled to attorney's fees because it incurred expenses to protect its interest.
The trial court, however, erred in awarding exemplary damages and litigation expenses.

Exemplary damages may be recovered in contractual obligations if the defendant acted in wanton or
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.32 As discussed, Comglasco defaulted in its
obligation to pay the rentals by reason of its erroneous belief that the lease contract was pre-
terminated because of the economic crisis. The same, however, does not prove that Comglasco acted
in wanton or fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.33 On the other hand, attorney's
fees may be recovered in case the plaintiff was compelled to incur expenses to protect his interest
because of the defendant's acts or omissions.

Further, the interest rate should be modified pursuant to recent jurisprudence.34 The monetary
awards shall be subject to 12% interest per annum until June 30, 2013 and 6% per annum  from July
1, 2013 until fully satisfied.

A Final Note

A lawyer, as an officer of the court, is expected to observe utmost respect and deference to the
Court. As such, he must ensure that he faithfully complies with rules of procedure especially since
they are in place to aid in the administration of justice. This duty to be subservient to the rules of
procedure is manifested in numerous provisions35 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Court admonishes Iloilo Jar' counsel for repeatedly failing to comply with the rules of procedure
and court processes. First, he belatedly filed the petition for review. Second, Iloilo Jar's counsel failed
to file its Reply within the time originally allotted prompting the Court to require him to show cause
why he should not be held in contempt.36 Personal obligations, heavy workload does not excuse a
lawyer from complying with his obligations particularly in timely filing the pleadings required by the
Court.

WHEREFORE, the January 30, 2015 Decision and June 17, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The February 17, 2005 Amended Order of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 37, Iloilo City, is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFCATION in that the award of exemplary damages
and litigation expenses is DELETED. The monetary award shall be subject to 12% per annum until
June 30, 2013 and 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until fully satisfied.
Atty. Raleigh Silvino L. Manikan is ADMONISHED for his repeated failure to observe the rules of
procedure, with a WARNING that a repetition to strictly comply with procedural rules shall be dealt
with more severely.

SO ORDERED.