#1 LANSANG VS CA

#2 MIAA VS CA
#3 SHANGRI-LA VS DEVELOPERS
#4 BAYAN VS DND SEC. GAZMIN
#5 INTERNATION SERVICE VS GREENPEACE SOUTHEAST ASIA

EQUAL ACCESS TO POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES AND POLITICAL DYNASTIES

PAMATONG VS COMELEC

FACTS:
Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent
COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a
nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a
registered political party with a national constituency.
Pamatong filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the
COMELEC violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Sec.
26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to
those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties.
The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all
the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for
the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous
national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international
campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government.
ISSUE:
Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?
RULING:
No.
As provided for under Sec. 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject
to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the
level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which
suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled
"Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally
1
considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different
treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II,
the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely
specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not
give rise to any cause of action before the courts.
Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures
that would accommodate as many people as possible into public office. The privilege of equal
access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations
specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus
Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates.” As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally
without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not
sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by anyone
who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any
person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.
The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine
the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as
contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

FIXES A STANDARD/SUFFICIENT STANDARD TEST

TABLARIN VS GUTIERREZ

FACTS:
The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year
1987-1988. However, the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the National
Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education, one of the
public respondents, and administered by the private respondent, the Center for Educational
Measurement (CEM).
On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. The petitioners sought to enjoin the
Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for
Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as
amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring
the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for
admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from
administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on the

2
petition for issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition. The NMAT
was conducted and administered as previously scheduled.
ISSUE:
Whether Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, offend against the
constitutional principle which forbids the undue delegation of legislative power, by failing to
establish the necessary standard to be followed by the delegate, the Board of Medical
Education?
RULING:
The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule-making authority by
an administrative agency like the Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad and highly
abstract. The standard may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the non-delegation
objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It
could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector
Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety.
In this case, the necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical Act:
“the standardization and regulation of medical education” and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same
Act, the body of the statute itself, and that these considered together are sufficient compliance
with the requirements of the non-delegation principle.

UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER

YNOT VS IAC

FACTS:
On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from
Masbate to Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac
Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner questioning the
constitutionality of executive order and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering the
merits of the case, the confiscation was sustained and the court declined to rule on the
constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court
but it also upheld the ruling of RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether E.O. 626-A is unconstitutional?
RULING:

3
The SC declared the E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. It held that the reasonable connection
between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure
is missing. The Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport
of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed
anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the
carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to
another province will make it easier to kill them there

PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATION
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY VS. COMELEC

FACTS:
Comelec refused to recognize Ang Ladlad LGBT Party, an organization composed of
men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered
individuals (LGBTs), as a party list based on moral grounds. In the elevation of the case to the
Supreme Court, Comelec alleged that petitioner made misrepresentation in their application.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ang Ladlad LGBT Party qualifies for registration as party-list?
RULING:
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party’s application for registration should be granted.
COMELEC’s citation of the Bible and the Koran in denying petitioner’s application was
a violation of the non-establishment clause laid down in Article 3 section 5 of the Constitution.
The proscription by law relative to acts against morality must be for a secular purpose (that is,
the conduct prohibited or sought to be repressed is “detrimental or dangerous to those
conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society"), rather than out of
religious conformity. The Comelec failed to substantiate their allegation that allowing
registration to Ladlad would be detrimental to society.
The LGBT community is not exempted from the exercise of its constitutionally vested
rights on the basis of their sexual orientation. Laws of general application should apply with
equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis
as other marginalized and under-represented sectors. Discrimination based on sexual orientation
is not tolerated ---not by our own laws nor by any international laws to which we adhere.

DOMICILE AND RESIDENCE

4
AQUINO VS COMELEC

FACTS:
Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the new 2nd district of Makati
stating that he has been residing there for ten months. When his candidacy was opposed, he
filed another certificate of candidacy stating that he has been residing in Makati for more than a
year by virtue of a contract of lease. COMELEC dismissed petition for Aquino’s
disqualification and garnered majority vote on 1995 election. Mateo Bedon filed for suspension
of his proclamation. COMELEC decided in favour of Bedon hence the petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Aquino failed the constitutional residency requirement?
RULING:
Petition dismissed, COMELEC decision affirmed. In order for Aquino to qualify he must
prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice. Clearly, the place
“where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home” where he eventually intends
to return and remain – his domicile – is what the Constitution speaks of residence for purposes
of election law. Property ownership is not an indicium of the right to vote or to be voted upon.

PROHIBITIONS RELATED TO THE PRACTICE OF PROFESSION

PUYAT VS DE GUZMAN

FACTS:
After an election for the Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI)
was held, one group, the respondent Acero group, instituted at the SEC quo warranto
proceedings, questioning the election. Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the
Interim Batasang Pambansa, entered his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which
the petitioner, Puyat group, objected on Constitutional ground that no Assemblyman could
“appear as counsel before any administrative body,” and SEC was an administrative body.
Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance for respondent Acero.
Assemblyman Fernandez had purchased 10 shares of IPI for P200.00 upon request of
respondent Acero. Following the notarization of Assemblyman Fernandez’ purchase, he filed a
motion for intervention in the SEC case as the owner of 10 IPI shares alleging legal interest in
the matter in litigation. The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Fernandez’
ownership of the said 10 shares.
ISSUE:
5
Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a stockholder of IPI, may intervene in the SEC
case without violating Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI) of the Constitution?
RULING:
Ordinarily, by virtue of the motion for intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be
said to be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although
he is joining the cause of the private respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for the
protection of his ownership of 10 shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation.
However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of
Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in
IPI, representing 10 shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them “after the fact”
that is, after the contested election of directors, after the quo warranto suit had been filed before
the SEC and 1 day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC. And what is more,
before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for
respondent Acero, but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of
the objection, he decided, instead, to intervene on the ground of legal interest in the matter
under litigation.
Under those facts and circumstances, the Court is constrained to find that there has been
an indirect appearance as counsel before an administrative body. In the opinion of the Court,
that is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition contained in Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now
Sec. 14, Art. VI). The intervention was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the
proceedings in some other capacity.
Thus, the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case falls within the ambit
of the prohibition contained in the 1973 Constitution. Respondent Commissioner's Order
granting Assemblyman Fernandez leave to intervene in the SEC Case was reversed and set
aside.

PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSIES VS ELECTION CONTESTS: SCOPE OF

INQUIRY; WHEN PROPER ELECTION CONTEST
PEREZ VS COMELEC

FACTS:
PAGE 21 SYLLABUS- GR 133944, OCT 28 1999

6
COMMISSION ON APPOINMENTS
DAZA VS SINGSON

FACTS:
The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized resulting to a political
realignment in the lower house. LDP also changed its representation in the Commission on
Appointments. They withdrew the seat occupied by Daza (LDP member) and gave it to the new
LDP member. Thereafter the chamber elected a new set of representatives in the CoA which
consisted of the original members except Daza who was replaced by Singson. Daza questioned
such replacement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a change resulting from a political realignment validly changes the composition
of the Commission on Appointments.
RULING:
As provided in the constitution, “there should be a Commission on Appointments
consisting of twelve Senators and twelve members of the House of Representatives elected by
each House respectively on the basis of proportional representation” of the political parties
therein, this necessarily connotes the authority of each house of Congress to see to it that the
requirement is duly complied with. Therefore, it may take appropriate measures, not only upon
the initial organization of the Commission but also subsequently thereto not the court.

DELEGATION OF EMERGENCY POWERS/ MILITARY POWERS

AMPATUAN VS HON. DILG SEC. PUNO

FACTS:
On November 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome massacre of 57 men and women, then
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946, placing “the Provinces of
Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency.” She
directed the AFP and the PNP “to undertake such measures as may be allowed by the
Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence” in the named
places. Under AO 273, she also delegated to the DILG the supervision of the ARMM.
The petitioners claimed that the President’s issuances encroached the ARMM’s autonomy, that
it constitute s an invalid exercise of emergency powers, and that the President had no factual
basis for declaring a state of emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the
City of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred. They want Proc. 1946 and AO
273 be declared unconstitutional.
7
 The respondents, however, said that its purpose was not to deprive the ARMM of its
autonomy, but to restore peace and order in subject places. It is pursuant to her “calling out”
power as Commander-in-Chief. The determination of the need to exercise this power rests
solely on her wisdom.
The President merely delegated her supervisory powers over the ARMM to the DILG
Secretary who was her alter ego any way. The delegation was necessary to facilitate the
investigation of the mass killings.
ISSUE/s:
1. Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called
out the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in
Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City?
2. Whether or not there is factual basis on the calling out of the Armed Forces?
RULING:
1. NO.
The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the
three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that
authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent
or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the
President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same.
2. YES.
The President’s call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence springs
from the power vested in her under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. While it is true
that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the President’s exercise of the above power,
unless it is shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court
will accord respect to the President’s judgment.

GENERAL PROHIBITION OF “RIDERS”

ALALAYAN VS NPC

FACTS:
Alalayan and the Philippine Power and Development Company assails the power vested in
NAPOCOR that "in any contract for the supply of electric power to a franchise holder,"
receiving at least 50% of its electric power and energy from it to require as a condition that such
franchise holder "shall not realize a net profit of more than twelve percent annually of its
8
investments plus two-month operating expenses." Also, it could “renew all existing contracts
with franchise holders for the supply of electric power and energy,". This is all in pursuant to
RA 3043 and the amendments it offered to RA 2641. Alalayan and PPDC are contractors with
NAPOCOR. They are re-suppliers of power produced by NAPOCOR. They aver that the
provision of the said RA is a rider in only meant to increase the capital stock of NAPOCOR.  
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 3043 is constitutional.
RULING:
YES.
The SC simply ruled that the Constitution does not require the Congress to employ in the
title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the
contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the
constitutional demand that it informs the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the
bill, and the public of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation.
And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take
appropriate action thereon, and thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.

SCOPE AND PURPOSE

PLANTERS VS FERTIPHIL

FACTS:

Petitioner PPI and private respondent

Fertiphil are private corporations
incorporated
under Philippine laws. They are both
engaged in the importation and
distribution of
9
fertilizers, pesticides and agricultural
chemicals.
● On June 3, 1985, then President
Ferdinand Marcos, exercising his
legislative powers,
issued Letter of Instruction (LOI) No.
1465 which provided, among others, for
the
imposition of a capital recovery
component (CRC) on the domestic sale
of all grades of
fertilizers in the Philippines
● In pursuant of the LOI, Fertiphil paid
P10 for every bag of fertilizer it sold in
the domestic
market to the Fertilizer and Pesticide
Authority (FPA). FPA then remitted the
amount
10
collected to the Far East Bank and Trust
Company, the depositary bank of PPI.
Fertiphil
paid P6,689,144 to FPA from July 8,
1985 to January 24, 1986.
● After the 1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA
voluntarily stopped the imposition of the
P10 levy.
Fertiphil demanded a refund of the
amount paid under the LOI from PPI,
but PPI refused
to pay
● Fertiphil filed a complaint for
collection and damages against FPA and
PPI with the RTC
in Makati.

11
● RTC rendered judgement in favor of
Fertiphil and demanded PPI to return the
sum of
P6,698,144.00 with interest at 12% from
the time of judicial demand plus
P100,000 in
attorneys’ fees and the cost of suit
● PPI filed an appeal with the CA but
the court just affirmed the RTCs
decision and
modifying it to remove the attorneys
fees
President Ferdinand Marcos, exercising his legislative powers, issued LOI No. 1465
which provided, among others, for the imposition of a capital recovery component (CRC) on
the domestic sale of all grades of fertilizers which resulted in having Fertiphil paying P 10/bag
sold to the Fertilizer and Perticide Authority (FPA).
FPA remits its collection to Far East Bank and Trust Company who applies to the
payment of corporate debts of Planters Products Inc. (PPI)
After the Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the P10 levy. 
Upon return of democracy, Fertiphil demanded a refund but PPI refused.  Fertiphil filed a
complaint for collection and damages against FPA and PPI with the RTC on the ground that
LOI No. 1465 is unjust, unreasonable oppressive, invalid and unlawful resulting to denial of
due process of law.  

12
 FPA answered that it is a valid exercise of the police power of the state in ensuring the
stability of the fertilizing industry in the country and that Fertiphil did not sustain damages
since the burden imposed fell on the ultimate consumers.
RTC and CA favored Fertiphil holding that it is an exercise of the power of taxation ad is
as such because it is not for public purpose as PPI is a private corporation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not LOI No. 1465 is an invalid exercise of the power of taxation rather the police
power?
RULING:
YES.
Police power and the power of taxation are inherent powers of the state but distinct and have
different tests for validity.  Police power is the power of the state to enact the legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty on property in order to promote general welfare.  While, the
power of taxation is the power to levy taxes as to be used for public purpose.  The main purpose
of police power is the regulation of a behavior or conduct, while taxation is revenue generation.
The lawful subjects and lawful means tests are used to determine the validity of a law enacted
under the police power.  The power of taxation, on the other hand, is circumscribed by inherent
and constitutional limitations.
In this case, it is for purpose of revenue.  But it is a robbery for the State to tax the citizen
and use the funds generation for a private purpose.  Public purpose does NOT only pertain to
those purpose which are traditionally viewed as essentially governmental function such as
building roads and delivery of basic services, but also includes those purposes designed to
promote social justice. Thus, public money may now be used for the relocation of illegal
settlers, low-cost housing and urban or agrarian reform.

FISCAL POWERS OF CONGRESS

GUINGONA VS CARAGUE

FACTS:
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion
for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as the
General Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS
amount to P27,017,813,000.00.

13
 The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled “
Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty,
as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), “by PD No. 1177, entitled “Revising the Budget
Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society,” and by PD
No.1967, entitled “An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic
of the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by
Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.”
The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for
debt service, it being higher than the budget for education, therefore it is against Section 5(5),
Article XIV of the Constitution which mandates to “assign the highest budgetary priority to
education.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional; it being higher
than the budget for education.
RULING:
No.
While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is
mandated to “assign the highest budgetary priority to education,” it does not thereby follow that
the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives
of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.
Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to
provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debt…It is not only a matter
of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of
our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt
service bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said
appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional.

EXECUTIVE POWER; VALID EXERCISE

DJUMANTAN VS DOMINGO

FACTS:
Bernard Banez, husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a
contract worker.He then embraced and was converted to Islam.

14
 He then, married petitioner in accordance with Islamic rites. Banez then returned to the
Philippines. Petitioner and her two children with Banez arrived in Manila as the “guests” of
Banez. The latter made it appear that he was just a friend of the family of petitioner and was
merely repaying the hospitability extended to him during his stay in Indonesia. Banez executed
an “Affidavit of Guaranty and Support,” for his “guests.” As “guests,” petitioner and her two
children lived in the house of Banez. Petitioner and her children were admitted to the
Philippines as temporary visitors. Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship of her
husband and petitioner. She filed a complaint for “concubinage”, however, subsequently
dismissed for lack of merit. Immigration status of petitioner was changed from temporary
visitor to that of permanent resident. Petitioner was issued an alien certificate of registration.
Banez’ eldest son, Leonardo, filed a letter complaint subsequently referred to CID. Petitioner
was detained at the CID detention cell. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the deportation
case on the ground that she was validly married to a Filipino citizen. CID disposed that the
second marriage of Bernardo Banes to respondent Djumantan irregular and not in accordance
with the laws of the Philippines. They revoked the visa previously granted to her.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the right of respondents to deport the petitioner is valid?
RULING:
Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is deemed
inimical to the public interest is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent
their entry into the country. This right is based on the fact that since the aliens are not part of the
nation, their admission into the territory is a matter of pure permission and simple tolerance
which creates no obligation on the part of the government to permit them to stay.
There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to be admitted,
much less to be given permanent residency, in the Philippines.The fact of marriage by an alien
to a citizen does not withdraw her from the operation of the immigration laws governing the
admission and exclusion of aliens. Marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino husband does not
ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen and does not excuse her from her failure to depart from
the country upon the expiration of her extended stay here as an alien. It is not mandatory for the
CID to admit any alien who applies for a visitor’s visa. Once admitted into the country, the
alien has no right to an indefinite stay. an alien allowed to stay temporarily may apply for a
change of status and “may be admitted” as a permanent resident. Among those considered
qualified to apply for permanent residency if the wife or husband of a Philippine citizen. The
entry of aliens into the country and their admission as immigrants is not a matter of right, even
if they are legally married to Filipino citizens.

15
QUALIFICATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT
POE-LLAMANZARES VS COMELEC

FACTS:
In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and that her residence up to day before May 9, 2016
would be 10 years and 11 months counted from May 24, 2005.
Grace Poe was born in 1968., found as newborn infant in Jaro, Iloilo and was legally
adopted by Ronald Allan Kelly Poe (FPJ) and Jesus Sonora Poe (SUSAN ROCES) in 1974. She
immigrated to the US in 1991 after her marriage to Theodore Llamanzares who was then based
at the US. Grace Poe then became a naturalized American citizen in 2001.
On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due to his father’s deteriorating
medical condition, who then eventually demise on February 3,2005. She then quitted her job in
the US to be with her grieving mother and finally went home for good to the Philippines
on May 24, 2005.
On July 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her
Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine
Passport.
In 2010, before assuming her post as appointees Chairperson of the MTRCB , she
renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirements as to Reacquisition of
Filipino Citizenship. From then on, she stopped using her American passport.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground
particularly among others, that she cannot be considered a natural born Filipino citizen since
she was a foundling and that her biological parents cannot be proved as Filipinos. The
Comelec en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is in want of citizenship and
residence requirements and that she committed misrepresentation in her COC.
On certiorari, the SC, reversed the ruling and held a vote of 9-6 that Poe is qualified as
candidate for Presidency.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a natural- born Filipino citizen

(2) Whether or not Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement.

RULING:
16
 1. YES.
Grace poe is considerably a natural-born Filipino Citizen. For that, she satisfied the
constitutional requirement that only natural-born Filipinos may run for Presidency.
There is high probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos, as being shown in her physical
features which are typical of Filipinos, aside from the fact that she was found as an infant in
Jaro, Iloilo, a municipality wherein there is 99% probability that residents there are Filipinos,
consequently providing 99% chance that Poe’s biological parents are Filipinos. Said probability
and circumstantial evidence are admissible under Rule 128, Sec 4 of the Rules on Evidence.
The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a class, natural born- citizens as based on
the deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional Convention, wherein though its enumeration is
silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language either to definitely exclude the
foundlings to be natural born citizens.
2.As to the residency issue, Grace Poe satisfied the 10-year residency because she satisfied the
requirements of ANIMUS MANENDI (intent to remain permanently) coupled with ANIMUS
NON REVERTENDI (intent of not returning to US) in acquiring a new domicile in the
Philippines. Starting May 24,2005, upon returning to the Philippines, Grace Poe presented
overwhelming evidence of her actual stay and intent to abandon permanently her domicile in
the US, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Filipino Citizenship under RA 9225.
Hence, her candidacy for Presidency was granted by the SC.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT; PROHIBITIONS

RAFAEL VS EMBROIDERY & APPARTEL CONTROL BOARD

FACTS:
Page 27 syllabus- 21 SCRA 336 -1967
ISSUE:
RULING:

SCOPE OF THE POWER OF COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS

BAUTISTA VS SALONGA

FACTS:
In August 1987, President Cory Aquino designated petitioner Mary Concepcion Bautista
as "Acting Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights. In December 1987, she extended to
17
Bautista a permanent appointment as Chairman of the Commission. Bautista took her oath of
office and immediately discharged her functions and duties.
In January 1989, President Aquino extended an "ad interim appointment" to Bautista. In
February 1989, the Commission on Appointments, requested Bautista's presence along with
documents as required by its rules in connection with the confirmation of her appointment.
Bautista refused to be placed under CA's review. She then filed a petition for certiorari with a
prayer for the immediate issuance of a TRO before the SC, to declare "as unlawful and
unconstitutional and without any legal force and effect any action of the CA on her lawfully
extended appointment on the ground that they have no lawful and constitutional authority to
confirm and to review her appointment.
Meanwhile, the CA wrote a letter to Executive Secretary Macaraig informing him that the
CA disapproved Bautista's "ad interim appointment" as Chairperson of the CHR.
Pending the resolution of Bautista's case, President Aquino designated Mallillin as
"Acting Chairman of the CHR".
Bautista filed a supplemental urgent ex-parte motion seeking to restrain Mallillin from
continuing to exercise the functions of chairman. The SC issued a TRO.
CA contends that, granting that Bautista's appointment as Chairman of the Commission
on Human Rights is one that, under Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, as interpreted in the
Mison case, is solely for the President to make, yet, it is within the president's prerogative to
voluntarily submit such appointment to the CA for confirmation.
Malilin invoked EO 163-A which provides that the tenure of the Chairman and the
Commissioners of the CHR shall be at the pleasure of the President.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment of the Chairman and Members of the CHR require the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments?
RULING:
NO.
Since the position of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights is not among
the positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, it
follows that the appointment by the President of the Chairman of the (CHR), is to be made
without the review or participation of the Commission on Appointments.
To be more precise, the appointment of the Chairman and Members of the Commission
on Human Rights is not specifically provided for in the Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen
18
and Members of the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections and the
Commission on Audit, whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution in the
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.

POWER OF CONTROL
JOSON VS TORRES

FACTS:
Petitioner Governor Joson was filed a complaint before the Office of the President for
barging violently into the session hall of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the company of
armed men. The case was endorsed to the DILG. For failure to file an answer after three (3)
extensions, petitioner was declared in default and ordered the petitioner 60-day preventive
suspension. Petitioner later “Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation”. DILG denied the motion
declaring that the submission of position papers substantially complies with the requirements of
procedural due process in administrative proceedings. Later, the Executive Secretary, by
authority of the President, adopted the findings and recommendation of the DILG
Secretary.  The former imposed on petitioner the penalty of suspension from office for six (6)
months without pay.
ISSUE:
Whether or not:
1. Preventive suspension is proper;
2. Procedural due process is violated;
3. The resolution of DILG Secretary is invalid on the ground of undue delegation; that it is the
President who is the Disciplining Authority, not the Secretary of DILG;
RULING:
1. YES.
Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Disciplining Authority at any time (a) after
the issues are joined; (b) when the evidence of guilt is strong; and (c) given the gravity of the
offense, there is great probability that the respondent, who continues to hold office, could
influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other
evidence. The act of respondent in allegedly barging violently into the session hall of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the company of armed men constitutes grave misconduct.  The
allegations of complainants are bolstered by the joint-affidavit of two (2) employees of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan.  Respondent who is the chief executive of the province is in a
19
position to influence the witnesses.  Further, the history of violent confrontational politics in the
province dictates that extreme precautionary measures be taken.
2. YES.
The rejection of petitioner’s right to a formal investigation denied him procedural due
process.  Section 5 of A. O. No. 23 provides that at the preliminary conference,
the Investigating Authority shall summon the parties to consider whether they desire a formal
investigation.  This provision does not give the Investigating Authority the discretion to
determine whether a formal investigation would be conducted.  The records show that petitioner
filed a motion for formal investigation. There is nothing in the Local Government Code and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations nor in A.O. No. 23 that provide that administrative cases
against elective local officials can be decided on the basis of position papers.  A.O. No. 23
states that the Investigating Authority may require the parties to submit their respective
memoranda but this is only after formal investigation and hearing.
3. NO.
The DILG resolution is valid. The President remains the Disciplining Authority.  What
is delegated is the power to investigate, not the power to discipline. The power to discipline
evidently includes the power to investigate.   As the Disciplining Authority, the President has
the power derived from the Constitution itself to investigate complaints against local
government officials.  A. O. No. 23, however, delegates the power to investigate to the DILG or
a Special Investigating Committee, as may be constituted by the Disciplining Authority.  This is
not undue delegation, contrary to petitioner Joson’s claim.
Under the doctrine of qualified political agency “…which recognizes the establishment of
a single executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the
Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution
or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the
multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by
and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.”
This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President provided in the
Constitution. Control is said to be the very heart of the power of the presidency. As head of the
Executive Department, the President, however, may delegate some of his powers to the Cabinet
members except when he is required by the Constitution to act in person or the exigencies of the
situation demand that he acts personally. The members of Cabinet may act for and in behalf of
the President in certain matters because the President cannot be expected to exercise his control

20
(and supervisory) powers personally all the time.   Each head of a department is, and must be,
the President’s alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required by law
to exercise authority.

FAITHFUL EXECUTION CLAUSE

BANDA VS EXECUTIVE SEC. ERMITA

FACTS:
Executive Order No. 378, amending Section 6 of Executive Order No. 285 by, inter alia,
removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Printing Office (NPO) over the printing
services requirements of government agencies and instrumentalities.
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 378, government agencies and instrumentalities are
allowed to source their printing services from the private sector through competitive bidding,
subject to the condition that the services offered by the private supplier be of superior... quality
and lower in cost compared to what was offered by the NPO. Executive Order No. 378 also
limited NPO's appropriation in the General Appropriations Act to its income.
The petitioners maintain that former President Aquino's Executive Order No. 285 is a
legislative enactment as the same was issued while President Aquino still had legislative powers
under the Freedom Constitution; thus, only Congress through legislation can validly amend
Executive Order No. 285.
Petitioners maintain that the issuance of Executive Order No. 378 would lead to the
eventual abolition of the NPO and would violate the security of tenure of NPO employees.
Petitioners avow that the reorganization of the NPO under Executive Order No. 378 is
tainted with bad faith
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is beyond the executive powers of President Arroyo to amend or repeal
Executive Order No. 285 issued by former President Aquino when the latter still exercised
legislative powers?
RULING:
It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has the power to
reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive department in line with the President's
constitutionally granted power of control over executive offices and by virtue of previous
delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes.

21
 It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is part of the Office of the Press
Secretary (which in various times has been an agency directly attached to the Office of the Press
Secretary or as an agency under the Philippine Information Agency), is part of the Office of the
President.
Concomitant to such power to abolish, merge or consolidate offices in the Office of the
President Proper and to transfer functions/offices not only among the offices in the Office of
President Proper but also the rest of the Office of the President and the Executive Branch, the
President implicitly has the power to effect less radical or less substantive changes to the
functional and internal structure of the Office of the President, including the modification of
functions of such executive agencies as the exigencies of the service may require.
There was neither an abolition of the NPO nor a removal of any of its functions to be
transferred to another agency. The NPO remains the main printing arm of the government for
all kinds of government forms and publications but in the interest of greater economy and
encouraging efficiency and profitability, it must now compete with the private sector for certain
government printing jobs.
In all, Executive Order No. 378, which purports to institute necessary reforms in
government in order to improve and upgrade efficiency in the delivery of public services by
redefining the functions of the NPO and limiting its funding to its own income and to transform
it into a... self-reliant agency able to compete with the private sector, is well within the
prerogative of President Arroyo under her continuing delegated legislative power to reorganize
her own office... the presidential power to reorganize agencies and offices in the executive
branch of government is subject to the condition that such reorganization is carried out in good
faith.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY

DRILON VS CA

FACTS:
The Department of Justice has brought suit to annul the CA decision prohibiting the
Government from pursuing criminal actions against the private respondents for the death of
Ireneo Longno and Lonely Chavez during early martial law.
In 1973, the private respondents PAREDES and GANZON were charged with double
murder before Military Commission No. 34. The military promulgated a decision acquitting
PAREDES but sentencing GANZON to life imprisonment with hard labor. PAREDES was
released from custody while GANZON was made to serve sentence until he was released in

22
1978 and placed under house arrest under guard. In 1985, GANZON joined the Kilusang
Bagong Lipunan (KBL), the party in power, where he was designated as campaign manager.
In 1988, administration having changed, then DOJ Sec. Ordoñez directed State
Prosecutor Trampe to conduct a preliminary investigation against the private respondents for
the above murders. The private respondents moved for dismissal, in GANZON'S case, on the
ground that he, Ganzon, had been extended an absolute pardon by the President Marcos, and he,
having been previously convicted, can no longer be tried anew, and in Paredes' case, on the
ground that he, Paredes, had been acquitted. Trampe, however, denied both requests and
reconsideration having been likewise denied, the private respondents went to the Court of
Appeals on prohibition.
The petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals, in granting prohibition, committed a
grave abuse of discretion:
(1) Ganzon has not adequately proved the fact of presidential pardon;
(2) there exists no evidence in the files of the Government to prove pardon;
(3) Ganzon's copy is a bare machine copy and Ganzon has failed to adequately establish
the loss of the original;
(4) the alleged pardon (or copy of it) had not been properly sealed and authenticated, or
executed in official Malacañang stationery; and
(5) the disposition of the murder cases by the military does not preclude the filing of
new informations by the civilian government.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Government may proceed criminally against the private respondents despite
verdict earlier rendered by Military Commission No. 34?
RULING:
CANNOT PROCEED.
Private respondents had been arraigned by the military court, pleaded not guilty, and,
with respect to Raul Paredes, acquitted, and with respect to Ganzon, convicted and sentenced.
To the mind of the Court, Ganzon has accepted the judgment against him, and as Tan asked,
"why should [he] who has accepted the justness of the verdict of the military court who is
satisfied that he had a fair hearing, and who is willing to serve his sentence in full, be dragged
through the harrow of another hearing in a civil court to risk being convicted a second time
perchance to serve a heavier penalty?"
That falls squarely within Tan's ruling, and as we tolerated no reinvestigation there, we
cannot tolerate one here.

23
 The Court cited three cases:
a. Olaguer vs. Military Commission No. 34 – Olaguer was rescued from a court martial
which sentenced him to death without receiving evidence in his defense. It would be a
cruel distortion of the Olaguer decision to use it as authority for reprosecuting
civilians regardless of whether, unlike Olaguer, they had been accorded a fair trial and
regardless of whether they have already been acquitted and released, or have accepted
sentences imposed on them and commenced serving the same.
b. Tan vs. Barrios – Olaguer should, in principle, be applied prospectively only to future
cases and cases still ongoing or not yet final when that decision was promulgated.
Hence, there should be no retroactive nullification of final judgments, whether of
conviction or acquittal, rendered by military courts against civilians BEFORE the
promulgation of the Olaguer decision. Such final sentences should not be disturbed by
the State. Only in particular cases where the convicted person or the State shows that
there was serious denial of the Constitutional rights of the accused should the nullity
of the sentence be declared and a retrial be ordered based on the violation of the
constitutional rights of the accused, and not on the Olaguer doctrine. If a retrial is no
longer possible, accused should be released since the judgment against him is null on
account of the violation of his constitutional rights and denial of process.”
c. Cruz vs. Enrile – “all the petitioners in said proceedings "who have been serving (but
not yet completed) their sentence imprisonment" shall have "the option either to
complete the servic their sentence, or be tried anew by the civil courts. Upon
conviction they should be credited in the service of their sentence for the period of
their previous imprisonment. Upon acquittal, they should be set free."

FOREIGN RELATIONS: SENATE CONCURRENCE IN INTERNATIONAL

AGREEMENTS
BAYAN MUNA VS ROMULO

FACTS:
In 2000, the RP, through Charge d’Affaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute
which, by its terms, is “subject to ratification, acceptance or approval” by the signatory states.

In 2003, via Exchange of Notes with the US government, the RP, represented by then DFA
Secretary Ople, finalized a non-surrender agreement which aimed to protect certain persons
of the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against them in
international tribunals.

Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and ratifying the
Agreement and prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared as
without force and effect.

24
ISSUE/s:
1. Did respondents abuse their discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
concluding the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement in contravention of the Rome Statute?
2. Is the agreement valid, binding and effective without the concurrence by at least 2/3 of all
the members of the Senate?
RULING:
The Agreement does not contravene or undermine, nor does it differ from, the Rome
Statute.  Far from going against each other, one complements the other.  As a matter of fact, the
principle of complementarity underpins the creation of the ICC. According to Art. 1 of the
Statute, the jurisdiction of the ICC is to “be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions [of
the signatory states].” the Rome Statute expressly recognizes the primary jurisdiction of states,
like the RP, over serious crimes committed within their respective borders, the complementary
jurisdiction of the ICC coming into play only when the signatory states are unwilling or unable
to prosecute.
Also, under international law, there is a considerable difference between a State-Party
and a signatory to a treaty. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a signatory
state is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty.
The Philippines is only a signatory to the Rome Statute and not a State-Party for lack of
ratification by the Senate. Thus, it is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the
object and purpose of the Rome Statute. Any argument obliging the Philippines to follow any
provision in the treaty would be premature. And even assuming that the Philippines is a State-
Party, the Rome Statute still recognizes the primacy of international agreements entered into
between States, even when one of the States is not a State-Party to the Rome Statute.
The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of
subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of
our history, we have entered executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial and
consular relations, most favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection,
postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity of these has never
been seriously questioned by our courts.

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

ELOISA TOLENTINO VS ATTY. ROY LAYOLA

FACTS: PAGE 31 SYLLABUS- GR 153809 JULY 27, 2011

ISSUE:

25
RULING:
JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY
TELECOM VS COMELEC

FACTS:
Petitioners challenge the validity of Sec. 92 of B.P. Blg. 881. on the ground (1) that it
takes property without due process of law and without just compensation; (2) that it denies
radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in
excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of
communication or information during the period of election.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has standing to bring the constitutional question on the assailed
provision?
RULING:
To affirm the validity of Sec. 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 is to hold public broadcasters to their
obligation to see to it that the variety and vigor of public debate on issues in an election is
maintained. For while broadcast media are not mere common carriers but entities with free
speech rights, they are also public trustees charged with the duty of ensuring that the people
have access to the diversity of views on political issues. This right of the people is paramount to
the autonomy of broadcast media. To affirm the validity of Sec. 92, therefore, is likewise to
uphold the people’s right to information on matters of public concern. The use of property bears
a social function and is subject to the state’s duty to intervene for the common good. Broadcast
media can find their just and highest reward in the fact that whatever altruistic service they may
render in connection with the holding of elections is for that common good.

PLENARY JUDICIAL POWER: DERIVATIVE; PET

MADRIGAL VS DOJ

FACTS:
Due to a loan that went sour, the city prosecutor filed a criminal case of estafa Par. 1
against herein respondents. Respondents filed a motion to suspend arraignment as they appealed
their case to the DOJ. The DOJ Sec. later released a resolution stating that a criminal case of
estafa under Par. 3 should be filed against the respondents

26
 Respondents sought for reconsideration. USEC Gutierrez then released a resolution on
which the petitioners sought reconsideration, but were later on denied. They appealed to the CA
but was denied as well.
Petitioners claim that the court committed grave abuse of discretion as it went against the
first resolution of the DOJ.
ISSUE:
Whether or not courts are empowered to substitute their judgment for that of the Secretary of
Justice?
RULING:
NO.
Courts are not empowered to substitute their judgment for that of the Secretary of Justice, save
only when it was rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.  In this case, we find no abuse, much less grave abuse of discretion, on the part of
the Secretary of Justice, acting through Usec. Gutierrez, as to warrant a reversal of the CA
Decision.
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: NO POWER
SERRANO VS GALLANT

FACTS:
Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and
Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., under a POEA-approved contract of employment for 12 months,
as Chief Officer, with the basic monthly salary of US$1,400, plus $700/month overtime pay,
and 7 days paid vacation leave per month.

On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to accept a downgraded
employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000
upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be Chief Officer by the end
of April 1998.

Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano Chief Officer. Hence, Serrano
refused to stay on as second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on May 26, 1998,
serving only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of
nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days.

Serrano filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for constructive
dismissal and for payment of his money claims in the total amount of US$26,442.73 (based on
27
the computation of $2590/month from June 1998 to February 199, $413.90 for March 1998, and
$1640 for March 1999) as well as moral and exemplary damages.

The LA declared the petitioner's dismissal illegal and awarded him US$8,770, representing his
salaray for three (3) months of the unexpired portion of the aforesaid contract of employment,
plus $45 for salary differential and for attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total amount;
however, no compensation for damages as prayed was awarded.

On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision and awarded Serrano $4669.50, representing
three (3) months salary at $1400/month, plus 445 salary differential and 10% for attorney's fees.
This decision was based on the provision of RA 8042, which was made into law on July 15,
1995.

Serrano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the
constitutionality of the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of RA 8042, which reads:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of overseas employment without just,
valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full
reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his
salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every
year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.

The NLRC denied the Motion; hence, Serrano filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of
Appeals (CA), reiterating the constitutional challenge against the subject clause. The CA
affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate, but skirted the
constitutional issue raised by herein petitioner Serrano.

ISSUE/s:
1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution on non-
impairment of contracts;
2. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and
Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector.
RULING:
1. NO.

28
 Petitioner’s claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with the stipulations in his
contract on the term of his employment and the fixed salary package he will receive is not
tenable.
The subject clause may not be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on
the impairment clause, for the law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State
to regulate a business, profession or calling, particularly the recruitment and deployment of
OFWs, with the noble end in view of ensuring respect for the dignity and well-being of OFWs
wherever they may be employed.
2. YES.
To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions
translate to economic security and parity.
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all
OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory
intent against, and an invidious impact on, OFWs at two levels:
First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis-à-vis OFWs with
employment contracts of one year or more;
Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and
Third, OFWs vis-à-vis local workers with fixed-period employment;
The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar
disadvantage.
Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative
of the right of petitioner and other OFWs to equal protection.
The subject clause “or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever
is less” in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

STANDING: LEGISLATORS AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL

FARINAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS:
The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act
No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for

29
being in violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have
only one subject which should be expressed in its title.

According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the

Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider.
The respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, urge this Court to dismiss
the petitions contending, preliminarily, that the petitioners have no legal standing to institute the
present suit. Except for the fact that their negative votes were overruled by the majority of the
members of the House of Representatives, the petitioners have not shown that they have
suffered harm as a result of the passage of Rep. Act No. 9006. Neither do petitioners have any
interest as taxpayers since the assailed statute does not involve the exercise by Congress of its
taxing or spending power.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners have legal standing to institute the case?
RULING:
The petitions were filed by the petitioners in their capacities as members of the House of
Representatives, and as taxpayers and registered voters.
Generally, a party who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result
of its enforcement. The rationale for requiring a party who challenges the constitutionality of a
statute to allege such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy is "to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."
However, being merely a matter of procedure, this Court, in several cases involving
issues of "overarching significance to our society," had adopted a liberal stance on standing.
Thus, in Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, this Court brushed aside the
procedural requirement of standing, took cognizance of, and subsequently granted, the petitions
separately filed by then Senator Francisco Tatad and several members of the House of
Representatives assailing the constitutionality of Rep. Act No. 8180 (An Act Deregulating the
Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes).
Certainly, the principal issue posed by the petitions, i.e., whether Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code, which this Court had declared in Dimaporo as deriving its existence
from the constitutional provision on accountability of public officers, has been validly repealed
by Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, is one of "overarching significance" that justifies this
Court’s adoption of a liberal stance vis-à-vis the procedural matter on standing.
30
TAXPAYERS
ABAYA VS EBDANE

FACTS:
Petitioners Plaridel M. Abaya who claims that he filed the instant petition as a taxpayer,
former lawmaker, and a Filipino citizen, and Plaridel C. Garcia, likewise claiming that he filed
the suit as a taxpayer, former military officer, and a Filipino citizen, mainly seeking to nullify
a DPWH resolution which recommended the award to private respondent China Road & Bridge
Corporation of the contract for the implementation of the civil works known as Contract
Package No. 1. They also seek to annul the contract of agreement subsequently entered into by
and between the DPWH and China Road & Bridge Corporation pursuant to said resolution. 
Respondent defends Petitioners don’t have Locus Standi since they are not party to the
contract.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners have the LOCUS STANDI (Legal Standing) to file the instant case
against the government notwithstanding that they are not a party to the contract to challenge its
validity?
RULING:
YES.
As taxpayers, they have Locus Standi to file the present suit. 
Briefly stated, locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question. More particularly, it is a party’s personal and substantial interest in a case such that he
has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act being challenged. 
Locus standi however is merely a matter of procedure and it has been recognized that in
some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by operation of
law or any other government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue
in the public interest.  Consequently, the court in a catena of cases, has invariably adopted a
liberal stance on locus standi, including those cases involving taxpayers. 
The prevailing doctrine in Taxpayer's Suit is to allow taxpayers to question government
contracts especially when there are:

31
1. illegal disbursement of public funds
2. the public money is being deflected to some other purpose or to someone's private bank
account, or they see
3. wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law
entered into by the national government or GOCCs allegedly in contravention of the law. 
Significantly, a taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to challenge its validity.  

CITIZENS AND ASSOCIATIONS: TRANSCENDETAL IMPORTANCE

LOZANO VS MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

FACTS:
These are four petitions consolidated pertaining to the oath-taking of Her Excellency,
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Philippines, and the validity of the exercise of the
powers and authority of the President by President Joseph Ejercito-Estrada, alleging that he is
the President “on leave”. This also presents the issue on whether the petitioner herein has the
standing in this case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner has the standing to sue in this case?
RULING:
NO.
Petitioners have no legal standing to file the suits. They have now shown any direct and
personal injury as a result of President Arroyo’s oath-taking. Specifically, Petitioner Lozano’s
alleged interest as a taxpayer is far too detached from the ultimate objective of his Petition:
nullify the oath-taking of Arroyo and declare Estrada as "President-on-leave." The other
petitioners have not even alleged, not to say shown, any prima facie legal interest to qualify
them as proper parties. Kibitzers, however well-meaning, have no locus standi.

DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

CHAVEZ VS GONZALES

FACTS:
As a consequence of the public release of copies of the “Hello Garci” compact disc
audiotapes involving a wiretapped mobile phone conversation between then-President Gloria
Arroyo and Comelec Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, respondent DOJ Secretary Gonzales
32
warned reporters that those who had copies of the CD and those broadcasting or publishing its
contents could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He also stated that persons
possessing or airing said tapes were committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by
anybody. Finally, he stated that he had ordered the National Bureau of Investigation to go after
media organizations “found to have caused the spread, the playing and the printing of the
contents of a tape.” 
Meanwhile, respondent NTC warned in a press release all radio stations and TV network
owners/operators that the conditions of the authorization and permits issued to them by
government like the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority explicitly provides
that they shall not use their stations for the broadcasting or telecasting of false information or
willful misrepresentation. The NTC stated that the continuous airing or broadcast of the “Hello
Garci” taped conversations by radio and TV stations is a continuing violation of the Anti-
Wiretapping Law and the conditions of the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of
Authority.  It warned that their broadcast/airing of such false information and/or willful
misrepresentation shall be a just cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the
licenses or authorizations issued to the said media establishments.
Subsequently, a dialogue was held between the NTC and the Kapisanan ng mga
Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP) which resulted in the issuance of a Joint Press Statement which
stated, among others, that the supposed wiretapped tapes should be treated with sensitivity and
handled responsibly.
Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 against respondents Secretary Gonzales
and the NTC directly with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law justify
straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press?
RULING:
NO.
A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is
given the strictest scrutiny, with the government having the burden of overcoming the
presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule. This rule applies equally
to all kinds of media, including broadcast media.
Respondents, who have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge freedom of
speech and of the press, failed to hurdle the clear and present danger test. [T]he great evil which
government wants to prevent is the airing of a tape recording in alleged violation of the anti-
wiretapping law. The records of the case at bar however are confused and confusing, and
33
respondents’ evidence falls short of satisfying the clear and present danger test.  Firstly, the
various statements of the Press Secretary obfuscate the identity of the voices in the tape
recording. Secondly, the integrity of the taped conversation is also suspect. The Press Secretary
showed to the public two versions, one supposed to be a “complete” version and the other, an
“altered” version. Thirdly, the evidence of the respondents on the who’s and the how’s of the
wiretapping act is ambivalent, especially considering the tape’s different versions. The identity
of the wire-tappers, the manner of its commission and other related and relevant proofs are
some of the invisibles of this case.  Fourthly, given all these unsettled facets of the tape, it is
even arguable whether its airing would violate the anti-wiretapping law.
We rule that not every violation of a law will justify straitjacketing the exercise of
freedom of speech and of the press. Our laws are of different kinds and doubtless, some of them
provide norms of conduct which[,] even if violated[,] have only an adverse effect on a person’s
private comfort but does not endanger national security. There are laws of great significance but
their violation, by itself and without more, cannot support suppression of free speech and free
press. In fine, violation of law is just a factor, a vital one to be sure, which should be weighed in
adjudging whether to restrain freedom of speech and of the press. The totality of the injurious
effects of the violation to private and public interest must be calibrated in light of the preferred
status accorded by the Constitution and by related international covenants protecting freedom of
speech and of the press. In calling for a careful and calibrated measurement of the
circumference of all these factors to determine compliance with the clear and present danger
test, the Court should not be misinterpreted as devaluing violations of law.  By all means,
violations of law should be vigorously prosecuted by the State for they breed their own evil
consequence.  But to repeat, the need to prevent their violation cannot per se trump the exercise
of free speech and free press, a preferred right whose breach can lead to greater evils. For this
failure of the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the
Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free press. There is no
showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the national
security of the State.

OTHER RULES: RAISE AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND

CONSTITUTIONALITY IS THE VERY LIS MOTA
ABS-CBN VS PHIL. MULTI-MEDIA

FACTS:
The Petitioner instituted this case for violation of the IP Code and infringement of ABS-CBN’s
broadcasting rights and copyright, which can be resolved without going into the
constitutionality of Memorandum Circular No. 04-08-88. As held by the Court of Appeals, the

34
only relevance of the circular in this case is whether or not compliance therewith should be
considered manifestation of lack of intent to commit infringement, and if it is, whether such
lack of intent is a valid defense against the complaint of petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court may pass upon the issue of constitutionality?
RULING:
As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity so that if not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised in the trial, and
if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal. In Philippine Veterans Bank
v. Court of Appeals, we held:
We decline to rule on the issue of constitutionality as all the requisites for the exercise of
judicial review are not present herein. Specifically, the question of constitutionality will not be
passed upon by the Court unless, at the first opportunity, it is properly raised and presented in
an appropriate case, adequately argued, and is necessary to a determination of the case,
particularly where the issue of constitutionality is the very lis mota presented.
However, records show that petitioner assailed the constitutionality of Memorandum
Circular No. 04-08-88 by way of a collateral attack before the Court of Appeals. In Philippine
National Bank v. Palma, we ruled that for reasons of public policy, the constitutionality of a law
cannot be collaterally attacked. A law is deemed valid unless declared null and void by a
competent court; more so when the issue has not been duly pleaded in the trial court.

TEXTUALLY DEMONSTRABLE COMMITMENT

TAÑADA VS ANGARA

FACTS:
Petitioners prayed for the nullification, on constitutional grounds, of the concurrence of
the Philippine Senate in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement, for brevity) and for the
prohibition of its implementation and enforcement through the release and utilization of public
funds, the assignment of public officials and employees, as well as the use of government
properties and resources by respondent-heads of various executive offices concerned therewith.
They contended that WTO agreement violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to
“develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos…
35
to give preference to qualified Filipinos and to promote the preferential use of Filipino labor,
domestic materials and locally produced goods” as (1) the WTO requires the Philippines “to
place nationals and products of member-countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local
products” and (2) that the WTO “intrudes, limits and/or impairs” the constitutional powers of
both Congress and the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization unduly limit, restrict and impair Philippine sovereignty specifically the legislative
power which, under Sec. 2, Article VI, 1987 Philippine Constitution is ‘vested in the Congress
of the Philippines.
RULING:
NO.
The WTO agreement does not unduly limit, restrict, and impair the Philippine
sovereignty, particularly the legislative power granted by the Philippine Constitution. The
Senate was acting in the proper manner when it concurred with the President’s ratification of
the agreement.
While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the
domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the
Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations. Unquestionably, the
Constitution did not envision a hermit-type isolation of the country from the rest of the world.
In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution “adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy
of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations.” By the doctrine of
incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which
are considered to be automatically part of our own laws. One of the oldest and most
fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda — international agreements must
be performed in good faith. “A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a
legally binding obligation on the parties x x x. A state which has contracted valid international
obligations is bound to make in its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to
ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.”
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty.
By their voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for
greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like
individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits,
they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise absolute rights. Thus, treaties
have been used to record agreements between States concerning such widely diverse matters as,
36
for example, the lease of naval bases, the sale or cession of territory, the termination of war, the
regulation of conduct of hostilities, the formation of alliances, the regulation of commercial
relations, the settling of claims, the laying down of rules governing conduct in peace and the
establishment of international organizations. The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact
and in reality, be considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the picture: (1) limitations
imposed by the very nature of membership in the family of nations and (2) limitations imposed
by treaty stipulations. As aptly put by John F. Kennedy, “Today, no nation can build its destiny
alone. The age of self-sufficient nationalism is over. The age of interdependence is here.”
The WTO reliance on “most favored nation,” “national treatment,” and “trade without
discrimination” cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality
and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on
“equality and reciprocity,” the fundamental law encourages industries that are “competitive in
both domestic and foreign markets,” thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered
domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries
that can compete with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino
enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free
trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the
Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.

POWER TO PROMULGATE RULES; PAR. 5, ENFORCEMENT OF

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, PLEADING, PRACTICE, AND PROCEDURE IN ALL
COURTS
IN RE: PETITION FOR RECOGNITION

FACTS:
The GSIS seeks exemption from the payment of legal fees imposed on government-
owned or controlled corporations under Section 22, Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of the Rules of
Court. The GSIS anchors its petition on Section 39 of its charter, RA 8291 (The GSIS Act of
1997).
The GSIS then avers that courts still assess and collect legal fees in actions and
proceedings instituted by the GSIS notwithstanding its exemption from taxes, assessments, fees,
charges, or duties of all kinds under Section 39. For this reason, the GSIS urges this Court to
recognize its exemption from payment of legal fees. According to the GSIS, the purpose of its
exemption is to preserve and maintain the actuarial solvency of its funds and to keep the
contribution rates necessary to sustain the benefits provided by RA 8291 as low as possible.
Like the terms "taxes," "assessments," "charges," and "duties," the term "fees" is used in the law
in its generic and ordinary sense as any form of government imposition. The word "fees,"
37
defined as "charge[s] fixed by law for services of public officers or for the use of a privilege
under control of government," is qualified by the phrase "of all kinds." Hence, it includes the
legal fees prescribed by this Court under Rule 141. Moreover, no distinction should be made
based on the kind of fees imposed on the GSIS or the GSIS' ability to pay because the law itself
does not distinguish based on those matters.
ISSUE:
Whether Congress may exempt the GSIS from the payment of legal fees?
RULING:
NO.
Rule 141 (on Legal Fees) of the ROC was promulgated by this Court in the exercise of its
rule-making powers under Sec 5(5), Art VIII of the Constitution:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxxxxxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.
xxxxxxxx
Clearly, therefore, the payment of legal fees under Rule 141 of the ROC is an integral
part of the rules promulgated by this Court pursuant to its rule-making power under Section
5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution. In particular, it is part of the rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in courts. Indeed, payment of legal (or docket) fees is a jurisdictional
requirement.
Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this
Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or
modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Court’s institutional independence, the
power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Court’s exclusive
domain. That power is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, much less with the
Executive.
SUPERVISION OF COURTS
DE VERA VS PELAYO

FACTS:
   On 28 Aug. 1996, petitioner Salvador De Vera filed a special civil action for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus to enjoin the MTC from proceeding with a complaint for ejectment
against him.  The case was re-raffled to Judge Benjamin Pelayo.
38
 On 9 June 198, MTC denied petitioner’s application for TRO.  1 Sept. 1998 when his
motion for reconsideration was denied.
        On 23 Sept 1998, petitioner filed with the Ombudsman a complaint against Pelayo,
accusing him of violating Arts. 206 and 207 and RA 3019.
        On 2 Oct 1998, Associate Graft Investigation Officer Erlinda Rojas recommended the
petitioner’s complaint to be referred to the SC.
        On 13 Oct 1998, the Office of the Ombudsman referred the case to the Court
Administrator, Supreme Court.
        On 6 Nov 1998, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the Evaluation Report.
Petitioner criticizes the jurisprudence cited by the Ombudsman as erroneous and not applicable
to his complaint. He insists that since his complaint involved a criminal charge against a judge,
it was within the authority of the Ombudsman not the Supreme Court to resolve whether a
crime was committed and the judge prosecuted therefor.
        On 4 Jan 1999, the Ombudsman denied the motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether the referral of the case to the Supreme Court is correct?
RULING:
YES.
Before a civil or criminal action against a judge for a violation of Art. 204 and 205 can be
entertained, there must first be “a final and authoritative judicial declaration” that the decision
or order in question is indeed “unjust.” The pronouncement may result from either: (a) an action
of certiorari or prohibition in a higher court impugning the validity of the judgment; or (b) an
administrative proceeding in the Supreme Court against the judge precisely for promulgating an
unjust judgment or order. Likewise, the determination of whether a judge has maliciously
delayed the disposition of the case is also an exclusive judicial function.

SECURITY OF TENURE: POWERTO DISCIPLINE

DE LA LLANA VS ALBA

FACTS:
Batasang Pambansa Blg. 129 entitled, “An act reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating
Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes” was passed, providing for the separation of Justices
and judges of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to municipal circuit courts (except the

39
occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax appeals). The honorable petitioner sought
to prohibit the respondents from implementing BP 129, alleging that the security of tenure
provision of the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded. Furthermore, they assert that
the reorganization was done in lack of good faith. However, the Solicitor General denies his
claim and maintains that the allegation of lack of good faith is unwarranted and devoid of any
support in law, and that BP 129 was a legitimate exercise of the power vested in the Batasang
Pambansa to reorganize the judiciary.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the reorganization violated the security of tenure of justices and judges as
provided for under the Constitution.
RULING:
NO.
The Court held that there was good faith in reorganizing the judiciary. Citing the separate
opinion of Justice Laurel in the case of Zandueta v. De La Costa, the Court similarly maintains
that the passage of BP 129 was in good faith seeing as its purpose was for the fulfillment of
what was considered a great public need by the legislative department, not intended to
adversely affect the tenure of judges or any particular judge. While it is possible that the
legislature could deliberately abuse the power to reorganize the judiciary, thus lacking good
faith, the Court is unconvinced that such was the case in this situation. Thus, where the Court
holds that the reorganization of the judiciary by virtue of BP 129 was done in good faith, the
“separation” of the petitioner due to the abolition of his office is valid and constitutional.

SEC. 14, ART. 8; CONTENTS OF DECISION: DECISION EXPRESSING CLEARLY

AND DISTINCTLY THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON WHICH IT IS BASED
TICHANGCO VS ENRIQUEZ

FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the decision and resolution of the CA affirming that there were no
legal grounds to initiate proceedings to nullify the OCT No. 820 and 7477 and the subsequent
titles derived therefrom: TCT Nos. 128240-128249, inclusive, and TCT No. 128279, all
covering parcels of land in Tondo, Manila, registered in the names of private respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA complied with Sec. 14, Art. 8 of the Constitution?
RULING:
40
YES.
There is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement when a collegiate
appellate court, after deliberation, decides to deny a motion; states that the questions raised are
factual or have already been passed upon; or cites some other legal basis. The CA decision
contains necessary antecedents to warrant its conclusions, the appellate court cannot be said to
have withheld “any specific finding of facts”. What the law insists on is that a decision state the
“essential ultimate facts.”

CONTENTS OF DECISION: INSUFFICIENT

REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL AUDIT

FACTS:
Based on the Audit Team’s Report, Judge Salvanera failed to take initial action to several
cases in his caseloads. Moreover, Judge Salvanera penned a one-page decision which does not
clearly state the facts and the law on which it is based. Hence, this case.
ISSUE:
Whether Judge Salvanera may be held administratively liable?
RULING:
YES.
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution provides: "No decision shall be rendered by
any court without expressing clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based."
Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court also requires that a judgment or final order determining
the merits of the case "shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him, and filed with
the clerk of court." This requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment,
the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. A decision that does not clearly and
distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how
it was reached. It is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the
possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal.
All told, the Court finds respondent Judge Salvanera guilty of gross inefficiency, gross
ignorance of the law, and violations of pertinent administrative circulars of the Court, which
merit disciplinary sanction.

PERIOD FOR MAKING DECISIONS

41
SEARES VS SALAZAR

FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint against Judge Salazar on the ground of ignorance of the law
for failure to decide criminal cases for violation of B.P. 22. Judge Salazar failed to decide or
resolve the case within the 90-day mandatory period.
ISSUE:
Whether Judge Salazar may be held administratively liable?
RULING:
YES.
The non-compliance of the 90-day period in itself renders the respondent judge subject to
administrative liability. It is the duty of a judge to take note of the cases submitted for his (her)
decision and see to it that the same are decided within the 90-day period fixed by law, and
failure to decide a case within the required period constitutes gross inefficiency. The 90-day
period is intended to prevent delay in the administration of justice and non-compliance thereof
constitutes a serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to speedy disposition of
their cases. Delay of justice is injustice. It erodes the faith and confidence of the people in the
judiciary, lowers its standard and brings it into disrepute.
The respondent judge is found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and dereliction of
duty.

DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSIONS

AMBIL VS COMELEC

FACTS:
On June 4, 1998, respondent Jose Ramirez filed an election protest with the COMELEC
challenging the result of the May 11, 1998 elections where petitioner Ruperto Ambil, Jr. was
proclaimed the duly-elected governor of Eastern Samar. On February 24, 2000, Commissioner
Japal Guidani retired from the service prior to the finalization of his proposed resolution in the
Ramirez protest. In said resolution, Commissioner Julio Desamito had dissented while
Commissioner Luzviminda Tangcangco did not indicate her vote.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to review decisions of the COMELEC.

42
RULING:
YES.
Article 9-a, Section 7 provides that any decision, order or ruling of each commission may
be brought to the SC on certiorari by the aggrieved party within 30 days from receipt of a copy
thereof. The Court interpreted the provision to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the
COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The decision
must be a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc, not a division, certainly not an
interlocutory order of a division.

CIVIL SERVICE LAW, PAR. 1

FELICIANO VS GIZON

FACTS:
LMWD filed a tax case with the Department of Finance (DOF) - a petition requesting
that certain water supply equipment and a motor vehicle, particularly a Toyota Hi-Lux pick-up
truck, be exempted from tax. The DOF granted the tax exemption on the water supply
equipment but assessed the corresponding tax and duty on the Toyota Hi-Lux pick-up truck,
which is the subject of the Motion for Reconsideration.
The MR was denied by the DOF. LMWD appealed the same to the CTA.
CTA found LMWD to be a GOCC with an original charter, thus, dismissing LMWDs
appeal for lack of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case.
LMWD filed a petition for review with the CA. The CA affirmed the decision of the
CTA that the LMWD is a GOCC with original charter, and not a private corporation or entity as
LMWD argued. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari filed by LMWD with this
Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the LMWD is a GOCC with original charter.
RULING:
A local water district is a government-owned and controlled corporation with special
charter since it is created pursuant to a special law, Presidential Decree No. 198 (1973). PD 198
constitutes the special charter by virtue of which local water districts exist. Unlike private
corporations that derive their legal existence and power from the Corporation Code, water
districts derive their legal existence and power from P.D. No. 198. Section 6 of the decree in
fact provides that water districts “shall exercise the powers, rights and privileges given to
43
private corporations under existing laws, in addition to the powers granted in, and subject to
such restrictions imposed under this Act.” Therefore, water districts would not have corporate
powers without PD 198. 

POLICY-DETERMINING: PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL

PAMANTASAN NG MAYNILA VS CSC

FACTS:
Page 41 syllabus- 241 SCRA 503-1995
ISSUE:
RULING:

REMOVAL FOR CAUSE/ SECURITY OF TENURE: PAR. 3, REORGANIZATION

CUEVAS VS BACAL

FACTS:
This case involves the appointment and transfer of career executive service officers
(CESOs).  More specifically, it concerns the “appointment” of respondent Josefina G. Bacal,
who holds the rank of CESO III, to the position of Chief Public Attorney in the Public
Attorney’s Office, which has a CES Rank Level I, and her subsequent transfer, made without
her consent, to the Office of the Regional Director of the PAO because of the appointment of
Atty. Carina Demaisip to the position of Chief Public Defender (formerly Chief Public
Attorney). Atty. Bacal filed a petition for quo warranto ruled in her favor by the Court of
Appeals. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether:
(1) Bacal is entitled of security of tenure considering that she belongs to Career Service;
(2) security of tenure in the Career Executive Service is acquired with respect to the position or
to the rank the officer is holding;
(3) CESOs may be shifted from one position to another without violating their security of
tenure;
(4) Bacal’s unconsented transfer from Acting Chief Public Attorney to Regional Director
constitutes a demotion;
44
RULING:
1.NO.
The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer
security of tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the required qualifications. Such
right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his
eligibility or lack of it.  A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position
cannot be appointed to it in the first place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed
to it merely in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligible. Here, Atty. Bacal has a
rank of CESO III “appointed” to a position of CESO I. The appointment extended to him
cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated.
2. Security of tenure in the career executive service is acquired with respect to rank and not
to position. The guarantee of security of tenure to members of the CES does not extend to the
particular positions to which they may be appointed a concept which is applicable only to first
and second-level employees in the civil service but to the rank to which they are appointed by
the President. Here, respondent did not acquire security of tenure by the mere fact that she was
appointed to the higher position of Chief Public Attorney since she was not subsequently
appointed to the rank of CESO I based on her performance in that position as required by the
rules of the CES Board.
3.YES.
Members of the Career Executive Service may be reassigned or transferred from one
position to another and from one department, bureau or office to another; provided that such
reassignment or transfer is made in the interest of public service and involves no reduction in
rank or salary; provided, further, that no member shall be reassigned or transferred oftener than
every two years. If a CESO is assigned to a CES position with a higher salary grade than that of
his CES rank, he is allowed to receive the salary of the CES position. Should he be assigned or
made to occupy a CES position with a lower salary grade, he shall continue to be paid the salary
attached to his CES rank. Here, there is a valid transfer of Atty. Bacal to the Regional Office as
it was made in the interest of public service and she is still compensated according to her CES
rank.
4.NO.
Respondent’s appointment to the position of Chief Public Attorney was merely
temporary and that, consequently, her subsequent transfer to the position of Regional Director
of the same office, which corresponds to her CESO rank, cannot be considered a demotion,
much less a violation of the security of tenure guarantee of the Constitution. The rule that
outlaws unconsented transfers as anathema to security of tenure applies only to an officer who
45
is appointed – not merely assigned – to a particular station. Such a rule does not proscribe a
transfer carried out under a specific statute that empowers the head of an agency to periodically
reassign the employees and officers in order to improve the service of the agency.

TEMPORARY EMPLOYEES
GLORIA VS CA

FACTS:
On June 29, 1989, petitioner [private respondent herein] was appointed Schools Division
Superintendent, Division of City Schools, Quezon City, by the then President Corazon C.
Aquino.
On October 10, 1994, respondent Secretary Gloria recommended to the President of the
Philippines that the petitioner be reassigned as Superintendent of the MIST [Marikina Institute
of Science and Technology], to fill up the vacuum created by the retirement of its
Superintendent, Mr. Bannaoag F. Lauro, on June 17, 1994.
On October 12, 1994, the President approved the recommendation of Secretary Gloria.
On October 13, 1994, a copy of the recommendation for petitioner's reassignment, as
approved by the President, was transmitted by Secretary Gloria to Director Rosas for
implementation.
On October 14, 1994, Director Rosas, informed the petitioner of his reassignment,
effective October 17, 1994.
Petitioner requested respondent Secretary Gloria to reconsider the reassignment, but the
latter denied the request. The petitioner prepared a letter dated October 18, 1994 to the
President of the Philippines, asking for a reconsideration of his reassignment, and furnished a
copy of the same to the DECS. However, he subsequently changed his mind and refrained from
filing the letter with the Office of President.
On October 19, 1994, the petitioner filed the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the reassignment of the private respondent is only temporary, hence, the
doctrine enunciated in Bentain vs. Court of Appeals is not applicable to the case at bar?
RULING:
No. The Court upholds the finding of the respondent court that the reassignment of petitioner to
MIST "appears to be indefinite". The same can be inferred from the Memorandum of Secretary

46
Gloria for President Fidel V. Ramos to the effect that the reassignment of private respondent
will "best fit his qualifications and experience" being "an expert in vocational and technical
education." It can thus be gleaned that subject reassignment is more than temporary as the
private respondent has been described as fit for the (reassigned) job, being an expert in the field.
Besides, there is nothing in the said Memorandum to show that the reassignment of private
respondent is temporary or would only last until a permanent replacement is found as no period
is specified or fixed; which fact evinces an intention on the part of petitioners to reassign private
respondent with no definite period or duration. Such feature of the reassignment in question is
definitely violative of the security of tenure of the private respondent.

COMELEC: COMPOSITION; QUALIFICATIONS; TERM

MATIBAG VS BENIPAYO

FACTS:
Herein petitioner Matibag was appointed by the COMELEC en banc as “Acting Director IV” of
the EID and was reappointed twice for the same position in a temporary capacity. Meanwhile,
then PGMA also made appointments, ad interim, of herein respondents Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason, as COMELEC Chairman and Commissioners, respectively. Their appointments were
renewed thrice by PGMA, the last one during the pendency of the case, all due to the failure of
the Commission of Appointments to act upon the confirmation of their appointments.
Respondent Benipayo, acting on his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, issued a memorandum
removing petitioner as Acting Director IV and reassigning her to the Law Department.
Petitioner requested for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, petitioner filed the instant
petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of herein respondents,
claiming that their ad interim appointments violate the constitutional provisions on the
independence of the COMELEC, as well as on the prohibitions on temporary appointments and
reappointments of its Chairman and members.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the ad interim appointments made by PGMA were prohibited under the
Constitution?
RULING:
NO.
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect
immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified
into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does
47
not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment
permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. The second paragraph of Section 16,
Article VII of the Constitution provides as follows:
“The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress,
whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only
until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress.”
Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next
adjournment, signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President.
While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as provided by law,
an appointment or designation in a temporary or acting capacity can be withdrawn or revoked at
the pleasure of the appointing power. A temporary or acting appointee does not enjoy any
security of tenure, no matter how briefly. This is the kind of appointment that the Constitution
prohibits the President from making to the three independent constitutional commissions,
including the COMELEC.
In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill the
vacancies in the COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were extended permanent appointments during the
recess of Congress. They were not appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
The ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are expressly allowed by the
Constitution which authorizes the President, during the recess of Congress, to make
appointments that take effect immediately.

We find petitioner’s argument without

merit.
An ad interim appointment is a
permanent appointment because it
takes effect

48
immediately and can no longer be
withdrawn by the President once the
appointee has
qualified into office. The fact that it is
subject to confirmation by the
Commission on
Appointments does not alter its
permanent character. The
Constitution itself makes
an ad interim appointment permanent
in character by making it effective
until
disapproved by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next
adjournment of
Congress.

49
In the instant case, the President did in
fact appoint permanent Commissioners
to fill the
vacancies in the COMELEC,
subject only to confirmation by
the Commission on
Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason were extended permanent
appointments
during the recess of Congress. They
were not appointed or designated in a
temporary or
acting capacity, unlike
Commissioner Haydee Yorac in
Brillantes vs. Yorac
34
and

50
Solicitor General Felix Bautista in
Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista.
35
The ad
interim appointments of Benipayo,
Borra and Tuason are expressly
allowed by the
Constitution which authorizes the
President, during the recess of Congress,
to make
appointments that take effect
immediately.
While the Constitution mandates
that the COMELEC "shall be
independent"
36
, this

51
provision should be harmonized
with the President’s power to
extend ad
interim appointments. To hold that
the independence of the
COMELEC requires the
Commission on Appointments to
first confirm ad interim appointees
before the
appointees can assume office will
negate the President’s power to
make ad
interim appointments. This is
contrary to the rule on statutory
construction to give
meaning and effect to every provision of
the law. It will also run counter to the
clear
52
intent of the framers of the Constitution.
We find petitioner’s argument without
merit.
An ad interim appointment is a
permanent appointment because it
takes effect
immediately and can no longer be
withdrawn by the President once the
appointee has
qualified into office. The fact that it is
subject to confirmation by the
Commission on
Appointments does not alter its
permanent character. The
Constitution itself makes
an ad interim appointment permanent
in character by making it effective
until
53
disapproved by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next
adjournment of
Congress.
In the instant case, the President did in
fact appoint permanent Commissioners
to fill the
vacancies in the COMELEC,
subject only to confirmation by
the Commission on
Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason were extended permanent
appointments
during the recess of Congress. They
were not appointed or designated in a
temporary or

54
acting capacity, unlike
Commissioner Haydee Yorac in
Brillantes vs. Yorac
34
and
Solicitor General Felix Bautista in
Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista.
35
The ad
interim appointments of Benipayo,
Borra and Tuason are expressly
allowed by the
Constitution which authorizes the
President, during the recess of Congress,
to make
appointments that take effect
immediately.

55
While the Constitution mandates
that the COMELEC "shall be
independent"
36
, this
provision should be harmonized
with the President’s power to
extend ad
interim appointments. To hold that
the independence of the
COMELEC requires the
Commission on Appointments to
first confirm ad interim appointees
before the
appointees can assume office will
negate the President’s power to
make ad

56
interim appointments. This is
contrary to the rule on statutory
construction to give
meaning and effect to every provision of
the law. It will also run counter to the
clear
intent of the framers of the Constitution.
We find petitioner’s argument without
merit.
An ad interim appointment is a
permanent appointment because it
takes effect
immediately and can no longer be
withdrawn by the President once the
appointee has
qualified into office. The fact that it is
subject to confirmation by the
Commission on
57
Appointments does not alter its
permanent character. The
Constitution itself makes
an ad interim appointment permanent
in character by making it effective
until
disapproved by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next
adjournment of
Congress.
In the instant case, the President did in
fact appoint permanent Commissioners
to fill the
vacancies in the COMELEC,
subject only to confirmation by
the Commission on

58
Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason were extended permanent
appointments
during the recess of Congress. They
were not appointed or designated in a
temporary or
acting capacity, unlike
Commissioner Haydee Yorac in
Brillantes vs. Yorac
34
and
Solicitor General Felix Bautista in
Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista.
35
The ad
interim appointments of Benipayo,
Borra and Tuason are expressly
allowed by the
59
Constitution which authorizes the
President, during the recess of Congress,
to make
appointments that take effect
immediately.
While the Constitution mandates
that the COMELEC "shall be
independent"
36
, this
provision should be harmonized
with the President’s power to
extend ad
interim appointments. To hold that
the independence of the
COMELEC requires the

60
Commission on Appointments to
first confirm ad interim appointees
before the
appointees can assume office will
negate the President’s power to
make ad
interim appointments. This is
contrary to the rule on statutory
construction to give
meaning and effect to every provision of
the law. It will also run counter to the
clear
intent of the framers of the Constitution.
ELECTION CONTESTS
ZARATE VS COMELEC

FACTS:
Julian Lallave, Jr. won the 1996 SK Elections of Brgy Ican, Malasiqui, Pangasinan, garnering a
total of 46 votes over Marivic Zarate who garnered 45 votes.
Unsatisfied with the proclamation by the Barangay Board of Canvassers, Zarate filed an
election protest before the Municipal Trial Court stating that three or more votes that read “JL”
should not have been credited in favor of Lallave. Zarate further stated that the votes bearing
61
“JL” were stray votes and that there was no candidate with the name or nickname of “JL”.
The Municipal Trial Court rendered it decision in favor of petitioner Zarate, declaring 8 of the
original 46 votes invalid.
Lallave appealed to the Commission on Elections theorizing that the votes reading “JL” should
be credited in his favour considering that such initials sufficiently identify him as the candidate
and that the votes bearing “Julian, Jr de Real”, “Notno Lallave”, and “Nono de Real” should
have been credited as well being his nickname and middlename, respectively.
The appeal by Lallave was not referred to a division of the Commission but was, instead,
submitted to the Commission en banc.The COMELEC en banc annulled the decision of the
Municipal Trial Court and declared Lallave as the elected SK chairman.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Commission on Elections committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction?
RULING:
YES.
The COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction without first referring the case to any of its
division. The petition for annulling the COMELEC’s decision was granted and was set aside.
The Commission was ordered to assign the case to a division.
The recourse of respondent Lallave transgressed Section 3 Article IX of the Constitution
which provides that “...election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that
motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.”

RECOMMENDATORY POWERS: DECISIONS

SEBASTIAN VS COMELEC

FACTS:
As the municipal board of canvassers was preparing to canvass the election returns,
petitioners sought the exclusion of several election returns claiming that such returns were
prepared under extreme duress, intimidation, and political pressure and influence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it unilaterally
disregarded the evidence of coercion that attended the preparations of the returns?
RULING:

62
 The COMELEC as a general rule need not go beyond the face of the returns and
investigate alleged election irregularities. We see no reason to depart from this rule in this
petition. In our view, there is no exceptional circumstance present in this controversy similar to
that proved in the Antonio case, aforecited, where the COMELEC as well as the Court found
"precipitate canvassing, terrorism, lack of sufficient notice to the Board, and disregard of
manifest irregularities in the face of the questioned returns" to justify the summary annulment
of the canvass and the annulment of petitioner Antonios proclamation. Rather, we are guided
here by the holding of the Court in the case of Matalam, in Maguindanao, where it is said:
"...Because what [petitioner] is asking for necessarily postulates a full reception of
evidence aliunde and the meticulous examination of voluminous election documents, it is
clearly anathema to a pre-proclamation controversy which, by its very nature, is to be
heard summarily and decided on as promptly as possible."
To require the COMELEC to examine the circumstances surrounding the preparation of
election returns would run counter to the rule that a pre-proclamation controversy should be
summarily decided.

SUPERVISION/REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES, MEDIA GRANTS,

PRIVILEGES
TELECOM VS COMELEC

FACTS:
Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc.
(TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. They
are suing as citizens, taxpayers and registered voters. It was declared to be without legal
standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it was not able to show that it was to suffer
from actual or threatened injury as a result of the subject law. Other petitioner, GMA Network,
Inc., appears to have the requisite standing to bring this constitutional challenge. Petitioner
operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the enforcement
of Sec. 92 of B.P Blg. 881 requiring radio and television broadcast companies to provide free
air time to the COMELEC for the use of candidates for campaign and other political purposes.
Petitioners challenge the validity of Sec. 92 on the ground (1) that it takes property without due
process of law and without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television broadcast
companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the
COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication or information
during the period of election. Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million
pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995
senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this
63
year. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is
the sale of air time to advertisers and to require these stations to provide free air time is to
authorize unjust taking of private property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost
P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for one hour each day and, in this year’s elections, it
stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELEC’s requirement that it provide at least 30
minutes of prime time daily for COMELEC Time.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast companies
the equal protection of the laws.
2. Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without due process
of law and without just compensation.
RULING:
Petitioner’s argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or by television
stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are
more individuals who want to broadcast that there are frequencies to assign. Radio and
television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and
frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given
the temporary privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege may reasonably be
burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service. In granting the
privilege to operate broadcast stations and supervising radio and television stations, the state
spends considerable public funds in licensing and supervising them.
The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide free
air time as against newspapers and magazines which require payment of just compensation for
the print space they may provide is likewise without merit. Regulation of the broadcast industry
requires spending of public funds which it does not do in the case of print media. To require the
broadcast industry to provide free air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the
industry gets.
As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is
taken by the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC. The use of property
bears a social function and is subject to the state’s duty to intervene for the common good.
Broadcast media can find their just and highest reward in the fact that whatever altruistic
service they may render in connection with the holding of elections is for that common good.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition is dismissed.

AUDIT JURISDICTION
64
MAMARIL VS DOMINGOA

FACTS:
Petitioner was formerly an Evaluator/Computer of the Land Transportation Office (LTO)
at its San Pablo City Branch. In the course of the performance of his duties, he committed errors
in his evaluation and computation, resulting in the under collection of registration, license and
other miscellaneous fees and penalties.
Petitioner availed of the Early Retirement Program under RA 6683. As a result of the
decision of the COA, holding that the amount of P44,515.90 be withheld from petitioner’s
terminal leave pay other than his retirement gratuity, he has not received in full the benefits due
him from his retirement.
Petitioner contended that he could not be held liable on the audit disallowances because
he was not an accountable officer within the meaning of Section 101 of P.D. No. 1445 (1978)
since: (a) his work was purely clerical; (b) he did not come into possession of any money or
property for which he is now asked to pay; and (c) he did not act in bad faith or with gross
negligence. He further contended that Decision No. 1614 itself advised the agency concerned to
take necessary measures towards the collection of the under collections the delinquent parties
liable for the payment of the fees and penalties
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s accountability is within the jurisdiction of the Commission on
Audit?
RULING:
Under the Constitution, the COA "shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine,
audit, and settle all accounts, pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses
of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities. However, where the internal control system of the
audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt such measures, including temporary
or special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the
general accounts of the Government and, for such period as may be provided by law, preserve
the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto."
Section 2(2) of the above article states that the COA is given the "exclusive
authority, subject to the limitations in this Article to define the scope of its audit
and examination, establish the technique and methods required therefor, and
promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, . . ." 

65
 As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions of the Constitution, state audit is not
limited to the auditing of the accountable officers and the settlement of accounts, but includes
accounting functions and the adoption in the audited agencies of internal controls to see to it,
among other matters, that the correct fees and penalties due the government are collected.
When any person is indebted to any government agency, the COA may direct the proper
officer to withhold the payment of any money due such person or his estate to be applied in
satisfaction of the indebtedness (P. D. No. 1445, sec. 37). Likewise, under the Manual on
Certificate of Settlement and Balances, a government auditor is empowered to order the
withholding of the payment of any money due a person determined to be liable for
disallowances, suspensions, and other deficiencies in the accounts audited.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT: LOCAL AUTONOMY

LIMBONA VS CONIE MANGELIN, et. al.

FACTS:
Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative
Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987
Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the
House of Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly of
Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local government officials. Petitioner accepted the
invitation and informed the Assembly members through the Assembly Secretary that there shall
be no session in November as his presence was needed in the house committee hearing of
Congress. However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in defiance of the
Limbona's advice, where he was unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that the session's
proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared that he was still the Speaker of the
Assembly. Pending further proceedings of the case, the SC received a resolution from the
Assembly expressly expelling petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue that
petitioner had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly
on a question which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly," for which
the respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and academic" because of its
resolution. 
ISSUE:
Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the autonomous governments or regions.
What is the extent of self-government given to the autonomous governments of Region XII?
RULING:

66
 The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions 9 and 12 by
Presidential Decree No. 1618. In relation to the central government, the Presidential Decree
provides that “the President shall have the power of general supervision and control over the
Autonomous Regions...” Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or
decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central
government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the
base of government power and in the process to make local governments “more responsive and
accountable,” “and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them
more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress.” At the same
time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to
concentrate on national concerns. The president exercises “general supervision” over them, but
only to “ensure that local affairs are administered according to law.” He has not control over
their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of
power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local
government units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free
to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central
authorities. 

According to the Supreme Court, an examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the
autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us to believe that they were never meant to
exercise autonomy through decentralization of power. The Presidential Decree, in the first
place, mandates that “the President shall have the power of general supervision and control over
Autonomous Regions.” In the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is
made to dischage chiefly administrative services. Thus, the SC assumes jurisdiction.

TAXATION POWER OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

YAMANE VS BA LEPANTO CONDOMINIUM

FACTS:
The city treasurer of Makati imposed taxes on Lepanto, a corporation that owned a
condominium, saying that because Lepanto collected assessments for operating expenses for the
common areas of the condominium, Lepanto was actually engaged in business.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the City of Makati may collect business taxes on condominium corporations?

67
RULING:
NO.
The SC ruled that Lepanto was not organized for profit. The fees it was collecting from
the condominium unit owners redound to the owners themselves because the fees collected are
being used for the maintenance of the condo. Further, it appears that the assessment issued by
the city treasurer did not state the legal basis for the tax being imposed on Lepanto – it merely
states that Makati is authorized to collect business taxes under the LGC, but no other reference
specific reference to specific laws were cited.

TERM OF LOCAL OFFICIALS

ONG VS ALEGRE

FACTS:
Private respondent Joseph Stanley Alegre (Alegre) and petitioner Francis Ong (Francis)
were candidates who filed certificates of candidacy for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte
in the May 10, 2004 elections. Francis was then the incumbent mayor.
On January 9, 2004, Alegre filed with the COMELEC Provincial Office a Petition to
Disqualify, Deny Due Course and Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Francis. The petition to
disqualify was predicated on the three-consecutive term rule, Francis having, according to
Alegre, ran in the May 1995, May 1998, and May 2001 mayoralty elections and have assumed
office as mayor and discharged the duties thereof for three (3) consecutive full terms
corresponding to those elections.
Alegre subsequently filed an election protest, docketed as Election Case No. 6850 before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Daet, Camarines Norte. In it, the RTC declared Alegre as the
duly elected mayor in that 1998 mayoralty contest, albeit the decision came out only on July 4,
2001, when Francis had fully served the 1998-2001 mayoralty term and was in fact already
starting to serve the 2001-2004 term as mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Francis’s assumption of office as Mayor for the mayoralty term 1998
to 2001 should be considered as full service for the purpose of the three-term limit rule?
RULING:
We hold that such assumption of office constitutes “service for the full term" and should
be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the

68
constitutional and statutory provisions, barring local elective officials from being elected and
serving for more than three consecutive term for the same position.
For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or
requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for 3 consecutive
terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served 3 consecutive terms.
 A candidate whose certificate of candidacy has been cancelled or not given due course
cannot be substituted by another belonging to the same political party as that of the former.
 A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be considered a candidate in
much the same way as any person who has not filed any certificate of candidacy at all cannot,
by any stretch of the imagination, be a candidate at all.

AUTONOMOUS REGIONS
DISOMANGCOP VS SEC. OF DPWH

FACTS:
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Republic Act No. 6734 (R.A. 6734), entitled "An
Act Providing for An Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao," was
enacted and signed into law on 1 August 1989. The law called for the holding of a plebiscite in
the provinces of Basilan, Cotabato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur,
Maguindanao, Palawan, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del
Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur, and the cities of Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos,
Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Princesa and Zamboanga. In the ensuing plebiscite held on 19
November 1989, only four (4) provinces voted for the creation of an autonomous region,
namely: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. These provinces became the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The law contains elaborate provisions on
the powers of the Regional Government and the areas of jurisdiction which are reserved for the
National Government.
Petitioners Disomangcop and Dimalotang filed the instant petition, in their capacity as
Officer-in-Charge and District Engineer/Engineer II, respectively, of the First Engineering
District of the Department of Public Works and Highways, Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (DPWH-ARMM) in Lanao del Sur.
Petitioners seek the following principal reliefs: (1) to annul and set aside D.O. 119; (2) to
prohibit respondent DPWH Secretary from implementing D.O. 119 and R.A. 8999 and
releasing funds for public works projects intended for Lanao del Sur and Marawi City to the
Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office and other administrative regions of DPWH; and (3) to
compel the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) to release all funds
69
for public works projects intended for Marawi City and the First District of Lanao del Sur to the
DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur only; and to compel respondent
DPWH Secretary to let the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur
implement all public works projects within its jurisdictional area. Moreover, petitioners allege
that D.O. 119 was issued with grave abuse of discretion and that it violates the constitutional
autonomy of the ARMM.
ISSUE:
Whether or not DO 119 and RA 8999 are both invalid and constitutionally infirm?
RULING:
YES.
At the outset, let it be made clear that it is not necessary to declare R.A. No. 8999
unconstitutional for the adjudication of this case. The accepted rule is that the Court will not
resolve a constitutional question unless it is the lis mota of the case, or if the case can be
disposed of or settled on other grounds. The plain truth is the challenged law never became
operative and was superseded or repealed by a subsequent enactment.
R.A. 9054 is anchored on the 1987 Constitution. It advances the constitutional grant of
autonomy by detailing the powers of the ARG covering, among others, Lanao del Sur and
Marawi City, one of which is its jurisdiction over regional urban and rural planning. R.A. 8999,
however, ventures to reestablish the National Government's jurisdiction over infrastructure
programs in Lanao del Sur. R.A. 8999 is patently inconsistent with R.A. 9054, and it destroys
the latter law's objective.
Clearly, R.A. 8999 is antagonistic to and cannot be reconciled with both ARMM Organic
Acts, R.A. 6734 and R.A. 9054. The kernel of the antagonism and disharmony lies in the
regional autonomy which the ARMM Organic Acts ordain pursuant to the Constitution. On the
other hand, R.A. 8999 contravenes true decentralization which is the essence of regional
autonomy.
D.O. 119 creating the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which has jurisdiction
over infrastructure projects within Marawi City and Lanao del Sur is violative of the provisions
of E.O. 426. The Executive Order was issued pursuant to R.A. 6734which initiated the creation
of the constitutionally-mandated autonomous region and which defined the basic structure of
the autonomous government. The office created under D.O. 119, having essentially the same
powers, is a duplication of the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur
formed under the aegis of E.O. 426. The department order, in effect, takes back powers which
have been previously devolved under the said executive order. D.O. 119 runs counter to the
provisions of E.O. 426. The DPWH's order, like spring water, cannot rise higher than its source
of power, the Executive.
70
 With the repeal of E.O. 124 which is the basis of D.O. 119, it necessarily follows that
D.O. 119 was also rendered Functus Officio by the ARMM Organic Acts.

ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS: PUBLIC OFFICE

ESTRELLA VS SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:
On July 1, 1975, petitioner was appointed as Municipal Cashier 2 in the Office of the
Municipal Treasurer, Isulan, Sultan Kudarat, with a bond in the amount of P28,000.00. He was
audited of his cash and accounts for the period from March 18 to 24, 1986 only. For reasons
unknown, the cash and accounts of the petitioner were not audited for the period from July 1,
1975, the date of his appointment, up to March 17, 1986. Based on the official receipts for the
period from February 7, 1986 to March 18, 1986 submitted by the petitioner during the audit
examination, petitioner apparently had daily collections. Under office rules, petitioner was
supposed to turn over the collections to Municipal Treasurer Jose B. Galvez, but he failed to do
so since Galvez was then on leave of absence. As recourse, petitioner should have deposited his
collections with the depository bank of the municipality but he likewise neglected to do.
Furthermore, the audit examination disclosed that from March 31, 1979 to December 3,
1985, petitioner made a total cash advance of P220,804.25. The cash advance of P14,025.00
given to the driver of Municipal Treasurer Galvez was included in petitioner's accountability
because it was the latter who granted it. Likewise, the amount of P15,000.00 used to pay the
salaries of the municipal employees, which petitioner borrowed from Mrs. Leonarda Panceras,
in-charge of the Special Educational Fund, was also charged to his cash advances. All in all,
petitioner received cash advances totaling P249,829.25.
Of the P249,829.25, petitioner was able to liquidate on November 20, 1985 the amount of
P29,083.57 only. The amount of P2,395.69 resulting from the liquidation of petitioner's cash
collections was added to P29,083.57, thus, petitioner's accountability was reduced to
P218,349.99.
After establishing the amount of the shortage, the OIC Municipal Treasurer submitted his
progress report demonstrating further restitution of petitioner's disallowed cash advances and
vouchers in the amount of P14,406.00 and P12,303.00 or a total of P26,709.00, thereby further
reducing his liability to P191,640.99. While petitioner admitted his accountability to be only
P64, 538.95, he doubted the accuracy of the said amount for the reason that in his perception,
his liability was allegedly between P30,000.00 and P40,000.00 only. Resultantly, petitioner was
charged with malversation of public funds in the Information filed with respondent
Sandiganbayan.

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 Duly arraigned on January 13, 1989, petitioner Nicanor E. Estrella pleaded "Not Guilty"
to the charge. After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner filed a "motion to be allowed
to file a demurrer to evidence" which was opposed by the prosecution. Respondent court denied
the said motion. On May 20, 1995, petitioner again filed a "motion and/or manifestation" for the
dismissal of the case for lack of merit. When the incident was heard, petitioner's counsel
admitted in open court that the motion and/or manifestation was "in the nature of a demurrer to
evidence", hence, pursuant to Sec. 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, petitioner effectively
waived his right to present evidence and submitted the case for decision based on the evidence
presented by the prosecution. The Sandiganbayan rendered its decision convicting petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner may be held accountable?
RULING:
YES.
Art. 217 of the Revised Penal Code holds liable for malversation a public officer who
shall appropriate public funds or property for which he is accountable, or shall take or
misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other
person to take such public funds or property. Furthermore, the failure of a public officer to have
duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by
any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or
property to personal uses.
The elements of malversation of public funds are (a) the offender is a public officer, (b)
he had custody or control of the funds or property by reason of the duties of his office, (c) these
funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable, and (d) that he
appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented, or through abandonment or negligence,
permitted another person to take them. Anent the last element, we have held that to justify
conviction for malversation of public funds, the prosecution has only to prove that the accused
received public funds or property and that he could not account for them or did not have them in
his possession and could not give a reasonable excuse for the disappearance of the same. An
accountable public officer may be convicted of malversation even if there is no direct evidence
of misappropriation and the only evidence is that there is a shortage in his accounts which he
has not been able to explain satisfactorily.
Petitioner was not able to produce the missing amount of P191,640.99; and neither was
he able to explain his failure to produce that amount. Aside from petitioner's feeble attempt to
shift the blame to the audit team, nothing in the records of this case supports his allegation that
the audit team had committed an error in the Report of Cash Examination.

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SANDIGANBAYAN
ABBOT VS MAPAYO

FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with a crime before the Sandiganbayan. By virtue of R.A. 7975
amending P.D. 1606, the case was transferred to the RTC. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss
which the RTC denied. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA to
reverse the ruling of the RTC. The Solicitor General filed a Comment, raising the point that the
CA was without jurisdiction to entertain the petition because jurisdiction was already vested in
the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE:
Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari and prohibition?
RULING:
YES.
The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was expanded in RA 7975 to include petitions for
the issuance of writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunction, and other
ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

TANODBAYAN AS SPECIAL PROSECUTOR

BIR VS OMBUDSMAN

FACTS:
Christopher S. Soquilon, Graft Investigation Officer received information from an “informer-
for-reward” regarding allegedly anomalous grant of tax refunds. The Ombudsman issued a
subpoena duces tecum to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) Commissioner to appear before
the Ombudsman and to bring the complete original case dockets of the refunds granted to
Limtuaco and La Tondeña, but the BIR asked that it be excused from complying with the
subpoena duces tecum because the Limtuaco case was under investigation and the investigation
thereof and that of La Tondeña was mooted.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the actions of the Ombudsman are valid.
2. Whether or not Ombudsman violated due process.
RULING:

73
 1. YES.
In the 1987 Constitution enjoins that the “Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of
the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials
or employees of the government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate case, notify
the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.”
No requirement of a pending action before the Ombudsman could wield its investigative
power.  The Ombudsman could resort to its investigative prerogative on its own or upon a
complaint filed in any form or manner.  Even when the complaint is verbal or written, unsigned
or unverified, the Ombudsman could, on its own, initiate the investigation.
2. YES.
The law clearly provides that if there is a reasonable ground to investigate further, the
investigator of the Office of the Ombudsman shall first furnish the respondent public officer or
employee with a summary of the complaint and require him to submit a written answer within
seventy-two (72) hours from receipt thereof. In the instant case, the BIR officials concerned
were never furnished by the respondent with a summary of the complaint and were not given
the opportunity to submit their counter-affidavits and controverting evidence. Instead, they were
summarily ordered to appear before the Ombudsman and to produce the case dockets of the tax
refunds granted to Limtuaco and La Tondeña. They are aggrieved in that, from the point of
view of the respondent, they were already deemed probably guilty of granting anomalous tax
refunds. Plainly, respondent Office of the Ombudsman failed to afford petitioner with the basics
of due process in conducting its investigation.

POWERS; FUNCTIONS; DUTIES: IN GENERAL

HONASAN VS PANEL OF INVESTIGATING PROSECUTORS

FACTS:
On August 4, 2003, an affidavit-complaint was filed with the Department of Justice
(DOJ) by respondent CIDG-PNP/P Director Eduardo Matillano alleging that after a thorough
investigation, he found that certain military personnel and Senator Gregorio Honasan II have
committed the crime of coup d’etat on July 27, 2003. The complaint was based on the sworn
statement of AFP Major Perfecto Ragil wherein he stated in his affidavit that he is a member of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and was invited to the National Recovery Program (NRP)
with a certain Captain Alejano. 
In the said meeting, Sen. Gringo Honasan presided the gathering wherein a plan on
overthrowing the government through force, violence and armed struggle in order to achieve the
74
goals of NRP. Ragil opposed the proposition but due to threats on his person, he was forced to
pursue it and even join their blood compact. This prompted the Panel of Investigating
Prosecutors of the DOJ to send a subpoena to Honasan for preliminary investigation. 

On August 27, 2003, Honasan and his counsel appeared at the DOJ and filed a Motion for
Clarification questioning DOJ’s jurisdiction over the case. He asserted that since the since the
imputed facts were committed in relation to his public office, it is the Office of the
Ombudsman, not the DOJ, that has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation. They
further alleged that it is the Sandiganbayan and not the regular courts that should take
cognizance of the case since they are public officials with Salary Grade 31. 
On September 10, 2003, DOJ thereafter issued an order deferring the resolution of
Honasan’s motion to clarify jurisdiction. Hence, Senator Honasan II filed the present petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against the DOJ Panel and its members,
CIDG-PNP-P/Director Matillano and Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo, attributing grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the DOJ Panel in issuing an order on the ground that the DOJ has no
jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation. 
ISSUE:
Whether or not the DOJ Panel has the authority and jurisdiction to conduct preliminary
investigation over the case of Honasan. 
RULING:
YES.
The authority of respondent DOJ Panel is based not on the assailed OMB-DOJ Circular
No. 95-001 but on the provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code under Chapter I, Title III,
Book IV, governing the DOJ. Under the said provision, the DOJ, as the government’s legal
counsel and prosecution arm, has the power to investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute
offenders and administer the probation and correction system. 
With regard to the issue of the Ombudsman jurisdiction over the case, Par. 1 of Section
13, Article XI of the Constitution does not exclude other government agencies tasked by law to
investigate and prosecute cases involving public officials. Under R.A 6770 or “The
Ombudsman Act of 1989,” the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving
public officers or employees is not exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized
agencies of the government. Such investigatory agencies referred to include the PCGG and the
provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants, the state prosecutors and the judges of the
municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial court. 

75
 In other words the provision of the law has opened up the authority to conduct
preliminary investigation of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan to all investigatory
agencies of the government duly authorized to conduct a preliminary investigation under
Section 2, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the only qualification that the
Ombudsman may take over at any stage of such investigation in the exercise of his primary
jurisdiction (when the case is cognizable by the Sandiganbayan). Therefore, the fact that
Honasan holds a Salary Grade 31 position (and that his case may be cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan) does not remove from the DOJ Panel the authority to investigate the charge of
coup d'etat against him. 

PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION AND IMPOSITION OF PENALTIES

VASQUEZ VS HOBILLA-ALINIO

FACTS:
On January 17, 1994, 2 informations were filed before the RTC of Bago City. That same
day private respondents filed a motion to recall warrants/orders of arrest on the ground that they
had not yet received copy of the complaint, neither had they been furnished by the Office of the
Ombudsman copy of the resolution of 14 December 1993, as required under Sec. 6, Rule II, of
Administrative Order No. 7 of the Office of the Ombudsman. They claimed that this resulted in
a denial of their right to seek reconsideration or reinvestigation in contravention of Sec.7 of the
Administrative Order. Moreover, they posited that the Office of the Ombudsman had no
authority to file the Informations in view of its own finding that the crime was not committed
by the accused in relation to their office. The following day private respondents filed a motion
to quash the Informations based on lack of authority.
On 26 January 1994 respondent Judge found that the Office of the Ombudsman failed to
furnish private respondents copy of the resolution of 14 December 1993 depriving them of their
right to move for reconsideration or to elevate the matter to a higher office before the
Informations were filed. Consequently, she ordered that the execution of the warrants/orders of
arrest be held in abeyance. For the same reason, she also granted the motion to quash the
Informations.
The Office of the Ombudsman filed for a motion for reconsideration.
The respondent judge maintained her ruling; imputing grave abuse of discretion and lack
or excess of jurisdiction to respondent Judge in granting the motion to quash the Informations
petitioner now comes to us for relief invoking our ruling in Torralba to stress his point.

76
 Petitioner further asks the Court to resolve the issue concerning the authority of the
Office of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute illegal acts and omissions of public
officers which respondent Judge did not pass upon.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to investigate and prosecute
illegal acts and omissions of the respondent judge?
RULING:
YES.
On the authority of the Office of the Ombudsman to file the Informations before respondent
Judge, we need only quote Sec. 15, of RA 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of
1989, which provides:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have
the following powers, functions and duties: (1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on
complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or
agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It
has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise
of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency
of Government, the investigation of such cases.
We explained in Deloso v. Domingo, the nature, power and function of the Office of the
Ombudsman thus:
The clause 'any [illegal] act or omission of any public official' is broad enough to
embrace any crime committed by a public official. The law does not qualify the nature of the
illegal act or omission of the public official or employee that the Ombudsman may investigate.
It does not require that the act or omission be related to or be connected with or arise from the
performance of official duty. Since the law does not distinguish, neither should we.
The reason for the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution and for the grant
to it of broad investigative authority, is to insulate said office from the long tentacles of
officialdom that are able to penetrate judges' and fiscals' offices, and others involved in the
prosecution of erring public officials, and through the exertion of official pressure and
influence, quash, delay, or dismiss investigations into malfeasances and misfeasance committed
by public officers. It was deemed necessary, therefore, to create a special office to investigate
all criminal complaints against public officers regardless of whether or not the acts or omissions
complained of are related to or arise from the performance of the duties of their office. The
Ombudsman Act makes perfectly clear that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses 'all
kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance that have been committed by any officer
77
or employee as mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of office' (Sec. 16, R.A.
6770).

JURISDICTION OVER CRIMINAL CASES

NATIVIDAD VS FELIX

FACTS:
PNP requested Tarlac Provincial Prosecutor to investigate Mayor Natividad’s
involvement in the death of Lourdes Aquino’s husband, Severino Aquino, at the Ramos Police
Station.
During the investigation, PNP filed another complaint with the Tarlac Municipal Circuit
Court, which directed Mayor Natividad’s arrest with bail. He posted bail with the Manila RTC,
which later issued an order recalling warrant. After conducting the preliminary investigation,
MCTC determined that there was probable cause to hold Natividad for murder with bail.
The Provincial Prosecutor approved the filing of information against Natividad and
Llerina in the Tarlac RTC (where Hon. Felix was the judge). Warrant of arrest was issued.
Upon seeing that the MCTC judge failed to conduct the second staged in the preliminary
investigation, RTC recalled the warrant and remanded the case for further preliminary
investigation. A panel of prosecutors later held that probable cause exists. The information was
amended, additionally charging Cabaong, Llerina and Millado. An arrest warrant was issued
without bail.
Mayor Natividad alleged that there was no preliminary investigation, and that Hon. Felix
had no jurisdiction because it was the Ombudman’s, not the provincial prosecutor, who had
jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation and that the proper court was the
Sandiganbayan. Hon. Felix denied Mayor Natividad’s motion, and committed the latter to
Tarlac Penal Colony.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Hon. Felix committed grave abuse of discretion in admitting the amended
information filed by the provincial fiscal and in directing Natividad’s arrest?
RULING:
NO.

78
 The latest law on Sandiganbayan (PD 1606) states that there are 2 requirements for an
offense to fall under the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction:
1) offense committed by a public officer must be in relation to his office, and
2) that the penalty be higher that prision correccional or imprisonment for 6 years or a
fine of P6,000.
The 2nd requirement was met, but the 1strequirement wasn’t because the offense charged
was murder. The offense could not have been committed in the performance of the mayor’s
responsibility to maintain peace and order. The alleged act doesn’t fall under any of the
functions of the municipal mayor in the Local Government Code. Assuming arguendo that the
1st requirement was satisfied, Ombudsman has only primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan, not exclusive original jurisdiction. The Ombudsman is not an exclusive
authority but a concurrent authority with similarly authorized agencies. He may take over the
investigation at any stage from any investigative government agency. His investigatory powers
are but directory in nature. Also, Natividad wasn’t denied due process as he has been afforded
every opportunity to present his counter-affidavit. He was notified, but it was he who did not
appear.

PUBLIC DOMAIN AND REGALIAN DOCTRINE

CHAVEZ VS NHA

FACTS:
On March 19, 1993, the National Housing Authority (NHA) and R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI)
entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) for the development of the Smokey Mountain
dumpsite and reclamation area to be converted into a low cost medium rise housing complex
and industrial/commercial site. The Project will involve 79 hectares of reclaimed land (it was
initially 40 hectares but the JVA was amended). The JVA also provides that as part of the
consideration for the Project, NHA will convey a portion of the reclaimed lands to RBI.
The reclamation of the area was made; and subsequently, Special Patents were issued
conveying the reclaimed land to NHA.
On August 5, 2004, former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez filed this Petition for
Prohibition and Mandamus seeking to declare NULL and VOID the Joint Venture Agreement
(JVA) and the Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project, and all other
agreements in relation thereto, for being Unconstitutional and Invalid.
ISSUE:

79
 1. Whether or not NHA and RBI have been granted the power and authority to reclaim
lands of the public domain;
2. Whether or not NHA and RBI were given the power and authority by DENR to reclaim
foreshore and submerged lands, as required;
3. Whether or not the reclaimed lands are classified as alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain;
4. Whether or not the transfer of reclaimed lands to RBI is void since it did not undergo
public bidding but by negotiated contract;
5. Whether or not RBI, being a private corporation, is barred by the Constitution to acquire
lands of public domain.

RULING:
1. YES.
Although PEA was designated under EO 525 as the agency primarily responsible for
integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects, its charter does not mention
that it has the exclusive and sole power and authority to reclaim lands of public domain. In fact,
EO 525 provides that reclamation projects may also be undertaken by a national government
agency or entity authorized by its charter to reclaim land.
There are 3 requisites to a legal and valid reclamation project:
a) approval by the President;
b) favorable recommendation of PEA; and
c) undertaken by any of the ff:
i. PEA
ii. any person or entity pursuant to a contract it executed with PEA
iii. the National government agency or entity authorized under its charter to reclaim
lands subject to consultation with PEA.
Applying the above requirements, the SC concluded that the Project has met all 3 requirements:
a. There was ample approval by the President of the Philippines. Presidents Aquino and Ramos
issued Proclamations approving and implementing the reclamation of lands.
b. There was an implied grant of a favorable endorsement of the reclamation phase from PEA.
This is shown in the fact that PEA was a member of the EXECOM which was in charge of
overseeing the implementation of the Project.
c. The reclamation was undertaken by the NHA, a national government agency authorized to
reclaim lands under its charter and other laws. While the charter of NHA does not explicitly

80
mention “reclamation” in any of its listed powers, such power is implied since it is vital or
incidental to achieving the objective of an urban land reform and housing program.
2. YES.
The DENR exercises exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all
lands of the public domain. As such, it decides whether areas, like foreshore or submerged
lands, should be reclaimed or not and whether they should be classified as alienable and
disposable.
In this case, when the President approved and ordered the development of a housing
project with the corresponding reclamation work, making DENR a member of the EXECOM
(committee tasked to implement the project), the required authorization from the DENR to
reclaim land can be deemed satisfied. Also, the issuance of the Environmental Compliance
Certificates by the DENR shows its ratification of the reclamation project.
3. YES.
When Proclamations Nos. 39 (placed the lands under the administration and disposition
of the NHA) and 465 (increased the reclamation area from 40 hectares to 79 hectares) were
issued, the inalienable lands covered by said proclamations were converted to alienable and
disposable lands of public domain. Furthermore, when the titles to such reclaimed lands were
transferred to the NHA, said alienable and disposable lands of public domain were
automatically classified as lands of the private domain or patrimonial properties of the State.
The reason is obvious: if the reclaimed land is not converted to patrimonial land once
transferred to NHA, then it would be useless to transfer it to the NHA since it will not be able to
transfer such lands to qualified entities and thus, it will not achieve its purpose.
4. VALID.
Since the lands reclaimed became patrimonial properties of the State upon transfer of
their titles to the NHA, the latter can therefore legally transfer them to RBI or to any other
interested qualified buyer without any bidding. Unlike the PEA, the NHA is a government
agency not tasked to sell lands of the public domain.
5. NO.
RA 6957, as amended (BOT Law), states that a contractor can be paid “a portion as
percentage of the reclaimed land” subject to the constitutional requirement that only Filipino
citizens or corporations with at least 60% Filipino equity can acquire the same. In this case, RBI
is a private corporation wherein Filipino citizens own at least 60% of its shares.

LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

81
CHAVEZ VS PEA

FACTS:
From the time of Marcos until Estrada, portions of Manila Bay were being reclaimed. A
law was passed creating the Public Estate Authority which was granted with the power to
transfer reclaimed lands. Now in this case, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with
AMARI, a private corporation. Under the Joint Venture Agreement between AMARI and PEA,
several hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands and several portions of
submerged areas of Manila Bay were going to be transferred to AMARI .
ISSUE:
Whether or not the stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands,
reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution?
RULING:
YES.
Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands are classified as alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain Section 3 of the Constitution: Alienable lands of the
public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may
not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease The 157.84 hectares of
reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the
name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private
corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA
may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987
Constitution and existing laws.
Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts whose “object or purpose is
contrary to law,” or whose “object is outside the commerce of men,” are “inexistent and void
from the beginning.” The Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution,
and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.

EXEMPTION FOR FORMER FILIPINO CITIZENS

REPUBLIC VS CA

FACTS:
Spouses de Vega purchased a lot in San Pablo City. At the time of the purchase,
respondent spouses where then natural-born Filipino citizens. They then filed an application for
82
registration of title of the two (2) parcels of land. This time, however, they were no longer
Filipino citizens and have opted to embrace Canadian citizenship through naturalization.
An opposition was filed by the Republic and after the parties have presented their
respective evidence. RTC ruled in favour of the spouses. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he
acquired by purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has complied
with the requirements for registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)?
RULING:
It must be noted that with respect to possession and occupation of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, the law employs the terms "by themselves", "the
applicant himself or through his predecessor-in-interest". Thus, it matters not whether the
vendee/applicant has been in possession of the subject property for only a day so long as the
period and/or legal requirements for confirmation of title has been complied with by his
predecessor-in-interest, the said period is tacked to his possession. In the case at bar,
respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the disputed land not only since June 12, 1945, but even as early as 1937.
Petitioner does not deny this except that respondent spouses, in its perception, were in
possession of the land sought to be registered only in 1978 and therefore short of the required
length of time.
Open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period
prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite
period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and
becomes private property.
In the case at bar, private respondents were undoubtedly natural-born Filipino citizens at
the time of the acquisition of the properties and by virtue thereof, acquired vested rights
thereon, tacking in the process, the possession in the concept of owner and the prescribed period
of time held by their predecessors-in-interest under the Public Land Act. In addition, private
respondents have constructed a house of strong materials on the contested property, now
occupied by respondent Lapiñas mother.

PUBLIC UTILITIES
JG SUMMIT HOLDINGS VS CA

83
FACTS:
The National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC), a government
corporation, entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with Kawasaki Heavy Industries,
Ltd. of Kobe, Japan (KAWASAKI) for the construction, operation and management of the
Subic National Shipyard Inc., (SNS) which subsequently became the Philippine Shipyard and
Engineering Corporation (PHILSECO).

Under the JVA, the NDC and KAWASAKI will contribute P330M for the capitalization
of PHILSECO in the proportion of 60%-40% respectively.  One of its salient features is the
grant to the parties of the right of first refusal should either of them decide to sell, assign or
transfer its interest in the joint venture.
NIDC transferred all its rights, title and interest in PHILSECO to the Philippine National
Bank (PNB). Such interests were subsequently transferred to the National Government pursuant
to an Administrative Order.
When the former President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 50 establishing the
Committee on Privatization (COP) and the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) to take title to, and
possession of, conserve, manage and dispose of non-performing assets of the National
Government, a trust agreement was entered into between the National Government and the APT
wherein the latter was named the trustee of the National Government’s share in PHILSECO.
In the interest of the national economy and the government, the COP and the APT
deemed it best to sell the National Government’s share in PHILSECO to private entities.  After
a series of negotiations between the APT and KAWASAKI , they agreed that the latter’s right
of first refusal under the JVA be “exchanged” for the right to top by 5%, the highest bid for the
said shares.  They further agreed that KAWASAKI woul.d be entitled to name a company in
which it was a stockholder, which could exercise the right to top.  KAWASAKI then informed
APT that Philyards Holdings, Inc. (PHI) would exercise its right to top.
At the public bidding, petitioner J.G. Summit Holdings Inc. submitted a bid of Two
Billion and Thirty Million Pesos (Php2,030,000,000.00) with an acknowledgement of
KAWASAKI/PHILYARDS right to top.
As petitioner was declared the highest bidder, the COP approved the sale “subject to the
right of Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Inc. / PHILYARDS Holdings Inc. to top JG’s bid by 5% as
specified in the bidding rules.”
On the other hand, the respondent by virtue of right to top by 5%, the highest bid for the
said shares timely exercised the same.

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 Petitioners, in their motion for reconsideration, raised, inter alia, the issue on the
maintenance of the 60%-40% relationship between the NIDC and KAWASAKI arising from
the Constitution because PHILSECO is a landholding corporation and need not be a public
utility to be bound by the 60%-40% constitutional limitation.
ISSUE:
Whether PHILSECO is a public utility?
RULING:
NO.
A shipyard like PHILSECO is not considered a public utility.
First.  By nature, a shipyard is not a public utility.
A "public utility" is "a business or service engaged in regularly supplying the public with
some commodity or service of public consequence such as electricity, gas, water, transportation,
telephone or telegraph service."
"Public use" means the same as "use by the public." The essential feature of the public
use is that it is not confined to privileged individuals, but is open to the indefinite public. It is
this indefinite or unrestricted quality that gives it its public character.
A "shipyard" is "a place or enclosure where ships are built or repaired." Its nature dictates
that it serves but a limited clientele whom it may choose to serve at its discretion. While it
offers its facilities to whoever may wish to avail of its... services, a shipyard is not legally
obliged to render its services indiscriminately to the public. It has no legal obligation to render
the services sought by each and every client. The fact that it publicly offers its services does not
give the public a legal right to... demand that such services be rendered.
Second. There is no law declaring a shipyard as a public utility.

IMMUNITY FROM SUIT

CHINA NATIONAL MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT CORP. VS SANTAMARIA

FACTS:
On 14 September 2002, petitioner China National Machinery & Equipment Corp.
(Group) (CNMEG), represented by its chairperson, Ren Hongbin, entered into a Memorandum
of Understanding with the North Luzon Railways Corporation (Northrail), represented by its
president, Jose L. Cortes, Jr. for the conduct of a feasibility study on a possible railway line
from Manila to San Fernando, La Union (the Northrail Project).

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 On 30 August 2003, the Export Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank) and the Department
of Finance of the Philippines (DOF) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (Aug 30
MOU), wherein China agreed to extend Preferential Buyer’s Credit to the Philippine
government to finance the Northrail Project. The Chinese government designated EXIM Bank
as the lender, while the Philippine government named the DOF as the borrower. Under the Aug
30 MOU, EXIM Bank agreed to extend an amount not exceeding USD 400,000,000 in favor of
the DOF, payable in 20 years, with a 5-year grace period, and at the rate of 3% per annum.
On 1 October 2003, the Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines, Wang Chungui (Amb.
Wang), wrote a letter to DOF Secretary Jose Isidro Camacho (Sec. Camacho) informing him of
CNMEG’s designation as the Prime Contractor for the Northrail Project.
On 30 December 2003, Northrail and CNMEG executed a Contract Agreement for the
construction of Section I, Phase I of the North Luzon Railway System from Caloocan to
Malolos on a turnkey basis (the Contract Agreement). The contract price for the Northrail
Project was pegged at USD 421,050,000.
On 26 February 2004, the Philippine government and EXIM Bank entered into a
counterpart financial agreement – Buyer Credit Loan Agreement No. BLA 04055 (the Loan
Agreement). In the Loan Agreement, EXIM Bank agreed to extend Preferential Buyer’s Credit
in the amount of USD 400,000,000 in favor of the Philippine government in order to finance the
construction of Phase I of the Northrail Project.
On 13 February 2006, respondents filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract and
Injunction with Urgent Motion for Summary Hearing to Determine the Existence of Facts and
Circumstances Justifying the Issuance of Writs of Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory
Injunction and/or TRO against CNMEG, the Office of the Executive Secretary, the DOF, the
Department of Budget and Management, the National Economic Development Authority and
Northrail. RTC Br. 145 issued an Order dated 17 March 2006 setting the case for hearing on the
issuance of injunctive reliefs. On 29 March 2006, CNMEG filed an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration of this Order. Before RTC Br. 145 could rule thereon, CNMEG filed a Motion
to Dismiss dated 12 April 2006, arguing that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over (a) its
person, as it was an agent of the Chinese government, making it immune from suit, and (b) the
subject matter, as the Northrail Project was a product of an executive agreement.
On 15 May 2007, RTC Br. 145 issued an Omnibus Order denying CNMEG’s Motion to
Dismiss and setting the case for summary hearing to determine whether the injunctive reliefs
prayed for should be issued. CNMEG then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was
denied by the trial court in an Order dated 10 March 2008. Thus, CNMEG filed before the CA a
Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction dated 4 April 2008.

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 In the assailed Decision dated 30 September 2008, the appellate court dismissed the
Petition for Certiorari. Subsequently, CNMEG filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was
denied by the CA in a Resolution dated 5 December 2008.

ISSUE:
Whether CNMEG is entitled to immunity, precluding it from being sued before a local court.
RULING:
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly
established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its
consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or
restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or
acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis.
Since the Philippines adheres to the restrictive theory, it is crucial to ascertain the legal
nature of the act involved – whether the entity claiming immunity performs governmental, as
opposed to proprietary, functions. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only
when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its
commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have
descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent
to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract
relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.
It was CNMEG that initiated the undertaking, and not the Chinese government. The
Feasibility Study was conducted not because of any diplomatic gratuity from or exercise of
sovereign functions by the Chinese government but was plainly a business strategy employed
by CNMEG with a view to securing this commercial enterprise.
The use of the term “state corporation” to refer to CNMEG was only descriptive of its
nature as a government-owned and/or -controlled corporation, and its assignment as the Primary
Contractor did not imply that it was acting on behalf of China in the performance of the latter’s
sovereign functions. To imply otherwise would result in an absurd situation, in which all
Chinese corporations owned by the state would be automatically considered as performing
governmental activities, even if they are clearly engaged in commercial or proprietary pursuits.
Even assuming arguendo that CNMEG performs governmental functions, such claim
does not automatically vest it with immunity. This view finds support in Malong v. Philippine
National Railways, in which this Court held that “immunity from suit is determined by the
character of the objects for which the entity was organized.”

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 In the case at bar, it is readily apparent that CNMEG cannot claim immunity from suit,
even if it contends that it performs governmental functions. Its designation as the Primary
Contractor does not automatically grant it immunity, just as the term “implementing agency”
has no precise definition for purposes of ascertaining whether GTZ was immune from suit.
Although CNMEG claims to be a government-owned corporation, it failed to adduce evidence
that it has not consented to be sued under Chinese law. Thus, following this Court’s ruling in
Deutsche Gesellschaft, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, CNMEG is to be presumed to
be a government-owned and -controlled corporation without an original charter. As a result, it
has the capacity to sue and be sued under Section 36 of the Corporation Code.
An agreement to submit any dispute to arbitration may be construed as an implicit waiver
of immunity from suit.
In the United States, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 provides for a waiver
by implication of state immunity. In the said law, the agreement to submit disputes to
arbitration in a foreign country is construed as an implicit waiver of immunity from suit.
Although there is no similar law in the Philippines, there is a reason to apply the legal reasoning
behind the waiver in this case.

GOVERNMENT OFFICERS
SHAUF VS CA

FACTS:
Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf filed a complaint for damages against private respondents Don
Detwiler and Anthony Persi before the Regional Trial Court, Branch LVI at Angeles City for
the alleged discriminatory acts of herein private respondents in maliciously denying her
application for the GS 1710-9 position in Clark Air Base. Private respondents, as defendants,
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that as officers of the United States Armed Forces
performing official functions in accordance with the powers vested in them under the
Philippine-American Military Bases Agreement, they are immune from suit.
ISSUE:
Can the private respondents validly set up the defense invoking the doctrine of immunity from
suit?
RULING:
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is
also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by
them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will
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require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the
appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be
regarded as against the state itself although it has been formally impleaded. It must be noted,
however, that the rule is not also all-encompassing as to be applicable under all circumstances.
There is no doubt that private respondents Persi and Detwiler, in committing the acts
complained of have, in effect, violated the basic constitutional right of petitioner Loida Q.
Shauf to earn a living which is very much an integral aspect of the right to life. For this, they
should be held accountable.

AGENCY-PROPRIETY
FONTANILLA VS MALIAMAN

FACTS:
A pick up owned by the National Irrigation Administration and driven officially by its
regular driver, Hugo Garcia, bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla, which resulted in
the latter's death. The parents of Francisco filed a suit for damages against Garcia and the NIA,
as Garcia's employer. After trial, the court awarded actual, moral and exemplary damages to
Spouses Fontanilla. NIA appealed. The Solicitor General contends that the NIA does not
perform solely and primarily proprietary functions but is an agency of the government tasked
with governmental functions, and is therefore not liable for the tortious act of its driver Hugo
Garcia, who was not its special agent.
ISSUE:
May NIA, a government agency, be held liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of
its driver who was not its special agent?
RULING:
YES.
NIA is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the
government. It is not a mere agency of the government but a corporate body
performing proprietary functions. Therefore, it may be held liable for the damages caused by
the negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent.

AMENDMENTS OR REVISION: INITIATIVE

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO VS COMELEC

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FACTS:
Private respondent filed with public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a
“Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People’s
Initiative” (Delfin Petition) wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order (1) Fixing the
time and dates for signature gathering all over the country; (2) Causing the necessary
publications of said Order and the attached “Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in
newspapers of general and local circulation; and (3) Instructing Municipal Election Registrars
in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing
stations at the time and on the dates designated for the purpose. Delfin asserted that R.A. No.
6735 governs the conduct of initiative to amend the Constitution and COMELEC Resolution
No. 2300 is a valid exercise of delegated powers. Petitioners contend that R.A. No. 6375 failed
to be an enabling law because of its deficiency and inadequacy, and COMELEC Resolution No.
2300 is void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not (1) the absence of subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, (2) R.A. No. 6735 is
adequate to cover the system of initiative on amendment to the Constitution, and (3)
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid
RULING:
NO.  
Petition (for prohibition) was granted. The conspicuous silence in subtitles simply means
that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. R.A. No.
6735 failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation. Provisions COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300 prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or
amendments to the Constitution are declared void.
Subtitles are intrinsic aids for construction and interpretation. R.A. No. 6735 failed to
provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative,
which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission
indicates that the matter of people’s initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future
law. 
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The
petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the
COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before
the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition; (2) to issue through its
Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the total number of registered voters in
each legislative district; (3) to assist, through its election registrars, in the establishment of
signature stations; and (4) to verify, through its election registrars, the signatures on the basis of
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the registry list of voters, voters’ affidavits, and voters’ identification cards used in the
immediately preceding election.
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the
COMELEC. The respondent Commission must have known that the petition does not fall under
any of the actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution
No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, the said
petition was merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more
than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December
1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to
file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.

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