House of Commons

Transport Committee

Personal passenger
safety in railway
stations
Oral and Written Evidence

Oral evidence taken on Wednesday 19 April

2006

Ordered by The House of Commons

to be printed 19 April 2006

HC 1057-i & ii
Published on 25 May 2006
by authority of the House of Commons
London: The Stationery Office Limited
£16.50
The Transport Committee

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the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Department for Transport and
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Mrs Gwyneth Dunwoody MP (Labour, Crewe) (Chairman)
Mr David Clelland MP (Labour, Tyne Bridge)
Mr Jeffrey M. Donaldson MP (Democratic Unionist, Lagan Valley)
Clive Efford MP (Labour, Eltham)
Mrs Louise Ellman MP (Labour/Co-operative, Liverpool Riverside)
Mr Robert Goodwill MP (Conservative, Scarborough & Whitby)
Mr John Leech MP (Liberal Democrat, Manchester, Withington)
Mr Eric Martlew MP (Labour, Carlisle)
Mr Lee Scott MP (Conservative, Ilford North)
Mr Graham Stringer MP (Labour, Manchester Blackley)
Mr David Wilshire MP (Conservative, Spelthorne)

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Witness
Wednesday 19 April 2006 Page

Mr George Muir, Director General, Association of Train Operating Companies,

Mr David Franks, Managing Director, National Express Group, Mr Ian Dobbs,
Chief Executive, Rail Division, Stagecoach Group, Mr Andrew Haines, Managing
Director, Railways, First Group, Mr Keith Luderman, Chief Executive, Rail, Go-
Ahead Group, and Mr Robin Gisby, Director of Operations and Customer
Services, Network Rail Ev 27

Chief Constable Ian Johnston CBE QM BSc (Hons), British Transport Police;
Mr Len Porter, Chief Executive, Rail Safety and Standards Board; and Mr Colin
Foxall, Chairman, and Ms Christine Knights, Board Member, Passenger Focus Ev 61

Derek Twigg MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for

Transport Ev 70

List of written evidence

01 Association of Train Operating Companies 1
02 National Express Group plc 6
03 Stagecoach Group: Rail Division 10
04 FirstGroup plc 14
05 Go-Ahead Group 17
06 Network Rail 26
07 Association of Train Operating Companies, Supplementary memorandum 36
08 National Express Group plc 37
09 Stagecoach Group: Rail Division, Supplementary memorandum 40
10 FirstGroup plc, Supplementary memorandum 42
11 Go-Ahead Group, Supplementary memorandum 43
12 Network Rail, Supplementary memorandum 45
13 British Transport Police 46
14 Rail and Safety Standards Board 50
15 Passenger Focus 53
16 Department for Transport 68
17 Department for Transport, Supplementary memorandum 79
18 Mr Alan D Crowhurst 81
19 Rail Action Group East of Scotland 81
20 Parliamentary Advisory Council for Transport Safety 83
21 Group 4 Securicor Services UK 85
22 Mr Nigel R Gansell 87
23 British Transport Police Authority 88
24 South Eastern Trains 92
25 National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers 96
26 Crime Concern 100
27 Soroptimist International of South East England 104
28 National Audit Office 107
29 Office of Rail Regulation 110
30 Merseytravel 111
31 Arriva 115
32 City of London Corporation: City Remembrancer’s Office 117
33 Mayor of London 121
34 Evening Standard 125
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 1

Oral evidence
Taken before the Transport Committee

on Wednesday 19 April 2006

Members present:

Mrs Gwyneth Dunwoody, in the Chair

Mr David Clelland Mr Eric Martlew

Clive EVord Mr Lee Scott
Mrs Louise Ellman Graham Stringer
Mr Robert Goodwill Mr David Wilshire
Mr John Leech

Memorandum submitted by Association of Train Operating Companies

PART ONE: INTRODUCTION

Summary
Train operators are committed to maintaining a safe environment for their passengers on stations and in
trains. We understand that some passengers are nervous about travelling at night, and we would not wish
our passengers to feel threatened. We have transformed the position we found ten years ago and have been
successful in reducing crime by broadly 40% and in attracting 40% more passengers to use the railway. More
staV are employed by train operators than at privatisation, specific training on security has been introduced,
and we contribute 60% more to policing costs. Help points, CCTV, better lighting and opening up the station
environment are all practical initiatives by train operators to improve security as well as passengers’
perceptions.
Operators aim to improve passenger security further on stations and trains and some ideas for doing so
are set out below. However crime is a wider societal issue not confined to the railway station and tackling
it requires an integrated approach involving police together with local and national Government.

Personal Safety has been a Priority for Ten Years

Ten years ago, the station environment was often poor. Routine ticket checks at the entrance to the
platforms came to an end at many stations between 1990 and 1994 as an economy measure, being replaced
by a kind of honour system backed up by the £10 penalty fare levied under the British Railways (Penalty
Fares) Act, 1989. The consequences were serious. In London, fare evasion was high at around 8%, and
antisocial behaviour was widespread on many routes.
Besides the loss of revenue from ticketless travel, train operators with problem routes considered that the
level of disorder faced by their passengers was unacceptable. They set about reclaiming control over the
railway space and returning the railway to passengers.
Train operators take the responsibility for passengers in their care very seriously. Looking after
passengers is an inherent part of being a train operator and is not simply something in a franchise agreement.
But stations are not citadels on a rock, they are part of the local community, and train operators cannot
achieve safety on stations without community support, nor can it be guaranteed once passengers have left
the station.
Whilst train operators will take all reasonable measures to ensure passenger security, beyond a certain
point it becomes a wider issue shared with Government. The railway and Government, particularly local
Government, must tackle the issue together.

How Effective have the Measures Been?

Over the last ten years, train operators have recruited security staV to patrol trains and stations, installed
ticket gates at stations, provided help points, cleaned and painted stations, removed graYti, set up a proper
process for litter clearance (recognising the removal of litter bins for security reasons) and introduced 20,000
CCTV cameras, which have proved very valuable both as deterrents and for securing convictions. In some
cases, stations have been remodeled or redundant buildings removed to eliminate hidden corners which
might encourage crime.
Ev 2 Transport Committee: Evidence

The measures taken by train operators and BTP have had a considerable degree of success, but the picture
has been confused by changes in definitions and recording procedures. Further information is given in the
Annexe Data on Crime on the Railway, attached to this paper.
If account is taken of these changes in definitions, the picture which emerges is of a decline in crime on
the railway of broadly 40% in the last ten years.
In absolute numbers, the level of crime on the railway is small compared with that in the community at large.
To put the total figure in context, there is less crime on the whole of the railway in England and Wales than
in the single London Borough of the City of Westminster. Stations are safer than the streets around them.

Concern for Safety at Stations and in the Local Community

Notwithstanding the safety measures taken, there is no doubt that some passengers remain concerned at
making certain rail journeys at night. Though it varies by locality, the National Passenger Survey shows
overall that 10% of passengers are dissatisfied with their personal security whilst using rail. (This is 3% lower
than in the previous survey.) Variations between train operators are quite wide generally reflecting their
locality, as shown in the Annexe to this paper.
But this concern for personal safety is not confined to the railway. People are similarly concerned about
their personal security in their own neighbourhood.
In answer to a British Crime Survey 2000 question: “How safe do you feel walking alone in this area after
dark?” 33% answered “a bit or very unsafe”. This is a particularly significant figure, given that it refers to the
area where the respondent lives and could be expected to be most comfortable. A similar concern is shown in
a British Crime Survey 2004–05 question which indicated that 26% of people in London had a “high level
of worry about violent crime” (16% for England and Wales).
Thus, concern about safety, particularly at night, applies to people walking in their own neighbourhood
as much as it applies to people travelling on the railway.

London—Crime at Stations

The figures for stations within the M25 show the nature of the challenge. As the table below shows, most
crimes are committed at the largest stations, where the number of passengers is highest, even though they
are fully staVed and have security measures in place. There are relatively few crimes at small stations, even
though they may be unstaVed or partially staVed. These figures are the key to prioritisation of resources to
give best value for money.
The first table below shows all notifiable crime incidents excluding theft of railway and passenger property
and car crime. The second table includes all notifiable crime incidents without exclusions. The tables also
show the measures taken at the stations:

Table 3.1
(CRIME EXCLUDING THEFT AND CAR CRIME)

Number Crime
Incidence of crime on of incidents in
London stations stations 2005 Gated StaVed CCTV
Per station Full Part Min

Very large stations 16 160 11 16 0 0 16

Large stations 90 28 40 50 35 5 88
Medium stations 152 13 20 15 132 5 144
Small stations 115 6 6 5 58 52 101
TOTAL 373 — 77 86 225 60 349
Notes:
“Crime Incidents” are all notifiable crime types including criminal damage, drug oVences, fraud, line of route oVences, public
order, robbery, sexual oVences, violence and other. But it excludes theft of passenger or railway property and car crime; (figures
are available for these).
“Full” means staVed till last train. “Min” means either not staVed, or staVed for 4 hours or less Monday to Friday only.
This table shows 373 stations—a greater number than in London Zones 1–6.
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 3

Table 3.2
(ALL NOTIFIABLE CRIME)

Incidence of all notifiable Number of All Crime

crime on London stations stations incidents in 2005
Per station
Very large stations 16 633
Large stations 90 69
Medium stations 152 30
Small stations 115 13
TOTAL 373 —
Source: BTP/ATOC.
The table showing all notifiable crime might exaggerate the concentration of crime at very large stations
as some crime occurs elsewhere but gets reported at the large station.

PART TWO: THE COMMITTEE’S SPECIFIC QUESTIONS

1. What are the most eVective means of making railway and underground stations safer for passengers?
This needs to be approached in the context of tackling crime in the communities the stations serve, and
of targeting resources to where they are most needed—usually the busier stations with higher crime rates.
No single measure will deal with crime. It requires a combination of measures which can be approached
systematically through the “Five Es”: Evaluation, Enabling, Engineering, Education, and Enforcement—
a well established approach to crime prevention.
The principal initiatives by train operators are listed below:

Train Operator Measures to prevent crime

Measures making it diYcult to commit an oVence (or “target hardening”) include:
— Designing crime out through station renovation or rebuilding, including removal of “blind spots”.
— Gating stations to exclude those who are not genuine passengers—about 140 stations have ticket
gates nationally, of which 77 are within the M25.
— Focus on patrolling known “hot spots”.
— Deployment of people and patrolling:
— Deployment by train operators of staV specially trained and accredited by BTP, examples
being Rail Enforcement OYcers (South East Trains) and Travelsafe oYcers (South West
Trains).
— Deployment of security staV contracted by train operators, for example, Task Force
(Southern).
— Deployment of Police Community Support OYcers, both employed by BTP and train
operators, such as Arriva Trains Wales.
— Higher lighting levels at stations and in car parks.

Other measures include:

— Increased financial support for BTP, up 60% over the last five years.
— Intelligence used to detect organised crime.
— Help points linked directly to a control room.
— CCTV, including systematic surveillance and evidence gathering.
Some of these measures have been funded or part funded with help from local Government.
Train operators have increased their front line staV. While total train operator staV numbers came down
from about 46,000 to 39,000 after privatisation, in the last five years staV numbers have increased to about
47,000. Most of the increase has been in front line staV. These figures do not include agency staV and police
community support oYcers which are additional to the numbers quoted.
The mix of initiatives described above is a more eVective way of promoting safety and security on the
railway and provides better value for money than conventional ticket oYce staV or platform supervision on
their own. Full staYng of stations would not stop crime happening, as demonstrated by figures in Table 1,
and by the figures for LUL stations which are staVed but still experience crime.
Ev 4 Transport Committee: Evidence

Train Operator measures which help in catching oVenders

The increasingly widespread use of CCTV plays a role in both preventing and detecting crime. Many train
operators are expanding the deployment of CCTV and increasing its eVectiveness by providing a live feed
to a monitored control room and through providing resources for evidence gathering.
There are now about 20,000 CCTV cameras on the national railway, including stations and depots. About
one-third of passenger coaches also have CCTV on board. Guidance on use of CCTVs has recently been
produced by ATOC and Network Rail.
There is merit in including smaller stations in town centre CCTV schemes, and this could be encouraged
through guidance from DfT and the Home OYce to local authorities.

Improving information exchange with the British Transport Police (BTP)

Some train operators participate in the BTP’s National Intelligence Model through the Area BTP
Tasking and Coordination Group. This helps ensure the most eVective deployment of both police and
railway security resources.

Developing links with the local community

There has been some success in train operator engagement with Crime and Disorder Reduction
Partnerships, and there is scope to extend these. Further progress may require some framework to manage
the expanding matrix of relationships—the Northern Rail franchise, for example, has 80 such schemes.
Northern Rail also has a particularly extensive station adoption scheme.
Other opportunities at the local level include station adoption schemes and community rail partnerships,
which encourage the development of businesses at unstaVed stations, examples of which include cafes, taxi
oYces and even a church. The Northwich station project in Cheshire is a good example of a multi-agency
partnership that is bringing people and activity to an unstaVed station. Opportunities also include
improving the integration of stations within the National Neighbourhood Policing Programme.
The Government’s initiatives announced in the Budget to provide an additional £100 million to support
and extend community policing and double the number of community support oYcers to 16,000 is welcome
and in line with the approach of train operators to work towards community policing.

2. Are the minimum standards to provide a safe and secure station environment high enough? Are the
requirements suYciently clear and specific to be eVective? If not what changes should be made?

Defining minimum standards or requirements.

Train operators aim to take all reasonable steps to secure the safety of their passengers, and to fulfil their
duty of care. There are some standards which help to fulfil this duty:
— Specific requirements for investment included in franchise agreements (these may relate to, for
example, Secure Station accreditation or CCTV).
— The train operators’ own internal station management control processes.
— The opening hours of ticket oYces are regulated, but often exceeded by TOCs.
— The Secure Stations Scheme.
— A guidance note on CCTV systems, recently produced by ATOC and Network Rail.
In practice, over the last ten years, the majority of improvements to security have come about from action
by train operators, rather than from Government specification.

Are these standards high enough, are they clear, what changes should be made?
These standards or requirements, coupled with train operators’ commitment to improvement, have been
eVective in reducing crime on the railway.
Notwithstanding the reduction in crime, and the measures taken on problem routes, it has to be
recognised that has not resulted in the removal of concern by some people about travelling at night, though,
according to the National Passenger Survey, that fear has been reduced.
Train operators aim to achieve further reduction in crime and progressively greater confidence amongst
passengers travelling at night, as discussed in paragraph 7 below.
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 5

3. Are the minimum standards eVectively policed? Are the penalties for failing to provide a secure station
environment suYciently severe?
Train operators comply with the standards and requirements set out above, and these are policed. They
also have internal control arrangements to ensure that their management processes are followed. Where any
standards at stations are part of a franchise agreement, they are monitored by the Department for
Transport. All breaches of franchise requirements are recorded and persistent breach results in action under
the terms of the franchise agreement. The recent National Audit OYce report stated that an investigation
had found high level of compliance with franchise obligations at stations.
In the case of counter terrorism, DfT is able to direct the measures to be taken through Transec and the
national Rail Security Programme.

4. Is it suYciently clear to passengers and others who is responsible for the safety of passengers in railway and
underground stations?
Yes. The responsibility for creating a safe and secure environment for passengers at a station rests clearly
with the relevant station operator. All franchise agreements require that there is an information display
giving the contact details for the person who is responsible for the station and that the information is kept
clearly legible and current. At smaller stations, help points connect directly to a staVed control oYce.
Contact points of the Train Operator and for Passenger Focus or London Travelwatch are posted at
every station.

5. Why are so few stations accredited under the secure stations scheme? Should the scheme be made
compulsory?
To obtain accreditation for secure station status:
— The design of the station must conform to standards judged by the local BTP Crime Reduction
OYcer to prevent and reduce crime and improve passenger perceptions.
— The management of the station must enable you to take steps to prevent crimes, respond to
incidents, and communicate eVectively with passengers.
— Crime statistics for the station over the 12 months prior to the inspection must show that you are
managing crime.
— A survey of users must show that, on the whole, passengers feel secure when using the station.
The principles underlying the scheme, which are essentially those of designing crime out of the station
(and car park) environment, are sound. Following its introduction in 1998 there was considerable
enthusiasm for the scheme as a tool for improving station safety. Station accreditation was included as a
commitment in a number of franchise agreements and delivered.
By 2003, many of the stations which would yield most benefit had been accredited. The DfT reviewed the
scheme, and some helpful changes were made in 2005. However, the scheme is not and was not designed to
be suitable for all stations. Accreditation can involve costs, administrative processes and time, without any
evidence that they would lead to improved safety. The time taken to collect data and make physical changes
means that this initiative cannot be implemented quickly, and the present system disadvantages smaller
stations. Nonetheless, the scheme has merit as it is; if it was changed to make it applicable to all stations, it
would loose some of its existing merits.
In recent years train operators progressed other means of enhancing passenger security—specialist staV
to patrol trains is one example and further, more sophisticated use of CCTV another. They have continued
to apply the principles underlying the Secure Station Scheme, even though they have not sought
accreditation for many more stations and in some cases have allowed accreditations to lapse. Nevertheless,
21 train operators participate in the scheme, and some have achieved accreditation for all their stations.
We do not think that the scheme should be made compulsory, and certainly not for all stations,
particularly the smaller ones with little or no evidence of recorded crime or disorder. However it does have
merit and it should have more prominence in the future.

6. What measures would be required to ensure significant improvements in passengers’ safety in railway and
underground stations?
A holistic approach is required that covers bus, underground, light rail and station environs, as well as
National Rail stations themselves. Significant reductions in crime levels have been secured over the last five
years, and the objective must be to continue this progress. The most obvious measures would be those which
reduce antisocial behaviour in the community at large. Partnerships with local police and local authorities
are likely to be most eVective in reducing crime and the fear of crime.
Ev 6 Transport Committee: Evidence

ATOC has formed a Police and Station Security Group to disseminate best practice. A wide range of
measures have been taken already and more can be done and achieved through a shared understanding of
what has been found to work and how best value for the money available can be obtained. A research project
has been initiated through RSSB to create a robust factual basis for this work.

7. Is the Government’s approach to passenger safety in railway stations eVective?

The approach outlined above has been eVective, and train operators aim to continue to take the lead in
improving security at stations. They believe that in the main the most cost eVective approach is
commercially driven and targets resources where they are most needed.
Nonetheless, there comes a point beyond which the requirements to address public concern and public
order have to be addressed jointly by train operators and Government. Accordingly we welcome the support
received from Local Government, including TfL, and we welcome the Secretary of State’s intention to
include additional measures in new franchise agreements, which enables them to be properly specified
and funded.
Train operators, for their part, intend to seek further improvements. They can achieve this through
patrolling (with police, agency and their own trained staV), equipment (CCTV and station design to deter
crime and assist detection) and partnership (with central and local government and Home OYce forces and
other agencies). In particular, they will:
— Work with BTP, particularly to develop a programme of neighbourhood policing in the railway
environment.
— Work with local authorities and other partnerships, including station adopters.
— Support the Secure Stations Scheme where it is most suitable.
— Continue to “design out” crime in stations as they are rebuilt or renovated.
— Continue to deploy CCTV where justified to stations not so far covered, and linked to town centre
schemes where appropriate.
— Further develop live monitoring of CCTV and evidence gathering with local authorities and BTP,
as has been successfully done with TfL and in Scotland.
— Complete research to establish a better understanding of the trends of crime and of the measures
eVective in reducing it.
In addition, we would encourage:
— DfT to introduce appropriate transitional arrangements to ensure that short franchise lengths do
not deter the introduction of security programmes and initiatives.
— DfT to encourage local authorities to include stations in town centre CCTV schemes.
31 March 2006

Memorandum submitted by the National Express Group PLC

Introduction: About National Express Group PLC

National Express Group (“NX”), one of the UK’s leading transport operators, is pleased to submit
evidence to the House of Commons Transport Committee for its important inquiry into passenger safety
at railway stations.
NX serves more than one billion passengers a year worldwide on its train, bus, light rail and express coach
operations. Our 40,000 employees, of which 20,000 are in the UK, are dedicated to improving continuously
the quality, value for money and, above all, the safety of all our services for our passengers.
We operate the following train franchises; c2c, Central Trains, Gatwick Express, Midland Mainline,
“one” and Silverlink.
We manage each of our businesses for growth—by investing in all aspects of our services, by working in
partnership with key stakeholders including customers and industry/Government bodies and by integrating
our services with the wider public transport network. An important element of our business philosophy is
to attract more people onto our services—and to maximise the use of public transport systems to bring about
economic, environmental and social benefits to the communities we serve.
An important consideration for people when deciding whether or not to use public transport is their
perception of their own personal security and safety. It is, therefore, both a commercial imperative—as well
as a moral one—for our passengers both to be as safe as possible and to feel as safe as possible.
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 7

We believe in local devolved management teams to serve the communities where we operate, rather than
imposing too heavily from the corporate centre. Nevertheless, we share best practice between our businesses,
and will give an important illustration of our approach later in this paper. By focusing on customer service,
innovation and marketing our ultimate goal is to make public transport the first travel choice.
Like many other publicly-quoted transport companies, NX is a commercial organisation with an
obligation to produce a fair return for its shareholders. In NX’s case, many of these shareholders include a
substantial number of our employees, as well as a range of financial institutions specialising in ethical
investments. This shareholder base reinforces the wider sense of our social responsibilities as a successful
and profitable business.

Responses

1. What are the most eVective methods of making railway and underground stations safer for passengers?
Stations vary enormously in their size, architectural history, facilities, and numbers and types of
passengers. Safety and security cannot, therefore, be approached on a “one size fits all” basis. Appropriate
investment must be made according to the level of risk at any given facility.
It is important to remember that most safety and security problems are concentrated at relatively few
stations. Targeting these stations and working in the closest collaboration with the British Transport Police
and other agencies generally proves to be the most eVective strategy.
Before making investments in safety and security, it is sensible to make a proper risk assessment of the
needs of passengers at each location. Due to these factors we do not believe that the Evening Standard’s
recent campaign to ensure manning of all railway stations in London as being practical or necessarily the
most suitable solution.
Sometimes it is possible to enhance safety and security at relatively little cost, for example by the removal
of blind spots and dark corners in station premises. Indeed, it could be argued that the single most beneficial
investment that any operator can make to improve station security is modern lighting, provided that it is
then properly maintained.
Risk assessments have demonstrated that there is a need for more sophisticated solutions, such as the
introduction of CCTV or security personnel, or a change to the hours of duty of railway operational
employees. CCTV ensures that a record of incidents is achieved with greater probability of detection,
capture and prosecution.
During our stewardship of the ScotRail franchise, NX designed, implemented and operated one of the
most sophisticated CCTV networks anywhere on the UK rail network, in partnership with the Strathclyde
Passenger Transport Executive (SPTE). Implementation was possible thanks to funding by the SPTE, who
recognised the wider social benefits of this improvement. We believe that such examples of partnership
working should be further encouraged across the railway industry.
An operator’s approach can also play an important part in aVecting the behaviour of potential oVenders.
Our Central Trains business deploys and widely advertises its policy of zero tolerance towards crime on the
railway. This is especially directed at those considering assaulting railway employees, who, in their front-
line roles, have to deal with increased antisocial behaviour which may take place around railway facilities.
Another example of the Central Trains’ approach has been its crackdown on fare evasion across its network
which is often associated with other forms of anti-social behaviour.
Through our own research we know those passengers who travel without tickets are more likely to be
involved in instigating crime on our services. We therefore believe one of the best ways to prevent crime on
the railways is to prevent the criminals from gaining access to the network. Our experience in gating the c2c
network is described below.

2. Are the minimum standards to provide a safe and secure station environment high enough? Are the
requirements suYciently clear and specific to be eVective? If not, what changes should be made?
To the extent that minimum standards exist in the heavy rail network, these are laid down by the franchise
agreements. For the original franchises and, indeed, most of those subsequently awarded, the OYce of
Passenger Rail Franchising (OPRAF), the Strategic Rail Authority (SRA) and DfT Rail have in turn not
been heavily prescriptive regarding the way in which franchisees should manage their station facilities,
leaving this very much to the commercial discretion of operators. Such bodies have the ideal opportunity
to specify their preferred requirements in the Invitation to Tender process, therefore ensuring that options
are priced as part of the bid.
Even without a particular contractual requirement to do so, our Silverlink business has paid a high level
of attention to the rapid removal of graYti from its stations, employing a control team based at Camden
for this specific purpose. This makes good business sense, as well as contributing towards the perception of
security for passengers. Moreover, NX has invested almost £2 million in security measures during its
stewardship of Silverlink.
Ev 8 Transport Committee: Evidence

The original franchise approach began to change with the award of the Greater Anglia franchise from 1
April 2004, when the SRA applied “Service Quality Standards” (SQS) to the ambience of stations. The SQS
scheme was built on the good practice developed by the Passenger Transport Executives through their
Service Quality Incentive Regime (SQUIRE). Although the SQS regime does not automatically lead to
additional safety and security measures, by requiring the operator to focus on such issues as cleanliness, the
removal of graYti, and the repair of vandalism, a significant impact can be made on the perception of safety
and security by passengers. Equally, a station which manifestly is looked after will be less likely to attract
antisocial behaviour.
Under the stewardship of NX, the Greater Anglia franchise—now known as “one”—has built upon the
SQS regime to achieve even higher standards of station quality than were specified by the SRA.

3. Are the minimum standards eVectively policed? Are the penalties for failing to provide a secure station
environment suYciently severe?
To our knowledge, no operator has been penalised for failure to comply with the standards, but the key
point is that the reputational and commercial penalties for being seen to neglect the safety and security of
passengers are serious.
The recent campaign by the London Evening Standard has drawn to the public’s attention the enormous
task faced by train operators in managing the behaviour of the small number of unruly and criminal people
who can make the experience of travelling miserable, or even dangerous, for law-abiding passengers.
As part of our stewardship of the Silverlink franchise, we have now delivered CCTV at all of the 48
stations managed by the business. Some 30 of these stations are monitored around the clock from our
Willesden control centre.
Station staV are on duty around the clock at Silverlink’s key interchange stations: Harrow & Wealdstone,
Queens Park and Wembley Central, with staYng at Willesden Junction being extended to the close of
services from the end of April 2006.

4. Is it suYciently clear to passengers and others who is responsible for the safety of passengers in railway and
underground stations?
The complex pattern of ownership of Britain’s railways undoubtedly can cause confusion to passengers.
However, there is no doubt that responsibility for providing the best possible safety and security rests with
the station operator, whether this is a franchisee, Network Rail or London Underground.
Clarity can be provided by the presence of uniformed staV employed by the station operator, and by the
installation of help points where staYng is not the best solution. Our c2c business has installed help points
at all of its stations and such features have also been installed at Silverlink Metro stations.

5. Why are so few stations accredited under the Secure Stations Scheme? Should the scheme be made
compulsory?
The Secure Stations Scheme provided a very useful kick-start to security and safety initiatives in the 1990s.
However, the scheme is now in need of modernisation to become less bureaucratic and applicable across
routes rather than on a station by station basis. NX would enthusiastically participate in such a review. NX
approached the original scheme with particular vigour in its Silverlink franchise, where Harrow &
Wealdstone, Watford High Street, Hatch End, Camden Road and Dalston Kingsland have secured
accreditation.
However, most of the “quick wins” have now been obtained, and the railways are left with a large number
of stations for which the securing of this award is either impractical or prohibitively expensive. Indeed,
money may be more eVectively spent on other security measures than on pursuing the badge of
accreditation.

6. What measures would be required to ensure significant improvements in passengers’ safety in railway and
underground stations?
Measures which can prevent crime include:
— Designing crime out.
— Gating of stations.
— Help points.
— CCTV.
— Patrolling of hot spots.
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 9

The best example of the full suite of measures available is given by our c2c business. We have been able
to install ticket gating at every c2c station (except Southend East), tackling both ticketless travel and the
antisocial behaviour with which it is often associated. Some 475 CCTV cameras have been installed. A
number of c2c stations have achieved or are working towards Secure Station accreditation, and four car
parks have been awarded the equivalent status.
The c2c business is currently investing £1.5 million on improvements to its CCTV network, including the
installation of new digital recording equipment. The company spends £1 million per year on security patrols
over and above its funding of the BTP, and regularly organises multi-agency sweeps of crime hotspots on
its network involving bodies such as the UK Immigration Service as well as law enforcement bodies. In
addition, c2c has been employing security consultants to assist in the next stage of its eVorts against the
criminals.
Nevertheless, c2c is an example of how the wider issues of crime and disorder aVecting society can spill
into the railways. The company has identified crime displacement as a result of local authority CCTV
schemes as a serious issue, and is working in partnership with these authorities to try to link their respective
systems. This is, however, a complex and expensive task.
In a further example of partnership, c2c has been working with Transport for London (TfL) to create an
integrated staVed CCTV control centre for stations within the Greater London boundary. This centre—at
Barking—is about to open. In addition NX has established an integrated CCTV control centre at Willesden
station on the Silverlink network. These facilities are operational 24 hours a day.
The perception of crime by passengers can be significantly aVected when a station is seen to be populated
with other users. NX has sought to encourage this perception by bringing retail opportunities on to its
stations in partnership with local businesses. This is well illustrated at stations such as Willesden Junction
on the Silverlink network.
7. Is the Government’s approach to passenger safety in railway stations eVective?
For several years, the main focus of the Government’s railway policy has, quite rightly, been on improving
the performance and value for money of the railways. In the wake of the decline in punctuality and reliability
after the Hatfield disaster and the collapse of Railtrack, Ministers had very little choice but to deal with
these issues.
As far as safety was concerned, the principal areas for attention were the prevention of accidents such as
Hatfield caused by poor maintenance of infrastructure, and of accidents such as Ladbroke Grove where
Signals Passed at Danger (SPADs) were the cause.
The progress made by the railways on performance and operational safety in recent years has contributed
to the enormous growth in ridership. This is now creating the intellectual space in which operators and
agencies can begin to address some equally important questions of passenger perception, such as personal
safety and security.
NX would welcome a more prescriptive approach from the authorities in the awarding of the next round
of rail contracts, in which bidders are encouraged to come forward with more creative ideas for improving
station ambience as well as physical security measures. It is important to recognise, however, that some
improvements of this kind can only be paid for over periods greater than the typical length of rail franchises,
so the mechanisms for the underwriting of these kind of investments by the authorities must be as creative
as those which have been applied to, for example, the procurement of rolling stock.
Other Information
NX is a multi-modal public transport operator, and is always looking for opportunities to spread best
practice amongst its businesses.
In 1999, Travel West Midlands—the largest bus operator in the region and a subsidiary of NX—
introduced in partnership with West Midlands Police and other agencies a project known as “Operation
Safer Travel” (OST).
OST aims to deter and detect crime, vandalism and graYti on the region’s buses and trams. It has done
much to establish a safer bus and tram network, and has won several awards.
Under the OST strategy, 211 joint police operations or “Gateway Checks” took place during 2005 in the
West Midlands. Nearly 30,000 bus services were checked during the year and 570,528 bus and metro
passengers had their tickets and travel arrangements scrutinised.
The OST partnership now extends to NX UK Bus Division operations at Travel Coventry and Travel
Dundee, the latter in partnership with Tayside Police.
OST aims to explain the consequences of criminal behaviour on public transport to the very young. This
is delivered by targeted school liaison work, through the respected “SMART” Schools Project. The scheme
is also strong in community involvement in both the West Midlands and on Tayside.
NX plans to extend the principle of OST into its train businesses, in particular Central Trains, Silverlink
and c2c.
April 2006
Ev 10 Transport Committee: Evidence

Memorandum submitted by Stagecoach Group: Rail Division

Executive Summary
1. Crime, and particularly the fear of crime, is a major issue for our customers and our staV, and therefore
for us as a company. At Stagecoach Group and South West Trains we are committed to dealing with the
issue as an urgent priority.
2. The South West Trains network oVers a test case of the problems facing train operators. It is the busiest
franchise in the country, and is also the most complex, covering suburban services around London and cities
such as Southampton, as well as long distance services and those calling at small rural stations.
3. South West Trains is also an illustration of best practice. We have worked with partners such as British
Transport Police and Transport for London, to introduce innovations like TravelSafe OYcers and CCTV
evidence gatherers, and a wide range of other measures. As a result South West Trains has won the Sir
Robert Horton safety award at the National Rail Awards in two of the last three years.
4. Over the past decade we have cut the number of reported crimes at our stations by 18%, at a time when
passenger numbers have increase by 50%. We have reduced the number of crimes at unmanned stations by
nearly half in the past three years, to 142 crimes in total across 27 stations.
5. Crime on the South West Trains network is falling. In answer to the Committee’s questions, therefore,
we believe that new requirements and enforcement are not needed to deliver better standards. Good
management, and close working with partners, can deliver significant improvements, as our experience
shows.
6. However, we are not complacent: our customers deserve to be safe and to feel safe as they travel with
us. It is after all vitally important to the success of our business that passengers are not deterred from
travelling with us by the fear of crime. Therefore as an integral part of our business plans Stagecoach and
South West Trains will continue to invest substantially in new technology, new people and new approaches
to dealing with crime, disorder and anti-social behaviour.
7. We welcome the Committee’s inquiry into this issue, and look forward to learning from the findings
of its report.

Introduction
8. Stagecoach Group is one of the world’s leading transport operators with train, bus, tram and express
coach operations in the UK and North America. Our rail division includes being franchise holder for South
West Trains and Island Line on the Isle of Wight, as well as a 49% holding in Virgin Rail Group, which runs
the West Coast and CrossCountry franchises.
9. In this submission we refer to our experience since 1996 of operating the South West Trains franchise.
South West Trains is the most extensive and complex in the UK, serving London Waterloo and operating
throughout and around Surrey, Hampshire and Dorset. The franchise includes inner-London urban
services, rush-hour commuter services into London and other major towns and cities in the south, long-
distance routes from along the South Coast to London and leisure services to holiday destinations in the
region.
10. We are proud of the way in which we have managed the South West Trains franchise. In 2006 we were
awarded the HSBC Rail Business of the Year Award, and we were named the Passenger Operator of the
Year at the National Rail Awards in September 2005.

Investment in Security

CCTV (introduction)
11. CCTV is a vital weapon in the detection of crime, allowing oVenders to be identified and providing
evidence against them. It also contributes to reducing the incidence of crime, by spelling out to potential
oVenders that they are likely to be filmed, and so prosecuted. We also believe that CCTV can play a major
role in reducing fear of crime. For these reasons we have invested substantially in CCTV on our stations
and on our trains over the term of our franchise.

CCTV on stations
12. 134 of our stations (76%) now benefit from CCTV. In total there are 1,888 cameras covering our
stations, and 90% of car parking spaces on the SWT estate are covered by CCTV. 72 of our stations with
CCTV are linked to our Customer Communication and Security Centre (CCSC) at Wimbledon. This allows
24-hour monitoring of 1,044 cameras.
13. We continue to expand coverage. Hamworthy in Dorset will be the next SWT station to benefit from
CCTV, and plans also been agreed in conjunction with Dorset County Council for a CCTV system at Upwey
near Weymouth.
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 11

14. To deal with concerns about coverage at “borders” between the CCTV network covering the railway
and that of local authorities we have agreements in place with councils, including those in Runnymede and
Kingston, which allow us to overlap with one another to provide seamless coverage. In other words the
Councils can access our system, and we can obtain feed from their cameras around our station as required.
We are keen to conclude similar agreements with other local authorities across our network.

CCTV on trains
15. The introduction of our new Desiro fleet from late 2003 allowed us to benefit from on-train CCTV
for the first time. We now have 1,788 cameras fitted to our trains. In addition, as part of the refurbishment
of our Class 455 rolling stock we have specified that CCTV is installed. This will mean a further 1,456
cameras on trains. The result is a more secure environment for passengers and for staV as they travel on our
network.

Evidence gatherers
16. Gathering evidence via CCTV is only part of the story: without skilled staV to sort through and
analyse the material it is not helpful to the British Transport Police or the Courts. South West Trains has
employed two trained evidence gatherers to collate CCTV footage on behalf of various stakeholders,
primarily the police.
17. The evidence gatherers:
— Collect CCTV footage from trains and stations following incidents.
— Facilitate one-to-one viewing sessions with managers and the police.
— Maintain databases of all video data and related company assets.
18. Employed since May 2005 the evidence gatherers have presented the British Transport Police with
1,003 CCTV footage download incidents. Employment of the evidence gatherers led to SWT and the police
winning the Sir Robert Horton rail safety award at the National Rail Awards in 2005.

Help points
19. South West Trains has help points at each of our 177 stations—there are 365 in all. Help points
provide a value service to customers, particularly at times when stations are unstaVed. They allow our
customers to speak to an operator about general inquiries, and are especially useful in emergency situations.
Within the London area all help points can be monitored by CCTV enabling operators to view the person
they are talking to, and providing reassurance to passengers.

Customer Communication and Security Centres (CCSC)

20. CCSCs play a major role in providing a safe and secure environment. From our centre at Wimbledon
we respond to help point queries and monitor CCTV at 72 of our stations. The CCSC is staVed 24 hours a
day, 365 days a year, and is often first to identify a specific problem. It has three core duties:
— Manage the customer information system.
— Monitor CCTV.
— Respond to help point queries.
21. In addition, the Centre takes a lead role in the reporting of faults and in arranging alternative
transport during times of journey disruption.

Secure Stations
22. The Secure Station Scheme was launched in 1998 by the Department for Transport and British
Transport Police. It establishes standards of good practice and for accreditation in relation to: station
design; management of the station; falling crime statistics; and rising passenger perceptions of security.
23. The Scheme is generally viewed as very eVective. Statistics demonstrate that crime is lower at
accredited stations as opposed to those that are not. The vital importance of addressing perceptions of crime
is an integral part of the Scheme, since accreditation can only follow favourable survey results.
24. Over the years South West Trains has established itself as the industry leader in relation to the Secure
Station accreditation scheme. We currently have 49 Secure Stations, and one more recognised by the Scheme
as “working towards secure stations” status. By April 2006 we expect to have 50 accredited stations.
Ev 12 Transport Committee: Evidence

25. Because we are currently involved in re-franchising we cannot comment in detail on what
commitments we might make to future investments. However, if Stagecoach is successful in its bid to win
the South Western franchise again we will continue to invest in passenger and staV security as a key part of
our business plan, and we will work in partnership with other agencies able to help us to reduce crime and
the fear of crime.

Personal Security Group

26. Throughout the South West Trains network there are Personal Security Groups comprising the group
station manager for the relevant area, British Transport Police and a selection of employees from diVerent
functions. They provide a forum for discussion of issues relating to vandalism, violence at work and anti-
social behaviour. The Groups are then encouraged to develop and propose initiatives to reduce or eliminate
the problem.
27. The company-wide Personal Security Group is tasked with supporting the local Groups in delivering
the proposed initiatives, and with formulating company policy for dealing with issues highlighted. It is
chaired by the Customer Service Director and attended by senior managers from SWT as well as British
Transport Police.

TravelSafe OYcers
28. Together with British Transport Police we identified a need to develop a deterrent against disorderly
and anti-social behaviour. In August 2003 TravelSafe OYcers, paid for by South West Trains, but deployed
by the British Transport Police, were introduced to provide support and reassurance to customers and
employees.
29. The primary duties of TravelSafe OYcers are:
— To provide a highly visible presence to reassure passengers and staV.
— Conducting train/station patrols.
— Carrying out station searches as required.
— Providing a deterrent to anti-social behaviour.
— Acting as a liaison oYcer with local partnership forums.
— Providing intelligence to British Transport Police.
— Enforcement of railway byelaws.
— Assisting with crowd control at major events.
30. Decisions by the police about the co-ordination of the activities of TSOs is based on information from
the Customer Communication and Security Centre and SWT personnel. There are now 56 TravelSafe
OYcers located at Clapham Junction, Richmond, Guildford, Portsmouth, Bournemouth/Weymouth and
Basingstoke

Contracted security guarding

31. To supplement the TSOs and British Transport Police personnel, security guards are contracted to
patrol key stations at the most sensitive times—generally at the end of the week during the evenings—to
reassure and support our employees and our customers. Their remit includes a particular focus on the
deterrence of anti-social behaviour and disorder.

Crime and disorder co-ordinator

32. Our focus in addressing the problems of disorder and anti-social behaviour is to a large part on
ensuring that there is a highly visible presence of TSOs and others at our stations and on our trains. This is
highly eVective, but may displace the problem or serve as a short-term fix, rather than dealing with it once
and for all.
33. We have recruited a Crime and Disorder Co-ordinator to:
— Reduce the vandalism and disorder that aVects services and stations.
— Identify and implement actions in order to reduce crime within the area.
— Develop partnerships with local authorities.
— Identify resources to combat crime, and institute change via external agencies.
34. Supporting the Crime and Disorder Co-ordinator is a data analyst, whose remit is to collate all types
of crime data and present them to both the company and local Personal Security Groups for analysis and
action plan development.
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 13

35. The first role of the Co-ordinator was determined by our Security and Information Group, which
developed a plan aimed at the Guildford-Ascot-Feltham-Windsor routes (covering 20 stations). During the
first nine months of the project in this area we have achieved a reduction of 56% in criminal damage, and
of 13% in violent crime across the 20 stations.
36. In part our success results from our partnership with the Government OYce for the South East,
allowing us to access funds from the Safer and Stronger Communities Fund. This has, for example, provided
better fencing and visual enhancement at Aldershot station. Other new projects currently being planned
include a cycle security campaign across Hampshire, and upgrades to the lighting at Hook, Eastleigh and
Fareham.

Violence at work
37. The terms of reference of the Committee do not refer to the safety of railway staV. However, many
of the problems of crime, and also of the uncertainty and stress caused by the fear of crime which aVect
passengers are of equal concern to our staV. Therefore, reducing the number of physical assaults on our
employees is a particularly key commitment of our Safety and Environment Plan.
38. Many of the initiatives highlighted earlier in this report are aimed at reducing violence at work. All
of our revenue protection personnel and guards are trained in conflict management.
39. Some specific initiatives aimed at reducing violence at work include:
— Internal assault reduction workshops.
— Distribution of safety advice cards.
— Monthly briefs to employees.
— High profile multi-agency exercises (such as Operation Ripple and Operation Unity, combining
our revenue protection staV and TSOs with British Transport Police and other police forces).
— The employment by South West Trains of a dedicated member of staV to follow up all incidents
of assaults on our employees.

White lighting
40. Amongst the legacies of British Rail was the usage of lower wattage bulbs in and around many
stations. This contributes towards feelings of unease about crime. In the last two years in particular, working
in partnership with Transport for London, South West Trains has invested heavily in improved lighting at
our stations in the Greater London area. As a result 40 stations have benefited from the installation of white
lighting, enhancing personal safety, the perception of greater security, and also aiding the quality of
CCTV footage.

Partnerships
41. We have referred in this submission to the importance of working with partners, including
particularly the British Transport Police and local authorities. We have also worked with Transport for
London to improve security at stations in London. For example, between 2004 and 2005 TfL contributed
£3 million towards a £10 million upgrade of our 53 London stations, which invested in CCTV, enhanced
lighting, security fencing and other matters.

Outcomes
42. In 1995 there were 7,511 crimes reported at stations on the South West Trains network. By 2005 that
figure had fallen to 6,175 incidents, notwithstanding the fact that the number of passenger journeys had
grown by nearly a half, to just over 150 million journeys. In other words, the number of reported crimes had
fallen by 18%; and the incidence of crime was four in every 100,000 journeys.
43. An area of particular concern are unmanned stations. In 2005 there were 142 crimes reported at 27
stations on our network regarded to be unmanned. This represented a fall of 46% from 2002.
44. In addition, over the years South West Trains has been widely recognised by its peers and by third
parties as being a leader in addressing the challenge of ensuring that personal security for staV and
passengers is improved. For example, we received the Sir Robert Horton safety award at the National Rail
Awards in both 2003 and 2005.
45. In addition, the British Transport Police has said that “we very much value the strength of the
partnership we have with you”, and in particular “BTP gratefully acknowledge the pioneering ‘complementary
policing’ initiative SW Trains took with its very successful Travel Safe Scheme. It has provided a model for the
rest of the industry”.
Ev 14 Transport Committee: Evidence

46. Nevertheless, there remains more to do. Crime, and the fear of crime, continues to be a major concern
for our passengers and for our staV. We are committed to continuing to invest in new technologies, people
and systems to address the issue, and we look forward to learning the lessons of the Committee’s inquiry.

Conclusion
47. We do not support proposals to introduce further forms of compulsion on train operating companies
to improve standards. We believe that it is an integral part of our business to encourage larger numbers of
passengers to use our services, particularly at oV-peak times—and doing so requires passengers to feel safe
and secure. In our view South West Trains demonstrates that much has been and can be achieved by train
operating companies, working alone or in partnership with others, under the existing regulatory regime and
franchising structure. However, if Government wishes to signal to the industry that it requires further
improvements in personal safety standards then the franchising process can and should be used to give
security an enhanced weighting at pre-qualification and bid evaluation stage.
48. The Committee will of course wish to reflect on what else can be done to ensure that best practice
spreads across the whole of the industry. We certainly welcome fair and measured assessment of the issue—
such as this inquiry by the Committee—which we believe will raise awareness and standards by allowing the
benchmarking of best practice.
31 March 2006

Memorandum submitted by FirstGroup plc

Summary
At First, we believe that our stations, along with our trains and staV, are a key part of how our customers
judge whether we deliver what we say we will. We know how important it is that the customers’ first and
lasting impression is a positive one. First impressions really do count.
We consider the safety of our passengers, staV and the general public to be paramount in operating our
rail and bus services. There is no panacea to make stations safer for passengers. We have operated rail
services for ten years and passenger safety is now a more complex picture than it was then. There is clear
evidence that demonstrates an overall reduction in recorded crimes at stations. However, this has not
removed the fear of crime although, according to the National Passengers’ Survey, it has reduced.
First is also committed to continually improving our security arrangements to reduce the fear of crime
and to ensure that every aspect of our operation is perceived as safe and secure. We recognise that these aims
will be achieved through a combination of crime prevention methods all designed to complement each other
and deliver a perceptibly safe and secure railway. Key elements of our strategy are outlined below and
include:
— A commitment to review current arrangements and facilities including lighting, staYng, automatic
and manual gatelines, CCTV provision, information provision, Help Points, cleaning and
maintenance regimes and station design.
— A commitment to continually review crime prevention measures.
— A commitment to funding additional Police Community Support OYcers (PCSOs) in key
locations across the network.
— Continuing to foster a strong relationship with the British Transport Police (BTP) and Home
OYce forces to work on joint solutions to address crime hotspots.
— Developing relationships with, and taking a prominent position within our local communities,
fostering links with local businesses, local authorities and residents.

Q1 What are the most eVective methods of making railway and underground stations safer for passenger?
We consider the safety of our passengers, staV and the general public to be paramount in operating our
rail and bus services. We accept that perception of safety and fear of crime are key determining factors in
the decision making process for potential customers when choosing their travel mode. However, there is no
simple solution to making stations safer for passengers.
Over a number of years, First has adopted a “package of measures” approach to passenger security at our
stations in line with Department for Transport (DfT) guidelines. We have moved towards a greater security
presence at stations and, dependent on the known risks, this can range from simply having an open, well lit
environment to increasing the number of frontline staV or mobile patrols at stations; from CCTV coverage
with Help Points to a full Police presence. Each station has diVerent characteristics and we do not think
there is a “one size fits all” solution.
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 15

Stations are the initial focal point of the customers’ journey and should be accessible, welcoming, safe,
secure and easy to use. Facilities at the station must be clean and oVer a pleasant environment that is
presentable, modern and user friendly. Station infrastructure should be cared for, well maintained, free from
graYti, presentable and in good working order; and routes around the station are well signed, appropriately
lit, accessible and welcoming.
In reality, stations are a part of the fabric of a local community. Therefore, the most eVective method of
making stations safer for passengers is to build a sense of community ownership; integrate station security
into community policing; and cooperate and involve the full range of partners involved in the wider
management of community safety.
Crime and anti-social behaviour on the railway cannot only be a matter for the train operator and
Network Rail. There are many agencies that can contribute to crime reduction and helping people feel safer.
Central to this partnership approach is the BTP, a specialised and dedicated police for the railways. The
BTP, through its close working relationships with other police forces, is perhaps likely to be the most
eVective in reducing crime on the railway. Like other Train Operating Companies we have committed a 60%
increase in funding for the BTP over the past five years.
We will continue to promote and support complementary policing through the funding of additional
Police Community Support OYcers. We are also reviewing the Railway Safety Accreditation Scheme
(RSAS). The RSAS will bring more people into the wider “policing family”. Based on similar Home OYce
Community Safety Accreditation Schemes, it allows organisations and their employees involved in railway
safety and security to be accredited by the police.

Q2 Are the minimum standards to provide a safe and secure station high enough? Are the requirements
suYciently clear and specific to be eVective? If not what changes need to be made

Apart from the Health & Safety at Work Act and the civil law Occupiers Liability Act, which require that
Train Operating Companies take all reasonably practicable and proportionate steps to reduce the risks to
public and staV, additional standards have been applied through the franchising process and franchise
agreements which contain detailed commitments on passenger safety and security. Irrespective of franchise
commitments we recognise the importance of working towards delivery of what our customers perceive to
be safe and secure station environments.
We believe the minimum standards accompanied by a programme of continuous improvement are the
key components to drive down crime and fear of crime concerns. There is no need for changes to the
requirements.

Q3 Are the minimum standards eVectively policed? Are the penalties for failing to provide a secure station
environment suYciently clear?

The standards and requirements are policed and complied with.

Breaches of the Health and Safety at Work Act are policed by Her Majesty’s Railway Inspectorate and
carry the risk of a criminal prosecution. Breaches of the Occupiers Liability Act leave the operator open to
civil action.
All train operators have internal control arrangements to ensure that their management processes are
followed.
The DfT monitors standards where a commitment to a secure station environment is part of a franchise
agreement. Any breach of a franchise commitment is recorded and persistent breaches result in action under
the terms of the franchise agreement. The recent National Audit OYce report Maintaining and improving
Britain’s railway stations (HC 132 Session 2005–06, 20 July 2005) stated “the SRA’s surveys typically
detected a high level of compliance with franchise obligations and other commitments.”

Q4 Is it suYciently clear to passengers and others who is responsible for the safety of passengers in railway
and underground stations?

A safe and secure environment for passengers at a station is the product of partnership between a large
number of organisations including the relevant station operator, Network Rail and the BTP. Every station
operated by First is clearly branded and it is a key statement of what we represent for customers and staV.
We use our strong brand to underpin our plans to fundamentally change customers’ perception of train
travel. It provides customers with an assurance of a consistent level of quality, safety and security.
Ev 16 Transport Committee: Evidence

Q5 Why are so few stations accredited under the secure stations scheme? Should the scheme be made
compulsory?
The number of stations with accreditation under the Secure Stations Scheme is growing and there is much
work going on to make stations more secure for passengers. Since the scheme was introduced First Great
Western has secured accreditation at 25 stations. In the past few weeks alone First TransPennine Express
has secured accreditation for a further three stations and there are more in the pipeline. However, there are
two reasons why the Secure Stations Scheme should not be made compulsory: firstly, accreditation does not
make a station instantly secure and secondly, stations without accreditation are not necessarily unsafe.
Another view is that action taken should be proportionate to the risk. A good example is in Scotland where
BTP figures show a 12% drop in recorded crime yet whilst there is an exceptionally strong centrally
controlled CCTV infrastructure in place, none of the stations operated by First ScotRail has sought secure
stations accreditation as the Scottish Executive and SPT, the two co-signatories to the franchise, monitor
the condition of stations and trains through SQUIRE (the Service Quality Incentive Regime).

Q6 What measures would be required to ensure significant improvements in passengers’ safety in railway and
underground stations?
The refranchising process is a good time to review rail network outputs. It allows the DfT to clearly specify
its priorities and aspirations. Bidders then look to meet that specification as cost eVectively as possible taking
into account not just the cost of such measures but the potential revenue implications as well. Having
recently bid successfully for two franchises it might be helpful to set out First’s approach.
We are committed to raising standards at all stations in the Greater Western franchise region by
undertaking investments of £1 million where it is needed. This helps to create a virtuous circle, as customers
and non-customers are more likely to travel. We will invest a further £13 million in 29 of the larger stations
(including Paddington) and a number of the important regional stations to provide improved passenger
facilities. This will underpin the future viability of these stations. We will ensure that stations are properly
maintained and clean. We will improve security through the extension of lighting and CCTV in vulnerable
locations and install Help Points so that all stations on the Greater Western franchise network have them.
Over and above our contribution to the British Transport Police, we will employ an additional 12
Community Support OYcers and we will install or extend ticket gatelines at five stations.
During the recent process for the Thameslink/GN franchise, First outlined its plans for ensuring that the
security of customers and staV is maintained. We set out our strategy for increasing the number of stations
to achieve Secure Stations Accreditation. We are committed to achieving Secure Station Accreditation at a
further 12 stations within two years of the start of the franchise.
DfT guidelines on the deployment, role, and training of staV, published after its 2005 review of the Secure
Stations Scheme, stated:
“The desire for a staV presence can be addressed by the sensitive deployment of staV, by increasing
their visibility and mobility, and by widening their range of responsibilities.”
Our stakeholder consultation and market research conducted during the bid process found that personal
security at stations although an issue for the GNTL customers was not of overwhelming importance.
Research from the Rail Passengers’ Council showed that 57% of passengers said that security at stations
was of high importance to them but 64% of them also stated that they were either satisfied or very satisfied
with the standards achieved.
As a result, our proposal for station security for the new First Capital Connect franchise was based on a
“package of measures” approach in line with DfT guidelines. We are appointing a new Head of Security to
work with the BTP, the Metropolitan Police, the City of London Police, Transport for London and other
agencies to improve the on train and station environments. We will invest to improve on the arrangements
currently in place and our commitment to the safety and security of our customers will bring two Sergeants
and three Constables from the British Transport Police and 24 Police Community Support OYcers plus 35
additional frontline staV on to the network.
We also accepted a recommendation from the Rail Passengers’ Council to introduce a new CCTV control
centre. Following consultation with the BTP we identified that this, together with of an additional mobile
PC/PCSO resource, would give the best overall response and deterrent mix.
Additionally, in line with the Secure Stations Scheme guidelines, a redeployment of some staV from single-
duty train dispatch to multi-functional customer service and security staV has been factored within the
longer-term strategy. These staV, located at the busiest stations, will be better able to deter the higher general
levels of crime associated with greater concentrations of people, for example, pick-pocketing, bag-snatching
and anti-social behaviour.
We believe that whilst the Secure Stations Scheme has its benefits, it is not always necessary or suitable
in all circumstances and the same or better results can be achieved by:
— Working in partnership with the BTP, Home OYce Police, other agencies and the community on
initiatives to remove or drive down crime in the area.
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 17

— Improved design of stations to ensue they are more open plan, removal of hiding places, providing
better lighting and the inclusion of CCTV and Help Points.
— Providing a visible response to our customers’ safety concerns by introducing more mobile staV
patrols to stations, which are known to be crime hotspots.

Q7 Is the Government’s approach to passenger safety in railway stations eVective?

Yes, crime on the railways is falling. A continuation of the concerted eVort between train operators and
Network Rail, the BTP, police forces and local authorities such as TfL, PTEs and Councils—with support
from central Government departments such as the Home OYce and the DfT—to address both crime and
the fear of crime should continue to improve passenger safety in railway stations.
31 March 2006

Memorandum submitted by Go-Ahead Group

The Go-Ahead Group welcomes the opportunity of presenting evidence to the Committee in relation to
passenger safety at stations.
With eVect from 1 April 2006, Go-Ahead will operate two of the largest franchises in London and the
South-East with responsibility for over 330 stations. The Southern and Southeastern franchises carry in
excess of 110 million passengers a year, 15% of the National rail business.
We fully recognise the importance of safety and security in our rail operations. We are acutely aware that
confidence in public transport is essential not only for the success of our business, but also in terms of the
London and thus National economy, and the ecological benefits of encouraging greater use of
environmentally friendly transport modes.
Personal security is a priority for our business. We will produce evidence describing the measures we have
taken and the substantial financial investment made. These measures go far beyond the obligations in our
Franchise Agreement.
The recent high profile press campaign on crime at London stations has exaggerated the risks to the
travelling public and has raised the fear of crime. Reported crime levels are significantly lower than in the
community at large, and the risk of exposure to crime is low. East Croydon, one of our busiest stations, had
a reported crime level of 270 notifiable oVences during 2005, set against a passenger throughput of some 22
million passengers per annum. Crime levels at all our Southern stations have reduced significantly over the
last three years. (See Annex “A”)
Nevertheless, we are in no way complacent about security, and recognise that more needs to be done to
counter the fear of crime and to encourage use of the railway during the more vulnerable oV-peak periods
of the day.

What are the most eVective methods of making railway and underground stations safer for passengers?
There is rarely a single solution to combating crime and disorder. Under the guidance of a professional
Head of Security and in close cooperation with the British Transport Police, the Group adopts a holistic
approach to combating crime and disorder. We follow the accepted crime reduction strategies based around
the principles of the five “E”s: Evaluation, Enabling, Education, Engineering and Enforcement. This
strategic approach ensures that a proper risk based evaluation based on the combined intelligence of the
police and our own data, is the precursor to any solutions or counter-measures.
The key issue is to create a safe environment for our passengers and staV, which in turn will improve the
perception of personal security. Perception of crime at stations is often influenced by the geographic
location. Railway stations do not sit separately from the communities they serve and consequently they are
a reflection of the fears of the community in general. If the public feel secure in their neighbourhood this
perception is likely to be reflected in their view of their local station, and vice versa.
In general terms, passengers are likely to feel most secure in a well-lit, well-maintained, clean and open
environment where there is natural surveillance from fellow-travellers, railway staV or from adjacent
properties. Conversely, an area that is poorly lit, and where there is litter graYti or evidence of vandalism,
will have the opposite eVect and create a sense of isolation and vulnerability that feeds the fear of crime.
As a consequence, Go-Ahead has concentrated on improving the cleanliness, appearance, and lighting
standards at all of its stations. It has fitted CCTV, Help Points, improved waiting accommodation, car
parking and cycle storage facilities, amongst other measures.
Most research relating to passenger security indicates that the public believe that the presence of staV is
particularly reassuring. In our Southern franchise we have recognised this concern, and over the last three
years have increased staYng levels at stations in the London Metro area by 70 people. Furthermore, where
circumstances have indicated a need, we have also employed private security oYcers to supplement our own
Ev 18 Transport Committee: Evidence

staV presence. It is not simply the presence of railway staV, but having the right people in the right place
doing the right job. In terms of combating the albeit low levels of station crime, it is no more realistic to
expect a security presence in every station than it is to expect a police oYcer on every street corner. In our
view a holistic approach, by risk assessing stations and providing appropriate physical and material
solutions, is the most appropriate way to address passenger concerns.
For ease of reference, we attach at “Appendix A” a brief summary of security measures implemented in
the Southern franchise over the last three years, together with “Appendix B” for Thameslink.

Is the minimum standards to provide a safe and secure station environment high enough?
Train operators are required to ensure the safety of their passengers under Section 3 of the Health and
Safety at Work Act, and in the civil law Occupiers’ Liability Act. Both these require that train operators
take all reasonably practicable and proportionate steps to reduce the risks to the public and staV. Train
operators have a legal duty of care.
The National Rail Security Group sets a high level strategy for crime prevention, and the tactics for
delivery are determined within Network Rail Regions. Individual operators fully participate in this process
as well as setting their own crime strategy (See Annex “C”) and by setting measurable objectives in their
Safety and Environmental Plan.
The opening hours of ticket oYces are regulated, which together with the number of windows to be
opened, partly determines station staYng arrangements.
The only other requirements under the terms of a Franchise Agreement are those which are negotiated
with the Department for Transport (DfT) when individual companies enter into a Franchise Agreement. In
the case of Southern, this is contained in Schedule Four of the Franchise Agreement. It also covers issues
of presentation and cleanliness that have a bearing on perceptions of security. Other parts of the Franchise
Agreement include specific obligations such as “Secure Station” accreditation, “Park Mark” standard for
car parks, CCTV on stations and trains, and Help Points at stations.
In recent years the DfT has placed greater emphasis on station security as evidenced by the Invitation to
Tender in franchise competitions. There are other minimum standards, such as those contained in the
counter terrorism measures of the National Railways Security Programme, which also serve to set standards
for security. The counter terrorist measures are considered to be appropriate and suYciently robust to deter
terrorism and other forms of crime without being unduly restrictive on an open public railway
transportation system.

Are the requirements suYciently clear and specific to be eVective? If not, what changes should be made?
These basic standards and requirements, coupled with the Group’s strong commitment to improvement,
has reduced crime on the stations in our franchises.
Otherwise, there is a clear expectation that operators will include security plans and measures for the safe
operation of the railway in their Franchises. Crime levels at stations are generally low, and security spend
has to be on a sensible and risk assessed basis. It may be perfectly feasible for example, for the DfT to specify
stations that need to have “Secure Stations Accreditation”, to specify the provision of “Help Points” and
CCTV or indeed to specify levels of station staYng. These costs would not be matched by additional
revenue, and the resultant extra subsidy requirements would have to be prioritised alongside other demands
for railway funding.

Are the minimum standards eVectively policed? Are the penalties for failing to provide a secure station
environment suYciently severe?
The internal standards of a Rail Operator and the commitments entered into through Safety and
Environmental Plans are the subject of both internal and independent external audit. A failure of any of our
Group companies to perform against published targets would be a matter of a focus by our Board where
there is no less concern about security issues than other aspects of railway safety. The consequence of
significant failure to meet safe operating practices would have significant impact on both Directors and
Management of the company concerned.
Minimum standards specific to station security diVer in our Franchise Agreements, and where these form
part of the Franchisees obligations, they are subject to audit by DfT. In recent years the process has been
more one of “self audit” or “certification” by the train operator. However we are, from time to time, subject
to verification by DfT Audit random checks. Minor non compliance can result in the operator being served
a notice of breach and being required to produce, at their own expense, an action plan to achieve compliance.
In severe cases, or what is known as a “material breach” of the franchise an operator could lose the franchise
with severe reputational and financial consequences.
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 19

In the case of compliance with the provisions of the National Railways Security Programme, stations in
the higher security groups are subject to regular audit by DfT Transport Security Inspectors. Any failures
to comply with mandatory elements can result in warning notices and ultimately in prosecution of the
franchisee or duty holder.

Is it suYciently clear to passengers and others who are responsible for the safety of passengers in railway and
underground stations?
Emphatically, yes. Train Operating Companies (TOC) are the public face of the railway, and passengers
look to TOC staV for all their needs, including their safety. Our staV wear distinctive uniforms, and we
prominently display at all stations details of the station manager and contact details for enquiries.
It may not be quite as clear to the public so far as policing is concerned. Whilst we have the benefit of a
distinct railway police the public may often see the local police force as being the first point of contact, and
not appreciate the demarcation lines between Metropolitan and Home OYce police forces and the British
Transport Police.

Why are so few stations accredited under the secure stations scheme?
The Secure Stations Scheme represents a national standard for passenger safety and security at Britain’s
railway stations. The Scheme was first launched in 1998, but following an independent review was
subsequently revised and re-launched in 2005. These revisions are aimed at simplifying some procedures
with the objective of encouraging more operators to take part. There are seven guidelines to accreditation
and four specific elements that need to be addressed by station operators. These are:
— Design and crime—the design of the station must conform to standards judged by the local BTP
Crime Reduction OYcer to prevent and reduce crime and improve passenger perceptions.
— Managing a secure station—the management of the station must allow the operator to take steps
to prevent crimes, respond to incidents, and communicate eVectively with passengers.
— Recording and monitoring of crimes and other incidents—crime statistics for the station over the
twelve months prior to the inspection must show that the TOC is managing crime. This entails a
crime level in relation to people using the station that is below specified crimes per footfall.
— Passenger perceptions—a survey of users must show that, on the whole, passengers feel secure
when using the station.
It will be noted that the process of accreditation is not simple. The process is quite rightly challenging,
and has to be so if accreditation is to have any purpose, significance or credibility. Neither is accreditation
a quick process. It requires considerable engagement from a limited crime reduction police resource and a
process of rectification of any physical shortcomings arising from the police audit. In some cases this may
involve capital expenditure although generally cost is not the principal bar to accreditation.
It can take some time for the physical and managerial measures to impact on crime and to reduce it to a
qualifying level in proportion to footfall. Stations with relatively low levels of crime, but low usage, often
struggle to meet the crime per footfall criteria, whereas a larger station with higher levels of crime and high
usage may pass the criteria more easily. It has been pointed out repeatedly to the DfT and to BTP that small
stations are disadvantaged in the “managing crime” per footfall formula.
In its original form a very costly element of accreditation was the need for an independent passenger
survey of specific age groups by gender. The survey had to show that on the whole, passengers felt secure
when using the station. The cost of the survey and analysis was disproportionately expensive and produced
unreliable results, even after high levels of investment in the station. Further, as public perception is often
dictated as much by the area outside the station, over which the railway has no control, as by the reality of
the risk of crime on the station itself, the scheme became discredited. For this reason Go-Ahead chose to
invest finite security resources in making improvements to security across the board rather than in expensive
public surveys.
In its revised form the Secure Stations Scheme permits the use of existing surveys in relation to perceptions
of security—for example the National Passenger Survey conducted by the Oxford Research Institute—
provided a suYciently large ample is obtained, which obviates the need for further surveys by train
operators. Southern currently has only three accredited stations, and is working towards accreditation of
an initial tranche of 40 stations that we expect will result in 25% of our stations achieving secure stations
status. However, as indicated above, the process is not a “quick win” and involves time and eVort to engage
staV in actively managing crime and security, physically improve the station environment, reducing crime
to footfall ratios and gaining passenger confidence.
By comparison, 22 Thameslink stations (79% of total), have achieved Secure Station Accreditation.
Ev 20 Transport Committee: Evidence

Should the scheme be made compulsory?

No—we think this would be counter productive.
Much is already an integral part of Go-Ahead’s bidding strategy and franchise management processes—
namely infrastructure provision—intelligent CCTV, Help Points, long-line PAs, completed by adequate
staYng both static and peripatetic.
The burden of processing a significant increase in SSA applications would fall to the Police, who would
not be able to cope.
Further, by mandating SSA, additional sanctions for failure would be necessary. In our view, it would be
unreasonable to penalise an operator who had used reasonable endeavours to reduce crime and anti-social
behaviour but who had failed due to circumstances or perceptions beyond their control. It may also lead
operators to fail to report crime.

What measures would be required to ensure significant improvements in passengers’ safety in railway and
underground stations?
Passenger safety and confidence may be improved by a more visible presence of Police and other
complementary policing resources during oV peak times. Southern has already contributed to this element
of confidence building in its own multi disciplined “Task Force” and through the employment of some 50
Rail Security OYcers. However, crime and disorder can occur anywhere and it is unrealistic to expect every
station and every train to maintain a permanent security presence, just as it is unreasonable to expect Police
or Community Support OYcers or Street Wardens to be visible on every street in the land. All resources
whether human of physical are finite and to be most eVective need to be directed on an intelligence led basis.
A joined-up approach which involves bus, underground, light rail and heavy rail stations environments
needs to be encouraged. For example, there remains scope to develop railway CCTV capability along the
lines of the joint Southern and Transport for London scheme in London. By Autumn of 2006 monitored
CCTV and help points will be introduced to 50 metro stations. When integrated with on board CCTV this
has the potential of providing a comprehensive public security and surveillance system. We also look
forward to forthcoming proposals on the future of the British Transport Police that has the potential of
refocusing policing eVorts on a transport led agenda rather than a more generic National Policing Strategy

Is the government’s approach to passenger safety in railway stations eVective?

With the exception of counter terrorism, much of the initiative for improved station security has come
from within the rail industry, aided by local and national government partnership arrangements.
Greater emphasis could be given to transport security in the work of local Crime and Disorder Reduction
Partnerships and a Government lead would be useful in that context. The introduction of the Railway
Accredited Persons Scheme with enhanced powers of enforcement under railway bye-laws has also been
welcomed. However the scheme could have been more attractive had the enforcement powers been more
relevant to the railway rather than being a direct copy of powers, scope and oVences currently available
under Community Safety Accreditation Schemes. Further, the process of accreditation of railway
businesses, managed by the Association of Chief Police OYcers Crime Prevention Initiatives Ltd is viewed
as being unnecessarily onerous and bureaucratic, which is also a disincentive to participation.

Conclusions
Since privatisation and through the process of competitive tendering for rail franchises the industry has
made significant investment in the security of stations and trains. Public perception of security measured
through independent survey has steadily improved as have passenger numbers. Crime at stations has fallen
consistently, but more can be done.
In the new Go-Ahead franchise for the Southeastern franchise, the most significant element of £70 million
of proposed investment is £20 million on security.
31 March 2006

Annex A

SOUTHERN SECURITY AND CCTV

(FRANCHISE ACQUIRED IN 30/8/2001)
Significant improvements in passenger security in the last three years. These include:
— Installation of a comprehensive monitored CCTV network linked to passenger announcements,
with help points and new waiting shelters (delivered in partnership with TfL).
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 21

— A positive working relationship with BTP and full participation in tasking meetings following the
Police National Intelligence to ensure that policing activities and our own complementary security
resources are deployed in the most eVective manner.
— Appointment of CCTV Data Profilers trained to police standards to profile oVenders and provide
evidential packs for police investigation and taking the pressure oV frontline police oYcers.
— The creation of a Crime and Disorder Task Force in partnership with BTP and a private security
firm. This team tackles anti-social behaviour issues, on an intelligence led basis to ensure that low
level disorder does not discourage travel.
— The employment of 50 rail security oYcers to enhance security and improve passenger confidence
on the network.
— Increased staYng levels at Metro area stations—by more than 70 in the last couple of years.
— The employment of Private Security Guards in covert operations to detect and detain graYti
vandals and to combat anti social behaviour.
— The provision of a discrete security budget to enable recommendations on security improvements
by both police and our own Head of Security to be implemented speedily and eVectively.
— The adoption of a zero tolerance approach to graYti on stations, with all but the most diYcult
damage cleaned oV or painted out within 24 hours.
— Three stations accredited under the Secure Stations Scheme and a further 40 comprising 25% of
all stations actively being promoted for accreditation by the end of 2006.
— Upgraded lighting at all our Metro area stations.
— Re-painting and re-signing all our London area stations using finishes which are easier to clean
and keep free of graYti.
— The introduction of maintenance teams to ensure levels of cleanliness and the state of repair of
stations is maintained at the highest possible level.
— A five day customer service training programme for staV which includes personal security issues
and leads to an NVQ qualification.
In addition, all of our Metro area stations have real time train information displays, our busiest stations
have ticket gates to control access/egress and we have recently replaced all of our ticketing equipment,
adding to the sense of regeneration/renewal.
Through these initiatives, we have seen recorded crime reduce substantially on our stations over the last
two years.
SOUTHERN—STATION CRIME STATISTICS AS SUPPLIED BY BTP

Calendar Year Total Notifiable Total Non Notifiable Total All Crime % Change

2002 7,273 1,639 8,912

2003 8,120 2,137 10,257 15
2004 7,882 1,657 9,539 "7
2005 4,233 778 5,011 "47

Southern

12000

10000
Recorded Crime levels

8000
Total Notifiable
6000 Total Non Notifiable
Total All Crime
4000

2000

0
2002 2003 2004 2005
Year
Ev 22 Transport Committee: Evidence

There was an overall increase from 2003 which coincides with the introduction of changed Home OYce
Counting Rules for Recorded Crime. However across the board there has been a reduction in recorded
crime in 2005 especially in recorded robbery oVences (Down 55.2%).

CRIME STATISTICS FOR EAST CROYDON STATION

(PASSENGER THROUGHPUT 21,162,691 PER ANNUM)

East Croydon

Calendar Year Total Notifiable Total Non Notifiable Total All Crime % Change
2002 340 69 409
2003 367 89 456 11
2004 354 69 423 "7
2005 240 80 320 "24

East Croydon
500
450
400
Recorded Crime levels

350
300 Total Notifiable
250 Total Non Notifiable
200 Total All Crime
150
100
50
0
2002 2003 2004 2005
Year
There was an overall increase from 2003 which coincides with the introduction of changed Home OYce
Counting Rules for Recorded Crime. However across the board there has been a reduction in recorded
crime in 2005

Annex B

THAMESLINK SECURITY
— Secure Stations Accreditation—22 of the 28 stations managed by Thameslink have achieved this
status. This is the highest ratio (79%) of any Train Operating Company in the UK.
— Significant investment (£2 million) has been made at our Metro stations in partnership with TfL
over the past two years. Improvements to security at these stations includes Newand extended
CCTV; upgrade of CCTV to Digital format; New and improved HelpPoints; improved lighting,
fencing, seating and waiting facilities and signage.
— Dedicated CCTV monitoring centres at Luton and Tooting.
— Dedicated security guards at several of our central London stations.
— Deployment of security guards on trains around the Wimbledon LoopComplete regeneration of
Thameslink managed stations on the Wimbledon Loop resulting in a drop in crime rates and
awards of Secure Station status.
— Tickets gates installed at Elstree & Borehamwood station to ensure that only fare paying
passengers should be able to enter the station.
— Dedicated External Liaison Manager—working closely with the community around the
Wimbledon Loop—liaising with Schools and Colleges, giving talks, encouraging good behaviour
on the railway—and rewarding pupils for good citizenship.
— Thameslink Website—Comprehensive station database giving details of station facilities which
enables a passenger to make an informed choice of where to travel from—helping to give a sense
of safety at each station.
— Thameslink Website—link to “The Teaching Zone” website which gives teachers the opportunity
to download lesson plans and other materials to deliver lessons on the dangers of the railway and
the benefits of good behaviour.
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 23

— Heavy cleaning task forces—rapid response to remove graYti on stations Introduction of Alcohol
Free Zones at St Albans and Harpenden stations in association with the BTP and local
Authorities.
— EVective participation in BTP National Intelligence Model Crime tasking meetings.

THAMESLINK—STATION CRIME STATISTICS AS SUPPLIED BY BTP

Calendar Year Total Notifiable Total Non Notifiable Total All Crime % Change
2002 144 21 165
2003 178 31 209 27
2004 165 15 180 "14
2005 158 21 179 "1

Thameslink Station Crime

250

200
Recorded Crime Levels

150 Total Notifiable

Total Non Notifiable
100 Total All Crime

50

0
2002 2003 2004 2005
Year
There was an overall increase from 2003 which coincides with the introduction of changed Home OYce
Counting Rules for Recorded Crime. However across the board there has been a reduction in recorded
crime in successive years.
Ev 24 Transport Committee: Evidence

OUR VISION

Think like a Passenger

To offer high quality rail travel,

providing our passengers with a welcoming,
well managed, safe and reliable service.

OUR VALUES

Trust us to be PROFESSIONAL

Our trains run on the dot.

And HONEST too, we won’t say something’s OK it it’s not.

You’ll find us very FLEXIBLE

We’ll help you if we can

We’re FRIENDLY not officious, and

We’re SAFE – you’re in good hands

OUR GOALS

• We want to run a railway that’s SAFE AND SECURE. That requires

professionalism and a focus on safety.

• It is professionalism and safety that will help us improve PERFORMANCE

• Top performance will help us to win CUSTOMER SATISFACTION, but

not without professionalism, honesty, friendliness and flexibility from our
staff.

• That means we must improve the motivation and PERFORMANCE OF

OUR STAFF and encourage their PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT.
For that we need an honest, professional, flexible culture.

• The bottom line is we want to the PROFITABLE and that comes from
achieving all these goals
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 25

CRIME REDUCTION STRATEGY

In delivering our promise to provide a welcoming, safe and secure railway for our passengers and staV,
as detailed in our Vision and Values. Southern will actively pursue a policy to preserve the railway from
“open access”. We will introduce cost eVective measures based on the crime reduction principals of
Evaluation, Enabling, Education, Engineering and Enforcement to control our environment and to reduce
both crime and the fear of crime on the railway. Whenever possible we will seek to achieve this goal through
the development of eVective partnerships with other stakeholders.

Our Passengers: Southern is committed to providing a safe, secure and welcoming experience for our
passengers from the time they access the railway until they leave our care. With this in mind, we will
introduce and pursue initiatives, in support of the National Rail Standard for Personal Security of Rail
Travellers, the National Railways Security Programme and the Rail Safety and Standards and Board
Personal Security Working Groups initiatives, intended to increase passenger confidence and to reduce the
fear of crime.

Our StaV: Southern acknowledges its responsibility and promise to provide a safe and pleasant working
environment for our staV. We acknowledge that in carrying out their jobs some of our staV may face
hostility and personal danger. We will ensure that staV likely to experience confrontation are aware of
potential risks to their personal safety and are provided with adequate and appropriate training. Whenever
possible the Company will also provide technical or physical support to enhance the personal safety of
vulnerable staV. Whenever a member of staV becomes the victim of crime we will ensure that support,
counselling and legal advice is provided.

Our Stations and Environs: Southern recognises that our stations are the gateway to the rail
infrastructure and as such provide the means to control the railway and to preserve the network from “open
access”. We will introduce access control through the appropriate use of automatic gating and staVed gate
lines. We will work towards the introduction of an integrated system of passenger information and actively
monitored CCTV surveillance designed to reinforce our promise to maintain a safe and secure railway
environment. We will adopt a policy of continual improvement in the maintenance, management and
appearance of our stations and car parks, in appropriate cases seeking accreditation for stations under the
DfT “Secure Stations” initiative and/or accreditation for Car parks under the Secured by Design “Park
Mark” scheme. We will fully comply with the requirement of the National Railways Security Programme.

Our Trains: Southern recognises that poor design features in rolling stock provide opportunities for
criminal and anti social conduct which has a significant impact on reliability, on the comfort and safety of
our passengers and on company profitability. We will work in partnership with Rolling Stock Leasing
Companies and our own Engineers to improve the design of existing stock and to remove or redesign
features vulnerable to misuse. For new trains we will work in close co-operation with the builders in
adopting a policy of “secured by design” which will minimise opportunities for vandalism, anti-social
behaviour and misuse of vehicles. Where appropriate we will enhance security on services through the
presence of trained Security StaV and greater staV visibility.

Our Timetable: We understand the annoyance and inconvenience caused to our passengers by the
cancellation and delays to train services as a consequence of the irresponsible and criminal acts of, a
minority. Southern will work with other railway partners to preserve the railway from “open access” and
to eliminate delay and losses arising from external factors.

Young People: Southern acknowledges and welcomes responsible use of the railway by young people.
Together with other industry partners we will adopt an education and marketing strategy intended to ensure
that young people appreciate the value of rail travel but are also aware of the inherent dangers to themselves
and others if the environment is misused.

Other Organisations: Southern believes that maintaining a secure and a safe railway environment cannot
be achieved alone, but depends upon a commitment from all members of the Railway Industry and external
agencies to the principals of crime reduction. The Company will actively encourage other stakeholders to
share our vision for a secure railway environment. To achieve our goals we will work in partnership with
others, including but not exclusively, the British Transport Police, Civil Police, DfT and other Government
Agencies, Transport for London, Network Rail, Rail Safety & Standards Board, Health and Safety
Executive, Other Train Operating Companies, Rolling Stock Leasing Companies, Industry, Local Crime
& Disorder Reduction Partnerships, Local Authorities, Schools and Youth Organisations.
Ev 26 Transport Committee: Evidence

Memorandum submitted by Network Rail

1. Further to the Committee’s announcement of its inquiry into Personal Passenger Safety in Railway
Stations, Network Rail would like to take the opportunity to provide a number of comments on this subject
and in relation to the questions posed.
2. We do note that this inquiry is separate from your on-going inquiry into transport security, “Travelling
without Fear”, in response to which we have already made a detailed submission. However, the committee
are invited to take our earlier submission into account as it deals in detail with significant activities related
to passenger safety such as the £17 million upgrade of Network Rail’s London CCTV network of 2,500
cameras across our 10 directly managed London stations.
3. As the committee will be aware, although Network Rail owns around 2,500 stations, all but 17 are
leased back to the Train Operators who manage and maintain the stations on a day-to-day basis and are
responsible for the provision of on-station staV. Over 50% of all passenger journeys start or finish at a station
managed by Network Rail. They are the hub of the rail network where the needs of hundreds of thousands
of people are met every day. Over 650 million people pass through our stations every year.
4. By virtue of the size of the those stations that Network Rail does manage (mostly the London termini
and a number of the city centre stations such as Leeds, Manchester and Glasgow), they are all continuously
staVed and are recognised by our stakeholders as delivering high levels of personal security.
5. Whilst the National Audit OYce (NAO) grouped responses of passengers using the 28 largest “hub
stations” at the highest level, our own customer satisfaction surveys show that there is a 92% satisfaction
with security at Network Rail’s stations.
6. Overall, Network Rail strongly believes that stations play a key role in the service provided to
passengers. Stations influence the experience at the start and end of every journey, which is why Network
Rail and its predecessor have invested almost £400 million over the past five years in its 17 major stations.
7. Network Rail continues to work with train operators, the Government and other funding partners to
improve the standards and facilities at railway stations.
8. Outside of those for which we have daily management responsibilities, we believe that there is much
left to be done to improve station environments, thereby addressing a number of issues including safety.
Network Rail has work underway to make it easier to collaborate with other organisations to deliver station
improvements and is seeking to lever in some £4bn of investment over the next 10 years from property
developers to help fund station improvements.
9. In respect of the Secure Stations Scheme, with the exception of one Station currently undergoing its
periodic re-accreditation, all our stations are members of the scheme. Obviously, as a supporter, Network
Rail would welcome more activity by all industry bodies in this area to raise passenger awareness of, and
support for, these initiatives. As we have recently completed our own investment in improved facilities, we
are keen to welcome greater TOC participation in the schemes, particularly for stations where there are high
levels of crime.
10. Network Rail’s stations therefore all operate at a level of security above the minimum laid out in the
scheme. In addition, by way of their size and high profile, they are subject to a wider range of inspection
regimes which cover a range of standards and processes. As such we would not propose to comment on the
impact of the scheme at the minimum level of accreditation and inspection.
11. Of those few (8%) of passengers who do report not feeling safe at our stations, the main reasons cited
are: threat of terrorism, lack of security presence, overcrowding, undesirables, threat of theft, and threat
of assault.
12. Our experience is that a number of simple measures generally have a significant impact in the
perceived security of a station including: the maintenance of a clean and well-lit environment, the prompt
repair or removal of vandalism and graYti, a visible presence of railway or police personnel, good signage
and information, and the removal of people begging, sleeping or loitering around the station premises.
13. The Secure Station Scheme, while specifically covering the station and car parking facilities only, does
recognises the security elements of the “whole journey”—eg the local street lighting, car parking facilities,
the availability of bus timetables and information, and telephone numbers and accessibility of local taxi
services—may make all the diVerence to the passenger’s perception of the rail journey. Again these are
elements built into our planning of station facilities and information in as far as possible.
14. As well as independent customer surveys, our main London termini have nominated contacts from
London Travel Watch to inspect and report on the services and facilities, our station managers engage in
face-to-face passenger contacts to receive comments and criticisms, and we share best practice with security
and police bodies as well as members of other railway industry bodies.
15. The overall protection and improvement of passenger safety at stations is a concern of our Safety and
Environment Plan. The principle risk identified in this context is through the boarding or alighting from
trains at stations—something that remains one of the main causes of passenger accidents.
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 27

16. The train operating companies are responsible for control of this accident risk, and the replacement
of Mark 1 slam-door trains with modern rolling stock with automatic doors will reduce it. We will support
the train operators in the management of this risk by progressing the risk-based platform stepping strategy
agreed by the SRA, ORR and HSE.
17. With regards to the question of clarity to passengers of responsibility for security, we would comment
that passengers tend to regard security holistically—believing that the vast majority of those industry
representatives they interact with during the course of their journey bear a shared degree of responsibility
for their safety—as indeed they and their fellow passengers do themselves.
18. As I hope the above demonstrates, Network Rail is always striving for practical opportunities to
improve safety at our stations, we believe these eVorts are delivering results for passengers and that our staV
and customers can rightly be proud of the levels of satisfaction we are largely achieving.
30 March 2006

Witnesses: Mr George Muir, Director General, Association of Train Operating Companies, Mr David
Franks, Managing Director, National Express Group, Mr Ian Dobbs, Chief Executive, Rail Division,
Stagecoach Group, Mr Andrew Haines, Managing Director, Railways, First Group, Mr Keith Ludeman,
Chief Executive, Rail, Go-Ahead Group, and Mr Robin Gisby, Network Rail, gave evidence.

Chairman: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, Mr Muir: Train operators were very pleased that
and welcome. We do have one or two bits of you did decide to have this hearing on safety at
housekeeping to perform, but I should warn you stations. It has been on the news recently of course in
that I am threatened with a division so I would say London and it is very important to our passengers.
to the witnesses that should the entire Committee Looking back over the last 10 years, it is perhaps
rise to its feet and leave, I trust that you will not take easy to forget that 10 years ago the conditions on
this personally! Members having an interest to trains and stations were in many places really very
declare? poor, and that in the last 10 years the situation on
Mr Martlew: Member of the Transport & General trains and stations has been improved enormously.
Workers’ Union and General & Municipal Train operators regarded the situation they found 10
Workers’ Union. years ago as quite intolerable for their passengers.
Mr Clelland: Member of Amicus. Since then they have been recruiting specialist staV
Graham Stringer: Member of Amicus. and have provided a large number of gated stations,
Clive EVord: Member of the Transport & General cleaned and painted stations, removed graYti,
Workers’ Union. introduced CCTV cameras, and supported the
Chairman: ASLEF. British Transport Police. These measures have been
Mrs Ellman: Member of the Transport & General eVective. Crime on the railway has declined by a
Workers’ Union. good deal in the last 10 years. What happened in the
Mr Wilshire: South West Trains provide me with a past of course is interesting but it is more important
car park pass. where we go from here. We need to achieve
continuous improvement in the safety of our
passengers and we have to do this through analysis
Q1 Chairman: I hope this extravagance will not go to and good thinking.
your head! Perhaps we could send them a list of what
we would like! Gentlemen, can I ask you first for the
Q3 Chairman: Mr Muir, a lot of these areas will be
record to identify yourselves, starting with you Mr
covered by the questions that we are about to ask
Muir.
you. Did you have a particular point that you
Mr Muir: George Muir, Director General of the
wanted to make?
Association of Train Operating Companies.
Mr Muir: I was going to add that the three areas that
Mr Franks: David Franks, Chief Executive of the
we found most eVective are patrolling, equipment
National Express Group’s Trains Division.
and partnership with the police.
Mr Dobbs: Ian Dobbs, Chief Executive of the Rail
Division at Stagecoach Group.
Mr Haines: Andrew Haines, MD of the Rail Q4 Chairman: Thank you. Can I ask our friend from
Division of First Group. Stagecoach first of all, you said you are in favour of
Mr Ludeman: Keith Ludeman, Chief Executive of a voluntary approach to raising standards and that
the Go-Ahead Group’s Rail Division. high standards of passenger safety are in the interests
Mr Gisby: Robin Gisby, Director of Operations and of commercial companies. If that is the case, why do
Customer Services at Network Rail. we have a problem with crime and the fear of crime
at stations?
Mr Dobbs: I think in actual fact what we have seen
Q2 Chairman: Because you are now in the posh end over the last 10 years is a reduction in crime. On our
of the establishment of Westminster you have particular franchise, South West Trains, we have
proper microphones operating in front of you, so seen a reduction of 18% since 1995, despite the fact
with any luck we shall be able to hear what you have that passenger numbers have gone up 50%, so in real
to say. Did anybody have a short statement they terms there has been a considerable improvement.
wanted to make before we begin. Mr Muir? That has been against a background of a lack of
Ev 28 Transport Committee: Evidence

19 April 2006 Mr George Muir, Mr David Franks, Mr Ian Dobbs, Mr Andrew Haines, Mr Keith Ludeman
and Mr Robin Gisby

prescription. We have done that for good business Q10 Chairman: No, do not leave that one.
reasons. We have also seen a significant reduction in Bureaucratic in what sense? If you have not got
the amount of reported incidents at unmanned compulsory standards to comply with why is the
stations, which is interesting, particularly over the system bureaucratic and why has it cost you a lot
last three years. Only about 2.3% of crime is actually of money?
at those stations whereas the vast majority is at Mr Dobbs: I will give you one example. If you take
staVed stations, and that is where we have targeted a very small station today, if you want to get Secure
resources. Station accreditation, you have to carry out
passenger surveys, you have to have a crime
Q5 Chairman: If this is the result, why would you reduction plan, you have to put in CCTV, and there
have a problem with compulsory standards? are a number of other requirements, for example the
Mr Dobbs: I do not think we have got a problem with design of the station itself. In some cases, the cost of
it as such. We will look at whatever Government puts doing that would be far too much and it would be
to us. We have to bid as franchisees on whatever terms better to come up with a diVerent approach to
are put to us, but we think that over the last 10 years managing the problem at that station. You asked
we have seen that the voluntary approach, which is earlier on about why does National Express prefer
customer focused, it is targeted at our customers on something more prescriptive. I think in some cases if
the ground, has actually worked. at the outset of a franchise it was very clear to
bidders what they were bidding for and it was clear
what was required at individual stations, then all
Q6 Chairman: Given the large numbers of stations bidders would bid for that franchise against that
there are, how can the Government ensure that they specification. If that specification, as I say, was clear,
are safe for passengers across the whole of the there would be an equal bid from everybody.
network without some very sensible, basic,
compulsory standards?
Mr Dobbs: We have actually employed voluntary Q11 Chairman: How many stations do you
standards during the last 10 years to get where we are actually manage?
today. It is clear that as we go forward in the way the Mr Dobbs: We manage directly 488.
franchises are put to us, the way we have to bid, that
things are changing slightly. There are often Q12 Chairman: How many of those are accredited?
requirements when we bid and we take on franchises Mr Dobbs: I have got the details here somewhere. I
to improve the position that we inherit. Certainly on can give that you information a bit later.
South West Trains, as an example, we have done
that to a huge degree, both in terms of the staYng we Q13 Chairman: It would be what, a majority of them
have put on the ground and in terms of the or a tiny percentage of them, given that you have got
technology we put out there as well. It is a joint this feeling about it?
thing. Mr Dobbs: It is a relatively small percentage of the
stations. I think there is a real opportunity to
Q7 Chairman: Mr Franks, you have got a rather improve the Secure Station approach to life.
more prescriptive approach in mind from the
Government. Tell us why that is? Q14 Chairman: So what would you want that would
Mr Franks: I think a one-size-fits-all approach is not encourage you to seek accreditation for all of your
appropriate to solving this problem across the whole stations?
of the railway network. The current arrangements Mr Dobbs: I think what we would need to do is
are that our franchise agreements outline a number perhaps not have a pass/fail approach to Secure
of requirements, and if there is a standard in place at Station accreditation; we ought to have something
the moment that is where it sits, and so we have like a star rating. An approach which we would
things like in some cases secure station accreditation, support at National Express Group would be to say
provision of CCTV, help points, et cetera. That does at a small station, where perhaps we provide help
feature in some franchise agreements but it does not points and we provide a plan to monitor and manage
feature in all of them. So there is some inconsistency. crime, it might be suitable for a one-star rating,
whereas at a larger station where we are providing
Q8 Chairman: I am going to stop you there. If there the full gambit of facilities—staYng around the
are 2,500 railway stations and only 323 of them are clock, the design is adequate, CCTV coverage and
accredited under the Secure Stations Scheme, it is the other requirements that are currently set down in
not a very good percentage, is it? Secure Station accreditation—in that scenario we
Mr Dobbs: No, but I do not think the Secure Station would perhaps get a five-star rating. In that
approach as it is currently set out and as it currently arrangement we could work towards accreditation
works is appropriate for all stations. of all stations.

Q9 Chairman: Why? Q15 Graham Stringer: Can I just follow that up.
Mr Dobbs: It can be bureaucratic and it can be very Certainly the specialist press seem to be surprised by
expensive to introduce. I will give you another the Minister Derek Twigg’s answer to a
example. Parliamentary question last month where he said in
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 29

19 April 2006 Mr George Muir, Mr David Franks, Mr Ian Dobbs, Mr Andrew Haines, Mr Keith Ludeman
and Mr Robin Gisby

new franchises he was looking on a station-by- Q22 Mrs Ellman: And your plans for the future?
station basis at security. From what you were saying Mr Dobbs: Our franchise at the moment is in the
in answer to the Chairman, does that mean to say rebidding phase so I imagine my competitors along
you would be happy with that approach? here would—
Mr Dobbs: If it is specified at the outset in the
invitation to tender for that franchise, everybody Q23 Chairman: The important thing Mrs Ellman is
would be bidding against that. Today if National concerned about is that you did include the ones
Express Group were to bid for a franchise on the actually on the trains there, did you not?
basis of Secure Station accreditation in the Mr Dobbs: On trains and on stations, yes.
franchise, we would not win the bid.
Q24 Chairman: So it is not quite the same thing, is it?
Q16 Graham Stringer: Do you think that the What are the numbers actually on the stations?
Minister has enough information to be able to Mr Dobbs: 76% of stations have cameras.
specify in the franchises exactly what is required,
both for health and safety reasons and personal Q25 Mrs Ellman: And what are you planning for the
security at stations? remainder?
Mr Dobbs: They would need to talk to the current Mr Dobbs: We have only got a few months of the
operator to get that information because obviously franchise left and obviously for confidentiality
it requires surveys and risk assessments at stations. reasons I am not able to say in public what our bid
There are a number of factors that are relevant. is going to be. I am sure my competitors will be in
exactly the same position sitting around me, but
Q17 Graham Stringer: From the information that suYce it to say we are planning to invest further in
you have, is the Department for Transport collecting station security and clearly it is a very important
that information at the present time on each issue for the business and for our customers.
individual station for which you are responsible? Mr Haines: We run all the stations in Scotland and
Mr Dobbs: The next franchise that is going out to about half of those are covered, about 188.
Chairman: I am very sorry, the Committee stands
tender will be the current Silverlink Metro franchise
adjourned. I would be grateful if Members would be
which will become the North London concessions
back in 10 minutes. I hope to rely on your speed.
part of Transport for London’s remit. We are
providing information for that franchise. The Committee was suspended from
2.59 pm to 3.10 pm for a division in the House.
Q18 Graham Stringer: On a station-by-station basis? Chairman: Mrs Ellman?
Mr Dobbs: Yes, there is a specific requirement from
the Mayor for that information.
Q26 Mrs Ellman: Do you agree that minimum
standards should be put in place for the standard of
Q19 Mrs Ellman: What proportion of stations has images on CCTV? Has anyone got any views on the
CCTV? Perhaps Mr Muir could give us the reply proposal that there should be minimum standards
across the network and then the individual operators for images produced on CCTV?
can tell us for their operations. Mr Muir: Yes there should and the new Code of
Mr Muir: In London about three-quarters to 80% of Practice that we have brought out indicates that they
stations have CCTV. will be when people upgrade them. What one has to
appreciate though for CCTV is that the train
operators moved very quickly into introducing
Q20 Mrs Ellman: And outside of London? CCTV before digital cameras were available, and as
Mr Muir: I would have thought a very much smaller a result we have got a large investment in analogue
percentage. I cannot guess the percentage. cameras. However, the cameras we have been
bringing in more recently have been the updated
Q21 Mrs Ellman: Why is it that you know the figure digital ones. When people change cameras or put
for London but you do not know the figure for new ones in they will be to that standard.
outside of London?
Mr Muir: Because I had a lot of data about London. Q27 Mrs Ellman: How does that standard compare
For the preparation for this report I just had more with European stations?
data about London. Mr Muir: I do not know but it is a very good quality.
Mr Franks: We operate at National Express a I have seen it, it is stunning quality.
number of stations outside of London. Of our 488
stations in total, 199 have CCTV, so just shy of 50%. Q28 Chairman: Does anyone else have any ideas?
Mr Dobbs: We have 76% of our stations covered by Mr Haines: I would support the move to digital
CCTV, 1,888 cameras on stations, a further 1,788 cameras as they are replaced. In fact, I think it would
cameras on trains, and another 1,400-odd cameras be a better use of resource than 100% coverage of
to come on trains that are to be updated, so over stations where there are maybe only one or two
5,000 cameras. passengers a day to upgrade to digital cameras. It is
Ev 30 Transport Committee: Evidence

19 April 2006 Mr George Muir, Mr David Franks, Mr Ian Dobbs, Mr Andrew Haines, Mr Keith Ludeman
and Mr Robin Gisby

a good example of where a jam spread may not be We look for particular patterns of behaviour
the most eVective way of getting a secure because what we are after eventually is getting a
environment for people. prosecution and deterring people from committing
crime on our stations. So it is a mix of the
Q29 Mr Leech: My follow-up question was whether information that you have in front of you, the
or not the extra investment is now being spent on quality of the image, and the degree to which you can
replacing existing camera technology rather than then pursue a prosecution in a way that then leads on
making up the rest of the network that currently to identifying individuals you can find on other parts
does not have cameras. of your network to try and stop crime in the future.
Mr Haines: In our case it is very much a mix of both. There is one example where we work with TfL within
We aim to get 95% of passenger journeys monitored a London TOC to aggressively reduce crime on the
by CCTV. We think the increment beyond that network using the most up-to-date CCTV we have.
would be prohibitively expensive for the value and it
is much better to spend the money in upgrading Q33 Chairman: Is that analogue or digital?
existing cameras. Mr Ludeman: Digital.
Mr Dobbs: Just to reinforce what Mr Ludeman was
Q30 Mr Leech: When you say monitored by CCTV saying there, the quality of information, the quality
do you mean live monitored so someone is always of image you get is very important from a
looking at it, or do you mean having CCTV there so prosecution point of view. One of the things we have
that it can be looked at if necessary? done in our CCTV room, which monitors about 70-
Mr Haines: A mix. Certainly in the next two years odd stations, is we have employed two full-time
the vast majority of our cameras will be monitored evidence gatherers whose sole job it is to sift
24 hours a day by dedicated staV. There are some information, to extract it, and to package it up in
stations where the cost of doing that is very such a way that it is admissible in court to prosecute
expensive. It is typically about £50,000 to link into a people, because if you do not do that then the system
single station. If it is a very lightly used station it may becomes just a toy.
not be the best use of resource, but the majority will
be manned and supervised as opposed to just Q34 Mrs Ellman: How far is the CCTV system
recorded. linked up with the PA systems?
Mr Dobbs: Certainly in our case most of the stations,
Q31 Chairman: Mr Gisby also wanted to say if not all of them, are from Wimbledon CCTV
something on that. centre link.
Mr Gisby: We run the 17 largest stations. They are
obviously all covered extensively with modern Q35 Mrs Ellman: Is that the same everywhere?
systems. The next money that we will spend will be Mr Ludeman: You tend to have facilities at the
on image recognition, processing and the larger stations that then allow you to speak to the
management of the information that is coming from smaller stations in your network. We are able to
the cameras. I think that is where we have to go now. speak to most of our stations from various points
If you look at the time it takes to process within our network, a long-line PA and we can reach
information and then lead to prosecutions and most of our customers in that way.
convictions, the eVort involved in that—and I am
sure the Chief Constable will speak to this later and Q36 Mr Martlew: On that very point, recently in the
I also speak as a member of the British Transport Underground there has been a situation where
Police Authority—that is where the investment has somebody is watching the monitor and announces
to go next. Instead of chasing coverage of 2,500 this young lad has either jumped over the gate or
stations at 100% we should be looking at better links whatever, and it is very reassuring to the public that
between the data gathering we already have and the somebody on the PA sees something happen and
processing of that subsequently. That is where we announces it and puts a spotlight on the individual.
need to go next. We are capturing an awful lot of Is that something you are thinking of continuing or
information, not just in our industry but links with expanding?
local authorities and with communities, with the Mr Haines: We are just in the process this week of
civil as well as the Transport Police, to be 100% sure letting a contract for the Trans-Pennine Express for
we are making 100% use of the information that we all its stations, and that is very much an integrated
are gathering, I think that is where we should look system where we will buy customer information
next. systems at the same time as a CCTV intelligent
network.
Q32 Mrs Ellman: What other work is being done on Mr Franks: I was going to make two quick points.
using the information that is gathered? One was that our own facilities within National
Mr Ludeman: If I may oVer an example. Within Express Group are being upgraded too, so we do not
Southern we have a control room that looks after a have just analogue systems, wherever we can we
good deal of the Metro stations in the network which upgrade. On c2c—that is the route between London-
runs from Victoria, London Bridge, et cetera. That Southend-Shrewburyness, for example—it is
was an initiative we embarked on jointly with TfL completely digital. We are just about to build a
and we have 24-hour monitoring of those stations. control centre which will be manned 24 hours a day
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 31

19 April 2006 Mr George Muir, Mr David Franks, Mr Ian Dobbs, Mr Andrew Haines, Mr Keith Ludeman
and Mr Robin Gisby

and do the sorts of things that have just been Mr Muir: Yes.
described. That is the way forward. The other point Mr Ludeman: Would it be helpful, Chairman, if I
I wanted to make very quickly is that I am not sure gave an example of one of my train companies as to
whether the Committee has seen the guidance note which stations are manned and which ones are not?
that has been issued for CCTV on stations. It is a
joint guidance note between ATOC, the British Q41 Chairman: Yes, we would like that.
Transport Police and Network Rail and it does Mr Ludeman: Within Southern in the Metro area,
cover a number of the things that have just been we have 58 stations and 52 of those are fully staVed
talked about. I have a copy here which I am prepared Monday to Friday. When you dip down to Saturday
to leave behind. 46 are manned and Sunday 35 are manned. That is
Chairman: That is very helpful. reflecting the various levels of activity at those
stations on those days. Re-emphasising what Mr
Q37 Mrs Ellman: What are your policies on staYng Franks said, we look at how we allocate people to
stations at all times while trains are running? serve those stations, not necessarily locating them
Mr Franks: StaYng is one approach to tackling the permanently at those stations—they might move
problem of security for both our customers and also around in a peripatetic way, they might be a security
our staV. We take our responsibilities at NEG very person or a ticket person. It depends on the
very, seriously. We want to provide a secure commercial requirements at that station at that time.
environment but, as I say, staYng is just one You will see from that very quick analysis that the
approach to tackling the problem. Other approaches majority of stations are manned for most of the
include mobile teams. traYc day. It is only on Sundays when less are
manned but the majority of them are.
Q38 Mrs Ellman: Could I just stop you there. I want
to focus for the moment on staYng, so what are you Q42 Mrs Ellman: Do any of you know how much
doing about staYng on stations? would it cost to staV your stations at all times trains
Mr Franks: What we do in National Express Group are running?
is assess the risks at each of our stations. The Mr Ludeman: Yes.
evidence comes about in various forms. For
example, we have crime data which is provided by Q43 Chairman: Not this afternoon, but would you
the British Transport Police. We have comments be prepared to do us a detailed note?
from our staV and from our customers. We have our Mr Ludeman: We have researched the numbers so if
own research where we talk to our customers. That you take the country as a whole you are looking at
forms the basis for a risk assessment. On the basis of about £25 million in the London area if every station
that assessment we then determine the right levels of was manned.
security that are to be provided at a particular
location. For a very small station where perhaps the Q44 Chairman: But that is everybody, not just you?
design of it is adequate and maybe the footfall at that Mr Ludeman: That is all the London operators
station is quite light, and it does not have a history within the London area.
of any crime, then the staYng at that station would
be very much dependent upon the commercial needs.
At other stations, say where the crime rates are Q45 Chairman: We would welcome a short
particularly high—and I can give you a very good supplementary note from all of you. Those with
example on Silverlink Metro which will become the large stations I am sure will give large submissions.
new North London franchise—all of the stations Mr Gisby: We are all manned 100% so I do not think
where the crime levels are relatively significant are I need to give you anything further.
actually staVed from the start of service to the close Mr Dobbs: I think one thing that we should stress is
of service. Where the crime rates are lower diVerent that we do put a lot of credence on having flexible
approaches are taken. staYng in these areas, so that rather than having one
Mr Dobbs: It is very diYcult to add very much to person in one place at one time, which can be
what Mr Franks has said. He has summarised what diYcult, we move people around and we have
all train operating companies do and that is about specially trained groups of staV, whether they be
assessing the risk. TravelSafe oYcers or Transport Police obviously as
well, going round providing a visible presence on
stations as required, which is risk based.
Q39 Chairman: I think we are going to have to ask
all of you for rather more precise information on
Q46 Mrs Ellman: Could you give us the reasons why
some of this. Mr Muir, we would like the exact
the CCTV you have got is not fully monitored?
figures on some of the numbers of stations that are
What is the reason for that?
covered and how many of them.
Mr Muir: When it was introduced it was impractical
Mr Muir: I have the figures for London but I do not
because it was originally analogue and it was
have them with me.
extremely diYcult to get the images from the stations
up to a central oYce. The first people to do a live
Q40 Chairman: As an Association I am sure you monitor were in fact in Scotland in about 1999. I
have members outside of London, Mr Muir? remember them introducing the first live monitoring
Ev 32 Transport Committee: Evidence

19 April 2006 Mr George Muir, Mr David Franks, Mr Ian Dobbs, Mr Andrew Haines, Mr Keith Ludeman
and Mr Robin Gisby

of trains to very, very good eVect. It is now being live Q55 Chairman: And how often have you prosecuted
monitored because now it is practical because of from that evidence in the last 12 months?
digital technology. Mr Ludeman: We do not of course make the
prosecution.
Q47 Mrs Ellman: Any other explanations?
Mr Ludeman: I suppose if you consider the amount Q56 Chairman: How often have you brought in the
of potential images that you would have to be BTP and asked for action on something?
looking at, we are not just talking about stations, we Mr Ludeman: I do not have the figures immediately
are talking about on our trains as well. In one of my to hand.
franchises we have 1,054 rail vehicles and in the
other one we have 1,313. That is an awful lot of Q57 Mr Scott: A couple of points. From what you
images to look at. are saying it is mainly reactive rather than proactive.
You are looking after someone has reported an
Q48 Chairman: I am very interested in this. Who event rather than trying to immediately notify the
looks at the stuV? Is it digital on the rolling stock, in authorities of that?
the carriages? Mr Haines: I think there is a big distinction there
Mr Ludeman: What we do is follow up incidents so between trains and stations.
when we know there has been an incident we will go
back and look at the evidence. Q58 Chairman: Not if they are not monitored, Mr
Haines.
Q49 Chairman: So somebody has to create a bit of a Mr Haines: The distinction I am trying to draw is
fuss before anyone takes any notice of what is that of the 188 stations we have got, 98% of the
coming through? When it is on a carriage where is footfall is continuously monitored, but we do not do
the point at which that material is monitored and that on the trains. There is no continuous
checked? monitoring of every single vehicle on every single
Mr Ludeman: We have all that information in the train. For that we wait for an incident but at the
depots that we operate and we do review that stations 98% of passenger movements are
information. We are only looking at incidents continuously monitored.
because of the sheer volume of the material.
Q59 Mr Scott: On a number of the stations you have
Q50 Chairman: You have made that point. We are town centre CCTV which is monitored 24 hours,
perfectly prepared to accept that, but you have made seven days a week. Has it been looked at plugging
a very sensible point about the numbers of CCTVs into that so you would not have the additional staV
there are on your carriages as well as at your costs that you mentioned earlier? How many have
stations. What I am saying to you is where are those looked into that?
images going and how often are they monitored? Are Mr Franks: You make a very good point. There are
you telling us that they will only be monitored if examples where that is happening, where we are
what is described as an incident comes up? linking our stations into town centre schemes. There
Mr Ludeman: If it is trains it is the depots. is a lot more that should be done.
Mr Dobbs: We have a couple of schemes in South
Q51 Chairman: Are they monitored in the depots so West Trains again which are linked to the local
that someone 24 hours a day is checking the stuV councils. Again, to reinforce what Mr Franks said,
coming into the depots? we will do more in the future. It is a partnership that
Mr Ludeman: No, they look at specific incidents. we need to take forward.

Q52 Chairman: How do they know there is an Q60 Clive EVord: Can I just follow up on CCTV
incident if they are not actually looking at the because my experience of CCTV is that my local
screens? monitoring station is as big as this room and it is a
Mr Ludeman: Because it is reported. room full of TV screens. The idea of 24-hour
monitoring is just a myth, is it not? You have got two
Q53 Chairman: So you have to wait for the train staV or three people looking at 40 or 50-odd screens. Is
to tell you “we had a problem on the Liverpool line” not CCTV a limited tool and are there not
before you realise— regulations about the use of CCTV that require a
Mr Ludeman: You have to wait for the train to get certain size image of anybody who has committed a
back into the depot. crime before you can go to any sort of action against
Mr Martlew: So it is not live transmission to the an individual? I do not know who would like to
depot. answer that, but I think it is a very limited tool in my
experience.
Q54 Chairman: So it is not live transmission, it is a Mr Haines: There are some limitations to it but the
recording and someone has to draw your attention evidence is there for our own eyes. We have seen
to a particular incident? significant reductions in crime and we have also seen
Mr Ludeman: Our staV or the individuals involved significant reductions in passenger fear of crime. If
in the incident will make a report. We gather the you look at CCTV in control centres, you are right,
report and we will check back. if you walk into a control centre where there is a
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 33

19 April 2006 Mr George Muir, Mr David Franks, Mr Ian Dobbs, Mr Andrew Haines, Mr Keith Ludeman
and Mr Robin Gisby

bank of 50 TV screens, it can be quite mind-blowing. Q66 Clive EVord: So where cameras are monitored
Having worked alongside the professionals who as opposed to the ones that are on the carriages if an
work in there day after day, they get very, very incident is reported, then the person monitoring the
attuned to picking up hot-spots and being able to screens can focus in on that particular area and then
notice diVerences. There is technology being play their part in dealing with the situation?
developed that is meant to be intelligent CCTV that Mr Gisby: Yes. I think we should be clear here
will trace unusual movements. Thus far when we though, the vast majority of the usage of this
have tested it in procurement processes it is not as equipment is reactive, to follow up after incidents
good as salesmen tend to suggest. It is something we that are reported elsewhere which have occurred
look at closely because, you are absolutely right, if because a number of complementary systems have
you could get something that could target risk not worked—people on the platform, staV here,
locations or risk activities then it would make it an police there, support oYcers elsewhere, the deterrent
even better tool. eVect of CCTV and other things. That is mainly
where they are used. I would not like this Committee
to go away with the idea that we have across the
Q61 Chairman: Why do we not ask Mr Gisby that? industry large numbers of people in real time
Mr Gisby: Which of the many questions would monitoring people across stations and proactively
that be? nipping events happening in real time at the time. It
is not like that.
Q62 Chairman: Mr Gisby, if you have got these big
stations and we know that most of the big crime is Q67 Clive EVord: If an incident is reported on one of
happening on big stations, what would your attitude your stations, is it then immediately brought to the
be to that? Do you have a problem with your attention of the people monitoring the CCTV
existing systems? cameras so that they can play their part in recording
Mr Gisby: We use them in a number of ways. We do any incidents that might take place?
monitor them. We have in London, as it says in the Mr Gisby: Yes and that can happen very quickly. It
papers, 2,500 screens and one person can look at can also, depending on the quality of the image, the
three or four screens. Do I have 600 or 700 people cameras and the co-ordination with BTP, take some
looking at the screens all the time? No I do not. We time, hence my comment earlier that further
monitor them where we expect trouble. We advise investment in this area and further co-operation and
jointly with the police where there might be trouble. liaison in this area is about sharing in real time and
However, it is one of a number of things. We have a quickly the information we are already gathering. I
lot of police community support oYcers provided by would not put up an awful lot more cameras in my
the BTP and we have a lot of our own staV across the 17 major stations. What I am interested in is quick,
stations as well. real time processing, sharing that information with
other authorities and other CCTV networks, and
some of the stuV to which Mr Haines referred, which
Q63 Chairman: What do you call a lot across 17 is more computer-based image recognition
stations? equipment so that we can get to the heart of the
Mr Gisby: We have a couple of hundred round matter quicker. I am sure the Chief Constable will
London and all our stations are manned fully all the talk about it later, but if you go to the video editing
time, 580 staV across 17 stations. suite of the BTP, it can take an awful long time to go
through an awful lot of images in order to get
patterns of behaviour and to capture people. I think
Q64 Chairman: Do you pay for those?
you will remember that after the incidents last
Mr Gisby: Yes. So it complements other things that summer the images at Luton were produced fairly
we do on the station. We use it reactivity, obviously quickly. The images which obviously helped come
following up incidents and prosecutions. When we from our cameras of previous work there took some
have had an incident reported it is very eVective in weeks to find because 17,000 tapes and images were
helping us. We also use it proactively just for taken away in the first couple of days. It takes time
managing crowds. It is also very useful to us in the to go through that stuV, whether you are dealing
ebb and flow of things across the network. We can with very major incidents or relatively minor ones.
see where we have got hot-spots, and if we have got That is probably where more of the investment
certain incidents we can react to those as well. should go now so that people can respond more
quickly.
Q65 Clive EVord: How many of the people who are
monitoring the screens are in radio contact with the Q68 Clive EVord: Is there an issue about the quality
British Transport Police or any other enforcement and the size of the image before any action can be
oYcers? taken?
Mr Gisby: They would be on each station jointly Mr Gisby: With the investment that is going into
with the Transport Police where they are based as digital equipment and so on, it is moving in the right
well as through the station management structure. way. You are seeing the end result of some years of
We can provide a back-up note on that if you frustration, I think, within the industry and
require. elsewhere about the degree of evidential definition
Ev 34 Transport Committee: Evidence

19 April 2006 Mr George Muir, Mr David Franks, Mr Ian Dobbs, Mr Andrew Haines, Mr Keith Ludeman
and Mr Robin Gisby

you do finally need to get for a conviction. It is quite Q75 Clive EVord: Do they give the public a false
a challenge to get suYcient evidence, particularly sense of security by deploying oYcers with fewer
given where some of these events happen, the powers or are they eVective in dealing with anti-
lighting, the dress of the person, and so on, simply to social behaviour?
get a conviction, but I think with the information Mr Haines: My experience of both TravelSafe
and images we are getting now that is getting much oYcers and community support oYcers is that they
better. are more readily available than police oYcers, you
can deploy them more quickly, and they are easier
Q69 Clive EVord: Can I ask Mr Dobbs, you pay for to recruit.
TravelSafe oYcers who are deployed by the British
Transport Police. How eVective have these been as Q76 Chairman: Are they cheaper?
compared to fully trained police oYcers and Mr Haines: Per head yes, but that was not the driver
community support oYcers in preventing crime on originally. It was a shortage of British Transport
railways? Police oYcers that drove us down that route at the
Mr Dobbs: They have proven to be very, very time. We had vacancies at local police stations which
eVective. We originally gave an undertaking to they were struggling to recruit to in the south-east of
introduce just over 30 oYcers and we have brought England in particular.
in 56, so we obviously believe that they have a very—
Q77 Clive EVord: Do they have to undergo CRB
Q70 Chairman: Are they identifiable, Mr Dobbs? checks?
Mr Dobbs: They are dressed in very distinctive Mr Haines: Very much so. They are recruited
uniforms. They do not try to look like policemen but alongside the British Transport Police who are
they wear hats, jackets, trousers, they are smartly involved in the process.
dressed, and they are out there to make sure that
anti-social behaviour does not fall on to railway
property and on to trains. They are very flexible. We Q78 Clive EVord: Is it not likely to create confusion
can put them in diVerent combinations in diVerent in the eyes of the public if you have got private
places at diVerent times, again based on risk. security guards which are yours, TravelSafe oYces,
community support oYcers, railway enforcement
Q71 Clive EVord: What are the significant oYcers and police oYcers, if there are so many
diVerences between them and community support enforcement oYcers for them to deal with?
oYcers? Mr Gisby: I think you are looking at a number of
Mr Dobbs: That is a question that I am not qualified proposals over the last couple of years to come
to answer. I will have to give you a reply on that forward and solve this problem. You are looking
afterwards. I do not know the answer to that. also at a possible restructuring of the Transport
Police and moving perhaps towards a more focused
force. I think there will be an evolution here.
Q72 Clive EVord: What powers do they have? Do
DiVerent operators and ourselves have all come at
they have the powers to stop someone and ask to see
this in slightly diVerent ways. There has been an
their ticket or remove someone from a station or do
overlap to that as a response to what happened last
they call the police in those situations?
summer and so on. I believe there is a role for a body
Mr Dobbs: They have limited powers but they do not
of men and women that are not as expensive to train
have the power of arrest. If that is required the
and maintain and as specialist as the Transport
Transport Police oYcers back them up. They are
Police themselves, but fit somewhere between what
deployed by the Transport Police as a means of
one might call straightforward railway station staV
gaining intelligence and also getting out there on the
and a higher level of security staV but not going as
trains and having a very visible presence.
far as a fully-fledged Transport Police oYcer.
Whether that is a CSO coming a little downwards
Q73 Clive EVord: Do they have an accreditation from a fully-fledged constable or it is the rail
under the Railway Safety Accreditation Scheme? industry moving a little further forward into more
Mr Dobbs: I do not think so. measures of hands-on security—
Chairman: I think we need to ask the police about
Q74 Chairman: Mr Haines has something to tell us. that, Mr Gisby.
Mr Haines: I was only going to help my colleague
out because it is a bit of an incestuous industry and
I introduced the TravelSafe oYcers in a previous life. Q79 Mr Wilshire: Mr Gisby touched on the point
They were the precursor to the community support that concerns me. I would like to ask all six of you
oYcers. If you like, they were the pilot. would merging the British Transport Police with a
Mr Gisby: So you know the diVerence between them diVerent police force make your railway stations
and the CSOs? safer?
Mr Dobbs: There is not a lot of diVerence. I do not Mr Gisby: No. Absolutely not.
believe they are accredited. The accreditation is
much more an initiative by the British Transport Q80 Chairman: But does that mean that you would
Police and most operators are still reviewing the consider some form of private force if you all seem
merits of that. to be seriously considering employing—
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 35

19 April 2006 Mr George Muir, Mr David Franks, Mr Ian Dobbs, Mr Andrew Haines, Mr Keith Ludeman
and Mr Robin Gisby

Mr Gisby: I am not sure about that. Mr Ludeman: I could not give you the figure for
prosecutions.
Q81 Mr Wilshire: Could we get the answer from
each of the six? Q88 Chairman: Would every one of you give me a
Mr Ludeman: British Transport Police has done a short note on the numbers of people who have been
first-class job for the railways because it is a prosecuted for assaults against staV, and if there is
specialist force and it is a national force. any special classification of those perhaps you could
provide the Committee with that as well.
Q82 Chairman: Is that a yes or a no? Mr Ludeman: There is, Chairman, a good news story
Mr Ludeman: I am working towards one—but in that over the last 12 months we have seen the tide
money is important and we have to live within our turn gradually on the number of assaults.
means. We have looked at other means of expanding
the number of people visible in our stations. Q89 Chairman: Is that anything to do with the Rail
Personal Security Group?
Mr Ludeman: I think it has got to do with the
Q83 Chairman: So is it a yes or a no, Mr Ludeman? amount of investment that my colleagues and I have
Mr Ludeman: We do not want the BTP merged with described to you today in our stations and on our
the Home OYce force. We want the specialism of a trains. It is to do with the training we have instigated
force that knows what the railway needs to continue. with our staV, assault avoidance techniques and the
Mr Haines: I do not think it is a yes or no answer. It like, changes to the design of stations to improve the
would depend on the terms. I think there is real value environment, but also at a national level the group
in retaining the British Transport Police but it would that you have just mentioned, which we believe is a
depend on the terms of policing the stations. first-class group. There are plenty of examples of
Mr Dobbs: We do not want a merger but we believe initiatives that that group is involved in that enable
that there is probably a modified role that makes best practice to be shared amongst the TOCs which
their presence on stations even more eVective. has seen the number of assaults on our staV of a
Mr Franks: Our position is the same as Mr Dobbs’. serious nature at long last start to reduce.
Mr Muir: My position is the same as the gentleman’s
on my left.
Q90 Chairman: So you have got a target for the
Chairman: I would hope it was, Mr Muir, that is why
reduction of assaults on staV?
I did not bother to ask you!
Mr Ludeman: We set ourselves our own targets
Clive EVord: Is there anything more that the British
within each company, but it is always too many.
Transport Police could do to improve safety on our
railways? It is an open question to any of you. There
are no burning issues amongst any of the train Q91 Chairman: If you could tell us that as well.
operators? Mr Ludeman: We could do.

Q92 Chairman: Who can tell us about the multi-

Q84 Chairman: Nothing they do not do? Mr Muir,
operator stations and the diYculty of explaining to
you are going to take it upon yourself?
people who is actually in charge?
Mr Muir: If I can recover from the last question.
Mr Haines: I am happy to pick that one up.
Yes, I think we can do more in local policing. There
is more to be done in co-ordinating staV—train
operator staV and BTP staV—locally under the Q93 Chairman: Mr Haines, how do you tell the
rubric of neighbourhood policing. public that you are in charge?
Mr Haines: The relationship with passengers is with
the train operators. I think that is pretty clear on
Q85 Chairman: You mean you would like railway most stations. As part of every franchise agreement
staV trained like policemen? you have to have details of who runs the stations,
Mr Gisby: No I did not mean that. I meant more who provides the services, contact details for the
careful, organised, thought-through collaboration company, and the local manager. That is very clear.
at a local level between us and the BTP: “can I get First Group’s policy is to brand everything very
more with the resources we have got?” clearly “First”.

Q86 Chairman: I do not want to keep you very Q94 Chairman: So why are the public so dismayed
much longer, gentlemen. Tell me about crime because they feel nobody is responsible for their
against staV; what measures are you taking to safety?
protect your staV against crime? Mr Haines: I have not seen evidence of that dismay.
Mr Ludeman: Railway crime against our staV If you look at the national passenger satisfaction
obviously means assaults and there are a number of surveys you will find that for some of our companies
diVerent initiatives we have followed over the years. three% of people are dissatisfied with station
If you look at the number of assaults at the moment, security.
it is largely a London and South East issue.
Q95 Chairman: Do you have a co-ordinated
Q87 Chairman: How many people have you approach across the whole of the train operating
prosecuted over the last two years? companies?
Ev 36 Transport Committee: Evidence

19 April 2006 Mr George Muir, Mr David Franks, Mr Ian Dobbs, Mr Andrew Haines, Mr Keith Ludeman
and Mr Robin Gisby

Mr Haines: Yes and we are developing that further. Mr Haines: Hundreds.

Mr Franks has already oVered the document that
shows you our best practice. Q103 Chairman: Hundreds?
Mr Haines: Absolutely but that may be because I
know where to look.
Q96 Chairman: Have you also agreed to things like
standardised signing? Q104 Chairman: You could not actually read them
Mr Haines: I would have to get back to you on but you knew they were there.
whether or not that is an industry-wide standard. Mr Haines: They are normally at the front of the
Mr Muir: We have a Code of Practice on station, very visible to people if you know it.
standardised signing.
Q105 Chairman: If you know where to look. If I know
Q97 Chairman: You make sure that all your members where to look I can see it and it is clear, and I know
adhere to that Code of Practice? when I get attacked that I can at least be sure that
Mr Muir: Not yet. someone will have some kind of record of it even if
they cannot actually read it when they get it?
Mr Haines: I would encourage you the next time you
Q98 Chairman: When are you going to make sure are at a station to look. I think you will find one very
they adhere to it? quickly. They have to be in a visible location. If not,
Mr Muir: When they upgrade their signing— the operators are failing in their duty under the
franchise agreement.
Q99 Chairman: Mr Muir, forgive me but some of our
stations are not only very ancient but are not going to Q106 Chairman: You have given me my task for the
be upgraded for many years, are they? next 12 months. I shall enjoy going round taking
Mr Muir: You are correct. pictures! I just want to finish on transparency
generally. The Rail Action Group says that in the
East of Scotland at present there is a feeling that no-
Q100 Chairman: To say that when they are upgraded one is responsible for safety. What are you doing
they are going to have their signs improved so that about that?
people will know who is responsible for the station Mr Haines: In Scotland, for example, we yesterday
and their safety is not much of an undertaking, is it announced a 30% reduction in violent crime and a
really? 30% reduction in staV assaults at stations.
Mr Haines: That undertaking is already there for
everyone, so there is no dubiety on that. Q107 Chairman: Then you had better tell some of
your passengers because they do not seem to know
Q101 Chairman: So you can deal with the gap about it.
between the time that it is going to take to modernise Mr Haines: This morning’s newspapers in Scotland
are full of it, I am glad to say.
the stations and the existence of this kind of signage?
Chairman: I think, gentlemen, you have been very
Mr Haines: Signage for who is responsible should be
indulgent. We do still have one or two questions
at every single station today. People are failing in their
which we will send to you and ask for written answers.
duty if that is not the case. I apologise again for making you wait but you have
been very helpful. Next time we shall expect to see an
Q102 Chairman: How many of them have you seen equal opportunities panel. Thank you very much
yourself, Mr Haines? indeed.

Supplementary memorandum submitted by the Association of Train Operating Companies

I am responding to your letter of 28 April which we received on 4 May. The answers to the questions you
raise are set out below:

1. Question 12: Exactly how many stations are managed by ATOC members, and how many of these are
accredited under the Secure Stations Scheme?
Response: ATOC members manage 2,498 stations. Of these, 191 are accredited under the scheme. One
further station is working towards accreditation. 23 further stations have been assessed and formal
accreditation by the DfT is awaited. Plans are in hand to seek accreditation for a further 59 stations—some
of these plans are well advanced with submission to the BTP Assessor due next month.

2. Questions 41–44: What would be the extra cost of staYng all the stations managed by ATOC members at
all times when trains are running?
Response: Unfortunately, it is not possible to supply the cost of staYng all stations at all times trains are
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 37

running. Many stations have been unstaVed for many years, and some have always been unstaVed halts. In
most cases there is no accommodation for staV at these stations. Clearly the cost of providing new buildings
and servicing them could only be determined after substantial research and it would not be possible to do
this in the timescale set for reply. Full time station staYng at all stations is not prescribed in franchise
agreements and our evidence made clear that station staYng would not of itself deal with the crime and
security issues discussed. In particular, it would have little value at stations with very low footfall.

3. Question 55: How many times in each of the last five years have ATOC members asked the BTP to prosecute
on the basis of CCTV evidence?
Response: Our members make CCTV evidence available to BTP at their request. BTP decides whether or
not to prosecute.

4. Question 64: Across all ATOC members, how many staV monitoring CCTV cameras are in radio contact
with BTP oYcers? What proportion of monitoring staV does this figure represent?
Response: 560 stations are “live monitored” at one or other of 15 central CCTV monitoring control
rooms. The Wimbledon Control Centre, for example, has live feeds from over 1,100 cameras, so continuous
monitoring of all is impractical. Live monitoring means that a rotating selection of cameras are monitored
with the ability of staV to focus on individual locations as required. All of these centres are in telephone
contact with the relevant BTP area control. In some circumstances, for example during major events at
CardiV Millenium stadium, BTP staV are present in the monitoring centre. The CCTV cameras in other
stations are monitored locally by station staV. These staV are able to contact BTP by telephone.

5. Question 87: How many prosecutions have been brought for violence against the staV of ATOC members,
in each of the past five years? And what is the breakdown into diVerent categories of violent crime?
Response: We do not hold these figures, but the following data from BTP may be helpful. In 2005–06,
violent crime comprised the following number of oVences:
7,348 Violence against the person
717 Sexual oVences
1,692 Robbery oVences
9,757 Total, violent crime
The figure for staV assaults represents some 20% of the above total. We do not have details of the number
of prosecutions brought by BTP, but the detections for staV assaults for that year totalled 957.

6. Question 89: What targets does ATOC promote among its members for reducing the number of incidents
of violent crime against your staV?
Response: TOCs have a zero tolerance approach to assaults on staV no matter how minor. The aim is to
see year on year reductions in reported assaults. The number of reported assaults is high because TOCs have
been putting every eVort in to encouraging the reporting of all assaults. TOCs ensure that all staV receive
training (and retraining), based on the role that they perform, to minimise the incidents of assault. TOCs
have instituted close working relationships with the BTP to ensure that all assaults are thoroughly
investigated.
9 May 2006

Supplementary memorandum submitted by the National Express Group PLC

Further to your letter of 28 April I am pleased to enclose the responses relating to National Express Group
train operations. You will note that we have been unable to respond in detail to all questions but have
endeavoured to respond to the best of our ability across our operations where possible.
 Ev 38 Transport Committee: Evidence
c2c Silverlink Metro Silverlink County MML Central Trains One Gatwick Express
Question Response Response Response Response Response Response Response
1 Question 12: Exactly – Operates 24 – Operates 54 – Operates 29 – Operates 7 stations. – Operates 193 – Operates 166 – Manages no stations.
how many stations stations. stations. stations. – 5 stations have SSS. stations. stations. – Neither London Victoria
do you manage, and – 4 currently hold – 5 stations currently – 7 stations currently – None accredited – None accredited nor Gatwick Airport are
how many of these SSS. hold SSS. hold SSS. under SSS. under SSS. accredited under the
are accredited under – 13 have just – 4 car parks hold Secure Stations Scheme.
the Secure Stations received the initial Secure Car Parking
Scheme? assessment by BTP status.
with a view to being
progressed to full
accreditation.
2 Questions 41-44: Cost unknown—see Cost unknown—see Cost unknown—see All MML stations Cost unknown—see Cost unknown—see Manages no stations. StaV
What would be the ATOC response ATOC response ATOC response are staVed from first ATOC response ATOC response attend all GX departures
extra cost of staYng which makes our which makes our which makes our to last train. which makes our which makes our and arrivals at London
all your stations at all points. points. points. points. points. Victoria station. Network
times when trains are Rail staV attend all GX
running? arrivals and departures at
Gatwick Airport.
3 Question 55: How c2c has had over 125 There are no There are no There are no BTP will normally BTP will normally None. The BTP has taken
many times in each of instances where we instances where occasions where we instances. request sight of request sight of decisions to prosecute on
the last five years (and/or the BTP) CCTV monitoring have asked the BPT CCTV. No instances CCTV. No instances other grounds, but not
have you asked the have requested a has been used to to prosecute on the known. known. solely on the basis of
BTP to prosecute on CCTV download drive a prosecution. basis of CCTV CCTV evidence.
the basis of CCTV following an incident. CCTV evidence is evidence.
evidence? In each case these used upon request
have been forwarded from the BTP
to BTP for following an incident
prosecution. or report of crime.
4 Question 64: How Zero—c2c staV Zero—Silverlink Zero—Silverlink Zero Zero Zero Although there are CCTV
many of your staV monitoring CCTV Metro staV County staV monitors in our operations
monitoring CCTV would contact the monitoring CCTV monitoring CCTV delivery centre on
cameras are in radio MICC via telephone. would contact the would contact the platforms 13/14 at London
contact with BTP MICC via telephone. MICC via telephone. Victoria, they are provided
oYcers? What to assist with train
proportion of working and are not
monitoring staV does monitored in connection
this figure represent? with passenger safety. GX
Controllers are not in
radio contact with BTP
oYcers. Requests for BTP
assistance are made via
Network Rail’s Station
Control.
 c2c Silverlink Metro Silverlink County MML Central Trains One Gatwick Express
Question Response Response Response Response Response Response Response
5 Question 87: How Of six staV physical Unknown—not Although there have Two prosecutions Information not Around 10 incidents Physical assaults against
many prosecutions assaults five available from BTP. been a number of have taken place with available within per year. GX staV are rare. The
have been brought prosecutions have investigations into county court timeframe from BTP. average number of
for violence against been brought. alleged staV assaults, judgments. physical assaults over the
your staV, in each of there have been no past 5 years is three per
the past five years? prosecutions brought. year, and these are
And what is the typically instances of
breakdown into pushing, shoving, spitting,
diVerent categories of etc. Details not known. We
violent crime? have in the past worked
with the BTP in
connection with Anti
Social Behaviour Orders.
6 Question 89: What The target set for the The target set for the The target set for the 5% reduction per During 2005 we 5% reduction. GX has set no target.
targets do you have reduction of violent reduction of violent reduction of violent 1,000 employees from suVered 100 violent
for reducing the crime against c2c rail crime against crime against 2006 against the 2005 assaults. Our target is
number of cases of staV for 2006 is Silverlink Metro staV Silverlink County figures. a 5% reduction.
violent crime against approx 18% against for 2006 is approx staV for 2006 is
your staV? that seen in 2005. 14% against that seen approx 15% against

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 39

in 2005. that seen in 2005.

2006 Target % 18 2006 Target % 15 2006 Target % 17

2005 Actual % 23 2005 Actual % 18 2005 Actual % 21

9 May 2006
Ev 40 Transport Committee: Evidence

Supplementary memorandum submitted by Stagecoach Group: Rail Division

1. Stagecoach Group was very glad to contribute to the Select Committee’s hearing on 19 April 2006. A
number of issues were raised during that meeting about which the Committee sought further information.

Secure Stations Accreditation

2. As mentioned in our original submission, the South West Trains franchise covers 178 stations. Of those
50 now have Secure Stations accreditation.

Staffing of Stations During Service Hours

3. The Committee asked for more detail about the hours during which our stations are continuously
staVed. The information is contained in the following table:

StaYng hours Numbers of stations Notes

24 hours a day 19 Including (eg): Waterloo, Woking, Winchester etc
Early and late shift 68 Typically 6.00 am until at least 10.00 pm
Early shift only 65 Typically 6.30 am to 1.30 pm
UnstaVed (Monday to Sunday) 26 Includes both suburban and rural stations
Total: 178 stations

4. It is worth noting that staV will be present on occasion at these stations at other times, for example if
they are targeted for attention by TravelSafe OYcers or revenue protection staV.
5. The Committee has also asked how much it would cost to ensure that all our stations are staVed during
service hours. We have two observations to make about this point:
— It is not a straightforward calculation—as well as additional staV costs there would be a need to
provide proper accommodation and facilities for staV, and to ensure that the right number of staV
(usually more than one) is on hand;
— Stagecoach Group is currently involved in the competition for the South Western trains franchise,
and to supply our estimate of costs in public to the Committee would advantage others applying
for the franchise.
6. We will write to the Chairman of the Committee to provide further information on this point.

Prosecutions for Crimes at South West Trains Stations

7. The Committee has asked for more details of the numbers of prosecutions for crimes committed at
South West Trains stations during the past five years. This is not an easy figure to identify, since many crimes
are reported directly to the police, and do not involve our staV.
8. We are also not able to provide comprehensive information about whether CCTV evidence was used
as part of each prosecution, since this information is not held centrally. It is certainly the case that CCTV
evidence is very valuable in securing successful prosecutions of those committing crime on railway stations
and on trains, and we are working with BTP to develop a system which will provide detailed statistics about
the way in which CCTV is used.
9. However, it may help the Committee to say that in 2005–06 South West Trains received and responded
to 1,600 requests for footage from CCTV systems at stations. 971 of these requests came from the British
Transport Police, and a further 242 from other agencies such as Surrey Police. The other requests were made
by organisations including South West Trains itself.
10. We received and met 566 requests for footage from trains. 323 requests were made by BTP, and 27
others from agencies including HM Customs and Excise (now HM Revenue and Customs) and
Hampshire Police.

Prosecutions for Assaults on Staff

11. At Stagecoach Group and South West Trains we regard the safety of our staV as paramount. As our
original evidence said, we have instituted a wide range of measures to protect and support staV, including
employing a dedicated member of staV to follow up all incidents of assaults on our employees.
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 41

12. Part of our strategy has been to encourage staV to report assaults, and in part as a result of this the
number of reported assaults has risen in recent years. The number of reported physical assaults on staV
during each of the past five years is as follows:

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

219 238 258 314 290

Our safety plan sets a target of no more than four physical assaults per 1,000 staV during each period of
a year. In 2005 we achieved a figure of 4.15 assaults per 1,000 staV, and we continue to work hard to ensure
that we meet our target.
13. In the past year, there have been 44 successful prosecutions following assaults on staV. In addition
there have been a number of ASBOs given to those involved in crime and anti-social behaviour on trains
and at stations. We will continue to work with the police and prosecution authorities to do all we can to
ensure that those who assault our staV are prosecuted.

Powers of TravelSafe Officers

14. Our TravelSafe OYcers provide a uniformed presence on trains and at stations to respond to crime
and anti-social behaviour. They are trained and deployed by the British Transport Police, but their remit is
to deter crime, rather than to arrest criminals: they have no greater powers of arrest than an average citizen.
15. However, TravelSafe OYcers have been trained by the British Transport Police to evict and restrain
people, using physical force if required. They are trained and empowered to enforce railway byelaws and to
undertake activities such as station searches as required.
16. Thus the powers of TravelSafe OYcers overlap with those of Police Community Support OYcers
(PCSOs), but are not as extensive. PCSOs also do not have the power of arrest, but they are able to issue
fixed penalty notices and so on. TravelSafe OYcers are intended to deter crime and gather information, and
have proved very eVective in doing so.
17. There are now 56 TravelSafe OYcers, located at Clapham Junction, Richmond, Guildford,
Portsmouth, Bournemouth/Weymouth and Basingstoke. There are PCSOs on the South West Trains
network, mainly located around Waterloo.

Contact Between CCTV Monitoring Staff and BTP

18. The Committee has asked whether the staV monitoring CCTV are in “radio contact” with the British
Transport Police. The contact between monitoring staV and BTP is not through radio, but by telephone
through the BTP’s Management Information and Communication Centre.

Minimum Standards
19. A major aspect of the Committee’s inquiry is to investigate whether minimum standards for passenger
safety at stations should be required of train operating companies. Given the tenor of the questions asked
during the evidence session it may be worth clarifying the view taken by Stagecoach Group.
20. Stagecoach Group is not “opposed” to minimum standards of passenger safety and security. Indeed
such standards are of course already set in existing and planned franchise agreements. We are very happy
that further, higher minimum standards are set in future franchise requirements. However, companies must
continue to strive to exceed minimum standards.
21. It has always been our belief that it is in the business interests of train operating companies to ensure
that passengers and staV are—and feel—as safe as possible from the threat of crime. We believe that South
West Trains has taken a leading role in addressing concerns about crime on the railways, and has
demonstrated what can be achieved by companies, often working in partnership with others, to exceed
defined minimum requirements.

Conclusion
22. We hope that this additional information is of interest and use to the Committee. Should it require
further evidence we are of course ready to assist.
9 May 2006
Ev 42 Transport Committee: Evidence

Supplementary memorandum submitted by FirstGroup plc

Further to your letter dated 28 April 2006 seeking additional information, we have outlined a response
to each of the questions tendered.

Question 12: Exactly how many stations do you manage, and how many of these are accredited under the
Secure Stations Scheme?
For purposes of clarity the response to this question has been broken down to reflect the current position
within each of our four Train Operating Companies,
First Great Western (FGW): The Greater Western Franchise which started on the 1st of April 2006
includes the direct management of 210 stations (Prior to the 1st of April First Great Western and First Great
Western Link managed a total of 86 stations, of which 41 had secure stations accreditation). Of the 124
former Wessex stations which joined FGW on the 1st of April 2006 none had secure stations accreditation.
Within the first two years of the new franchise FGW are working towards the accreditation of 105 stations
and a further 63 within the first three years. Accreditation will also be maintained at stations where it has
already been achieved.
First Capital Connect (FCC): FCC commenced operations on 1st April 2006 and directly manages 74
stations. Of these, 22 have achieved accreditation under the Secure Stations scheme and most have already
gone through at least one re-accreditation. This demonstrates that measures needed to obtain secure stations
accreditation have been maintained. Of these stations 16 are within the TfL area. Through a targeted
investment programme FCC is also committed to achieve Secure Stations accreditation at a further 12
stations by April 2008, as well as re-accrediting all 22 currently held.
First TransPennine Express (FTPE): FTPE directly manage 30 stations. Of these, nine have achieved
secure stations accreditation. FTPE are working towards achieving secure stations accreditation at the
remaining 21 stations within the next 18 months.
First ScotRail (FSR): FSR directly manage 341 stations and despite having a strong CCTV infrastructure
in place has not sought secure stations accreditation as the Scottish Executive and SPT, the two co-
signatories to the franchise, monitor the condition of stations and trains through SQUIRE (the Service
Quality Incentive Regime). In support of this diVerent approach recent BTP figures show a 12% drop in
recorded crime in Scotland.

Question 41–44: What would the extra cost of staYng all your stations at all times when trains are running?

Unfortunately, it is not possible to supply the cost of staYng all stations at all times trains are running.
Many stations are permanently unstaVed halts with no accommodation for staV. Clearly the cost of
providing new buildings and services could only be determined after substantial research and it would not
be possible to do this in the timescale set for reply. Full time station staYng at all stations is not prescribed
in franchise agreements and our evidence made clear that station staYng would not of itself deal with the
crime and security issues discussed. In particular, it would have little value at stations with very low footfall.

Question 55: How many times in each of the last five years have you asked the BTP to prosecute on the basis
of CCTV evidence?

The BTP regularly use CCTV footage in the investigation of their cases and this has lead to a significant
number of convictions. The BTP have built up good relationships with our CCTV centres and are well aware
of the areas that CCTV covers. Their objectives are very much focused on crimes against the person on
stations and trains and for every reported crime of this nature, at CCTV covered stations, they will request
the footage.
A number of significant cases have been solved using our CCTV footage. Two such instances are of note.
There was a serious assault on a woman at Sutton Common and the CCTV footage was shown on
Crimewatch. The person was apprehended, charged and sentenced to a custodial sentence. Another case
was at Elephant and Castle where the Police identified a person committing a robbery on a person and the
CCTV footage was used to not only prove the guilt of the individual committing the crime but also had to
be used to identify the victim as they hadn’t come forward at the time of the persons arrest.
CCTV footage has been especially useful in prosecuting those committing theft from vehicles in car parks
and on assaults on staV. An area that we will be working more closely with the BTP on is on using CCTV
footage to gain convictions for vandalism and damage on stations, which is not currently within the BTP
priorities or objectives but adds to the fear of crime to the travelling public.
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 43

Question 64: How many of your staV monitoring CCTV cameras are in radio contact with BTP oYcers? What
proportion of staV does this figure represent?
None of our staV monitoring CCTV cameras are in radio contact with the BTP oYcers but all our CCTV
staV has access to a direct line to the BTP Control Room, which is also BTP’s preferred method of managing
communication. However, during special operations BTP may provide a mobile phone number, which
provides direct contact to an Inspector in charge.
As part of an FGW/local crime partnership initiative in Reading, the station cameras can be accessed by
the town centre control room where the staV are in contact with the Thames Valley Police OYcers and BTP
oYcers by radio.

Question 87: How many prosecutions have been brought for violence against your staV, in each of the past five
years? And what is the breakdown into diVerent into diVerent categories of violent crime?
Due to the limited timescale the BTP are not in a position to provide a breakdown of crimes against StaV
for the past five years at present. Thankfully we have not experienced many cases where staV have suVered
a major assault which resulted in a serious injury. In all these cases we have worked closely with the BTP
to obtain a prosecution where the assailant has been identified. There were two cases where a prosecution
was not pursued and a caution issued. In both these cases civil actions was funded, by the company, on
behalf of the staV members. Both of these lead to a civil compensation payment to the staV members.
The vast majority of assaults on staV are however of a more minor nature, predominantly verbal abuse
and threatening behaviour of which there has been little success in prosecuting these cases as they do not
fall within the Home OYce guidelines to the CPS that it is in the public interestpursue the cases. Where a
physical assault occurs, most fall within the area of common assault. On nearly every occasion these have
lead to the assailant, where identified, receiving a caution and no further action being taken. Once again this
is in line with Home OYce guidelines.

Question 89: What targets do you have for reducing the number of cases of violent crime against your staV?

First are currently targeting a 20% reduction in the number of cases of violent crime against our staV.
8 May 2006

Supplementary memorandum submitted by the Go-Ahead Group

The Go-Ahead Group welcomes the opportunity of presenting further evidence and clarification to the
Committee in relation to passenger safety at stations.
With eVect from 1 April 2006, Go-Ahead operates two of the largest franchises in London and the South-
East with responsibility for over 330 stations. The Southern and Southeastern franchises carry in excess of 110
million passengers a year, 15% of the National rail business.

1. Question 12: Exactly how many stations do you manage, and how many of these are accredited under the
Secure Stations Scheme?

Answer: We manage 163 Stations in our Southern Franchise of which seven are currently accredited. A
further 15 are planned to achieve accredited status by the end of June 2006. A follow on tranché of 28 stations
are being considered for 2006–07. By July 2007 we would expect to have 50 (30%) of Southern stations
accredited.
In our newly acquired Southeastern franchise there are 182 stations, of which nine on the Hayes Line are
accredited. Southeastern has plans to extend accreditation to other stations on a rolling programme, 10
accreditations in the first year of the franchise, and more in successive years.
Our former Thameslink Franchise included 28 stations, of which 22 (79% of total), achieved Secure Station
Accreditation.

2. Questions 41–44: What would be the extra cost of staYng all your stations at all times when trains are running?

Answer: Notional staV costs alone, excluding building and other costs, would be circa £7.5 million for
Southern and circa £10.3 million for Southeastern.
Ev 44 Transport Committee: Evidence

3. Question 55: How many times in each of the last five years have you asked the BTP to prosecute on the basis of
CCTV evidence?
Answer: We are not in a position to ask BTP to prosecute. Rather, we prepare CCTV evidence packages for
BTP (and other police forces) and respond to their requests for CCTV evidence, or pro-actively advise them
of its availability for use in their investigations.
Further, CCTV forms only part of a prosecution case, and we are unable to provide quantifiable data on the
usefulness of the CCTV evidence alone in terms of identification, or indeed the prosecution of oVenders.
In our Southern franchise, from 30 November 2005 up to the present date we have supplied CCTV evidence
in 638 cases from our Hove CCTV Centre and from the 24 July 2005 to 29 April 1,037 downloads from our
Streatham Hill CCTV Centre. This equates to an average of 2,913 cases per annum.
In our Southeastern franchise, A central CCTV monitoring system has only been in operation since March
2005 when new digital CCTV, funded by TfL, commenced roll out to 52 stations within South-London/North-
Kent Metro.
From March 2005 to end of April 2006, we have prepared 512 CCTV evidence packages for police, (starting
with just two in March 2005 rising steadily to 131, 138 and 108 in February, March and April 2006
respectively.)
It is worth noting that following the terrorist attacks in London on 7 and 21 July 2005 that CCTV from our
Group systems proved vital in identifying suspected terrorists. In particular CCTV from Luton (Thameslink)
and Kings Cross (NR) provided vital evidence.
In Southern all CCTV for the relevant period of interest was preserved. In additional 581 VHS tapes, 170
CD/DVDs and 28 Digital hard drives were handed to the police.
In Southeastern at all 71 stations within the M25 CCTV was secured. Police requests were subsequently
made for download from six trains and nine stations for a 48-hour period.

4. Question 64: How many of your staV monitoring CCTV cameras are in radio contact with BTP oYcers? What
proportion of monitoring staV does this figure represent?
Answer: There is no direct radio link between any of our monitoring centres and the police. However all the
monitoring centres are able to contact the BTP Control Room (MICC) by telephone and the MICC has a
direct radio link with operational oYcers.

5. Question 87: How many prosecutions have been brought for violence against your staV, in each of the past five
years? And what is the breakdown into diVerent categories of violent crime?
Answer: See Attachment—Data provided courtesy of British Transport Police

6. Question 89: What targets do you have for reducing the number of cases of violent crime against your staV?
Answer: Each Franchise operates as a distinct business and sets its own performance targets. In Southern the
target is set at not more than 104 StaV Injury Assaults in 2006 (actual in 2005 115) seeking a reduction of 10%.
In Southeastern the target is set at not more than 47 staV assaults in 2006–07 (year end figure for 2005–06
was 53 hence also seeking an overall reduction of 10%).
8 May 2006

SOUTHERN:
NUMBER OF ASSAULTS

2005–06 2004–05 2003–04 2002–03 2001–02

B00 Wounding/GBH with intent 1 0 0 2 3
B01 Wounding/GBH without intent 1 1 1 0 0
B02 ABH 45 39 26 24 32
B06 Threats to kill 3 1 5 1 2
B22 Injury by dangerous dog 0 0 1 1 0
S07 Harassment 1 3 2 0 2
X02 Racially aggravated ABH 10 1 1 0 0
X03 Racially aggravated common assault 6 12 72 2
X07 Racially aggravated harassment, alarm or distress 18 39 8 9 4
X08 Racially aggravated fear or provocation of violence 22 13 6 3 2
X10 Racially aggravated harassment 1 1 0 0 0
Z70 Common assault 141 144 80 114 84
TOTAL 249 254 137 156 131
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 45

NUMBER OF PROSECUTIONS

2005–06 2004–05 2003–04 2002–03 2001–02

B00 Wounding/GBH with intent 0 0 0 1 1
B01 Wounding/GBH without intent 1 1 1 0 0
B02 ABH 13 16 11 59
B06 Threats to kill 1 1 3 0 0
B22 Injury by dangerous dog 0 0 0 0 0
S07 Harassment 0 0 1 0 1
X02 Racially aggravated ABH 6 0 1 0 0
X03 Racially aggravated common assault 0 8 3 0 0
X07 Racially aggravated harassment, alarm or distress 3 11 4 2 2
X08 Racially aggravated fear or provocation of violence 8 7 3 2 1
X10 Racially aggravated harassment 1 1 0 0 0
Z70 Common assault 21 33 17 24 15
TOTAL 54 78 44 34 29

SOUTHEASTERN:
NUMBER OF ASSAULTS

2005–06 2004–05 2003–04 2002–03 2001–02

B00 Wounding/GBH with intent 1 1 0 1 0
B01 Wounding/GBH without intent 0 1 1 0 0
B02 ABH 38 42 18 67 12
B06 Threats to kill 4 2 0 3 2
B22 Injury by dangerous dog 0 0 0 0 0
S07 Harassment 1 2 2 1 0
X02 Racially aggravated ABH 0 2 2 0 0
X03 Racially aggravated common assault 3 7 0 1 1
X07 Racially aggravated harassment, alarm or distress 11 2 1 1 3
X08 Racially aggravated fear or provocation of violence 8 0 1 1 3
X10 Racially aggravated harassment 0 0 1 0 0
Z70 Common assault 124 106 118 97 59
TOTAL 190 165 144 172 80

NUMBER OF PROSECUTIONS

2005–06 2004–05 2003–04 2002–03 2001–02

B00 Wounding/GBH with intent 1 1 0 1 0
B01 Wounding/GBH without intent 0 0 0 0 0
B02 ABH 13 13 11 10 2
B06 Threats to kill 0 0 0 1 0
B22 Injury by dangerous dog 0 0 0 0 0
S07 Harassment 0 0 0 0 0
X02 Racially aggravated ABH 0 1 0 0 0
X03 Racially aggravated common assault 2 2 0 0 0
X07 Racially aggravated harassment, alarm or distress 2 0 1 0 0
X08 Racially aggravated fear or provocation of violence 0 0 1 1 1
X10 Racially aggravated harassment 0 0 1 0 0
Z70 Common assault 19 21 22 20 8
TOTAL 37 38 36 33 11

Supplementary memorandum submitted by Network Rail

Further to your request to Robin Gisby, Director of Operations and Customer Services, please find below
follow up notes on a number of the questions raised by the committee. In respect of: assaults on staV, action
taken by the BTP in each of these, and the role of CCTV in prosecutions, I am able to provide the following
information.
In respect of Q55, please be aware that the BTP does not technically prosecute people itself, this is the job
of the Crown Prosecution Service. Therefore, they do not have prosecution related data.
The BTP instead uses the term “detection”, which is where:
— A person has been charged or summonsed for a crime.
— An oVender has been cautioned or given a final warning or reprimand.
— The oVender admits the crime ands asks for it to be taken into consideration by the court.
Ev 46 Transport Committee: Evidence

— No further action has been taken by the police, which usually occurs if the oVender is dead or
severely ill; or when an essential witness or victim is permanently ill.
— A penalty notice for disorder has been issued.
— A formal warning for cannabis possession has been issued.
The following data is for the BTP force as a whole (excluding LU) in order to provide you with a complete
picture of the overall level of violent crime on the railways.

Force excluding LU
2001–02 2002–03 2003–04 2004–05 2005–06
Violence against the person 4,737 5,776 6,432 7,126 7,348
Sexual oVences 718 692 799 893 717
Robbery oVences 2,625 1,769 2,088 1,724 1,692
Total violent crime 8,080 8,237 9,319 9,743 9,757
It is not possible to provide data as to how many people have been prosecuted on the basis of CCTV
evidence as the BTP do not keep this type of data.
In respect of question 87, the following table shows overall BTP detections for staV assaults (again,
excluding LU):

Detections for StaV Assaults

(excluding LU Area)
2001–02 430
2002–03 526
2003–04 645
2004–05 779
2005–06 957
Network Rail’s own record of staV assaults for the last full year (2005–06) was 162. Assault figures
comprise two categories: Verbal and Physical. Verbal abuse is any verbal statement that the victim considers
to be oVensive, abusive or insulting, but not accompanied by a threat of force, this includes anything of a
racial or sexual nature. Physical abuse includes both actual physical contact and direct threats and gestures
of violence, including those with a weapon.
Due to a change in the categorisation of assaults in April 2005 which was accompanied by a campaign to
encourage staV to report more verbal assaults, there are no directly comparable figures for previous years.
In respect of question 89; the overwhelming majority of assaults on Network Rail staV occur at the
stations we manage. At each of these there is a safety action plan aimed at reducing the level of assaults, this
is backed up by training and information to our employees, public campaigns and liaison with the BTP and
community support oYcers who have a high profile at each of these 17 large stations. In addition, where the
CPS does not bring a case forward for prosecution and we feel that there may be an opportunity to bring
a private action, Network Rail will seriously consider doing so on behalf of an employee.
With regards an overall target, the assault figures are monitored and reported on at senior level: there is
no specific target figure for assaults on staV, rather the aim of Network Rail’s eVorts is to drive the overall
figure down.
I trust that the above information helps in the committee’s considerations on safety at stations. Should
you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to get in touch.
10 May 2006

Memorandum submitted by the British Transport Police

Introduction
British Transport Police (BTP) is the national police force for the railways providing a policing service to
rail operators, their staV and passengers throughout England, Wales and Scotland.
BTP has developed valuable expertise and the skills required to police a modern railway network. Fully
integrated with local policing, BTP works closely with industry and community partners to provide a
specialist, dedicated service protecting passengers, staV, and the network infrastructure from disruption and
fear of crime.
BTP’s policing of Britain’s railways is considered to be among the most sophisticated and successful of
any railway policing in the world. In terms of what can be done to make railway station safer it outline what
BTP is dong in terms of its policing priorities; increasing visibility through extending the police family, and
mounting specific operations to further its objectives and reassure staV. It also addresses station security and
the need for properly maintained stations, the Secure Stations scheme accreditation process and how the
scheme could be improved.
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 47

Increasing Personal Safety—BTP Priorities

BTP is determined to increase actual and perceived personal safety on the railway network and this is
illustrated by the priorities included within the BTP Policing Plan 2005–06. These include:

Combating anti-social behaviour

Low level disorder oYces such as ticket touting (often selling travelcards to feed drug habits), travel fraud,
trespass, vandalism and others can adversely aVect feelings of personal safety on the railways and can also
be an indicator of wider criminality. BTP uniquely maintains a database of all non-recordable oVences, and
detections of low-level disorder have increased dramatically over recent years. Economic costs to the railway
industry are enormous, and BTP has worked hard to ensure that the criminal justice system recognises the
eVect of a crime that is often seen as victimless.

StaV assaults
BTP has included targets surrounding staV assaults on the annual Policing Plan since 2004–05. This was
in response to a significant increase experienced in 2003–04. Various tactics are employed by BTP to tackle
staV assaults and increase the safety of rail staV. These include encouraging rail staV to report all assaults;
ensuring minimum standards of investigation are implemented; working in partnerships with TOCs to
highlight workplace violence; creating specialist units on some Areas to tackle this type of crime; issuing
spittle/DNA kits to rail staV to gather evidence in instances of assault; and working with TOCs through
crime reduction opportunities to improve station CCTV systems to aid the identification of oVenders.

Robbery
Robbery is a BTP priority due to the aggravating feature of actual or threatened violence and the
disproportionate impact this crime has on public perceptions of safety whilst travelling on the rail network.
BTP met the National Policing Plan target of reducing robbery by 14% by 31 March 2005 and continues to
successfully target perpetrators of this crime.

Violent assaults
Detecting violent oVenders was a target for BTP during 2005–06 and will be again in 2006–07. The
inclusion of oVensive weapon oVences within this category further underlines BTP’s resolve to eradicate
violence on the network and supports initiatives such as Operation Shield, which is described in detail below.
It is impossible to overestimate the negative eVects on personal safety these types of crime on the railway
community and BTP are committed to bringing those who commit them to justice.

Hate crime
Hate crime constitutes any crime where a person’s prejudice against an identifiable group is a factor in
their choice of victim and causes extreme distress to both staV and passengers when it occurs. The oVence
could be motivated by hatred, bias or prejudice and is based on the actual or perceived race, gender, colour,
religion, national origin, disability or sexual orientation of another individual or group, including
domestic disputes.
This target underpins substantial BTP activity in this area. BTP has established a Hate Crime Unit, and
has joined the True Visions website, which exists to encourage people to report hate crime. BTP is committed
to vigorously investigating all reported incidents to the satisfaction of the victim, identifying and successfully
prosecuting oVenders, implementing a positive arrest policy and, where a prosecution is not feasible,
identifying other methods of resolution so as to provide protection, comfort and reassurance to victims.
BTP’s other Policing Plan priorities are focused on reducing the threat of terrorism, fatality management,
reducing and detecting theft of passenger property, combating graYti and investigating route crime. In
2004–05, BTP achieved all of its objectives, and is on course to achieve all of its objectives in 2005–06 despite
the increasing demands of the terrorist threat following the July bombings. This is a magnificent
achievement.
BTP’s performance has contributed substantially to the overall decrease in crime on the railway network
of 1.6% between financial year 2003–04 and 2004–05. It is expected that it will go down another 2% during
2005–06. It is important to remember that the railway network is actually a very safe place to be. Based on
2004–05 footfall data, there are around 89 oVences recorded on the railway network for every million
passenger journeys, whilst there are 31 oVences recorded on the underground for every million passenger
journeys. The extremely low levels of crime on London Underground reflects the considerable investment
in BTP by TfL, which has resulted in a substantial increase in police numbers on the Underground. Both
the mainline and London Underground are actually very safe environments.
Ev 48 Transport Committee: Evidence

Passenger volume will also inevitably have an eVect on crime and it is likely that the railway community
will continue to grow. As Transport 2000 commented in 2005:
“Passenger journeys on Britain’s railways last year exceeded one billion, the highest since 1959, and
train operators estimate that demand for rail travel will grow by 66% over the next 20 years. But parts
of the network are already bursting at the seams and desperately need expanding. Other parts of the
network will soon reach capacity as demand for rail use continues to rise.”
The overall decrease in recorded crime on the railways is even more impressive when viewed in the context
of year-on-year rise in passenger volumes.

Increasing Personal Safety—Increasing the Police Family

Complementary policing is about working with a range of people who support the work of regular police
oYcers. These include volunteer Special Constables, sponsored Special Constables, Police Community
Support OYcers (PCSOs), security staV, customer care and other rail staV. The introduction and continued
expansion of BTP’s complementary policing options is a key method of increasing BTP visibility and
increasing personal safety on the railway network.

Railway safety accreditation scheme

The Railway Safety Accreditation Scheme (RSAS) is the latest addition to complementary policing. The
RSAS will bring more people into the wider “policing family”. It allows organisations and their employees
involved in railway safety and security to be accredited by the police. Under the scheme, accredited persons
are given limited powers aimed at providing a better quality of life for the railway community.
RSAS accredited people will be able deal with certain situations without involving police and, as part of
the wider policing family, improve liaison and information sharing. This leads to more eVective action and
prioritisation on issues aVecting local railway communities, and allows for locally driven approaches to
solving problems.
Southeastern Trains were the first Train Operator to make an application for accreditation under the
RSAS, which meant a steep learning curve for both them and the BTP. Since the accredited Railway
Enforcement OYcers (REOs) came into being they have been involved in the following:

2,724 Tickets issued

1,195 Penalty Fares issued
648 Persons reported under the Regulation of Railways Act Level 3 OVence (for which the penalty
could be up to 3 months in prison and/or £1,000 fine)
474 Recorded verbal warnings given
225! Occasions of drunks or undesirables being removed from trains and stations
82 People reported for anti-social oVences under Railway Byelaws (for which the penalty could be up
to 3 months in prison and/or £1,000 fine)
18 TVM Blockages removed preventing thefts from the machines
15 Passengers at high risk assisted arrests as a direct result of activity.

It is diYcult to quantify the saving made in the terms of lost minutes in the cases where disruptive
passengers have been removed from trains by the REO’s. Without the intervention of the REO’s local
station staV would have had to dealt with these individuals, which would have caused delays and had knock-
on eVects as staV would be distracted and unable to despatch other services.
The main purpose for the introduction of this new role was to improve passengers feeling of safety and
security whilst travelling on Southeastern Trains. In their most recent passenger survey conducted on the
Catford Loop lines in February, policed by REOs, the percentage of passengers stating that they felt good
or very good about their safety rose from 36% to 42%—a significant improvement of 6% over a short period
of time.

Police Community Support OYcers

Police Community Support OYcers (PCSOs) work alongside BTP oYcers to ensure high visibility
policing, increase the travelling public’s sense of security whilst upon the railway, and support police oYcers
in their work on the rail network.
The main role of PCSOs is to deal with quality of life issues that do not always require the presence of a
police oYcer. Even so, all PCSOs are given full training to enable them to take appropriate action in the
event of diYcult circumstances. They are supervised by police oYcers and have radio access to enable them
to call for assistance should it be required. They do not need to be accompanied by police oYcers except
during a tutor period following training, or where the type of duty being undertaken makes accompanied
patrol more appropriate.
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 49

In BTP’s London South area, PCSOs have been deployed since March 2005. They have been warmly
received by station staV, the general public and local businesses. The introduction of PCSOs has made a
diVerence to crime figures, as well as the overall feeling of security of the public. There has been a big
reduction in beggars and thieves at stations such as Waterloo, Victoria, Charing Cross and London Bridge.
BTP, in partnership with the railway industry will continue to use PCSOs and other appropriate forms of
complementary policing to further increase safety on the rail network.

Increasing Personal Safety—BTP in Action

BTP mounts many operations and strategies throughout the year to further its policing objectives,
reassure passengers and staV, and to detect and arrest oVenders. Following a number of recent incidents
involving the use of knives, BTP has implemented a preventative strategy aimed to promote “zero tolerance”
in the use and carrying of knives and other weapons within the railway environment.
Operation Shield involves the deployment of electronic scanners staVed by Police OYcers in uniform
working in partnership with Community Support OYcers and Revenue Inspectors at railway stations.
The electronic scanners are similar to those deployed at airports and other controlled zones. The
operation is intelligence-led and focuses on areas of the network where violent crime is more prevalent.
Initial results have been encouraging. Since the launch of the operation on 6 February 2006, 55 people
have been arrested and 33 weapons have been recovered including an axe, hammer and a CS gas canister.
All persons arrested have been known to Police previously.
The impact on the travelling public and rail staV has been very positive and encouraging. The presence
of Uniformed OYcers and the electronic arches has aVorded BTP an opportunity to further engage with the
community and provide general crime prevention advice.
The operation will continue in London until the end of March and will be extended Force-wide to cover
the entire Country. The first deployment outside London is to be in Scotland in both Glasgow and
Edinburgh in April. Targeted deployment of these resources should bring about a decline in weapons related
crime and associated violence. It is the intention of British Transport Police in conjunction with its industry
partners to create a “weapons free” environment on Britain’s railway.

Increasing Personal Safety—the Secure Stations Scheme

BTP welcomes any eVorts by TOCs need to improve safety and security at stations. However, the House
of Commons Committee of Public Accounts publication “Maintaining and Improving Britain’s Railway
Stations” published in December 2005 came to the following conclusions:
— Few train operating companies have joined national schemes to reduce crime and improve
personal safety at stations even though research in 1996 and 2002 suggests that introducing
additional security measures can increase patronage by up to 11%.
— The original franchises awarded on privatisation of the railways failed to put suYcient emphasis
on improving station facilities.
— Network Rail has been seen as a barrier to station improvement through unduly complicated and
inflexible procedures, an unwillingness to share risks associated with improvement projects, and
a lack of targets for developing franchised sites.
The Secure Stations Scheme is an excellent opportunity for the rail industry to work with BTP in
improving safety and security for passengers. The Secure Station scheme started in 1998 as a partnership
between Crime Concern, BTP and the DfT.

Accreditation
A new and more simple accreditation system was introduced in 2005 after negotiations between DfT, train
operators and BTP. The main changes were around the “scoring” attributed to crime at stations and this
was replaced with a benchmark of comparative crime figures to passenger footfall at the relevant station.
The other main change was the “Working Towards” criteria which was introduced to encourage operators
to join the scheme. BTP is responsible for reviewing the station after notification from the TOC that any
work etc has been carried out and if successful is re-inspected every two years. There are currently 240
accredited stations in the scheme. 4 are “Working Towards” accreditation and 60 have lapsed over the last
two years.

How could it be improved?

The Secure Stations scheme does appear to reduce crime, particularly when combined with the Safer Car
Park scheme. However, there is no specific process or policy for identifying stations which should be selected
as priority cases, although some franchises do stipulate that all stations must be in the scheme. At present
(other than by franchise stipulation) it is left to the franchisee to apply for the scheme. Local Crime
Ev 50 Transport Committee: Evidence

Reduction OYcers do promote the scheme with operators. The Secure Stations scheme has few specific
security standards as it is mainly designed around safety standards. The scheme could benefit from some
specific standards which would ensure that materials such as fencing, lighting, CCTV etc were fit for
purpose. The Safer Car Park award administered by the British Parking Association does have specific
standards for design and materials.
There should be a process in place whereby BTP can influence train operators and the DfT in the selection
process and ensure that priority stations are dealt with. It could be made part of the franchise agreement
for each TOC to achieve Secure Station status at stations which reach a particular “risk” threshold which
would take account of crime rates. This would obviously have to be dealt with carefully, as some TOCS will
have more problem stations than others.
There are many instances of stations being built or re-furbished without early engagement of the BTP
Crime Reduction Unit & Architectural Liaison OYcer and Counter Terrorism Security Advisor. The BTP
is best placed to advise Network Rail and TOCS on plans which are likely to have any Crime and Disorder
Act implications. Under Section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act, authorities must consider these issues
in their strategies. It is therefore important that BTP is appraised of any plans likely to have this eVect at
the earliest opportunity.
Train design and CCTV should also be a key consideration when deigning stations. BTP are working with
Industry Partners to formulate guidance on the minimum levels for CCTV—it is essential that CCTV
systems become standardised, and that the quality of CCTV images is suYciently good for them to be
properly used.
31 March 2006

Memorandum submitted by the Rail Safety & Standards Board

The Rail Safety and Standards Board (RSSB)

1. RSSB is an independent not-for-profit company owned by major stakeholders in the rail industry
including Network Rail and train operators.
2. The RSSB response to the questions posed by the Transport Committee reflects the company’s role in
relation to:
— Safety policy and the industry’s Strategic Safety Plan.
— Research and development.
— Facilitation and support of industry initiatives, in particular the Rail Personal Security Group
(RPSG).
3. Essentially all of the stations on the national rail network, formerly the responsibility of British Rail,
are owned by Network Rail. Franchised train operators manage all but 17 “major stations” operated by
Network Rail. It is therefore inappropriate for RSSB to respond to some of the specific questions raised by
the Committee.

Passenger Safety and Security

4. More than a billion passenger journeys are made on the main line network each year and the vast
majority are incident-free with the British Transport Police (BTP) recording less than one assault for every
hundred thousand passenger journeys made. Of the assaults that take place approximately four fifths are
to members of railway staV. The risk to the public within the railway environment is lower than it is in the
wider community.
5. The industry’s Strategic Safety Plan for 2006 addresses personal security and station safety as set out
in Annex A of this submission.

The Rail Personal Security Group (RPSG)

6. RPSG was established in response to a recommendation in the research project “Reducing Assaults
on Railway StaV” (December 2002), that “the industry should establish and equip (including the provision
of financial support) a Task Force to develop a common strategy and promote it within the industry, to local
and national government, law enforcement agencies and the media”.
7. The industry agreed that a group focused on personal security issues would be beneficial, but that to
concentrate solely on staV assaults would be restrictive. For that reason, customer and public security
(excluding terrorism) are addressed by RPSG.
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 51

8. RPSG first met in August 2003 and has continued to meet every two months since then. Membership
of RPSG is drawn from passenger train operators, Network Rail, railway trades unions, British Transport
Police (BTP), Passenger Focus, the Department for Transport (DfT), Transport for London and the Home
OYce. RPSG is facilitated and supported by RSSB.

Transport Committee Questions

What are the most eVective methods of making railway and underground stations safer for passengers?
9. RPSG identified that it could best contribute to making stations safer by raising the profile of personal
security on the railway, to encourage sharing of best practice thereby supporting train operators and
Network Rail in discharging their duties to manage the risk.
10. Assaults occurring at railway stations cannot be addressed in isolation as this risk has to be addressed
in the context of the communities within which stations are located. RPSG recognises the importance of
working with communities and wishes to see transport representation in Crime and Disorder Reduction
Partnerships (CDRP). Because violence is a wider societal problem, a holistic approach is needed to tackle
it. Accordingly RPSG is currently working with the Home OYce and BTP to develop guidelines for the rail
industry and CDRPs to use in their joint activities.
11. RPSG is dependent on the willingness of the members to share their ideas and learn from each other
not only in respect of successful measures but also the unsuccessful, with the aim of improving personal
security and reducing anti-social behaviour on the railway. The following are amongst the successful
initiatives that individual train operators have adopted to improve personal security for staV and passengers.
— “Adopt a Station”—community involvement to improve the environment at unmanned stations
(which is also the subject of further research—see below).
— Progression of “Secure Stations” scheme.
— Increased visibility of staV and funded recruitment by BTP of railway staV as Special Constables
and Police Community Support OYcers (PCSO).
— Creating links with local schools to encourage rail travel in a safe environment, including
agreement of “Schools Charters” and accreditation of those who go into schools as presenters of
railway safety messages.
— More use of station and on train CCTV systems.
— Installation of automatic ticket barriers which act as a deterrent to antisocial behaviour by limiting
access opportunities for fare evasion.
— Strict imposition of penalty fares for ticketless travellers.
12. RSSB is, on behalf of the wider industry, currently in dialogue with the Crown Prosecution Service
to promote the view that the range of sanctions available within the criminal law is appropriate but that
there are occasions where the public interest would be better served if prosecutors were more aware of the
impact on the railway of assaults and other crime.

Are the minimum standards to provide a safe and secure station environment high enough? Are the requirements
suYciently clear and specific to be eVective? If not, what changes should be made?
13. Individual duty holders are best placed to determine the configuration of stations and determine the
levels of staV appropriate to the levels of use of each station and the risks of assaults and other inappropriate
behaviour.

Are the minimum standards eVectively policed? Are the penalties for failing to provide a secure station
environment suYciently severe?
14. The combined economic and safety regulatory regime to be introduced in April 2006 is appropriate
as is the range of penalties provided for in the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974.

Is it suYciently clear to passengers and others who is responsible for the safety of passengers in railway and
underground stations?

15. Duties under the law are clear.

Ev 52 Transport Committee: Evidence

Why are so few stations accredited under the secure Stations scheme? Should the scheme be made compulsory?
16. This question is best addressed to station operators.

What measures would be required to ensure suYcient improvements in passengers’ safety in railway and
underground stations?
17. Research into personal safety and security at stations is a component of the wider DfT funded
research and development (R&D) programme managed by RSSB on behalf of the rail industry and
associated stakeholders. Public behaviour has been subject to scrutiny since the inception of the programme
in 2001. Early outputs of the R&D programme generated recommendations that led to the setting up of
RPSG (see paragraphs six to eight above).
18. All reports generated by projects within the R&D programme managed by RSSB are available on-
line at www.rssb.co.uk
19. Published research reports specifically addressing issues of personal security can be summarised as
follows:

— Reducing assaults on railway staV (T039), published 2002

This project provided a better understanding the size of the growing problem of assaults on railway
staV, and identified measures to counteract it. A range of techniques was used in the study,
including focus groups, staV surveys, gathering information from train and station operators,
comparing data from operators and the Safety Management Information System (SMIS) and the
modelling of experts’ views about influencing factors. The project recommended that railway
organisations review their countermeasures, publish plans, set targets and share information. The
project also proposed that the industry establish a personal security task force on the issue (as
previously indicated this led to the creation of RPSG). This project further recommended better
and more consistent data should be input to the industry’s Safety Management Information
System (SMIS) and that there should be regular reporting from SMIS. RSSB has since upgraded
SMIS to deliver the requirements specified by RPSG on behalf of duty holders.

— Fears and experiences of assault and abuse on the railway (T047), published 2004
This project Investigated the fears and experiences of railway staV and customers in relation to
assault and abuse on the railway. The report identified measures to improve personal security—
better data, risk analysis, best practice and partnerships. This project has helped inform industry’s
response to concerns about personal safety and security amongst the travelling public. It surveyed
existing rail users and non-rail users to determine which groups consider themselves to be at risk,
and which groups actually are at risk. Specific recommendations were to improve industry data
(changes to SMIS have been made) quality and systems, to undertake further analysis of risk at
stations, to determine and share best practice and to work in partnership with other agencies to
ensure appropriate skills and resources are brought to bear on the problem. This report is also
material to the industry having set up RPSG.
20. A number of other research projects also of relevance to the subject of personal security have also
been published. They relate to the perception and evaluation of route crime, the benefits of CCTV, trespass
and vandalism, the benefit of complementary policing, cost of assaults and the development of suitable
materials for teachers and schools. Further research is ongoing and projects under development with the
support of RPSG and other community safety stakeholders include Safety at London Stations—Review of
Existing Knowledge

Is the Government’s approach to passenger safety in railway stations eVective?

21. The principles set out in the Government’s National Community Safety Plan are appropriate.
31 March 2006

Annex A

EXTRACT FROM STRATEGIC SAFETY PLAN 2006 RELATING TO STATIONS AND

PERSONAL SECURITY
Statistics on crime at stations may reflect changes in the level of reporting rather than the number of actual
crimes. The most reliable estimate is that violent crime is generally falling, although this may mask acute
problems in specific locations, or rises in certain categories of violent crime. What can be said with certainty
is that the overall risk to the individual passenger is very small.
Anti-social and dangerous behaviour by the public remains a cause of concern. For example, drivers
frequently report encountering dangerous practices such as sitting on platform edges.
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 53

Actions:
Station operators will:
— Continue to improve station environments with improved lighting and core safe areas, where
appropriate;
— Continue to work with the British Transport Police, supporting the police community support
oYcer scheme and employing dedicated security staV, where appropriate;
— Make greater use of CCTV;
— Work towards an agreed industry specification for CCTV installation and download to simplify
the process of making use of recorded images in tackling crime;
— Bring more stations into the Secure Stations Scheme1.
— Review the impact of the proposed change to 24-hour licensing on public behaviour issues on
the railway.

Memorandum submitted by Passenger Focus

1. Summary
1.1 The Transport Committee of the House of Commons is conducting an inquiry into “the current
standards of passenger safety in railway stations”. In this context, “safety” refers to personal security and
protection from crime and harassment, rather than physical safety and protection from accidental injury.
Among the issues which the Transport Committee wishes to identify are:
— What are the most eVective methods of making railway stations safer for passengers?
— What measures would be required to ensure significant improvements in passengers’ safety in
railway stations?
1.2 This Memorandum and its Annex seek to draw together the evidence emerging from recent
research in this field. The key messages are:
— Tracking of passengers’ priorities shows that personal security is not highest on the list of aspects
of performance in which they most wish to see improvements. Concerns about reliability,
frequency, cost and comfort almost always take precedence.
— It is plain, however, that many passengers do wish to see enhanced security, and some are deterred
from travelling by such concerns.
— Research suggests that, overwhelmingly, they regard more adequate levels of staYng, and the more
visible and authoritative presence of those staV who are currently deployed, as the appropriate
solution.
— Physical or technical measures such as CCTV, help points, and enhanced lighting and sightlines
are regarded as ancillary improvements rather than as substitutes for staYng.
— Except in the still-limited areas where complementary policing personnel such as community
support, travel safe and/or rail enforcement oYcers are routinely deployed, passenger-facing
railway staV are not recruited and trained primarily to perform security functions, and they are
not necessarily equipped or willing to act in the protective roles which passengers expect.

2. Passenger Focus’s Policy

2.1 Passenger Focus believes that the safety and security of passengers is of paramount importance.
2.2 Passenger Focus presses for stations to be staVed wherever possible. This is not only to provide ticket
sales and direct revenue protection but also to provide a reassuring staV presence for both personal security
and information and as a deterrent to crime. To achieve this, staV must be visible and conduct regular
patrols. They must be trained in the skills necessary to exercise authority when required and to provide
reassurance through their presence, appearance and demeanour. They should be invested with the legal
powers (eg under the police accreditation scheme) necessary to allow them to discharge this role eVectively.
Passenger Focus’s definition of full staYng covers all times when trains call at the station; the industry’s
definition is less rigid and obvious: “fully staVed” can refer to a situation where two shifts are covered but
where early-morning and late-evening trains, and often all day at weekends, are uncovered.
2.3 Passenger Focus believes that the role of staV should be complemented, not replaced, by technology.
Help points (capable of both summoning assistance in emergencies and obtaining information at other
times) should be prominently available and conveniently sited at stations and be maintained in good order.

1 Stations are accredited under this scheme as complying with a set of minimum standards.
More information is available at:
http://www.dft.gov.uk/stellent/groups/dft—mobility/documents/divisionhomepage/036930.hcsp
Ev 54 Transport Committee: Evidence

We support the system used in Scotland and parts of London whereby the help point and CCTV system are
linked. CCTV should be monitored rather than just recorded, and be of a standard capable of allowing the
successful prosecution of oVenders. We would also like to see CCTV systems at stations linked with those
outside so that oVenders can be tracked once they leave the station.
2.4 Passenger Focus supports initiatives such as the Secure Stations and Secure Car Parks schemes, but
believes that their eVectiveness (and entitlement to continuing accreditation) should be related to their
measured impact on passengers’ perceptions of security, not simply a checklist of physical features. We
endorse the recommendation of the RSSB report Fears and experiences of passengers from assault that the
Home OYce Fear of Crime Matrix (in a suitably modified form, as the current version applies only to major
stations) can be a useful tool to help rail companies develop strategies and priorities for action.
2.5 Passenger Focus accepts that the railway does not operate in a vacuum and suVers from the same
problems with crime and disorder as the rest of society. Tackling issues of security on the railway is,
therefore, a wider social issue and not a problem for the industry to resolve in isolation. Passenger Focus
therefore welcomes and encourages the active participation of rail industry in local community safety
partnerships, and its engagement with all relevant agencies working in this field. We welcome the successful
introduction of anti-social behaviour orders on the railway, and the work being done by RSSB Rail Personal
Security Group with the Crown Prosecution Service to increase judicial awareness of the seriousness of
railway crime.
2.6 We are particularly keen that in its plans for station regeneration, Network Rail should encourage
the use of station precincts for a range of activities (not necessarily directly rail-related) which will foster a
continuous flow of people and help overcome the air of isolation and abandonment which can be a deterrent
to passengers.
2.7 Passenger Focus believes that there should be a clearly located source of authority within the industry
partnerships charged with the responsibility of championing such activity in each region, and that
promoting specific security initiatives (including station staYng) should become obligatory upon operators
through the franchising process. We warmly welcome the priority to be given to this facet of passenger
service in the new franchising regime to be introduced by TfL on the North London Railway, and commend
this as a model to the DfT.

3. National Passenger Survey

3.1 The only quantified country-wide index of rail users’ views is the National Passenger Survey (NPS),
originally commissioned by the Strategic Rail Authority (SRA) and now compiled twice-yearly under the
direction of Passenger Focus. This is based on the results of polling more than 28,000 passengers twice a
year in the course of journeys made on the National Rail network.
3.2 In the most recently published wave of results (Autumn 2005), 59% of those polled declared
themselves to be satisfied with security at stations, placing it only ninth out of twelve station-related service
attributes covered1. This rating has risen by 5% over the past three years, but its relative position in the
rankings has remained constant.
3.3 Leisure users are most likely to be satisfied with station security (65%), followed by business users
(59%), while commuters’ satisfaction rating was only 55%. Of users of high speed long distance trains, 68%
were satisfied, compared with 59% of passengers on regional services and 57% on London and south east
routes. Among the last of these, the oV-peak/peak diVerential was 59% to 55% respectively. Frequent users
therefore have more negative perceptions than those who travel occasionally.
3.4 Those who voiced active concern about station security (less than a quarter of the total) were invited
to indicate their reasons. In descending order of frequency, the principal reasons given were:
57% Saw rowdy behaviour by other people on station
43% Lack of station staV
37% Fear of terrorism
20% Lack of other passengers
18% Poor on-station lighting
17% Lack of information
11% Saw actual vandalism or violence
3.5 When asked about their reasons for being concerned with personal security in the vicinity of stations,
the same respondents’ answers were:
23% Poor lighting around station
19% Fear of terrorism
19% Lack of other people in neighbourhood
16% Station in an isolated position
11% Insecure station car park
9% Saw vandalism or violence in neighbourhood
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 55

3.6 It is noteworthy that only a small minority had been witnesses to actual vandalism or violence, as
distinct from rowdy behaviour, so that a sense of isolation and an absence of eVective authority are suYcient
in themselves to engender feelings of insecurity. This underlines the strength of passenger perception.

4. Passenger Priorities
4.1 Although the NPS gives a valuable snapshot of how passengers in general perceive the level of security
currently achieved on stations, and the reasons underlying the dissatisfaction of those who believe it is
inadequate, it does not give any direct indication of the importance ascribed to improving personal security
relative to other service attributes. This was investigated by SRA in May 2005 by means of a specially-
commissioned study using multivariate analysis2. When passengers were invited to rank diVerent journey
elements to show their priorities for improvement, personal security at stations came only 16th out of 30.
There was little variation between the ratings of diVerent categories of respondent.
4.2 The NPS data also do not address:
— the views of non-passengers who may be deterred from rail travel because of a perceived lack of
security on the system,
— other sub-sets of users within the total body of passengers (diVerentiated by, for example, gender,
ethnicity, age, or time of travel) who may have distinctive views, or
— the measures open to the industry which would be likely to raise satisfaction levels, and the cost-
eVectiveness of these.
4.3 The last of these considerations is important. This is not only because improving personal security
has an opportunity cost (it consumes resources which would otherwise be available to meet other passenger
expectations) but also because it may be that the remedy to the problem lies partly or wholly outside the
industry’s control. If some people will only use door-to-door transport because they are unwilling to run the
perceived risks encountered while travelling to or from a station at either end of the rail trip, it is immaterial
to them what level of security is oVered while on the railway itself.
4.4 It is therefore necessary to turn to other sources of information to explore these issues in greater
depth. There is a substantial body of research literature relating to public attitudes to safety and security on
transport systems in general and the railway in particular, including the solutions which are seen to be most
likely to be eVective. The Annex to this Memorandum comprises a review of some of the most significant
studies.

5. What Passengers Want

5.1 2005 saw the publication by the then Rail Passengers Council (now Passenger Focus) of What
passengers want from stations3, the findings of a series of focus group studies conducted in various parts of
the country. In relation to security, this work confirmed the conclusions of previous researchers:
5.2 Security both inside and outside the station is a high priority for passengers with fear of or direct
experience of car crime and a low perception of personal security in and around station entrances, especially
so at night. Commuters and business passengers feel that some smaller stations are “lonely places” and that
leaving them at night is “dangerous”. Other participants do not use train services at night because this is
considered “too risky”.
5.3 The main concerns with travelling at night can be summed up as:
— no staV or supervision at the station when returning home late;
— ticket oYce is closed;
— gangs of youths hanging around the station or in waiting rooms drinking;
— lack of people;
— lack of adequate lighting in stations and in car parks;
— bushes and foliage along walkways/exits.
5.4 It was thought that stations being staVed would be the most eVective way of improving station
security at night. In general it was felt that stations should be staVed as long as trains were running. The
presence of retail facilities in the station which were open also led to a higher perception of security. Retailers
were seen as a point of help if it should be required . . . A major concern, particularly for the smaller stations,
was that although staV would be desirable it would [not be] practicable because of concerns about personal
security of staV.
5.5 Although it was generally thought that the introduction of CCTV and panic buttons could do little
to improve personal security, participants thought they should be fitted as standard, even if stations were
staVed. The benefits of CCTV were thought to be that film could be used for identification purposes and
might reduce car crime. If introduced, participants thought that CCTV should be clearly and very obviously
signposted so that people knew it was there.5.6 When prompted it was agreed that better lighting would
Ev 56 Transport Committee: Evidence

benefit passengers emotionally leading to an increased feeling of personal security. There was an awareness
of help points at medium [sized] stations, but they were underused by participants who seemed to be unsure
of their purpose or of what would happen if they used one.

6. Maintaining and Improving Stations

6.1 The July 2005 report by the National Audit OYce (NAO) on Maintaining and improving Britain’s
railway stations4 suggested (quoting Crime Concern’s research) that measures to improve personal security
would result in 15% more travel by rail and Underground, much of it out of peak hours (when there is spare
capacity). StaV presence, good lighting and CCTV surveillance were seen as being the three most important
factors reassuring passengers about their personal safety while waiting for a train. Passengers felt less secure
at small stations which are unstaVed for all or part of the day, and after dark.
6.2 The NAO also commented on the limited impact of the Government-sponsored Secure Stations
scheme. It was felt that it suVered from a lack of support from train companies (partly because of the cost
of the regular surveys required to acquire and retain accreditation). Many of the accredited stations had a
low level of crime initially, so accreditation was achieved without making significant changes, and had little
practical impact. Passenger awareness of the scheme was low, so it did little to aVect perceptions of crime.
In January 2005 only 118 stations (out of more than 2500) were accredited, and the number was declining—
although as these included 87 of the busiest stations on the network, more than two thirds of journeys began
or ended at a “secure station”. The diYculty faced by the industry is that although recorded levels of crime
are highest at the busiest stations, passengers’ concern for their security is greatest in relatively unfrequented
locations. A review in 2003 of the separate Secured Car Park scheme showed that improvements made to
achieve this award had a positive eVect on users’ perceptions, but in March 2004 only 125 station car parks
were covered by it.
6.3 Standards will not be driven up in the absence of an enforcement regime. The SQUIRE regime used
in Scotland and in PTE areas indicates the need for and eVectiveness of monitoring. NAO reported that the
regime cost £600,000 to implement in 2003–04 while the train operators paid £1 million in penalties. The
NAO report highlighted the absence of a single organisation co-ordinating the development of stations and
facilities at them.

7. Crime and Safety at London Stations

7.1 Earlier this year, the Transport Committee of the London Assembly published the findings of its own
scrutiny of Crime and Safety at London’s Suburban Railway Stations5. This report was critical of the lack of
integration between CCTV systems operated by local authorities and those found on the railway. It
expressed concern at the lower level of policing provided on the National Rail network compared with the
Underground. It described many suburban stations as being “poorly lit and sparsely staVed” which made
for “an unwelcoming, sometimes threatening environment hardly designed to encourage greater use—
especially during oV-peak periods.” The Secure Stations award scheme was felt to be well-intentioned but
“misdirected and too concerned with corporate procedure rather than the experience of the passenger.”
7.2 The Committee “sought to highlight that by providing better and brighter lighting inside and outside
the station, better street level real time travel information, more consistent signage, oVering more
commercial lettings and raising basic design standards, stations can become more welcoming to the
passenger.” But quoting research conducted by Transport for London (TfL), which confirms that increased
staYng tops the list of passenger preferences for improving station safety, it noted that “it is rare that any
Tube station is unstaVed during service hours and yet on London’s rail network it is common to find stations
after a certain time in the evening completely devoid of staV.” It accepted that staV represent a greater cost
over time than some of the other improvements discussed, but suggested that they could be more
imaginatively deployed. “Ticket oYce staV, though essential during peak time, may provide a more visible
presence elsewhere in stations during oV-peak hours.” It applauded TfL’s declared intention of requiring
stations on the North London Railway to be continuously staVed when it assumes responsibility for this
franchise next year.

8. In Conclusion
8.1 Passenger Focus welcomes the Committee’s inquiry and its opportunity to present evidence. We
highlight four aspects which must be tackled:
1. More staV—visible and clearly uniformed—at stations;
2. Physical facilities which complement staV presence: help points, CCTV, good lighting, clear
sight lines;
3. Better co-ordination between the numerous bodies which share responsibility for rail
operations; and
4. Monitoring regimes incorporating SQUIRE requirements/passenger perceptions.
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 57

8.2 We also wish to address the points raised by the Committee more specifically. These points are largely
addressed in the preceding paragraphs, but for sake of completeness we cover them again in brief below.
Many of the concepts in the questions overlap, and we have therefore brought both the questions and our
direct responses together for ease of reference.
8.2.1 What are the most eVective methods of making railway and underground stations safer for passengers?
Is it suYciently clear to passengers and others who is responsible for the safety of passengers in railway and
underground stations?
— StaYng is the single most eVective means of making stations safer. StaV should be visible, easily
recognisable, trained in the skills necessary to exercise authority when required and invested with
necessary legal powers. They must patrol frequently. StaYng is clearly a greater cost over time than
some other expedients, often depending on how they are deployed—but it is the one which
passengers consistently expect. Questions of station staYng need to be addressed through the
franchising process. There seems to be merit in examining the role and eVectiveness of South West
Trains’ “travel safe oYcers”. StaV presence must be complemented with appropriate technology:
CCTV, help points and good lighting. Design, especially to ensure clear sight lines is vital, as is
the active engagement of the industry with all other relevant agencies to deter crime and disorder.
Ensuring CCTV coverage of help points is beneficial as is integration of railway and external
CCTV systems. Monitoring of such systems, rather than only recording is important, as is ensuring
that recordings made are of prosecutable quality. Greater eVort needs to be made in providing
another human presence at stations, such as oVering commercial lettings of more station buildings.
Pilot schemes have been undertaken for various situations; these should be evaluated and where
successful, implemented more widely and good practice shared.
8.2.2 Are the minimum standards to provide a safe and secure station environment high enough? Are the
requirements suYciently clear and specific to be eVective? If not, what changes should be made? What measures
should be required to ensure significant improvements in passengers’ safety in railway and underground
stations? Are the minimum standards eVectively policed? Are the penalties for failing to provide a secure station
environment suYciently severe?
— In certain areas SQUIRE regimes are in operation, specifying the level and number of features and
facilities to be provided and maintained. Monitoring of their provision is a key component and
levels of penalty have exceeded the costs of operation, indicating non-compliance. Absence of any
regime would doubtless permit even greater non-compliance. Extension of this type of measurable
provision and monitoring for enforcement, in future franchise specifications, is a possible way
forward. Overall responsibility for co-ordinating station developments should be vested in a single
organisation. DiVerent requirements apply under diVerent franchises which complicates definition
of satisfactory standards, and any absence of monitoring renders them meaningless in any case. It
is preferable for contractual obligations to enhance station security, as a requirement without a
contract to underpin it will be ignored.
8.2.3 Why are so few stations accredited under the Secure Stations Scheme? Should the scheme be made
compulsory?
— The scheme is useful in focussing on station security. At the outset, larger stations achieved
accreditation with little need to make alterations. However, the cost, both of accreditation and
monitoring to retain accreditation, is a drain on scarce resources and has led many train companies
to give little priority to the scheme which has, in any case, minimal passenger awareness, and no
business case was made for smaller stations. Compulsory introduction of the scheme to current
operators could have a major financial impact on them. Reincentivisation may be best achieved
through the refranchising process; for this reason, we welcome the requirement in the SWT
Invitation to Tender for those stations experiencing the significant majority of footfall to achieve
Secure Station Accreditation (SSA), incorporating an appreciation of the stations’ experience of
crime. The requirement to liaise with BTP on assessing the security/crime risk at all the franchisee’s
stations and ensure that the proposals include all identified high-risk locations is a particularly
significant new development. A priced option of up to 95% footfall coverage is most encouraging.
These requirements should be adopted in other new franchises.
8.2.4 Is the Government’s approach to passenger safety in railway stations eVective?
— The franchise agreement is the government’s principal tool in this respect. (Our comments on the
SWT ITT, in 8.2.3 apply equally here.) However, bidders are left to make their own suggestions.
While this heavy hint is welcome, it stops short of a requirement or compulsion. Bidders for
diVerent franchises may easily oVer diVerent levels of provision, which will make a common
national approach much more diYcult to achieve, unless a common level is specified. The absence
of targets hampers enforcement.
— Good practice can be shared but introduction of such measures must be tempered by the
evaluation of passengers’ perceptions and needs and the recognition of the diVering circumstances
during daytime compared with evening and of station size and location. Clear responsibility for
the implementation of measures to enhance passenger security should be based on a partnership
Ev 58 Transport Committee: Evidence

approach where each partner has contractually enshrined objectives. Passengers need to
understand what they can expect and confidence should not be undermined by confusion over staV
roles or unmet expectations.

References
1 National Passenger Survey—Wave 13—Autumn 2005—Consultees Report. Passenger Focus (2006).
2 Passenger Expectations and Priorities for Improvement (research summary RS0501). Continental
Research for Strategic Rail Authority (May 2005, unpublished).
3 What passengers want from stations. Rail Passengers Council (June 2005).
4 Maintaining and improving Britain’s railway stations. National Audit OYce (July 2005).
5 Crime and Safety at London’s Suburban Railway Stations. London Assembly Transport Committee
(January 2006).

Annex

DETAILS OF RESEARCH

A. Home Safe
Home Safe Research undertaken for Merseytravel in 19931 revealed the proportion of rail users who felt
“at risk” of attack when travelling at night to be:

Female % Male %
Walking to/from station 40 35
Inside station 35 25
Waiting on the platform 43 39
On board the train 31 25

This work found that

Arrangements for the manning [sic] and supervision of stations are often optimised for operational
convenience and cost minimisation rather than concern for passenger security. The result is that stations
are frequently unstaVed at times when travellers feel most vulnerable.
The situation on many rail stations can seem particularly threatening. The frequency of arrivals and
departures is substantially less than at a bus station and the secluded nature of the platforms means there
is considerably less potential oversight of activity from people passing by. The design of many stations with
alcoves and gaps between platform buildings also creates potential hiding places. Access to platforms may
require use of subways which are also seen as an especially intimidating environment.
Replacement of station booking oYce staV by machines for ticket vending heightens perception of risk.
People unfamiliar with how the machines work may adopt behaviour which invites contact or may feel
obliged to ask strangers for advice/assistance who, in other circumstances, they might avoid.
Feelings of insecurity can become acute outside normal shopping/business hours when the number of
passengers falls and retail premises close.
It is noteworthy that this study showed (a) that many people, including current users, feel insecure while
travelling by rail, (b) that this is especially true after dark, and (c) that the absence of staV is seen as a
significant contributory factor. Very similar findings have emerged from subsequent investigations of the
same issue.

B. Perceptions of Safety from Crime

A study of Perceptions of safety from crime on public transport undertaken for the Department of
Transport in 19962 found that
Passenger surveys in this country and abroad consistently reveal that, despite low levels of reported and
recorded crime, passengers have real fears for their personal safety whilst using public transport. There is
evidence that these fears influence their decisions to travel and, in particular, their use of public transport.
Some people avoid travelling after dark, some avoid particular modes of transport or particular routes or
locations, while others do not see public transport as a viable option and resort to either the perceived
relative safety of their car or to staying at home.
In the course of this study, focus groups were held in various parts of the country, with participants
selected to take account of a range of personal attributes. The discussions were not limited to rail travel, so
it is noteworthy that the authors concluded that:
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 59

The greatest concerns for personal safety were expressed by participants in the London [Underground
station] and Birmingham [train station] focus groups, often linked to their fears about mentally disturbed
people whose actions were described as unpredictable and erratic.
In a household interview survey conducted as part of the same project, fewer respondents rated their
personal safety while travelling as poor or very poor than gave this rating for other journey factors—i.e.
cost, reliability, usefulness, ease of boarding/alighting. But there were some noteworthy variations within
the sample, dissatisfaction being higher amongst women, amongst people travelling after dark, amongst
people not in employment, amongst those with no car, and amongst residents of metropolitan counties.
About 12% had experienced or observed incidents of crime or anti-social behaviour while travelling. In the
case of rail users, waiting on platforms was seen as markedly less safe than travelling on trains, and the
Underground as less safe than main-line railways.

The study found that:

The absence of staV or visible and available staV contributes substantively to people’s anxieties about
personal safety. Uniformed staV [transport, security or police] were seen as being ‘in authority’ and helping
to create an atmosphere of “control” which passengers closely associated with a safe and secure
environment. However, the absence of staV is not only a contributing factor to people’s anxiety about
personal safety in these circumstance. The lack of staV is also an indication that there was [sic] likely to be
few passengers travelling as well . . . It is not solely staV that fulfils [sic] people’s desire for a human presence,
but people want larger numbers of people because they perceive that the majority will not cause a problem
for their personal safety.
When asked to rate the eVectiveness of eight diVerent possible means of improving safety when waiting
for trains, the largest vote went to the presence of staV at the station.

C. Fear and Experiences of Assault

A 2004 report for the Rail Safety & Standards Board (RSSB) on Fear and experiences of passengers from
assault (3) analysed the information contained in databases maintained by RSSB and the British Transport
Police (BTP). When passenger/national demographics were compared with the actual likelihood of diVerent
passenger groups being assaulted, the consultants found some intriguing paradoxes. Specifically:
Males are much more likely to be the victim of assault, although females are more concerned about
personal security.
Young people (under the age of 25) are victim of 68% of assaults. Passengers over the age of 45 are rarely
the victim of an assault but are very concerned about personal security.
People from ethnic minority groups are far more likely to be assaulted but this could be the reflection of
the fact that assaults tend to be concentrated in metropolitan areas which have larger ethnic populations.
Another phase of the same study surveyed samples of rail users and non-users to ascertain the extent to
which they had actually experienced assaults or abuse while travelling. Only 1% of users claimed actually
to have experienced a “physical attack”, and these mostly occurred during the day, were of a sexual nature
and committed by commuters. It was concluded that these are incidents where women are molested on busy
trains, and go largely unreported.
But 7% had experienced an incident of some kind during the past year, and a further 8% had witnessed
one. Only 12% had reported them. Again, the profile of incidents was quite diVerent from that of people’s
fears. Incidents occurred mainly on trains, but concerns were greater about stations. Incidents occurred as
frequently in daylight as after dark, but the latter aroused more fear. They were committed both by
individuals and groups, but concern was mainly about groups of youths. Current users have a low level of
concern about travelling during the day, but 18% will not travel (or travel alone) after dark, compared with
25% of non-users who would not do so during the day and 38% after dark. The greatest fear is of being
robbed, felt by 23% of users and 30% of non-users. This fear is felt disproportionately highly by women (who
are also concerned about sexual assault) and by disabled people. Students and young people are particularly
worried about the possibility of being beaten up.
A series of focus groups was held to explore directly the views of passengers who are, or who feel, more
vulnerable when travelling by train. It emerged that:
Few of those consulted had had direct experience of being targeted for or witnessing assaults, exceptions
being male school pupils and male students. This supports national statistics which confirm that males aged
under 25 are the most likely group to be the victim of violent crime. There was broad consensus across the
groups that alcohol and drugs are significant factors contributing to aggressive behaviour, whilst others
highlighted passengers’ frustration and discomfort linked to unsatisfactory rail services.
Many people spoke of feeling afraid and anxious when travelling by train and highlighted smaller,
unstaVed stations as being particularly unpleasant. They provided anecdotal evidence of making sometimes
quite significant detours to avoid these stations, inadvertently contributing to the problem.
Ev 60 Transport Committee: Evidence

Opinions about the eVectiveness and attitude of rail staV were mixed. Many people acknowledged the
diYcult circumstances in which some staV have to operate and several cited positive and sensitive responses
when they had needed help. Youths and male students were more critical in their comments about staV,
which may point to mutual defensiveness and concern.
There was also strong support for increased staV training, both to help related issues to ensure they
respond appropriately to these passengers. Notwithstanding the above, there was consensus across all
groups that levels of staV need to be increased.

D. People’s Perceptions of Security

In March 2004 the Department for Transport published People’s perceptions of personal security and their
concerns about crime on public transport4, a report of research in which the specialist consultancy Crime
Concern revisited the issues explored in its 1996 study (see paragraphs 4.1 to 4.5 above) to assess changes
which had occurred meanwhile and the impact of various policy initiatives which had been taken. The
summary of key diVerences noted that, among other findings:
There is some evidence from the household surveys, reinforced by the findings from the discussion groups,
of greater concerns about travelling by train, especially by women. Perceptions of the actual train journey
compare negatively with those of the stations where security features, including the presence of staV, are
in place.
There are greater concerns in 2002, both during the daytime and after dark, for waiting on or travelling
by the Underground.
There are stronger feelings expressed in 2002 about the presence of litter and graYti at infrastructure and
on trains and buses. Participants in the discussion groups identify increases in takeaway foods and the
removal of litter bins for security purposes as contributing to a greater sense of the transport environment
without proper care and management.
The absence of visible transport staV is a key contributing factor to insecurity in 1996 and 2002. In this
later study, however, participants place greater emphasis on the need for staV to be trained, proactive and
in control of the travelling environment.
In the 2002 discussion groups, greater emphasis is placed on the perceptions of insecurity that arose from
the anti-social and sometimes violent behaviour of those influenced by alcohol and/or illegal drugs. Much
more emphasis is placed in the 2002 study on the impact of illegal drugs and concerns that potentially violent
or erratic behaviour could result.
As in the 1996 study, the presence of groups of rowdy young people is a source of insecurity for those
travelling by public transport. That such young people could be the source of vandalism as well as nuisance
behaviour is made more explicit by adults in the 2002 discussion groups.
Especially in and around city centre transport systems (and London in particular), begging is more
commonly identified as a concern in the 2002 study, possibly reflecting the apparent increase in the numbers
of those begging. Participants in the discussion groups tend to feel irritated rather than threatened by the
requests for money. However, participants say they could feel threatened when those begging are aggressive
or drunk.
In a detailed review of the findings of a household survey on how best to address these concerns, it
concluded that between 1996 and 2002 the popularity of the presence of staV at stations rose still further,
particularly among young people, among travellers in London, and among black (but not Asian) people.
Escorted journeys and discussion groups were conducted for a range of diVerent stations.
In the escorted journeys and discussion groups at the Secure Stations and at other train stations in London
and Merseyside, the presence of staV and CCTV camera surveillance were the prime reasons why people felt
secure.
It was concluded that:
Most in the discussion groups were in favour of patrols by uniformed oYcers on trains and at stations
with requests that such patrols should be regular and frequent.
and that:
Surveys and discussion groups consistently identify the importance of visible and available staV to
provide reassurance to passengers. The training of staV is important to enhance their role in reassuring
passengers and for their own security. Increasingly, there are initiatives to provide additional personnel to
complement the role of more traditional transport staV. For a number of train operators providing local
services in Greater London and other cities, security personnel or guards have been contracted to enhance
the personal security of passengers and staV. There is now a move to build on the experience of using security
staV by combining their security and customer assistance roles.
The report describes in approving detail the deployment of travel safe oYcers (TSOs) by South West
Trains (SWT) in November 2002.
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 61

The objective is to achieve high levels of customer service and security, and create a general feeling of well-
being and safety when travelling by train. South West Trains commented that the TSOs are really providing
a second tier of policing and are there to safeguard customer service standards. SWT and the British
Transport Police (BTP) provide recruitment and training for the TSOs. The oYcers come from a range of
backgrounds and are expected to have the key qualities of communication, motivation and commitment.
They are skilled and trained to communicate with the public and to oVer support and reassurance in diYcult
situations.
Following training, the TSOs have a period of “on the job” coaching with the BTP. The TSOs are
provided with access to intelligence provided by the BTP to identify hotspots for crime and anti-social
behaviour. For example, the presence of TSOs is targeted to deter a growing practice of begging on local
train services coming into Waterloo station. Their presence will also reassure passengers who are known to
feel intimidated by aggressive begging in a confined environment where, unlike the street or station, they
cannot easily walk away.
The role of the TSOs is to provide reassurance to the travelling public on trains and stations, enforce the
railway by-laws and provide support and assistance to passengers. They are also expected to attend local
managing out crime meetings and to develop contacts with local schools and their pupils. The oYcers also
help with crowd control and managing events.
At the time of the study, the deployment of TSOs was too recent for most participants in the discussion
groups to be aware of them, but when the idea was explained the initial responses were very positive.

References
1 Reported in Public Transport Passenger Security—Problems and Policies, edited by Andrew D Mellor.
Steer Davies Gleave (1996).
2 Perceptions of safety from crime on public transport. Crime Concern and Transport & Travel Research for
the Department of Transport (June 1997).
3 Fears and experiences of passengers from assault. Rail Safety & Standards Board (2004).
4 People’s perceptions of personal security and their concerns about crime on public transport. Crime
Concern for Department for Transport (2004).
March 2006

Witnesses: Chief Constable Ian Johnston CBE QM BSc (Hons), British Transport Police; Mr Len Porter,
Chief Executive, Rail Safety and Standards Board; and Mr Colin Foxall, Chairman, and Ms Christine
Knights, Board Member, Passenger Focus, gave evidence.

Q108 Chairman: May I apologise to you for keeping railways are a reasonably safe place. There were, for
you waiting. I am sure that the quality of your example, nearly as many crimes in the Borough of
evidence will have improved like good wines with a Westminster as there were on the entire railway
slight detention. Starting with the Chief Constable, system throughout England and Wales last year.
would you be kind enough to identify yourselves for
the record. Q110 Chairman: And most of those were fraud! Do
Chief Constable Johnston: Ian Johnston, Chief carry on.
Constable for the British Transport Police. Chief Constable Johnston: What I think we need is a
Mr Porter: Len Porter, Chief Executive of the Rail multi-agency strategy which does a number of
Safety and Standards Board. things: first, something that positions stations more
Mr Foxall: Colin Foxall, Chairman of Passenger at the heart of local communities, and I think that is
Focus. very important; something which influences the
Ms Knights: Christine Knights, Board Member for physical environment more eVectively than it does at
Passenger Focus. the moment; something which targets initiatives to
key areas rather than the ones that are easiest to do;
Q109 Chairman: Do any of you particularly want to something which expands complementary policing,
make one or two remarks before you start or are you something which enhances the neighbourhood
prepared to go straight into questions? policing style you have heard mentioned here
Chief Constable Johnston: I would like to make just already; and something which raises the significance
a couple of very short points, if I may. First, ensuring of personal safety within the franchising
the personal safety of passengers is very important arrangements. We are very keen to take part in any
for BTP. About half of the 79,000 notifiable oVences ideas that emerge from here.
committed on the railway do occur on stations so
stations are obviously an important part of it. We Q111 Chairman: Chief Constable, it is very clear that
recognise there is a very real sense of fear some of the train operating companies are very
experienced by many passengers. Obviously there much opposed to the imposition of standards and
has got to be absolutely no complacency here but it they think a voluntary system will do instead. They
is worth noting that in comparative terms the think that high standards of safety are in their own
Ev 62 Transport Committee: Evidence

19 April 2006 Chief Constable Ian Johnston CBE QM BSc (Hons), Mr Len Porter, Mr Colin Foxall
and Ms Christine Knights

commercial interests and therefore they do not agree Q117 Chairman: Well then forgive me, Mr Foxall, I
with compulsory methods. Do you think that is an will go to somebody who does not feel torn.
argument borne out by evidence? Mr Porter: I will give you the answer. They should
Chief Constable Johnston: I think some have taken be compulsory but we need to be careful that the
their responsibilities very seriously. South West compulsion does not turn into simply ticking boxes.
Trains pioneered the use of TravelSafe oYcers and I That is my point.
thought that was a very good initiative which we
have certainly found very, very helpful in supporting Q118 Chairman: I accept that but Ms Knights, then,
us. I think the point Mr Franks made about an even are you saying it would be possible to have a set of
playing field for all the operators could probably compulsory standards as long as they were agreed
only be achieved through arrangements which were right the way across the network and as long people
mandatory and supported by legislation. knew they corresponded to reality, which is what
Mr Foxall is actually saying?
Q112 Chairman: So are you saying—? Ms Knights: I think there needs to be a set of
Chief Constable Johnston: I would be for a standards which are appropriate for the
mandatory arrangement. circumstances of each station.

Q113 Chairman: Does anybody else want to Q119 Chairman: Wait a minute. Are you saying we
comment on that? need a ground base of standards with individuality
Mr Foxall: I did want to make a very short built in for each individual station?
statement. Can I do that in three quick points. Ms Knights: No. At the moment what we are looking
at is passenger satisfaction being lower in medium-
sized and small stations and what we are generally
Q114 Chairman: Please do. getting through the franchise is requirements for
Mr Foxall: First of all, could I explain I have asked certain standards at the larger stations where there is
Christine Knights to join us because she is one of the high crime and high footfall. If we consider the
board members who specialises in this area so I hope passenger satisfaction, I think what we need is a set
her evidence will be helpful to the Committee in of basic standards but with additional or lesser
quite a broad way. There are three short things I standards in the diVerent sizes and types of station.
wanted to say. There are a large number of initiatives
and regimes in play on this subject of personal safety Q120 Chairman: Mr Porter, what are your views
in station facilities generally, but the problem is that on this?
it is a patchwork of things. What we need is a Mr Porter: I think the last time I appeared at one of
strategy or vision to guide things. We lack a these Committees you were concerned about the
controlling mind, body or a person to do this. I hear cost of standards, so I certainly could not propose
that the DfT is producing a single person to look standards in this area. I think the rail industry—
after policy. I think that is likely to be a good thing
but we need to watch quite carefully to see if it makes
Q121 Chairman: I am rarely accused by anyone of
progress. The third point is that with all the regimes
being concerned about costs but I am happy to
that we have around we want to make sure they are
hear it.
designed to meet passenger needs because you can
Mr Porter: I think the rail industry has grown more
have lots of regimes but if it amounts to ticking
knowledgeable about risk. The way that we police
boxes and checking things on forms, we want to
this ought to be according to risk.
make sure the things that are done in terms of
personal safety, things on stations for example,
actually work. The last thing I would say is both Ms Q122 Chairman: That does rather lean towards
Knights and I sit on the BTP Authority but we are flexibility.
here today plainly as Passenger Focus. Mr Porter: I would agree with that.

Q123 Chairman: Chief Constable, I am going to

Q115 Chairman: Let me be quite clear, are you come back to you because I am not now clear what
saying there should be fewer standards but they it is that is being proposed. Are we saying that we
should be compulsory and they should be should have a very straightforward set of minimum
standardised? standards but over and above those minimum
Mr Foxall: I think we would like to see it clearer. We standards there should be some flexibility for
would like for there not to be so many conflicting individual stations to put in bits that they like?
diVerent sorts of schemes all over the place. Chief Constable Johnston: I would go for a gold,
silver, bronze approach which would be mandatory
Q116 Chairman: I accept that and that is clear but through the franchising arrangements which would
what I am saying to you is do they need to be be set at diVerent thresholds, so small stations with
compulsory standards across all the train operating low footfall, low crime levels, meet one standard,
companies because it is clear they are all over the those with more crime, more people would meet
place. another standard and the bigger ones where there is
Mr Foxall: I am really torn in answering this most crime would be required to meet the higher
question. standard. I would want some system which had
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 63

19 April 2006 Chief Constable Ian Johnston CBE QM BSc (Hons), Mr Len Porter, Mr Colin Foxall
and Ms Christine Knights

flexibility and some system which targeted—which Q128 Chairman: What do you do with what
the gold, silver, bronze thing would do—the places information, Chief Constable? You tell the train
at which it was most needed because at the moment operating companies and what do they do with it, if
requirements within franchises are often specified in the answer is not a lemon?
terms of “You must have X number of secure Chief Constable Johnston: Some respond
stations” and they quite intelligently go for the ones responsibly and eVectively on occasions and others
that cost least. are unable to do so.

Q129 Chairman: Are unable or unwilling or do not

Q124 Mrs Ellman: There seems to be a discrepancy
intend to cough up the cash?
here between where need is greatest as identified by
Chief Constable Johnston: I think resources are a
high crime and where people feel there is a need
key issue.
because they are uneasy. Who should decide which
Chairman: I suspect they might be.
of those areas has higher priority in terms of action
needed?
Mr Foxall: I think the answer to that is that is why Q130 Mrs Ellman: Would you say the Secure
we think we should have a strategy which tries to Stations Scheme is successful?
address precisely that sort of question. At the bigger Chief Constable Johnston: I would say they are part
stations it is fairly plain that you can make decisions of the successful formula. There are other things to
about what you need to do and maybe Network Rail improving the lives of passengers on stations than
can help do that without too much diYculty. When just the Secure Stations Scheme but it is a big step in
we get further down—I hesitate to say “down the the right direction and I am very supportive of it.
line”—to the smaller stations it then becomes very Mr Porter: I would agree with that.
diYcult to say what is necessary and what I would Mr Foxall: From our point of view we see it being
like to see happen there is to encourage the local much more applicable to the larger stations and
community to become involved in making decisions diYcult to apply to the smaller stations.
about local stations and how they should be Commenting on the earlier discussion, we have
protected. talked about identifying needs but that ignores one
Mr Porter: I do not think it is a question of who very important thing and that is passengers’
should decide, it is a question of what the data and perception. If passengers are fearful of going into
information tells you as to where the priority risk is stations it does not matter whether there has or has
and then it is absolutely clear without anybody not been a problem on that station, it is a question of
taking a view as to where work should be done. whether they perceive it to be an environment where
there might be a problem. Somehow we have to take
that into account, which is why I think we need a
Q125 Chairman: To be devil’s advocate for a wider discussion about this. It is not just a statistical
moment, Mr Porter, are you not really saying that is bean counting exercise, it is an exercise about what
if, for example, the information gathered by CCTV the passengers think and what will make them secure
is on digital, if there is someone monitoring it, if in travelling.
there is some means of filtering that information?
Are there not a lot of ifs in that statement? Q131 Mrs Ellman: Why do you think there are only
Mr Porter: I do not think it is anything to do with 323 secure stations registered under the scheme from
CCTV. over 2,500 stations?
Mr Porter: Cost.
Q126 Chairman: No, but it is the quality of the
information. Where do you gather the information Q132 Mrs Ellman: Cost of?
from if it is a small station with no staV and it has not Chief Constable Johnston: I think the scheme could
got CCTV that anybody can decipher? I am sorry to be made easier and more flexible, which is why I
be boring about this but you have got to know what would quite like a gold, silver, bronze approach.
the information is before you sort it out, have you That is part of it. I think they see it as more diYcult
not? It is no use looking at the Chief Constable, I to achieve than it would be. There is an issue of cost
know his views but I want your views. in this as well. One of the things the scheme does is
Mr Porter: We have information in the various survey passengers so you do pick up on passengers’
databases that would describe where the incidents feelings and fear of crime through the present Secure
are taking place, that was why I was looking at the Stations Scheme.
Chief Constable because he has the database.
Q133 Mr Leech: I am interested to know whether
there is any diVerence between the levels of fear of
Q127 Chairman: So you could draw us a nice crime in stations where they have the Secure Stations
coloured map of the whole of the railway system of Scheme in place and whether people are aware that
the United Kingdom suitably graded as to the level those stations do have that scheme.
of crime in each individual area? Ms Knights: One of our concerns is that passengers
Mr Porter: Can we? are not particularly aware, nor is it particularly
Chief Constable Johnston: We certainly can. There is publicised, whether a station has accreditation
crime data for each station. under the Secure Stations Scheme or not. Clearly
Ev 64 Transport Committee: Evidence

19 April 2006 Chief Constable Ian Johnston CBE QM BSc (Hons), Mr Len Porter, Mr Colin Foxall
and Ms Christine Knights

there is a balance to be struck as to whether to days a week. For economy reasons, as the staV are
reassure people or to engender more fear, but there already there monitoring them, would you
has been research on the Secure Car Parks Scheme recommend it as a way forward for all stations to be
and when people found out about that it seemed to linked to town centres?
reassure them. Surely there is work to be done on Chief Constable Johnston: I think there is a challenge
looking at reassuring people through further nationally across all organisations about the
publicity on the Secure Stations Scheme. integration of CCTV systems for police forces, for
local authorities, for football grounds. There is a
Q134 Mr Wilshire: Somebody said, and this whole series of work to be done here. The Home
concerns me, if this is what people “perceive” to be OYce, God bless them, have commissioned some
a safe environment. Can any of you see any danger work and are due to report at the end of this year
in trying to reassure people beyond the point that which will be about achieving a working towards
you can actually deliver and, therefore, make them common standards to enable exactly that process to
less aware of their surroundings and less responsible take place. Whilst that is going on there is lots of
for their own safety? work that can be done. Lewisham, for example, has
Chief Constable Johnston: I think you can do things got cameras from the station into their borough
to make people feel safer by the way the environment control room and there are other places around
is constructed. Places that are dark and dirty do not London that I know of where that currently
give people a sense of reassurance and comfort and happens. There is scope for a lot more of that work
you can do something about that regardless of the which would be very good operationally in terms of
actual crime levels that are there. Paradoxically, tying up events because often the people who are
places where there are no people around are quite misbehaving on the stations turn out to be the people
frightening for some people and having people who misbehave in the towns, so there are some
around, whoever those people are, in a way helps operational links there, and there is some resource
people to feel safer. The issue of fear of crime is very saving in terms of who is sitting in front of these
much a separate issue from crime itself. The people cameras watching them.
who are worried about crime are by and large the Mr Porter: I think that we should see rail personal
elderly and people who are victims are the young. security as part of a community safety initiative,
The people who are worried about it are women, which is the point you are making. Just backing up
men are much more often victims of crime. People the Chief Constable’s point, if we do a very good job
are worried about crime at night, most of the crime on the railway, and I think that is happening, all that
is during the day. People on the railways are worried is going to do is push people out into the car park
about crime most on trains but mostly crime occurs first and then into the community centre or into the
on the platforms, on the stations. There are two shopping centre or whatever and there is no point
challenges to be addressed around crime and fear of spending the money to move them from A to B, we
crime and they require diVerent strategies. need to take a rather more holistic view.

Q135 Mrs Ellman: Should accreditation only be Q137 Mr Scott: I wonder if I could ask Mr Foxall
given to stations which are deemed to be at risk? and Ms Knights if you agree that this would help
Chief Constable Johnston: I think that would be a with the feel or the perception that people fear,
very sensible use of resources. You are into an issue which we heard is wrong?
about how do you define to what extent they are at Mr Foxall: I think it would be good. In fact, I agree
risk but that is exactly the point I am saying, at the with the last point that Mr Porter has just made. If
moment sometimes secure stations are places which you make the station tremendously secure and if the
have accreditation and that investment could have four streets outside the station are terribly insecure
been more usefully spent somewhere else. you have created another sort of problem unless you
Mr Foxall: I think that is problematic, Chairman. I are always going to guarantee someone comes to the
do not like disagreeing with the Chief Constable but station in a car or whatever. It does need to proceed
I think that is problematic because I still think the in that context. We must not ignore the fact that
perceptions people have influence travel. I accept crime on the railways is part of society’s crime. We
there is a boundary that you cannot go beyond. You cannot isolate it. Yes, clearly it is a specialist area
cannot go to ridiculous lengths to make people feel and we have to treat it in a particular way but it is
absolutely comfortable because if they innately fear, part of society’s crime and that is why I believe the
they innately fear, but I am worried about saying local community has to get involved too in looking
you do it simply on a risk assessment basis or on the at the issues that are raised in the stations. You
basis of experience. cannot shut the station in a box.
Chief Constable Johnston: My point around risk was Ms Knights: This goes back to Mr Foxall’s point at
I was including fear of crime as one of the elements the beginning that it is about a partnership to try to
within the risk assessment. resolve these issues where diVerent bodies, local
Mr Foxall: Then we are in agreement. authorities, BTP, RSSB and the train companies and
Network Rail, all need to work together, but there
Q136 Mr Scott: We have heard about the CCTV on does need to be one controlling body or one
station platforms. In a number of areas the town controlling mind having an overview to make sure
centres are already monitored 24 hours a day, seven there is a catalyst for action in each area.
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 65

19 April 2006 Chief Constable Ian Johnston CBE QM BSc (Hons), Mr Len Porter, Mr Colin Foxall
and Ms Christine Knights

Chief Constable Johnston: I would very much want much more careful way but it is interesting that the
to see stations positioned much more in the heart of general perceptions are not as bad as you would like
local communities because that is a way into to think.
resources, you can get town centre wardens engaged
and interested in stations, local shopkeepers, Q141 Chairman: I cut Mr Porter oV before so I must
develop Neighbourhood Watch capability. If we give him another chance.
were able to develop more ownership of the railway Mr Porter: I am glad that I have been given the
stations within local communities we could bring in opportunity to come back in because that is exactly
resources, bring in community support and get lots the point I wanted to make. We have done some
of help alongside the CCTV. general research on perception and the issue of
Mr Porter: I fully agree with that because if— societal concern. Without being too generalistic, it is
Chairman: Mr Porter, forgive me. If you agree I am largely associated with media hype and there is no
going to move on. real concrete reason for societal concern with
personal security on the railway, and an awful lot of
Q138 Mr Martlew: Listening to yourselves and the this is driven again by the media. That does not
previous witnesses, is station security a success story, matter to the public, the public have a perception of
is it getting better, or do I believe what I read in a problem and that is what we must deal with by
the papers? communicating in the right way.
Chief Constable Johnston: I think it is a mixed bag.
In some places there have been big improvements Q142 Mr Martlew: Are you saying that the media
and some places are pretty grim and people are quite are frightening people?
right to be anxious about spending time there. I do Mr Porter: Yes.
think there are lots of good initiatives going on so the Chairman: I think any minute now Chief Constable,
situation overall is getting better. As a police force you are going to find yourself censoring the
we have had better support in the last year or so to newspapers, that would be a good rally.
enable us to make a contribution to it. Clive EVord: Can I clarify, I may have missed your
Developments in CCTV are very positive although I answer earlier on, if I did I apologise. Mr Foxall or
do share Robin Gisby’s comments about more Ms Knights, do you agree that all stations should be
investment needed in the monitoring and use end of manned at all times when trains are running?
the business to get the full investment returns out of Chairman: StaVed, I think.
it. The front end is not quite done but enough has
gone into it, it is more in the back end and how we Q143 Mr Martlew: That is not like you, Chairman.
utilise the materials like CCTV and the like. I think Mr Foxall: I do not think we have answered that yet.
the picture is improving. Crime was down last year, I think the answer to that is passengers like to see
it was down the year before on the railways by small people around, it would be a good thing. We have
percentages but it is a step in the right direction. I do campaigned for ticket oYces to be manned in
think overall that we are going in the right direction London. We generally oppose reductions of
but not fast enough. manning on trains and things of that kind.

Q139 Mr Martlew: Chief Constable, earlier you Q144 Clive EVord: I am still not clear, is the answer
indicated that you needed legislation and then you yes or no?
appeared to contradict yourself to the extent that Mr Foxall: The answer, of course, is yes but the
you said you could put it in through the franchise. reality is that the train companies find that diYcult
Politicians know the idea that you are going to get to respond to.
legislation quickly is very unlikely. What would
you say? Q145 Clive EVord: Who do you speak for, the train
Chief Constable Johnston: I was clumsy with my companies?
language there. I regard the franchise as a regulatory Mr Foxall: I do not speak for train companies, and
requirement when I was talking about a legal basis you know that well, I speak for passengers and I
for it. There needs to be a regulatory requirement have said that very clearly. Passengers would prefer
which is mandatory and not an opt-in and opt-out to see staV and it would be desirable to have staV but
basis. what we have to respect and understand is there are
some stations which have such low footfall, it would
Q140 Mr Martlew: And you would put it in the be diYcult to put staV there, that is a fact.
franchise?
Chief Constable Johnston: I would see an easy route Q146 Clive EVord: Is it not a fact that footfall will get
through the franchise. even lower if you do not have staV?
Mr Foxall: The satisfaction levels from passengers in Mr Foxall: Indeed, and that is a major consideration
surveys we do show a steady improvement in this and I think it needs to be taken into account when
and although it is not great, you have got 60% levels the franchise is let. Adequate staYng on stations is
of satisfaction in general with personal safety. I something we want to see.
agree with the Chief Constable, I think it is
extremely variable and one of the things I would like Q147 Clive EVord: Ms Knights, would you like to
to do later on is have a look at the variability in a add anything?
Ev 66 Transport Committee: Evidence

19 April 2006 Chief Constable Ian Johnston CBE QM BSc (Hons), Mr Len Porter, Mr Colin Foxall
and Ms Christine Knights

Ms Knights: Yes, I would like to add something that infinitely better than things that were there five years
has not cropped up already. Mr Martlew asked is it ago because poor images do not do the job in court,
a success story or not and I think there are examples so the standard for images is very important as well.
of good practice but I think what is not happening is
that the measures being taken have not been Q151 Clive EVord: How does that sit with co-
evaluated against the impact on passengers’ of ordinating station systems with local community
perceptions. This is a good case in point. There may systems?
be a package of measures which are the solutions for Chief Constable Johnston: I think it is part of the
smaller stations where there cannot be staV. We do bigger picture that the Home OYce working party
not yet have suYcient evaluation of measures in has got to wrestle with because this is a problem that
place. has got tentacles everywhere and is, I think,
probably beyond the world. The way into it for me
is through a data warehousing approach which is the
Q148 Clive EVord: Is there any evidence or any way they resolve incompatibility of computers,
research which anyone has done that can having some piece of machinery there into which
demonstrate having staV at a station increases you can dump data which then comes out in a
people’s confidence and therefore increases use of format which is for common usage. I would see that
the transport network? sort of approach as being the interim measure.
Chief Constable Johnston: The evidence I would
point to is that at a number of the major stations
Q152 Clive EVord: Is CCTV more about being a
over the last year in Central London we have been
deterrent rather than detection and actual
able to introduce PCSOs, for example, at Victoria
convictions?
and crime at Victoria over the last year has gone
Chief Constable Johnston: 20% of all the people we
down by—
caught for robbery in London south last year was
through CCTV. The bombers were identified
Q149 Chairman: What are PCSOs, Chief Constable? primarily through CCTV. It is a fantastic device in
Chief Constable Johnston: Police community terms of detection and I think it has got massive
support oYcers. They are part of the extended police value to the police service in terms of detection as
family and they were introduced, for example, at well as in reassurance terms to the public.
Victoria and crime has gone down there by about
11%. It dropped initially by about 25 or 26%, it is Q153 Clive EVord: Southwest Trains pays for
down for the year by about 11%. I think one of the TravelSafe oYcers who are deployed by your force.
significant factors of that is there is a significant In your view, how eVective are these oYcers
number of additional yellow jackets visibly present compared with fully trained police oYcers or
around the station which has made a diVerence to community support oYcers?
actual crime levels. Certainly the feedback that we Chief Constable Johnston: They are less physically
have—I guess it is not a proper evaluation—is that able. They have fewer powers but what they do oVer
it is very welcome. is a very friendly and very reassuring presence. I
Mr Porter: If I can comment. I am fairly sure in think they were a fantastic initiative by Southwest
saying that we have done some research on this and Trains. They were the first train company to pick up
there is a correlation between increasing numbers of on this and I think they were the precursor to
people and reducing crime. community support oYcers. I think they are still a
very worthwhile part of the extended police family
but they do not have powers of arrest and they do
Q150 Clive EVord: Can I clarify something on not have a means to enforce regulations other than
CCTV. Mr Johnston, you suggested that it is some of the byelaws for the railways which railway
important that CCTV systems are standardised employees can enforce.
across the country and that minimum standards
should be set for the quality of images. Do such Q154 Clive EVord: Is there any danger of confusion
common standards exist at all yet and why is in the eyes of the public with so many diVerent
standardisation so important? enforcement oYcers?
Chief Constable Johnston: A step has been made, as Chief Constable Johnston: I have not experienced
I think you have heard from George Muir. There is that. To use an anecdotal approach, my wife does
an agreement between us, the train operators and not know the diVerence between any of them. She
ATOC, in moving forward to stick to a common finds them all reassuring and I think that is
format for the recording of the new visual images. fundamentally the point, do you find them
This is very important to us because at the moment reassuring or not.
to download images we require diVerent equipment
for diVerent sets of digital imaging and this is very Q155 Chairman: If she was arrested by one of them
expensive and very ineYcient and can be very, very when he had not got the legal right, she might take a
slow indeed. I think the standards are very, very mild interest.
important in that sense. They are also important in Chief Constable Johnston: She has had some good
terms of the quality of the pictures although I can advice from me about that and it probably would be
say most of the things on the market today is to plead guilty. I take the point. They have badges
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 67

19 April 2006 Chief Constable Ian Johnston CBE QM BSc (Hons), Mr Len Porter, Mr Colin Foxall
and Ms Christine Knights

which are very visible which says exactly what they Chief Constable Johnston: We operate according to
are. Police oYcers have very visible police badges on, the national intelligence model where we have
the police community support oYcers have very tasking arrangements where we invite the industry
visible badges on. What they are is easy to see, what along, they come along to the meeting, they say,
that means to people is a very fair point and I do “These are the resources that we have got available”,
think there is some risk of confusion but I am then we say “These are the resources that we have got
back to the point of fundamentally do they reassure available”. We look at the problems and we jointly
and help and support. I think they do. The risk of deploy. That is something that has started fairly
confusion is worth the asset that we have got. recently. There is a mixed level of take up across the
industry at the moment but it is building and it is for
Q156 Clive EVord: You recently carried out us to market that with industry to avoid that sort of
Operation Shield which was detecting people overlapping deployment, Southern in the shape of
carrying knives. How successful do you think that is? Keith Ludeman, who we heard from earlier, they
Will you use it in the future and can it be adapted to have a team of security guards who work jointly
identify other things that people may be carrying? alongside us. They are part of that tasking
Chief Constable Johnston: I think it is a fantastic arrangement. We have got pretty good joined-up
operation. We had lots of really good feedback from arrangements with these high level supports, like the
members of the public about it. We have had a large PCSOs, the specials that we have, the accredited
number of arrests, in fact the numbers you have got oYcers that we have on the rail industry and the
are about doubled now to what we reported in the TravelSafe people.
paper to you when the paper was prepared a few
weeks back. They are very, very eVective indeed. We Q159 Mr Leech: Have there been any examples
had people with carving knives up their sleeves where the co-ordination has failed and, if so, do you,
stopped by our oYcers using these machines. More as the transport police, try and take control of the
importantly, we watch people who come towards situation?
them and then decide they do not want to go near Chief Constable Johnston: We have been able to
them and that raises our suspicions to the point show a bit of leadership on this with the support of
where we conduct an investigation and frequently the rail industry. I have never seen it fail in any sense
find either they are wanted or they have some because there is more than enough for all of us to do
weapon or some other paraphernalia on them which out there anyway. There are examples where we
they should not have. It is a very eVective tool. We could have targeted resources more closely in one
put out a couple of these arches to start with in each spot and perhaps have been more eVective by joint
of our areas up and down the country. They are activity but that is part of the learning process of
going to be used in Scotland as part of the anti- working together.
knives campaign they are running up there. It will be
part of the national knives amnesty activity by Q160 Chairman: Before you go Mr Johnston, tell us
Government later this year. about the rail personal security group? Is it being
eVective? Are you managing to deal with the whole
question of assaults against railway staV?
Q157 Clive EVord: Are the train operating Chief Constable Johnston: We have put a lot of eVort
companies investing in this technology? into dealing with assaults on railway staV, we think
Chief Constable Johnston: We have done that they are entitled to proper protection. They are in a
through the budget provided to us by the authorities, very diYcult position sometimes and if we want
that is one of the initiatives we have been able to take them to look after the public, we have got to look
on the back of the money that we have got from after them. We were the first force in the country to
them. We have had support from the operators use DNA to detect oVences of spitting against
because it is on their property that we have to place railway staV. We have improved the number of
these arches and I think that they have proven clear-ups, they have increased over the last three
themselves to be a really worthwhile asset and if the years by something like 85%. A lot of initiatives that
extension around the country is equally successful we have taken have made a big diVerence to the
we want to do more of it. number of people who we have been able to detect.
The new group will help to get support from other
Q158 Mr Leech: Very briefly going back to the issue partners in tackling this very important point.
of all the diVerent kinds of security, is there a danger Chairman: On that note I suspend the Committee
that without a co-ordinated approach we could have and I am very grateful to the witnesses. Thank you
a situation where you have got CSOs, TravelSafe very much indeed.
oYcers, police oYcers, everybody on one station
and nobody somewhere else. How does the co- The Committee suspended from
ordination work? 4.25pm to 4.35pm for a division in the House.
Ev 68 Transport Committee: Evidence

Memorandum submitted by the Department for Transport

Introduction
The purpose of this memorandum is to provide the Committee with a summary of the Department’s
position on personal safety at railway stations. The sections below set out the Department’s views under the
following headings :-
— Opening statement;
— Responsibility for passenger safety.
— Government initiatives:
— Personal security measures at stations;
— The Secure Stations Scheme;
— Policing.
— Summary and conclusions.

Opening Statement
The Government is committed to continued improvements in personal safety at railway stations.
Providing a rail system which passengers regard as safe to use at all times is not a straightforward task. Many
of our stations were built by the Victorians and have suVered badly from underinvestment since. We are
addressing that neglect through an unprecedented level of investment; by making money available for
station improvements; by encouraging improved personal safety for passengers and staV through specific
initiatives like the Secure Stations Scheme (the new South Western franchise will, for the first time, impose
specific requirements on an operator to achieve and maintain Secure Stations Scheme accreditation) and by
increased BTP spending.
More generally, the Government continues to support the work of the police, local authorities, Crime and
Disorder Reduction partnerships (CDRPs) and transport operators to tackle crime on all modes of public
transport. We continue to develop, evaluate and disseminate good practice in reducing crime and the fear
of crime wherever it occurs in the transport system. We also continue to raise the profile of transport crime
as an issue that CDRPs should consider within their crime and disorder strategies. The rail industry is
committed to working with CDRPs and others to improve community safety.
The following sections of this memorandum highlight the progress that has already been made and
describes the Government’s future plans in this area.

Responsibility for Passenger Safety

There are just over 2,500 stations on the network. All but a handful (such as St Pancras International and
Prestwick) are owned by Network Rail. Seventeen—the main London termini and a small number of major
stations outside London—are managed directly by Network Rail themselves. The rest are leased to and
managed by the main train operator serving the station. The operators’ responsibilities include the personal
safety of passengers.
Regular users are generally well aware of who their train operators are and so have a good idea of where
to take their complaint when things go wrong at their local station. At multi-operator stations, however,
this may be much less obvious and there needs to be more information at stations making it clear where
responsibility lies. This is already addressed at Network Rail stations. Displays on train departure boards
identifying not only the company responsible but also the name of the duty manager are a feature of some
Network Rail stations which might usefully be adopted elsewhere.
A particular issue arises at stations shared by Underground and main line trains. In these cases, too, more
imaginative use of signing could go a long way towards ensuring that passengers know who is responsible
for their safety.

Government Initiatives to Promote Passenger Safety

A range of current Government initiatives are directed specifically at dealing with crime and the fear of
crime among users of railway stations:

Personal safety measures at stations

The Government is spending £87 million a week on the railways. Spending specifically on stations is
diYcult to identify separately because it comes from a wide variety of sources including Network Rail, train
operators, private investors and local authorities. The National Audit OYce, however, have estimated that
around £675 million was spent on station maintenance, operations, renewals and improvements in 2003–04.
Even with investment at that level, it is inevitable that there will be competing calls on funds. Operational
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 69

safety, for example, was rightly the priority following Hatfield and other major accidents. Even now that
those issues have been addressed, there continue to be other areas which matter to passengers—punctuality
and reliability being the outstanding examples—as well as personal safety.
The Department has been undertaking research into the most eVective ways of tackling crime at those
stations with the highest rates of crime, and especially those in socially excluded areas, to see whether the
need is for conventional crime reduction or wider regeneration solutions. We hope to make the results
available to operators and others later this year.
Franchise agreements increasingly require train operators to make improvements to stations in their area.
We now routinely expect train operators, in submitting their bids, to demonstrate that they have considered
the appropriate level of safety at stations. Operators are expected to have priced station upkeep into their
bids and Network Rail is fully funded to maintain the physical structure of stations through the income line
set by the OYce of Rail Regulation in the interim review. A well maintained station is valuable in reassuring
passengers and is less likely to attract anti social behaviour.
There is, additionally, central funding for stations. Network Rail has a £50 million a year pot for small
investments which can be used both directly to pay for improvements like CCTV installation and to lever
in third party funding. Around a third of stations nationally, and over half the three hundred or so in
London, now have CCTV and the number is increasing steadily as operators and Transport for London
continue to invest in increased passenger safety. For the longer term, improved passenger safety is one of
the items Ministers will want to specify in the High Level Output Specification.
Recent media reporting of station safety issues has concentrated heavily on the benefits which might flow
from insisting that all stations are staVed whenever trains are running. This is something we will continue
to examine but which is likely to prove an expensive option that may well not make the best use of what are
inevitably limited resources. A more sophisticated approach which targets crime hot spots is likely to be
much more eVective than a blanket requirement that every station, regardless of circumstances, must be
staVed at all times.
This memorandum has already drawn attention to the level of current investment in the railway but the
very fact that so much public money is being spent underlines the need to ensure that we are getting the best
value for it. Responsibility for stations within the Department is currently spread across a number of
diVerent Divisions, reflecting the wide range of current initiatives in the area. There is, though a clear need
to ensure that the various strands of policy relevant to stations in general and personal safety at stations in
particular is properly coordinated. A post is therefore being created within the Strategy and Finance
Directorate of the Department’s Rail Group specifically to take responsibility across the board for stations
issues and to ensure a sharper focus.

The Secure Stations Scheme

The Secure Stations Scheme is directed by the Department and the British Transport Police and enables
operators to gain accreditation for stations which have a comprehensive package of measures to reduce
crime and reassure passengers. Accreditation is based on four criteria:
— the physical design of the station, ensuring that crime is, as far as possible, designed out;
— ensuring that the station is being managed in a way that reduces crime;
— statistical evidence showing that crime at the station is being managed; and
— survey results showing that the majority of passengers feel secure.
Accreditation can be withdrawn at any time if standards are not maintained. In any case, accreditation
lasts only two years, after which it lapses if it is not renewed. Once accreditation has been gained, there are
incentives on operators to maintain standards. In some cases this will take the form of a specific franchise
obligations; we expect this to become an increasingly common feature of franchises in the future. Even where
there is no direct obligation, however, operators will want to avoid the negative publicity that would result
from allowing accreditation to lapse.
The strength of the scheme is that it both gives a good coverage of the things that matter to passengers
and specifically measures users’ perceptions, not merely those of the operator. The Scheme was the subject
of a formal independent review in 2003. The review generally endorsed the Scheme and proposed no major
changes. Those recommendations which were made were aimed at improving the eVectiveness and take up
of the Scheme by reducing its cost, simplifying administration and giving a clearer steer in the case of stations
which failed to meet the accreditation standard.
Following the Scheme’s relaunch in March 2005, there has been a 52% increase in accreditations. Most
train operators and Network Rail now participate. We have considered whether accreditation should be
compulsory and we have, in fact, made accreditation of more stations a franchise requirement. Insisting on
it across the board would, however, be an expensive option and one which would have to be phased in over
a period. We are considering, as an alternative, whether franchise bidders might be required to state what
percentage of their stations would be accredited and to what timetable.
Ev 70 Transport Committee: Evidence

Policing
Total crime on the railways decreased by 1.9% in 2004–05. The British Transport Police (BTP) currently
deploys 2,773 oYcers, an increase of 11% on the number employed in 2004–05, which itself saw a then
record rise of 9% on the previous year. This does not include either Special Constables or Police
Community Support OYcers (PCSOs). 200 additional Specials will be recruited over the next three years,
bringing the numbers up to 426. An extra 60 PCSOs have been recruited during 2005–06, bringing the total
to over 200.
PCSOs have been deployed at the main London termini, Leeds, Birmingham New Street, Manchester
Piccadilly and CardiV Central. These stations are among those with the highest passenger numbers and
also the highest crime levels.
PSCOs do not have all the powers of police oYcers but they are a visible, and uniformed, patrolling
presence. They are an eVective deterrent, especially to the type of low level anti-social behaviour that can
add to the fear of crime. They have a range of powers not available to other railway staV. They can require
a person’s name and address, can confiscate alcohol being consumed in a public place and can detain
people for up to thirty minutes pending the arrival of a police oYcer.
By introducing the legislation to allow the BTP to deploy PCSOs, the Government has enabled the force
to extend its policing capability. We have also put in place legislation to allow the BTP to establish a
Railway Safety Accreditation Scheme. This allows the BTP Chief Constable to confer limited police
powers on specific employees (such as Network Rail or train operating company station or security staV)
once they have been suitably trained and accredited under the scheme. Accredited persons can be deployed
on trains and at stations. They do a valuable job in reassuring the public and contributing to the fight
against crime, disorder and anti-social behaviour.
On 11 October 2005, the Secretary of State announced a review of the BTP. His decision to carry out
the review was made in the context of the review of the 43 local police forces in England and Wales which
is being undertaken by the Home Secretary but which does not cover the BTP. The wider review is
addressing proposals for major restructuring of policing across England and Wales and the Secretary of
State considered it right to review the BTP at the same time.

Summary and conclusions

Part of the Government’s vision, as set out in its Ten Year Plan for Transport, was safer and more secure
transport accessible to all. This memorandum has made the point that attention to rail safety issues in the
early years of the period covered by the Plan concentrated on learning the lessons of major accidents like
that at Hatfield. Personal safety was nevertheless identified as an important issue from the outset. The Plan
specifically identified the need for “station improvements including improved . . . personal security, with
greater coverage of CCTV at stations and station car parks and increasing numbers of stations accredited
under the Secure Stations Scheme.”
Good progress has been achieved in those and other related areas, as this memorandum has described.
That is reflected in the results of the Autumn 2005 National Passenger Survey conducted by Passenger
Focus which showed that 59% of passengers nationally rated personal security at stations as satisfactory
or good. 10% rated it unsatisfactory or poor. Results for London and the South East were almost identical
(57% and 10% respectively). The survey also showed that satisfaction ratings in this area were improving.
We recognise that there is work still to be done to reassure passengers not only that rail is a safe means
of transport but also that their personal safety is not at risk while on trains and at railway stations.
3 April 2006

Witness: Derek Twigg, a Member of the House, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for
Transport, gave evidence.

Q161 Chairman: Good afternoon, Minister, we are Derek Twigg: Yes, I am Derek Twigg, Minister for
very grateful to you for coming. Railways.
Derek Twigg: Good afternoon.

Q162 Chairman: I assumed you engineered the vote Q164 Chairman: Did you have something you
so that you could make an entry on a high note. particularly wanted to tell us, Mr Twigg?
Derek Twigg: Once a whip always a whip I think, Derek Twigg: Yes, I would like to make a short
Mrs Dunwoody. statement before you ask me questions. Clearly, I
believe this is a very important issue and I welcome
the investigation by this Committee. I think it is
Q163 Chairman: Could I ask you to identify important to put it in context as well. We are an
yourself? increasingly successful railway. There is £87 million
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19 April 2006 Derek Twigg MP

being invested a week now and a billion passengers Q169 Chairman: I understand there are lots and lots
so a growing railway. We want to see that growing and lots of train stations, in fact I sometimes think I
railway continue and therefore personal safety is an have been to every one, but what I am asking is
important part of that in terms of encouraging something rather simpler. Some train operating
people onto the railway. As you will know, Mrs companies think that there should be a degree of
Dunwoody, we have put in place a new structure compulsion and some train companies think that
now with the new DfT rail group put in place and of there should not. What is the attitude of Her
course Network Rail have responsibility for Majesty’s Government?
performance in the TOCs service division and of Derek Twigg: We do not think we should compel
course they have the most responsibility for what every single train operating company to do
happens at stations in terms of the management and something at every single station. We believe there
operation. As I have said in my submission, we are diVerent remedies and approaches to stations.
intend to create a post to co-ordinate station issues
within the new Department for Transport rail Q170 Chairman: So you do not believe that there
group. should be compulsory standards?
Derek Twigg: Not for every station. What we are
Q165 Chairman: Forgive me, you “intend to create”, saying is that the secure stations accreditation
future tense? programme should continue to grow and that is why
Derek Twigg: Yes, we are in the process of doing in the South Western—
that, we have not done that yet because a number of
responsibilities are spread across diVerent parts of Q171 Chairman: How many stations does that
the divisions. In the new franchises, and South cover?
Western in particular, which is the one we have just Derek Twigg: It is roughly about 250 stations at
done and sent out, we will be putting much greater present.
stipulation in that in terms of secure station
accreditation, and, of course, also we have done
some research which will report later this year in Q172 Chairman: How many stations are there on the
terms of tackling crime at high crime stations in United Kingdom railway system?
socially excluded areas. Derek Twigg: As you are aware, there are 2,500
stations.
Q166 Chairman: When could we expect that?
Derek Twigg: Some time later this year. Q173 Chairman: Would you think that was a
satisfactory percentage?
Derek Twigg: First of all, I agree that we need to
Q167 Chairman: Thank you very much. Some of our
improve on that and clearly—
train operators strongly oppose the imposition of
standards by Government because they think a
voluntary approach is better. They say high Q174 Chairman: Anything other than 200 when we
standards of passenger safety are in their own best have got 2,000-odd stations would be an
commercial interests and therefore compulsory improvement.
measures are simply unnecessary. Are these Derek Twigg: We want to do that. That was why we
arguments borne out by the state of passenger safety launched it last year and we have had over 100 new
in stations across the network? accreditations since then. I would also like to say,
Derek Twigg: I think it is true to say that comparing Chairman, that what is important here is that the
crime, stations and safety is much less of a problem stations that are accredited account for most of the
in wider society generally. However, it is an throughput of passengers on our network.
important issue that we have got to tackle and there
are a variety of ways that we can do this. In terms of Q175 Chairman: Wait a minute, say that again.
the train operator companies, I think they are best Derek Twigg: Most of the stations that are currently
placed to determine what needs to be done at accredited are the busiest stations. Not all of them,
individual stations because there is a variety of but most of them.
diVerent types of stations with diVerent throughput
and diVerent ages, et cetera, around the country.
Obviously that is correct but also, as Government, I Q176 Chairman: You are saying that therefore we do
think we have a responsibility to see that we do work not have to worry too much?
with the industry and help standards improve in Derek Twigg: No, I did not say that. What I am
terms of personal safety of passengers on the trying to say is in terms of the total coverage of
railway. people using the stations it is greater than 250. If you
look at 250 stations in isolation compared with 2,500
then clearly I can see the point you are making and
Q168 Chairman: Does that mean you do approve of clearly we want to improve on that but what I am
compulsory standards or does that mean you do not saying is that the stations, particularly the Network
approve of compulsory standards? Rail stations, are some of the busiest stations in the
country and, therefore, most of the passengers going
Derek Twigg: What we say is that one size does not through them are covered by the accredited
fit all. stations scheme.
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19 April 2006 Derek Twigg MP

Q177 Chairman: The diYculty is, Minister, they can Derek Twigg: That is why we are looking at how we
get on in those stations but where do they get oV? can continue to improve on the secure stations status
Derek Twigg: That is why I agree with you that we for accredited stations and why, as I mentioned a few
do need to see more secure stations accreditation. moments ago, we are looking at the South Western
That is why, for instance, in the South Western franchise and how we can improve that in the
franchise documentation we have just sent out we franchises in the future. As I say, I do not believe we
are asking the bidders to cover 80% of the footfall can be prescriptive about every station because there
through stations with secure stations accreditation is such a variety of diVerence of stations.
status and also every station is surveyed with the Chairman: You have been kind enough to explain
BTP. that three times now.

Q178 Chairman: So you are moving towards a Q184 Mrs Ellman: Passenger surveys show very
tougher line with the franchise agreements you use clearly the importance that passengers attach to
to lever up safety standards? visible staYng at stations. What is the Government
Derek Twigg: Yes. We have not set it at 100%, we doing to act on that?
think the figure of around 80% of footfall going Derek Twigg: I would answer that by saying there
through stations is a reasonable figure. We have got are a number of options for improving security at
to look in terms of what is the best option for stations. StaYng will be one and where train
diVerent stations and for a lot of stations it would be operating companies think that is something they
suitable to go through that process but for others it wish to do clearly they will do that, but it is not
may not be. For instance, it would depend how well always the case that having staYng at stations
used stations are. Some stations already have necessarily mitigates crime or, in fact, deals with a
security installed. particular problem. For instance, someone sitting in
a ticket oYce at a station may not have a good
Q179 Chairman: I think we have been round that bit handle on what is happening on the platform or on
of the track before. Are you saying one single body the periphery of the station where a lot of crime takes
should hold overall responsibility for station place, so it might not necessarily be the best option.
development? There is a variety of options in terms of CCTV,
Derek Twigg: No, station responsibility is clearly information on the platforms, lighting, and mirrors
with the train operating companies and Network in dark alleyways.
Rail when it is their stations. As a Government we
want to work with them and see improvements at the
stations and that is why we are doing some of the Q185 Mrs Ellman: There are all those things but let
things I outlined to you a few minutes ago. us just stop for a moment and look at the staYng
issue because the surveys that have taken place,
including those commissioned by the Department,
Q180 Chairman: So you are prepared to be tougher show what a major factor visible staYng on stations
when franchise agreements are being used but you is for passengers travelling. Is that not something
do not think we should have a single body and you that you would respond to as a Government, as the
are not looking for minimum requirements to set Minister?
common standards and requirements for all
Derek Twigg: We would ask in terms of the whole
stations?
security approach, the personal security approach,
Derek Twigg: As I tried to make clear, and maybe I
what is the best option to take it forward. It may be
did not and I apologise for that, we believe that—
the case in certain stations that additional staYng
may be the best option but, having said that, some
Q181 Chairman: It is probably just me, I am easily of the highest crime stations do have more staV than
confused. others. On a rural station with a very small number
Derek Twigg: The best people to determine the of people going through it every day, would you
security in terms of what needs doing and what can decide that was the best way to spend money on
be developed at stations, working with the likes of security, would it not be better doing something else?
the BTP, would be the train operating companies
because they manage and run the stations every day.
We are not in the process of managing and Q186 Mrs Ellman: Are you saying that the
running stations. Government does not single out staYng at stations
as an item of particular importance?
Q182 Chairman: I do not think we actually asked Derek Twigg: It does have an importance but it is
you that, Minister. I think we asked you something a—
a lot simpler. You do not actually run the trains but
you do require them all to comply with certain safety Q187 Mrs Ellman: Is it of particular importance?
standards, do you not? Derek Twigg: StaYng can play a very important
Derek Twigg: Yes. role, the most important role in some stations, but
there has to be a variety of measures. This is why the
Q183 Chairman: You do not actually run the train operating companies, who have to run and
stations but why should you not ask them to comply manage the stations, are the best placed people to
with certain safety standards? determine that.
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 73

19 April 2006 Derek Twigg MP

Q188 Mrs Ellman: Do you not think they might be Derek Twigg: Obviously there has been a whole
tempted to look at cost rather than what the public range of expenditure on various things on the
want? railway and some of that will have gone into security
Derek Twigg: There will always be an issue about but there is also other money that has come into
cost in terms of what is aVordable. You will know, dealing with security and improving stations in
and I do not need to go through it, and I know the terms of local authorities, for instance, in Crime
Chairman would not let me go through it, the Reduction Partnerships.
substantial amount of money that the Government
has put into the railways in the last seven or eight Q195 Chairman: You were the one who was insisting
years in terms of the improvements that have been on the amount of money that has gone into the
brought about. It is a judgment that has to be made railway system, and I agree with you absolutely, I
on the ground as well in terms of what is the best way think you are doing extraordinarily well, but I am
of taking forward security at particular stations. interested to know which bit has been targeted at
security?
Q189 Mrs Ellman: Has the Department made any Derek Twigg: I am saying as part of the overall
assessment of the cost of there being staYng at package some of that money has been spent on
stations while trains are running? security.
Derek Twigg: No.
Q196 Graham Stringer: I would like to go back to
the points you were making about putting
Q190 Mrs Ellman: That is not an issue you have requirements in the franchises to improve the
looked at? security at stations. I have got a copy of the answer
Derek Twigg: No. you gave to Peter LuV last month about putting
those requirements into the franchise. How do you
Q191 Mrs Ellman: What about safety of rail staV get the information that enables you to put that
against crime, what has the Government done information into the franchise?
about that? Derek Twigg: If it is helpful, Chairman, I am happy
Derek Twigg: Again, the prime responsibility is for to read out the small paragraph of what was said in
the train operating companies and Network Rail the South Western franchise which would deal with
who employ those staV in terms of security. I am sure Mr Stringer’s points.
the people you have had previously before the
Committee today will have made clear what their Q197 Chairman: Please do.
approach is to that. It is very important that there is Derek Twigg: It says: “It is proposed that the base
good security for staV, they are delivering an case specification should require bidders to deliver
excellent service and play an important role in secure station accreditation for those stations with
developing and improving the rail service. In terms 80% of the franchise footfall. The bidders will be
of the civil issues, in terms of CCTV, lighting, how required to assess with the BTP the security crime
the management of security is done, that is for the risk at all stations in the franchise and ensure that
train operating companies or the station operator. I their proposals covering 80% of the footfall include
know that DNA packs have been given to some staV all identified high risk locations”.
in recent times.
Q198 Graham Stringer: So you are asking the
Q192 Mrs Ellman: Are there any targets the bidders to go through the process?
Government has set for reducing attacks on staV? Derek Twigg: With the BTP.
Derek Twigg: There is no target that we have
because we do not have prime responsibility for that, Q199 Graham Stringer: You yourself do not have
that is for the train operating companies and any of that information by which you can identify
Network Rail. particular crime hotspots on stations?
Derek Twigg: We have not got not statistical
information on all stations but we will get the
Q193 Mrs Ellman: The Government have not taken information back as part of the bidding process.
any particular interest in that?
Derek Twigg: No, we do take an interest in terms of
Q200 Graham Stringer: Do you have, like the Mayor
security as a whole on the railway and security of
of London has, a list of crime-ridden stations? I do
passengers and the staV and that is why we have
not want to get into problems of order of magnitude,
invested significant amounts of money in the railway
we know there will be more crime on Euston and the
over the last eight years and why you see the
big London stations than anywhere else. If we take
improvements in security that have taken place
the huge Manchester, Birmingham, London stations
around the network.
out, do you have a target of crime-ridden stations
throughout the network that you would like to do
Q194 Chairman: Minister, that money you have something about?
invested over the last eight years has not been Derek Twigg: Not in that sense, no, because it is for
specifically targeted towards safety, has it? Is there the train operating companies as the managers of the
any element of that that you could point to where stations, or Network Rail, to develop the approach
you have insisted on certain safety improvements? to dealing with crime. Clearly the secure stations
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19 April 2006 Derek Twigg MP

accreditation process is one way we support that and previously were not as proscriptive so it may be more
want to see that improved and that does cover some diYcult but as part of the franchises there are
of the biggest stations in terms of the greatest footfall penalties that can be imposed and plans to recover
going through those stations. What we are looking from situations that need to be implemented if we
at as well, as I mentioned in my opening statement, is seek that as part of the franchise agreement.
we are doing some research looking at those stations
with the highest crime in the most deprived areas to Q205 Graham Stringer: Apart from the research you
learn lessons from some of those stations that have commissioned, what is your source of
already have accreditation status but also to look at information about crime on stations?
those stations that have not and compare issues and Derek Twigg: We get the annual reports from the
look at what can be done to improve it. They can BTP and we have regular meetings with the BTP and
also be linked into wider deprivation issues and with the train operating companies. MPs write to us
issues outside of the stations which we need to look on issues.
at. There are things we are looking at and
developing. Q206 Graham Stringer: In those statistics you get
from BTP, is crime against the person on railway
Q201 Graham Stringer: You have commissioned stations separated out from the other statistics?
research into crime on the railway system, the Derek Twigg: Violent crime, you mean? Yes. It is
stations. Would you care to share with the categorised in terms of what the crimes are. I am
Committee any of the early findings of that happy to let you have a list of that.
investigation?
Derek Twigg: Ministers have not got that yet, we Q207 Mr Goodwill: We have received evidence this
hope to have that later this year. Clearly we are afternoon about the use of CCTV systems and some
happy to share that with the Committee when we of the information has been a little bit patchy about
have that information. the deployment of these, particularly outside
London. Do you have the big picture? Could you tell
Q202 Graham Stringer: Presumably this has us, for example, what proportion of stations across
happened to you as a Minister. Take Clitheroe the entire network is now monitored using CCTV?
station in the North West, if the Member for that Derek Twigg: About a third of stations.
area wrote to you and said there had been five
serious attacks on diVerent people on that station, Q208 Mr Goodwill: We have also heard that there
would you feel it was your responsibility to do are diVerent ways that CCTV is being used. Some of
something about it at that stage? it seems to be reactive and if an incident occurs they
Derek Twigg: Clearly we would want to raise that can go back, pull the tapes and see that incident.
with the train operating company and the BTP, who Others are being monitored and others are being
I am sure in that instance would already be aware of monitored and backed up with PA announcements
the situation. Again, it would be worth exploring to people who may be starting to behave in a
with them whether they wanted to go for secure disruptive or antisocial way. How important do you
station accreditation. As you know, the Member of think those diVerent types are and how would you
Parliament can be a very important implement in like to see the deployment of those in the future?
terms of ensuring some changes are made. For Derek Twigg: I think CCTV is a very important
instance, with secure station accreditation the weapon and defence in terms of issues around crime
Member of Parliament is always informed who at stations or crime generally. Clearly there are
generally—not always, but generally—takes an diVering standards of CCTV around and we would
interest in what is going on. There are opportunities like to see the best quality, particularly if they could
there to try and do things but, as I say, it is for the be linked up with other CCTV systems.
train operating companies who manage and run the
stations to do something about it. Q209 Chairman: So you have written that into the
franchise, have you?
Q203 Graham Stringer: Would you be prepared to Derek Twigg: No, we have not. What I am trying to
lean on the train operating companies, threaten to say, if I can just finish my answer and I will hopefully
change the franchise, which I understand you have be able to give you some further information on
the power to do? that,—
Derek Twigg: Are you talking about for one station?
Q210 Chairman: I am sure you will.
Q204 Graham Stringer: I am just using it as an Derek Twigg: In terms of the accredited secure
example, it might be part of a network, it might be station status that is something we looked at as part
one station. of that process. Again, it is down to the train
Derek Twigg: I think it is a diYculty in terms of what operating companies that manage the stations to
would be in a particular franchise. As you know, determine these things working with the BTP. I
South Western is the first one that we have done as know the BTP work very closely with them about
the Department for Transport from start to finish this. I was at Wimbledon station recently and they
and you have seen what we are doing in terms of the have got an excellent system there and went through
additional security issues we want to put in there. I the process in terms of they were backtracking over
suspect that some of the franchise agreements footage where they were able to pinpoint oVenders
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 75

19 April 2006 Derek Twigg MP

and deal with that in one particular case where stations. Have you any information as to how far
someone fired oV an extinguisher at the station when that crime has been negated completely or whether
a train was coming into the station. Yes, there are there has just been a displacement into areas around
diVerent systems and maybe that is something that stations or other city centre areas? Are we genuinely
needs to be looked at in terms of the future reducing crime by these systems or are we just
deployment of CCTV. displacing it to other areas?
Derek Twigg: I think BTP have said that they see
Q211 Mr Goodwill: Can you see a situation in the secure station accreditation has helped reduce crime
future when all stations would be required through but clearly it will vary from station to station. There
the franchise agreement to deploy CCTV? are a number of factors that need to be brought into
Derek Twigg: I think more and more will be. I come play in terms of what is the best solution for a
back to the earlier point. Whether it is right that particular station.
every station needs to have CCTV—Mrs Ellman
made the point about staYng—is it staYng, is it Q216 Mr Leech: Do you agree with the train
lighting, is it having the particular design of the operating companies who are arguing that it is better
station changed, or some part of it, or mirrors where to upgrade a lot of the existing CCTV on the old
there are subways, et cetera, there are lots of analogue systems to digital rather than trying to
diVerent approaches. Is it the same at a rural station extend it to 100% coverage of all the stations?
where only a small handful of people go on it every Derek Twigg: I think it is a matter of judgment that
day compared with a busier town station? the train operating companies need to make on their
stations in terms of how they spend the resources
Q212 Chairman: Are you asking us, Minister? that are available.
Derek Twigg: No, I am not asking you, I am just
saying these are some of the considerations that have Q217 Chairman: Minister, does the Department
to take place. have any view at all about how safety should be
Chairman: I beg your pardon, I was not clear. handled?
Derek Twigg: I tried to explain that is part of the
Q213 Mr Goodwill: In those circumstances do you reason that we support and deal with the secure
think that the cost of manning of CCTV could even stations accreditation, why we put the clause in the
contribute to the closure of stations or lines? South Western franchise and why we are working
Derek Twigg: That is an interesting line you are closely with train operating companies and the rest
trying to draw me down but, as you know, we are not of the industry. I am trying to make clear that, yes,
in the process of closing hundreds or dozens of we have a strategic view in terms of the Department
railway stations, in fact we want to grow the under the new structure but in terms of the actual
railways. You will have just seen our recent operation and management of the stations the
announcement on Northern Rail and, despite the people best placed to determine what happens there
suspicions and innuendo, there were no closures. We are the train operating companies and we will work
want to grow the railway. Having the sorts of with them.
security measures we have spoken about here today Chairman: I do not think we were asking you to
we will encourage more encourage people to use the operate the cameras.
railway which is already something that is becoming
more and more attractive by the day. Q218 Mr Martlew: Can we go back to the policy
which appears to be to push up standards through
Q214 Mr Goodwill: I think one failure that has been tightening the franchise, improving the franchise,
highlighted this afternoon is the situation where a and that seemed to be the view of the Chief
local station has a CCTV system that is not being Constable, as opposed to new legislation. You
monitored but the local authority does have a mentioned that you want 80% of secure stations
monitoring room. Do you think it has been a from South Western trains.
mistake not to encourage more stations to link into Derek Twigg: Of the footfall.
their local CCTV systems?
Derek Twigg: We have encouraged them to work Q219 Mr Martlew: What is it at the present time?
with the Crime Reduction Partnerships which exist Derek Twigg: In terms of what we have asked them
in areas to deal with crime. Often crime will not just to do?
be relevant to a particular station, it might be a
general wider problem in the area around the station Q220 Mr Martlew: You are asking them to improve
which may involve the station at some point. Clearly to 80% of the footfall at the stations but what is it at
closer partnership work is something that we would the present time? Is it a high target for them or are
encourage and I know that a number of operators they already there?
are already doing that quite well. In fact, Derek Twigg: I could not give you the answer to that
Wimbledon is one of those operators as part of the today. I can come back to you on that.
South Western Franchise who are doing that.
Q221 Mr Martlew: You mentioned Northern Trains
Q215 Mr Goodwill: We have heard how having more and I have two stations just outside my constituency
people around the place in fluorescent jackets and that could be closed. Obviously my concern if they
having more cameras around has reduced crime in had been fully staVed would have been the
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19 April 2006 Derek Twigg MP

economics would have been such that they would railway and that includes safety and there are a
have closed. Nobody has mentioned the cost of variety of sources from which to do that. The key
security. Do you believe that there is a case for responsibility remains with the train operating
increasing the take from the fare box and putting up companies and Network Rail where they have
prices to increase security on the railways? stations. We have not got that information. We have
Derek Twigg: Sorry, putting up the price of rail so we not done that.
can increase security?
Q226 Graham Stringer: Let me lead on to another
Q222 Mr Martlew: For example, in Spain they put a question related to that. As I am sure you are aware,
tariV on the ticket which pays for security. Do you we are doing a concurrent investigation into security
think that is a policy that should be taken up here? of transport across the whole of the UK. One of the
Derek Twigg: You come to an interesting area in issues that we have come across is that, of course, the
terms of the price of railway tickets. Our policy rail system is a completely open system and I am sure
remains, as you well know, it is RPI plus one. There terrorists know that as well. Do you not think it
is over 87 million a week being spent on the railways. would be sensible to know against the background
A lot of the staV and a lot of the security cameras are of a potential threat from terrorists how much is
already there and a lot of the other improvements being spent on security and whether that could be
are part of that money, which is a significant used to help in the general security of the system
improvement from where we were a few years ago. against terrorist attacks? Do you not think the
In terms of staYng generally it comes back to the Government should have some idea of those issues
issue I am trying to make a point on. It does not and figures?
mean that every station needs to be staVed, that may Derek Twigg: As I say, there are a variety of sources
not be the best solution. of investment that comes into the railway and we
have not had those figures. What we do know is that
Q223 Mr Martlew: I am not arguing with that. I am there have been significant amounts spent on the
not arguing for the Government to put extra money railway and that includes security as well.
in. What I am saying is if the train operating
companies came to you with a good security case Q227 Graham Stringer: Really that is not good
saying, “We can improve security at stations by this enough, is it? To know that there are diVerent
much but we need to increase prices”, what would be sources is not really an excuse for not knowing how
your view of that? much has been spent on it and whether it is
Derek Twigg: As you know, we are currently improving and whether that will help or not in
reviewing the Saver tickets and fares but I would not general security as against a terrorist attack?
like to say at this stage that we have not had that Derek Twigg: Security is improving per se because
approach. We would listen to any approach made by there are more CCTV cameras around, there is
the train operating companies but our policy better lighting at a large number of stations and, as
remains as it is. I say, we are improving the franchises in terms of the
way we deal with the security issue. The overall
Q224 Graham Stringer: Have you any quantitative crime rate has dropped, although I accept in certain
estimate in actual figures of the amount that has categories it has not. There is already evidence of
been spent on an annual basis on increased security what has been done in terms of improvements. What
at stations? I want to do, like everybody else around this table,
Derek Twigg: We do not have that for a number of is see further improvement in that. Because of a
reasons. The money has been spread across a variety of sources of income coming into the railway,
number of expenditure areas on the railway. A lot of and into stations in particular, clearly that is
the money specifically has been spent in terms of something we do not currently have the figures on.
upgrading the railway from where it was a number
of years ago but also there is other money coming in Q228 Clive EVord: There has been a proliferation of
in terms of local authorities and private sources. The categories of names of enforcement staV on our
actual amounts do not come just from the railways: TravelSafe oYcers, community support
Department or the train operating companies. oYcers, railway enforcement oYcers as well as
police oYcers and the BTP themselves. Is there any
Q225 Graham Stringer: I know that it comes from danger that in this proliferation of diVerent
diVerent sources, it is just that reading through the categories of oYcers there is going to be confusion in
written submissions that are before the Committee, the eyes of the public?
the diVerent train operating companies say, “We Derek Twigg: No, I do not believe there will. As you
have spent money on this” but all of them are pretty know the number of BTP oYcers has significantly
reluctant to say, or they have not said, “We have increased in recent years, as has the number of
spent five million, 10 million” or any figures. In your community support oYcers, which I think,
concern about safety and security of stations I eventually, in the next year or two, will go up to over
wonder whether the Department have bothered to 400. There is the new railway accreditation scheme,
ask or find those figures out. the one I launched recently, at Victoria Station for
Derek Twigg: It is not so much have been bothered the South Eastern Trains. These are all helping to
to ask but, as I say, as I am sure you would recognise, reassure passengers, helping to deal with crime,
there has been an increase in investment in the particularly low level crime and anti-social
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 77

19 April 2006 Derek Twigg MP

behaviour. I think that complements the British Derek Twigg: The train operating companies
Transport Police. I know the Chief Constable has contribute significant amounts anyway in to the
been very supportive and is very enthusiastic about British Transport Police. One point in answer to that
those improvements that are taking place. is to say it is for the BTP to decide operational
matters and they decided with Operation Shield to
Q229 Clive EVord: Has the Government made any put that in place. That has brought success in a
assessment of the eVectiveness of the Southwest number of areas and they want to extend it but that
Trains’ TravelSafe oYcers as a deterrent for anti- is part of the overall budget deliberations. I cannot
social behaviour or preventing crime? say today whether that will change the amount of
Derek Twigg: We have not made any particular money that will come into the BTP. What I can say
study of that but clearly we believe that having more is there has already been an increase in the funding
personnel in terms of security has helped that. The available. There has been an increase in the number
BTP, as I say, work very closely with the diVerent of BTP oYcers; there has been another increase in
bodies but I think the community support oYcers the community support oYcers and of course, we
will increase and the railway accreditation scheme, have had the railway accreditation scheme as well.
which has been launched recently, has already had There has been a significant increase in security from
success in terms of dealing with some of the low level the BTP and those who work with them.
anti-social behaviour.
Q233 Clive EVord: Does the Government have the
Q230 Clive EVord: Is there any concern on the authority in any way to turn around to the train
Government’s part that we are seeing a proliferation operating companies who are making money and
of oYcers who have got limited powers and, running the railways and say that we have concerns
therefore, we are giving the public a false sense of about safety and we think you should be
security? contributing more in this area in terms of safety on
Derek Twigg: It is also hand in hand with an increase the railways?
in the number of British Transport Police oYcers Derek Twigg: We talk on a regular basis to the train
which I think is now at record levels. There has been operating companies, Network Rail and to the BTP
an increase in both British Transport Police oYcers and clearly issues of security will come up and we
and also in terms of the other safety and security will talk to them about that. Where we think things
oYcers who come on to the railway. I think also we work well we would encourage that. In terms of the
have made major contributions to the British overall budgets of that, that is something that has
Transport Police in terms of the investment in got to take part of the annual negotiations around
capital projects and helping in that way as well. the budget settlement. I can only repeat the budget
There is a lot of investment gone into British has increased.
Transport Police as well, as you know, from the
industry as a whole. Q234 Clive EVord: Does the Government have the
authority to say to train operating companies,
Q231 Clive EVord: What about new technology? “Spend some more money in this area”?
Operation Shield was very successful, I believe, in Derek Twigg: If we put in a franchise we could in
detecting people carrying knives on the rail network. that sense but, as I say, in terms of what we franchise
Does the Government intend to invest more money the train operating company to do, clearly we would
in technology of that kind and what other items want to work with them rather than saying you must
might be detected that we might not want people to not do this or that. There are certain things we would
take on the railways using that sort of technology in put in, we have said certain things in the South
the future? Western franchise. We would work with them and
Derek Twigg: I know it is going slightly outside this hopefully if we find something that works well, we
work, but we have done some trials in terms of would look at how we could improve things. I think
terrorism issues and things. In terms of the specific we try to work together in partnership and develop
one, Operation Shield, that was an initiative by the better and more appropriate means of security but,
British Transport Police which we welcome. As you as I say, the train operating companies, working
know they are extending it and this has had some with the BTP, are the best people to deliver that.
success in detecting a number of individuals who
carry knives so clearly we welcome that sort of
Q235 Clive EVord: We have seen in the past in other
initiative. As I say, the overall budget of the BTP has
areas, to put it bluntly, that the train operating
been increased by the train operating companies,
companies have not invested where people would
who are funding it, and of course in terms of capital
have liked them to have invested the money. At the
which includes improvements in the BTP’s ability
end of the day, if there is a concern about safety and
to operate.
we are saying this train operating company is not
taking its responsibilities in this regard seriously,
Q232 Clive EVord: If this technology, as it appears does the Government have the power to say “do
to have done, proves to be eVective, will the more and spend more”?
Government be approaching train operating Derek Twigg: If it is part of the franchise you can do
companies to say, “Contribute some more towards it by the franchise mechanism itself. We have a
this and we can make the railway safer”? contract with the train operating companies.
Ev 78 Transport Committee: Evidence

19 April 2006 Derek Twigg MP

Q236 Chairman: Is it the intention of the Q243 Chairman: You could send us a copy of the
Government that all the new franchises will include advertisement that you put out?
a standard minimum safety requirement that they Derek Twigg: When we do it we will do so, yes.
will expect the company taking the franchise to
comply with?
Q244 Chairman: Preferable within the next
Derek Twigg: It is an operational matter for the BTP
fortnight. What grade are you advertising?
working with the train operating company. In terms
Derek Twigg: That is currently being determined.
of what we have done in the South Western franchise
clearly we will continue with that in the new
franchises. We will also learn lessons from this Q245 Chairman: So you want it, but you do not
franchising process as well so whether we can know when you are going to advertise it and you do
improve or do things in a diVerent way as the not know what grade it is going to be?
franchises roll out over the next few months and Derek Twigg: The new structure has only recently
year, then clearly we will look at that as well. gone into place and we have been evaluating that
and looking at how we can improve things. There
has been a number of issues around stations
Q237 Mr Leech: The Department for Transport has
recently. For instance, you would know we have just
admitted that in some multi-operator stations it is
launched the Access For All Fund, £370 million, to
often diYcult for passengers to work out who is
improve access at stations for disabled and other
responsible for safety. What is the Department
people and the issues around franchises, et cetera,
doing to try and address this problem?
and, of course, security at stations. We are currently
Derek Twigg: It really is the responsibility of the
considering that and as soon as we come to a
operator and Network Rail to ensure that the
conclusion about those issues, I will certainly write
passengers and the people who are using the station
to you and let you have that information.
know who is responsible for the station and for
safety, and we would encourage that. We would like
to see that made clear for the operation of the Q246 Chairman: As soon as. What sort of timetable
station. are you envisaging?
Derek Twigg: I would imagine we would have
somebody—
Q238 Mr Leech: If they are not doing it, what is the
Department going to do to make sure that they do it?
Derek Twigg: It is something that we can look at. In Q247 Chairman: I can write to you every week, I am
terms of worthy examples, clearly we would have to not above that.
look at that and talk to the train operating company Derek Twigg: I can say as soon as we can, Mrs
or Network Rail in terms of ensuring that happens. Dunwoody.
We would have a discussion with them about that. It
is important, as you rightly say, that information is Q248 Chairman: Of course. I do apologise but I am
available to passengers. still not absolutely clear what the Cabinet’s position
is. Do you intend, in each of the new franchises, as
Q239 Mr Leech: Do you not feel the Department they fall vacant, to write in a requirement for
should show some leadership when people do not standards of safety in stations that you expect the
seem to have any idea who is responsible for the train operating companies to adhere to?
security of the station that they are on? Derek Twigg: In terms of South Western franchise,
Derek Twigg: If we receive complaints, and there is we have asked for a station accreditation for 80% of
an issue which is raised at a particular stage, then footfall. On a franchise by franchise basis, we will
that is something that we will look at. look at that and put in a particular requirement by
improving security. We are not going to be
prescriptive about every station but we will put in
Q240 Chairman: Minister, I wonder if I can ask you
requirements depending on that particular
one or two simple questions.
franchise.
Derek Twigg: There is always a danger on this, Mrs
Dunwoody.
Q249 Chairman: I do not think franchises are
awarded on individual stations are they, Minister, or
Q241 Chairman: I am a very uncomplicated woman
has it changed?
and my questions are terribly uncomplicated. When
Derek Twigg: No.
is your new post with the responsibility for co-
ordinating the Government’s policy going to be
filled? Q250 Chairman: Let us start again. When the
Derek Twigg: As soon as possible. franchise comes up, is it the Government’s intention
to include a requirement for safety in stations?
Derek Twigg: Yes.
Q242 Chairman: A week, a month? Have you started
the advertising?
Derek Twigg: As soon as possible. I would hope by Q251 Chairman: Unspecified?
the autumn and before the end of the year, Derek Twigg: As I say, we will hopefully learn
hopefully. lessons from what we are doing now.
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 79

19 April 2006 Derek Twigg MP

Q252 Chairman: I see. How will you reach that Derek Twigg: The specific research that we have
standard agreement? What are the standards that already asked for, which is taking place now, that
you are going to ask for? Are they going to be the will be later this year.
ones that you asked for in the franchise that has just
been agreed? Q255 Chairman: Later, will that be after?
Derek Twigg: It is likely to be but clearly this is the Derek Twigg: As soon as we can do it but it will be
first time we have gone through this process on a at a later point this year. It will be in the very near
franchise. Clearly we want to evaluate what has future.
taken place, there is the BTP and the bidders
approach to this in terms of the individual stations
and the percentage of those that should be included. Q256 Chairman: The timetable will be that at some
We will look at that and assess that but we will point quite soon we are going to advertise for the
include in every franchise now an issue of personal role of someone who will co-ordinate policy on
security. stations.
Derek Twigg: With the Department, yes.
Q253 Chairman: More than once today you have
mentioned how eYcient BTP were, how you rely on Q257 Chairman: That person once they are
them for the gathering of information, how you rely appointed, you will tell us not only when that is
on them for the eYcient policing of trains and of going to be and what their grade is going to be, that
stations. It is Government’s view that we should person will then have the responsibility of drawing
retain a specialised force of police oYcers funded by together all of these diVerent strands and
the industry and partially administered by formulating a policy that will enable us all to feel
Government, is that right? totally safe on the railway system?
Derek Twigg: As you know we are due another Derek Twigg: We are working with ministers as we
hearing on this next week. I will say to you on this, formulate policies on the system, yes.
clearly we have narrowed our review down to two
options which are to abolish them or to look at a re-
focus BTP which I am sure we will go in to in more Q258 Chairman: Good. Is there anything else you
detail next week. That is currently where we are and would like to enlighten us with this afternoon?
we hope to complete that process by around May. Derek Twigg: No, I think that is about all, Mrs
Dunwoody.
Q254 Chairman: When are you going to complete Chairman: It has all been very revealing. Thank you
your research into the whole question of crime on ever so much, Minister, we are very grateful to you
stations? and I am sure we will see you again ere long.

Supplementary memorandum submitted by the Department for Transport

In the course of giving evidence to the Committee on 19 April, I promised to write with further details on
a number of points. Two are items that I can deal with immediately. On the others, I shall write again as
soon as the information is available. Taking them in order :—
— The new South West franchise: I explained that the new franchise will require the operator to gain
Secure Station Scheme accreditation for enough stations to account for 80% of the total franchise
footfall. Mr Martlew asked what percentage is already covered in this way. The answer is 67%;
— Crimes against the person: Mr Stringer asked about statistics on crimes against the person. The
figures are set out in the attached table;
— The new post being created in the Department’s Rail Group to co-ordinate policy on stations: the
detailed job description for the post is in the process of being drawn up and will be ready shortly.
I will make sure that a copy is sent to the Committee Clerk as soon as it is available;
— Results of research into crime at stations: I explained that it will be later this year before the
preliminary results from this research are available. Again, I will make sure that the results are sent
to the Committee as soon as possible.

REPORTED CASES OF CRIME AGAINST THE PERSON BY BTP AREA 1998–09 to 2004–05

BTP Area 1998–99 1999–2000 2000–01 2001–02 2002–03 2003–04 2004–05

London North 659 742 809 920 1,126 1,334 1,632
London South 1,849 2,160 2,107 1,837 2,265 2,350 2,509
London Underground 1,456 1,575 1,471 1,424 1,880 2,295 2,622
North Eastern 243 204 285 306 495 605 625
Scottish 345 396 348 406 545 631 617
North Western 466 551 526 604 654 787 786
Western 388 461 497 594 691 725 957
Force Total 5,406 6,089 6,043 6,091 7,656 8,727 9,748
Ev 80 Transport Committee: Evidence

Notes
Crime at stations is not recorded separately. The figures in the table therefore cover all relevant crimes in
the relevant category reported to the BTP. For the purposes of the table, “crimes against the person” are
defined as violence against the person, sexual oVences and robbery.
A change in counting rules occurred in 1998. This was built upon by changes in the National Crime
Recording Standards (NCRS) in 2002, introduced by the Home OYce. All police forces in England and
Wales were required to adopt the NCRS. It had the eVect of increasing the number of recorded crimes by
an average of 22% in all forces in England and Wales. BTP adopted this standard on 1 April 2002. The
principle of NCRS is that if, on the balance of probability, a crime has been committed it is recorded as a
crime. The standard has made crime recording more victim-focused.
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 81

Written evidence
APPENDIX 1

Memorandum submitted by Mr Alan D Crowhurst

I refer to the invitation to submit memoranda on the above topic as given in your Press notice 31/2005–06
of 16 March and would like to submit the following observations:
1. To make stations appear to be safer it is my view that staV should be present and visible at all times
that the station is open for passenger traYc. This would also enable facilities such as toilets to be kept open
rather than closed in the very early evening as is so often the case. Removal of graYti would also be a factor.
2. It would be necessary to define what the minimum standards are at this time for any worthwhile
comment to be made. The use of a security telephone is of little use if the operator, as and when a response
made be obtained, is at a remote oYce and may not even be aware of what station telephone is being used.
3. In my experience policing is not common except at major termini and there does not seem to be a
system of regular calls by local police forces to back up BTP.
4. It is not at all clear as to who the station operator might be nor how they may be contacted in the case
of problems or defects especially at unmanned locations.
5. It would be helpful for security if stations were to be developed to have more than their transport role,
eg provision of mail boxes, telephones, recycling facilities, Public toilets, bus and taxi information and other
services. This would enhance public use and thus make stations less frightening.
6. Since the railway industry is now so much under DfT control initiatives are less likely to be oVered
especially if involving investment. Further compulsion however might not be a good idea unless the DfT
financed and rewarded the participants.
7. More staYng would ease the problem especially if they are visible, able to communicate properly and
if other methods of communication with rail staV were to be prominent and clearly marked.
8. I am not convinced that this is a matter for the government, per se, but for Rail Operators, local
authorities and the various Police Authorities together with B T P. Involvement at central government level
is likely to add layers of bureaucracy and expense, slow down implementation and produce a negative
response from the public who are beginning to distrust measures promoted Centrally.
It is my view that staYng and multiple uses of station facilities is at the core of ordinary security, ie from
crime and vandalism.
Despite the neglect we still have a very worthwhile rail system with many stations of architectural interest
and value although there are far too many bus stop type stations which provide neither security nor
protection from the weather.
17 February 2006

APPENDIX 2

Memorandum submitted by Rail Action Group East of Scotland

1. What are the most eVective methods of making railway and underground stations safer for passengers?
Without doubt, the presence of staV is a major factor in contributing to feeling safe in a station. If
passengers know there is a staV presence nearby, they will feel more secure if any incidents should occur. It
would be helpful if there was a manned Police oYce or desk at larger stations. At the moment, there is a
heightened police presence in larger stations, but there is no information for the travelling public as to where
police oYcers are located in a station at any given time. They do not give the impression of being there for
the assistance of passengers.
A secure waiting area is very helpful, particularly to passengers with children. The large open waiting area
at Waverley Station, Edinburgh, does not give a feeling of security to lone passengers, especially those
travelling late at night. It is also very cold and unwelcoming. Such a secure area should be close to any staV
presence.
SuYcient lighting is also important, both in the station area and in any adjacent car parking area. Dark
corners and alleyways are intimidating. Travellers want to feel that they can make a safe exit from their train
through the station to collect their car.
Ev 82 Transport Committee: Evidence

2. Are the minimum standards to provide a safe and secure station environment high enough? Are the
requirements suYciently clear and specific to be eVective? If not, what changes should be made?
I am not aware of the terms of the specific standards, but the minimum requirements should include the
following, some of which I have noted above:
— StaV presence and staVed enquiry desk.
— Permanent police base in larger stations, not just a police presence.
— Good (not just adequate) lighting within and outwith the station.
— Secure, well-lit waiting area adjacent to staV presence.
— Clear signage.
— SuYcient toilet provision (more than one facility in larger stations).
— Reasonable facilities for disabled/parents with children (ie disabled toilets/baby changing rooms
should be available during all times the station is open).
From my own journeys I know that the above standards do not apply at all stations, indeed they do not
apply at all mainline stations. This does not encourage travellers, particularly those who perceive themselves
as vulnerable—lone travellers, women, disabled and parents with young children.

3. Are the minimum standards suYciently policed? Are the penalties for failing to provide a secure station
environment suYciently severe?
I am not aware of any policing which may take place, other than monitoring by specific interest groups.
Likewise, I am not aware of any penalties payable.

4. Is it suYciently clear to passengers and others who is responsible for the safety of passengers in railway and
underground stations?
Absolutely not. There is no information available that I have ever seen giving details of the Station
Manager/Duty Train Manager, who presumably has responsibility for passenger safety in his station. On
some occasions, I have found my way to a Station Manager’s oYce: on every occasion it was not easy to
find, and took the form of a firmly shut door, rather than an accessible oYcial.
Information on passenger satisfaction within a station should be available in a central location e.g. next
to the ticket desk, and in large letters so it can be read by everyone. In addition, passenger feedback forms
should be readily available at locations throughout a station, so that passengers do not feel they have to
“hunt down” the Station Manager/Duty Train Manager if they have reason to give feedback.

5. Why are so few stations accredited under the Secure Stations Scheme? Should the scheme be made
compulsory?
I can only assume that it is because Network Rail and the Train Operating Companies do not think it is
a priority. However, my viewpoint as a woman often travelling alone, sometimes in the evening, at other
times accompanied by children, is that a secure station is extremely important. If I do not feel safe when
travelling to a particular area by rail, I will choose another form of transport.
Some stations feel secure, even though they may not fit all the criteria. York has good lighting, a central
waiting area, a welcoming environment and a taxi rank right outside the door. Newcastle, on the other hand,
has the toilets shunted oV into a dark area underneath the bridge, instead of in the main station area. Dundee
has central facilities and taxi rank/car parking immediately accessible, and Aberdeen is also well lit and
welcoming. Stansted, approaching from the airport, can be hard to find because of insuYcient signage, and
the platforms feel isolated, cold and draughty. I have not found a secure waiting area here, and don’t feel
I want to use this station in the evening. Toilets were also hard to find and a long way from some of the
platforms.

6. What measures would be required to ensure significant improvements in passengers’ safety in railway and
underground stations?
As noted at question 2 above. At present there is a feeling that there is no-one responsible for passengers’
safety. It is not clear to passengers who they should approach if they have any concerns.
I rarely see any staV when I travel by Underground, especially at platform level. This form of travel can
feel threatening and intimidating to a lone traveller at night. A helpline could be set up—as is currently
available from unmanned stations—for passengers to contact if they had concerns while travelling. This
should be publicised within the stations, on the platforms and within the train carriages. The existence of
the helpline would go a long way towards increasing the feeling of security among passengers. At the
moment there is a feeling that “anything could happen to you but there’s no-one around if it does” which
is very worrying and intimidating.
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 83

7. Is the Government’s approach to passenger safety in railway stations eVective?

Clearly not, or else their approach is not being taken seriously by those responsible for managing stations.
Please get Station Managers out of their oYces and engaging with the travelling public. Tell us where they
are, and how we can contact them if we have concerns. Have the police at a staVed desk instead of strolling
round the station, and have this desk well signed. Provide areas where travellers who feel vulnerable can feel
safer and encourage us to use the railway more. It’s a great form of transport—don’t make it so hard for us
to use it!
27 March 2006

APPENDIX 3

Memorandum submitted by the Parliamentary Advisory Council for Transport Safety

The Parliamentary Advisory Council for Transport Safety (PACTS) is a registered charity and an
associate Parliamentary Group. Its charitable objective is, “To protect human life through the promotion of
transport safety for the public benefit”. Its aim is to advise and inform members of the Houses of Parliament
on air, rail and road safety issues. PACTS brings together safety professionals and legislators to identify
research-based solutions to transport safety problems having regard to cost, eVectiveness, achievability and
acceptability. We welcome the opportunity to contribute to the current inquiry.
This submission will focus on the key issues of passenger perception of safety at stations and passenger
behaviour in overcrowded conditions. The discussion of these issues aims to inform the Committee’s
deliberations on the inquiry questions regarding eVective methods of making stations safer, responsibility
for passenger safety and measures required to improve passenger safety.
There has been much criticism of railway stations in the media in recent months, with commentary
focusing on passenger concerns about personal security including:
— lack of staV;
— poor lighting;
— narrow or dark passageways and stairwells;
— lack of accurate timetable information;
— lack of waiting areas; and
— lack of facilities (shops etc).
Confirming this, the autumn 2005 Rail Passenger Council national passenger survey found that only 57%
of people are satisfied with personal security at railway stations—which was an increase of 3% from the
previous autumn.
PACTS’ primary interest in railway station safety lies in its implications for people choosing rail as their
preferred mode of travel, above the option of a private vehicle. Road trauma is the leading cause of
accidental death for people under the age of 50 and the second most common cause of all deaths of children
aged 10–16. Although significant and commendable progress has been made in reducing the casualty rate,
it remains the case that each year more than 3,000 people are killed and more than 30,000 are seriously
injured in collisions. By comparison, rail is a very safe mode of transport. The 1994–2003 average rate of
fatality per billion passenger kilometres across the modes shows that rail is much safer than road-based
travel:
Fatalities across the modes per billion passenger km

Air 0.00
Rail 0.4
Bus/Coach 0.3
Car 2.81
Motorcycle 113
Pedal cycle 39
Pedestrian 52

(DfT, Road Casualties Great Britain: 2004, p116)

1 This includes the driver and passenger.

Ev 84 Transport Committee: Evidence

Improving railway station safety has the potential to play an important role in reducing casualties by
encouraging people away from private vehicles on to trains. In its report Maintaining and improving Britain’s
railway stations, the National Audit OYce (NAO) notes that:
Research carried out for the Department in 1996 and 2002 suggests that improving personal safety
would result in 15% more journeys by train (and Underground), much of it outside peak hours.
(National Audit OYce, Maintaining and improving Britain’s railway stations, 2005, p.2)
The station environment therefore has a significant impact on both actual and perceived safety and,
consequently, on transport choices. The OYce of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) points to the
importance of public space in its Living Places: cleaner, safer, greener policy statement, which notes that:
Every one of us, every day, takes decisions about which areas to use and when and how we use
them. Many of our decisions and activities are influenced by our perceptions of the quality and
safety of the spaces we encounter.
(ODPM, http://www.odpm.gov.uk/index.asp?id%1127644£P77—9838)
Given that the additional journeys cited by the NAO research are outside peak hours, they are likely to
be discretionary trips such as shopping or travelling for leisure and a proportion of potential passengers may
therefore choose not to travel at all if personal railway safety were not improved. However, a proportion
of journeys will be rail replacing car as the preferred travel option and this has benefits for reducing road
casualties.
As such, PACTS is concerned that current anxieties regarding railway station safety are an obstacle to
greater use of trains and supports station improvement measures that will contribute to modal shift away
from road-based transport.
The issue of overcrowding on trains and at stations is one many commuters, especially those in the south-
east, are unfortunately familiar with. This committee inquired into this issue in 2003 and commented on the
lack of research available to inform policy makers and train operating companies on the health and safety
eVects of overcrowding. Although the risk of a crowding-related fatality or serious injury at a station is
statistically low, experience would suggest that large numbers of passengers combined with the narrow
platforms that characterise many older Underground stations and the speed with which trains enter the
platform area has the potential to result in an accident and could also contribute to health related conditions
like stress and anxiety.
Less serious accidents are known to be a result of overcrowding at stations. A 2002 report prepared for
Transport for London, The Tube: Moving On, A Report for The Tube Future Priorities Investigative
Committee, commented that, “evidence received also pointed to safety implications in stations, for example
the recent upward trend in injuries sustained on escalators, to which overcrowding has been a significant
contributory factor.”2
The Transport Committee’s inquiry recommended that more research be undertaken to assess the health
and safety eVects of overcrowding on both trains and stations. A recent literature review on overcrowding
and health on the railways, Rail passenger crowding, stress, health and safety in Britain,3 confirms that little
research has been done into this area. PACTS would support more research on this issue to gain an
understanding of how to minimise potential risks from passenger congestion on platforms.
PACTS is also concerned to ensure that the staYng levels at and design of major London Underground
stations are appropriate to respond to an emergency evacuation situation. The passenger congestion levels
and design features typical of many 19th century stations, such as narrow platforms and passageways,
elevators and multiple flights of stairs, could slow evacuation. Although there is little scope to improve the
layout of these stations, it is possible to deploy staV to ensure smooth evacuations. Research published by
PACTS shows that a major influence on the behaviour of passengers in an emergency is the performance
of the staV. In the field of aviation, one assertive cabin crew member can evacuate passengers more quickly
than two non-assertive cabin crew. In those accidents where a successful rapid evacuation of all the
passengers is achieved, the cabin crew will have managed to control the passengers and prevented disorderly
behaviour4.
The presence of suYcient numbers of staV at the major Underground stations, who are trained to respond
in mass evacuation situations, is important when considering rail station safety.
PACTS would urge improvements to railway stations in an eVort to attract potential passengers—who
could otherwise choose to travel by car—on to trains as part of the road casualty reduction strategy, to
reduce the health and safety risks due to over crowding and to ensure suYcient staV are available to assist
in evacuating in emergencies.
27 March 2006

2 National Economic Research Associates, The Tube: Moving On, A Report for The Tube Future Priorities Investigative
Committee, 2002.
3 Tom Cox, Jonathan Houdmont & Amanda GriYths, Rail passenger crowding, stress, health and safety in Britain, 2005.
4 Helen Muir, In times of crisis, how do passengers react?, PACTS 2004, p.7.
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 85

APPENDIX 4

Memorandum submitted by Group 4 Securicor Services (UK)

Group 4 Securicor Security Services (UK) is please to have the opportunity to respond to the Committee
on the issue of personal passenger safety in railway stations. We have a number of comments on this subject,
which are detailed below.

What are the most eVective methods of making railway and underground stations safer for passengers?
There are no minimum staYng levels for stations under franchise agreements. However, research has
shown that a visible staYng presence at stations is the single most important factor in making passengers
feel secure (Crime and Safety at London’s Suburban Railway Stations, January 2006, London Assembly
Transport Committee). New research conducted by Group 4 Securicor with 1500 people aged 16–64
between 2 and 6 February 2006 reveals that 76% of UK adults would feel safer when travelling by train or
tube if there was a uniformed security presence.
There are many contributing factors which create the perception of being within a safe environment;
CCTV (with highly visible warning boards) and bright lighting, as well as signs confirming that Secure
Station status has been achieved are just a few. Unfortunately the award of Secure Station status alone does
not significantly reduce the potential vulnerability felt by passengers when entering or leaving an un-manned
station. The most eVective method of assuring the travelling public is by deploying staV at all times when
the facility is open. It is important that the personnel deployed on stations should be highly visible and
perceived to be professional and competent. This may be achieved in a number of ways:
1. By contracting with a Security Industry Authority (SIA) accredited company to provide security
staV at stations and a rapid response service.
2. By deploying suitably trained internal (TOC) staV as security staV. It should be obvious to both
the traveler and the potential oVender that these staV members have the security of passengers as
their primary role.
3. By deploying Police Community Support OYcers accredited by BTP.

Are the minimum standards to provide a safe and secure station environment high enough? Are the requirements
suYciently clear and specific to be eVective? If not, what changes should be made?
There is no requirement to provide staV at stations throughout its opening hours. Many stations are
unmanned for significant periods on a daily basis. A permanent security presence may not be a cost eVective
option, particularly at quiet, suburban stations. However, a mobile security force deployed around the
network with the ability to respond rapidly to incidents will improve the public perception of station
security.

Are the minimum standards eVectively policed? Are the penalties for failing to provide a secure station
environment suYciently severe?
There do not appear to be any penalties for TOCs that do not provide a secure station environment. Nor
do the TOCs seem to have a “duty of care” to their passengers when they are in danger or threatened in
some way. Health and Safety legislation requires that companies take the safety of visitors to their premises
as seriously as that of their employees. Perhaps H&S considerations should be applied to the travelling
public with the associated penalties for TOCs that were in breach of their obligation to provide a safe
environment.
Once Secure Station status is achieved it should be maintained with a series of regular checks. Whilst the
principal of achieving accreditation, is detailed in the scheme there is no documented requirement to
maintain the management practices throughout the two year validity period.

Is it suYciently clear to passengers and others who is responsible for the safety of passengers in railway and
underground stations?
It is not clear where the responsibility for security & safety lies on mainline and suburban stations. Most
passengers would assume that the British Transport Police are responsible, however, the BTP are
chronically under-resourced and under-funded.
Ev 86 Transport Committee: Evidence

Why are so few stations accredited under the Secure Stations Scheme? Should the scheme be made compulsory?

It is a voluntary scheme with little incentive for the TOCs to seek accreditation. Also the criteria scoring
system is confusing and there is little consistency in the standard of security at Secure Stations. Furthermore,
there is low public awareness of the scheme and how it benefits the travelling public. The measure of how
secure a station is should be based on criteria that are passenger focused, for example if a minimum staYng
level was established for Secure Stations then customers could be reassured that they would not be alone at
a station when travelling in the evening.
There are so few stations currently accredited because it is not compulsory. The TOCs are likely to seek
accreditation for those stations where it can be achieved with little or no capital outlay or significant changes
to management processes. Where significant cost or management eVort is required stations are unlikely to
be accredited unless the Secure Station Scheme is made compulsory.

What measures would be required to ensure significant improvements in passengers’ safety in railway and
underground stations?

1. An increase in uniformed security presence with minimum manning or patrol frequency standards
during station opening hours.
2. A public awareness campaign to explain who is responsible for passenger safety.
3. A compulsory Secure Stations Scheme with penalties for failure to achieve auditable performance
standards.
4. Regular “mystery shopper” visits to stations at unsociable hours.

Is the Government’s approach to passenger safety in railway stations eVective?

The Government should make measures to improve passenger safety at railway stations a condition of
the tendering process for future rail franchises.

Summary
— We believe that the most eVective method of assuring the travelling public is through the
deployment of a uniformed security presence at train stations with set minimum standards on their
patrol frequency.
— At present, there is little incentive for TOCs to seek accreditation under the Secure Station Scheme
or provide the appropriate duty of care to their passengers at railway stations. A compulsory
Secure Stations Scheme with penalties for failure to achieve auditable performance standards
could address this.
— The Government should also introduce measures to improve passenger safety as a condition in the
tendering process for future rail franchises.
— It is not clear where the responsibility for security & safety lies on mainline and suburban stations.
There is also low awareness of the Secure Stations Scheme and how it benefits the travelling public.
A public awareness campaign may be required to address these issues.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the problem of personal passenger safety in railway stations is best addressed by finding
ways to increase the presence of uniformed staV with clear responsibility for passenger safety and security.
Given the resource constraints on the BTP, an unbiased approach should be taken as to which organisations
could provide these staV. The private security industry has demonstrated that is can deliver innovative and
flexible manpower solutions that are cost-eVective and oVer best value. Now that the private security
industry is regulated it is better prepared than ever to make a significant contribution to the safety of
passengers at railway stations.
30 March 2006
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 87

APPENDIX 5

Memorandum submitted by Mr Nigel R Gansell

Summary
In my 60 years of using the “crown jewels” of our country namely our prized railways never have I seen
such appalling standards of public safety on both main line railways and Underground stations.
A smattering of CCTV cameras won’t I repeat won’t solve the problem of safety for passengers. Their
needs to be far more penalties fixed against the railway companies for plain incompetence. It has taken the
London Evening Standard to Highlight and investigate our atrocious lack of security on main line stations.
I personally use Wood Street Station operated by One Railway. A man was murdered late at night on
Wood Street in September of last year. I have never used this station at night.
On the day of the London Bombings I walked quite freely into the side entrance of Wood Street Station.
The situation still exists. There is NO security at Wood Street Station. You can walk in. A terrorist bomber
could walk into Wood Street Station and indeed other stations. Quite freely. An appalling situation!
Walthamstow Central Station is a dump! It must be very frightening for women at night. May I stress at
this point that politicians of all hues are quite incapable of improving the situation. Railways are now
considered big business with priority to shareholders.

Recommendations
1. What are the most eVective methods of making railways and Underground stations safer for
passengers?
(a) Re introduction of railway guards—a priority. Plus more station staV at nights. (There is no night
staV at Wood Street, Walthamstow. There is no staV at Walthamstow Bus Station—laughable.)
2. Are the minimum standards to provide a safe and secure station environment high enough? Answer:
Of course not. Minimum standards of safety and security should be scrutined by the general public. With
no guards on trains you have no personal security. StaYng levels at main line stations are poor. I overheard
a woman at Kings Cross Station in February (I was boarding a Hull Trains express says “ Where are all the
porters”(!). I see no personalised service any more although on board Hull Trains the service by attendants
was excellent.
3. Are the minimum standards eVectively policed? NO. The standards are poor. Penalties. I would not
know what they are!
4. Who is responsible for safety of passengers. NO. I assume the railway companies are responsible. For
example do the railway companies operate any evacuation procedures for passengers? I am not thinking in
terms of an Airbus A380 evacuation with broken arms and limbs. Just a small scale exercise done perhaps
in some siding or exhibition area?
5. Why are so few stations accredited under the Secure Stations Scheme. I know or have no knowledge
of such a scheme. Why not a Passengers Manifesto for Safety drawn up by passengers and not by
professional bodies? The private rail companies are a law to themselves. There needs to be more “kick ass”
approach to the rail companies.
6. Measures to ensure significant improvements in passengers’s safety in railway and underground
stations. ANSWER: Will the penny ever drop in simple terms you need Re Introduction of Train Guards.
More station staV especially during the evenings. More security in the form of police patrols operated by
the British Transport Police.
At this point worth mentioning the tremendous amount of luggage carried by passengers during the
working day. No luggage vans on many trains. None whatsoever on the Tube system. Seperation of luggage
from passengers on the tube system whilst ideal is probably not workable.
Is the Government approach to passenger safety in railway stations eVective? Answer: I am at a loss in
comprehending just what the Government approach actually is. There was no Public Inquiry into Passenger
Safety (from memory) in the London Bombings.
If over there was a “botched” police operation this was it. Four men caught on video camera at Luton
Station who could not be tracked. The Stockwell Tube Station shooting should also be brought into the
equation. Where was the safety for other passengers? If the Met Police has a shoot to kill policy then there
are ramifications for the general public at large. As a personal opinion the Government approach to
passenger safety is poor. And I am kind in saying its poor.
Conclusions: What is needed is a Task Force of passengers, Company representatives and politicians
(cross party) to mount a serious get tough approach against the rail companies. Huge amount of investment
needs to be poured into public safety at rail stations. Certainly the visibility of more police at stations is
crucial. Personally I have no fears of railway stations but the grass roots thinking is missing.
Ev 88 Transport Committee: Evidence

Only until the needs of passengers are really taken into consideration will the travelling public feel more
secure and confidence. Some basics could be brought on line. What about some public toilets opened at
night. Some strip lighting on the most dismal of stations. Floodlit if necessary.
Railway station security—its a farce!

ADDITIONS

Summary Addition

(a) First Aid. Safety precautions on Main Line Stations and London Underground Stations:
Has there been a review of all first aid equipment carried by both train and platform staV. How much
training is undertaken in First Aid measures by the train operating authorities?
Of major concern to this writer was the removal of fire hydrants from all London Underground trains.
What in case of a fire on the train? I fully understand that under the previous LU regime fire hydrants were
removed due to vandalism.
First aid equipment (bandages etc) should be stored on all LU trains.

(b) Overcrowding on main line platforms/surbanan service and LU tube stations:

This is an ever increasingly worrying problem. Coupled with the added dangers of many suitcases and
travellers’ bags left on platforms. Surely platform staV should be more visible.

(c) Personal train attendants:

Train operating companies may wish to look at Hull Trains and how they look after the travelling public
both on the train and at Hull Mainline Station. Far more station couriers should be visible on the concourse
of many stations. That many main line surbuban train stations are unattended both during the day and night
is nothing short of scandalous.
Better lighting at all stations is a priority. And may I add that many stations facia are never cleaned. There
are two marvellous inventions that train operating companies might take a look at—namely water to wash
down station platforms on a daily basis and paint.

(d) Awarding of Rail Franchises:

Written into all rail franchises should be a section of Personal Passenger Safety in Railway Stations, eg
current situation within the operators Charter and impending improvements etc.
29 March 2006

APPENDIX 6

Memorandum submitted by the British Transport Police Authority

The Authority welcomes the Committee’s inquiry into personal passenger safety at railway stations and
the opportunity to contribute to the debate. We restrict our submission to non-operational matters,
operational issues being properly matters for consideration by the Chief Constable.
We make this submission in the context of the current review of the British Transport Police (BTP) by
the Department for Transport, which has identified abolition and “refocusing” of the BTP as the two most
likely outcomes in a recent letter to train operating companies. Refocusing is not clearly defined but seems
to refer to a focus only on low level crime and a greater role for train operating companies providing
private security.
Our fundamental position is that successive reviews have confirmed the need for a national specialist (and
properly funded) police force for the railways. Nothing has changed since to suggest this is not the case, and
any proposals to the contrary would be to the detriment of the travelling public, and indeed the railway
industry as a whole. The track record suggests train operating companies would not invest suYciently in
dealing with security matters.
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 89

1. What are the most Effective Methods of Making Railway and Underground Stations Safer for
Passengers?
The BTPA believes that it is important in this debate to distinguish between crime and security. Whilst
security is a matter which the private sector plays a role in, both on the railways and in many other areas,
crime is rightly something which should be dealt with by the proper authorities, which are both public and
accountable, and therefore in a position to prioritise the public good. Security personnel and the police
should (and do) work together, but security personnel should not be deployed instead of police oYcers and
police community support oYcers, but should complement policing activity. One of the fundamental
functions of the police is to detect and deter crime. This is achieved by proactive operations based on the
national intelligence model. The police also react to emergency calls from the public. The right balance has
to be struck between security personnel, who can give a physical presence, and police oYcers with the full
range of statutory powers.
The BTP is funded by the railway industry, and therefore largely by passengers. This gives it a unique role
as a police force which can and does prioritise the concerns of the railway industry, staV and passengers in
a way they would not otherwise be.
Securing adequate funding for the BTP is one of the key functions of the BTPA, and is essential to making
railway and underground stations safer for passengers and for railway staV. The source of that funding has
long been based on the ‘user pays’ principle. Whether this needs to be adapted to reflect additional
requirements for anti-terrorism or wider social issues is a question for government rather than the BTPA.
Our concern is that the Force is well-funded and this continues to be our priority during the current review
of the BTP being held by the Department for Transport.
The right balance between private sector interest and the public good is fundamental to the eVectiveness
of the BTP. The restructuring of the BTP Committee to create the BTPA has enabled us to tackle legacy
issues of inadequate funding settlements and secure increased funding for the Force. It is of note in the
context of the current debate that TfL, which is a public body, has funded significant additional BTP oYcers
for the Underground. We believe that any erosion of these important reforms of the governance of the BTP
would be a step backwards for passenger safety.

2. Is it Sufficiently clear to Passengers and Others who is Responsible for the Safety of Passengers
in Railway and Underground Stations?
Having a national railway police force which operates throughout the UK is helpful for passengers as they
have a single point of contact no matter their location. Investment planned by the BTPA will secure a 24-
hour call answering centre which will be a great improvement for passengers. Visible policing at stations is
also critical for passengers. The BTPA has funded increased numbers of police oYcers and community
support oYcers with investments of £2.05 million in 2005–06 and £288k in 2006–07 (specifically for PCSOs
for use in Wales).
Erosion of the BTP’s role, or abolition of the national force to be replaced by regional ones, will lead to
greater confusion around responsibility and accountability for passenger safety.

3. What Measures would be Required to Ensure Significant Improvements in Passengers’ Safety in

Railway and Underground Stations?
Particularly due to the legacy issues caused by previous inadequate funding settlements, significant
improvements to passenger safety require increased funding of the BTP. The BTPA has addressed the need
for investment in its three-year Strategic Plan and it will be important in future to maintain its ability to
secure adequate funding settlements from the railway industry. At a time of heightened terrorist security
alert, BTPA with industry support has increased its funding for counter-terrorism activities. It seems to us
that an individual has the right to expect the State to protect him or her against certain activities. This should
include terrorism and an element of government funding in the future may assist industry in providing for
anti-terrorism activities, as was the case for example in additional Department for Transport funding for
increased BTP activity during July 2005 as a result of the bombings on the London Underground.
There is a continued need for a specialist, national railway police force. This has been identified by
numerous reports including by HMIC and by this Committee, and government has in the past been
supportive of the BTP. Abolition or downgrading of the BTP as a consequence of either the DfT review or
the restructuring of Home OYce forces would deal a blow to passenger safety, both in the short term as
operations are disrupted and in the long-term, as HMIC noted in its 2004, Report on the BTP:
“ . . . the enforced amalgamation/merger of the whole or part of the British Transport Police with one
or all Home OYce Police Forces would unquestioningly lead to a dilution of the specialist service given
to the rail industry and its public users and, most probably, would lead to a significant reduction in
the number of police oYcers and police staV left to police the network.”
Ev 90 Transport Committee: Evidence

4. Is the Government’s Approach to Passenger Safety in Railway Stations Effective?

In 2004, the government reviewed the BTP and created the BTPA to replace the BTP Committee. This
restructuring has led to increased funding for the BTP and consequential operational improvements. All
nine operational targets were met for 2004–05 and the BTPA is currently meeting all eleven operational
targets for 2005–06.
We believe this is the right approach and has allowed for investment and modernisation of the BTP via
the BTPA’s three-year Strategic Plan and increased budgets to address the legacy issues. These investments
will improve the eVectiveness of the Force and secure greater passenger safety in railway and underground
stations. If the BTP were downgraded or abolished, these achievements would be compromised and
passenger safety would suVer.
The GLA Transport Committee’s report of January 2006 into crime and safety at London’s suburban
railway stations noted the lack of priority given by train operating companies to passenger safety. This has
demonstrated that it is not sensible to give the private sector too much responsibility for passenger safety,
and that it is important to maintain the proper role of the BTP in protecting against crime on the railways.
Security personnel should be an addition, not a replacement for police oYcers and police community
support oYcers.
30 March 2006

Annex

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. Introduction
The purpose of this annex is to provide the Transport Select Committee with evidence of the Authority’s
work in supporting the British Transport Police’s work in addressing this important issue. This includes
information on:
— The ways in which BTPA has set the Force’s strategic direction to address concerns around
personal safety on the rail network.
— How BTPA is directing the Force to target the causes of passengers concerns about personal safety
by setting the appropriate policing plan targets.
— Where the Authority has invested in reassurance policing.
— How the Authority has contributed to developing partnership working with the industry.
— Details of the Authority’s membership profile.
— How the Authority meets its statutory duty to consult with the travelling public.

2. Setting the Force’s Strategic Direction

The Authority is fully conscious of the importance of passenger safety and reassurance in all areas of the
rail network and has reflected this in the aims and objectives it has set out in the Force’s current three year
Strategic Plan. Specifically, the Authority has set the following three year objectives5:
— Promote public safety and assurance by working in partnership with others to make the railway
a safe environment for all.
— Reduce crime by working with our partners and our railway community to tackle the causes of
crime, as well as dealing with crime incidents.
Further, the Chair of the Police Authority, in his foreword to the three year Strategic Plan, has stated that:
“We are committed to providing policing excellence for Britain’s railways to help build a safe railway
environment that is free from disruption and fear of crime. We believe we are well on the way to
achieving this, and the actions described in this Strategic Plan will enable us to continue developing
and delivering the eVective modern policing that our communities demand and deserve. Much,
however, depends upon continued support of our communities and strategic partners, with whom we
intend to work even more closely than we have in the past6”.
The Strategic Plan also sets out the policing style that the Force will adopt over the three year period and
this explicitly refers to the Force’s role in “reducing crime, fear of crime and to provide reassurance . . . (and
in) taking the lead in . . . dealing with low-level crime, disorder and anti-social behaviour, which is in line
with the Government’s drive to improve the quality of everyday life for all”7.

5 British Transport Police (2005) Strategic Plan 2005–08, p5.

6 British Transport Police (2005) Strategic Plan 2005–08, p7
7 British Transport Police (2005) Strategic Plan 2005–08, p10.
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 91

3. Setting the Force’s Policing Plan Objectives

In achieving these wider strategic aims, the Authority has set the Force policing plan targets in 2005–06
and 2006–07 that specifically contribute to passenger (and rail staV) reassurance in all areas of the rail
network, including railway stations. In 2006–07 these targets will include the following which are
particularly relevant to the issue being investigated by the Select Committee8:
— Anti-social behaviour—increase number of oVenders brought to justice to at least 13800 by 31
March 2007.
— GraYti—increase number of detections to at least 750 by 31 March 2007.
— Theft of passenger property—5% reduction in oVences by 31 March 2007.
— StaV assaults—increase detection rate to at least 46% by 31 March 2007.
— Robbery—to increase detection rate to at least 34% by 31 March 2007.

4. Investments in Reassurance Policing

Increasing investment in reassurance policing has been a priority for both the Force, and the Authority
since its creation in July 2004. The Authority has made the following specific investments in relation to
reassurance policing:
— For 2005–06 the Authority approved various bids relating to counter terrorism and increased
policing visibility such as Police Community Support OYcers (PCSOs), which totalled £2.05
million.
— For 2006–07 the Authority has approved £288k of investment for additional PCSOs for use in
Wales.

5. Development of a Partnership Working Approach

The Authority has been supportive of the Force’s desire to enter into more partnership working with the
industry, and other key, stakeholders. They have demonstrated this commitment by setting this out as a key
objective within the current three year Strategic Plan (as detailed in section 2 above). In addition the
Authority has also instructed the Force to progress work around developing jointly owned policing plan
targets with industry partners9, and the Authority expects to play a key role in any dialogue with the industry
around meeting this objective. Clearly there is a need for a genuine commitment from the rail industry to
be fully engaged in the process of developing partnership working in relation to personal security on all areas
of the rail network. However, while the Authority does accept that there is significant scope for further
development of a partnership approach to improving passenger security at railway stations, it believes that
it is necessary to properly diVerentiate between security and criminal risks and to ensure that the Force plays
an appropriate, but secondary, role in any activities which relate solely to security issues.
If further investment in policing is required then the Authority is happy to take that decision, however it
is crucial that this decision making is carried out in partnership with the industry. The Authority also feels
that it is for Government to decide how to ensure that the various agencies engaged in these partnership
arrangements deliver on the commitments they have made.

6. Authority Membership
The Authority membership brings together individuals representing a range of interests, including those
of rail passengers, thus ensuring that the travelling public have a voice in the decisions that the Authority
takes on their behalf. The required profile of British Transport Police Authority member is set out in the
Railways, Transport and Safety Act 2003 as follows10:
— At least four members representing the interests of providers of railway services;
— At least four members representing the interests of persons travelling by rail;
— A person representing the interests of employees of the rail industry;
— A person nominated by the Strategic Rail Authority;
— A person representing the interests of Scotland and appointed following consultation with the
Scottish Executive;
— A person representing the interests of Wales and appointed following consultation with the Welsh
Assembly;
— A person representing the interests of England.

8 British Transport Police (2006) Paper to the Police authority Meeting of 7 March, Agenda Item 8 “2006–07 policing plan
targets”.
9 British Transport Police (2006) Paper to the Police authority Meeting of 7 March, Agenda Item 8, Section 5, “2006–07 policing

plan targets”.
10 Railways, Transport and Safety Act 2003, Schedule 4, Part 1, Membership. London, HMSO.
Ev 92 Transport Committee: Evidence

7. A Duty to Consult with Passengers

As set out in part 3 of the Railways, Transport and Safety Act 2003, the Authority has a statutory duty
to consult with (amongst others) (a) passengers on the railways (b) groups of persons representing
passengers on the railways11. In meeting this duty, the Authority has sought to capture rail passengers’
security and safety concerns by including questions on the spring wave of the National Passenger Survey,
currently administered by Passenger Focus. These questions ask passengers to identify their own priorities
for the Force’s policing activities and are fed directly into the policing plan and budget setting process.

8. Conclusions

This memorandum has set out the ways in which the British Transport Police Authority has already
demonstrated a commitment to improving personal passenger safety at railway stations through its work
with the British Transport Police Force and industry partners, and will obviously continue to do so.
Finally, we thank the Committee for the opportunity to put forward our views on this issue, and are happy
to provide any additional documentation or comments which may be of assistance.

APPENDIX 7

Memorandum submitted by South Eastern Trains

1. South Eastern Trains

South Eastern Trains operates trains services from Kent and East Sussex into London. We run
approximately 1,700 trains a day, 1,400 into the capital. We carry 120,000 passengers a day into London
during the morning peak and 132.2 million passenger journeys are made with us every year.
We have 178 stations on our network of which 142 are covered by Closed Circuit Television (CCTV). SET
is responsible for day-to-day operations at these stations, save for the major London terminals, which are
managed by Network Rail, and Blackfriars, which is managed by Thameslink.
SET took over from Connex on 9 November 2003, and will transfer to Govia on 1 April 2006 as part of
the Integrated Kent Franchise
SET is committed to creating a safe and secure environment for its passengers and we are proud of our
record which includes rail industry “firsts” such as the British Transport Police (BTP) special constable
scheme and employing railway enforcement oYcers. This issue has the highest priority within SET, and
Managing Director, Michael Holden serves as a member of the BTP Authority.

1.1 Are stations unsafe?

It is perhaps worth noting that:

— stations are relatively safe places, with passengers statistically more at risk from crime on the street
outside that in the station itself;
— most crimes at stations occur during the day when the majority of stations are staVed;
— “crimes” reported on railway stations includes trespass on the track, graYti and damage to cars
in station car parks. While all are a criminal oVence, these activities do not constitute much of a
risk to passenger security; and
— any crime on Network Rail-owned land (which may be hundreds of yards away from the station)
is recorded as a crime happening at that station. For example a criminal oVence committed at a
taxi rank or a in a station approach road would be logged as a crime at the station, irrespective of
whether the victims were rail users.
Of course, while the fear of crime is worse than the reality, these fears are real and need to be addressed.

11 Railways, Transport and Safety Act 2003, Part 3, Public Consultation. London, HMSO.
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 93

2. What are the Most Effective Methods of Making Railway and Underground Stations Safe for
Passengers?
Dealing with crime and disorder is only possible on a partnership basis, by working closely with the British
Transport Police, the Metropolitan and county police forces, Network Rail, local authorities and other
stakeholders.
The most important task is to create a safe environment, which helps improve the perception of safety
and security. However, stations are part of the communities they serve and a reflection of the local area. If
that area is littered, covered in graYti, badly lit and suVers from crime, this will influence passengers
perceptions of the station.
As a result, since taking over the franchise from Connex in November 2003, SET has concentrated on
improving standards and has invested some £12.5 million in our stations. We have re-painted over 100
stations as part of a three yearly on-going programme and we have introduced benchmark standards on
cleaning. We aim to remove all graYti from stations within 24 hours and as well as regular cleaning, all
stations are now receiving a “deep clean” once a year. Signage and passenger information have been
improved, we are controlling station access and egress and we believe that our stations are now cleaner,
brighter, welcoming and provide more reassurance to our passengers.
For your information purposes we attach a brief summary of measures designed to improve passenger
security implemented by SET over the last two and half years.

3. Are the Minimum Standards to Provide a Safe and Secure Environment High Enough? Are the
Requirements Sufficiently Clear and Specific to be Effective? If not, What Changes Should be
Made?
Train operators are required to ensure the safety of their passengers under Section 3 of the Health and
Safety at Work Act, and in civil law, under the Occupiers’ Liability Act. Both require the train operators to
take all reasonably practicable steps to reduce the risks to the public and staV.
To help discharge this responsibility, there are a number of processes:
— the train operators’ own internal management control processes applicable to stations;
— the Secure Stations Scheme;
— specific requirements for investment included in franchise tender documents or agreements. These
may relate to, for example, Secure Station accreditation or CCTV;
— regulating ticket oYce opening hours; and
— guidance on CCTV systems, produced by ATOC and Network Rail;
Railway Group Standards may also be relevant in some areas.
The majority of improvements to security have come about from proposals from franchisees, rather than
from Government specification. In terms of providing a safe and secure environment there are no specific
franchise commitments other than giving the train operator a duty of care to its passengers.
Operators would welcome clarity from the Department for Transport (DfT) on this issue. However,
raising safety and security standards, particularly increasing front line staV numbers would have cost
implications, and have to be reflected in the premium charged for the franchise, a rise in fares, or by a
combination of both.

4. Are the Minimum Standards Effectively Policed? Are the Penalties for Failing to Provide a
Secure Station Environment Sufficiently Severe?
Our own standards are the subject of external and internal audit. Internally, failure to protect passengers
and staV would be the focus of attention by the SET board who take this issue as seriously as the committee
does. Externally. breaches of the Health and Safety at Work Act are dealt with by Her Majesty’s Railway
Inspectorate and carry the risk of prosecution. Where station standards are part of a franchise agreement
they are monitored by the DfT and breach will result in action under the terms of that agreement.

5. Is it Sufficiently Clear to Passengers and Others who is Responsible for the Safety of
Passengers?
Yes. Responsibility rests with the train operator. At all our stations there is an information display giving
contact details for the station manager, and telephone numbers for our customer services unit, Passenger
Focus or London Travelwatch, Network Rail and the BTP.
At our smaller stations there are help points which enable passengers to contact our staV direct.
However, in terms of station policing there may be some confusion amongst passengers as to the roles
and responsibilities of the BTP and the metropolitan and county forces.
Ev 94 Transport Committee: Evidence

6. Why are so Few Stations Accredited Under the Secure Stations Scheme? Should the Scheme be
Made Compulsory?
To achieve accreditation under the DfT’s secure stations scheme, the design of the station must conform
to standards judged by the BTP to prevent and reduce crime and improve passenger safety, crime statistics
must have reduced in the 12 months prior to the inspection, a survey of passengers must show that they
feel secure and finally, that the management of the station must enable the operator to reduce crime and
communicate with passengers.
Of these four criteria, only the last is in our gift. Nearly all our stations are over a century old, have several
access points and date from an era where staYng levels were considerably more generous. Some also have
listed building status, making it very diYcult to eVect design changes. As for reducing crime statistics, we
now positively encourage passengers and staV to report all crime, including graYti, vandalism, trespass on
the line, and damage to vehicles in car parks. This has the eVect of increasing the number of reported
incidents. As outlined in 1.1 above, crime statistics also include incidents on Network Rail land outside the
station, over which we have no direct ownership or control. It is also extremely diYcult to allay passengers’
fear or perception of crime,—a situation not helped by alarmist media coverage.
This notwithstanding, SET is applying for secure station accreditation for nine stations on the Hayes Line.
For the reasons outlined above, unless the criteria for accreditation is revised we do not feel the scheme
should be made compulsory. Moreover, if there were sanctions against operators for not having secure
stations accreditation, there may be a temptation not to report crime for fear of losing it.

7. What Measures Should be Required to Ensure Significant Improvements in Passengers’ Safety

at Railway Stations?
We believe that station security will be enhanced by the upgrading of station CCTV systems to include
monitoring by staV in our control room, continued high visibility security patrols by our Rail Enforcement
OYcers, by working closely with the British Transport Police to identify and provide other physical security
improvements and partnership working with Network Rail, local authorities and other stakeholders. It is
our view that good passenger and staV security comes from the delivery of integrated programmes, including
improving the environment and providing training.
Re-deployment of staV may also be part of the solution. Last year, in response to a fall in the number of
traditional ticket oYce transactions, SET submitted proposals to the former Strategic Rail Authority to
reduce ticket oYce opening hours and instead re-deploy staV to customer-facing positions in stations and
on trains.
We envisaged no compulsory redundancies and our proposals included recruiting 30 additional members
of staV. However, the DfT has deferred any decision until Govia takes over SET on 1st April. We are hopeful
of a positive decision, particularly in light of a recent Greater London Assembly report which called on train
operators to meet concerns about safety at stations by considering more imaginative staYng deployment
at stations.

8. Is the Government’s Approach to Passenger Safety in Stations Effective?

At the heart of this issue has been the lack of any formal Government approach to passenger safety, as
when drawing up the first rail franchises, the former OYce of Passenger Rail Franchising did not include
any commitments to improve security at stations.
We are pleased that the DfT is now addressing this, and we understand that the specification for the South
Western franchise will include minimum requirements on visible staYng and the installation of barriers. We
are also advised that Transport for London’s (TfL) specification for the Silverlink Metro service will
incorporate a commitment to staV stations at night. We assume that if such commitments are included in
future rail franchises, or the terms of current franchises are varied by mutual agreement, that the cost
burdens will be reflected in the level of premiums or by greater flexibility on fares setting.

9. Conclusion
We believe that since taking over from Connex, SET has made significant progress in improving passenger
safety. While the fear of crime is still there, public perception, as gauged through independently conducted
surveys, has slowly improved. Our oV-peak passenger loadings, particularly in the evening and at night have
also improved, demonstrating that despite alarmist press coverage as to the safety of passengers at stations,
the public has not been deterred from using our services.
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 95

We accept that there is always more that could be done to improve passenger security, and we welcome
debate on this issue. However, we would ask that that debate is balanced, uninfluenced by political
considerations and that any recommendations are properly evidenced and costed.

Annex

MEASURES TAKEN BY SET TO IMPROVE PASSENGER SECURITY

Station Staffing
When we took over the franchise from Connex in November 2003 we inherited a shortfall of 200 frontline
staV. Those vacancies have now been filled and we are able to staV our barriers for longer, increase the
presence on the platform, and oVer greater assurance to our passengers

Appointment of Railway Enforcement Officers

These are a new grade of staV and SET is the first train operating company to employ them. They are
accredited by the BTP, are empowered to issue on the spot fines, confiscate alcohol and tobacco, eject
persons from trains and stations and are trained to properly utilise their citizen’s powers or arrest where
necessary. Their patrolling is intelligence led.
Since the oYcers commenced duty last year, our latest passenger satisfaction survey showed a significant
increase in the number of passengers reporting themselves satisfied with personal security on our network,
particularly at night.
The cost to SET is £1.25 million per year.
% 100
90
80
70
60
50 41 43
34 34 35 36 38 38
40 33 31 30 32 31 29 31 30 32
30
20
10
0
Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3
'01 '02 '02 '02 '02 '03 '03 '03 '03 '04 '04 '04 '04 '05 '05 '05
% 100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30 15 16 15 17
11 11 12 12 12 11 13 12 12 12 14 12
20 10
10
0
Q3 '01 Q4 '01 Q1 '02 Q2 '02 Q3 '02 Q4 '02 Q1 '03 Q2 '03 Q3 '03 Q4 '03 Q1 '04 Q2 '04 Q3 '04 Q4 '04 Q1 '05 Q2 '05 Q3 '05

Enhanced CCTV
In partnership with TfL, some £3 million is being invested in digital CCTV systems with capability for
active monitoring by selection within Greater London. The system has now been rolled out on the Hayes
and Dartford Loop lines and will be extended to the majority of our stations in the Grater London area.

New Trains Programme

We inherited a £500 million new trains programme from Connex. This included the replacement of Mark
1 slam door stock with Class 375 Electrostar units on our longer distance routes and the introduction of
Class 376 Suburban Electrostar units in the metro area. Both are equipped with on-board CCTV, allow
through carriage views and represent a considerable improvement in passenger security. Our networker
units have also been refurbished, and are cleaner, lighter and more welcoming.
Ev 96 Transport Committee: Evidence

Additional Security Patrols

SET spends £270,000 per year on additional security patrols. As with the Railway Enforcement OYcers
their work is intelligence led, targeting known problem areas such as late night trains.

Participation in Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships

Throughout our franchise area, we work with those local authorities that have established Crime and
Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs). There are active CDRPs in Bexley, Southwark, Bromley,
Dartford, Thanet, Medway, Hastings and Lewisham. Our participation has resulted in a variety of positive
outcomes including:
— external finance to upgrade CCTV, lighting and install help points;
— patrols by local authority wardens on trains and stations;
— vegetation, litter and graYti clearance programmes; and
— working with schools to improve the behaviour of students traveling by train to and from school;
Other measures taken by SET include:
— upgrading lighting at all Metro stations;
— zero tolerance approach to graYti on stations with target to remove within 24 hours; and
— positive working relationship with BTP, Metropolitan and county police forces.
SET was praised by BTP Chief Constable Ian Johnston who earlier this year said:
South Eastern Trains have been a sterling supporter of BTP in our fight to tackle crime and disorder
on the railways; they have successfully encouraged their staV to join the Specials, and released them
from work time to undertake those roles. They employed a full time senior member of BTP staV in a
security advisor role, and they work with us on a daily basis to reduce crime and to improve the quality
of life of their passengers. (BTP press release, January 2006)
Following the return to the BTP of their secondee, SET established a full-time senior management post
of Head of Crime and Security. As well as continuing the advisory role he is a key player in assisting in the
improved co-ordination of the deployment and tasking of the Railway Enforcement OYcers, additional
security patrols and joint operations with BTP. This role is currently being carried out by an ex Assistant
Chief Constable from that force.
We have also:
— successfully opposed applications for late night drinking licenses in public houses adjacent to
our stations;
— in partnership with local authorities, secured Anti Social Behaviour Orders against youths
responsible for crime and disorder on our network;
— allowed staV paid time oV to train as BTP special constables; and
— in conjunction with the BTP, produced a security information and advice booklet for all staV.
30 March 2006

APPENDIX 8

Memorandum submitted by RMT

Introduction
RMT welcome the opportunity to contribute to the House of Commons Transport Committee inquiry
into passenger safety. The National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers (RMT) are the largest
rail union. Overall we represent over 70,000 workers from diVerent transport industries, at least 40,000 of
whom work in the railway industry.
It is our view that current arrangements to ensure passenger safety are inadequate. There is no consistent
reporting of incidents, lines of responsibility are blurred, the Secure Stations Scheme is entirely voluntary
and there are far too many stations with virtually no staV presence. RMT believe that there are a number
of initiatives that could be taken to improve passenger safety. However research demonstrates that the single
most important factor in making passengers feel secure is a visible staV presence at stations.
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 97

Secure Stations Scheme

The Department for Transport (DoT) currently runs the Secure Stations Scheme which sets out a number
of improvements train operating companies can make to improve passenger security. The guidelines are
helpful however the committee should be aware that it is a purely voluntary scheme.
Network Rail owns all rail stations and they also operate and manage the ten largest stations in London.
All the other stations are leased to Train Operating Companies, (TOCs.) The TOC is generally responsible
for the day to day maintenance, cleaning and operation of the station under the franchise agreement. The
franchises report to the Department of Transport who now manage the franchises directly, and the British
Transport Police also have responsibility. In addition Transport for London and local authorities also co-
ordinate crime reduction strategies but this is undertaken on a voluntary basis.
There are a number of improvements to stations that can be made by TOCs to stations set out in the DoT
Secure Stations Scheme documentation. Site perimeters, entrances and exits should be clearly marked.
Closed circuit TV equipment should be visible with quality images which are regularly monitored.
Lighting throughout the station is important, particularly where important information such as
timetables are displayed. The station also needs to be designed in such a way as to minimise possible security
concerns so that for example blind corners are minimised and where they are unavoidable additional
precautions are put in place. Information needs to be readily accessible in respect of the lay out of the station,
the train services and other transport options. There should also be clear directions to and from the station.
It is recommended that passengers should have the opportunity to call for assistance if this is required.
There are also useful guidelines for TOCs on how to manage the station and measure crime and monitor
passenger perceptions of security. The guidelines also set out the importance of a staV presence and advise
TOCs that staV training to deal with passenger security and safety issues should be addressed. The guidance
also correctly states that staV security is vital for facilitating passenger security.
RMT would certainly be interested to learn if those stations which have gained accreditation under the
scheme have succeeded in attracting additional passengers due to improved security for passengers. If this
is the case RMT would endorse the roll out of the scheme across the network on a mandatory basis providing
minimum staYng levels were included.
It should also be pointed out that stations need to be designed to facilitate access to all groups in society.
As a result of new legislation the Department of Transport is funding a number of improvements to stations
that will facilitate greater access for disabled passengers, for example clear passenger announcements and
customer information systems, step free stations and increased staYng assistance.

Current Standards
It is unfortunate that industry wide data on assaults and other incidents at stations which could be used
to make valid comparisons across the network is not available. If it does exist it is certainly not publicly
available and the fragmented nature of the industry makes the collection of the data more diYcult than it
sensibly should be.
The committee has asked whether the minimum standards are eVectively policed and whether penalties
are severe enough for non-compliance. These questions are largely academic as the Safe Stations Scheme is
run on a voluntary basis.
RMT do not have detailed information on requirements in franchise agreements for stations for each train
operating company. However it is apparent that certain companies have very few duties beyond normal
requirements under health and safety legislation. In January 2006 the London Assembly commissioned a
report on crime and safety at stations in London. The report highlighted the inadequate provisions in place
to ensure a station environment conducive to passengers well being.
This is not a situation that should be allowed to continue. Recent newspaper reports have highlighted the
situation at many London stations. Passengers have experienced poorly lit stations which are not accessible
to all, no staV presence, inadequate ticketing facilities and train information, and a general lack of any
facilities, e.g. toilets or waiting rooms. There have been frequent assaults at many stations in the capital and
the factors outlined above are likely to exacerbate potential crime problems.
We are pleased that as a result of increasing public concern this issue the Mayor of London has stated
that he will insist on staYng at stations for the new Silverlink franchise when he assumes control of the
franchise in November 2007. This should be extended to other stations where similar concerns on the lack
of staV presence have been raised.

Report on Crime and Safety from the Great London Authority

The House of Commons transport committee has asked who is responsible for the safety of passengers
at stations. Information from the above mentioned report from the London Assembly reveals that certain
train operating companies believe they have few responsibilities for the setting of appropriate standards
at stations.
Ev 98 Transport Committee: Evidence

South Eastern Trains explicitly stated that their franchise agreement does not specify any obligation to
upkeep maintenance or station safety. Therefore the focus is on any applicable health and safety standards
as opposed to factors such as passenger security and environmental factors. Thameslink made a similar
statement.
The increase in crime at London stations is alarming. The London Assembly report reveals that the
number of reported crimes on London’s 602 tube and rail stations has increased as follows:
2002–03 22,539
2003–04 26,054
2004–05 30,428
The 2004–05 figures include 18,068 crimes at London Underground stations and 12,360 crimes at rail
overground stations.
Earlier we indicated that local authorities did undertake crime reduction strategies. The report from the
London Assembly stated that evidence from local boroughs indicated that securing active TOC involvement
in borough wide crime and disorder strategies was diYcult due to the fragmented nature of public transport
in all its forms. The application within TOCs was patchy and inconsistent.
The report from the London Assembly studied the use of closed circuit TV and if any co-ordination exists
with local authorities who manage central CCTV rooms. The report described its findings on the overground
railway as a microcosm of the problems caused by splintered responsibility across the transport network.
This is because there are no common industry standards; no obligation to install CCTV on trains and also
no minimum requirements for the equipment that is used on the network.
Sadly there are also no requirements to link CCTV equipment with local authorities or law enforcement
agencies. The report stated that there was an insuYcient incentive for TOCs to invest in new high quality
technology due to the limits of franchises. The report also indicated that the number of BTP oYcers for
dealing with crime in London was insuYcient with only 1700 oYcers to deal with over 600 rail and tube
stations. However the transport committee may wish to note that the total across the whole national
network is only 2,500. London Underground has recently made an additional payment to the British
Transport Police for additional oYcers to work specifically on the Underground.

Staffing Railway Stations

Whilst noting that there would need to be some consideration of the level of passenger services running
through certain rural stations we believe there are clear practical arguments for ensuring robust staYng
arrangements at stations right across the UK. In particular many stations within London have potentially
far greater usage throughout the day with a visible staV presence. At the current time many stations within
the capital are used by work commuters in the morning and evening peak but after this ridership can
dramatically drop oV. The lack of staYng is a major factor.
More generally Transport 2000 have noted in their report “At the Leading Edge” that almost 75% of
women do not feel safe at railway stations in the evening and that “measures to improve personal safety
could increase the use of public transport by 10%”. Increased station staYng will also improve stations by
reducing graYti, vandalism and the non-payment of fares. Obviously increased revenue will help to generate
revenue which can contribute towards or pay for staYng costs.
However it is apparent that there is a lead in time for this and so resources will need to be forthcoming
upfront. It is our belief that increased ridership will follow but a period of time will have to pass before
potential users from the general public will appreciate that the rail network is a safer place upon which to
travel. We also believe that savings can be made by integrating the railway and in particular taking the Train
Operating Companies into public ownership.
The policy within London of de-staYng stations outside the peak period can lead to a whole set of
problems. These include a rising amount of crime against the person, increased acts of vandalism, (including
obstructive objects being placed on track, arson and missiles thrown from trains) and increased trespass
where there is no staV presence. If staV are not present to ensure the public have valid tickets for travel the
possibility of assault is shifted to staV working on trains. 41% of all attacks on rail staV are related to
ticket disputes.
It will probably not come as a surprise to the transport committee that there have been an increasing
number of assaults on rail workers. The Rail Safety and Standards Board Report from September 2005
records a total of 2600 assaults on the workforce for the period between January and July 2005, representing
an average of twelve on every day of the week.
It is a sad fact that crimes against the person are not recorded by the industry, however these figures are
recorded by the British Transport Policy and they report that violent crime against the person on the railway
has increased every year since 1999.
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 99

The union recommends that at stations no lone working should be allowed and staYng levels should be
determined upon the basis of a proper risk assessment, including the threat of violence. Risk assessments
are sometimes undertaken for particular grades and applied across a number of locations. This is not
adequate because the risk of crime depends on so many diVerent factors as illustrated earlier in this
submission.
A thorough plan needs to be developed for the whole rail network so that crime against passengers and
staV is taking seriously with comprehensive statistics collected throughout the industry. The current
fragmentation of the industry leads to a voluntary and piecemeal approach to preventative measures with
no overall control.

Information on Franchise Agreements for Train Operating Companies

RMT would like to advise the transport committee of a very important point regarding disclosure of
information that can impact on factors aVecting passenger security. During the recent re-tendering process
for South Eastern Trains RMT were denied access to the Invitation to Tender (ITT) document. This was
subsequently released but only after the completion of the procurement process. The union has since been
in communication with the oYce dealing with Freedom of Information enquiries.
RMT were advised by South Eastern Trains that we had already received a copy of the Stakeholder
Briefing Document which gave detail of what the SRA was asking bidders. However the Invitation to Tender
document contains important information that was not included in the Stakeholder Briefing Document. The
ITT reveals that bidders should consider changes to ticket retailing policies and procedures as part of their
submissions. Bidders are also advised that South Eastern Trains are already developing a business case in
readiness for the introduction of a more eYcient ticket retailing strategy.
In March 2005 South Eastern Trains brought forward proposed changes to schedule 17 of the Ticketing
and Settlement Agreement which would have resulted in a cut of around 100 station staV. This was only
withdrawn following a campaign by RMT and other passenger groups. Not only was this issue of significant
interest to RMT but the proposed cut in station staV was also a matter for wider public debate especially
bearing in mind the widespread media and political coverage of the lack of staV at stations and consequent
safety concerns.
In addition the ITT document also stated that bidders could bring forward proposals to extend Driver
Only Operation, resulting in the removal of guards and therefore the presence of a member of staV who
could potentially assist passengers on a train. Again it is our view that RMT and other interested parties
should have had access to the ITT at the time as this would have given the opportunity to raise concerns
with the SRA and through Parliament. The new franchise will be dependent upon public subsidy of £585
million over eight years and therefore the issues raised within the ITT are very much in the public interest.

Funding
RMT believe that a return to public ownership could release significant funds to pay for additional staV
at stations on the national rail network.
Research from Professor Jean Shaoul has revealed that considerable savings could be made through
returning the train operating companies into public ownership. The cost of each tendering exercise is
between £3m and £4m and there are additional costs that TOCs factor in for their costs of preparing bids.
In addition far less bureaucracy and monitoring costs relating to the contracts would be needed; this is
estimated at £30 million per year. The most significant savings would arise from subsidies and fare revenues
which would no longer be paid to private lenders and investors. Dividends paid annually to TOCs to parent
companies averaged £170 million in the years 2001–03. Profits increased to £290 million in 2004, an increase
of 20%.
Professor Shaoul estimates that £200 million a year could be saved through returning TOCs to public
ownership. She has calculated that this could fund an additional 1500 rail staV and a doubling of investment
currently being made on station maintenance, operations, renewals and enhancements.
Earlier we referred to improvements being funded by the Department of Transport to improve disabled
access to the railway. It is very disappointing that following this investment the number of rail journeys
covered with full staYng by 2015 will only increase from 70% to 76%. In addition the number of fully staVed
stations will increase from 20% to 23%.

Fire Safety Regulations

RMT would also like to bring to the attention of the transport committee the potential threat to staYng
at certain stations covered by the Fire Precautions (Sub-Surface Railway Stations Regulations) 1989.
Ev 100 Transport Committee: Evidence

The 1989 Regulations make up Section 12 of the Fire Precautions Act 1971, and were added on the
recommendation of the Fennell Report into the 1987 King’s Cross fire. The committee may well be aware
of the recent debate surrounding the future of these regulations on London Underground and other “sub-
surface stations”, however the regulations also cover national rail stations which are “sub-surface”,
including Birmingham New Street, London’s Charing Cross and several in Liverpool. The government’s
Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005, as originally drafted, would have repealed the 1971 Act, and
with it the Section 12 regulations.
The regulations stipulate minimum safe staYng levels, means of detecting and warning of fires and means
of escape and firefighting, as well as standards of fire-resistant construction, training and various other
precautions, which are not specified in the Fire Safety Order the Government wants to replace them with.
The Government government’s first move to scrap the 1989 regulations—which lay down minimum
staYng levels and other safety standards for sub-surface stations—was opposed by the House of Commons’
Regulatory Reform Committee in October 2004, following an intervention by RMT parliamentary group
convenor John McDonnell.
The government has subsequently said it would repeal the regulations in April 2007, However, the Fire
Safety Order and guidance do not give the same statutory protections as in the 1989 Regulations,
specifically on:
— Means of escape.
— Means of fighting fire.
— Means of detection and giving warning.
— Fire-resistant construction.
— Instruction and training.
— Keeping of records.
— Additional precautions including practicable steps to prevent smoking, and staYng levels.
RMT believe that the current regulations should not be repealed when inadequate provisions are being
made for their replacement.

Conclusion
The union has become increasingly alarmed at the rising number of assaults at stations. We believe that
de-staYng of stations has caused additional dangers. In view of the public money being spent on the national
rail network passengers have a reasonable expectation that there will be a staV presence at stations.
The Secure Stations Scheme is welcome but it is not mandatory. Train operating companies are in a
position where they can ignore best practice as promoted by the scheme. Savings can be made by ending the
fragmentation of the industry and restoring train operating companies to public ownership. We are also
confident that many more people will use the railway and increased revenue can in future be generated if
people believe that stations are safe at night. In any event demand for rail is expected to increase significantly
in the years ahead.
Finally in the event of tendering for franchises continuing RMT recommends that the Invitation to
Tender documents should be publicly available to industry parties, including the relevant trade unions and
passenger groups. This would mean that changes to staYng and security at stations can be publicly
scrutinised. Otherwise trade unions and passenger groups are eVectively forced into a rearguard action once
proposals are published.
RMT would be happy to come and give evidence directly to the transport committee.
30 March 2006

APPENDIX 9

Memorandum submitted by Crime Concern

1. Crime Concern welcomes the opportunity to submit written evidence to the Committee’s Inquiry.
Crime Concern is a social business which works with national and local statutory partners, local
organisations and others to create safer communities. We achieve this through the delivery of local crime
prevention projects in over seventy localities across England and Wales and through the provision of a
specialist consultancy advisory service to local partnerships, public services and business. We have probably,
at some time, worked with most of the 370 plus Crime and Disorder Partnerships (CDRPs) in England and
their counterparts in Wales. We are strategically funded through the Home OYce.
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 101

2. Our consultancy division has been undertaking research, training and consultancy across the public
transport sector for the past fifteen years. This experience provides us with a unique understanding of the
eYcacy of the various policy strategic and operational responses. We have drawn on this experience in our
evidence and would be happy to provide further details of any of the work referenced.

Executive Summary
3. Crime Concern’s experience is that:
— EVective passenger safety strategies incorporate a combination of prevention, environmental and
enforcement measures.
— There is a multiplicity of reasons why passengers feel vulnerable. As with most types of crime,
women, young people and members of minority groups (race, faith, disability) are likely to feel
particularly vulnerable.
4. We support the recommendations made in the National Audit OYce report “Maintaining and
improving Britain’s railway stations” (2005)12 which confirmed findings from our previous research into
personal safety issues for both the Department for Transport (DfT) and the Rail Safety and Standards
Board (RSSB).
5. In addition, we recommend that:
— A “whole journey” approach13, to passenger safety is more widely adopted. Passenger safety in
railways stations should not be dealt with in isolation.
— Train Operating Companies (TOCs) and transport authorities should become more closely
engaged with CDRPs.
— The role of complementary policing, in relation to the rail environment, is expanded and a
consistent, national approach is developed.
— A national strategy on personal safety training for rail staV is developed.
— More is done to realise the potential of the Secure Stations Scheme and more research is
undertaken into the business case for participation.
— Through collaboration between Network Rail, the rail operating companies and the new National
OVender Management Service, oVenders sentenced to Unpaid Work should be comprehensively
engaged in work to make the rail system safer and cleaner.

Background
6. Crime Concern’s has provided consultancy support on transport safety issues to the DfT, the RSSB
and individual TOCs. Our work, which has been at both a strategic and operational level, has involved
identifying crime, disorder and personal safety issues in the railway environment, and developing guidance,
strategies and recommendations to reduce these problems and improve actual and perceived public safety.

7. Work has included:

— research on complementary policing for the RSSB;
— research into rail passenger and staV perceptions and experiences for the RSSB;
— research on the (former) DETR’s Secure Route pilot;
— a safety and security audit for South West Trains, which contributed to their development of
company wide passenger safety initiatives and counter-measures; and
— an evaluation of ‘Youth on the Move’ which was a transport-focused outreach project in
Merseyside funded jointly by Merseytravel and the Youth Service.

Transport Crime and Social Exclusion

8. Our research for the RSSB on passengers’ experiences and perceptions of risks to personal safety
confirmed the following factors contribute to passengers’ sense of vulnerability:
— Quiet, unstaVed stations.
— Lack of (or oV-peak closure) of station facilities eg cafe[acute]s, shops.
— Dirty, poorly maintained stations.

12 The National Audit OYce’s report “Maintaining and improving Britain’s railway stations” (2005) provided a detailed analysis
of both the problems facing strategic bodies and train operating companies (TOCs) with the operation and maintenance of
railway stations and the measures currently being implemented to address them. The report identified where improvements
still need to be made and the barriers to progress.
13 This approach was piloted by Crime Concern for the Department for Transport two to three years ago.
Ev 102 Transport Committee: Evidence

— StaV who are unable or unwilling to provide help and information.

— Lack of (or inaccurate) information about services—or information only given in English and/or
in a written format.
— Groups of young people using station premises to congregate.
— Street drinkers and aggressive beggars.
— Travelling oV-peak and after dark.
— Travelling during major sports and other events when there are large crowds and people have been
drinking.
9. These factors deter people from using public transport, reducing footfall and therefore informal
surveillance—creating a vicious circle. When passengers feel vulnerable they also look more vulnerable and
are, therefore, more likely to be targeted.
10. Women, older passengers, young people, people with mental or physical disabilities and those from
minority ethnic communities often feel particularly vulnerable. Many of these passengers do not have the
use of a car and may depend on the rail network for access to leisure, work, training and other social contact.
Fear of using rail transport may, therefore, impact negatively on their levels of social inclusion and personal
well-being.

What are the most eVective methods of making railway and underground stations safer for passengers?
11. EVective approaches to passenger safety will require a combination of prevention, environmental and
enforcement measures, and will be promoted across the crime prevention and reduction field. Moreover,
measures outlined in the NAO report and in our own research reports for the RSSB and the DfT confirm
that it is essential that stations provide a visibly managed environment. Further details are given below.
12. Although the focus of the Committee’s inquiry is on stations, our research for the (former)
Department for the Environment, Transport and the Regions’ pilot Secure Route initiative demonstrated
the importance of addressing “whole route” issues ie the station is just one link in a passenger’s journey.
Security in car parks, the environment immediately outside stations, on-train security, access to and
availability of on-going transport options (taxis, buses) and provision of clear, accurate travel information,
should also be addressed. Improving stations is very important but if it is done in isolation, passengers’
safety in the wider sense will not be secured. In addition, a well-lit, well-maintained station with a “managed
environment” ie visible staV, high profile information about what action will be taken against oVenders,
CCTV etc will help to deter those intending to cause trouble.

Is it suYciently clear to passengers and others who is responsible for the safety of passengers in railway and
underground stations?
13. Passenger awareness of how TOCs and strategic bodies operate is generally low. Furthermore,
passengers do not necessarily diVerentiate between diVerent TOCs covering diVerent stages of their journey:
they will judge the quality of service, including personal safety factors on the whole journey, irrespective of
which lines and stations they use whilst in transit. Irregular/leisure travellers and those making long journeys
may use several companies’ services on one trip and it is therefore perhaps not surprising that diVerences
in approach and/or policy and procedure between companies can lead to confusion and expectations not
being met.
14. The RSSB Rail Personal Safety Group provides an industry-wide forum to discuss and help address
safety and security issues, and to encourage consistency across the network. However, the RSBB can only
recommend, not enforce change. We recommend that national strategies are developed on personal safety
training for rail staV and on complementary policing.

Why are so few stations accredited under the Secure Stations Scheme? Should the Scheme be made compulsory?
15. Following its review of the Scheme in 2003, the DfT abolished the accreditation fee and established
a ‘working towards accreditation’ category. However, not all TOCs support the Scheme and, given that it
is still a voluntary initiative, incentive to increase participation is still insuYcient. For accreditation to
increase, it would help to be able to demonstrate the business case for participation ie to establish whether
accreditation has led to increased footfall.
16. Making the Scheme compulsory would help establish a national baseline for rail companies’
approach to improving safety and security. However, there may be issues for companies operating rural and
smaller stations in low crime areas with relatively low footfall, as improvements will represent a relatively
high investment compared with potential increased revenue.
17. The NAO’s report confirmed that public awareness of the Scheme itself is low, but improvements
made to achieve accreditation will improve passenger perceptions (and actual experience) of person safety
eg higher standards of maintenance, CCTV, Help Points etc. The DfT review also recommended improved
marketing and promotion of the Scheme. We support this.
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 103

What measures would be required to ensure significant improvements in passengers’ safety in railway and
underground stations?

Strategic:
18. Transport operators should work proactively with local authorities, police, and CDRPs to analyse
and address problems aVecting stations in the context of the local crime environment; people causing trouble
and committing crimes on the railway are also likely to be oVending in the local area and may already be
known to the police and other local agencies. Currently, transport is significantly under-represented on
CDRPs although the Home OYce and the RSSB’s Rail Personal Safety Group are actively promoting this
approach.
19. Operators should actively encourage both passengers and staV to report crimes and incidents of
antisocial and threatening behaviour, make it clear how they can do so and provide feedback where
appropriate. Most operators regularly collate and analyse reported incident data to identify hotspots and
individuals and key risk factors and this should be central to companies’ strategic approach to tackling the
problem.

Environment:
20. Lighting and lines of sight should be improved, vegetation should be cut back, vandalised property
repaired and graYti cleaned as soon as possible, waiting areas should be sited where those waiting can see
and be seen, and fencing should be adequate, in good repair and reduce unwanted access to station areas.
21. The Committee may be aware that the Government is planning a major expansion in the provision
of Unpaid Work in the community. This is where oVenders are sentenced to a number of hours of unpaid
work for community benefit. This often involves environmental clean up work. We believe there is much
greater potential for this major source of labour to be deployed across the rail system, and elsewhere, to
increase safety and reduce the fear of crime. We recognise that there are significant health and safety
considerations to be addressed in making this a reality, but feel any strategy for enhancing safety in the rail
system should include those who are partly responsible for the insecurity paying back something. The rail
system should work closely with the National OVender Management Service and its service providers to put
a national initiative in place.
22. We are also aware that under the new anti social behaviour legislation, local councils can choose to
act to remove graYti from other organisations’ premises and then recoup the cost of this. We are not aware
to what extent these powers have been used yet (if at all) or whether they have been used in relation to the
rail system. However we would encourage the Committee to explore with bodies like the LGA whether a
drive could be introduced. This could do much to improve public perceptions of safety and to reassure the
public that action is being taken.

Surveillance/accessing help:
23. Ideally, digital CCTV should be linked to a central control room where cameras are constantly
monitored and to platform Help Points which enable operators to zoom in on callers in need of help and /
or surveillance. StaYng levels and visibility should be improved, especially when stations are quiet, and
police and complementary staV should patrol, particularly in ‘hot spot’ locations.

Enforcement:
24. Our research for the RSSB into the potential benefits of complementary policing for the rail industry
(2005) concluded that there is considerable scope for enhancing and expanding the role of complementary
policing staV in the rail environment ie contracted security; dedicated policing units; wardens; specialist
transport staV; voluntary sector. These staV:
— deal with low level crime and anti-social behaviour;
— gather intelligence (being the “eyes and ears” of the police);
— build links with local communities; and
— provide a reassuring presence.
25. Our research found that many rail companies are already using a range of complementary policing
staV to augment the British Transport Police (BTP) and Home OYce (HO) policing role. However, these
initiatives have been developed by individual companies and our recommendations stressed the need for a
consistent, national approach with complementary policing considered as part—not the whole—of the
solution.
Ev 104 Transport Committee: Evidence

Is the Government’s approach to passenger safety in railway stations eVective?

Conclusion
26. The evidence from the NAO and our own research suggests that there have been some good
improvements made in many areas. However, these improvements are patchy and some passengers are still
not confident about using stations in some locations, especially oV-peak and after dark.
27. We repeat our recommendation that it is essential to view the station as just one element in the whole
journey. Passengers will assess risks to their personal safety in terms of the weakest link in that journey and
will chose not to use public transport if they believe those risks are significant.
31 March 2006

APPENDIX 10

Memorandum submitted by Soroptimist International of South East England

Overview and Summary

1. This memorandum is based on grassroots research about the views and experiences of women
passengers. Soroptimist International is a major women’s voluntary organisation serving the community in
various ways including investigation of issues and presentation of reports. A Rail Safety Task Force
established in 1996 by Soroptimist International of South East England has published three reports on
passenger personal safety, based on visits to over 500 stations across Britain, surveys of the views of women
and young people and inspection of various types of rolling stock. It did not look at London Underground
other than to observe some of its good practice. It has discussed its findings with DfT, ATOC and individual
TOC directors, Rail Regulators, BTP, the SRA, Network Rail, RSSB, HSE, the Rail Passengers Council
and many figures in the rail industry.
2. On some topics there have been helpful responses to the report recommendations but on others little
progress has been made. Some we believe need Government action to correct fundamental weaknesses in
the arrangements set up when British Rail disappeared, while others need much closer and more coordinated
working between the diVerent parts of the rail industry.
3. Chapter 8 of our report “Safe and Sure: A quick wins agenda for Britain’s railways” set out 78
recommendations directly relevant to this inquiry. That report was submitted to the Committee in
December 2002. It forms the context for the action now advocated in this memorandum.
1. These observations are directed both to the Committee’s specific questions, and to some associated
aspects, in the light of our past research on personal security matters on the over-ground railway system
throughout Britain.

Q1. What are the most eVective methods of making railway and underground stations safer for passengers?

Q6. What measures would be required to ensure significant improvements in passengers’ safety in railway and
underground stations?
2. Passengers want not only to be safe, but to feel safe. That applies throughout their whole journey. In
the case of rail travel that means not just within the station itself, but also in the area immediately outside
it where they may have parked their car, or have to emerge at night, and within the rolling stock where they
will almost certainly at some time have experienced or witnessed unpleasantness and threats of various
kinds.
3. They also want:
— a consistent recognisable network they can confidently navigate, not a series of fiefdoms where
diVering approaches and systems apply to even such fundamental matters as basic signage and
safety information;
— immediate access to help and information if they have problems; and to be able to report concerns.
That goes for on the train as well as oV it;
— clearly visible staV. Even where there are people on the spot, too often they are hidden behind
frosted windows and shut doors. Low cost station modification could make more eVective use of
what is available;
— less reliance on CCTV cameras as a panacea that requires no other action. It is little comfort to a
passenger who is attacked or hassled to know it is recorded for court use if meanwhile nobody
actively intervenes; and
— clean well-tended surroundings where somebody is plainly in charge.
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 105

4. The Committee might like to ask the Department for Transport (DfT) and the Association of Train
Operating Companies (ATOC) if they agree with this analysis. Can these matters be collectively addressed
rather than left to the personal preferences of each franchisee?

Q2. Are the minimum standards to provide a safe and secure station environment high enough? Are the
requirements suYciently clear and specific to be eVective? If not, what changes should be made?

Q5. Why are so few stations accredited under the Secure Stations Scheme? Should the scheme be made
compulsory?
5. We deal with these questions together because our comments on the Secure Stations scheme are
relevant to both.
6. We welcomed the Secure Stations Scheme set up following our 1997 report. However this has become
over-specified other than for major stations and neglects the multitude of smaller stations at the “other end”
of journeys. We suggested to the Department for Transport two remedial approaches.
— Three levels of improvement required, being set according to their footfall, say Gold, Silver and
Bronze, with all stations required to attain at least Bronze, while striving to move up the league
table as resources allowed;
— Alternatively a base level of provision and maintenance, every station obliged to conform as a
franchise condition, ie required standard of lighting, a well-lit “safe “area with a help point (at least
a telephone), taxi access, cleanliness, and information.

7. The Committee might like to ask why DfT has ignored our suggestions.

Q3. Are the minimum standards eVectively policed? Are the penalties for failing to provide a secure station
environment suYciently severe?
8. There are two issues here, namely maintaining standards and applying sanctions.

(a) Maintaining standards

9. It is management’s job to secure cleanliness, removal of graYti and prompt repairs. We saw some sad
examples of expensive make-overs which have not been subsequently maintained. A good fault-reporting
system is essential. We welcome the BTP scheme to get local people to “adopt” a station and keep an eye
on it. Performance standards must be set for response-times eg maximum hours within which a damaged
phone will be repaired. Lying behind the maintenance of standards is good design for buildings and
equipment.

(b) Sanctions
10. At present none seem to operate. We recall OPRAF (now defunct) telling us the delivery of promises
from TOCs about maintenance was something they would spot check. The SRA (also now defunct) seemed
to be similarly minded. Three possible concurrent approaches are possible:
— Performance requirements, set by DfT as franchising authority, on maintenance of critical items,
with penalties on the TOC if spot checks or the public report failures;
— Conditions imposed by or required of Network Rail as landlords when letting stations to TOCs.
We were underwhelmed by what we saw about the present workings of this relationship. There is
obscurity about who is responsible for which land and buildings around stations eg disused station
buildings, fenced oV scraps of land. This leads to disputes over cleaning track litter and no doubt
other things;
— Higher priority and tighter management control within TOCs themselves. We were surprised at
some of the slack supervision we observed of contracted out services.

Q4. Is it suYciently clear to passengers and others who is responsible for the safety of passengers in railway
and underground stations?
11. No, as regards the overground railway. There is opaqueness over responsibilities as between TOCs,
Network Rail and the BTP and confusion among the public. When it comes to knowing to whom to report
what, many people simply give up. Not only is there no policy of locating standard information on this and
other topics in standard appropriate places and immediately recognisable format, but too often there is no
information. LT has useful lessons to teach other operators about all of this.
Ev 106 Transport Committee: Evidence

12. For reporting police matters, we were glad that our Rail Crimewatch suggestion was taken up by BTP
some years ago. However initial publicity needs to be refreshed and the number (unfortunately rather long)
prominently displayed in more places including the backs of tickets. We note that the Home OYce is piloting
a “Single Non-Emergency Number” scheme similar to that of BTP, but with a much simpler number. We
understand BTP are planning to keep their number and develop it as a more eVective single contact point
for the public

13. The Committee might like to ask DfT, Network Rail and BTP for their views on this topic and why
standard guidance on reporting is not used across the rail system.

Q 7. Is the Government’s approach to passenger safety in railway stations eVective?

14. The short answer is no. It has long been DfT practice to sideline personal security issues on railways
as entirely the province of the small unit dealing with disabled access and social inclusion. Prior to the critical
report by the PAC about public expenditure vis a vis strategy on stations, there seems to have been no
allocation of responsibility for the topic anywhere within the many branches of Railway Directorate. A
related issue is who has an overview of research needs—DfT? (and if so where?) RSSB? RPC (now
PassengerFocus)?

15. The Committee might like to ask why this has been so and where DfT see the strategic responsibility for
overseeing the provision of a secure railway to lie.

16. A second issue involving DfT is the failure of successive railway Bills to clarify the statutory definition
of health and safety (which over the years has grown incrementally like a coral reef) so as to make explicit
that it now includes responsibility for personal security between one passenger and another as well as
between staV and passengers. This gap in the legislation has left the topic in limbo.

17. The Committee might like to ask the DfT to explain why they think this statutory gap is acceptable, and
their view of its implications for standard setting, information collection, enforcement and accountability.

Additional Aspects

18. We conclude with three general points touched on in earlier paragraphs.

19. Action by ATOC: We have regularly pressed ATOC to translate their lip-service to a “National Rail
Product” into eVective action to secure standard signage, pictograms, the LTU standard of content design
and location of information boards, identical Help Points etc across the system to help travellers feel more
confident and be less vulnerable. Recently there has been added the embarrassment of users faced with each
TOC’s individual choice of baZing mechanisms for on-train disabled toilets; and their diVerent designs of
high tech fare machines, each of which must be carefully studied before use.

ATOC might be asked why they have given so little leadership on this.

20. Network Rail: Network Rail is a hidden and largely unaccountable hand in the present outcomes.

The Committee might explore how their responsibilities and obligations as owners and landlords of stations
might be clarified.

21. Joint action with local authorities and private developers: It seemed to us regrettable that just as
schemes were getting oV the ground, the SRA when its budget was cut pulled the rug out from under the
financing of Rail Passenger Partnerships. This seemed an eVective instrument for achieving station
betterment through partnerships between TOCs, LAs, community groups and private enterprise—the sort
of thing the PAC have suggested.

The Committee might ask DfT their intentions about this scheme.
30 March 2006
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 107

APPENDIX 11

Memorandum submitted by the National Audit OYce

Introduction and Summary

1. The Comptroller and Auditor General reported on maintaining and improving Britain’s railway
stations in July 2005. The report examined whether rail passengers were satisfied with station facilities and
services and whether station requirements were being met, the barriers to station improvement and what
was being done to overcome them.14 On the basis of that report the Committee of Public Accounts took
evidence from the Department for Transport, the Strategic Rail Authority, Network Rail, the OYce of Rail
Regulation and the Association of Train Operating Companies and issued its own report on Britain’s
railway stations in February 2006.15
2. This memorandum by the National Audit OYce sets out the findings from these reports that concern
passenger safety in railway stations and has been prepared with a view to assisting the Transport Committee
in its consideration of this subject.

Summary
— Many passengers do not feel safe at railway stations (paragraphs 3 to 7).
— Roles and responsibilities at stations are set out in a variety of contractual agreements. The
Committee of Public Accounts concluded that the number of bodies involved in maintaining and
improving stations has led to a fragmented approach, lacking overall leadership and strategic focus
(paragraphs 8 to 11).
— The security requirements at stations set out in franchise agreements are limited to ensuring there
is adequate lighting. In 2003, in its Modern Facilities at Stations programme the Strategic Rail
Authority established specifications for staVed stations that went beyond those set out in franchise
agreements but with adoption dependent on funding. The specifications are highest for medium
and large staVed stations. Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) and Help Points are not included in
the specifications for small stations (paragraphs 12 to 16).
— National schemes promote good practice in station security, but few Train Operating Companies
are involved and the schemes have had little impact (paragraphs 17 and 18).

Many Passengers do not Feel Safe at Railway Stations

3. Our analysis of the Spring 2004 National Passenger Survey data on station facilities and services
showed that passengers are most satisfied with the provision of passenger information, the assistance they
receive from station staV, and connections with other forms of public transport. (The most recent National
Passenger Survey, carried out in Autumn 2005, confirmed these findings). However, one of the areas where
levels of satisfaction are lower is passengers’ feelings of personal security while at stations. As with other
areas, passenger satisfaction in this area varies greatly between categories of station (see Figure 1 below).

Figure 1

PASSENGER SATISFACTION WITH PERSONAL SECURITY WHILST USING STATIONS

Per cent fairly or very satisfied (National Passenger Survey Spring 2004)
All National Regional Important Medium Small Small
stations hub hub feeder staVed staVed unstaVed
55 62 61 53 46 49 38

4. Train Operating Companies have made considerable investments in CCTV surveillance in recent
years. A third of stations are now equipped with such systems. The results of the National Passenger Survey
show that there has been some improvement in the number of passengers feeling safer (54% in autumn 2002,
and 59% in autumn 2005). In the autumn 2005 National Passenger Survey, furthermore, 25% of passengers
said that they had had cause to worry about their personal safety on the railway in the preceding six months.
More than half of these cited anti-social behaviour by other passengers at stations, 43% a lack of station
staV, 37% fear of terrorism and 18% poor station lighting as reasons for their concerns about personal
safety.

14 Maintaining and improving Britain’s railway stations, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, HC132 of Session
2005–06.
15 Committee of Public Accounts, Twenty-second Report of Session 2005–06, Maintaining and improving Britain’s railway
stations, HC 535.
Ev 108 Transport Committee: Evidence

5. The reliability of crime figures recorded by the British Transport Police depends on victims reporting
oVences to the police. The total number of notifiable oVences recorded by the British Transport Police on
the railways rose by 17% (to 65,051) between 2000–01 and 2003–04. This included a 37% increase in assaults
on railway staV, and increases of 25% each in violent crimes and in public disorder and criminal damage.
The Strategic Rail Authority pointed out that some of the increase can be attributed to the increase in the
number of passengers using the network: passenger journeys increased by six% between 2000–01 and
2003–04. Some of this increase can also be attributed to a change in the National Crime Recording Standard
in April 2002, which resulted in more oVences being recorded in oYcial figures.
6. Research by Crime Concern16 for the Department in 1996 and 2002 suggested that measures to
improve personal safety would result in 11% more journeys by public transport, including 15% more by train
and Underground. Much of the increase would occur outside peak hours. The research also found that the
presence of staV, good lighting and CCTV surveillance at stations were the three most important factors
reassuring passengers about their personal safety when they waited for a train. Passengers feel more secure
at large stations, which are staVed, than at small stations unstaVed for much or all of the day, many of which
do not have CCTV security systems. Passengers feel most unsafe after dark, particularly at unstaVed
stations.
7. In the Rail Safety and Standards Board’s 2003–-04 safety plan, the industry set itself a target to reduce
crime against passengers and others on railway property by 7.5% by December 2005. It expected to achieve
this through, amongst other activities, improved lighting at stations, more CCTV systems and help points,
and the further adoption of best practice accreditation schemes.

Roles and responsibilities at stations are set out in a variety of contractual agreements. The Committee of
Public Accounts concluded that the number of bodies involved in maintaining and improving stations has led to
a fragmented approach, lacking overall leadership and strategic focus.

8. Britain’s 2,507 railway stations17 vary greatly in size. Each of the 28 largest stations is used on average
by 90,000 passengers a day, and each of the 1,200 small unstaVed stations by just 100 passengers. Seventy%
of all rail journeys are made from the busiest 10% of stations. Network Rail owns most stations and is
responsible for their structural repair and renewal. It also operates and manages 17 large stations, known as
managed stations. It leases the remainder, known as franchised stations, to 22 Train Operating Companies
responsible for station maintenance, cleaning and operations. These Train Operating Companies pay rent
(including regulated charges) to Network Rail.
9. The Strategic Rail Authority has had a key role to play in stations, since the government established
it in February 2001 to deliver strategic leadership to the railway industry. It inherited from its predecessor,
the OYce of Passenger Rail Franchising, minimum standards, including facilities and services required at
franchised stations, monitored Train Operating Companies’ compliance with requirements and helped fund
stations’ operation and improvement. Other public and private sector organisations also play a part. The
Strategic Rail Authority was abolished under the Railways Act 2005. In June 2005, the Department for
Transport took over its strategic, franchising and station roles in England and Wales and in October 2005
the Scottish Executive took over these roles for Scotland. In April 2005, Network Rail took over its
responsibility for monitoring Train Operating Companies’ operational performance, while in July 2005 the
OYce of Rail Regulation took over its monitoring of some consumer protection issues. The Department
for Transport, Train Operating Companies acting as Station Facility Owners, Network Rail and the British
Transport Police share responsibility for improving security at stations, although primary responsibility
rests with the Station Facility Owners.
10. A variety of contractual agreements set out Network Rail’s and Train Operating Companies’
respective roles and responsibilities, and there are various sources of funding for the maintenance, repair
and renewal of stations, involving a complicated flow of taxpayer subsidies together with income from
passenger fares and from commercial concessions such as shops and cafe[acute]s at stations. None of the
organisations involved collected information about the total amount of public and private sector money
spent on stations. We estimated that, in 2003–04, over £420 million was spent on day-to-day maintenance,
cleaning and operations of stations, including £370 million by Train Operating Companies at franchised
stations, and that Network Rail spent over £100 million renewing station assets including £65 million at
franchised stations.
11. The Committee of Public Accounts concluded that the number of bodies involved in maintaining and
improving stations has led to a fragmented approach, lacking overall leadership and strategic focus. The
Committee recommended that the Department should identify investment priorities across the network, set

16 Crime Concern is an independent, not-for-profit organisation and registered charity that works with local communities and
agencies to reduce crime.
17 These are stations on the “heavy rail” network excluding heritage lines, London Underground and other metropolitan
underground stations.
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 109

out a coherent approach for attracting in private funding to help fund improvements, and set out clearly
the actions needed to address anticipated capacity pressures, particularly at major stations, over the next
10 years.18

The security requirements at stations set out in franchise agreements are limited to ensuring there is adequate
lighting. In its Modern Facilities at Stations programme, the Strategic Rail Authority established specifications
that went beyond those of franchise agreements, but with adoption dependent on funding. The specifications are
highest for medium and large staVed stations, with CCTV and Help points not included in the specifications
for small stations.
12. There is no single, authoritative definition within the rail industry of what passengers want and need
from stations, and what value they place on satisfying them. Research carried out for Railtrack in 1999, and
more recently by Network Rail, suggested that passengers’ core needs at a station were for the station to be
secure and for staV and good quality information to be available.
13. The Strategic Rail Authority, and before it the OYce of Passenger Rail Franchising, set basic
obligations for most franchised stations that largely reflected the facilities that existed at the time of
privatisation rather than identified passenger needs. Train Operating Companies have generally complied
with them, and Network Rail has reported an improvement in stations’ structural condition since
privatisation.
14. The security requirements set out in the original franchise agreements were limited to ensuring that
there is adequate lighting, switched on throughout the hours of darkness when the station is open. The
Strategic Rail Authority reviewed its franchising policy in 2002 and concluded that, while the policy of
relying on commercial incentives to encourage Train Operating Companies to improve the quality of
passenger rail and station services had achieved a number of successes, overall it had not delivered the
outcomes envisaged. The Strategic Rail Authority decided that, from spring 2004, it would more clearly
specify station standards, facilities and services in new franchise agreements, setting a higher level of
requirements in some respects and new requirements where there had previously been none. The new
franchise agreements set out more specific requirements for lighting at stations, but do not include any new
security requirements.
15. During the awarding of, and any subsequent revisions to, franchises the OYce of Passenger Rail
Franchising and later the Strategic Rail Authority encouraged Train Operating Companies to commit
themselves in their franchise plans to invest in station improvements. Some franchise plans specified the
improved facilities and services that Train Operating Companies would provide at particular stations, while
others quantified how much would be spent on them. The most common improvements involved
installation of CCTV systems and better passenger information systems.
16. In June 2003, in its Modern Facilities at Stations (MFAS) programme, the Strategic Rail Authority
established specifications for facilities at staVed stations. These went beyond those set out in franchise
agreements, but the specifications were lower for small stations and their adoption has been dependent on
available funding. CCTV and Help points were included in the specifications for medium and larger staVed
stations but not for small staVed (and unstaVed) stations. In drawing up its specification over the period
2001 to 2003, the Strategic Rail Authority consulted Train Operating Companies, Passenger Transport
Executives, the OYce of Rail Regulation, the Scottish Executive and the National Assembly for Wales. But
there was limited consultation with passengers and representative rail passenger groups. By March 2005,
the SRA had funded Network Rail to complete MFAS improvements at 67 stations. Network Rail had
completed designs to upgrade facilities at a further 662 stations, but the SRA did not have funding to
proceed with these improvements.

National schemes promote good practice in station security, but few Train Operating Companies are involved
and the schemes have had little impact
17. The Department for Transport, the Home OYce and the police work with other stakeholders in
running two accreditation schemes for station and car park security. Take-up remains low, however, and
both schemes have had limited impact:

The Secure Stations Scheme

— Since 2002, the Strategic Rail Authority has been committed to encouraging Train Operating
Companies to seek accreditation under the Secure Stations scheme, which specifies high standards
for crime management. An independent review of the scheme in April 2003 found that one of the
main weaknesses of the scheme was lack of support from some Train Operating Companies. The
cost of the required regular passenger surveys was also a major deterrent to some Train Operating
Companies joining the scheme. The review found that many of the stations had low levels of crime

18 Committee of Public Accounts, Twenty-second Report of Session 2005–06, Maintaining and improving Britain’s railway
stations, HC 535, page 5, paragraph 8.
Ev 110 Transport Committee: Evidence

before accreditation, which was therefore achieved without requiring any significant changes;
subsequently crime fell only a little from previous levels. The review also found that there was a
low level of awareness of the scheme among passengers, and that it had therefore had a limited
impact on passengers’ fear of crime. The review’s recommendations included targeting the scheme
at stations with high levels of crime to improve the scheme’s eVectiveness, and better marketing
and promotion of the scheme.
— In response, the Department has reduced the costs of the scheme by allowing Train Operating
Companies to draw upon station-specific results from crime questions in the National Passenger
Survey and, in March 2005, by abolishing the accreditation fee and introducing a category of
‘working towards accreditation’, to encourage take-up of the scheme. As at January 2005, there
were 118 accredited stations, a fall of 12% from the 134 accredited stations in October 2002. Since
87 of the largest stations are accredited, however, two-thirds of rail journeys involve passengers
starting or finishing their journey at a Secure Station.
— The Department has recently begun research on approaches to reducing crime at stations in high
crime locations and the British Transport Police has deployed Police Community Support OYcers
along with police co-ordinators at the main London terminal stations, Leeds, Birmingham New
Street, Manchester Piccadilly and CardiV Central, which have the highest numbers of crimes. At
London Victoria, crime fell by a quarter in the first six weeks of these OYcers’ deployment.

The Secured Car Park Scheme

— An independent review of the Secured Car Park scheme in March 2003 found that crime fell
sharply after accreditation in car parks with high levels of crime. Passengers’ perceptions of their
own security at accredited stations improved, although this was due less to the accreditation itself
than to the improvements that were made to gain it, such as lighting, CCTV and a visible security
presence. Coverage of station car parks, however, is low; in March 2004, the scheme covered just
125 car parks at stations. In October 2004, the scheme was re-launched under the new name of the
Safer Parking Award. The scheme’s accreditation criteria now focus more on crime risk
management and less on the design of the car park itself. In our January 2005 report on Reducing
Vehicle Crime19, we recommended that the Home OYce encourage Train Operating Companies
to participate in the scheme.
18. The Committee of Public Accounts noted that few train operating companies have joined national
schemes to reduce crime and improve personal safety at stations even though research in 1996 and 2002
suggests that introducing additional security measures can increase patronage by up to 11%. The Committee
recommended that the Department should work with the Association of Train Operating Companies and
British Transport Police to promote national schemes with station operators and passengers and that it
should also consider making participation a franchise requirement.20
31 March 2006

APPENDIX 12

Memorandum submitted by the OYce of Rail Regulation

1. The OYce of Rail Regulation is the independent regulator of the rail industry in Great Britain. We are
economic regulator for the national railway. From 1 April 2006 we will be the health and safety regulator for
all railways in Great Britain, taking over responsibility from HSE, with HSE Rail staV transferring to ORR.
2. Under Section 3 of the Health and Safety and Work etc. Act 1974 it is the duty of every employer to
conduct his undertaking in such a way as to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that persons not in
his employment (such as, in the case of stations, passengers or other members of the public) are not exposed
to risks to their health and safety. Under section 2 of the same Act it is the duty of employers to ensure, so
far as reasonably practicable, the health, safety and welfare of their employees.
3. The police, particularly the British Transport Police, have the key responsibility for addressing
criminal activity at stations.
4. However every employer, such as a station operator, has a duty to identify and implement measures
needed to comply with the requirements and prohibitions imposed upon him or under the relevant statutory
provisions. These measures follow from a suitable and suYcient assessment of:
(a) the risks to the health and safety of his employees to which they are exposed whilst they are at
work; and

19 Reducing Vehicle Crime, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, HC183 of Session 2004–05.
20 Committee of Public Accounts, Twenty-second Report of Session 2005–06, Maintaining and improving Britain’s railway
stations, HC 535, page 4, paragraph 3.
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 111

(b) the risks to the health and safety of persons not in his employment arising out of or in connection
with his undertaking.
5. In its capacity as safety regulator, HSE Rail’s main focus has been on risk in the railway arising from
train crashes. HSE has also engaged extensively with the industry on the safety of employees at stations. For
instance in 2005 the London Metro Team Railway Inspectorate Contact OYcer (RICO) was involved in a
group tackling assaults to staV on Docklands Light Railway. Their eVorts have seen noteworthy reductions
in rates of incidence of such attacks.
6. As far as personal security of passengers and members of the public from criminal activity is concerned,
HSE’s general approach has been to defer to the British Transport Police, and an assessment of risks to
public personal security is not, for instance, required, when an operator’s safety case is assessed. This
approach is consistent with the government’s Enforcement Concordat under which action by diVerent
enforcing authorities is coordinated.
7. In our new role we will be developing a strategy for safety regulation of the railway. This will build on
the work already done by HSE Rail, based on assessment of the risks arising from railway activities, and
prioritised in a way, which reflects the scale of the risks. We will continue to assess whether significant risks
at stations are being addressed by the industry, for instance through:
— the collection by the industry of appropriate data, its analysis and use,* commissioning by it of
further research where this is needed,
— carrying out by industry companies of suitable risk assessment of stations where there is concern,
— adoption of good practice and taking other necessary action by industry parties.
8. As regulator of the national railway, we are not a funder of the railway. We cannot require and would
not be able to support and endorse new standards that specify, for instance, levels of station staYng and
facilities unless these were consistent with a robust appraisal of the risks, benefits, costs and savings.
9. We can and will continue to use our powers and influence to facilitate improvements, and help secure
better value for money through, for example, ensuring the industry has the contractual tools available to
eVectively agree and implement enhancements, and to engage all relevant stakeholders (including local
authorities and the police), and to facilitate third party investment. It is however for the industry and funders
to develop initiatives to meet legitimate public concerns and we welcome such initiatives.
31 March 2006

APPENDIX 13

Memorandum submitted by Merseytravel

Introduction

1. Merseytravel is the operating name of the Merseyside Passenger Transport Authority (PTA) and the
Merseyside Passenger Transport Executive (PTE).
2. The PTA sets the transport policies in the sub region, and the Passenger Transport Executive (PTE)
implements those policies. These policies are set out in the Merseyside Local Transport Plan, a statutory
document covering the period 2000–01 to 2005–06. The Local Transport Plan 2, due for submission to the
Department for Transport on 31 March 2006, will set out the transport priorities for the sub region between
2006–07 and 2010–11.
3. Merseyside’s train network is unique. It is virtually 100% separate from the rest of the UK rail network.
The Merseyrail Electrics network operates as a self-contained metro railway using an electrified third rail
network. In recognition of its uniqueness, the Government gave Merseytravel control of the local train
operating franchise, including flexibility over the length of time for the franchise. Merseytravel then let a 25-
year concession to Merseyrail Electrics (2002) (known as “Merseyrail”) to operate passenger services on the
Wirral and Northern lines, which included a requirement to invest in the quality of stations on the network.
4. This paper is submitted to assist the Committee with its inquiry and draws specifically on the
experience since Merseytravel took control of responsibility for the concession from the Strategic Rail
Authority in July 2003. The SRA’s principal responsibilities have since been taken over by the Department
for Transport. This move has had an impact on the strength of partnership working between local bodies
in order to improve personal security on the railway to a measurable level. Merseytravel and Merseyrail’s
success has been recognised nationally and that should be disseminated as best practice across the country.
5. If it would assist Members’ deliberations further, Merseytravel would be delighted to give oral evidence
to the Committee.
Ev 112 Transport Committee: Evidence

Context
6. Rail has a higher share of the public transport market in Merseyside than other similar areas—this
reflects the specific, local purpose of the Merseyrail Network. The rail network plays an important part in
Merseyside in terms of providing inclusive access to key employment, residential, leisure and retail
destinations.
7. Crime, and the fear of crime is recognised as a major deterrent for people when making the choice to
travel by public transport. Nationally, the DfT believe that crime or the fear of crime has a dampening eVect
on public transport ridership of around 11.5%. Elsewhere in Government, a report by the Social Exclusion
Unit into Transport and Social Exclusion identified fear of crime as one of the 5 key factors in increasing
“transport poverty”.
8. On Merseyside, in seeking to achieve a “Single integrated transport network, accessible to all”,
Merseytravel has had to address these issues of crime to encourage all sectors of society access to transport
modes. This is particularly relevant for public transport in some of the most deprived areas of the sub region.
For example, all stations on the Merseyside Northern Line from Ormskirk and Kirkby to Kirkdale have
got Secure Station Status. Merseytravel believes it a significant achievement that it is in these areas of
deprivation that our most prominent achievements have been made.
9. We have sought to share our expertise in this area through membership of the steering group for the
ongoing DfT research “Reducing Crime and Fear of Crime at Rail Stations in Socially Excluded or High
Crime Areas”.
10. Merseytravel and Merseyrail play a key role in overseeing security on the railways, both on trains and
in stations. This investment of time and resources has brought significant results;
— Of the 66 Merseyrail Electrics stations on the network, 27 have been awarded Secure Station status
since 2004; 110,895 passengers journeys begin or end at a secure station each day.
— Merseytravel has led the partnership for the “TravelSafe” programme which follows the model of
a voluntary sector compact.
— Merseytravel supports the presence on British Transport Police, and has provided for a large team
of Community Support OYcers dedicated to the rail network and hosts a seconded British
Transport Police (BTP) Inspector.
— All of Merseytravel’s stations are staVed from before the first train until after the last train.
— All of the stations have CCTV facilities to evidential standards.
— Merseytravel has also included the comfort of passengers as a key issue for managing the fear of
crime on the railways comprehensive information provision and well maintained waiting facilities
are examples.
11. In February 2006, the success of Merseyrail’s approach to station security was recognised in the
award of the HSBC Rail Business Award for its Personal Security Project.

What are the most eVective methods of making railway and underground stations safer for passengers?
12. Merseytravel, with their TravelSafe partners has to date achieved Secure Station Status at 40% of
stations on the Merseyrail Network. Crime and the fear of crime has reduced significantly and as a result,
passenger figures continue to rise. Since July 2004, the number of assaults on passengers has been reduced
by 60%, the number of assaults on staV has been reduced by 10% and incidents of graYti have reduced by
60%. This achievement is the result of a number of methods set out below.
13. Of those listed, the three that have the most significant impact are: StaYng, CCTV and lighting. The
latter two of which are a key element of station design.
— Revenue protection. Ticket gates have been introduced by Merseyrail at the six largest stations on
the network as a commitment within the Concession Agreement. This approach has reduced
ticket-less travel from approximately 14% to around 3% in just the second year of operation
(2004–05) and has been an attractive deterrent for antisocial behaviour.
— Station Design/Standards. Current design of new stations and station refurbishment takes into
account security requirements and aims to increase the level of personal security at stations. For
instance St Helens Central currently has 5 CCTV cameras which will be increased to 32 when the
station refurbishment is complete next year.
All station design is carried with the intention of introducing gating, if not immediately then, at a
later date.
— Modern Facilities at Railway Stations (MFAS) Programme. Twenty-one stations in Merseyside
have now benefited from the MFAS programme (delivered in partnership with the Train
Operating Companies, Strategic Rail Authority and Network Rail), focusing on the provision of
real time passenger information and, where appropriate, passenger waiting rooms. All of the
stations that were included in the MFAS programme have now been awarded Secure Station
Status.
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 113

— TravelSafe. Working with partners, Merseytravel’s TravelSafe Initiative is designed to combat

crime and disorder and perceptions of crime and disorder across all public transport modes in
Merseyside. TravelSafe is a cross industry initiative which works towards a safer public transport
system for all. The goal of TravelSafe is:
“To work as partners to create a public transport system that oVers the opportunity for all
members of the community to travel safely and without fear”
TravelSafe follows the principles of a Crime and Disorder Reduction partnership, giving clear lines
of responsibility and a multi-organisational strategy. Organisations involved in TravelSafe range
from Merseytravel and representatives from the varied advisory panels, the Rail Passengers
Council, Merseyside and British Transport Police, Crown Prosecution Service, schools and the
Government OYce as well as the local authority based Crime and Disorder Reduction
partnerships.
As part of TravelSafe, a specialist crime analyst has been recruited to develop the specification,
design and implementation of an Incident Reporting System (IRiS) which conforms to the police
National Intelligence Model. The IRiS system can identify black spots and make judgements on
the eVectiveness of measures, such as CCTV, and to identify where the next focus of energy should
be. TravelSafe and BTP have also developed an innovative data sharing protocol which allows for
a more joined up use of crime data. This excellent cross working has secured prosecutions, the
imposition of ASBOs and exclusion of individuals from stations.
An audit of crime is conducted and a strategy produced every three years. Having reciprocal
representation on each of the districts Crime and Reduction Partnerships means that public
transport crime is included in each of their strategies.
— Community Involvement. Merseytravel in conjunction with Merseyrail and Northern Rail is
developing a station adoption programme in line with the Association of Community Rail
Partnerships (ACORP) code of practice. The aim is to develop community engagement thus to
reduce the level of crime and vandalism around the station and increasing passengers perception
of them as safe locations and to encourage the development of new skills such as horticulture and
community art.
— British Transport Police. Merseytravel supports the policing of the County’s rail network through
direct financial support to the BTP. In February 2005, Merseytravel began funding the first
Community Support OYcers (CSOs) on trains and stations outside London. One year later, the
success of the original CSOs led to the recruitment of ten further oYcers, bringing the total number
on the network to sixteen. The CSOs compliment Police OYcers by providing highly visible
reassurance patrols. They can use a number of powers which include issuing penalty notices for
minor oVences or detaining a person, for more serious oVences, until a police oYcer can attend
and deal with the incident.
The BTP’s seconded inspector oVers benefits for both organisations; they provide a single point
of contact for the wide range of partners involved in community safety and provide a direct link
to the current issues and best practice within BTP. Their impact has been measurable including:
the authorisation of an Anti-Social Behaviour Dispersal Order (Section 30 Order) being granted
for a 6 month period which resulted in a 42% reduction in recorded crime for the period granted,
compared to the same period of the previous year.
— Private Contractors. Merseyrail Electrics has also contracted CFS, a private security contractor
to support the enforcement work of the BTP and CSOs. CFS work as part of the team providing
primarily a CCTV monitoring service from a remote depot that allows real time monitoring on
“Hot spot” locations and is backed up by 3 security patrol cars working around the clock and
patrol our key risk sites out of normal operational hours. CFS also provide on going reporting and
analysis of incident trends.

Are the Minimum Standards to provide a safe and secure station environment high enough? Are the
Requirements suYciently clear and specific to be eVective? If not, what changes should be made?
14. Merseytravel and Merseyrail Electrics believe that we are well on the way to achieving the minimum
standards for safe and secure stations across the network, using the Secure Station Status as the initial
measure of achievement.
15. For Merseyrail to have 40% of their network Secure Station-accredited within 18 months took
significant time, eVort and resources. In cost terms alone, figures are currently averaging between 7k and
10k per station on infrastructure improvements alone. The costs of resources such as management time and
security deployment are much more varied between stations and as such are more diYcult to quantify.
16. Merseyrail have undoubtedly benefited through having staVed stations when implementing the
scheme. However, there is a misconseption in the industry that staVed stations are a pre-requisite for
achieving the standard. While this is not an issue on the Merseyrail Network, addressing this misnomer may
well encourage more applicants.
Ev 114 Transport Committee: Evidence

17. It is clear that measures of security standards, aside from the Secure Station Scheme, are largely
agreed at the local level (including via Performance Indicators in the Local Transport Plan). This reduces the
potential for comparison in quality of service and the dissemination of best practice across administrative
boundaries.

Are the Minimum Standards eVectively policed? Are the penalties for failing to provide a secure station
environment suYciently severe?
18. The principal penalty for Train Operating Companies, such as Merseyrail Electrics, if they do not
address anti social behaviour or the fear of anti-social behaviour is inevitably lost ridership and therefore
lost revenue. The Secure Stations Scheme is a self- monitoring scheme and evaluation is ongoing and the
award can be lost if standards are not met.
19. In Merseyside, CURSER staV monitor facilities at all stations to identify facilities that fall below the
required standard, such as a damaged shelter. While the role of the CURSER staV is in relation to the
Merseyrail Electrics’ concessionary agreement, their monitoring regime provides a degree of oversight
which can be used as a toll for monitoring the application of Secure Station Status.
20. Other measures to evaluate security levels include: independent passenger surveys to understand
crime as well as the fear of crime; site specific assessments by Merseyrail Electrics and BTP to review
measures in place and devise a renewed action plan; design and management assessment including station
layout, passenger facilities and staV training/competence.
21. There are presently no national initiatives or implications if transport providers do not set to comply
with the requirements of Secure Stations Status.

Is it suYciently clear to passengers and others who is responsible for the safety of passengers in railway and
underground stations?
22. With staV at each station from before first train until after last, there is always a single point of contact
for any passenger to approach for the reporting of security issues. This single point of contact is in addition
to on-station help points, a BTP presence and CFS patrols. On Merseyside, the public trust the TravelSafe
initiative and are comfortable that the processes in place are suYcient enough that providing they speak to
an on-duty oYcer, regardless of organisation, their incident will be dealt with appropriately and by the most
relevant person.

Why are so few stations accredited under the Secure Stations Scheme? Should the scheme be made compulsory?
23. There are presently around 270 stations with Secure Station Status, meaning 10% of all Secure
Stations are in the Merseyside sub-region. The very small national take up of the scheme suggests a lack of
information and understanding of the measures that can be applied; these may range from small changes
to large scale investment. This needs to be addressed at the national level and the scope for learning from
others including a strategy for the wider roll out of the standard.
24. 40% of stations on the Merseyrail Network are now accredited under the Secure Station Scheme.
Funding prioritisation remains an issue; of those accredited for Secure Station status, 21 were beneficiaries
through the MFAS programme. If the scheme were to be made compulsory, it would need to be supported
by additional funding that would mean station improvements were progressed without being at the expense
of other transport priorities. There is a need for a national position on funding prioritisation for station
security, driven by the Government, including leadership at the highest level including large scale
improvements in all of Britain’s major stations.

What measures would be required to ensure significant improvements in passenger’s safety in railway and
underground stations?
25. Merseytravel and Merseyrail have set out some of the over-riding measures that have led to the
success that is being built on in Merseyside. However, the fundamental key to success building on existing
knowledge via a strong and focused partnership A significant level of improvement has been achieved in a
relatively short time in reducing security incidents, particularly assaults but the key challenge is now to
maintain this success and in particular to manage perception of customers and employees.
26. Merseytravel and Merseyrail’s security strategy embeds the concept of zero tolerance to quality of
life infringements (anti social behaviour in particular) across the partnership. This has been a significant step
change in approach as, previously, resources and initiatives were primarily focused on higher level crimes
and on a reactive basis. By reducing the number of lower level issues all aspects of security will improve and
with the added benefit of improving customer perception which is at the heart of this challenge.
27. A customer focused plan to improve overall perception of (and continuously strive to improve) on
the Merseyrail network is in operation. Managing perception is tackled by maximizing visibility of existing
resources and by focusing on those quality of life issues that can be precursors to higher level incidents (eg
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 115

feet on seats, smoking and loitering). This is a long term plan to deal with the issues rather than short term
measures which have limited eVect and become diYcult to sustain. The following key long term measures
are fundamental:
— Public Education Programmes (“If you see something, say something”).
— Secure stations and safer parking.
— State of the art CCTV.
— Bye Law Enforcement: A legal framework has already been implemented via the law courts to
prosecute fare evader/oVenders. This will be built on as we now move into a more specific Bye Law
enforcement regime. Enforcement of oVenders who do not comply with specific railway Bye Laws
will continue to gather momentum as we move to a total Zero Tolerance policy.
— Introduction of new operational exercises, based on best practice gained from New York
experience, which increase perceived visibility and tackle Quality of Life issues including:
— Train Order Maintenance Sweeps (TOMS) exercises have now commenced and will take place
at high footfall locations to maximize passenger and staV exposure to the process. There main
aim is to show a high profile visible presence to provide passengers and staV with an assurance
that the network is safe and secure.
— Quality of Life teams (dedicated, trained, working with PCSOs and Outreach Workers).
28. The Secure Stations scheme is a key aspect of tackling security incidents and also managing
perception of security for passengers, in particular by demonstrating an ongoing commitment to reasonably
manage security at station locations. Secure Stations (and indeed Safer Parking) clearly shows that the
operator will continue to look at reducing passenger and security related incidents and providing robust,
clean and reliable facilities for passenger use.

Is the Government’s approach to passenger safety in railway stations eVective?

29. The approach has been eVective for Merseyrail although this success is in response to a number of
factors detailed above. It is important that the governments approach continues to find ways to promote
environments for success as has been experienced on Merseyside.
31 March 2006

APPENDIX 14

Memorandum submitted by Arriva

1. Arriva
Arriva is one of the leading transport services organisations in Europe. With over 30,000 employees, we
operate buses and trains in the United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark, Holland and Germany and buses in
Spain, Portugal and Italy.
In the United Kingdom, Arriva operates the Arriva Trains Wales franchise and has previously operated
train franchises in the North of England, including Merseyside. Arriva is shortlisted for the South West
Trains franchise bid.
We are pleased to submit this report to the Committee’s enquiry into passenger safety at stations. We will
be happy to clarify any points that will assist the Committee with its enquiry.

2. ATOC
Arriva supports the submission provided by the Association of Train Operating Companies to this
investigation. In the remainder of this report, we oVer observations from our own experience.

3. Arriva Trains Wales

Since the start of our Arriva Trains Wales (ATW) franchise on 7 December 2003 much has been invested
in improving physical and perception of security on trains and at stations.
ATW manages its security work using an overarching strategy referred internally as the 5 “E”s—being:
— Evaluation (data collection and analysis).
— Education (both staV and the community).
— Enforcement (ensuring crime is dedicated and culprits apprehended).
Ev 116 Transport Committee: Evidence

— Enabling (providing resources and policies).

— Engineering (physical and design changes to reduce the problem).

4. Evaluation
ATW has improved its collection of data from staV by bringing roadshows to depots and mess rooms to
emphasise the importance of timely and accurate reporting and with the help of staV redesigning the
reporting forms and processes to enable them to report more easily. We have also established improved data
exchange processes with the British Transport Police (BTP) and Network Rail to improve intelligence
gathering.

5. Education
We have initiated a staV newsletter to improve communication on assaults and will soon be commencing
a schools competition to highlight to children the importance of safety on trains and at stations.
We have also worked with the BTP to improve knowledge of the impact of staV assaults with the Crown
Prosecution service.
ATW’s Adopt a Station programme now covers 110 stations across its network. Station adopters
comprise of individuals, groups and voluntary organisations and no financial commitment is required.
Adopters may do as little as complete a weekly survey form that includes reporting on issues such as graYti
and vandalism, which further facilities ATW’s ability to take the necessary remedial action to ensure anti-
social behaviour is quickly tackled and discouraged. Adopt a Station has successfully reduced anti-social
behaviour at unstaVed stations such as Gowerton where the adoption by the local community has led to a
substantial reduction in vandalism and where the car park is now safe to use.
Another good example where further community involvement has been achieved is at Mountain Ash in
the South Wales valleys. Mountain Ash has suVered in the past from vandalism and anti-social behaviour
caused by local teenagers. As part of ATW’s “Adopt a Station” programme, Mountain Ash has been
adopted by the local secondary school and a partnership has been put together involving the school, a feeder
primary school, ATW, British Transport Police and a private sponsor.
As well as involvement of ATW and BTP in school assemblies and research by the school’s Homework
Club into the station’s past and present, a “Keystart Project” was also set up which has involved school
pupils in clearing vegetation and improving the station’s physical appearance to make it appear less
threatening.

6. Enforcement
Recently, we have jointly funded with the BTP and the Welsh Assembly Government the recruitment of
21 Police Community Support (PCSOs) oYcers to work closely with the communities we serve to improve
crime detection and prevention and to help staV and passengers feel more safe and secure as they travel
around our network. We see this very much as enhancing the work done to date on improving security,
helping us to target known ‘hot spots’ and implement action plans to bring about clear improvements.
Making people feel more secure at stations will never be just about the further extension of technology
and the targeted deployment of enforcement oYcers. Recognising this, ATW has sought to engage with the
communities it serves as part of a holistic approach to station security and safety.
Working with the BTP and to support the new PCSO oYcers new police stations will be opening at
Pontypridd and Machynellth with ATW providing the accommodation for free.
In addition to the PCSOs ATW also fund 12 security guards on 2 of the more troublesome valley branch
lines to improve actual and the perception of security for staV and passengers. These security guards have
been successful in supporting staV and in moving problems oV the railway. Security guards have now also
been employed at a number of key stations for Friday and Saturday nights.
ATW have also supplied all front line staV with DNA swab kits to help assist in the detection of anti-
social behaviour.

7. Enabling
A key dimension in respect of issues around safety and security at stations is the risks involved for railway
staV themselves. During 2005 there were 143 reported physical and verbal assaults on ATW staV, as against
just three incidents of reported assaults on passengers. Assaults on staV have been an increasing trend in
recent years and ATW have established an Assaults Reduction Team (ART) with staV volunteers and their
own budget to reduce this problem and to reverse the trend.
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 117

Involvement of railway staV, who are represented on the ART, has played a critical role in the overall
process of tackling the problem. StaV suggestions have led to improving appropriate training and briefing
at induction and being made better aware of appropriate channels to come forward with information and
suggestions
ATW have also worked with managers and staV to extend its Chain of Care services to staV aVected by
assaults to enable them to feel more supported in the workplace on their return.
Perhaps the most important development occurred in February 2006 when ATW employed a dedicated
Security Manager. A senior ex-policeman, he is already having success in coordinating ATW’s security
eVorts both internally and with third parties and is driving forward ATW’s 5 E’s strategy.

8. Engineering
A jointly funded scheme with the Welsh Assembly Government has seen the extension of CCTV and Help
Points to 13 stations in North Wales. In addition, we have commenced the installation of on-train CCTV
across our train fleet which will be completed for spring 2007.
We have commenced trial with a “Mosquito” device at Treorchy station. This emits a high frequency
signal after 7 pm (audible to only those below 21 years of age) in the shelter area (where drug dealing and
other antisocial behaviour has been a persistent problem) to deter loitering. This is proving extremely
successful and we intend to trial a further device at another station.
As well as ATW funding a number of station lighting improvements we are working with Network Rail
to renew some old brick built shelters with modern shelters that while providing cover present a more open
aspect to reduce issues of hiding and criminal activity.

9. Conclusion
If the Committee would wish to have further information about any of these initiatives or would with to
inspect any of them, we will be happy to make the necessary arrangements.
3 April 2006

APPENDIX 15

Memorandum submitted by the City of London Corporation’s City Remembrancer’s OYce

Background
1. The City of London’s function as the world’s leading international financial and business centre is
heavily dependent upon having an eYcient and attractive transport system to move large numbers of people
daily. Rail access is vitally important as it is estimated that 82% of the 312,000 commuters who come to work
in the City each day travel by train or underground21. Jobs in the City attract people who live in outer
London and beyond, with approximately 30% of work trips to the City originating outside greater
London22. For those people, rail is the only public transport option, apart from a limited number of
commuter coaches. This high dependency on rail means that all issues aVecting rail travel to, and within,
London are of importance to the City of London Corporation.
2. A key objective of the City’s Community Strategy23 is to maximise the safety of all modes of transport,
including railway stations, and to work in partnership with the British Transport Police (BTP) and transport
operators to achieve improvements where necessary. Personal safety is important at all stations but is a
particularly critical issue at many of the suburban and rural stations used by City commuters on their
journeys to and from work. The City’s Good Transport Group (a forum of businesses, residents and
transport operators) has stressed the importance of improving actual and perceived safety at these stations,
particularly for workers who may start out early in the morning or return home after dark when many
stations are unstaVed. The City has supported bids for improving safety at suburban stations through its
membership of the Thames Gateway Partnership.
3. This submission has been drafted in conjunction with the City’s railway advisers, Transport
Interchange Consultants Ltd (TIC), who have developed a Station Investment Priority System to assist with
prioritising the implementation of security measures. As the majority of TIC’s relevant experience has been
on the smaller, suburban stations on the railway system, the thrust of this response is associated with this
type of station. Much of its substance appears, however, equally applicable to many of the stations on the
Tube and other railway systems.

21 2001 Census of Population, OYce of National Statistics.

22 ibid.
23 The City Together: A Vision for a World Class City.
Ev 118 Transport Committee: Evidence

Summary of Key Points

— It is necessary to diVerentiate between actual and perceived threat.
— A Priority Investment System is required to determine how investment in security systems can be
implemented in the most cost eVective manner.
— CCTV is frequently not eYciently used at present.
— CCTV is best controlled from central points.
— Investment in retail, catering and commercial facilities at and adjacent to stations can increase
their use and reduces the cost to the railways of longer staV hours.
— At the smaller and unmanned stations, platform furniture and shelters should be grouped around
platform entrances.
— Abandoned, vandalised and derelict structures are seen as threatening and should therefore be
removed.
— Where platforms and the serving road are at diVerent levels, safety can be improved by waiting for
the train, in purpose built shelters on the street pavement.
— Stations should be better integrated with their hinterland by upgrading the feeder footpath systems
and making them more secure.
— Car parks and cycle shelters should be made secure.
— The industry needs to accept that investment in security measures yield real benefits and such
benefits need to be better understood.
— In principle, target standards are probably satisfactory. In some areas, however, due to shortage
of funds and other factors, it appears that little is being achieved in reaching such standards.
— Due to a lack of investment in systems and police resources there is insuYcient policing in many
areas.
— The passenger should be able to contact the appropriate organisation from the platform in a crisis.
— A shortage of funds and lack of an eVective priority system means that not enough is being done
in the creation of secure stations.
— To achieve cost eVective investment, there needs to be greater co-ordination between railways and
local government.

Responses to Specific Questions

What are the most cost eVective methods of making railway and underground stations safer for passengers?
4. Many suburban and rural stations are lonely places, particularly after dark. However, it is important
to diVerentiate between the passenger’s perception of danger and the actual real risk of assault or theft.
Passenger surveys indicate that passengers feel more secure when they are aware of the full range of
operational safety systems and when a member of staV is present. The Station Investment Priority System
(SIPS) indicates that the most cost eVective measures are electronic security measures and additional staV.
The aim must be to give staV the ability to eVectively ensure that the station is a safer place, thus they must
be able to control and utilise the station security systems in the most eYcient manner.
5. Currently many CCTV systems are not monitored and rarely link to the comprehensive town centre
systems operated by so many local authorities. This view is echoed by the recent Guidance Note on CCTV24,
which quoted from a recent report of the London Assembly’s Transport Committee—“We were
disappointed to learn that CCTV systems are often not monitored and do not connect to the comprehensive
systems now operated by local authorities. Often the technology does not permit them to work together and
glaring holes are left in the security net. We strongly recommend that the rail operators and local councils
coordinate their activities more eVectively in future”25.
6. Benefits can be derived from CCTV systems being tied into a comprehensive monitoring network
which also includes the provision, Public Address (PA), Help Points (HP) and Computer Information
Systems (CIS) at each station. In the longer term, the network would ideally be controlled from one or two
central points. In the shorter term, however, there would be merit in 4 or 5 station units being set up, with
control of other stations from one of these. This level, whilst quite expensive operationally does allow for
a measure of local control. The combined use of CCTV and PA systems by the operative is considered the
most eVective way of deterring crime and vandalism. Where this approach is used on some stations in south
London, it allows the operative to “talk” to mostly young people to deter antisocial behaviour before it
occurs. This sense of a controlling presence gives other passengers a feeling of security. If “the controller”

24 ATOC/BTP/Network Rail Guidance Note—‘CCTV for Stations—Functional, Technical and Operational Requirements.’
Version 1—Issued March 2006.
25 “Crime and Safety at London’s Suburban Railway Stations”, Transport Committee of the Greater London Assembly, Greater
London Authority, January 2006.
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 119

can also be identified and is available on the Help Point system, this again inspires confidence in the security
system. Such “key” or control stations can also be the recipients of the “focus facilities”, which are discussed
further below.
7. Focus facilities are directed at increasing activity at the station. This can be done by a number of
methods in creating a “focus station”. In the first instance, the purpose is simply to increase the number of
passengers using the system and being around or on the platform. The broader aspect of a focus station is
the siting of activities adjacent to the station, such as newsagents, catering activities, small food stores, dry-
cleaners, flower shops and a series of facilities which appeal and are useful to the commuter, both male and
female. This could also include taxi companies, medical centres, dentists and children’s crèches/nursery
schools. This last group oVers additional facilities to the commuter, so increasing passenger use. They also
appeal to people not using the trains, thus generating more activity around the station.
8. If it is possible to attract additional activities, it could generate commercial pressures for the operators
of these services to keep such facilities open whilst passengers are using the station. It would therefore be
possible to have staV around at little additional cost to the railway. In such situations, the railway could
consider the possible franchising out of ticket sales to the company running the catering facilities or the
newsagents or any one of the activities already mentioned. In some cases organisations such as supermarkets
or local hotel chains have bought up old goods yards adjacent to stations and it is possible to liaise with such
organisations, with a view to increasing facilities for commuters.
9. At its simplest level, which is that appropriate to many of the stations on the railway network, it is
suggested that stations should provide integrated booking, waiting and catering facilities perhaps with
minimal retail sales. If toilets are to be provided, they should lead oV the central area. Clearly visible within
this central waiting area should be the various safety systems to which we have referred. Such a facility
should remain open and staVed whilst the station is open and there should be clear arrival and departure
information that encourages waiting at night to take place in this area. Advice on the PA system should
allow time for passengers to move out to either the adjacent platform or to cross to the opposite platform.
It is preferable to group the platform facilities around the entrance to the platform, particularly at the
smaller and frequently unstaVed stations. This leads to a sense of togetherness and thus security, especially
during the night. This area should be particularly well lit and contain the various safety and information
features which we recommend at all stations. All shelters should principally be constructed of see through
materials.
10. Any form of dereliction, unnecessary and threatening buildings and vandalism immediately create a
feeling of danger. Wherever feasible, these should be removed as soon as possible and the platform facilities
made as simple and elegant as possible. Good design is a necessary part in the creation of a feeling of security.
11. Many station platforms are either above or below the adjacent road network. Such platforms are
often out of sight of the road and the neighbouring properties and are thus particularly threatening at night.
This acts as a deterrent for many people, especially women, who will not venture near such stations at night,
particularly if the platform has a single entrance at one end. In such cases, if the pavement is wide enough,
an “Interchange Lounge” (IL) could be incorporated, which can be located on the main road pavement next
to the station entrance(s). This can be for either rail passengers or bus and rail passengers, if there is an
adjacent bus stop. The IL is equipped with all the necessary Security and Information systems.
Announcements are scheduled to allow time to access the appropriate platform, and the ramp and platform
lights are turned up a few minutes before the train arrival time.
12. Better integration of the station into its hinterland, can also improve the safety of walk in passengers.
This is best achieved by resurfacing footpaths, cutting back overhanging and threatening undergrowth,
providing lighting and if considered necessary, CCTV cameras. Where main walk in routes cross well-used
roads, adequate pedestrian facilities should be provided. The concept of tying the station into its hinterland
and better involving the local users will increase activity at the station. Reduction of walk in times and
improved safety on the walk in route can have as big an impact on patronage as increasing train frequency.
Involvement of the local user group in the operation and upgrade of the station also improves the
relationship with the local community. It may be the case that if basic designs, such as murals, can be
undertaken by local schoolchildren, a sense of local ownership is established, which reduces vandalism
considerably. As vandalism is perceived as threatening, this reduction also improves safety, or at least the
sense of safety.
13. Finally, it is important to make all parking, both for cars and cycles, secure. Too many stations have
available but apparently under-utilised car and cycle parking spaces. Further enquiry yields the reply that
cars or bikes are unsafe at that location. However, if the park has the full security measures installed and is
registered as secure, car parking and cycle storage is usually taken up.
14. To ensure the use of “the most cost eVective methods” requires that there be a system to demonstrate
that one investment is more cost eVective than another. This develops a Priority Rating (PR) for each
measure by combining a social impact factor and an economic factor, which, in turn, is dependent on station
flow, elasticity of the particular measure and its cost. The system develops a PR for each investment measure,
so allowing a relative priority to be established.
Ev 120 Transport Committee: Evidence

15. The gains from investment in improved security measures are referred to in the Association of Train
Operating Companies (ATOC) Passenger Demand Forecasting Handbook (PDFH). There is, however, still
some scepticism over the results, as it is diYcult to quantify the actual financial and social gains, which such
individual investment measures do generate. Hence the relationships need to be more carefully researched
in order that government, railway operators and local authorities accept the results. As well as increasing
patronage, improved security can act to reduce vandalism and thus the cost of repair. It also has the eVect
of reducing turnover of station staV. Many booking clerks have been assaulted and the fear of coming to
work at a vandalised station is substantial and stressful. It would be preferable if the assessment of
investment benefits could include the reduced repair costs and the eVect of the improved working conditions
for staV.
16. It is stressed that for any investment to be made on a cost eVective basis, there must be adequate
funding, investments must be sensibly prioritised and all the interested parties must work together for the
entire period of development and implementation.

Are the minimum standards to provide a safe and secure environment high enough . . . ?
17. On paper the standards are suYcient. There is, however, a shortage of funds and there seems to be
no logic in the order in which existing funds are made. Whilst the standards may be suYcient, therefore,
little is actually being achieved in some areas, resulting in standards not being met. As noted in response to
the first question, a relatively simple system for prioritising investments at stations has been developed and
it is suggested that this or any other appropriate system be adopted in an attempt to prioritise investment
within and between stations on a logical basis.

Are the minimum standards eVectively policed . . . ?

18. Minimum standards are arguably not eVectively policed, as there is not yet suYcient investment in
staYng at stations, electronic security and information systems, station infrastructure or the BTP. If the
approach to prioritise investment outlined above can be implemented, then the travelling public might begin
to perceive that railway stations are becoming safer.

Is it suYciently clear to passengers and others who is responsible for the safety of passengers in stations?
19. It is considered that the passenger is unconcerned about who is responsible for security. What is
arguably more important however is the knowledge of how to contact the organisation, which is responsible
at the time of an emergency. They also need to know who to contact when they need to follow up on any
particular issue. All stations require clearly indicated Help Points and beside the Help Point, a clear set of
contact numbers indicating the number to be contacted for information and in an emergency.

Why are so few stations accredited under the Secure Stations Scheme. Should the scheme be made compulsory?
20. There are not enough funds and no priority system. Hence those involved in the upgrade process are
frequently overwhelmed and very little is acheived. Until there is a logical process for ranking investment,
and funding is made available, little will continue to be achieved. It is suggested that until suYcient funds
are made available, the scheme should not be made compulsory.
21. A summary of the main conclusions are included in the Annex.
March 2006 Annex

Main Conclusions
(i) A useful factor in improving the future safety of passengers and the reduction in their perception
of fear is by the integration of stations with a range of catering, retail and commercial activities
which increase activity in and around the station area and thereby result in longer manning hours
at little cost to the railway. Wherever this is considered to be feasible, the railway and the local
authority should work together to achieve this goal.
(ii) Electronic security systems should be installed at all stations and run from central control points
but integrated with local authority systems.
(iii) Stations should be better integrated into their hinterland by upgrading lighting, opening up new
pedestrian links, clearing undergrowth, providing CCTV surveillance and better defining
pedestrian crossings on the main feeder walk in routes.
(iv) All threatening structures, dereliction and vandalism should be removed.
(v) At smaller and unmanned ‘stations, shelters and seats, information and security infrastructure
should, whenever feasible, be grouped around the platform entrance/exit, which should be well lit.
This provides a focus for waiting passengers, particularly at night.
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 121

(vi) Where platforms are well below or above the local main road and are thus hidden from
surrounding properties, it is advised, if feasible, that waiting for trains should take place in purpose
built Interchange Lounges at pavement level.
(vii) Car parks and cycle storage should be made secure.
(viii)Local user and amenity groups should become involved and local schools could be asked to play
a role in designing murals on station approaches.
(ix) Investment must be formally prioritised.
(x) Further development is required to understand the quantifiable benefits of investment in security
measures. The railway industry and government should adopt the output of this work.
(xi) The railway industry and local government should work closely together to eYciently implement
the security measures in a systematic and prioritised fashion.
(xii) SuYcient funds need to be available to allow the industry to better meet the existing security
standards.

APPENDIX 16

Memorandum submitted by the Mayor of London

Summary
1. Investment in personal safety and security on London’s transport network by the Mayor and
Transport for London (TfL) has helped create a safer and more secure environment for both passengers and
staV. This has been particularly eVective on the networks directly controlled by TfL and has helped create
a low crime environment which is eVectively policed by uniformed staV focussed on the transport network.
2. It is disappointing that the Train Operating Companies (TOCs) are dragging their heels in this area,
relying on Transport for London to fund the safety improvements that their passengers require. For
example, in 2005–06 TfL contributed to 93% of the total capital investment on infrastructure improvements
such as CCTV and help points on the National Rail network. In addition, over the last 18 months TfL has
invested over £3 million in enhanced visible policing on the Silverlink network. It is essential that the TOCs
take responsibility for the safety of their passengers and provide the necessary resources to deliver the
passenger safety measures required.
3. The Mayor and TfL believe that a compulsory standard should be introduced to govern security issues
on the rail network and this should replace the current Secure Stations Scheme. Consideration should also
be given to integrating this standard with current Transec regulations and the extension of these standards
where appropriate to other parts of the transport network such as buses and bus stations. The transport
industry will need to be consulted fully on the development of the standards. They would need to take into
account the impact of costs on the transport industry and should allow for appropriate local discretion. The
emphasis should be on self-assurance/audit, i.e. the operator manages the risk.
4. While the current requirements of the Secure Stations Scheme are not fully appropriate, the scheme
provides a useful building block to develop a more appropriate and compulsory standard that will deliver
a safer transport system for passengers and staV.

Background
5. The Mayor and Transport for London (TfL) have a strategic interest in security on the whole of
London’s transport network, and a direct operational role in running the London Underground (LU) and
Docklands Light Railway (DLR). In addition, from November 2007 TfL will take over responsibility for
the North London Railway (NLR), and the Mayor may give instructions or guidance to the Franchising
Director in relation to the provision of railway services in Greater London.
6. The Mayor and TfL have actively invested in policing London’s transport system and currently pay
for over 2,000 uniformed police oYcers with specific responsibilities for patrolling TfL systems. This
investment in visible policing has been supported by further security investment in infrastructure such as
CCTV and help points. Working closely with police partners, TfL transport services are places where
passengers and staV are both reasonably secure and also perceive themselves to be secure. For example in
2004–05 there was less than one robbery a day on the entire LU system, a system which carries over 3 million
passengers a day.
7. In addition, TfL has invested significantly in the national rail network even though it does not have
direct responsibility for this. Over the last 18 months TfL has invested over £3m in enhanced visible policing
on the Silverlink network and over the past two years £20m in infrastructure improvements such as CCTV
and help points on the overground network as a whole, in order to help address security concerns.
Ev 122 Transport Committee: Evidence

What are the most eVective methods of making railway and Underground stations safer for passengers?
8. Clear strategic responsibility for safety and security issues on a transport network is a pre-requisite to
eVective delivery of a safe system for passengers and staV. The Mayor and TfL’s role over much of London’s
transport network has helped deliver consistent safety and security measures that have enhanced safety and
security on the network. This ensures delivery of a single and coherent investment programme for the
network, which is a situation that has not previously been in place on the overground network, other than
for specific investment issues driven by TfL London Rail.
9. TfL consider (drawing on its experience of on LU/DLR) that available and visible staV and uniformed
police oYcers are a key factor in positively influencing the perception of safety and security. In addition, the
implementation of integrated security systems including Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(CPTED) principles help in creating a feeling of a controlled and managed environment. TfL implements
these principles wherever appropriate on its rail networks, including:
— highly visible staV deployed in a manner appropriate to the transport system;
— maintaining low levels of ticketless travel;
— enforcement of byelaws and railway legislation;
— clearly defined delineation between public and semi- public space;
— clear signage;
— passenger Help Points on every platform and at every entrance—this is important to enable urgent/
emergency contact with a staV member who can take action required;
— 24/7 CCTV linked to a central control;
— CCTV to Home OYce/ATOC CCTV guideline standard;
— on train CCTV;
— good lighting levels;
— clear lines of sight on platforms;
— minimising areas of concealment (people and objects);
— mirrors to see around corners;
— clean stations and trains;
— improved, passenger friendly waiting accommodation;
— removing graYti as quickly as possible; and
— working in partnership with a responsive and accountable police force.
10. These principles are supported by actively working with the criminal justice agencies to eVectively
deal with the perpetrators of crime and disorder, full engagement with local boroughs, targeted deployment
of police resources and eVective use of anti social behaviour orders which will all contribute to making the
network more secure for passengers.
11. TfL/LU also operates a very successful Crime Reduction Partnership Unit with the British Transport
Police (BTP) who implement a problem solving approach to crime and disorder issues on the network,
undertake specific crime reduction projects on the network and liase closely with local Crime and Disorder
partnerships, staV, passengers and the local community.

Are the minimum standards to provide a safe and secure station environment high enough?

12. There are no overarching minimum standards for the transport network in this area and this is a
situation that should be rectified. The Secure Stations Scheme is voluntary and should be considered as being
a building block for any future compulsory standard rather than meeting the need in this area.
13. There are minimum requirements laid down by DfT Transport Security Division (Transec) for
preventative security measures (counter-terrorism) and a number of standards developed by particular parts
of the industry. For example, LU has well developed standards built into their design specifications for
stations.
14. The Mayor and TfL believe that a compulsory standard should be introduced to govern safety and
security issues on the rail network and this should replace the current Secure Stations Scheme. Consideration
should also be given to integrating this standard with current Transec regulations and the extension of these
standards where appropriate to other parts of the transport network such as buses and bus stations. This
standard should cover the types of issues outlined in paragraph nine of our submission above.
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 123

Are the requirements suYciently clear and specific to be eVective? If not what changes should be made?
15. As outlined in paragraph 12 above, current requirements are voluntary. A compulsory standard
should be introduced to govern safety and security issues on the rail network, which will also need to be
clearly communicated.
16. However, communication from the DfT in relation to the Secure Station Scheme and related safety
and security issues has improved noticeably over the past few years.

Are the minimum standards eVectively policed?

17. TfL considers that the limited minimum standards that are in place are not eVectively policed.

Are the penalties for failing to provide a secure station environment suYciently severe?
18. Given that the Secure Station Scheme is voluntary and is not included as a contractual requirement
in many rail franchises there are no consequent direct penalties. In addition, the concept of a ‘secure station
environment’ is not specifically defined in terms that can be applied across the network.
19. However, it would be possible to develop a contractual model that deals with this issue. For the new
DLR franchise there is a requirement for the passenger perception of safety and security score to be above
a set target or the franchisee is financially penalised.
20. In addition, TfL London Rail, as part of the NLR concession, aims to include an enhanced standard
of safety and security incorporating the principles outlined in paragraph nine above.

Is it suYciently clear to passengers and others whom is responsible for the safety of passengers in railway and
underground stations?
21. On the DLR and London Underground, the answer is yes. This results from a combination of the
corporate image through the LUL/DLR logo, station design and signage. Where there is clear ownership
of a station there is little doubt who is responsible.
22. However, there is some confusion on the overground network due to the number of train operating
companies (TOCs) involved and the lack of clarity for the public of the ownership of some rail stations. Clear
strategic responsibility for safety and security issues on a transport network is a pre-requisite to eVective
delivery of a safe system for passengers and staV. TfL is well placed to provide this within London and the
current DfT consultation published on the 9 March will look at a change in responsibilities for London’s
rail network. This consultation requests views on extending the Mayor’s powers on specific rail services that
run beyond the London boundary, the scope of those powers, and the appropriate governance
arrangements. This proposal would allow the development of clear lines of responsibility for policing and
personal safety and security on the overground network. Whilst the responsibility (in legal terms) for the
personal safety and security of passengers on any franchise that TfL may control will rest with the concession
operator, i.e. the TOC chosen to operate the franchise, TfL will insist on higher standards being achieved.

Why are so few stations accredited under the Secure Stations Scheme?
23. The Secure Stations Scheme was a genuine attempt to introduce security guidelines to the rail industry
where there were none before.[m2] However, the scheme has a number of flaws:
— It is a voluntary scheme and is not consistently built into contractual requirements.
— Originally the required passenger surveys were too onerous and expensive.
— It is too heavily weighted in regard to the overall perception percentage score. In its current form
it does not truly reflect passenger perceptions. For example, the underlying reasons why people
feel unsafe.* It does not deal with security issues on rolling stock.
— The crime levels used make no distinction between serious and non-serious crime. This can allow
an operator to gain accreditation even when suVering a proportion of serious oVences such as rape
or robbery if the ratio is still below 1:20,000 oVences.
— Generally the weightings within the standard need further consideration. It is possible to be
awarded Secure Stations certification when the station may still have significant safety and security
issues. More weight must be given to pro-active security measures such as 24 hour CCTV.
24. The most important elements of personal safety are the perceptions of passengers and the presence
of high-visible staV at all times. Again, it is our view that no station should be considered for a Safe Station
award unless:
— The majority of passengers using that station believe it to be safe.
Ev 124 Transport Committee: Evidence

— The actions of staV on the station are audited. In other words, whilst the scheme recognises that
staV presence is important, it does not diVerentiate between a member of staV located in a ticket
oYce who cannot, or does not, see what is going on at the station, and a member of staV (or police)
who is highly visible and on a platform (which is where passengers want them to be).

Should the scheme be made compulsory?

25. Not in its present form.
26. A compulsory standard should be introduced to govern safety and security issues on the rail network
and this should replace the current Secure Stations Scheme. The current scheme provides a useful building
block in the development of a new scheme. The principles outlined in paragraph nine above should be
included in any new scheme. The scheme should encompass the rail system as a whole and incorporate the
whole journey, including station infrastructure and rolling stock.
27. In addition, the potential for diVerent levels of certification/accreditation should be considered
dependent on the type of network being considered. For example, appropriate safety and security standards
for LU stations maybe slightly diVerent from those appropriate for a small overground suburban station.
It is imperative however, that the standards are integrated and included in a single scheme.
28. Any scheme should be mandatory within any new franchises and should, if possible, be
retrospectively applied to all franchises. For example there could be a three-year timeframe of compliance
(eg Year 1—50% compliance, Year 2—75% and Year 3—100% compliance).
29. As part of this process, consideration should also be given to integrating this standard with current
Transec regulations and the extension of these standards where appropriate to other parts of the transport
network such as buses and bus stations. It is important that this process fully engages the bus industry and
other key stakeholders.

What measures would be required to ensure significant improvements in passengers’ safety in railway and
Underground stations?
30. Actual crime levels are relatively low on LU and DLR, which are one of the most managed public
spaces in London. Often the perception of safety and security is driven by external factors eg 9/11, Madrid
bombings, media coverage.
31. The introduction of a compulsory scheme as described in previous paragraphs and governance
arrangement as outlined in paragraphs five to eight would assist in delivering these improvements.
32. Specific standards that should apply as a minimum, can be summarised as:
— 24 hour CCTV linked to a central control.
— Passenger Help Points on every platform and at every entrance—this is important to enable
urgent/emergency contact with a staV member who can take action required:
— enhanced lighting levels;
— clear Lines of Sight integral to design;
— improved, passenger friendly waiting accommodation; and
— high visible staYng appropriate to mode.
33. Overall, all stations should have these and they should be a mandatory requirement for any revised
Safer Station Scheme. When TfL assumes responsibility for the North London railway these standards will
be mandatory and fully audited.

Is the Government’s approach to passenger safety in railway stations eVective?

34. As mentioned throughout this document, there is a lack of a clear compulsory standard.
35. The creation of a single responsible body for running London’s transport network is a vital element
of delivering a safe and secure environment in railway stations. A clearly responsible organisation for
security in London (such as TfL) complemented by the creation of a single client function for transport
policing in London would fully support the development of a safer and more secure network in the capital.
Improving personal security is too important a matter to be left to the choice for operators.
5 April 2006
 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 125

APPENDIX 17

Memorandum submitted by The Evening Standard

1. The Murder of Tom ap Rhys Pryce
The Evening Standard launched a campaign calling for a radical improvement in passenger safety at
stations across London following the murder of Tom ap Rhys Pryce.
The 31-year-old lawyer was stabbed to death shortly after leaving unmanned Kensal Green station on his
way home on the evening of 12 January. The two men later arrested and charged with Mr Pryce’s murder
had earlier been captured on CCTV leaving the deserted station after they had robbed a man on the
platform.
Within half an hour they launched a ferocious attack on Mr Pryce as he walked home from the station
after a night out. He was apparently selected by the muggers as “rich pickings” because he was wearing a
smart suit and overcoat.

2. London’s Empty Stations

Spurred by this horrific murder our Safer Stations campaign highlighted how at least 229 stations across
Greater London are left unstaVed for all or part of the day. This amounts to two-thirds of stations in the
London region, the vast majority of them small suburban stations used by hundreds of thousands of
commuters every weekday.
More than 30 stations are never manned, dozens more have staV only during the morning peak or until
lunchtime.
After dark even stations in some of the most desirable part of London can seem forbidding for lone
travellers, especially women and the elderly. Further, those parts of London where you are least likely to
meet a train company employee in the evening are often those most notorious for high levels of crime. These
include Silverlink stations such as Harlesden and Kensal Green, parts of south London such as Streatham
and Eltham and east London crime hotspots including Hackney.
The paper discovered that one stretch of Silverlink’s network—through Tottenham, Walthamstow and
Leytonstone—had eight unmanned stations in a row. This sorry state of aVairs comes despite the £130
million a year profit made by the 10 London rail firms, who have enjoyed a Government subsidy of £2.2
billion since rail privatisation a decade ago.

3. “It’s no Way to Travel in the 21st Century”—Silverlink Passenger

As part of our campaign the Standard called for all of London’s stations be manned until the last train
has left. The call won the enthusiastic support of thousands of readers, many of whom experience the
intimidating atmosphere of unmanned and neglected stations ever day. We were deluged with e-mails and
letters from rail passengers highlighting the often dire condition of their local station and demanding action
from the rail companies.
Asif Begum, a postman from Walthamstow, said of Walthamstow Queens Road: “Most of the stations
around this part of London are unmanned. It’s ridiculous. You hear about muggings all the time, both on
the platforms and on the trains. There needs to be more security to protect the passenger.” Sian Hickmott,
of Bromley, said of Shortlands station: “Crime in the area is rising. There’s no way I would feel safe
wandering on to this platform alone at night. It’s just too dangerous a risk to take.”
Birgit Moller, said of Silverlink’s Gunnersbury station: “Every week somebody is attacked round here.
More staV would make a diVerence.”

4. The Political Response

Public backing for our campaign was echoed by support from politicians at all levels.
More than fifty MPs backed the campaign, including energy minister and Croydon North MP Malcolm
Wicks, who said: “In the evenings stations are often desolate and many of my constituents, not just women,
are fearful about travelling.” Vauxhall MP Kate Hoey said: “CCTV cameras will help, but they will never
replace a real person.”
On February 14 London Mayor Ken Livingstone announced that all 50 Silverlink stations would be
manned from November 2007, once he takes over responsibility for the company’s routes. He said his “first
priority” will be station safety and security.
Mr Livingstone’s pledge meant that for the first time in decades an entire line on the commuter network
would have a visible staV presence throughout the hours of the timetable.
The Mayor attacked as “obscene” the failure of the rail companies to provide staV for all their London
stations while trains are running.
Ev 126 Transport Committee: Evidence

Mr Livingstone’s attack was followed by a promise from Transport Secretary Alistair Darling to improve
security on the railways and at stations. In an interview with the Evening Standard he said: “I think there
has to be a radical change in gear towards improving safety and security at stations. There are stations where
people have tolerated things for too long.”
Mr Darling said that passengers would begin to feel more secure as measures come in to improve policing,
increase staYng levels and deter muggers and pickpockets. The measures, designed to fall into pike over the
next couple of years as the various franchises come up for renewal or tender, include:
— A review of the British Transport Police (BTP) to “refocus” on a perception of safety.
— Tough new security standards covering staYng, policing and CCTV to be incorporated into
contracts every time a franchise is renewed or put out to tender.
— StaV to be encouraged to be more visible at stations and the installation of more entrance barriers
at outlying stations to deter muggers from lurking inside.
However, Mr Darling refused to order that all stations be manned while trains are running, saying there
were sometimes better ways to make passengers safer.
He said: “I support the Standard campaign to make train travel safer but I think there’s a variety of ways
you can do it. StaYng is important but it isn’t the whole answer.”

5. Rail Companies Split over Staffing

In a major victory for London’s rail passengers Chiltern Railways became the first of the capital’s rail
companies to announce it would staV its stations until the last train leaves.
On February 17 it announced security guards would immediately begin to patrol its four London stations:
Sudbury Hill in Harrow, Harrow Road, Wembley Stadium and Northolt Park.
In a statement Chiltern said: “We recognise there is considerable public anxiety in London in relation to
unstaVed stations after dark.
“We will therefore be reviewing all security features. While this process is ongoing we will ensure a security
presence patrolling at these stations during the hours of darkness while trains are in service and we will
examine options for permanent staYng as part of this review.”
Chiltern’s move was followed by a warning from the Department of Transport to South West Trains that
it would have to hire more staV or risk losing its franchise, which is up for renewal next year.
In a further significant breakthrough Brent council announced it had secured a ground-breaking
agreement with Silverlink over late-night staYng of stations. Following public pressure Brent obtained a
commitment from the rail company at the heart of the Standard’s campaign that it would work with
Network Rail, the Met police and the British Transport Police to ensure a uniformed presence at its stations
at night.
Silverlink agreed to train two security guards at Kensal Green in how to use ticket barriers which it says
will stop vandals and muggers getting access to the station after ticket oYce staV have finished their shifts.
The company has also pledged to provide security guards at Queens Park station and as part of the
agreement the Met has oVered to use Wembley Central-as a base for its Safer Neighbourhood team of
oYcers in the area.
However, despite the positive reaction of Chiltern and Silverlink and the strong support of the public,
London’s other rail companies have so-far refused to consider night-time staYng. They are South West
Trains, First Great Western Link, Southern Railway, WAGN and Thameslink. This appeared to fly in the
face of evidence to your own committee from the head of British Transport Police, Chief Constable Ian
Johnston, who said the public clearly wanted to see stations staVed and that evidence showed crime falls
where there are more uniformed staV present. As he stated: “In places where there are no other people
around, people are quite frightened. Having other people around helps people feel safer.”
April 2006

Printed in the United Kingdom by The Stationery OYce Limited

336994 5/2006 19585