G.R. No.
L-23815 June 28, 1974
ADELINO H. LEDESMA, Petitioner,
vs. HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental,
Branch I, Silay City, Respondent.
One of the grounds for such a motion was his allegation that with his appointment as Election Registrar
by the Commission on Elections, he was not in a position to devote full time to the defense of the two
accused. The denial by respondent Judge of such a plea, notwithstanding the conformity of the
defendants, was due "its principal effect [being] to delay this case." 2 It was likewise noted that the
prosecution had already rested and that petitioner was previously counsel de parte, his designation in
the former category being precisely to protect him in his new position without prejudicing the accused.
It cannot be plausibly asserted that such failure to allow withdrawal of de oficio counsel could ordinarily
be characterized as a grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. There is, however, the
overriding concern for the right to counsel of the accused that must be taken seriously into
consideration. In appropriate cases, it should tilt the balance. This is not one of them.
Petitioner, on October 13, 1964, was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Province
of Negros Occidental. Then and there, he commenced to discharge its duties. As he was counsel de
parte for one of the accused in a case pending in the sala of respondent Judge, he filed a motion to
withdraw as such. Not only did respondent Judge deny such motion, but he also appointed him
counsel de oficio for the two defendants.
Subsequently, on November 3, 1964, petitioner filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as
counsel de oficio, premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections to require full time service as
well as on the volume or pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent him from handling
adequately the defense. Respondent Judge, in the challenged order of November 6, 1964, denied said
motion. A motion for reconsideration having proved futile, he instituted this certiorari proceeding.
Issue:
What is assailed in this certiorari proceeding is an order of respondent Judge denying a motion filed by
petitioner to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio.
Ruling:
The petition must fail.
The assailed order of November 6, 1964 denying the urgent motion of petitioner to withdraw as
counsel de oficio speaks for itself. It began with a reminder that a crime was allegedly committed on
February 17, 1962, with the proceedings having started in the municipal court of Cadiz on July 11, 1962.
Then respondent Judge spoke of his order of October 16, 1964 which reads thus: "In view of the
objection of the prosecution to the motion for postponement of October 15, 1964 (alleging that counsel
for the accused cannot continue appearing in this case without the express authority of the Commission
on Elections); and since according to the prosecution there are two witnesses who are ready to take the
stand, after which the government would rest, the motion for postponement is denied.
When counsel for the accused assumed office as Election Registrar on October 13, 1964, he knew since
October 2, 1964 that the trial would be resumed today. Nevertheless, in order not to prejudice the civil
service status of counsel for the accused, he is hereby designated counsel de oficio for the accused. The
defense obtained 8 postponements postponements (on May 17, 1963, June 13, 1963, June 14, 1963,
October 28, 1963, November 27, 1963, February 11, 1964, March 9, 1964, June 8, 1964 July 26, 1964,
and September 7, 1964." 4 Reference was then made to another order of February 11, 1964😊
"Upon petition of Atty. Adelino H. Ledesma, alleging indisposition, the continuation of the trial of this
case is hereby transferred to March 9, 1964 at 8:30 in the morning. The defense is reminded that at its
instance, this case has been postponed at least eight (8) times, and that the government witnesses have
to come all the way from Manapala." 5 After which, it was noted in such order that there was no
incompatibility between the duty of petitioner to the accused and to the court and the performance of
his task as an election registrar of the Commission on Elections and that the ends of justice "would be
served by allowing and requiring Mr. Ledesma to continue as counsel de oficio, since the prosecution
has already rested its case."
What is readily apparent therefore, is that petitioner was less than duly mindful of his obligation as
counsel de oficio. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. It could be that for some lawyers, especially the neophytes in the profession, being
appointed counsel de oficio is an irksome chore. For those holding such belief, it may come as a surprise
that counsel of repute and of eminence welcome such an opportunity. It makes even more manifest
that law is indeed a profession dedicated to the ideal of service and not a mere trade. It is
understandable then why a high degree of fidelity to duty is required of one so designated.
A recent statement of the doctrine is found in People v. Daban: 7 "There is need anew in this disciplinary
proceeding to lay stress on the fundamental postulate that membership in the bar carries with it a
responsibility to live up to its exacting standard. The law is a profession, not a trade or a craft. Those
enrolled in its ranks are called upon to aid in the performance of one of the basic purposes of the State,
the administration of justice. To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an indigent
defendant, a lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio. The fact that his services are rendered
without remuneration should not occasion a diminution in his zeal. Rather the contrary. This is not, of
course, to ignore that other pressing matters do compete for his attention. After all, he has his practice
to attend to. That circumstance possesses a high degree of relevance since a lawyer has to live; certainly
he cannot afford either to neglect his paying cases. Nonetheless, what is incumbent upon him as counsel
de oficio must be fulfilled."
So it has been from the 1905 decision of In re Robles Lahesa, 9 where respondent was de oficio counsel,
the opinion penned by Justice Carson making clear: "This Court should exact from its officers and
subordinates the most scrupulous performance of their official duties, especially when negligence in the
performance of those duties necessarily results in delays in the prosecution of criminal
cases ...." 10 Justice Sanchez in People v. Estebia 11 reiterated such a view in these words: "It is true that
he is a court-appointed counsel. But we do say that as such counsel de oficio, he has as high a duty to
the accused as one employed and paid by defendant himself. Because, as in the case of the latter, he
must exercise his best efforts and professional ability in behalf of the person assigned to his care. He is
to render effective assistance. The accused-defendant expects of him due diligence, not mere
perfunctory representation. For, indeed a lawyer who is a vanguard in the bastion of justice is expected
to have a bigger dose of social conscience and a little less of self-interest." 12chanrobles virtual law library
The weakness of the petition is thus quite evident.
3. If respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, it was only due to the apprehension that
considering the frame of mind of a counsel loath and reluctant to fulfill his obligation, the welfare of the
accused could be prejudiced. His right to counsel could in effect be rendered nugatory. Its importance
was rightfully stressed by Chief Justice Moran in People v. Holgado in these words: "In criminal cases
there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The
right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the
most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of
procedure, and; without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not
know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or
uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it
has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under rules of procedure it is not
enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him
whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for
him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his
own." 13 So it was under the previous Organic Acts. 14 The present Constitution is even more emphatic.
For, in addition to reiterating that the accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel," 15 there is this new provision: "Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force,
violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him.
Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence." 16chanrobles
virtual law library
Thus, is made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense of an accused. Such
a consideration could have sufficed for petitioner not being allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio.
For he did betray by his moves his lack of enthusiasm for the task entrusted to him, to put matters
mildly. He did point though to his responsibility as an election registrar. Assuming his good faith, no such
excuse could be availed now. There is not likely at present, and in the immediate future, an exorbitant
demand on his time. It may likewise be assumed, considering what has been set forth above, that
petitioner would exert himself sufficiently to perform his task as defense counsel with competence, if
not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of the profession in good
standing. The admonition is ever timely for those enrolled in the ranks of legal practitioners that there
are times, and this is one of them, when duty to court and to client takes precedence over the
promptings of self-interest.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs against petitioner.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
Barredo, J., took no part.
PETITIONER Adelino Ledesma
RESPONDENT Rafael Climaco, Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Silay City, Negros Occidental, Branch 1
DOCKET No. L-23815
DATE 28 June 1974
PONENTE Fernando, J.
FACTS:
On 13 October 1964, Adelino Ledesma was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of
Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental, thus discharged his duties. As he was counsel de parte for one
of the accused pending in the court, he filed a motion to withdraw, but was denied by the
respondent Judge Rafael Climaco. He was also appointed by the Judge as counsel de oficio for the
two defendants. As a result, he filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de
oficio, premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to render full time
service. The volume of work will also prevent him from handling adequately the defense. However,
the Judge still denied the said motion, as well as the motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not issue Ledesma, a member of the bar, may withdraw as counsel de oficio, due to an
appointment as Election Registrar.
RULING:
No, Ledesma may not withdraw as counsel de oficio for the sole reason of his appointment as
Election Registrar.
The provision in the Constitution states that, “Any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No
force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used
against them. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.”
This manifests the indispensable role of a member of the bar in the defense of an accused. What is
incumbent upon him as counsel de oficio must be fully fulfilled. The ends of justice would be served
by allowing and requiring Ledesma to continue as counsel the officio, since the prosecution has
already rested its case—the case being postponed at least eight (8) times. It was also noted that
there was no incompatibility between his duty to the accused and to the court and the performance
of his task as Election Registrar.
Hence, because of these considerations, it is suffice for petitioner not being allowed to withdraw
as counsel de oficio.
