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Castelo vs. Court of Appeals

*
G.R. No. 96372. May 22, 1995.

ANTONIO L. CASTELO, BERNABE B. BANSON, LOURDES A.

BANSON, and POMPEYO DEPANTE, petitioners, vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS, 12th Division, and MILAGROS DELA
ROSA, respondents.

Judgments; When the dispositive portion of a judgment, which has

become final and executory, contains a clerical error or an ambiguity
arising from an inadvertent omission, such error or ambiguity may be
clarified by reference to the body of the decision itself.—The established
doctrine is that when the dispositive portion of a judgment, which has
become final and executory, contains a clerical error or an ambiguity arising
from an inadvertent omission, such error or ambiguity may be clarified by
reference to the body of the decision itself.
Same; In construing an ambiguous judgment, it must be assumed that
the judge meant to decide a case in accordance with law.—It thus appears
that the Castro-Bartolome decision was ambiguous in the sense that it was
too cryptic. Examination of the body of that decision, however, sheds no
light on the reference intended by Castro-Bartolome, J. in directing private
respondent “to pay interest.” Luna, J. himself had to resort to “fair
interpretation.” We believe that, in these circumstances, we must assume
that Mme. Justice Castro-Bartolome meant to decide in accordance with
law; that we cannot fairly assume that she was unfamiliar with the
applicable law or that she had intended to grant petitioners less than that
they were entitled to under the law. Thus, the important question is: under
the circumstances which were before Castro-Bartolome, J., what should
private respondent dela Rosa have been held liable for in accordance with
law?

________________

* THIRD DIVISION.

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Same; Art. 2209 of the Civil Code; Interests; Damages; The

appropriate measure for damages in case of delay in discharging an
obligation consisting of a payment of a sum of money is the payment of
penalty interest.—Under Article 2209, the appropriate measure for damages
in case of delay in discharging an obligation consisting of the payment of a
sum of money is the payment of penalty interest at the rate agreed upon in
the contract of the parties. In the absence of a stipulation of a particular rate
of penalty interest, payment of additional interest at a rate equal to the
regular or monetary interest, becomes due and payable. Finally, if no
regular interest had been agreed upon by the contracting parties, then the
damages payable will consist of payment of legal interest which is six
percent (6%) or, in the case of loans or forbearances of money, twelve
percent (12%) per annum.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The “obligation consisting in
the payment of a sum of money” referred to in Article 2209 is not confined
to a loan or forbearance of money.—The contention of private respondent
that Article 2209 of the Civil Code is not applicable in this case because the
interest referred to therein is given as compensation for the use of money,
not for the incurring of delay as in the instant case, need not detain us for
long. Article 2209 governs transactions involving the payment of indemnity
in the concept of damages arising from delay in the discharge of obligations
consisting of the payment of a sum of money. The “obligation consisting in
the payment of a sum of money” referred to in Article 2209 is not confined
to a loan or forbearance of money.
Same; Contracts; In case of ambiguity in contract language, that
interpretation which establishes a less onerous transmission of rights or
imposition of lesser burdens which permits greater reciprocity between the
parties, is to be adopted.—The interpretation we adopt is also supported by
the principle that in case of ambiguity in contract language, that
interpretation which establishes a less onerous transmission of rights or
imposition of lesser burdens which permits greater reciprocity between the
parties, is to be adopted.

PETITION for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Nemesio V. Manlangit for petitioners.
     Jose O. Uy, Jr. for private respondent.

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FELICIANO, J.:

On 15 October 1982, petitioners Antonio Castelo, Bernabe Banson,

Lourdes Banson and Pompeyo Depante entered into a contract
denominated as a “Deed of Conditional Sale” with private
respondent Milagros Dela Rosa involving a parcel of land located in
1524 España Street, Sampaloc, Manila, 84.19 square meters in area.
The agreed price of the land was Two Hundred Sixty Nine
Thousand, Four Hundred and Eight Pesos (P269,408.00). Upon
signing the contract, private respondent paid petitioners One
Hundred Six Thousand Pesos (P106,000.00) leaving a balance of
One Hundred Sixty Three Thousand Four Hundred and Eight Pesos
(P163,408.00).
The Deed of Conditional Sale also stipulated that:

“x x x      x x x      x x x

b.) The balance of P163,408.00 to be paid on or before December 31,

1982 without interest and penalty charges;
c.) Should the said balance [remain unpaid] by the VENDEE, the
VENDORS hereby agree to give the VENDEE a grace period of
SIX (6) months or up to June 30, 1983 to pay said balance provided
that interest at the rate of 12% per annum shall be charged and 1%
penalty charge a month shall be imposed on the remaining
1
diminishing balance.” (Italics supplied)

Private respondent Dela Rosa was unable to pay the remaining

balance on or before 30 June 1983.
On 29 July 1983, petitioners filed an action for specific
performance with damages in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila against Dela Rosa.
The RTC, in a decision dated 17 August 1984 rendered by Judge
Antonio Q. Malaya, ordered the rescission of the Deed of
Conditional Sale.
Petitioners then went on Certiorari to the Court of Appeals
questioning the trial court’s decision rescinding the Deed of
Conditional Sale. They claimed that rescission of the contract was
only an alternative relief available under the Civil Code, while they,
in their complaint before the RTC, had asked for

________________

1 Deed of Conditional Sale, Annex “D,” p. 2; CA Records, p. 15.

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specific performance with damages.

In a decision written by Castro-Bartolome, J., dated 21
November 1986, the Court of Appeals, in CA G.R. No. 07938-SP,
annulled and set aside the RTC’s decision of 17 August 1984. In its
dispositive portion, the Court of Appeals decision stated:

“WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is hereby granted annulling the

decision of Judge Malaya dated August 17, 1984 and a new one entered:

1) allowing the amendment of the complaint to conform to the

evidence already presented and defaulted defendant to answer the
amendment within the reglementary period; and
2) ordering the defendant to comply with her obligation under the
conditional sale to pay the balance of the conditional sale in the
amount of P163,408.00, to pay interest and in default thereof the
2
rescission thereof is the alternative.” (Italics supplied)

Petitioners filed a motion for execution of the 17 August 1984

judgment of the trial court as modified by the 21 November 1986
judgment of the Court of Appeals. Private respondent opposed this
motion.
A writ of execution of the 21 November 1986 judgment of the
Court of Appeals was issued by the trial court on 2 September 1988.
Accordingly, a Sheriff’s Notice to Pay Judgment was served on
private respondent Dela Rosa requiring her to pay petitioners a total
of One Hundred Ninety Seven Thousand Seven Hundred Twenty
Three Pesos and Sixty Eight Centavos (P197,723.68), computed as
follows:

“Principal ............................................................ P163,408.00

  plus interest of  
  12% (per contract)  
  from 21 Nov. 1986 to  
2 Sept. 1988 ............................................... 34,315.68
Total amount    
of judgment
  (excluding sheriff’s fees  
  and P197,723.68”3
expenses).......................................

________________

2 Court of Appeals Decision dated 22 August 1990, “Annex B,” pp. 1-2.
3 Sheriff’s Notice to Pay Judgment, “Annex C,” CA Records, p. 14.

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Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and a separate motion

for alias writ of execution contending that the sum of P197,723.68,
based on the Sheriff’s own computation, was erroneous. They
argued that the obligation of private respondent was to pay (a)
interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum plus (b) one
percent (1%) penalty charge per month, from default, i.e., from 1
January 1983: “e) That the amount to be paid by the Defendant
should be P398,814.88 instead and not P197,723.68 or a difference
of P201,091.20; detailed computation of which are as follows:

Unpaid balance ............................................ P163,408.00

     with interest of 12%    
     P.A. and 1% penalty    
     charge a month    
January to December 1983 ........................ 39,217.92
January to December 1984 ........................ 39,217.92
January to December 1985 ........................ 39,217.92
January to December 1986 ........................ 39,217.92
January to December 1987 ........................ 39,217.92
January to August 1988 ........................... 26,145.28
1% interest per month    
(P268.16)
     the interest for one (1)    
     year @ 24%    
.............P39,217.92
  x 5 years  
    P196,089.60
Interest from January to    
August 1988 ...................................... 26,145.28
Interest from January    
1983 to August 1988 ........................ 222,234.88
Principal...............................   163,408.00
    P385,642.88
Plus Real Estate Tax Paid ........................ 13,172.00
Amount due to Plaintiffs ....... .................... P398,814.88”4
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They also claimed that the amount arrived at by the Sheriff was
inconsistent not only with the Court of Appeals’ decision of 21 4
Rollo, pp. 25-26.

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November 1986, but also the stipulations in the “Deed of

Conditional Sale.”
In an Order of 18 April 1990, the trial court denied the motion for
alias writ of execution and the motion for reconsideration. In
denying petitioners’ motions, the trial court stated that it did not
have authority to enlarge the scope of the dispositive portion of the
Court of Appeals’ decision which was the subject of execution.
Moreover, the trial court continued, the phrase “to pay interest”
found in the dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ 21
November 1986 decision did not refer to the stipulation in the “Deed
of Conditional Sale” but rather to the legal rate of interest imposed
by the Court of Appeals which started to run from 12 February
1987, the date of entry of judgment. Had it intended otherwise, the
Court of Appeals would have declared so.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the 18 April 1990 Order,
without success.
Petitioners then went on Certiorari for the second time to the
Court of Appeals claiming that the trial court had acted with grave
abuse of discretion in issuing its Orders dated 18 April 1990 and 18
June 1990. The petition, docketed as C.A.-G.R. SP No. 22464, was,
however, dismissed for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals,
speaking this time through Luna, J., pronounced that:

“Indeed, what must be the subject of execution is the “new one” or new
decision (referring to the Court of Appeals’ decision in CA-G.R. No. 07938
SP dated 21 November 1986), wherein this Court decreed in paragraph “2”
of the dispositive portion, ordering the “defendant x x x to pay the balance
of the conditional sale in the amount of P163,408.00, to pay interest x x x.”
Being a “new” judgment or decision, the computation of the “interest” on
the balance of the conditional sale should commence from the date of its
ENTRY on February 12, 1987, when the decision became FINAL and
EXECUTORY. It is the DECISION of this Court WHICH DECREED
5
PAYMENT and ACCRUAL OF INTEREST.”

Hence this Petition for Review contending that, in the Luna, J.

decision, the Court of Appeals had erred in ignoring the

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5 Court of Appeals Decision, 22 August 1990, p. 14; Rollo, p. 30.

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stipulation for payment of interest in case of default found in the

“Deed of Conditional Sale.”
The instant Petition does not seek a review of the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 21 November 1986, issued in CA G.R. No.
07938-SP, which long ago became final and executory. The Petition
before us now presents the issue of what is the correct interpretation
of the phrase “to pay interest” set out in the dispositive portion of
the 21 November 1986 decision of Castro-Bartolome, J.
The established doctrine is that when the dispositive portion of a
judgment, which has become final and executory, contains a clerical
error or an ambiguity arising from an inadvertent omission, such
error or ambiguity may be clarified by reference to the body of the
decision itself. In Reinsurance Company of the Orient, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals,6 the Court surveyed the applicable case law in the
following manner:

“It is true that even a judgment which has become final and executory may
be clarified under certain circumstances. The dispositive portion of the
judgment may, for instance, contain an error clearly clerical in nature
(perhaps best illustrated by an error in arithmetical computation) or an
ambiguity arising from inadvertent omission, which error may be rectified
or ambiguity clarified and the omission supplied by reference primarily to
the body of the decision itself. Supplementary reference to the pleadings
previously filed in the case may also be resorted to by way of corroboration
of the existence of the error or of the ambiguity in the dispositive part of the
judgment. In Locsin, et al. v. Paredes, et al. (63 Phil. 87 [1936]), this Court
allowed a judgment which had become final and executory to be clarified by
supplying a word which had been inadvertently omitted and which, when
supplied, in effect changed the literal import of the original phraseology:
          ‘x x x it clearly appears from the allegations of the complaint, the
promissory note reproduced therein and made a part thereof, the prayer and
the conclusions of fact and of law contained in the decision of the
respondent judge, that the obligation contracted by the petitioners is joint
and several and that the parties as well as the trial judge so understood it.
Under the juridical rule that the judgment should be in accordance with the
allegations, the evidence and the conclusions of fact and law, the

________________

6 198 SCRA 19 (1991).

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dispositive part of the judgment under consideration should have ordered

that the debt be paid severally, and in omitting the word or adverb
“severally” inadvertently, said judgment became ambiguous. This
ambiguity may be clarified at any time after the decision is rendered and
even after it had become final (34 Corpus Juris, 235, 326). The respondent
judge did not, therefore, exceed his jurisdiction in clarifying the dispositive
part of the judgment by supplying the omission. (63 Phil. at 91)’
In Filipino Legion Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al. (56 SCRA 674
[1974]), the applicable principle was set out in the following terms:
     ‘[W]here there is ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the
dispositive portion of a decision, the court may clarify such ambiguity by an
amendment even after the judgment had become final, and for this purpose it
may resort to the pleadings filed by the parties, the court’s findings of facts
and conclusions of law as expressed in the body of the decision.’ (56 SCRA
at 691; also Presbitero v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 443 [1984])
In Republic Surety and Insurance Company, Inc. v. Intermediate
Appellate Court (152 SCRA 309 [1987]), the Court applying the above
doctrine said:
          ‘x x x We clarify, in other words, what we did affirm. What is
involved here is not what is ordinarily regarded as a clerical error in the
dispositive part of the decision of the Court of First Instance, which type of
error is perhaps best typified by an error in arithmetical computation. At the
same time, what is involved here is not a correction of an erroneous
judgment or dispositive portion of a judgment. What we believe is involved
here is in the nature of an inadvertent omission on the part of the Court of
First Instance (which should have been noticed by private respondent’s
counsel who had prepared the complaint), of what might be described as a
logical follow-through of something set forth both in the body of the decision
and in the dispositive portion thereof: the inevitable follow-through, or
translation into, operational or behavioral terms, of the annulment of the
Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage, from which petitioners’ title or
7
claim of title embodied in TCT 133153 flow.’ (152 SCRA at 315)”
(Emphases in the original)

________________

7 Reinsurance Company of the Orient, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 198 SCRA 19 at

28-29 (1991).

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The question we must resolve is whether or not there is an ambiguity

or clerical error and inadvertent omission in the dispositive portion
of the decision of Castro-Bartolome, J., dated 21 November 1986,
which may legitimately be clarified by referring to the body of the
decision and perhaps even the pleadings filed before her. It will be
recalled that the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of that
decision of Castro-Bartolome, J. ordered private respondent dela
Rosa

“to comply with her obligation under the conditional sale to pay the balance
of the conditional sale in the amount of P163,408.00, to pay interest and in
default thereof the rescission thereof is the alternative.” (Emphases
supplied)

The dispositive portion itself failed to specify expressly whether

Castro-Bartolome, J. was referring to the payment of interest in
accordance with the terms and conditions of the “Deed of
Conditional Sale” or whether, as Luna, J. was to hold almost four (4)
years later that the requirement of “to pay interest” related, not to the
interest provisions of the Conditional Sale Deed between petitioners
and private respondent, but rather to legal interest on the amount of
the unpaid balance of the purchase price of the land which would
begin to accrue from the date of the entry of the Castro-Bartolome
judgment on 12 February 1987. Luna, J. said:

“It is settled that the only portion subject of execution is the dispositive
portion of a judgment. The judgment of the Honorable Court of Appeals
does not refer to the interest referred to in the Conditional Deed of Sale.
Said judgment or dispositive portion cannot be stretched or enlarged to refer
to the interest indicated in the Conditional Deed of Sale. If that were the
intention of the Honorable Court of Appeals, as contended by plaintiffs, it
would have said so in black and white. This Court is not authorized to re-
write, alter, amend or change the above-mentioned dispositive portion of the
judgment of the Honorable Court of Appeals.
By a fair interpretation, the interest therein referred to is the legal rate of
interest imposed by the Honorable Court of Appeals which must commence
from the entry of judgment on February 12, 1987. At this stage, it appearing
that the Decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals had long become final
and executory. This Court has no more jurisdiction to entertain reception of
evidence in the matter of the execution of the dispositive portion of the
judgment of the Honorable

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Court of Appeals.” (Emphasis supplied)

It thus appears that the Castro-Bartolome decision was ambiguous in

the sense that it was too cryptic. Examination of the body of that
decision, however, sheds no light on the reference intended by
Castro-Bartolome, J. in directing private respondent “to pay
interest.” Luna, J. himself had to resort to “fair interpretation.” We
believe that, in these circumstances, we must assume that Mme.
Justice Castro-Bartolome meant to decide in accordance with law;
that we cannot fairly assume that she was unfamiliar with the
applicable law or that she had intended to grant petitioners less than
that they were entitled to under the law. Thus, the important question
is: under the circumstances which were before Castro-Bartolome, J.,
what should private respondent
9
dela Rosa have been held liable for
in accordance with law?
We believe and so hold that the phrase “to pay interest,” found in
the dispositive portion of the Castro-Bartolome decision must, under
applicable law, refer to the interest stipulated by the parties in the
Deed of Conditional Sale which they had entered into on 15 October
1982. We note, in the first place, that the phrase “to pay interest”
comes close upon the heels of the preceding phrase “to comply with
her obligation under the conditional sale to pay the balance—of
P163,408.00.” A strong inference thus arises that the “interest”
required to be paid is the interest stipulated as part of the “obligation
[of private respondent dela Rosa] under the conditional sale
[agreement] to pay the balance of [the purchase price of the land].”
There is, in the second place, no question that private respondent
dela Rosa had failed to pay the balance of P163,408.00 on or before
31 December 1982. The applicable law is to be found in Article
2209 of the Civil Code which provides as follows:

“If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor
incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the
contrary, shall be the payment of the interest agreed

________________

8 Rollo, p. 28.
9 See, in particular, State Investment House, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 198 SCRA 390
(1991).

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upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest which is six
percent (6%) per annum.” (Italics supplied)

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Under Article 2209, the appropriate measure for damages in case of

delay in discharging an obligation consisting of the payment of a
sum of money is the payment of penalty interest at the rate agreed
upon in the contract of the parties. In the absence of a stipulation of
a particular rate of penalty interest, payment of additional interest at
a rate equal to the regular or monetary interest, becomes due and
payable. Finally, if no regular interest had been agreed upon by the
contracting parties, then the damages payable will consist of
10
payment of legal interest which is six percent (6%) or, in the case
of loans or forbearances of money, twelve percent (12%) per
11
annum. Applying Article 2209 to the instant case, we must refer to
the “Deed of Conditional Sale” which, as already noted, had
specifically provided for “interest at the rate of 12% per annum” and
a “1% penalty charge a month [to] be imposed on their remaining
diminishing balance.” There was, it thus appears, no need for the
subsequent Luna, J. decision to refer at all to the payment of legal
interest from the time of entry of the Castro-Bartolome decision.
The contention of private respondent that Article 2209 of the
Civil Code is not applicable in this case because the interest referred
to therein is given as compensation for the use of money, not for the
12
incurring of delay as in the instant case, need not detain us for
long. Article 2209 governs transactions involving the payment of
indemnity in the concept of damages arising from delay in the
discharge of obligations consisting of the payment of a sum of
13
money. The “obligation consisting in the payment of a sum of
money” referred to in Article 2209 is not confined to a loan

_______________

10 State Investment House, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra.

11 Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Hon. Court of Appeals and Mercantile Insurance
Company, Inc., 234 SCRA 78 (1994); Pilipinas Bank v. Court of Appeals, 225 SCRA
268 (1993); Tio Khe Chio v. Court of Appeals, 202 SCRA 119 (1993).
12 Memorandum for Private Respondent, p. 30.
13 Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Hon. Court of Appeals and Mercantile
Insurance Company, Inc., 234 SCRA 78 (1994); National Power Corporation vs.
Angas, 208 SCRA 542 (1992).

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applied Article 2209 in the determination of the interest properly

payable where there was default in 14the payment of the price or
consideration under a contract of sale as in the case at bar. Article
2209 has also been applied by this Court in cases involving an action
15
for damages for injury to persons and loss of property; to actions
16
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for damages arising from unpaid insurance claims; and an action
involving the appropriate rate of interest on just compensation that is
17
payable for expropriated lands.
The stipulation in the “Deed of Conditional Sale” requiring the
payment of interest is not unlawful. The validity of the contract of
conditional sale itself has not been put to question by private
respondent dela Rosa and there is nothing in the record to suggest
that the same may be contrary to law, morals, good custom, public
order or public policy. Accordingly, the contractual stipulation must
be regarded as binding and enforceable as the law between the
18
parties.
We turn, therefore, to the examination of the contractual
stipulation on interest which we quoted in full earlier. Under the
terms of that stipulation, private respondent was bound, and entitled,
to pay the balance of P163,408.00 on or before 31 Decem-ber 1982
without incurring any liability for any interest and penalty charges.
During the grace period of six (6) months, that is, from 1 January
1983 to 30 June 1983, private respondent vendee was given the right
to pay the said balance or any portion that had remained unpaid
provided that “interest at the rate of 12% per annum shall be charged
and 1% penalty charge shall be imposed on the remaining
diminishing balance.” We observe that residual ambiguity infects
this particular portion of the stipulation on payment of interest. The
question is whether, during the

_______________

14 Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 170 SCRA 63 (1989); Philippine
Virginia Tobacco Administration vs. Tensuan, 188 SCRA 628 (1990); Pilipinas Bank
vs. Court of Appeals, 225 SCRA 268 (1993).
15 Reformina vs. Tomol, Jr., 139 SCRA 260 (1985).
16 Tio Khe Chio vs. Court of Appeals, 202 SCRA 119 (1991).
17 National Power Corporation vs. Angas, 208 SCRA 542 (1992).
18 Article 1306, Civil Code. See also Reparations Commission vs. Visayan
Packing Corporation, 193 SCRA 531 (1991); Jovellanos vs. Court of Appeals, 210
SCRA 126 (1992). VOL. 244, MAY 22, 1995

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period of 1 January 1983 up to 30 June 1983, 12% interest per

annum plus 1% penalty charge a month was payable “on the
remaining diminishing balance;” or whether during the period from
1 January 1983 to 30 June 1983, only 12% per annum interest was
payable while the 1% per month penalty charge would in addition
begin to accrue on any balance remaining unpaid as of 1 July 1983.
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We believe that the contracting parties intended the latter view of

their stipulation on interest; for if the parties had intended that
during the grace period from 1 January 1983 to 30 June 1983,
interest consisting of 12% per annum plus another 12% per annum
(equivalent to 1% per month), or a total of 24% per annum, was
payable, then they could have simply said so. Instead, the parties
distinguished between interest at the rate of 12% per annum and the
1% a month penalty charge. The interpretation we adopt is also
supported by the principle that in case of ambiguity in contract
language, that interpretation which establishes a less onerous
transmission of rights or imposition of lesser burdens which permits
19
greater reciprocity between the parties, is to be adopted.
Summarizing the import of the contractual stipulation of the
parties:

(1) During the period from 1 January 1983 up to 30 June 1983,

private respondent vendee dela Rosa was bound to pay
interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the unpaid balance
of P163,408.00.
(2) Commencing on 1 July 1983, and until full payment, dela
Rosa was bound to pay interest at the rate of 12% per
annum plus another 12% per annum (or 1% penalty charge
a month), or a total of 24% per annum, to be computed on
the “remaining diminishing [unpaid] balance.”

Private respondent finally contends that she had already complied

with her obligation considering that after she had been served with a
writ of execution dated 2 September 1988, she

________________

19 Article 1378, Civil Code. See Gacos v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 8 (1992);
Heirs of Severo Legaspi, Sr. v. Vda. de Dayot, 188 SCRA 509 (1990); Labasan v.
Lacuesta, 86 SCRA 16 (1978); Perez v. Cortes, 15 Phil. 211 (1910); Olino v. Medina,
13 Phil. 379 (1909).

193

VOL. 244, MAY 22, 1995 193

Castelo vs. Court of Appeals

deposited with the trial court on 7 September 1988 the amount stated
20
therein, that is, the amount of P197,723.68. Obviously, this
contention raises a question of fact; just as obvious, however, is the
rule that questions of fact cannot be raised in a petition for review on
certiorari before this Court. At all events, private respondent’s
factual contention is properly addressed not to this Court, but rather
to the trial court during execution proceedings. In the interest of
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complete resolution of this drawn out litigation and of achieving

substantial justice, we would add that if the trial court finds that, in
point of fact, the amount of P197,723.68 had indeed been deposited
with the trial court on 7 September 1988, then the total amount due
from private respondent should be correspondingly reduced by the
application of the amount of the deposit in accordance with the rules
21
on application of payments. Conversely, the interest yield or civil
fruits of the deposit, commencing from date of application of the
deposit as partial payment, would pertain to petitioners who have
not thus far enjoyed the use of the monies deposited.
The conclusion we have reached renders it unnecessary to pass
upon the other contentions made by private respondent.
WHEREFORE, for all foregoing, the Petition for Review is
hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 22
August 1990 in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 22464 (the Luna, J. decision) is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the dispositive portion of
the Decision by Castro-Bartolome, J., dated 21 November 1986, in
C.A.-G.R. No. 07938-SP is hereby CLARIFIED as follows:

“WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is hereby GRANTED annulling the

Decision of Judge Malaya dated August 17, 1984 and a new one entered:

(1) allowing the amendment of the complaint to conform to the

evidence already presented and defaulted defendant to answer the
amendment within the reglementary period;
(2) ordering the defendant to comply with her obligation under the
conditional sale to pay the balance of the conditional sale in the

_______________

20 Memorandum for Private Respondent, p. 26.

21 Articles 1252-1254, Civil Code. VOL. 244, MAY 22, 1995

194

194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cruz vs. Leabres

amount of P163,408.00, to pay interest on the amount of the

balance remaining unpaid during the period from 1 January 1983
to 30 June 1983 at the rate of 12% per annum; and, from 1 July
1983 until full payment of the amount due, to pay interest at the
rate of 12% per annum plus another 12% per annum (i.e., 1%
penalty charge per month), or a total of 24% per annum, on the
balance remaining unpaid; and
(3) in default thereof, the rescission of the “Deed of Conditional Sale”
is the alternative.”

No pronouncement as to costs.
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SO ORDERED.

     Romero, Melo and Vitug, JJ., concur.

     Francisco, J., On leave.

Petition granted. Judgment reversed and set aside.

Notes.—Once a decision becomes final, the court can no longer

amend, modify, much less set aside the same. (Adez Realty, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 623 [1992]) A final judgment may be
amended if necessitated by compelling circumstances. (Ramos vs.
Court of Appeals, 244 SCRA 72 [G.R. No. 42108, 10 May 1995])

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