NatRes Case Digest

Magallona v. Ermita, G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011.

Facts:

In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now under scrutiny. The
change was prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines ratified on 27 February 1984.
Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of
archipelagic States like the Philippines and sets the deadline for the filing of application for the extended
continental shelf. Complying with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the
location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories,
namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of islands" whose
islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.

Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their respective capacities as "citizens,
taxpayers or x x x legislators," as the case may be, assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal
grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the
Philippine state’s sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the
terms of the Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties, and (2) RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward
of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and
national security, contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in
violation of relevant constitutional provisions.

In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522’s treatment of the KIG as "regime of islands" not only
results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.
To buttress their argument of territorial diminution, petitioners facially attack RA 9522 for what it
excluded and included – its failure to reference either the Treaty of Paris or Sabah and its use of UNCLOS
III’s framework of regime of islands to determine the maritime zones of the KIG and the Scarborough
Shoal.

Issue:

1. Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit.

Held:

1. Yes. Nonetheless, we recognize petitioners’ locus standi as citizens with constitutionally sufficient
interest in the resolution of the merits of the case which undoubtedly raises issues of national
significance necessitating urgent resolution. Indeed, owing to the peculiar nature of RA 9522, it is
understandably difficult to find other litigants possessing "a more direct and specific interest" to
bring the suit, thus satisfying one of the requirements for granting citizenship standing.

2. No. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral
treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters
[12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines],
 exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that
UNCLOS III delimits. UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among United
Nations members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the world’s oceans and
submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States’ graduated authority over a limited
span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts.

On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to
mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight
or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime
zones and continental shelf.

Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to
delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this
gives notice to the rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime space and
submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of
sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal,
immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the
living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf
(Article 77).

UNCLOS III and RA 9522 not

The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law
norms subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the
interest of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international navigation, consistent with the
international law principle of freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the political branches of the
Philippine government, in the competent discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass legislation
designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage. 40 Indeed,
bills drawing nautical highways for sea lanes passage are now pending in Congress. 41

In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, operate to
grant innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treaty’s
limitations and conditions for their exercise. 42 Significantly, the right of innocent passage is a customary
international law,43 thus automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law. 44 No modern State
can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance
with customary international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international
community.

Henares v. LTFRB, G.R. No. 158290, October 23, 2006.

Facts:

Citing statistics from the Metro Manila Transportation and Traffic Situation Study of 1996, the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the National Capital Region, a study of the Asian
Development Bank, the Manila Observatory and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) on the high growth and low turnover in vehicle ownership in the Philippines, including diesel-
powered vehicles, two-stroke engine powered motorcycles and their concomitant emission of air
pollutants, petitioners attempt to present a compelling case for judicial action against the bane of air
pollution and related environmental hazards.

Petitioners allege that the particulate matters (PM) – complex mixtures of dust, dirt, smoke, and liquid
droplets, varying in sizes and compositions emitted into the air from various engine combustions – have
caused detrimental effects on health, productivity, infrastructure and the overall quality of life.
Petitioners particularly cite the effects of certain fuel emissions from engine combustion when these
react to other pollutants. Fuel emissions also cause retardation and leaf bleaching in plants. According to
petitioner, another emission, carbon monoxide (CO), when not completely burned but emitted into the
atmosphere and then inhaled can disrupt the necessary oxygen in blood. With prolonged exposure, CO
affects the nervous system and can be lethal to people with weak hearts.

Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners contend that the bases for their petition for a writ of
mandamus to order the LTFRB to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel, lie in Section 16, Article
II of the 1987 Constitution, our ruling in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., and Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8749
otherwise known as the "Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999."

Issue: Whether or not the present action is supported by law.

Held:

1. Yes. This petition focuses on one fundamental legal right of petitioners, their right to clean air.
Moreover, as held previously, a party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality
which may, in the exercise of the Court's discretion, be set aside in view of the importance of the
issue raised. We brush aside this issue of technicality under the principle of the transcendental
importance to the public, especially so if these cases demand that they be settled promptly.

Undeniably, the right to clean air not only is an issue of paramount importance to petitioners for
it concerns the air they breathe, but it is also impressed with public interest. The consequences
of the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of a neglected environment due to emissions
of motor vehicles immeasurably affect the well-being of petitioners. On these considerations, the
legal standing of the petitioners deserves recognition.

Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993.

Facts:

Issue:

Held:

Social Justice Society v. Atienza, G.R. No. 156052, March 7, 2007

Facts:
On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027.
Respondent mayor approved the ordinance on November 28, 2001. It became effective on December
28, 2001, after its publication.

Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted pursuant to the police power delegated to local government units, a
principle described as the power inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to
promote the order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of the society.

Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and directed
the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating
their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses
situated in the area are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of the oil companies Caltex (Philippines),
Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.

Issue: Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the
removal of the Pandacan Terminals.

Held:

Yes. To support the assertion that petitioners have a clear legal right to the enforcement of the
ordinance, petitioner SJS states that it is a political party registered with the Commission on Elections
and has its offices in Manila. It claims to have many members who are residents of Manila. The other
petitioners, Cabigao and Tumbokon, are allegedly residents of Manila.

We need not belabor this point. We have ruled in previous cases that when a mandamus proceeding
concerns a public right and its object is to compel a public duty, the people who are interested in the
execution of the laws are regarded as the real parties in interest and they need not show any specific
interest. Besides, as residents of Manila, petitioners have a direct interest in the enforcement of the
city’s ordinances. Respondent never questioned the right of petitioners to institute this proceeding.

On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to
"enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city." One of these is Ordinance No.
8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has
not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his
ministerial duty to do so. In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., we stated the reason for this:

These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute
imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public
business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes
and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared
unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and
are bound to obey it.