Mauel vs Republic (G.R. No.

165842, November 29, 2005)

Petitioner: Eduardo Manuel

FACTS:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Baguio City, Branch 3, convicting the petitioner of bigamy.

The petitioner married Rubylus Gaña on July 28, 1975 in Makati. On the same year, Gaña was
charged with estafa. The petitioner visited her in jail after three months and never saw her again. 

In January 1996, petitioner, then 39 years old met complainant Tina B. Gandalera, 21 years old,
in Dagupan City. Petitioner visited her several times in Baguio City, at one time he brought his
parents whom assured the complainant and her parents that the petitioner is single. On April 22,
1996, they had a civil marriage in Baguio, settling at Irisan, Baguio. In their marriage contract,
petitioner wrote that he was "single".

After three years of marriage, complainant allege that petitioner was home only twice or thrice a
year and that whenever complainant asks for sustenance, the petitioner would slap her. On
January 2001, the petitioner finally left and did not return. Petitioner allege that the reason he left
was that her wife has a lover evidenced by the "love-bite" he saw on her neck.

The RTC of  Baguio ruled against the petitioner, sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty
from six years to ten month as minimum and ten years as maximum, and indemnity in the
amount of Php 200,000.00 by way of moral damages. After appealing with the Court of Appeals,
the sentence was reduced to two years, four months and one day minimum and ten years
maximum. 

Issues:

1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it ruled that
petitioner's first wife cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as
there was no judicial declaration of presumptive death as provided for under Article 41 of the
Family Code.

2.  Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it affirmed the
award of Php 200,000.00 as moral damages as it has no basis in fact and in law.
Ruling:

1. No, the Court of Appeals did not commit an error of law. The Family Code, having a
retroactive effect, amended Article 390 of the Civil Code, wherefore adding the third rule in the
requirements for a subsequent bigamous marriage to be considered valid, which are: (1) the prior
spouse have been absent for four consecutive years, (2) the spouse present has a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse is already dead, and (3) a judicial declaration of presumptive death
of the absent spouse (Armas vs Calisterio 330 SCRA 201), the third rule of which is designed to
harmonize with Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code which defines and penalizes bigamy.

2. No, there is no error of law committed by the Court of Appeals. The petitioner is liable for
moral damages in accordance to Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code. Article 19 contends
that a person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duty, act with
justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith; Article 20: every person who,
willfully or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter the same; and Article
21:  any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another, in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs and public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The petitioner's collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after his marriage, by his
and his parents' assurance that he is single, were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused
injury to the complainant. Also, the petitioner's acts are against public policy as they undermine
and subvert the family as a social institution,and against good morals, and the interest and
general welfare of society. Therefore, the award of Php 200,000. 00 cost for moral damages is
just and reasonable.
MAGSUMBOL VS. PP
G.R. NO 207175

I. Facts:

– In 2002, around 11’oclock in the afternoon petitioner, Eduardo Magsumbol, Erasmo Magsino,
Apolonio Inanoria, and Bonifacio Ramirez along with unidentified 7 unidentified others 
allegedly cut, take, steal and carry away with them thirty-three (33) coconut trees valued
(P44,400.00). The unregistered parcel of land was co-owned by Ernesto Caringal and Menandro
Avanzado who then charged with the crime of  Theft against the petitioners.

In defense, Atanacio Avanzado testified that he authorized the petitioners to cut down the
coconut trees within the boundary of his property, which was adjacent to the land co-owned by
Menandro. He also claimed that there were no muniments that delimit the boundaries between
the adjacent lots.

RTC and CA decided in favor of Caringal and M. Avanzado on the basis that A. Avanzado is a
biased witness because he was related by affinity to Magsumbol and Magsino.

II. Issue/s

– W/N the accused are not guilty of Theft, where malice and intent to gain, as elements of the
crime of theft are not present.

III. Ratio/Legal Basis:

– YES.  In view of conflicting claims, the Court cannot determine with certainty the owner of the
33 felled coconut trees. The uncertainty of the exact location of the coconut trees negates the
presence of the criminal intent to gain. Criminal intent must be clearly established with the other
elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. RTC and CA erred in brushing aside
the testimony of A. Avanzado because of their family relationship does not by itself render a
witness’ testimony inadmissible or devoid of evidentiary weight. 

The course of executing Atanacio’s instructions, Magsumbol and his co-accused encroached on
the land co-owned by Menandro, because they missed the undetectable boundary between the
two lots, and cut down some of Menandro’s trees, such act merely constituted mistake or
judgmental error.

The criminal mind is indeed wanting in the situation where Magsumbol and his co-accused even
sought prior permission from Brgy. Captain Arguelles to cut down the coconut trees which was
done openly and during broad daylight effectively negated malice and criminal intent on their
part. It defies reason that the accused would still approach the barangay captain if their real
intention was to steal the coconut trees of Menandro. Besides, criminals would usually execute
their criminal activities clandestinely or through stealth or strategy to avoid detection of the
commission of a crime or a wrongdoing.

The prosecution miserably failed to establish proof beyond reasonable doubt that Magsumbol,
together with his co-accused, damaged the property or Menandro with malice and deliberate
intent and then removed the felled coconut trees from the premises.

IV. Dispositive Portion

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed December 14, 2012 Decision and the
May 6, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 34431 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Petitioner

[G.R. No. 135919. May 9, 2003]PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,appellee,vs. DANNY DELOS

Facts: On November 6, 1997, in the Municipality of San Jose, Del Monte, Province of Bulacan,
Philippines, appellant DannyDelos Santos Fernandez accused guilty with intent to kill Rod
Flores Juanitas, with evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of superior strength,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab, hitting him on the different parts
ofhis body which directly caused his death. That on November 1997, De Leon witnessed the
gruesome killing of Flores, whiledrinking with three men (Salvador, Tablate & Rainier) in
Sarmiento Homes, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan

Issue: Whether or not the testimonies of the witnesses are credible even after two month period

Held: Yes. The court ruled that the two-month delay is hardly an indicium of a concocted story.
It is but natural for witnesses toavoid being involved in a criminal proceeding particularly when
the crime committed is of such gravity as to show the cruelty ofthe perpetrator. Born of human
experience, the fear of retaliation can have a paralyzing effect to the witnesses. Thus, inPeople
vs.Dacibar, we held that the initial reluctance of witnesses to volunteer information about a
criminal case is of common knowledge and has been judicially declared as insufficient to affect
credibility, especially when a valid reason exists for such hesitance. Besides, settled is the rule
that positive identification prevails over alibi and denial. Decision is affirmed with modification.
GUIYAB VS.PEOPLE
G.R No. 152527

FACTS:

On March 11, 1993, petitioner Joey Guiyab was charged with Homicide before the
Regional Trial Court of Cabagan.That on or about December 12, 1992 in the Municipality of
Tumauini, Province of Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the honorable court, the
said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and
without any just motive, assault, attack and stab with a bladed pointed instrument one Rafael
Bacani, inflicting upon him, a stab wound on the right anterior back wall, which directly caused
his death. On the other hand, petitioner raised the defense of alibi which was corroborated by
Domingo Gumaru, and petitioners’ parents Silvano and Vicenta Guiyab, that at the time of the
incident he was not at Tumauiani; he averred that he was farming until 5:00 PM at Sitio Bayabo,
Camasi and slept around 9:00 PM.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the identity of the accused as the assailant was fully established by the
prosecution

HELD:

Yes. The court held that In the person of Joseph Madriaga who served and witnessed the whole
incident and testified in a categorical and straightforward manner on the events leading to the
death of the victim and positively identified the petitioner, is sufficient to convict the petitioner.
Further, through careful and thorough examination of the records, the judgment rendered the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide as defined and penalized under
Article 249 of RPC.

We do not doubt Joseph’s identification of Joey Guiyab. Even if he did not know the name of the
petitioner prior to the incident, he was able to identify him in open court. Besides, Joseph
maintained that although he did not know the name of the petitioner, he knew him by his face.9
There is nothing in law or jurisprudence which requires that, for a positive identification of a
felon by a prosecution witness to be good, the witness must first know the former personally.10
The witness need not have to know the name of the accused for so long as he recognizes his face.

We ruled that “knowing the identity of an accused is different from knowing his name.
People v Carmen

Facts:

That in the morning of July 1, 1986, Aida Villanueva and her younger sister Avelyn
Villanueva, 10 and 7 years old, respectively, were sent on an errand by their father Charlito
(should be Charito) Villanueva to buy rice in Masbate, Masbate. The Villanuevas lived in
Mobo, a neighboring town of the capital of the province. Upon their arrival at the poblacion of
the capital town of Masbate at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning, Aida and Avelyn went to
the pier, staying there up to 12:00 noon, to meet their mother whom they thought would
arrive by boat from Manila. They left the pier when their mother did not arrive and went
to Helen Theatre on Zurbito Street, Masbate, Masbate, to see a picture.

"At around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day while they were infront of the
Helen Theatre, they were called by the accused Carmen Lim, in a loud voice. "Come here
Nene" and asked them to go to her house just infront of the moviehouse. Aida and Avelyn
went to the house of the accused and got inside passing through the front door.

"After a brief conversation with the two children, the accused gave Aida and Avelyn rice and
kangkong for lunch. After they had finished eating, Aida was told by the accused to take a bath.
The accused gave Aida a dress to wear.

"From July 1, 1986 to July 15, 1986, Aida Villanueva was detained in the house of the
accused doing household chores such as cleaning the kitchen, scrubbing the floor, washing
the plates including removing lice from the head of the accused and fanning her. Avelyn,
the younger sister of Aida, was brought by Carmen's mother (should be sister) in Cebu on
the same day they arrived in the house of the accused.

"On July 15, 1986, Charito Villanueva, father of the two minor children, found his daughter
Aida in the house of the accused. He asked the accused to let Aida go home with him, but
the accused refused."Charito came back to the house of the accused the following day, July
16, 1986, accompanied this time by Sgt. Antonio Ariate of the 266th PC Company at Camp
Bonny Serrano, Masbate, Masbate, who had with him an armalite. After identifying himself to
the accused, the soldier told the accused that he was taking Aida with him.

Without resistance but uttering slanderous remarks, the accused released Aida to Sgt.
Ariate. Charito Villanueva and his daughter Aida were brought by Sgt. Ariate to the 266th
PC Company Headquarters where the complaint of Charito was recorded in the blotter by
CIC Vincent Elliot Vasquez of the I & I Section.

ISSUE:
 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE APPELLANT DESPITE THE
FACT THAT APPELLANT HAD NO MOTIVE TO DETAIN AIDA AND AVELYN
VILLANUEVA

RULING:

There is no kidnapping in this case. The two minors voluntarily entered the appellant's
residence through the front entrance. The fact of detention which is an essential element in the
crime charged, was not clearly established. There was no showing that there was actual
confinement or restriction of the person of the offended party. There is no indication that Aida
was locked up, physically restrained of her liberty or unable to communicate with anyone.

There are other circumstances which create grave doubts in Aida's version of her two
week detention. In her testimony, Aida claimed that she attempted to escape three times but she
was not able to do so. Aida did not go with her father because the appellant allegedly told her not
to go. For someone who had been detained against her will, as between her father and her
detainor, Aida would have disregarded the appellant's order and would have run to her father.

The appellant is a woman of sufficient means. It is undisputed that she is the owner of a
store and was the employer of two maids at the time of the incident. Had she wanted to hire an
additional maid, she could certainly afford to hire another one without going to the extent of
committing a crime as serious as kidnapping. No motive was ever propounded by the
prosecution.

People vs. Page (G.R. No. L-37507)

Facts:

On February 13, 1972 Crisanto Camposano, went to the house of William Page. They were
friendssince boyhood. Page was an eighteen-year old third year high school student at the
Arellano'University. At past ten o'clock, Page and Camposano went to the rotonda or intersection 
of Taft Avenue and F. B.Harrison Boulevard, where they boarded a Manila-bound jeepney. Page
was armed with a balisong  knife.Camposano had a revolver. According to Page's confession, he
seated himself beside a male passenger who was near the driver on thefront seat. Camposano
took a seat at the back of the jeepney where two female passengers were seated.With the jeepney
was in front of the San Antonio Savings Bank on Harrison Boulevard, Page and Camposanotold
the driver to turn left on Russel Avenue, going to M. Roxas Boulevard, and then to turn left
going toParañaque . There, they held up the driver and the three passengers. They got the money
and pieces
of  jewelry of the passengers and the driver. From the rear view mirror of the jeepney, Page saw 
Camposanodumping the two female passengers on Roxas Boulevard. Then, the two directed the
driver to proceed to theairport. Camposano gave Page a watch and a woman's ring as his share of
the loot.The woman, who jumped from the jeepney was brought to the hospital, however, she
was already dead whenshe reached the hospital.William Page appealed from the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal dated July 21, 1973,convicting him of robbery with homicide,
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court correctly ruled that Page, as a fellow conspirator of Camposano,
could beheld liable for robbery with homicide or for robbery only.

Held:

The SC find that the trial court's conclusion as to conspiracy is borne out by the evidence. Page
andCamposano were boyhood friends. About six hours before the crime was committed, they
were alreadytogether. They were in the Baclaran rotonda at around ten o'clock in the evening or
shortly before the holdupwas committed. They boarded the jeepney in that place. Inside the
jeepney, they coordinated their actions.They directed the jeepney driver to go near the airport or
in the vicinity of Page's residence, a place whichwas well-known to the two malefactors. They
left the jeepney together and fled in the same direction.There is not a scintilla of doubt that a
conspiracy to commit robbery existed between Page and Camposano.The fact that the two armed
themselves with deadly weapons, a knife and a revolver, signified that they weredetermined to
kill their victims in order to consummate their nefarious objective.The conspiracy may be
inferred from the acts of Page and Camposano. Those acts reveal that they hadagreed to commit
robbery inside a passenger jeepney (Art. 8, Revised Penal Code). This Court may
take judicial notice that that kind of robbery has been frequently
committed since the liberation when the jeepneycame into existence as a public conveyance.Page
and Camposano implemented their agreement when they waited for a passenger jeepney at
theBaclaran rotonda and boarded it at the same time. If they had no evil intention, they could
have sat together at the back. But, they did not do so. Obviously, as previously planned by them,
Page took the front seat sothat he could control the driver and at the same time extort money
from him and the other passenger in thefront seat. Camposano took a seat at the back of the
jeepney so that he could rob the two female passengers.
PP VS CABARENO
349 SCRA 297

FACTS:

During a barangay fiesta in Jayobo, Lambunao, Iloilo, a certain Wilbert Cabareno apparently
tried to shoot Aurelio Catedrilla, a barangay captain, while the latter was helping to pacify a
commotion near a discohan. However, he hit Nerio Casaquite instead, a barangay tanod who was
with Catedrilla. According to Cabareno, he was only being framed for the death of Casaquite,
which was allegedly in fact committed by Catedrillas grand nephew. He stated that during an
argument wherein Catedrillas grand nephew was involved, Catedrilla and his grand nephew
started grappling for a shotgun, which accidentally went off and hit Casaquite while he was
leading the person whom Catedrillas grand nephew was having an argument with. Cabareno was
convicted of murder by the lower court, appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
He was sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE: WON Cabareno is guilty of the crime of murder in the case at bar.

RULING:

No. Appellant should be convicted of homicide, not murder.In the present case, Cabareno is
indeed responsible for the death of Casaquite even if his intended target when he fired the gun
was supposedly Catedrillo. Paragraph 1,Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, provides:Art. 4.
Criminal Liability. --- Criminal liability shall be incurred:1.By any person committing a felony
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.In the present case,
appellant is responsible for the death of Nerio Casaquite, even if the formers intended target
when he fired the gun was supposedly Catedrillo.Criminal liability is incurred by any person
committing a felony, although the actual victim be different from the one intended.However, the
trial court ruled that the killing was qualified by treachery. However, it failed to explain the basis
of such ruling.

The proven facts do not adequately establish the presence of this qualifying circumstance. As the
Court held: The qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot logically be appreciated because the
accused did not make any preparation to kill the deceased in such a manner as to insure the
commission of the crime or to make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend
himself or retaliate.This circumstance can only be applied, according to the tenor of Article 13,
Sub-section 16 of the Revised Penal Code, when the culprit employs means, methods or forms of
execution which tend directly and specially to insure the commission of the crime and at the
same time to eliminate or diminish the risk to his own person from a defense which the other
party might offer.Although it was proved that Casaquite was shot in the back, the prosecution
failed to prove that Cabareno deliberately adopted the attack, considering that it was executed
during a commotion and as a result of it.