LEO ECHEGARAY vs.

 THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

[G.R. No. 132601. October 12, 1998]
DOCTRINE
Court held that "punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering
death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that
word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and
barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life." Would the
lack in particularity then as to the details involved in the execution by lethal
injection render said law "cruel, degrading or inhuman"? The Court believes
not. For reasons hereafter discussed, the implementing details of R.A. No.
8177 are matters which are properly left to the competence and expertise of
administrative officials.

FACTS:
On June 25, 1996, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of petitioner
Leo Echegaray for the crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his
common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of the death penalty for the
said crime.
PROCEDURE:
Petitioner filed motion for reconsideration and a supplemental motion
for reconsideration raising constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 and the
death penalty for rape. Both were denied. Consequently, Congress changed
the mode of execution of the death penalty from electrocution to lethal
injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177, designating death by lethal
injection
On March 2, 1998, petitioner filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction
and/or Temporary Restraining Order from carrying out the execution by lethal
injection of petitioner for being: (a) cruel, degrading and inhuman
punishment per se as well as by reason of its being (b) arbitrary,
unreasonable and a violation of due process, (c) a violation of the Philippines'
obligations under international covenants, (d) an undue delegation of
legislative power by Congress, (e) an unlawful exercise by respondent
Secretary of the power to legislate, and (f) an unlawful delegation of delegated
powers by the Secretary of Justice to respondent Director. In his motion to
amend, the petitioner added equal protection as a ground.
The Solicitor General stated that the Supreme Court has already upheld
the constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law, and has declared that the death
penalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment; execution by
lethal injection, as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the questioned rules,
is constitutional, lethal injection being the most modern, more humane, more
economical, safer and easier to apply (than electrocution or the gas chamber);
in addition to that, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
does not expressly or impliedly prohibit the imposition of the death penalty.
 On March 25, 1998, the Commission on Human Rights filed a Motion for
Leave of Court to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae with the
attached Petition to Intervene and/or Appear asAmicus Curiae alleging that
the death penalty imposed under R.A. No. 7659 which is to be implemented
by R.A. No. 8177 is cruel, degrading and outside the limits of civil society
standards.
ISSUE: Whether or not  R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules do not pass
constitutional muster for:
(a) Violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment,
(b) Violation of our international treaty obligations,
(c) Being an undue delegation of legislative power, and
(d) Being discriminatory.
DECISION:
LETHAL INJECTION, NOT CRUEL, DEGRADING OR INHUMAN
PUNISHMENT UNDER SECTION 19, ARTICLE III OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION. REIMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY LAW DOES
NOT VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL TREATY OBLIGATIONS
THERE IS NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER IN R.A.
NO. 8177 TO THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND THE DIRECTOR OF
BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, BUT SECTION 19 OF THE RULES AND
REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT R.A. NO. 8177 IS INVALID.
SECTION 17 OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT R.A.
NO. 8177 IS INVALID FOR BEING DISCRIMINATORY AND CONTRARY TO
LAW.

REASONING:
LETHAL INJECTION, NOT CRUEL, DEGRADING OR INHUMAN
PUNISHMENT UNDER SECTION 19, ARTICLE III OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION.

It is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a

cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment. In the oft-cited case of Harden v.
Director of Prisons, this Court held that "punishments are cruel when they
involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel,
within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there
something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere
extinguishment of life." Would the lack in particularity then as to the details
involved in the execution by lethal injection render said law "cruel, degrading
or inhuman"? The Court believes not. For reasons hereafter discussed, the
implementing details of R.A. No. 8177 are matters which are properly left to
the competence and expertise of administrative officials.
 In a limited sense, anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or
distress, and since punishment imports pain or suffering to the convict, it may
be said that all punishments are cruel. But of course the Constitution does not
mean that crime, for this reason, is to go unpunished.” The cruelty against
which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the
method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method
employed to extinguish life humanely.
For as long as the death penalty remains in our statute books and meets
the most stringent requirements provided by the Constitution, the Court must
confine their inquiry to the legality of R.A. No. 8177, whose constitutionality
was duly sustain in the face of petitioner's challenge. The Court find that the
legislature's substitution of the mode of carrying out the death penalty from
electrocution to lethal injection infringes no constitutional rights of petitioner
herein.

II. REIMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY LAW DOES NOT VIOLATE

INTERNATIONAL TREATY OBLIGATIONS
Indisputably, Article 6 of the Covenant enshrines the individual's right to
life. Nevertheless, Article 6 (2) of the Covenant explicitly recognizes that
capital punishment is an allowable limitation on the right to life, subject to the
limitation that it be imposed for the "most serious crimes".  Moreover,
International Covenant on Civil And Political Rights states that in countries
which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be
imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force
at the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions
of the present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.  This penalty can only be carried out
pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court."
The punishment was subject to the limitation that it be imposed for the
"most serious crimes". Included with the declaration was the Second Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at
the Abolition of the Death Penalty was adopted by the General Assembly on
December 15, 1989.  The Philippines neither signed nor ratified said
document.

III. THERE IS NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER IN

R.A. NO. 8177 TO THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND THE DIRECTOR
OF BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS.

Empowering the Secretary of Justice in conjunction with the Secretary of

Health and the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, to promulgate rules and
regulations on the subject of lethal injection is a form of delegation of
legislative authority to administrative bodies.
The reason for delegation of authority to administrative agencies is the
increasing complexity of the task of government requiring expertise as well as
the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad
problems demanding its attention. Considering the scope and the definiteness
of R.A. No. 8177, which changed the mode of carrying out the death penalty,
the Court finds that the law sufficiently describes what job must be done, who
is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority.
R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative
policy, mark its limits, map out its boundaries, and specify the public agencies
which will apply it. it indicates the circumstances under which the legislative
purpose may be carried out. R.A. No. 8177 specifically requires that "the
death sentence shall be executed under the authority of the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections, endeavoring so far as possible to mitigate the
sufferings of the person under the sentence during the lethal injection as well
as during the proceedings prior to the execution." Further, "the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections shall take steps to ensure that the lethal injection to be
administered is sufficient to cause the instantaneous death of the
convict." The legislature also mandated that "all personnel involved in the
administration of lethal injection shall be trained prior to the performance of
such task." The Court cannot see that any useful purpose would be served by
requiring greater detail. The question raised is not the definition of what
constitutes a criminal offense, but the mode of carrying out the penalty
already imposed by the Courts. In this sense, R.A. No. 8177 is sufficiently
definite and the exercise of discretion by the administrative officials concerned
is, to use the words of Justice Benjamin Cardozo, canalized within banks that
keep it from overflowing.
Thus, the Court finds that the existence of an area for exercise of
discretion by the Secretary of Justice and the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections under delegated legislative power is proper where standards are
formulated for the guidance and the exercise of limited discretion, which
though general, are capable of reasonable application.

D. SECTION 17 OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT

R.A. NO. 8177 IS INVALID FOR BEING DISCRIMINATORY AND
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Petitioner contends that Section 17 is unconstitutional for being
discriminatory as well as for being an invalid exercise of the power to legislate
by respondent Secretary. Petitioner insists that Section 17 amends the
instances when lethal injection may be suspended, without an express
amendment of Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section
25 of R.A. No. 7659.

"SEC. 17. SUSPENSION OF THE EXECUTION OF THE DEATH

SENTENCE. Execution by lethal injection shall not be inflicted upon a
woman within the three years next following the date of the sentence or
while she is pregnant, nor upon any person over seventy (70) years of
age. In this latter case, the death penalty shall be commuted to the
penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in
Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code."
 On this point, the Courts finds petitioner's contention impressed with
merit. While Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25
of Republic Act No. 7659, suspends the implementation of the death
penalty while a woman is pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery,
Section 17 of the implementing rules omits the one (1) year period following
delivery as an instance when the death sentence is suspended, and adds a
ground for suspension of sentence no longer found under Article 83 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended, which is the three-year reprieve after a
woman is sentenced. This addition is, in petitioner's view, tantamount to a
gender-based discrimination sans statutory basis, while the omission is an
impermissible contravention of the applicable law.
Being merely an implementing rule, Section 17 aforecited must not
override, but instead remain consistent and in harmony with the law it seeks
to apply and implement. Administrative rules and regulations are intended to
carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify, the law." An administrative agency
cannot amend an act of Congress. In case of discrepancy between a
provision of statute and a rule or regulation issued to implement said statute,
the statutory provision prevails. Since the cited clause in Section 17 which
suspends the execution of a woman within the three (3) years next following
the date of sentence finds no supports in Article 83 of the Revised Penal
Code as amended, perforce Section 17 must be declared invalid.

IN RE CUNANAN
94 PHIL. 534, MARCH 18, 1954

DOCTRINE
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice
of the profession and their supervision have been indisputably a judicial
function and responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system from
which ours has been derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment or
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is
concededly judicial.

FACTS
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers
Act, in 1952. Under the Rules of Court governing admission to the bar, "in
order that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may be deemed to have
passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general
average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any
subject."(Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court).

Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered

and passed by this court, and feeling conscious of having been discriminated
against (See Explanatory Note to R. A. No. 972), unsuccessful candidates
who obtained averages of a few percentage lower than those admitted to the
Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill
No. 12 which, among others, reduced the passing general average in bar
examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946.

The President requested the views of the court on the bill. Complying with that
request, seven members of the court subscribed to and submitted written
comments adverse thereto, and shortly thereafter the President vetoed it.
Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371
which is an Act to fix the passing marks for bar examinations from nineteen
hundred and forty-six up to and including nineteen Hundred and fifty-five,
embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill.

Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar
those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and
inadequate preparations. By and large, the law is contrary to public interest
since it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who had inadequate preparation for the
practice of law profession, as evidenced by their failure in the exams.

After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions
for admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while others whose motions
for the revision of their examination papers were still pending also invoked the
aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. To avoid injustice to
individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration,
irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.
Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to revise their grades. If they are
to be admitted to the bar, it must be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if
declared valid, should be applied equally to all concerned whether they have
filed petitions or not.

ISSUE
Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid.

HELD
RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar,
those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and
inadequate preparation.

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice
of the profession and their supervision have been indisputably a judicial
function and responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system from
which ours has been derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment or
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is
concededly judicial.

On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of

the judicial and legislative departments of the government.

It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice
of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on
the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities may say, merely
 to fix the minimum conditions for the license.

Reasons for Unconstitutionality: 1. There was a manifest encroachment on

the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court. 2. It is in effect a
judgment revoking the resolution of the court, and only the S.C. may revise or
alter them, in attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated the Constitution. 3. That
congress has exceeded its power to repeal, alter, and supplement the rules
on admission to the bar (since the rules made by congress must elevate the
profession, and those rules promulgated are considered the bare minimum.)
4. It is a class legislation 5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title of the
law, contrary to what the constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the
provisions of art. 1, the entire law is void.

Republic Act Number 972 is held to be unconstitutional.

SALVADOR ESTIPONA vs.

HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO

G.R. No. 226679               August 15, 2017

DOCTRINE

The Supreme Court held that the power to promulgate rules of

pleading, practice and procedure is now Their exclusive domain and no longer
shared with the Executive and Legislative departments.

FACTS:

Petitioner Estipona, Jr. was charged with violation of Section 11 of RA 9165.

On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into
a Plea Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and,
instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12 (NOTE: should
have been Section 15?) of the same law, with a penalty of rehabilitation in
view of his being a first-time offender and the minimal quantity of the
dangerous drug seized in his possession.

Petitioner argues that Section 23 of RA 9165 which prohibits plea bargaining

in all violations of said law violates:

1. The intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof;

2. The rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and
3. The principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches
of the government.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional as it

encroached upon the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of
procedure.
2. Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional for being
violative of the Constitutional right to equal protection of the law.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: YES

The Supreme Court held that the power to promulgate rules of

pleading, practice and procedure is now Their exclusive domain and no longer
shared with the Executive and Legislative departments.

The Court further held that the separation of powers among the three co-
equal branches of our government has erected an impregnable wall that
keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure
within the sole province of this Court.  The other branches trespass upon this
prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or
modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by the Court.

Viewed from this perspective, the Court had rejected previous attempts on the
part of the Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power, to amend the
Rules of Court (Rules), to wit:

1. Fabian v. Desierto -Appeal from the decision of the Office of the

Ombudsman in an administrative disciplinary case should be taken to the
Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules instead of
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 as provided in Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770.
2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, Inc. – The Cooperative Code provisions on notices cannot
replace the rules on summons under Rule 14 of the Rules.
3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from
Payment of Legal Fees; Baguio Market Vendors MultiPurpose
Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes; In Re:
Exemption of the National Power Corporation from Payment of
Filing/Docket Fees; and Rep. of the Phils. v. Hon. Mangotara, et al. –
Despite statutory provisions, the GSIS, BAMARVEMPCO, and NPC are not
exempt from the payment of legal fees imposed by Rule 141 of the Rules.
4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division) – The first
paragraph of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770, which prohibits courts except the
Supreme Court from issuing temporary restraining order and/or writ
of preliminary injunction to enjoin an investigation conducted by the
Ombudsman, is unconstitutional as it contravenes Rule 58 of the Rules.

Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court
asserted its discretion to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of
procedure, to the exclusion of the legislative and executive branches of
government. To reiterate, the Court’s authority to promulgate rules on
pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive and one of the safeguards of
Our institutional independence.

SECOND ISSUE: UNRESOLVED

The Supreme Court did not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A.
No. 9165 is contrary to the constitutional right to equal protection of the law in
order not to preempt any future discussion by the Court on the policy
considerations behind Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165.

Pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the statutory provision in toto

or a qualified version thereof, the Court deemed it proper to declare as invalid
the prohibition against plea bargaining on drug cases until and unless it is
made part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly
issued for the purpose.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSIONS ABOUT PLEA BARGAINING:

Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure

Fabian v. Hon. Desierto laid down the test for determining whether a rule is
substantive or procedural in nature.

In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for

the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies
any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure,
that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a
disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not
procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be
classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of
implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.

In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural rule

violates substantive rights. By the same token, it is towards the provision of a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases in all
courts that the rules on plea bargaining was introduced. As a way of disposing
criminal charges by agreement of the parties, plea bargaining is considered to
be an “important,” “essential,” “highly desirable,” and “legitimate” component
of the administration of justice.

In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as “a process whereby

the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition
of the case subject to court approval.” There is give-and-take negotiation
common in plea bargaining.  The essence of the agreement is that both the
prosecution and the defense make concessions to avoid potential losses.
Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be encouraged because the chief
virtues of the system – speed, economy, and finality – can benefit the
accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the court.

Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage, the rules on plea

bargaining neither create a right nor take away a vested right. Instead, it
operates as a means to implement an existing right by regulating the judicial
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for
justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.

No constitutional right to plea bargain

Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are
infringed by trying him rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor
need not do so if he prefers to go to trial.  Under the present Rules, the
acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right but depends
on the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, which is a condition
precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense that is necessarily
included in the offense charged.  The reason for this is that the prosecutor has
full control of the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to always
prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on what the
evidence on hand can sustain.

Plea bargaining, when allowed

Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to

the point when the prosecution already rested its case.

As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial court’s

exercise of discretion should not amount to a grave abuse thereof.

If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail

hearing or after the prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a
plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish
the guilt of the crime charged. The only basis on which the prosecutor and the
court could rightfully act in allowing change in the former plea of not guilty
could be nothing more and nothing less than the evidence on record. The
ruling on the motion must disclose the strength or weakness of the
prosecution’s evidence. Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence on
hand, the judge’s acceptance of the defendant’s change of plea is improper
and irregular.

Carpio-Morales vs. Binay, G.R. No. 217126-27, Nov. 10, 2015 (Digest on
RA 6770)

DOCTRINE
RA 6770 and, in so doing, took away from the courts their power to issue a
TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, it
encroached upon this Court’s constitutional rule-making authority. Through
this provision, Congress interfered with a provisional remedy that was created
by this Court under its duly promulgated rules of procedure, which utility is
both integral and inherent to every court’s exercise of judicial power. Without
the Court’s consent to the proscription, as may be manifested by an adoption
of the same as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative
circular issued therefor, there thus, stands to be a violation of the separation
of powers principle

FACTS:
– The Ombudsman’s argument against the CA’s lack of subject matter
jurisdiction over the main petition, and her corollary prayer for its dismissal, is
based on her interpretation of Section 14, RA 6770, or the Ombudsman Act,
which reads in full:

Section 14. Restrictions. – No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to

delay an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act,
unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the
investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.

No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision
or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question
of law.

– The Ombudsman’s maintains that the first paragraph of Section 14, RA

6770 textually prohibits courts from extending provisional injunctive relief to
delay any investigation conducted by her office. Despite the usage of the
general phrase “[n]o writ of injunction shall be issued by any court,” the
Ombudsman herself concedes that the prohibition does not cover the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Are the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 14 of R.A. No. 6770, valid and
constitutional?

RULING: The first paragraph is declared INEFFECTIVE until the Court adopts
the same as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular
duly issued; The second paragraph is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND
INVALID.

The Court rules that when Congress passed the first paragraph of Section 14,
RA 6770 and, in so doing, took away from the courts their power to issue a
TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, it
encroached upon this Court’s constitutional rule-making authority. Through
this provision, Congress interfered with a provisional remedy that was created
by this Court under its duly promulgated rules of procedure, which utility is
both integral and inherent to every court’s exercise of judicial power. Without
the Court’s consent to the proscription, as may be manifested by an adoption
of the same as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative
circular issued therefor, there thus, stands to be a violation of the separation
of powers principle.

In addition, it should be pointed out that the breach of Congress in prohibiting

provisional injunctions, such as in the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770,
does not only undermine the constitutional allocation of powers; it also
practically dilutes a court’s ability to carry out its functions. This is so since a
particular case can easily be mooted by supervening events if no provisional
injunctive relief is extended while the court is hearing the same.

Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against
“decision or findings” of the Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and thus –
similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770- attempts to effectively
increase the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction without its advice and
concurrence, it is therefore concluded that the former provision is also
unconstitutional and perforce, invalid. Contrary to the Ombudsman’s
posturing, Fabian should squarely apply since the above-stated Ombudsman
Act provisions are in part materia in that they “cover the same specific or
particular subject matter,” that is, the manner of judicial review over issuances
of the Ombudsman.

Note that since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is clearly
determinative of the existence of the CA’s subject matter jurisdiction over the
main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, including all subsequent proceedings
relative thereto, as the Ombudsman herself has developed, the Court deems
it proper to resolve this issue ex mero motu (on its own motion):
Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the
trial are ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of
the appellate court is involved in which case it may be raised at any time or on
the court’s own motion. The Court ex mero motu may take cognizance of lack
of jurisdiction at any point in the case where that fact is developed. The court
has a clearly recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction in any
proceeding.

Maceda vs. Vasquez (G.R. No. 102781)

DOCTRINE
Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative
supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of
the CA down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it
is only the SC that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance
with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they
commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into
this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Facts: Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the
Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz
Maceda. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda has falsified his
certificate of service by certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have
been submitted for decision for a period of 90 days have been determined
and decided on or before January 31, 1989, when in truth and in fact,
petitioner Maceda knew that no decision had been rendered in 5 civil and 10
criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera
alleged that petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates of service for 17
months.

Issue: Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes

an encroachment into the SC’s constitutional duty of supervision over all
inferior courts

Held: A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to

the SC for serious misconduct and under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his
felonious act.

In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court
with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by
the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court’s power of administrative
supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of
separation of powers.

Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative

supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of
the CA down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it
is only the SC that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance
with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they
commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into
this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises

from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said
complaint and refer the same to the SC for determination whether said judge
or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative.

Ampong v. CSC

DOCTRINE
Administrative jurisdiction over a court employee belongs to the Supreme
Court, regardless of whether the offense was committed before or after
employment in the judiciary. However, the Court constrained to uphold the
ruling of the CSC based on the principle of estoppel. 

FACTS
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision of CA affirming
the Civil Service Commission’s exercise of administrative jurisdiction over
petitioner.
In November 1991, Evelyn Junio Decir took the Professional Board
Examination. At the time of PBET, both Evelyn and Sarah Ampong were
public school teachers under the supervision of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports. In 1993, Ampong was appointed as Court Interpreter III in
RTC, Isabel Sarangani Province. In 1994, a woman representing herself as
Evelyn Decir went to CSRO to claim a copy of her PBET Certificate of
Eligibility. CSRO personnel noticed that the woman did not resemble the
examinee in the Picture Seat Plan and was later confirmed that the person
claiming eligibility was different from the one who took the exam. It was
petitioner Ampong who took and passed the examinations under the name
Evelyn Decir. Ampong voluntarily appeared at the CSRO and admitted to the
wrongdoing. In 1996, the CSC found petitioner Ampong and Decir guilty of
dishonesty, dismissing them from the service.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, raising the issue of jurisdiction. She

argued that the exclusive authority to discipline employees of the judiciary lies
with the Supreme Court and the CSC acted with abuse of discretion. She
contended that at the time the case was instituted the CSC already lost
jurisdiction over her.

ISSUE
W/N CSC can properly assume jurisdiction over administrative proceedings
against a judicial employee involving acts of dishonesty as a teacher,
committed prior to her appointment to the judiciary

RULING
Administrative jurisdiction over a court employee belongs to the Supreme
Court, regardless of whether the offense was committed before or after
employment in the judiciary. However, the Court constrained to uphold the
ruling of the CSC based on the principle of estoppel. The previous actions of
petitioner have estopped her from attacking the jurisdiction of the CSC. A
party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal
exercising quasi-judicial functions to secure an affirmative relief may not
afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty. Under the
principle of estoppel, a party may not be permitted to adopt a different theory
on appeal to impugn the court’s jurisdiction. Petitioner’s admission of guilt
stands.

In Re: Gonzalez

The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court,

the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman
may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of,
culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public
officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law,
but not by impeachment (Sec. 2, Art. XI, 1987 Constitution)
Facts: 

Cuenco filed a disbarment case against Justice Marcelo Fernan, which the

SC dismissed  for utter lack of merit.

Meanwhile, Tanodbayan/Special Prosecutor Gonzalez received a letter-

complaint. Attached in the letter was an anonymous letter by "Concerned
Employees of the Supreme Court" addressed to Gonzalez referring to
charges for disbarment brought by Cuenco against Justice Fernan and asking
Gonzalez "to do something about this." Also attached was a copy of
a telegram from Cuenco addressed to Gonzalez wherein Cuenco encouraged
Gonzalez to file responsive pleading to the Supreme Court en banc to comply
with the Petition of Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court asking
Tanodbayan's intervention.

Gonzalez indorsed the letter-complaint to Justice Fernan, who, in turn,

brought the matter to the SC en banc.

Issue:

May a Supreme Court justice be disbarred during his term of office?

Held:

No. A public officer who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of

the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be
removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with
disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer. Further, such public
officer, during his incumbency, cannot be charged criminally before the
Sandiganbayan or any other court with any offence which carries with it
the penalty of removal from office, or any penalty service of which would
amount to removal from office.

To grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the

Member's incumbency, would in effect be to circumvent and hence to run
afoul of the constitutional mandate that Members of the Court may be
removed from office only by impeachment for and conviction of certain
offenses listed in Article XI (2) of the Constitution.
The Court is not here saying that it Members or the other constitutional
officers we referred to above are entitled to immunity from liability for
possibly criminal acts or for alleged violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
or other supposed misbehavior. What the Court is saying is that there is a
fundamental procedural requirements that must be observed before such
liability may be determined and enforced. A Member of the Supreme
Court must first be removed from office via the constitutional route of
impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.
Should the tenure of the Supreme Court Justice be thus terminated by
impeachment, he may then be held to answer either criminally or
administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any wrong or misbehavior
that may be proven against him in appropriate proceedings. (In Re: Gonzalez,
A.M. No. 88-4-5433, April 15, 1988)

DENNIS A. B. FUNA, PETITIONER, VS. THE CHAIRMAN, COA,

REYNALDO A. VILLAR
G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012

DOCTRINE

The COA Chairman shall be appointed by the President for a term of seven
years, and if he has served the full term, then he can no longer be
reappointed or extended another appointment. In the same vein, a
Commissioner who was appointed for a term of seven years who likewise
served the full term is barred from being reappointed. In short, once the
Chairman or Commissioner shall have served the full term of seven years,
then he can no longer be reappointed to either the position of Chairman or
Commissioner. The obvious intent of the framers is to prevent the president
from “dominating” the Commission by allowing him to appoint an additional or
two more commissioners.

FACTS: Funa challenges the constitutionality of the appointment of Reynaldo

A. Villar as Chairman of the COA.

Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the

fourth year of Villar as COA Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting
Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008. Subsequently, on
April 18, 2008, Villar was nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA.
Shortly thereafter, on June 11, 2008, the Commission on Appointments
confirmed his appointment. He was to serve as Chairman of COA, as
expressly indicated in the appointment papers, until the expiration of the
original term of his office as COA Commissioner or on February 2, 2011.
Challenged in this recourse, Villar, in an obvious bid to lend color of title to his
hold on the chairmanship, insists that his appointment as COA Chairman
accorded him a fresh term of 7 years which is yet to lapse. He would argue, in
fine, that his term of office, as such chairman, is up to February 2, 2015, or 7
years reckoned from February 2, 2008 when he was appointed to that
position.

Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar, via a letter dated February
22, 2011 addressed to President Benigno S. Aquino III, signified his intention
to step down from office upon the appointment of his replacement. True to his
word, Villar vacated his position when President Benigno Simeon Aquino III
named Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan (Chairman Tan) COA Chairman. This
development has rendered this petition and the main issue tendered therein
moot and academic.

Although deemed moot due to the intervening appointment of Chairman Tan

and the resignation of Villar, We consider the instant case as falling within the
requirements for review of a moot and academic case, since it asserts at least
four exceptions to the mootness rule discussed in David vs Macapagal Arroyo
namely:

a. There is a grave violation of the Constitution;

b. The case involves a situation of exceptional character and is of paramount
public interest;
c. The constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public;
d. The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
The procedural aspect comes down to the question of whether or not the
following requisites for the exercise of judicial review of an executive act
obtain in this petition, viz:
a. There must be an actual case or justiciable controversy before the court
b. The question before it must be ripe for adjudication;
c. The person challenging the act must be a proper party; and
d. The issue of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity and
must be the very litis mota of the case

ISSUES:

a. WON the petitioner has Locus Standi to bring the case to court
b. WON Villar’s appointment as COA Chairman, while sitting in that body and
after having served for four (4) years of his seven (7) year term as COA
commissioner, is valid in light of the term limitations imposed under, and the
circumscribing concepts tucked in, Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution
HELD:

Issue of Locus Standi: This case before us is of transcendental importance,

since it obviously has “far-reaching implications,” and there is a need to
promulgate rules that will guide the bench, bar, and the public in future
analogous cases. We, thus, assume a liberal stance and allow petitioner to
institute the instant petition.
In David vs Macapagal Arroyo, the Court laid out the bare minimum norm
before the so-called “non-traditional suitors” may be extended standing to sue,
thusly:

a. For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds

or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
b. For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the
election law in question
c. For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are
of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
d. For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of
infringes their prerogatives as legislators.

On the substantive issue:

Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution provides that:
(2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by the
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of
seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman
shall hold office for seven years, one commissioner for five years, and the
other commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to
any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.

Petitioner now asseverates the view that Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987
Constitution proscribes reappointment of any kind within the commission, the
point being that a second appointment, be it for the same position
(commissioner to another position of commissioner) or upgraded position
(commissioner to chairperson) is a prohibited reappointment and is a nullity
ab initio.

The Court finds petitioner’s position bereft of merit. The flaw lies in regarding
the word “reappointment” as, in context, embracing any and all species of
appointment. The rule is that if a statute or constitutional provision is clear,
plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation.

The first sentence is unequivocal enough. The COA Chairman shall be

appointed by the President for a term of seven years, and if he has served the
full term, then he can no longer be reappointed or extended another
appointment. In the same vein, a Commissioner who was appointed for a term
of seven years who likewise served the full term is barred from being
reappointed. In short, once the Chairman or Commissioner shall have served
the full term of seven years, then he can no longer be reappointed to either
the position of Chairman or Commissioner. The obvious intent of the framers
is to prevent the president from “dominating” the Commission by allowing him
to appoint an additional or two more commissioners.

On the other hand, the provision, on its face, does not prohibit a promotional
appointment from commissioner to chairman as long as the commissioner has
not served the full term of seven years, further qualified by the third sentence
of Sec. 1(2), Article IX (D) that “the appointment to any vacancy shall be only
for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor.” In addition, such
promotional appointment to the position of Chairman must conform to the
rotational plan or the staggering of terms in the commission membership such
that the aggregate of the service of the Commissioner in said position and the
term to which he will be appointed to the position of Chairman must not
exceed seven years so as not to disrupt the rotational system in the
commission prescribed by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).

In conclusion, there is nothing in Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D) that explicitly

precludes a promotional appointment from Commissioner to Chairman,
provided it is made under the aforestated circumstances or conditions.

The Court is likewise unable to sustain Villar’s proposition that his promotional
appointment as COA Chairman gave him a completely fresh 7- year term––
from February 2008 to February 2015––given his four (4)-year tenure as COA
commissioner devalues all the past pronouncements made by this Court.
While there had been divergence of opinion as to the import of the word
“reappointment,” there has been unanimity on the dictum that in no case can
one be a COA member, either as chairman or commissioner, or a mix of both
positions, for an aggregate term of more than 7 years. A contrary view would
allow a circumvention of the aggregate 7-year service limitation and would be
constitutionally offensive as it would wreak havoc to the spirit of the rotational
system of succession.

In net effect, then President Macapagal-Arroyo could not have had, under any
circumstance, validly appointed Villar as COA Chairman, for a full 7- year
appointment, as the Constitution decrees, was not legally feasible in light of
the 7-year aggregate rule. Villar had already served 4 years of his 7-year term
as COA Commissioner. A shorter term, however, to comply with said rule
would also be invalid as the corresponding appointment would effectively
breach the clear purpose of the Constitution of giving to every appointee so
appointed subsequent to the first set of commissioners, a fixed term of office
of 7 years. To recapitulate, a COA commissioner like respondent Villar who
serves for a period less than seven (7) years cannot be appointed as
chairman when such position became vacant as a result of the expiration of
the 7-year term of the predecessor (Carague). Such appointment to a full term
is not valid and constitutional, as the appointee will be allowed to serve more
than seven (7) years under the constitutional ban.

To sum up, the Court restates its ruling on Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the
Constitution, viz:

1. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional

commissions, after the expiration of the uneven terms of office of the first set
of commissioners, shall always be for a fixed term of seven (7) years; an
appointment for a lesser period is void and unconstitutional. The appointing
authority cannot validly shorten the full term of seven (7) years in case of the
expiration of the term as this will result in the distortion of the rotational
system prescribed by the Constitution.

2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death,

resignation, disability or impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired portion
of the term of the predecessor, but such appointments cannot be less than the
unexpired portion as this will likewise disrupt the staggering of terms laid
down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).

3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC, who were

appointed for a full term of seven years and who served the entire period, are
barred from reappointment to any position in the Commission. Corollarily, the
first appointees in the Commission under the Constitution are also covered by
the prohibition against reappointment.

4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than
seven years is eligible for an appointment to the position of Chairman for the
unexpired portion of the term of the departing chairman. Such appointment is
not covered by the ban on reappointment, provided that the aggregate period
of the length of service as commissioner and the unexpired period of the term
of the predecessor will not exceed seven (7) years and provided further that
the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted from death, resignation,
disability or removal by impeachment. The Court clarifies that “reappointment”
found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one and the same office
(Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman). On the other
hand, an appointment involving a movement to a different position or office
(Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a new appointment and, hence,
not, in the strict legal sense, a reappointment barred under the Constitution.

5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a

temporary or acting capacity.

Brillantes v. Yorac
.DOCTRINE
Article IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution expressly describes all the
Constitutional Commissions as “independent.” Although essentially
executive in nature, they are not under the control of the President of
the Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions. Each of
these Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable
laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own discretion. Its
decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review on Certiorari by
this Court as provided by the Constitution in Article IX-A, Section 7

FACTS:
A coup attempt occurred in December 1989 prompting president Aquino to
create a fact finding commission which would be chaired by Hilario Davide.
Consequently he has to vacate his chairmanship over the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC). Haydee Yorac, an associate commissioner in the
COMELEC, was appointed by then President Corazon Aquino as a temporary
substitute.

The petitioner is challenging the designation on the ground that the choice of
the Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections is an internal matter that
should be resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the
President of the Philippines violates their independence. He cites the practice
in this Court, where the senior Associate Justice serves as Acting Chief
Justice in the absence of the Chief Justice. No designation from the President
of the Philippines is necessary.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the designation of the Acting Chairman of the COMELEC is
unconstitutional.

HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that the designation is unconstitutional.

Article IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution expressly describes all the

Constitutional Commissions as “independent.” Although essentially executive
in nature, they are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in
the discharge of their respective functions. Each of these Commissions
conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and
in the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are
subject only to review on Certiorari by this Court as provided by the
Constitution in Article IX-A, Section 7. The choice of a temporary chairman
comes under that discretion. Such discretion cannot be exercised for it, even
with its consent, by the President of the Philippines.

The Court has not the slightest doubt that the President of the Philippines was
moved only by the best of motives when she issued the challenged
designation. But while conceding her goodwill, we cannot sustain her act
because it conflicts with the Constitution. Hence, even as this Court revoked
the designation in the Bautista case, so too must it annul the designation in
the case at bar.

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION V. CITY OF MANILA - CASE DIGEST -

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

DOCTRINES

It also violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for
protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades
private rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up
rate are really there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who
needed rest or to “wash up” or to freshen up.

FACTS:

In 1992, Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law the Ordinance No. 7744 that
prohibits  hotels, motels, inns, lodging houses, pension houses and similar
establishments from offering short-time admission, as well as pro-rated
or “wash up” rates or other similarly concocted terms, in the City of Manila.

The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of
the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike.

Petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC) et. al. filed a petition on the ground
that the Ordinance directly affects their business interests as operators of
drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila.

RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner.

CA reversed the decision and asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise
of police power.

ISSUE:

WON the ordinance is constitutional.

HELD:

NO.The ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon individual

liberty. It also violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for
protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades
private rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up
rate are really there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who
needed rest or to “wash up” or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be
avoided by the said ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited
group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may be adversely
affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate
demands of public interest or public welfare.
Hence, Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED.

YNOT v. IAC

DOCTRINE

To warrant a valid exercise of police power, the following must be present: (a)
that the interests of the public, generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require such interference, and; (b) that the means are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose.

FACTS

Here, the constitutionality of former President Marcos’s Executive Order No.

626-A is assailed. Said order decreed an absolute ban on the inter-provincial
transportation of carabao (regardless of age, sex, physical condition or
purpose) and carabeef. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of
this shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government, to be
distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the
Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission (NMIC) may see fit, in
the case of carabeef. In the case of carabaos, these shall be given to
deserving farmers as the Director of Animal Industry (AI) may also see fit.
Petitioner had transported six (6) carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to
Iloilo. These were confiscated by the police for violation of the above order.
He sued for recovery, which the RTC granted upon his filing of a supersedeas
bond worth 12k. After trial on the merits, the lower court sustained the
confiscation of the carabaos, and as they can no longer be produced, directed
the confiscation of the bond. It deferred from ruling on the constitutionality of
the executive order, on the grounds of want of authority and presumed
validity. On appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court, such ruling was
upheld. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. On the main, petitioner
asserts that EO 626-A is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright
confiscation, and that its penalty suffers from invalidity because it is imposed
without giving the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial
court—as guaranteed by due process.

ISSUE

Whether  EO 626-A is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process

clause.

HELD

YES. To warrant a valid exercise of police power, the following must be

present: (a) that the interests of the public, generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require such interference, and; (b) that the means
are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose. In US v.
Toribio, the Court has ruled that EO 626 complies with the above
requirements—that is, the carabao, as a poor man’s tractor so to speak, has a
direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of the order,
and that the method chosen is also reasonably necessary for the purpose
sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive. The ban of the slaughter of
carabaos except those seven years old if male and eleven if female upon
issuance of a permit adequately works for the conservation of those still fit for
farm work or breeding, and prevention of their improvident depletion. Here,
while EO 626-A has the same lawful subject, it fails to observe the second
requirement. Notably, said EO imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter
of the carabaos but on their movement. The object of the prohibition is
unclear. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the
purpose sought to be achieved by the disputed measure is missing. It is not
clear how the interprovincial transport of the animals can prevent their
indiscriminate slaughter, as they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty
in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining them in one province will
not prevent their slaughter there, any more that moving them to another will
make it easier to kill them there. Even if assuming there was a reasonable
relation between the means and the end, the penalty is invalid as it amounts
to outright confiscation, denying petitioner a chance to be heard. Unlike in the
Toribio case, here, no trial is prescribed and the property being transported is
immediately impounded by the police and declared as forfeited for the
government. Concededly, there are certain occasions when notice and
hearing can be validly dispensed with, such as summary abatement of a
public nuisance, summary destruction of pornographic materials,
contaminated meat and narcotic drugs. However, these are justified for
reasons of immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and urgency of
the need to correct it. In the instant case, no such pressure is present. The
manner by which the disposition of the confiscated property also presents a
case of invalid delegation of legislative powers since the officers mentioned
(Chairman and Director of the NMIC and AI respectively) are granted
unlimited discretion. The usual standard and reasonable guidelines that said
officers must observe in making the distribution are nowhere to be found;
instead, they are to go about it as they may see fit. Obviously, this makes the
exercise prone to partiality and abuse, and even corruption.

CARLOS BALACUIT ET.AL V. CFI OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE - CASE

DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

DOCTRINE

A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be

unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police power.33 A police
measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and operation of a business
should not encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of
their property rights.34 The right of the owner to fix a price at which his
property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself and,
as such, within the protection of the due process clause.""
FACTS:

the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan pass an ordinance penalizing any
person, group of persons, entity, or corporation engaged in the business of
selling admission tickets to any movie or other public exhibitions, games,
contests, or other performances to require children between seven (7) and
twelve (12) years of age to pay full payment for admission tickets intended for
adults but should charge only one-half of the value of the said tickets.

The Petitioners, theater owners, aggrieved by said ordinance, they file a

complaint before the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan
City assailing the constitutionalit of Ordinance No. 640.

The Court rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 640 of the City of
Butuan constitutional and valid.

ISSUE:

WON Ordinance No. 640 is a valid exercise of police power

HELD:

YES. Ordinance No. 640 infringes theater owners’ right to property.

While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such
regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory
ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive
amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of
regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation,
be unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police power.33 A
police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and operation of a
business should not encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by the
citizens of their property rights.34 The right of the owner to fix a price at which
his property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself
and, as such, within the protection of the due process clause."" Hence, the
proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property in their own way,
to fix what prices of admission they think most for their own advantage, and
that any person who did not approve could stay away.

Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and property rights of
petitioners for even if We could assume that, on its face, the interference was
reasonable, from the foregoing considerations, it has been fully shown that it
is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of the property and personal rights
of citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot,
under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid.

KNIGHTS OF RIZAL v. DMCI

DOCTRINE
The project was way well from the Park where the monument was located. 
The SC ruled further that a mandamus did not lie against the City of Manila. It
is categorically clear that “a mandamus is issued when there is a clear legal
duty imposed upon the office or the officer sought to be compelled to perform
an act, and the party seeking mandamus has a clear legal right to the
performance of such act.”

FACTS:
DMCI Project Developers, Inc. acquired a lot in the City of Manila.  The said
lot was earmarked for the construction of Torre de Manila Condominium
project.  After having acquired all the necessary permits and documents, the
DMCI-PDI was ready to commence the intended project.  However, the City of
Manila Council issued a resolution to temporarily suspend the Building Permit
until such time that issues had been cleared.  Consultations after
consultations had he been initiated both by the City of Manila and DMCI-PDI. 
Finally, On Jan. 2014, the City Council of Manila, issued another resolution
ratifying and confirming all previously issued permits, licenses and approvals
issued by the City for Torre de Manila.

Knights of Rizal, on the other hand, filed a petition for injunction seeking TRO,
and later a permanent injunction, against the construction of the project.  The
KOR argued that the building, if completed, would be a sore to the view of the
monument, an endangerment to the nation’s cultural heritage, and a
construction borne out of bad faith.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court should issue a writ of mandamus against the City
Officials to stop the construction of Torre de Manila.

RULING:

No, The SC ruled that there was no law prohibiting the construction of the
project.  It was not even considered as contrary to morals, customs and public
order.  The project was way well from the Park where the monument was
located.  The SC ruled further that a mandamus did not lie against the City of
Manila. It is categorically clear that “a mandamus is issued when there is a
clear legal duty imposed upon the office or the officer sought to be compelled
to perform an act, and the party seeking mandamus has a clear legal right to
the performance of such act.”  In the case at bar, such factors were wanting.
Nowhere was it found in the ordinance, or in any Law or rule that the
construction of such building outside the Rizal Park was prohibited if the
building was within the background sightline or vision of the Rizal Monument. 
Thus, the petition was lacking of merit and, thus dismissed.