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German Desert Defense Tactics WWII

The document describes the evolution of German defensive tactics in North Africa from improvised laagers to elaborate fortified positions anchored by artillery and anti-aircraft guns from May to June 1941. It details the construction of two strongpoints, Points 206 and 196, to support Fort Capuzzo in mid-May. On the small unit level, positions were built in triangular "triplex" arrangements of foxholes to maximize fields of fire and mutual support.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
247 views4 pages

German Desert Defense Tactics WWII

The document describes the evolution of German defensive tactics in North Africa from improvised laagers to elaborate fortified positions anchored by artillery and anti-aircraft guns from May to June 1941. It details the construction of two strongpoints, Points 206 and 196, to support Fort Capuzzo in mid-May. On the small unit level, positions were built in triangular "triplex" arrangements of foxholes to maximize fields of fire and mutual support.

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Vaggelis
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GHQ, 28100 Woodside Road, Shorewood, MN 55331 USA • (612) 374-2693 • www.ghqmodels.

com
January - February 2001 Modeling Excellence Since 1967

German Desert Defensive Tactics:


The Gazala Battles, May & June 1941
T he US Army Intelligence Branch On 7 May, the commander of the 15th During the nights of 8/9 May, the Meduaaur
originally published the source material for Panzer Division issued a back-to-basics salient was fortified in depth with heavy
this article during World War II. The intelli- directive for defensive preparations. weapons support. The salient's garrison
gence report was republished by the US Because of the vast area assigned to 15th consisted of one infantry battalion, with two
Marine Corps prior to its commitment into Panzer Division, the usual line of companies in reserve. The British probed
the Persian Gulf. Vorgeschobene Stellungen (advanced posi- Meduaaur on 17 May, attacking a Stützpunkt
tions) were placed only where the enemy on the German left flank. Two German
The German Army's sound defensive sys- could approach undetected. The first defen- companies, falling back to their antitank
tem, developed during the latter half of the sive zone extended to a depth of 550 yards, ditches after the perimeter was pierced by
First World War, was modified to meet the flanked by heavy machine guns with eche- enemy armor, managed to repulse the
special conditions of desert warfare. "Fine loned antitank guns. Behind this zone stood British. The British rallied for a second
tuned" would be a better term, because the the reserve formations - one or two sections attack, but were defeated by a counterat-
basic principals of the 1918 doctrine to each company, one company to each bat- tacking tank company from the armored
remained intact. talion. To camouflage the work, dummy reserve.
positions were erected, landmarks were
1. Effective fire is more important than cover. removed or shuffled, and radio masts were In the days following, further orders, ema-
2. The defense is to wear down an attack cut to one or two yards to conceal headquarters. nating from corps-level, directed 15th
before launching a counterattack. Panzer Division to prepare for "a long peri-
3. Aggressive and effective reconnais-
sance must be used to discover enemy
intentions and screen one's own positions.
4. A mutually supporting fire plan must
cover the entire front.
5. Most covering fire should be concen-
trated on the Stützpunkt [strongpoint], posi-
tioned in favorable terrain along a likely
axis of enemy attack.

In the African Campaign's early slash and


dash stages, the Germans gave virtually no
thought to prepared defensive positions.
During rest stops, each unit erected its own
temporary laager ringed with a single linear
perimeter. This sufficed as long as the
Germans held the strategic initiative, but the
failure to reduce Tobruk swung the tide to
the British. Thus, the Germans were forced
to address the measures necessary for a pro- BA Photograph
longed period of defensive warfare.
Several artillery observation posts.
Gun positions for one or two artillery bat-
teries.
Advanced point.
One reconnaissance section in foxholes.

In the following weeks fortification efforts


escalated. Reconnaissance and localized
attacks consolidated and conformed the
front to the most favorable terrain possible.
This rendered some strongpoint points
redundant, but others were considerably
strengthened. Positions previously defend-
ed by platoons and companies, became bat-
talion and even regimental strongpoints.
Promised reinforcements, particularly artillery
and antiaircraft artillery began to arrive.

During this period two seminal aspects of


German desert defense emerged. First, bat-
talion fortifications were anchored by
groups or batteries of high-velocity dual-
purpose guns, such as the famous "88" or
Italian 75mm and 90mm anti-aircraft guns.
(It is interesting to note that all vehicle
parks were ordered placed a mile to the
rear, with the exception being prime movers
for the guns. These were dug-in within the
gun emplacements.) Secondly, on the
squad and platoon level, trenches and
strongpoints were built as "triplices." The
term first appears in a report detailing the
works of Machine Gun Battalion 8. All
weapons, stated the commanding officer,
are placed in half-moon triplices, with one
heavy machine gun in the center with two
light machine guns connected by crawl
trenches 33 yards away. This principle was
seized upon by corps command. Orders
National Archinves Photograph
were issued to modify existing positions,
od of defense." Immediately a reconnais- One heavy mortar section. with very specific standards. The squad
sance headquarters of four officers was Three 37mm and One 50mm antitank guns. position, designed in part by Rommel him-
tasked to scout and select suitable ground Three 20mm and One 88mm antiaircraft guns. self, consisted of a triangular arrangement
for fortification around Fort Capuzzo. On One artillery observation post and an alter- of three foxholes with a 50-meter front.
20 May construction of two Stützpunkte native OP. One of the foxholes housed a heavy weapon
supporting Fort Capuzzo commenced, one such as an antitank rifle, heavy machine
at Point 206 and another at Point 196. The Point 196: gun, or an 81mm mortar. Flanking the
garrisons considered necessary to hold the heavy weapons pit and connected to it by
Stützpunkte were: One infantry company. communication trenches, were two pits
One heavy machine gun platoon. housing light machine guns. Each pit had a
Point 206: One heavy mortar section. 360o arc of fire. The "Rommel Triangle"
One light infantry gun battery. was then expanded into a "trefoil" concept
Two infantry companies. Thirteen 37mm and One 50mm antitank guns. of platoon, company and battalion
One heavy machine gun platoon. Three 20-mm antiaircraft guns. Stützpunkte, with three squad triplices form-
ing a platoon triplice, three platoons to a By now the Meduaaur salient was the As usual, defense plans involved the prepa-
company, and so on up the organizational responsibility of the 15th Schutzen Brigade. ration of a counterattack, this time on the
chain. In larger Stützpunkte, the command The brigade's elements were disposed into right flank with two rifle companies, tanks,
posts of the infantry, field artillery, and three sectors - one battalion of Schutzen antitank guns, and the usual reserve compa-
88mm guns were close together because Regiment 104 (left), one battalion of ny. Flanking the salient on the right, was
long communication trenches tended to Schutzen Regiment 115 (center), and one the Italian Armored Division Ariete.
weaken a position by thinning out the battalion of Schutzen Regiment 115 (right). Apparently the Germans were dissatisfied
defending troops. Furthermore, long unde- The other companies were held in reserve, salient on 20 June. There were groups of
fended trenches provided handy cover for as was one battalion of Panzer Antitank weapons extending all the way back to bat-
enemy troops. Regiment 5, which was south of brigade talion headquarters; the light machine guns
headquarters. The Antitank Battalion 39, were thinned out in the front line until there
In accordance to these new orders, Engineer one company of the Antitank Battalion 33, was only one each 110 yards; the antitank
Battalion 33 set to work on 19 May on the and one company of the Antitank Battalion guns were placed at 330-yard intervals;
Meduaaur salient. Besides taking part in 605 - a total of 50 antitank guns -were allot- company frontage was 990 yards; and com-
several firefights the battalion finished its ted to the salient, in addition to an artillery pany depth (to battalion headquarters) was
work on 1 June. In the process it removed regiment and an engineer battalion. 1,100 yards.
3,000 British and 800 Italian mines, laid
5,185 sandbags, and strung 3,170-yards of a Under the new plan, each battalion had two Although the brigade's antitank gun was
double barbed wire fence. Rimming the rifle companies forward, the heavy weapons considerably reduced, it still had its full
wire, the engineers planted a minefield con- company halfway back to battalion head- compliment of machine guns. There were
sisting of 674 S-mines and 1,674 T-mines. quarters, the heavy machine gun company so many machine guns, it was difficult to
Thirty-three Stützpunkte were built along somewhat farther forward, and the third find sufficient fields of fire. A battalion
with 10 special positions housing two anti- rifle company in battalion reserve. The sector in the Meduaaur salient was about
tank guns and one machine gun each. In great bulk of the light machine guns were 1,780 yards, and, on the basis of a two-com-
addition, after the local commander deter- deployed up against the wire in pairs. Half pany front, each company with eighteen
mined that the south-eastern bulge in the of the antitank guns were in the front line. light machine guns, there were only 50
salient unnecessarily stretched the defenses, Company frontages were about 830 yards, yards for each weapon. It therefore decided
the bulge was given up, but not before and positions were between 445 to 500 to withdraw the heavy weapons to where
2,300 T-mines, 159 booby traps, 1,560 pres- yards deep. The average front of a light they could fire indirectly over the forward
sure mines, and 139 trip-wire mines were machine gun was 55 yards. There were a lines. It was easy to cover every point with
sown into it. total of six antitank guns for each company fire with the 80 heavy and light weapons in
front, or two to every 280 yards. a motorized infantry battalion. Long-range

BA Photograph
Germans repaired one 88-mm and two 75-
mm guns during the night. The next morn-
ing the position was battle ready, with a
bayonet strength of 100 German infantry-
men, 38 anti-aircraft personnel, and 130
Italians.

To pump-up the troops, reports from the


Army News Services (Wehrmachtbericht)
was taken regularly on the radio and distrib-
uted among the men. German successes in
other areas of the front mitigated the feeling
of helplessness before British tanks which
Schon noticed among Germans as well as
Italians. Nevertheless, the troops expected
to be relieved; there was confidence that
counterattacking German tanks would settle
Imperial War Museum Photograph the battle. Spirits soared on 20 November
when German tanks appeared on the hori-
indirect machine gun barrages were largely Oasis Company 12, consisting of four offi- zon. Morale plummeted, however, when
ineffective, however, because troop training cers, 24 noncommissioned officers and 112 the panzers failed to move in and relieve the
in fire accuracy and correction had been enlisted men, disposed in ten positions - one position.
neglected. Because of their limited effec- for each section and one for headquarters,
tiveness, and to save ammunition, machine manned the main Stützpunkte. The support- With the last antiaircraft positions knocked
gun barrages were kept to a fifteen or thirty ing arms, some placed with the neighboring out, Schon requested permission to with-
second duration. Italian battalion, was strong: six 75mm field draw. Instead he was ordered to hold out.
guns; two or three 88-mm guns and two Relief was promised and he was told to
There was only one complete after action 75mm antiaircraft guns; three 37mm anti- expect resupply by air. There was no relief
report of a company-sized Stützpunkte tank guns; and four heavy machine guns force or airdrop forthcoming, just a renewed
resisting a British attack. Lieutenant Schon, and ten light machine guns. There was British attack.
commander of the 12th Oasis Company ammunition for three days and food and
held out at Libyan Omar from 18 to 30 water for eight days. Conditions in the Stützpunkte grew increas-
November, when due to lack of supplies and ingly worse. During the day, the men were
equipment losses, he was forced to retire to The envelopment of Libyan Omar began on forced to stay in their foxholes, because any
Got Adhidiba with 80 survivors from his 20 November. On that day, an 88mm gun outside movement drew immediate sniper
original 150-man muster destroyed a British observation post at a fire. At night, hunkered in and on constant
range of 3-1/2 miles. On 22 November, the alert status, they become cramped and stiff
From Schon's report, he deployed his men main British attack began. Omar Nuovo as the cold settled into their joints and
in the following manner: fell in the morning, and the British tanks limbs. Rations and water ran short. In their
came over to Libyan Omar. Three of the weakened state, the Germans were unable to
The Vorgeschobener Stützpunkte (advance four Italian companies supporting Schon repulse a pair of unsupported infantry tanks,
post) was commanded by a noncommis- surrendered with little resistance. The which eventually overran and smashed
sioned officer with 11 men, one antitank assault on the German positions began late every heavy weapon. Had the British sup-
gun, one light mortar, two light machine in the afternoon, with the 88-mm guns ported these tanks with infantry, the battle at
guns, rations for five days, and emergency knocking out 17 infantry tanks. As usual, this point would have been lost. Armed
rations. Its mission was to observe, not to the 88-mm guns were vulnerable to counter- now with only rifles and light automatic
draw fire. There were three telephone wires battery fire and a combination of artillery
running to Oasis Company 12, the Italian weapons, Schon finally got permission to
shells and tank shot silenced them just retire. He slipped out under the cover of
battalion, and the Italian artillery (attached before nightfall. The surviving smaller
to the Oasis Company for the defense of darkness and, after an all-night forced
German antitank guns took up the fight, but march, reached the garrison at Got
Libyan Omar). This post remained unspot-
their shells simply bounced off the infantry Adhidiba.
ted from 18 to 23 November, and only with-
tanks. Inexplicably, the British did not
drew on the main position a day after the
press their advantage and withdrew as night by Edward Morris
main battle started. The post was able to
fell. Given a welcomed reprieve, the
observe behind British lines.

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