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*Army Techniques Publication Headquarters
No. 3-21.8 Department of the Army
Washington, DC, $SULO
Contents
Page
PREFACE .................................................................................................. xxi
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... xxiii
Chapter 1 ORGANIZATION........................................................................................ 1-1
Section I – Operational Overview .................................................... 1-1
Operational Environment .................................................................... 1-1
Unified Land Operations ..................................................................... 1-5
Law of Land Warfare........................................................................... 1-9
Section II – Role of the Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad............ 1-10
Organization ...................................................................................... 1-10
Duties and Responsibilities ............................................................... 1-14
Habitual Attachments ........................................................................ 1-23
Capabilities ....................................................................................... 1-28
Limitations ......................................................................................... 1-29
Close Combat ................................................................................... 1-29
Employment Considerations ............................................................. 1-29
Section III – Role of the Mechanized Infantry Platoon and
Squad ............................................................................................... 1-30
Organization ...................................................................................... 1-30
Responsibilities ................................................................................. 1-32
Bradley Fighting Vehicle ................................................................... 1-38
Capabilities ....................................................................................... 1-39
Limitations ......................................................................................... 1-40
* This publication supersedes FM 3-21.8, The Infantry 5LIOHPlatoon and Squad; ATTP
3-21.71, The Mechanized Infantry Platoon and Squad (Bradley); and ATTP 3-21.9, SBCT
Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad.
i
Contents
Figures
Figure 1-1. Infantry rifle platoon and squads .......................................1-11
Figure 1-2. Infantry fire team ................................................................1-12
Figure 1-3. Infantry squad ....................................................................1-13
Figure 1-4. Infantry weapons squad ....................................................1-13
Figure 1-5. Attack aviation call for fire brief format ..............................1-21
Figure 1-6. Indirect fire request format .................................................1-24
Figure 1-7. Close air support 9-line request example ..........................1-25
Figure 1-8. DD Form 1380, Tactical Combat Casualty Care
(TCCC) Card.....................................................................1-27
Figure 1-9. Bradley platoon organization .............................................1-31
Figure 1-10. Stryker platoon organization ............................................1-42
Figure 1-11. DD Form 1380, Tactical Combat Casualty Care
(TCCC) Card.....................................................................1-49
Figure 1-12. Infantry rifle company ......................................................1-54
Figure 1-13. Mechanized Infantry company.........................................1-55
Figure 1-14. Armor company ...............................................................1-56
Figure 1-15. SBCT Infantry rifle company............................................1-57
Figure 2-1. Envelopment ........................................................................2-5
Figure 2-2. Turning movement ...............................................................2-6
Figure 2-3. Frontal attack .......................................................................2-7
Figure 2-4. Penetration ..........................................................................2-8
Figure 2-5. Infiltration .............................................................................2-9
Figure 2-6. Flank attack .......................................................................2-10
Figure 2-7. Fire team wedge ................................................................2-23
Figure 2-8. Fire team file ......................................................................2-23
Figure 2-9. Squad column, fire teams in wedge ..................................2-25
Figure 2-10. Squad line ........................................................................2-26
Figure 2-11. Squad file .........................................................................2-26
Figure 2-12. Platoon column ................................................................2-31
Tables
Table 2-1. Primary formations ............................................................. 2-21
Table 2-2. Comparison of fire team formations ................................... 2-22
Table 2-3. Comparison of squad formations ....................................... 2-24
Table 2-4. Comparison of platoon formations ..................................... 2-29
Table 2-5. Mounted formation characteristics ..................................... 2-37
Table 2-6. Movement techniques and characteristics ......................... 2-44
Table 2-7. Consolidation and reorganization activities ........................ 2-68
Table 3-1. Advantages and disadvantages of delay techniques ........... 3-9
Table 3-2. Obstacle effects.................................................................. 3-35
Table 5-1. Actions at rally point ........................................................... 5-16
Table 5-2. Stationary and passing unit responsibilities ....................... 5-30
Table 5-3. Actions at halts ................................................................... 5-46
Table 6-1. Actions by ambush elements ............................................. 6-39
Table 6-2. Example infrared collection matrix ..................................... 6-48
Table F-9. Weapons squad duty positions and responsibilities .......... F-42
Table F-10. M240-series rates of fire .................................................. F-49
Table G-1. Shoulder-launched munitions ..............................................G-2
Table G-2. Javelin capabilities and features .........................................G-9
Table G-3. Physical characteristics of the command launch unit ........G-10
Table G-4. Physical characteristics of the round .................................G-11
Table G-5. Javelin capabilities and limitations ....................................G-13
Table G-6. Effects of the M141 BDM on field fortifications or
bunkers ............................................................................G-20
Table G-7. Armored vehicle kills .........................................................G-25
Table G-8. Effects of different munitions on vehicle types ..................G-27
Table G-9. Missile selection priority chart ...........................................G-31
Table G-10. Personnel duties ..............................................................G-34
Table G-11. AT4 Surface danger zones criteria in meters ..................G-36
Table H-1. Relationship between breaching organization and
breaching fundamentals ...................................................H-11
Table H-2. Demolitions ........................................................................H-22
Table H-3. Charges .............................................................................H-33
Table H-4. Firing system components.................................................H-34
Table H-5. Mine delivery methods .......................................................H-39
Table H-6. Characteristics of antitank mines .......................................H-42
Table H-7. Characteristics of antipersonnel mines .............................H-43
This publication addresses the significant changes in Army doctrinal terminology, concepts,
and constructs and proven tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). The following
paragraphs provide a summary by chapter:
Chapter 1 – Organization:
z Provides a brief description of operational environments for Infantry platoons and
squads. An overview of the Army's operational concept of unified land operations,
operational structure, and law of war, rules of engagement (ROE), and combat
power.
z Addresses the role and organizational characteristics the Infantry platoon and squad
as trained to conduct offensive, defensive, and stability tasks.
z Addresses company team operations for the Stryker Infantry rife company, Infantry
rifle company, and Armor and mechanized Infantry company.
z Describes task organization, mission, capabilities, and limitations the Infantry
platoon and squad echelons within all three brigade combat teams (BCTs) as well
as the duties and responsibilities of personnel within those echelons.
Chapter 2 – Offense:
z Addresses primary purpose of the offense—to decisively defeat, destroy, or
neutralize the enemy force, or to seize key terrain.
z Discusses offensive actions to deceive or divert the enemy, deprive them of
resources or decisive terrain, collect information, or fix the enemy in position.
z Describes offensive actions, during defensive missions, required to destroy an
attacker and exploit success.
z Addresses the following keys to offensive missions—identify the enemy’s decisive
point; choose a form of maneuver avoiding the enemy’s strength while exploiting
Chapter 3 – Defense:
z Addresses primary purpose of the defense—to repel, to defeat, or to destroy an
enemy attack and to gain the initiative for the offense.
z Discusses the basics, characteristics, and planning considerations and direct and
indirect fire planning of defensive missions the Infantry platoon and squad
performs.
z Describes the three defensive tasks—area defense, mobile defense, and retrograde
operations.
z Addresses the five-step sequence of a defense during execution.
z Discusses three basic forms of the defense: defense of a linear obstacle, perimeter
defense, or a reverse-slope defense.
z Addresses common defensive control measures.
z Concludes with a discussion of planning considerations in transitioning to other
operations.
Chapter 4 – Stability:
z Discusses stability components of operations encompassing various military
missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States (U.S.) in
coordination with other instruments of national power.
z Addresses BCT support to stability tasks, essential offensive and defensive tasks,
and planning considerations.
z Describes conduct of mission command warfighting task—inform, influence and
cyber/electromagnetic activities, replacement of the five Army information tasks
(inform and influence, mission command warfare, information management,
operations security (OPSEC), and military deception).
z Terms information engagement, command and control warfare, and information
protection are rescinded.
z Provides discussion on transitioning from stability tasks to operations focused on
offensive or defensive tasks.
Chapter 5 – Movement:
z Describes the different types of movements, administrative and tactical.
z Introduces the different types of movement formations and techniques.
z Discusses route selection, navigational aids, and route types.
z Provides techniques for crossing different types of danger areas and enemy contact
at danger areas.
z Addresses movement with combat vehicles mounted and dismounted and security
aspects going along with mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support
available, time available and civil considerations (METT-TC).
z Concludes with other movement situations, over water and under limited visibility.
Chapter 7 – Sustainment:
z Addresses the sustainment challenges to ensure continuous operations during
combat.
z Discusses sustainment of the Infantry platoon and squad (its Soldiers) to ensure
maneuver and conduct of combat operation.
z Describes the process to continually anticipate Soldier needs and ensure the platoon
and squad is properly sustained to conduct their mission.
z Addresses anticipation of future sustainment needs critical to operations and
maintaining the momentum.
z Focuses platoon and squad sustainment operations, includes unit responsibilities,
company trains operations, and functions of sustainment.
Note. Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine gender is used, both male
and female are implied.
Organization
The primary mission of the Infantry platoon and squad is to close
with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver to destroy, capture,
or repel an assault by fire, close combat, and counterattack. In order
to succeed, Infantry platoons and squads are aggressive, physically
fit, disciplined, and well-trained. The inherent strategic mobility of
Infantry units dictates a need to be prepared for rapid deployment
in response to situations in different operational environments. This
chapter provides a brief discussion of operational environment and
an operational overview of unified land operations, and the law of
land warfare. It focuses on the role and organization, as well as the
duties and responsibilities within the Infantry platoon and squad.
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
1-2. The operational environment for an Infantry platoon and squad is a composite of
conditions, circumstances, and influences affecting the employment of that platoon or
squad. It has a bearing on decisions made by the platoon leader and squad leader. As with
Army leaders at all levels, platoon leaders and squad leaders use operational variables to
analyze and understand the specific operational environment in which they conduct
operations. They use mission variables to focus on specific elements of an operational
environment during mission analysis. The operational environment for each operation is
different and usually evolves as an operation progresses. It is critical that each platoon
leader and squad leader understands his specific operational environment in order to plan,
prepare, execute, and assess operations. (Refer to ADRP 5-0 for more information.)
OPERATIONAL VARIABLES
1-3. When Infantry forces are alerted for deployment, redeployment within a theater of
operations, or assigned a mission, their assigned higher headquarters provides an analysis
of the operational environment that affects operations at that higher level. From that
higher-level operational environment analysis, a platoon leader or squad leader can draw
any information relevant to his particular part of the higher headquarters operational
environment. This allows him to use the limited resources available to collect and analyze
additional information that applies only to his more specific operational environment.
Analysis of operational environment at all levels of command uses the common framework
of the eight operational variables and associated subvariables. The term PMESII-PT is
used as a memory device. (Refer to JP 3-0 for more information.) The following is a list
of the operational variables, their definitions, and examples (in parentheses) of questions
a platoon leader or squad leader might need answered about each variable:
z Political. Describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of
governance—formally constituted authorities, as well as informal or covert political
powers. (Who is the tribal leader in the village?)
z Military. Exposes the military and paramilitary capabilities of all relevant actors
(enemy, friendly, and neutral) in a given operational environment. (Does the enemy
in this neighborhood have antitank missiles?)
z Economic. Encompasses individual and group behaviors related to producing,
distributing, and consuming resources. (Does the village have a high unemployment
rate?)
z Social. Describes the cultural, religious, and ethnic makeup within an operational
environment and the beliefs, values, customs, and behaviors of society members.
(Who are the influential people in the village? For example, religious leaders, tribal
leaders, warlords, criminal bosses, or prominent families.)
z Information. Describes the nature, scope, characteristics, and effects of individuals,
organizations, and systems that collect, process, manipulate, disseminate, or act on
information. (How much access does the local population have to news media or
the Internet?)
z Infrastructure. Comprises the basic facilities, services, and installations needed for
the functioning of a community or society. (Is the electrical generator in the village
working?)
z Physical environment. Includes the geography and man-made structures as well as
the climate and weather in the area of operations. (What types of terrain or weather
conditions in this area of operation favor enemy operations?)
z Time. Describes the timing and duration of activities, events, or conditions within
an operational environment, as well, as how the timing and duration are perceived
by various actors in the operational environment. (For example, at what times are
people likely to congest roads or conduct activities that provide cover for hostile
operations?)
1-4. Upon receipt of a warning order (WARNORD) or mission, leaders filter relevant
information categorized by the operational variables into the categories of the mission
variables used during mission analysis. The mission variables consist of METT-TC.
1-5. Incorporating the analysis of operational variables into METT-TC ensures leaders
consider the best available relevant information about conditions that pertain to the
mission. Input from the operational variables often emphasizes the operational
environment civil aspects. This emphasis is most obvious in civil considerations, but it
affects the other mission variables of METT-TC as well. The platoon leader analyzes civil
considerations in terms of, areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events
(ASCOPE). (Refer to ATP 2-01.3 for more information.)
1-6. The Infantry platoon interacts with people at many levels. In general, the people in
any area of operation can be categorized as a threat, an enemy, an adversary, a neutral, or
a friend. One reason land operations are complex is all categories are intermixed, often
with no easy means to distinguish one from another. Threat, enemy, adversary, and neutral
are defined as—
z Threat. Any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and
intent to harm U.S. forces, U.S. national interests, or the homeland. (Refer to
ADRP 3-0.)
z Enemy. A party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized.
(Refer to ADRP 3-0.) An enemy is a combatant and is treated as such under the law
of war.
z Adversary. A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and
against which the use of force may be envisaged. (Refer to JP 3-0.)
z Neutral. A party identified as neither supporting nor opposing friendly or enemy
forces. (Refer to ADRP 3-0.)
z Host Nation. A nation which receives the forces and supplies of allied nations and
NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory.
THREAT
1-7. Threats may include individuals, groups of individuals (organized or not
organized), paramilitary or military forces, nation-states, or national alliances. When
threats execute their capability to do harm to the United States, they become enemies.
Preparing for and managing these threats requires employing all instruments of national
power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. (Refer to ADRP 2-0 for more
information.)
1-8. The term hybrid threat has evolved to capture the seemingly increased complexity
of operations, and the multiplicity of actors involved, and the blurring between traditional
elements of conflict. A hybrid threat is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular
forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces, or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually
beneficial effects. Hybrid threats combine regular forces governed by international law,
military tradition, and customs with irregular forces that act with no restrictions on
violence or targets for violence. Such varied forces and capabilities enable hybrid threats
to capitalize on perceived vulnerabilities, making them particularly effective. While the
existence of innovative enemies is not new, hybrid threats demand the Infantry platoon
and squad prepare for a range of possible threats simultaneously (Refer to ADRP 3-0 for
more information.)
1-9. Incorporating civil considerations into mission analysis requires critical thinking,
collaboration, continuous learning, and adaptation. It requires analyzing ASCOPE. In
support of unified land operations, Army forces at every echelon must strive to obtain
support from the indigenous population and institutions. Many social factors influence
MISSION VARIABLES
1-10. Mission variables describe characteristics of the area of operation, focusing on how
they might affect a mission. Incorporating the analysis of the operational variables into
METT–TC ensures Army leaders consider the best available relevant information about
conditions that pertain to the mission. Using the operational variables as a source of
relevant information for the mission variables allows commanders to refine their
situational understanding of their operational environment and to visualize, describe,
direct, lead and assess operations. The mission variables are—
z Mission. Commanders and staffs view all of the mission variables in terms of their
impact on mission accomplishment. The mission is the task, together with the
purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for the action.
It is always the first variable commanders consider during decisionmaking. A
mission statement contains the, who, what, when, where, and why of the operation.
z Enemy. The second variable to consider is the enemy dispositions (including
organization, strength, location, and tactical mobility), doctrine, equipment,
capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action.
z Terrain and weather. Terrain and weather analysis are inseparable and directly
influence each other’s impact on military operations. Terrain includes natural
features (such as rivers and mountains) and man-made features (such as cities,
airfields, and bridges). Commanders analyze terrain using the five military aspects
of terrain, observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key and decisive
terrain, obstacles, cover and concealment (OAKOC). The military aspects of
weather include visibility, wind, precipitation, cloud cover, temperature, and
humidity.
z Troops and support available. This variable includes the number, type, capabilities,
and condition of available friendly troops and support. This includes supplies,
services, and support available from joint, host nation and unified action partners.
They also include support from civilians and contractors employed by military
organizations, such as the Defense Logistics Agency and the Army Materiel
Command.
z Time available. Commanders assess the time available for planning, preparing, and
executing tasks and operations. This includes the time required to assemble, deploy,
and maneuver units in relationship to the enemy and conditions.
z Civil considerations. Civil considerations are the influence of manmade
infrastructure, civilian institutions, and activities of the civilian leaders,
populations, and organizations within an area of operation on the conduct of
military operations. Civil considerations comprise six characteristics, expressed as
ASCOPE: areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events.
support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events.
(Refer to ADRP 3-28 for more information.)
z Homeland defense is the protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic
population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and
aggression, or other threats as directed by the President. DOD leads the response,
with other departments and agencies in support of the DOD efforts. (Refer to
JP 3-27 for more information.)
z The philosophy of mission command—the exercise of authority and direction by
the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the
commander’s intent—guide leaders in the execution of unified land operations.
Unified land operations begin and end with the exercise of collective and individual
initiative to gain a position of advantage while degrading and defeating the enemy
throughout the depth of enemy’s organization. (Refer to ADRP 6-0 for more
information.)
OPERATIONS STRUCTURE
1-16. The operations structure—operations process, warfighting functions, and
operational framework—are the Army’s common construct for operations. It allows Army
leaders to rapidly organize efforts in a manner commonly understood across the Army.
The operations process provides a broadly defined approach to developing and executing
operations. The warfighting functions provide an intellectual organization for common
critical functions. The operational framework provides Army leaders with basic
conceptual options for visualizing and describing operations. (Refer to ADRP 5-0 for more
information.)
Operations Process
1-17. The operations process is the Army’s overarching framework to integrate processes
and activities across the force by means of mission command. It consists of major mission
command activities performed during operations, including:
z Planning is the process by which leaders translate the commander’s visualization
into a specific course of action (COA) for preparation and execution, focusing on
the expected results. Planning to determine the relationship among the mission
variables begins with the analysis and assessment of conditions in the operational
environment, with particular emphasis on the enemy. It involves understanding and
framing the problem and envisioning the set of conditions representing the desired
end state.
z Preparation consists of activities performed by units to improve their ability to
execute an operation. Preparation includes, but is not limited to, plan refinement,
rehearsals, information collection and assessing, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
This includes coordination, confirmation briefs and back briefs, inspections, and
movement.
z Execution is putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the
mission, and using situational understanding to assess progress and make execution
and adjustment decisions.
Operational Framework
1-22. Army leaders are responsible for clearly articulating their concept of the operation
in time, space, purpose, and resources. An established framework and associated
vocabulary assist greatly in this task. Army leaders are not bound by any specific
framework for conceptually organizing operations, but three operational frameworks have
proven valuable in the past. Leaders often use these conceptual frameworks in
combination. For example, a commander may use the deep-close-security framework to
describe the operation in time and space, the decisive-shaping-sustaining framework to
articulate the operation in terms of purpose, and the main and supporting efforts framework
to designate the shifting prioritization of resources. These operational frameworks apply
equally to tactical actions in the area of operation. (Refer to ADRP 3-0 for more
information.)
1-23. Area of operation refers to areas assigned to Army units by higher headquarters.
Within their area of operation, commanders integrate and synchronize maneuver, fires,
and interdiction. To facilitate this integration and synchronization, commanders have the
authority to designate targeting priorities and timing of fires.
1-24. Area of influence is a geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable
of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the
commander’s command or control. (ADRP 3-0) The area of influence normally surrounds
and includes the area of operation.
1-25. Area of interest is that area of concern to the commander, including the area of
influence, adjacent areas, and areas extending into enemy territory. This area also includes
areas occupied by enemy forces that could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission.
(Refer to ADRP 3-0 for more information.)
1-26. Deep-close-security framework that has been associated historically with a terrain
orientation but can be applied to temporal and organizational orientations as well. Deep
operations involve efforts to disrupt uncommitted enemy forces. Close operations involve
efforts to have immediate effects with committed friendly forces, potentially in direct
contact with enemy forces, to include enemy reserves available for immediate
commitment. Security operations involve efforts to provide early and accurate warning of
enemy operations, provide the force with time and maneuver space within which to react
to the enemy, protect the force from surprise, and develop the situation so the commander
can use the force.
1-27. Decisive-shaping-sustaining framework lends itself to a broad conceptual
orientation. Decisive operations lead directly to the accomplishment of the mission.
Commanders may combine the decisive-shaping-sustaining framework and the deep-
close-security framework when this aids in visualizing and describing the operation. The
decisive operation need not be a close operation. Shaping operations create and preserve
conditions for the success of decisive operation. Commanders may designate more than
one shaping operation. Sustaining operations enable the decisive operation or shaping
operation by generating and maintaining combat power.
1-28. Main and supporting efforts are part of a framework, more simplistic than other
organizing frameworks, focuses on prioritizing effort among subordinate units. Therefore,
commanders can employ it with either the deep-close- security framework or the decisive-
shaping-sustaining framework. The main effort is the designated subordinate unit whose
mission at a given point in time is most critical to overall mission success. It is usually
weighted with the preponderance of combat power. Typically, the main effort shifts one
or more times during execution. Supporting efforts are designated subordinate units with
missions that support the success of the main effort.
1-33. The Soldier’s Rules distill the essence of the law of war, outlining the ethical and
lawful conduct required of Soldiers in operations. (Refer to Army Regulation [AR] 350-1
for more information.) Soldier’s Rules are—
z Soldiers fight only enemy combatants.
z Soldiers do not harm enemies who surrender. They disarm them and turn them over
to their superior.
z Soldiers do not kill or torture any personnel in their custody.
z Soldiers collect and care for the wounded, whether friend or enemy.
z Soldiers do not attack medical personnel, facilities, or equipment.
z Soldiers destroy no more than the mission requires.
z Soldiers treat civilians humanely.
z Soldiers respect private property and possessions.
z Soldiers should do their best to prevent violations of the law of war.
z Soldiers report all violations of the law of war to their superior.
ORGANIZATION
1-35. The Infantry rifle platoon and its squads can be task organized alone or as a
combined arms force based upon METT-TC. (See figure 1-1.) Its effectiveness increases
through the synergy of combined arms including tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles (BFVs)
and Stryker Infantry carrier vehicles (ICVs), engineers, and other support elements. The
Infantry rifle platoon and squad as a combined arms force can capitalize on the strengths
of the team’s elements while minimizing their limitations.
grenadier provides high explosive (HE) indirect fires for both point and area targets. A
team leader leads his team by example.
INFANTRY SQUAD
1-40. Currently, there is only one type of Infantry squad and its primary role is a maneuver
or base-of-fire element. (See figure 1-3.) While the platoon’s task organization may
change, the Infantry squad’s organization generally remains standard.
1-41. The Infantry squad is a model for all tactical task organizations. It is comprised of
two fire teams and a squad leader. It can establish a base of fire, providing security for
another element, or conducting fire and movement with one team providing a base of fire,
while the other team moves to the next position of advantage or onto an objective. The
squad leader has two subordinate leaders to lead the two teams, freeing him to control the
entire squad.
Note. The combat load for an SLM is two per rifle squad. Either two M72-series
light antitank (AT) weapon, M136-series antitank (AT4), M141 bunker defeat
munitions (BDMs), or a combination of are normally issued to the rifleman.
Note. When referring to the medium machine gun in this manual, it refers to the
M240-series machine gun. There are several variants of the M240. They are the
M240, M240B, M240C, M240D, M240E, M240G, M240H and M240L, each
supporting their specific platform. The M240B is the standard Infantry medium
machine gun of the U.S. Army. The M240L machine gun is the next generation
medium machine gun, currently being fielded to replace the M240B.
Note. The duties and responsibilities of leadership and platoon members must be
executed even in the absence of a particular leader to ensure mission
accomplishment in accordance with the commander’s intent.
PLATOON LEADER
1-46. The platoon leader leads his Soldiers by personal example and is responsible for all
the platoon does or fails to do, having complete authority over his subordinates. This
centralized authority enables him to maintain unit discipline, unity, and to act decisively.
He must be prepared to exercise initiative within his company commander’s intent and
without specific guidance for every situation. The platoon leader knows his Soldiers, how
to employ the platoon, its weapons, and its systems. Relying on the expertise of the platoon
sergeant, the platoon leader regularly consults with him on all platoon matters. During
operations, the platoon leader—
z Leads the platoon in supporting the higher headquarters missions. He bases his
actions on his assigned mission and intent and concept of his higher commanders.
z Conducts troop leading procedures.
z Maneuvers squads and fighting elements.
z Synchronizes the efforts of squads.
z Looks ahead to the next “move” of the platoon.
z Requests, controls, and synchronizes supporting assets.
z Employs mission command systems available to the squads and platoon.
PLATOON SERGEANT
1-48. The platoon sergeant is the platoon's most experienced NCO and second-in-charge,
accountable to the platoon leader for leadership, discipline, training, and welfare of the
platoon's Soldiers. He sets the example in everything. He assists the platoon leader by
upholding standards and platoon discipline. His expertise includes tactical maneuver,
employment of weapons and systems, sustainment, administration, security,
accountability, protection warfighting functions, and Soldier care. As the second-in-
charge, the platoon sergeant assumes no formal duties except those prescribed by the
platoon leader. However, the platoon sergeant traditionally—
z Ensures the platoon is prepared to accomplish its mission, which includes
supervising precombat checks and inspections.
z Updates platoon leader on appropriate reports and forwards reports needed by
higher headquarters.
z Prepares to assume the role and responsibilities of the platoon leader.
z Takes charge of task-organized elements in the platoon during tactical operations,
which may include but is not limited to, quartering parties, support elements in raids
or attacks, and security patrols.
z Monitors the morale, discipline, and health of the platoon.
z Positions where best needed to help the engagement (either in the base of fire or
with the assault element).
z Receives squad leaders’ administrative, logistical, and maintenance reports, and
requests rations, water, fuel, and ammunition.
z Requests logistical support from the higher headquarters, and usually coordinates
with the company’s first sergeant or executive officer.
z Ensures Soldiers maintain all equipment.
z Ensures ammunition and supplies are properly and evenly distributed after the
platoon consolidates on the objective and while the platoon reorganizes.
z Manages the unit’s combat load prior to operations, and monitors logistical status
during operations.
z Establishes and operates the unit’s casualty collection point (CCP). This includes
directing the platoon medic and aid/litter teams in moving casualties, maintains
platoon strength level information, consolidates and forwards the platoon’s casualty
reports, and receives and orients replacements.
z Employs the available digital mission command systems to the squads and platoon.
z Ensures Soldiers distribute supplies according to the platoon leader’s guidance and
direction.
z Accounts for Soldiers, equipment, and supplies.
z Coaches, counsels, and mentors Soldiers.
z Upholds standards and platoon discipline.
z Understands the mission and commander’s intent two levels up (company and
battalion).
SQUAD LEADER
1-51. The squad leader directs team leaders and leads by personal example. He has
authority over his subordinates and overall responsibility of those subordinates’ actions.
Centralized authority enables him to act decisively while maintaining troop discipline and
unity. Under the fluid conditions of close combat, the squad leader accomplishes assigned
missions without constant guidance from higher headquarters.
1-52. The squad leader is the senior Infantry Soldier in the squad and is responsible for
everything the squad does or fails to do. He is responsible for the care of the squad’s
Soldiers, weapons, and equipment, and leads the squad through two team leaders. During
operations, the squad leader—
z Is the subject matter expert on all battle and individual drills.
z Is the subject matter expert for the squad’s organic weapons employment, and
employment of supporting assets.
z Knows weapon effects, surface danger zones, and risk estimate distances for all
munitions.
z Uses control measures for direct fire, indirect fire, and tactical movement
effectively.
z Controls the movement of the squad and its rate and distribution of fire (including
call for and adjust fire).
z Fights the close fight by fire and movement with two fire teams and available
supporting weapons.
z Selects the fire team’s general location and temporary sector of fires in the defense.
z Communicates timely and accurate situation reports (SITREPs) and status reports
including—
Size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment (SALUTE) spot reports
(SPOTREPs).
Status to the platoon leader (including squad location and progress, enemy
situation, enemy killed in action [KIA], and security posture).
Status of ammunition, casualties, and equipment to the platoon sergeant.
z Employs digital mission command systems available to the squad and platoon.
z Operates in all environments to include the urban environment.
z Conducts troop leading procedures.
z Assumes duties as the platoon sergeant or platoon leader as required.
z Understands the mission and commander’s intent two levels up (platoon and
company).
TEAM LEADER
1-53. The team leader leads his team members by personal example and has authority
over his subordinates and overall responsibility of their actions. Centralized authority
enables him to maintain troop discipline and unity and to act decisively. Under the fluid
conditions of close combat, he accomplishes assigned missions using initiative without
needing constant guidance from higher headquarters.
1-54. The team leader’s position on the battlefield requires immediacy and accuracy in
all of his actions and is a fighting leader who leads by example. He is responsible for all
his team does or fails to do, and is responsible for caring of the team’s Soldiers, weapons,
and equipment. During operations, the team leader—
z Is the subject matter expert for all the team’s weapons and duty positions and all
squad battle drills.
z Leads his team in fire and movement.
z Controls the movement of his team and its rate and distribution of fire.
z Employs digital mission command systems available to the squad and platoon.
z Ensures security of the team’s area of operations.
z Assists the squad leader as required.
z Is prepared to assume the duties of squad leader and platoon sergeant.
z Enforces field discipline and preventive medicine measures.
z Determines his team’s combat load and manages its available classes of supply as
required.
z Understands the mission two levels up (squad and platoon).
1-55. When maneuvering the team, the team fights using one of three techniques. This
includes:
z Individual movement techniques. This is the lowest level of movement.
z Buddy team fire and movement.
z Fire team fire and movement (maneuver).
1-56. Determining a suitable technique is based on the effectiveness of the enemy’s fire
and available cover and concealment. The more effective the enemy’s fire, the lower the
level of movement. Because the team leader leads his team, he is able to make this
assessment firsthand. Other leaders must be sensitive to his decision on movement.
GRENADIER
1-57. The grenadier currently is equipped with an M203/M320 weapon system consisting
of an M16-series or M4-series rifle/carbine and an attached 40-mm grenade launcher. He
provides the fire team with a high trajectory and an HE capability out to 350 meters. His
fire enables the fire team to achieve complementary effects with high trajectory, HE
munitions, and flat trajectory ball ammunition from the team’s weapons. The grenade
launcher allows the grenadier to perform three functions: suppress and destroy enemy
Infantry and lightly armored vehicles with HE or high explosive dual purpose (HEDP);
provide obscurants to screen and cover his squad’s fire and movement; and employ
illumination rounds to increase his squad’s visibility and mark enemy positions. The
grenadier—
z Accomplishes all tasks of the rifleman.
z Engages targets with appropriate type of rounds both day and night.
z Identifies 40-mm rounds by shape and color. He must know how to employ each
type of round and know its minimum safety constraints.
z Knows the maximum ranges for each type of target of the grenade launcher.
AUTOMATIC RIFLEMAN
1-58. The automatic rifleman’s primary weapon is currently the 5.56-mm M249 light
machine gun. The automatic rifleman provides the unit with a high volume of sustained
suppressive direct fires of area targets. The automatic rifleman employs his weapon system
to suppress enemy Infantry and bunkers, destroy enemy automatic rifle and AT teams, and
enable the movement of other teams and squads. He is normally the senior Soldier of the
fire team and must—
z Be able to accomplish all tasks of the rifleman and grenadier.
z Be prepared to assume the duties of team leader and squad leader.
z Be able to engage groups of enemy personnel, thin-skinned vehicles, bunker doors
or apertures, and suspected enemy locations with automatic fire.
z Be able to provide suppressive fire on these targets so his teammates can close with
and destroy the enemy.
z Be familiar with field expedient firing aids to enhance the effectiveness of his
weapon: an example is aiming stakes.
z Be able to engage targets from the prone, kneeling, and standing positions with and
without night observation devices, and understands the mission two levels up
(squad and platoon).
RIFLEMAN
1-59. The rifleman provides the baseline standard for all Infantry Soldiers and is an
integral part of the fire team. The rifleman is an expert in handling and employing the
weapon and placing well-aimed fire on the enemy. Additionally, the rifleman must—
z Be an expert on his weapon system, his rifle, its optics, and its laser-aiming device,
and is effective with this weapon system day or night.
z Be capable of engaging all targets with well-aimed shots.
z Employ all weapons of the squad, as well as common munitions.
z Construct and occupy a hasty firing position and know how to fire from it. He must
know how to occupy covered and concealed positions in all environments and what
protection they provide from direct fire weapons, and is competent in the
performance of these tasks while using night vision devices.
z Fight as part of his unit, which includes proficiency in his individual tasks and drills.
z Know the duties of his teammates and is prepared to fill in with their weapons, if
needed.
SQUAD-DESIGNATED MARKSMAN
1-61. The squad-designated marksman employs an optically enhanced general-purpose
weapon. He also receives training available within the unit’s resources to improve the
squad’s precision engagement capabilities at short and medium ranges.
1-62. A rifleman may be assigned as the squad-designated marksman. He is chosen for
his demonstrated shooting ability, maturity, reliability, good judgment, and experience. He
must be able to execute the entire range of individual and collective rifleman tasks within
the squad. (Refer to FM 3-22.9 for more information.)
1-63. The squad designated marksman is not the squad sniper, he is a fully integrated
member of the rifle squad and provides an improved capability for the rifle squad. He does
not operate as a semi-autonomous element on the battlefield as a sniper, nor does he
routinely engage targets at the extreme ranges common to snipers.
MACHINE GUNNER
1-64. The gunner is normally the senior member of the medium machine gun team.
During operations, the gunner—
z Is responsible for his assistant gunner and all the gun equipment.
z Is responsible for putting the gun in and out of action.
z Is the subject matter expert for information contained in FM 3-22.68.
z When attached to a rifle squad, is the subject matter expert for employment of the
medium machine gun, and advises the rifle squad leader of the best way to employ
the medium machine gun.
z Enforces field discipline while the gun team is employed tactically.
z Knows the ballistic effects of the weapon on all types of targets.
z Assists the weapons squad leader and is prepared to assume his responsibilities.
z Understands the mission two levels up (squad and platoon).
COMBAT LIFESAVER
1-66. The combat lifesaver (CLS) is a nonmedical Soldier trained to provide enhanced
first aid/lifesaving procedures beyond the level of self-aid or buddy aid. The CLS is not
intended to take the place of medical personnel. Using specialized training, the CLS can
slow deterioration of a wounded Soldier's condition until treatment by medical personnel
is possible. Each certified CLS is issued a CLS aid bag. Whenever possible, the platoon
leader ensures each fire team includes at least one CLS.
HABITUAL ATTACHMENTS
1-68. Fire support team and combat medics normally are attached anytime the platoon
deploys.
FORWARD OBSERVER
1-69. The forward observer (FO), along with his RTO, is the platoon subject matter expert
on indirect planning and execution. He advises the platoon leadership on the employment
and execution for all fire support assets, including company mortars (if assigned), battalion
mortars, field artillery, and other allocated fire support assets. He is responsible for
locating targets, and calling and adjusting indirect fires. The fire support team also knows
the mission and concept of operation, specifically the platoon’s scheme of maneuver and
concept of fires, and is the platoon leader’s indirect fire expert. The forward observer
also—
Informs the fire support team of the platoon situation, location, and indirect fire
support requirements.
Prepares and uses maps, overlays, and terrain sketches.
Calls for and adjusts indirect fires. (See figure 1-6, page 1-24.)
Operates as a team with the fire support radiotelephone operator.
Selects targets to support the platoon’s mission.
Selects observation posts and movement routes to and from selected targets.
Operates digital message devices and maintains communication with the company
and battalion fire support officer (FSO).
Maintains grid coordinates of his location.
Prepares to employ close air support (CAS) assets. (See figure 1-7, page 1-25.)
PLATOON MEDIC
1-70. Combat medics are assigned to the medical platoon and are tasked to support the
Infantry battalion. Combat medics are allocated to the Infantry companies on the basis of
one combat medic per platoon, and one senior combat medic per company. The platoon
combat medic or the company senior combat medic goes to the casualty’s location, or the
casualty is brought to the combat medic at the CCP. The CCP combat medic makes his
assessment, administers initial medical care, initiates a DD Form 1380 (Tactical Combat
Casualty Care [TCCC] Card) (see figure 1-8) then, requests evacuation or returns the
individual to duty. (Refer to AR 40-66 for details and instructions on completing the form.)
Figure 1-8. DD Form 1380, Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) Card
1-71. The Infantry platoon combat medic usually locates with, or near, the platoon
sergeant. When the platoon moves on foot in the platoon column formation, the combat
medic positions himself near the platoon sergeant. If the platoon is mounted, the combat
medic usually rides in the same vehicle as the platoon sergeant. + Emergency medical
treatment (EMT) procedures performed by the combat medic may include opening an
airway, starting intravenous (IV) fluids, controlling hemorrhage, preventing or treating for
shock, splinting fractures or suspected fractures, and providing relief for pain.
1-72. The Infantry platoon combat medic is trained under the supervision of the battalion
surgeon or physician’s assistant and medical platoon leader. The platoon combat medic is
responsible for—
Triaging injured, wounded, or ill friendly and enemy personnel for priority of
treatment.
Conducting sick call screening.
Assisting in the evacuation of sick, injured, or wounded personnel under the
direction of the platoon sergeant.
Assisting in the training of the platoon’s combat lifesavers in enhanced first-aid
procedures.
Requisitioning Class VIII supplies from the battalion aid station (BAS) for the
platoon according to the tactical SOPs.
Recommending locations for platoon casualty collection point.
Providing guidance to the platoon’s combat lifesavers as required.
CAPABILITIES
1-73. The following lists capabilities of the Infantry rifle platoon and squad:
Conduct offensive and defensive tasks in all types of environments, day and night.
Seize, secure, occupy, and retain terrain.
Destroy, neutralize, suppress, interdict, disrupt, block, canalize, and fix enemy
forces.
Breach enemy obstacles.
Feint and demonstrate to deceive the enemy.
Screen friendly units.
Reconnoiter, deny, bypass, clear, contain, and isolate. These tasks might be oriented
on both terrain and enemy.
Conduct small-unit operations.
Participate in air assault operations.
Participate in airborne operations (airborne only).
Operate in conjunction with mounted forces.
Operate in conjunction with special operations forces.
Participate in amphibious operations.
LIMITATIONS
1-74. The Infantry rifle platoon and squad has the following limitations:
z Limited close combat and sustainment assets.
z Limited vehicle mobility, the foot speed of organic elements may establish the pace
of operations.
z Vulnerable to enemy armor, artillery, and air assets when employed in open terrain.
z Vulnerable to enemy CBRN attacks with limited decontamination capability.
CLOSE COMBAT
1-75. Infantry platoons and squads normally operate as part of a larger force. They
habitually benefit from the support of organic mortars, artillery, close air support, Army
attack aviation, air defense, and engineers. They may additionally receive support from
elements of armored or Stryker formations. They provide their own suppressive fires either
to repel enemy assaults or to support their own maneuver. During close combat, platoon
leaders determine how to employ their squads by considering the following objectives:
z Support the rifle squads with direct fires.
z Suppress or neutralize enemy elements or positions using indirect fires, Army attack
aviation, or close air support.
z Destroy enemy armored vehicles with Javelin fires.
1-76. Success in operations requires seamless coordination of platoons and rifle squads
in close combat. It depends on their ability to react to contact; employ suppressive direct
and indirect fires; maneuver to a position of reletive advantage; and assault to defeat,
destroy, or capture an enemy. For success the Infantry platoon relies on the ability of
leaders and Soldiers to—
z Maximize the use of restricted and complex terrain to achieve a position of
advantage while mitigating the Infantry platoons lack of inherent protection.
z Use limited visibility to their advantage to maximize the effect of surprise
complemented with aggressive maneuver.
z Operate their weapons with accuracy and deadly effect.
z Outthink, outmaneuver, and outfight the enemy.
EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS
1-77. Infantry units can operate in all terrain and weather conditions. They might be the
dominant force because of rapid strategic deployment. In such cases, they can take and
gain the initiative early, seize and retain or control terrain, and mass fires to stop the enemy.
Infantry units are particularly effective in restricted or urban terrain, where they can
infiltrate and move rapidly to the rear of enemy positions. The leader can enhance their
mobility by using helicopters and airlift.
1-78. Squads and platoons fight through enemy contact at the lowest possible level. Upon
enemy contact, all Soldiers and leaders must act at once. Battle drills are the standard
procedures that help the platoon take immediate action.
1-79. Before they can maneuver, squads or platoons in contact must establish effective
suppressive fires and gain fire superiority. If the platoon or squad cannot move under its
own fires, the leader must request support from the commander. Once fire superiority is
achieved, they maneuver against an enemy position. Infantry platoons and squads must
optimize the use of terrain to its greatest advantage masking avenues of approach to
maximize surprise and shock during the assault.
ORGANIZATION
1-81. The mechanized Infantry platoon is equipped with four BFVs and is divided into
two elements: mounted and dismounted. Figure 1-9 (page 1-30) depicts the BFV-equipped
mechanized Infantry platoon organization. The platoon can fight as two mutually
supporting maneuver elements or as two distinct maneuver elements—one mounted and
one dismounted. The platoon must prepare to fight in a variety of operational
environments. Once the rifle squads have dismounted, the mounted element can provide a
base of fire for the rifle squads as they close with and destroy the enemy.
MOUNTED ELEMENT
1-82. The mounted element comprises four BFVs that are organized into the following
two sections:
z The A section with the platoon leader as the section leader and the second BFV as
his wingman.
z The B section with the platoon sergeant as the section leader and the second BFV
as his wingman.
DISMOUNTED ELEMENT
1-83. Three, nine-man rifle squads make up the platoon’s dismounted element. The rifle
squads are organized as follows:
z The rifle squad has two, four-man fire teams and a squad leader.
z Each fire team is comprised of a —
Fire team leader.
Squad automatic weapon (SAW) gunner.
Grenadier.
Rifleman.
z One of the riflemen in the fire team is designated and trained as the antiarmor
specialist and fires the Javelin close combat munitions.
z The other rifleman in the squad is the squad’s designated marksman.
1-84. Based on the mission, the squad can carry the Javelin command launch unit and
missiles as well as an M240B medium machine gun.
RESPONSIBILITIES
1-85. The employment of the BFV by well-trained and proficient Soldiers enhances the
platoon’s capabilities to conduct operations with greater lethality, survivability, mission
command, and mobility.
PLATOON LEADER
1-86. The platoon leader leads his Soldiers by personal example and is responsible for all
the platoon does or fails to do, having complete authority over his subordinates. This
centralized authority enables him to maintain unit discipline, unity, and to act decisively.
He must be prepared to exercise initiative within his company commander’s intent and
without specific guidance for every situation. The platoon leader knows his Soldiers, how
to employ the platoon, its weapons, and its systems. Relying on the expertise of the platoon
sergeant, the platoon leader regularly consults with him on all platoon matters. During
operations, the platoon leader—
z Leads the platoon in supporting the higher headquarters missions. He bases his
actions on his assigned mission and intent and concept of his higher commanders.
z Conducts troop leading procedures.
PLATOON SERGEANT
1-88. The platoon leader should consider the platoon sergeant a fighter by trade and place
him in the tactical plan either dismounted or maneuvering the mounted element. The
platoon sergeant is the senior NCO and most experienced Soldier in the platoon. He assists
and advises the platoon leader. In the platoon leader’s absence, he leads the platoon. He
supervises the platoon’s administration, logistics, and maintenance. He handles individual
training management and the professional development of his Soldiers. He advises the
platoon leader on appointments, promotions and reductions, assignments, and discipline
of NCOs and enlisted Soldiers in the platoon. His tactical expertise in platoon operations
includes maneuver of the platoon and employment of all weapons.
1-89. The platoon sergeant—
z Controls the mounted element when the platoon leader dismounts; or, dismounts
with, commands, and controls the platoon when necessary (METT-TC dependent).
z Updates the platoon leader on appropriate reports, and forwards reports needed by
higher headquarters.
z Takes charge of task-organized elements in the platoon during tactical operations,
which may include, but are not limited to, quartering parties, support elements in
raids or attacks, and security patrols.
z Serves as a Bradley commander when the platoon operates mounted.
z Monitors the morale, discipline, and health of platoon members.
z Ensures Soldiers maintain all equipment.
z Coordinates and supervises company directed platoon resupply operations.
z Collects, prepares, and forwards logistical status updates and requests to the
company headquarters.
z Ensures ammunition and supplies are properly and evenly distributed after the
platoon consolidates on the objective and while the platoon reorganizes.
z Directs the platoon’s casualty evacuation process during mounted or dismounted
operations.
z Maintains platoon strength information, consolidates and forwards the platoon’s
casualty reports, and receives and orients replacements.
z Receives section and squad leaders’ administrative, logistical, and maintenance
reports and requests for rations, water, fuel, and ammunition.
z Ensures Soldiers distribute supplies according to the platoon leader’s guidance and
direction.
z Accounts for Soldiers, equipment, and supplies.
z Coaches, counsels, and mentors Soldiers.
z Upholds standards and platoon discipline.
BRADLEY COMMANDER
1-92. The platoon leader, platoon sergeant, and the two section leaders serve as the
Bradley commander for their BFVs. In the platoon leader’s absence, the gunner assumes the
responsibilities of the Bradley commander.
SECTION LEADER
1-94. While mounted, the platoon leader and platoon sergeant are the section leaders.
However, in the event that the platoon leader or platoon sergeant must dismount, the senior
Bradley commander within each section becomes the section leader, assisting and advising
the platoon leader in the employment of the mounted section. The section leader handles—
z Tactically employing and maintaining the BFVs within the section and individual
training of the section’s personnel.
z Monitoring his vehicle and section position on the platoon formation, digital
overlays, and digital reports.
z Navigating correctly, with or without precision navigation system.
z Sending SPOTREPs as requested or when the section makes contact.
BRADLEY GUNNER
1-95. The gunner observes the battlefield to detect enemy targets. The gunner handles—
z Operating the turret weapons as directed by the Bradley commander to engage and
destroy targets.
z Serving as Bradley commander when only two men remain in the BFV.
z Bearing the responsibility for performing unit-level maintenance on the turret and
its weapons systems.
z Helping with navigation and with radio operation.
BRADLEY DRIVER
1-96. The driver operates the vehicle under the Bradley commander’s control. The
driver—
z Follows terrain-driving procedures and tries to select hull-down positions.
SQUAD LEADER
1-97. The squad leader is the senior Infantry Soldier in the squad and is responsible for
everything the squad does or fails to do. He is responsible for the care of the squad’s
Soldiers, weapons, and equipment, and leads the squad through two team leaders. The
senior dismounted squad leader is responsible for the employment of the dismount element
until the platoon leader or platoon sergeant arrives. During operations, the squad leader—
z Is the subject matter expert on all battle and individual drills.
z Is the subject matter expert for the squad’s organic weapons employment, and
employment of supporting assets.
z Knows weapons effects, surface danger zones, and risk estimate distances for all
munitions.
z Uses control measures for direct fire, indirect fire, and tactical movement
effectively.
z Controls the movement of the squad and its rate and distribution of fire (including
call for and adjust fire).
z Fights the close fight by fire and movement with two fire teams and available
supporting weapons.
z Selects the fire team’s general location and temporary sector of fires in the defense.
z Communicates timely and accurate SITREPs and status reports, including—
SALUTE SPOTREPs.
Status to the platoon leader (including squad location and progress, enemy
situation, enemy KIA, and security posture).
Status of ammunition, casualties, and equipment to the platoon sergeant.
z Employs digital mission command systems available to the squad and platoon.
z Operates in all environments to include the urban environment.
z Conducts troop leading procedures.
z Assumes duties as the platoon sergeant or platoon leader as required.
z Understands the mission and commander’s intent two levels up (platoon and
company).
TEAM LEADER
1-98. The team leader leads his team members by personal example and has authority
over his subordinates and overall responsibility of their actions. Centralized authority
enables him to maintain troop discipline and unity and to act decisively. Under the fluid
conditions of close combat, he accomplishes assigned missions using initiative without
needing constant guidance from higher headquarters.
1-99. The team leader’s position on the battlefield requires immediacy and accuracy in
all of his actions and is a fighting leader who leads by example. He is responsible for all
his team does or fails to do, and is responsible for caring of the team’s Soldiers, weapons,
and equipment. During operations, the team leader—
z Is the subject matter expert for all the team’s weapons and duty positions and all
squad battle drills.
z Leads his team in fire and movement.
z Controls the movement of his team and its rate and distribution of fire.
z Employs digital mission command systems available to the squad and platoon.
z Ensures security of the team’s area of operations.
z Assists the squad leader as required.
z Is prepared to assume the duties of squad leader and platoon sergeant.
z Enforces field discipline and preventive medicine measures.
z Determines his team’s combat load and manages its available classes of supply as
required.
z Team members provide local security as needed. They provide maintenance support
for the BFV. Each team member is equally responsible for the welfare of the squad.
z Understands the mission two levels up (squad and platoon).
1-100. When maneuvering the team, the team fights using one of three techniques. This
includes—
z Individual movement techniques. This is the lowest level of movement.
z Buddy team fire and movement.
z Fire team fire and movement (maneuver).
z Determining a suitable technique is based on the effectiveness of the enemy’s fire
and available cover and concealment. The more effective the enemy’s fire, the
lower the level of movement. The team leader leads his team; therefore, he is able
to make this assessment firsthand. Other leaders must be sensitive to his decision
on movement.
RIFLEMAN
1-101. Each rifle squad has two riflemen. Each rifleman is either designated as the
antiarmor specialist or designated marksman.
Antiarmor Specialist
1-102. The designated antiarmor specialist has a Javelin AT missile system. This weapon
system gives the squad, platoon, and company a lethal fire-and-forget, man-portable, top
attack antiarmor capability. With it, they can defeat enemy main battle tanks up to 2000
meters during day, night, and in adverse weather conditions. If required, the squad
antiarmor specialist destroys enemy armor threats that might impede the squad or platoon’s
progress.
Designated Marksman
1-103. The designated marksman acts as a member of the squad under the direction of
the squad leader or as designated by the platoon leader. Although normally functioning as
a rifleman within one of the fire teams in a rifle squad, the designated marksman is armed
with a modified rifle. He is employed at the direction of the fire team leader or squad
leader. He is trained to eliminate high-payoff enemy personnel targets (such as enemy
automatic rifle teams, AT teams, and snipers) with precision fires.
GRENADIER
1-104. Each squad has two grenadiers with an M320/203 weapon system, which
comprises a carbine with an attached 40-mm grenade launcher. The M320/203 can be used
in two ways. It can be attached to the M16 assault rifle and the M4 carbine, attaching under
the barrel forward of the magazine, or it can be used dismounted with a stock attached as
a standalone model.
AUTOMATIC RIFLEMAN
1-105. Each rifle squad has two automatic weapons. The automatic rifleman mainly uses
the M249 SAW.
COMBAT LIFESAVER
1-106. The CLS is a nonmedical Soldier trained to provide enhanced first aid/lifesaving
procedures beyond the level of self-aid or buddy aid. The CLS is not intended to take the
place of medical personnel. Using specialized training, the CLS can slow deterioration of
a wounded Soldier's condition until treatment by medical personnel is possible. Each
certified CLS is issued a CLS aid bag. Whenever possible, the platoon leader ensures each
fire team includes at least one CLS.
1-107. The CLS—
z Ensures that the squad CLS bag and litters are properly packed and stored.
z Identifies Class VIII shortages to the platoon medic.
z Participates in all casualty treatment and litter-carry drills.
z Uses enhanced first-aid skills in the field until casualties can be evacuated.
z Knows the location of the casualty collection point and the TACSOP for
establishing it.
WEAPON SYSTEMS
1-109. The BFV's four weapon systems include the 25-mm automatic gun, the 7.62-mm
coaxial machine gun, the tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missile-
launcher system, and two smoke-grenade launchers.
LETHALITY
1-110. The BFV features an improved Bradley acquisition system, which adds an
improved target acquisition subsystem and missile control subsystem. The improvements
include a second-generation, forward-looking infrared thermal sight; a target-designation
function; dual-target tracking; an eye-safe laser range finder; an automatic gun-target
adjustment; automatic optical alignment; and “hunter-killer” capability. Second-
generation forward-looking infrared thermal sight allows the Bradley commander or
gunner to identify and acquire targets beyond the range of the vehicle’s weapon systems.
The improved Bradley acquisition system enables the user to acquire, recognize, identify,
and automatically track two targets within the same field of view and selected
magnification, day or night. The M2A3 BFV can use the 25-mm cannon or 7.62-mm
machine gun to engage either of two targets appearing in the same field of view and any
aspect, and the TOW while stationary.
SURVIVABILITY
1-111. Equipment on the BFV that helps ensure survivability includes—
z Roof fragmentation protection.
z Mounting capability for reactive armor tiles.
z Aluminum structure with steel appliqué spaced laminate, steel armor, or both.
z Titanium roof armor.
z 10-Soldier gas particulate filter unit.
z Halon fixed fire suppression systems in engine and personnel compartments.
z Portable carbon dioxide fire extinguishers.
z Bradley urban survivability kits.
CAPABILITIES
1-112. In accomplishing its assigned missions, the platoon employs close combat forces
and sustainment assets within its capabilities. The platoon’s effectiveness depends on the
synergy of its subordinate elements, to include its BFVs and the rifle squads. To employ
the platoon effectively, the platoon leader capitalizes on its strengths. The BFV-equipped
mechanized Infantry platoon can—
z Assault enemy positions.
z Assault with small arms and indirect fires to deliver rifle squads to tactical positions
of advantage.
z Use 25-mm cannon and 7.62-mm machine gun fire to effectively suppress or
destroy the enemy’s Infantry.
LIMITATIONS
1-113. The platoon leader must understand the limitations of the BFV-equipped
mechanized Infantry platoon to effectively employ the platoon. These limitations include
the following:
z BFVs are vulnerable to enemy antiarmor fires, attack helicopters, mines, AT guided
missiles, and close attack aircraft.
z Rifle squads are vulnerable to small arms, improvised explosive device (IED), and
indirect fires when not mounted.
z The foot speed of the dismounted Soldiers may establish the pace of operations.
z The BFV poses a variety of challenges in water-crossing operations. Between other
things, the platoon could have difficulty finding adequate fording sites or a bridge
with a sufficient weight classification.
z Radio communications may be significantly degraded in built-up areas and other
restricted terrain.
z Noise generated by BFVs may prevent them from arriving in an area undetected.
CLOSE COMBAT
1-114. BFV-equipped Infantry platoons and rifle squads normally operate as part of a
larger force. They benefit from the support of armor, artillery, mortars, close air support,
close combat attack, air defense, and engineers. They provide their own suppressive fires
either to repel enemy assaults or to support their own maneuver. During close combat,
platoon leaders determine how to employ the BFVs by considering the following
objectives:
z Support the rifle squads with direct fires.
z Provide mobile protection to transport rifle squads to the critical point on the
battlefield.
z Suppress or destroy enemy vehicles and other lightly armored vehicles.
z Destroy enemy armor with TOW fires.
1-115. Success in operations hinges on the actions of platoons, sections, and rifle squads
in close combat. It depends on their ability to react to contact; employ suppressive fires;
maneuver to an enemy’s vulnerable flank; and fight through to defeat, destroy, or capture
an enemy. For success, the BFV-equipped Infantry platoon relies on the ability of leaders
and Soldiers to—
z Use the potential of both the rifle squads and the BFV.
z Operate their weapons with accuracy and deadly effect.
z Outthink, outmaneuver, and outfight the enemy.
z Use terrain to their advantage.
EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS
1-116. Leaders must consider the following guidelines when employing mechanized
Infantry during decisive operations:
z Squads and platoons fight through enemy contact at the lowest possible level. Upon
enemy contact, all Soldiers and leaders must act at once and follow up. Battle drills
are standard procedures that help the platoon take immediate action.
z Before they can maneuver, squads or platoons in contact must establish effective
suppressive fires and gain fire superiority. If the platoon or squad cannot move
under its own fires, the leader must request support from the commander. Once they
gain fire superiority, they maneuver against an enemy position. The BFVs suppress
the enemy, move to a dismount location (if caught in the open), and dismount the
rifle squads. The BFVs quickly build a base of fire for the rifle squads to maneuver.
MISSION
1-118. Stryker Infantry platoons and squads share their company’s primary mission,
which is to close with and destroy the enemy through fire and maneuver; to destroy or
capture the enemy; and to repel the enemy assault by fire, close combat, and counterattack.
ORGANIZATION
1-119. The platoon must prepare to fight in a variety of operational environments. Once
the rifle squads have dismounted, the mounted element can provide a base of fire for the
rifle squads as they close with and destroy the enemy. Figure 1-10 (page 1-42) depicts the
platoon headquarters, the mounted elements, and the Infantry squads. The platoon can
fight as in multiple mutually supporting maneuver elements to include—
z Squad leader controls two dismounted teams and mounted Stryker vehicle.
z The squads fight dismounted while the Stryker vehicles move in vehicle sections.
z The platoon fights in sections with mounted and dismounted elements supporting
one another.
z The platoon fights with dismounted squads and Stryker vehicles or as two distinct
maneuver elements one mounted and one dismounted.
PLATOON HEADQUARTERS
1-120. The platoon headquarters consists of the platoon leader, platoon sergeant, RTO,
and attached fire support team and platoon combat medic. The platoon leader
responsibilities include the employment of the platoon and all the platoon’s systems. The
platoon sergeant is the senior NCO in the platoon. He is second in succession of command
and leads the platoon’s mounted element when the platoon leader dismounts with the
Infantry squads. He assists and advises the platoon leader and leads the platoon in the
platoon leader’s absence.
WEAPONS SQUAD
1-125. The weapons squad consists of a squad leader, two two-man machine gun teams
and a vehicle team. The weapons squad provides the primary base of fire for the
maneuver of the platoon’s rifle squads with accurate fires against enemy personnel and
equipment. The two machine gun teams consist of the gunner and assistant gunner. Each
team is currently equipped with the M240B 7.62-mm medium machine gun with an
effective range of over 800 meters. The platoon leader may want to consider providing
additional security for the weapons squad if their base of fire is otherwise protected from
enemy units. The vehicle team organization is the same as above.
RESPONSIBILITIES
1-126. The increased complexity of the ICV-equipped Infantry platoon requires highly
trained Soldiers and leaders. The increase of equipment in the platoon requires more cross
training to ensure Soldiers can fill vacancies or shortfalls in critical positions. Increases in
the amount and complexity of equipment and the transfer of increased information at every
level require platoon members to work closer than ever before.
PLATOON LEADER
1-127. The platoon leader leads his Soldiers by personal example and is responsible for
all the platoon does or fails to do, having complete authority over his subordinates. This
centralized authority enables him to maintain unit discipline, unity, and to act decisively.
He must be prepared to exercise initiative within his company commander’s intent and
without specific guidance for every situation. The platoon leader knows his Soldiers, how
to employ the platoon, its weapons, and its systems. Relying on the expertise of the platoon
sergeant, the platoon leader regularly consults with him on all platoon matters. During
operations, the platoon leader—
z Leads the platoon in supporting the higher headquarters missions. He bases his
actions on his assigned mission and intent and concept of his higher commanders.
z Conducts troop leading procedures.
z Maneuvers squads and fighting elements.
z Synchronizes the efforts of squads.
z Looks ahead to the next “move” of the platoon.
z Requests, controls, and synchronizes supporting assets.
z Employs mission command systems available to the squads and platoon.
z Checks with squad leaders ensuring 360-degree, three-dimensional security is
maintained.
z Checks with weapons squad leader controlling the emplacement of key weapon
systems.
z Issues accurate and timely reports.
z Places himself where he is most needed to accomplish the mission.
z Assigns clear tasks and purposes to the squads.
z Understands the mission and commander’s intent two levels up (company and
battalion).
z Normally dismounts when the situation causes the platoon to dismount.
z As leader of Section A, keeps his crew and wingman informed.
z Receives on-hand status reports from the platoon sergeant, section leaders and
squad leaders during planning.
z Develops the fires with the platoon sergeant, section leaders, and squad leaders.
z Coordinates and assists in the development of the obstacle plan.
z Oversees and is responsible for property management.
1-128. The platoon leader works to develop and maintain situational understanding. This
is a product of four elements. First, the platoon leader attempts to know what is happening
in present terms of friendly, enemy, neutral, and terrain situations. Second, he knows the
end state representing mission accomplishment. Third, he determines the critical actions
and events occurring to move his unit from the present to the end state. Finally, he assesses
the risk throughout.
PLATOON SERGEANT
1-129. The platoon sergeant is the platoon's most experienced NCO and second-in-
charge, accountable to the platoon leader for leadership, discipline, training, and welfare
of the platoon's Soldiers. He sets the example in everything. He assists the Platoon Leader
by upholding standards and platoon discipline. His expertise includes tactical maneuver,
employment of weapons and systems, sustainment, administration, security,
accountability, protection warfighting functions, and Soldier care. As the second-in-
charge, the platoon sergeant assumes no formal duties except those prescribed by the
platoon leader. However, the platoon sergeant traditionally—
z Ensures the platoon is prepared to accomplish its mission, which includes
supervising precombat checks and inspections.
z Updates platoon leader on appropriate reports and forwards reports needed by
higher headquarters.
z Prepares to assume the role and responsibilities of the platoon leader.
z Takes charge of task-organized elements in the platoon during tactical operations,
which may include, but is not limited to, quartering parties, support elements in
raids or attacks, and security patrols.
z Monitors the morale, discipline, and health of the platoon.
z Positions where best needed to help the engagement (either in the base of fire or
with the assault element).
z Receives squad leaders’ administrative, logistical, and maintenance reports, and
requests rations, water, fuel, and ammunition.
z Requests logistical support from the higher headquarters, and usually coordinates
with the company’s first sergeant or executive officer.
z Ensures Soldiers maintain all equipment.
Ensures ammunition and supplies are properly and evenly distributed after the
platoon consolidates on the objective and while the platoon reorganizes.
z Manages the unit’s combat load prior to operations, and monitors logistical status
during operations.
Establishes and operates the unit’s CCP. This includes directing the platoon medic
and aid/litter teams in moving casualties, maintains platoon strength level
information, consolidates and forwards the platoon’s casualty reports, and receives
and orients replacements.
z Employs the available digital mission command systems to the squads and platoon.
z Ensures Soldiers distribute supplies according to the platoon leader’s guidance and
direction.
z Accounts for Soldiers, equipment, and supplies.
z Coaches, counsels, and mentors Soldiers.
z Upholds standards and platoon discipline.
z Understands the mission and commander’s intent two levels up (company and
battalion).
1-133. The weapons squad leader is usually the senior squad leader, second only to the
platoon sergeant, and performs all the duties of the rifle squad leader. In addition, the
weapons squad leader—
z Controls fires and establishes fire control measures.
z Recommends medium machine gun employment to the platoon leader.
z Coordinates directly with the platoon leader for medium machine gun base-of-fire
effects, and plans accordingly.
z Monitors ammunition expenditure.
z Coordinates directly with the platoon leader in placement of the Javelin-CCMS to
best cover armored avenues of approach in the defense and overwatch positions in
the attack.
z As the senior squad leader, becomes the alternate platoon sergeant on the ground if
the platoon sergeant does not dismount.
z Employs mission command systems available to the squad and platoon.
z Trains his squad on individual and collective tasks required to sustain combat
effectiveness.
z Manages the logistical and administrative needs of his squad, such as requesting
and issuing ammunition, water, rations, and special equipment.
z Maintains accountability of Soldiers and equipment.
z Conducts troop leading procedures.
z Assists the vehicle commander in maintaining the ICV.
z Assumes control of the vehicle in absents of the platoon sergeant and platoon leader.
z Understands the mission two levels up (platoon and company).
TEAM LEADER
1-134. Two fire team leaders lead by example and control the movement and fires
of the fire team. They assist the squad leader in tactical control of the squad and in training
team members on individual and collective tasks and battle drills. Team leaders provide
the necessary local security and maintenance support for the ICV and are responsible for
the welfare of their teams. They control fires and distribution of fires for the team by
designating and marking targets.
VEHICLE COMMANDER
1-135. The vehicle commander is responsible for the employment and maintenance of
the ICV. He acquires targets, issues fire commands, and controls vehicle fires. The vehicle
commander is primarily responsible for the overall maintenance of the ICV weapon
systems and the automotive portion of the vehicle. He is responsible for the weapons
training and welfare of the crew. He sends digital SITREPs as requested or when the
vehicle makes contact. He navigates, assisted by the Precision Navigation System, and
ensures his vehicle maintains position in platoon formations.
VEHICLE DRIVER
1-136. The driver drives the vehicle under the vehicle commander’s control. He follows
terrain-driving procedures and tries to select hull-down positions. He also aids in detecting
targets and observing rounds fired. He assists in navigation by monitoring odometer
readings and observing terrain. The driver is primarily responsible for operator
maintenance of vehicle automotive systems.
GRENADIER
1-137. The grenadier is equipped with an M320/M203Weapon System consisting of an
M4/M16 rifle and an attached 40-mm grenade launcher. The M320/M203 allows him
to fire HE rounds to suppress and destroy enemy Infantry and lightly armored vehicles.
He also can employ smoke to designate targets or screen his squad’s movement, fire,
and maneuver. During night and adverse weather conditions, the grenadier also may
employ illumination rounds to increase his squad’s visibility and mark enemy or friendly
positions.
AUTOMATIC RIFLEMAN
1-138. The automatic rifleman’s primary weapon is the M249 SAW. Each Infantry
squad has two automatic weapons. The M249 provides the squad with a high volume of
sustained long-range suppressive and lethal fires beyond the effective range of the
M16/M4 rifle. The automatic rifleman employs the SAW to suppress enemy Infantry and
bunkers, destroy enemy automatic rifle and antitank teams, and enable maneuver of other
teams and squads. (Refer to appendix B for more information on the employment of the
M249 SAW.)
COMBAT LIFESAVER
1-140. The CLS is a nonmedical Soldier trained to provide enhanced first aid/lifesaving
procedures beyond the level of self-aid or buddy aid. The CLS is not intended to take the
place of medical personnel. Using specialized training, the CLS can slow deterioration of
a wounded Soldier's condition until treatment by medical personnel is possible. Each
certified CLS is issued a CLS aid bag. Whenever possible, the platoon leader ensures each
fire team includes at least one CLS.
1-141. The CLS—
z Ensures that the squad CLS and litters are properly packed and stored.
z Identifies Class VIII shortages to the platoon medic.
+ Provides enhanced first aid for injuries and participates in all litter-carry drills.
Uses enhanced first-aid skills in the field until casualties can be evacuated.
Knows the location of the casualty collection point and the TACSOP for
establishing it.
PLATOON MEDIC
1-142. Platoon combat medics are assigned to the medical platoon and are tasked to
support the Infantry battalion. Combat medics are allocated to the Infantry companies on
the basis of one combat medic per platoon, and one senior combat medic per company.
The location of the combat medic is of extreme importance for rapid medical treatment of
casualties.
1-143. The company senior combat medic collocates with the company trains. When a
casualty occurs, the CLS renders first aid, or first aid is provided through self-aid or buddy
aid. The platoon combat medic or the company senior combat medic goes to the casualty’s
location, or the casualty is brought to the combat medic at the CCP. The CCP combat
medic makes his assessment, administers initial medical care, initiates a DD Form 1380
(see figure 1-11) then requests evacuation or returns the individual to duty. (Refer to AR
40-66 for details and instructions on completing the form.)
Figure 1-11. DD Form 1380, Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) Card
1-144. The Infantry platoon combat medic usually locates with, or near, the platoon
sergeant. When the platoon moves on foot in the platoon column formation, the combat
medic positions himself near the platoon sergeant. If the platoon is mounted, the combat
medic usually rides in the same vehicle as the platoon sergeant. + EMT procedures
performed by the combat medic may include opening an airway, starting IV fluids,
controlling hemorrhage, preventing or treating for shock, splinting fractures or suspected
fractures, and providing relief for pain.
1-145. The Infantry platoon combat medic is trained under the supervision of the
battalion surgeon or physician’s assistant and medical platoon leader. The platoon combat
medic is responsible for—
Triaging injured, wounded, or ill friendly and enemy personnel for priority of
treatment.
Conducting sick call screening.
Assisting in the evacuation of sick, injured, or wounded personnel under the
direction of the platoon sergeant.
Assisting in the training of the platoon’s combat lifesavers in enhanced first-aid
procedures.
Requisitioning Class VIII supplies from the BAS for the platoon according to the
TACSOP.
Recommending locations for platoon casualty collection point.
Providing guidance to the platoon’s combat lifesavers, as required.
FORWARD OBSERVER
1-146. The fire support team is the platoon’s expert on indirect fire planning and
execution. The fire support team is the primary observer for all fire support assets to
include company and battalion mortars, field artillery, and any other allocated fire support
assets. He is responsible for locating targets and calling and adjusting indirect fires. He
must know the mission and the concept of operation, specifically the platoon’s scheme
of maneuver and concept of fires. He works directly for the platoon leader and interacts
with the company fire support team. The fire support team must also—
Inform the fire support team headquarters of the platoon situation, location, and fire
support requirements.
Prepare and use maps, overlays, and terrain sketches.
Call for and adjust indirect fires.
Select targets to support the platoon’s mission.
Select observation post(s) and movement routes to and from selected targets.
Operate digital message devices and maintain communication with the battalion and
company FSO.
Maintain grid coordinates of his location.
Be prepared to back up the platoon leader’s radio on the higher headquarters net if
needed.
z Be prepared to employ close air support assets and Army aviation during close combat
attacks.
PROTECTION
1-148. The Stryker ICV has several levels of protection depending on what armor
and systems have been added. Furthermore, it’s reduced audible and thermal signature,
speed provide significant additional protection. Future modifications may include reactive
and active armor systems. Currently, the ICV has the following protection features:
z The basic steel body armor protects against 7.62-mm fire.
z A spall liner protects Soldiers and equipment from fragments of the inner hull
breaking off when hit by a projectile.
z The ceramic appliqué armor, applied to the basic steel body, protects against
14.5-mm machine gun and 152-mm artillery fragmentation.
Description
1-150. The Remote Weapon Station-Improved (RWS-I M151E2) is a weapon mount
turret on which an M2HB .50-caliber machine gun or MK19 40-mm grenade machine
gun can be mounted. It is remotely operated from inside the vehicle compartment,
providing complete armored protection from direct enemy fire. The remote operation of
the RWS–I M151E2 is carried through the computerized f ire c ontrol u nit and a joystick.
This enables the part of the weapon station above vehicle deck, remote controlled
elevation and depression of the weapon mount and 360 degrees unrestricted traverse
rotation. The system also has remote weapon charging capability as well as firing. A
stabilization system enables the operator to track and engage targets while on the
move. The tracking and control capabilities of the RWS-I M151E2 provide a high first-
round hit probability against stationary and moving targets.
Characteristics
1-151. The RWS M151E1 is mounted to the top right side of the vehicle and is operated
and controlled from the interior of the chassis. The RWS M151E1 can accept either the
M2 or the MK19 40-mm grenade machine guns. It has the following characteristics:
z Both day and night operation modes.
z Traversing a full 360 degrees under power.
z Powered traverse and elevation at a rate of 80 degrees per second.
z Maximum elevation of +60 degrees.
z Maximum depression of –20 degrees.
z Foldable for transportability.
z Integrated fire control unit color display for operator interface.
z Smoke grenade launchers for local protection capable of firing four banks of four
grenades each.
z Thermal imaging module: Provides visual images for both day and night operations.
z Video imaging module: Provides a color day camera for clear and easier target
identification.
z A Small, Tactical, Optical, Rifle- Mounted (STORM), Micro-l aser Rangefinder
is mounted above the thermal imaging module and allows for accurately
determining the range to a target. It also provides visible aiming lasers, and an
infrared aiming laser. Although the STORM laser range finder is capable of much
more, only these features are utilized when mounted on the RWS M151E1.
Armament
1-152. The RWS M151E1 is capable of mounting either the M2HB .50-caliber machine
gun or the MK19 40-mm grenade machine gun. Because of stabilization, the machine
guns have different maximum effective ranges than when ground mounted.
Note. The MK19 40-mm grenade machine gun’s range is reduced when used on
a Stryker RWS compared to ground mounting due to limitations imposed by the
maximum range of movement of the Sight Servo Assembly in relation to the
weapon station platform’s elevation angle.
EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS
1-153. Leaders must consider the following guidelines when employing Stryker Infantry
during decisive operations:
z Squads and platoons fight through enemy contact at the lowest possible level.
Upon enemy contact, all Soldiers and leaders must act at once and follow up.
Battle drills are standard procedures that help the platoon take immediate action.
z Before they can maneuver, squads or platoons in contact must establish effective
suppressive fires and gain fire superiority. If the platoon or squad cannot move
under its own fires, the leader must request support from the commander. Once
they gain fire superiority, they maneuver against an enemy position. The Stryker
ICV can suppress the enemy, move to a dismount location (if caught in the open),
and dismount the rifle squads. The ICVs quickly build a base of fire for the rifle
squads to maneuver.
CLOSE COMBAT
1-154. ICV-equipped Infantry platoons and rifle squads normally operate as part of a
larger force. They benefit from the support of armor, artillery, mortars, close air
support, close combat attack, air defense, and engineers. They provide their own
suppressive fires either to repel enemy assaults or to support their own maneuver.
During close combat, platoon leaders determine how to employ the ICVs by considering
the following objective:
z Support the rifle squads with direct fires.
z Provide mobile protection to transport rifle squads to the critical point on the
battlefield.
z Suppress or destroy enemy personnel and other soft targets with a .50-cal machine
gun or an MK19.
1-155. Success in operations hinges on the actions of platoons, sections, and rifle squads
in close combat. It depends on their ability to react to contact; employ suppressive fires;
maneuver to an enemy’s vulnerable flank; and fight through to defeat, destroy, or capture
an enemy. For success, the ICV-equipped Infantry platoon relies on the ability of leaders
and Soldiers to—
z Use the potential of both the rifle squads and the ICV.
z Operate their weapons with accuracy and deadly effect.
z Outthink, outmaneuver, and outfight the enemy.
z Use terrain to their advantage.
ARMOR COMPANY
1-161. The Armor company is organized, equipped, and trained to fight pure or as a task
organized company team. The Armor company comprises a headquarters and three tank
platoons. The company headquarters comprises the commanding officer, executive officer,
first sergeant, and supply section. The company headquarters is equipped with two tanks,
a M113A2/A3 armored personnel carrier, and wheeled vehicles for mission command and
sustainment. A maintenance section from the forward support company is normally
attached to the Armor company. The ambulance squad in the combined arms battalion may
deploy and attach an armored medical evacuation vehicle to an Armor company with its
assigned crew of one emergency care sergeant with two ambulance drivers/crew. (See
figure 1-14, page 1-56.)
Offense
Platoon leaders and squad leaders must understand the principles
and TTP associated with the offense. They must comprehend their
role when operating within a larger organization’s operations, and
when operating independently. Leaders must recognize the
complementary and reinforcing effects of other maneuver elements
and supporting elements with their own capabilities, and understand
the impact of open or restrictive terrain on their operations. The
platoon conducts the offense to deprive the enemy of resources,
seize decisive terrain, deceive or divert the enemy, develop
intelligence, or hold an enemy in position. This chapter covers the
basic principles of the offense, common offensive planning
considerations, actions on contact, movement to contact attack, and
transitions.
AUDACITY
2-3. Audacity is a simple plan of action, boldly executed. Audacity inspires Soldiers to
overcome adversity and danger. It is a key component of all offensive actions, increasing
the chance for surprise. Audacity depends upon the leader’s ability to see opportunities for
action, decide in enough time to seize opportunities, and accept prudent risks. Leaders
understand when and where to take risks, plan, and execute boldly.
CONCENTRATION
2-4. Concentration is the massing of overwhelming effects of combat power to achieve
a single purpose. Leaders balance the necessity for concentrating forces to mass effects
against the need to disperse forces in order to avoid creating lucrative targets. Advances
in ground, air mobility, target acquisition, and long-range precision fires enable attackers
to concentrate effects. Mission command systems provide reliable, relevant information
that assist commanders in determining when to concentrate forces to mass effects. The
Infantry platoon and squad achieves concentration through—
z Careful planning and coordination based on a thorough terrain and enemy analysis,
plus accurate reconnaissance.
z Designation of a main effort and allocation of resources to support it.
z Continuous information flow.
z Massing firepower using long-range precision fires and maneuver.
SURPRISE
2-5. In the offense, surprise is achieved by attacking the enemy at a time or place they
do not expect or in a manner for which they are unprepared. Estimating the enemy
commander’s intent and denying the ability to gain thorough and timely situational
understanding are necessary to achieve surprise. Unpredictability and boldness help gain
surprise. The direction, timing, and force of attack also help achieve surprise. Surprise
delays enemy reactions, overloads and confuse his command and control systems, induces
psychological shock in enemy soldiers and leaders, and reduces the coherence of defensive
missions. By diminishing enemy combat power, surprise enables the attackers to exploit
enemy paralysis and hesitancy. The Infantry platoon and squad achieve surprise by—
z Gaining and maintaining information dominance by conducting thorough
information collection and counterreconnaissance efforts.
z Striking the enemy from an unexpected direction, at an unexpected time, and by
unique combinations of movement with units that cross all types of terrain.
z Quickly changing the tempo of operations.
z Being unpredictable.
TEMPO
2-6. Tempo is the relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect
to the enemy. Controlling or altering tempo is necessary to retain the initiative. A faster
tempo allows attackers to quickly penetrate barriers and defenses, and destroy enemy
forces in-depth before they can react. Leaders adjust tempo as tactical situations,
sustainment necessity, or operational opportunities allow. This ensures synchronization
and proper coordination, but not at the expense of losing opportunities, that defeats the
enemy. Rapid tempo demands quick decisions. It denies the enemy the chance to rest while
continually creating offensive opportunities.
OFFENSIVE TASKS
2-7. The four offensive tasks are movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit.
Each is explained below.
MOVEMENT TO CONTACT
2-8. Movement to contact is an offensive task designed to develop the situation and
establish or regain contact. (Refer to FM 3-90-1 for more information.) It creates favorable
conditions for subsequent tactical actions. The leader conducts a movement to contact
when the enemy situation is vague or not specific enough to conduct an attack. Forces
executing this task seek to make contact with the smallest friendly force possible. A
movement to contact may result in a meeting engagement, which is a combat action
occurring when a moving force engages an enemy at an unexpected time and place. Once
making contact with an enemy force, the leader has five options: attack, defend, bypass,
delay, or withdraw. Two movement to contact techniques are search and attack, and cordon
and search.
ATTACK
2-9. An attack destroys or defeats enemy forces, seizes and secures terrain, or both.
(Refer to FM 3-90-1 for more information.) Attacks incorporate coordinated movement
supported by direct and indirect fires. They may be decisive or shaping operations and
hasty or deliberate, depending upon the time available for assessing the situation, planning,
and preparing. However, based on METT-TC, the leader may decide to conduct an attack
using only fires. An attack differs from a movement to contact because enemy main body
dispositions are at least partially known, allowing the leader to achieve greater
synchronization. This enables the massing effects of attacking forces combat power more
effective in an attack than in a movement to contact.
EXPLOITATION
2-10. Exploitation follows an attack and disorganizes the enemy in-depth (Refer to
FM 3-90-1 for more information.) Exploitations seek to disintegrate enemy forces to the
point where they have no alternative but surrender or retreat. Exploitation take advantage
of tactical opportunities, foreseen or unforeseen. Division and higher headquarters
normally plan site exploitations as branches or sequels plans. However, the Infantry
platoon and squad may participate as part of the fixing force or striking force.
PURSUIT
2-11. A pursuit is an offensive task designed to catch or cut off a hostile force attempting
to escape, with the aim of destroying them. (Refer to FM 3-90-1 for more information.) A
pursuit normally follows exploitation. Transition into a pursuit can occur if it is apparent
enemy resistance has broken down entirely and the enemy is fleeing the area of operation.
Pursuits entail rapid movement, decentralized control and clear commanders’ intent to
facilitate control.
FORMS OF MANEUVER
2-12. Leaders select the form of maneuver based on METT-TC. The leader then
synchronizes the contributions of all warfighting functions to the selected form of
maneuver. An operation may contain several forms of offensive maneuver, such as frontal
attack to clear enemy security forces, followed by a penetration to create a gap in enemy
defenses, which in turn is followed by an envelopment to destroy a counterattacking force.
While Infantry platoons and squads do not have the combat power to conduct all forms of
maneuver on its own, they will participate as part of a larger organization. The six forms
of maneuver are—
z Envelopment.
z Turning movement.
z Frontal attack.
z Penetration.
z Infiltration.
z Flank attack.
ENVELOPMENT
2-13. Envelopment is a form of maneuver in which an attacking force seeks to avoid the
principal enemy defenses by seizing objectives behind those defenses allowing the
targeted enemy force to be destroyed in their current positions. BCTs and above normally
plan and conduct envelopments. At the tactical level, envelopments focus on seizing
terrain, destroying specific enemy forces, and interdicting enemy withdrawal routes. The
leader’s decisive operation focuses on attacking an assailable flank. It avoids the enemy’s
strength at the front where the effects of fires and obstacles are greatest. Generally, the
leader prefers to conduct envelopment instead of a penetration or frontal attack because
the attacking force tends to suffer fewer casualties while having the most opportunities to
destroy the enemy. Envelopment also produces great psychological shock on the enemy.
If no assailable flank is available, the attacking force creates one. The four varieties of
envelopment are single envelopment, double envelopment, encirclement, and vertical
envelopment. (See figure 2-1.)
TURNING MOVEMENT
2-14. A turning movement is a form of maneuver in which the attacking force seeks to
avoid the enemy’s principle defensive positions by seizing objectives behind the enemy’s
current position. This causes the enemy forces to move out of their current positions or
divert major forces to meet the threat. The leader uses this form of offensive maneuver to
seize vital areas in the enemy’s support area before the main enemy force can withdraw or
receive reinforcements. This form of offensive maneuver transitions from an attack into a
site exploitation or pursuit. A turning movement seeks to make the enemy force displace
from their current locations, whereas an enveloping force seeks to engage the enemy in
their current locations from an unexpected direction. Divisions normally execute turning
movements. (See figure 2-2, page 2-6.)
FRONTAL ATTACK
2-15. A frontal attack is a form of maneuver where an attacking force seeks to destroy a
weaker enemy force, or fix a larger enemy in place over a broad front. An attacking force
can use a frontal attack to overrun a weak enemy force. The leader commonly uses a frontal
attack as a shaping operation in conjunction with other forms of maneuver. (See
figure 2-3.)
PENETRATION
2-16. A penetration is a form of maneuver where an attacking force seeks to rupture
enemy defenses in a narrow front to disrupt the defensive system. Destroying the
continuity of defense allows the enemy’s subsequent isolation and defeat in detail by
exploiting friendly forces. The penetration extends from the enemy’s security area through
main defensive positions into the enemy support area. The leader employs a penetration
when there is no assailable flank, enemy defenses are overextended and weak spots are
detected in the enemy’s positions, or time pressures do not permit envelopment. (See figure
2-4, page 2-8.)
INFILTRATION
2-17. An infiltration is a form of maneuver where an attacking force conducts undetected
movement through or into an area controlled by enemy forces. The goal is to occupy a
position of advantage behind enemy positions while exposing only small friendly elements
to their defensive fires. Infiltration occurs by land, water, air, or a combination of means.
Moving and assembling forces covertly through enemy positions takes a considerable
amount of time. To infiltrate, the force avoids detection and engagement. Since this
requirement limits the size and strength of the infiltrating force, and infiltrated forces alone
rarely can defeat an enemy, infiltration normally is used in conjunction with and in support
for other forms of maneuver. (See figure 2-5.)
FLANK ATTACK
2-18. A flanking attack is a form of offensive maneuver directed at the flank of an enemy
force as illustrated in figure 2-6, page 2-10. A flank is the right or left side of a military
formation and is not oriented toward the enemy. It is usually not as strong in terms of
forces or fires as is the front of a military formation. A flank may be created by the attacker
with fires or by a successful penetration. A flanking attack is similar to envelopment but
generally conducted on a shallower axis. It is designed to defeat the enemy force while
minimizing the effect of the enemy’s frontally-oriented combat power. Flanking attacks
normally are conducted with the main effort directed at the flank of the enemy. Usually, a
supporting effort engages the enemy’s front by fire and maneuver while the main effort
maneuvers to attack the enemy‘s flank. This supporting effort diverts the enemy’s attention
from the threatened flank. Corps and divisions are the most likely echelons to conduct
turning movements. It often is used for a hasty operation or meeting engagement where
speed and simplicity are paramount to maintaining battle tempo and, ultimately, the
initiative.
MISSION COMMAND
2-24. In the Infantry platoon, the platoon leader is the central figure in mission command
and is essential to integrating the capabilities of the warfighting functions. Mission
command invokes the greatest possible freedom of action to his subordinates, facilitating
their abilities to develop the situation, adapt, and act decisively through disciplined
initiative within the platoon leader’s intent. It focuses on empowering subordinate leaders
and sharing information to facilitate decentralized execution.
2-25. Mission command conveys the leader’s intent, and an appreciation of METT-TC,
with special emphasis on—
z Enemy positions, strengths, and capabilities.
z Missions and objectives, including task and purpose, for each subordinate element.
z Commander’s intent.
z Areas of operations for use of each subordinate element with associated control
graphics.
z Time the operation is to begin.
z Scheme of maneuver.
z Special tasks required to accomplish the mission.
z Risk.
z Options for accomplishing the mission.
2-26. In addition to mission command warfighting function tasks, five additional tasks
reside within the mission command warfighting function. These tasks are—
z Conduct military deception.
z Conduct civil affairs operations.
z Install, operate, and maintain the network.
z Conduct airspace control.
z Conduct information protection.
2-27. The planning and coordination requirements and procedures for offensive tasks are
the same for both mechanized and Stryker Infantry units. The mechanized and Stryker
platoon leader, however, must consider the following:
z The speed of the BFV versus speed of the dismounted Infantryman.
z The increased firepower of the BFV and Stryker and supporting weapons.
z The ability to rapidly bring combat power to bear at the decisive point with
enhanced communication and coordination capabilities.
2-29. The following paragraphs are select tactical mission tasks that a platoon may
receive that are typically associated with offensive tasks. Each are described below.
Note. The situations used in this section are examples only. For the complete list,
refer to FM 3-90-1. They are not applicable in every tactical operation, nor
intended to prescribe specific method for achieving the purpose of the operation.
BREACH
2-30. A platoon may conduct a breach during an attack to break through or secure a
passage through an enemy defense, obstacle, minefield, or fortification. A platoon can
participate in a hasty breach or participate as part of a larger unit during the conduct of a
deliberate breach. A deliberate breach requires a synchronized combined arms operation.
DEFEAT
2-31. A platoon defeats an enemy force when the enemy force has temporarily or
permanently lost the physical means or the will to fight. During a defeat, the defeated
force’s leader is unwilling or unable to pursue his adopted course of action, thereby
yielding to the friendly commander’s will. Also, he can no longer interfere with the actions
of friendly forces to a significant degree.
DESTROY
2-32. A platoon destroys an enemy force when it physically renders an enemy force
combat-ineffective until it is reconstituted. A platoon can destroy an enemy force by—
z Executing an ambush where the entire enemy element is in the kill zone.
z Using surprise direct and indirect fire into an engagement area.
z Coordinating direct and indirect fires onto an objective.
z Massing indirect fires onto an unprepared enemy.
SEIZE
2-33. A platoon has seized an objective when it physically occupies it and the enemy can
no longer place direct fire on it. A platoon may seize during either offensive or defensive
tasks. Examples include:
z A platoon seizes the far side of an obstacle as part of a company team breach.
z A platoon seizes a portion of an enemy defense as part of a company team deliberate
attack.
z A platoon seizes key terrain to prevent its use by the enemy.
SUPPRESS
2-34. A platoon or squad has suppressed an enemy when the enemy cannot prevent our
forces from accomplishing their mission. It is a temporary measure. The platoon can use
direct fire or call in indirect and obscuring fires. Units in support and attack by fire
positions often use suppressive fires to accomplish their mission. It is often used by the
platoon during an attack to—
z Allow further movement of friendly forces.
z Isolate an objective by suppressing enemy units in mutually supporting positions.
z Cover the dismounted assault element from the line of departure (LD) to the
objective.
INTELLIGENCE
2-38. Leaders use threat event templates, the situation template, the likely threat COA,
the most dangerous threat COA, civil consideration products, terrain products, and other
intelligence products. The platoon leader may need to request information through the
company intelligence support team (CoIST) company intelligence analyst from the
battalion staff to answer platoon information requirements. (Refer to FM 3-21.10 for more
information.)
2-39. By studying the terrain, the leader tries to determine the principal enemy heavy and
light avenues of approach to the objective. Leaders also try to determine the most
advantageous area the enemy’s main defense might occupy, routes the enemy may use to
conduct counterattacks, and other factors such as OAKOC. The attacking unit
continuously conducts information collection during the battle because it is unlikely the
leader has complete knowledge of the enemy’s intentions and actual actions.
FIRES
2-40. The platoon leader must have a good, indirect fire plan for his route to cover
anticipated places of contact. These targets are a product of the platoon leader’s analysis
of the factors of METT-TC and must be incorporated into the company’s indirect fire plan.
2-41. Leaders conduct fires planning concurrently with maneuver planning at all levels.
BCTs and battalions typically use top-down fire support planning, with bottom-up
refinement of plans. As part of the top-down fire planning system, the company
commander refines the fire plan from higher headquarters to meet mission requirements,
ensuring these refinements are incorporated into the higher headquarters plan.
2-42. A clearly defined concept of the operation enables the platoon leader and FO to
articulate precisely how they want indirect fires to affect the enemy during the different
phases of the operation. In turn, this allows the company FSO to facilitate the development
of fires supporting accomplishment of the company’s mission down to the squad level.
(Refer to ADRP 3-09 for more information.)
SUSTAINMENT
2-43. The objective of sustainment in the offense is to assist the platoon in maintaining
the momentum. The platoon leader wants to take advantage of windows of opportunity
and launch offensive tasks with minimum advance warning time. Platoon sergeant and
squad leaders must anticipate these events and maintain flexibility to support the offensive
plan accordingly.
2-44. A key to an offense is the ability to anticipate the requirement to push support
forward, specifically in regard to ammunition, fuel, and water. This anticipation helps
maintain the momentum of attack by delivering supplies as far forward as possible.
Leaders use throughput distribution, and preplanned, preconfigured packages of essential
items to help maintain offensive momentum and tempo.
PROTECTION
2-45. The rapid tempo and changing nature of the offense presents challenges to the
protection of friendly assets. The forward movement of subordinate units is critical if the
leader is to maintain the initiative necessary for offensive tasks. Denying the enemy a
chance to plan, prepare, and execute a response to the friendly offense by maintaining a
high operational tempo is a vital means the leader employs to ensure the survivability of
his force. Using multiple routes, dispersion, highly mobile forces, piecemeal destruction
of isolated enemy forces, scheduled rotation and relief of forces before they culminate, and
wise use of terrain are techniques for maintaining a high tempo of offense. The exact
techniques employed in a specific situation reflect METT-TC.
2-46. The leader protects subordinate forces to deny the enemy the capability to interfere
with their ongoing operations. Protection also meets the leader’s legal and moral
obligations to the organization’s Soldiers. Some protection assets may need to be requested
from higher. (Refer to ADRP 3-37 for more information.) To help preserve the force, the
leader constantly assesses and ensures the following doctrinal protection tasks are
addressed during the platoon’s planning, preparation, and execution:
z Conduct operational area security.
z Employ safety techniques (including fratricide avoidance).
z Implement operation security.
z Provide intelligence support to protection.
z Implement physical security procedures.
z Apply antitank measures.
z Conduct survivability operations.
z Conduct CBRN operations.
z Provide support for EOD.
z Coordinate air and missile defense.
2-50. FM 3-99 addresses the following basic considerations for planning and execution
of air assaults:
z Air assault operations are best conducted at night or during weather conditions
allowing aircraft operations that obscure enemy observation. This facilitates
deception and surprise.
z Indirect fire support planning provides suppressive fires along air routes and in the
vicinity of landing zones. Priority for fires should be to the suppression of enemy
air defense systems.
z Infantry unit operations are not changed fundamentally by integrating with aviation
units. However, tempo and distance are changed dramatically.
z Ground and aerial reconnaissance units should be employed as early as possible to
conduct reconnaissance and surveillance activities to shape the operational area for
execution.
URBAN TERRAIN
2-51. Offensive tasks in urban terrain are designed to impose the leader’s will on the
enemy. Offensive missions in an urban environment aim to destroy, defeat, or neutralize
an enemy force. However, the purpose may be to achieve some effect relating to the
population or infrastructure of the urban area. Leaders should use a combined arms
approach for offensive urban operations.
2-52. Offensive missions in urban areas are based on offensive doctrine applied to urban
terrain. Urban terrain imposes a number of demands different from ordinary field
conditions, such as problems with troop requirements, maneuver, and use of equipment.
As with all offensive missions, the leader must retain his ability to maneuver against enemy
positions. (Refer to ATTP 3-06.11 for more information.)
SUBTERRANEAN ENVIRONMENTS
2-53. In cities, subterranean features include underground garages, passages, subway
lines, utility tunnels, sewers, and storm drains. Most allow troop movement. In smaller
towns, sewers and storm drains may permit Soldiers to move beneath the fighting to
surface behind the enemy. Knowledge of nature and location of underground facilities is
of great value to both the urban attacker and defender. Subterranean routes can grant
attackers use of both surface and subterranean avenues of approach, enabling them to place
a smaller force behind enemy defenses. Depending upon strength and depth of the
aboveground defense, attackers along the subterranean avenue of approach can become
the main attack. If subterranean efforts are not immediately successful, it forces defenders
to fight on two levels and to extend his resources to more than just street-level fighting.
(Refer to ATTP 3-06.11 for more information).
2-54. The presence of subterranean passages forces defenders to cover urban areas above
and below ground with observation and fire. Subterranean passages are more a
disadvantage to defenders than the attackers are. However, given the confining, dark
environment of these passages, they do offer some advantages when thoroughly
reconnoitered and controlled by the defender. A small group of determined Soldiers in a
prepared defensive position can defeat a numerically superior force. Subterranean
passages—
z Provide covered and concealed routes to move reinforcements or to launch
counterattacks.
2-61. Every squad and Soldier has a standard position. Soldiers can see their team leaders.
Fire team leaders can see their squad leaders. Leaders control their units using arm-and-
hand signals and intra-squad/team communications.
2-62. Formations also provide 360-degree security and allow units to give the majority of
their firepower to the flanks or front in anticipation of enemy contact.
2-63. Formations do not demand parade-ground precision. Platoons and squads must
retain the flexibility needed to vary their formations to the situation. Using formations
allows Soldiers to execute battle drills quickly and gives them the assurance their leaders
and buddy team members are in the expected positions and performing the right tasks.
2-64. Sometimes platoon and company formations differ due to METT-TC. For example,
the platoons could move in wedge formations within a company vee. It is not necessary
for platoon formations to be the same as the company formation unless directed by the
company commander. However, the platoon leader coordinates his formation with other
elements moving in the main body team’s formation.
Note. Formation illustrations shown in this chapter are examples only. They
might not depict actual situation or circumstances. Leaders must be prepared to
adapt their choice of formation to the specific situation. Leaders always should
position themselves where they can best control their formations.
PRIMARY FORMATIONS
2-65. Combat formations are composed of two variables: lateral frontage, represented by
the line formation; and depth, represented by the column formation. The advantages
attributed to one of these variables are disadvantages to the other. Leaders combine the
elements of lateral frontage and depth to determine the best formation for their situation.
In addition to the line and column/file, the other five types of formations—box, vee,
wedge, diamond, and echelon—combine these elements into varying degrees. Each does
so with different degrees of emphasis resulting in unique advantages and disadvantages
2-66. The seven combat formations can be grouped into two categories: formations with
one lead element, and formations with more than one lead element. The formations with
more than one lead element, as a general rule, are better for achieving fire superiority to
the front, but are more difficult to control. Conversely, the formations with only one lead
element are easier to control but are not as useful for achieving fire superiority to the front.
2-67. Leaders attempt to maintain flexibility in their formations. Doing so enables them
to react when unexpected enemy actions occur. The line, echelon, and column formations
are the least flexible of the seven formations. The line mass to the front has vulnerable
flanks. The echelon is optimized for a flank threat, something units want to avoid. The
column has difficulty reinforcing an element in contact. Leaders using these formations
should consider ways to reduce the risks associated with their general lack of flexibility.
(See table 2-1.)
Movement Characteristics
WHEN
MOVEMENT MOST FIRE
FORMATION OFTEN CAPABILITIES
USED CONTROL FLEXIBILITY SECURITY
AND
RESTRICTIONS
Basic fire Allows
Fire team
team Easy Good immediate fires All-round
wedge
formation in all directions
Close
Allows
terrain,
Less flexible immediate fires
limited
Fire team file Easiest than the to the flanks, Least
visibility,
wedge masks most
dense
fires to the rear
vegetation
2-69. The team leader adjusts the team’s formation as necessary while the team is moving.
The distance between Soldiers will be determined by the mission, the nature of the threat,
the closeness of the terrain, and by the visibility. As a general rule, the unit should be
dispersed up to the limit of control. This allows for a wide area to be covered, makes the
team’s movement difficult to detect, and makes it less vulnerable to enemy ground and air
attack. Fire teams rarely act independently. However, in the event they do, when halted,
they use a perimeter defense to ensure all-around security.
2-71. In this formation the fire team leader is in the lead position with his men echeloned
to the right and left behind him. The positions for all but the leader may vary. This simple
formation permits the fire team leader to lead by example. The leader’s standing order to
his Soldiers is, “Follow me and do as I do.” When he moves to the right, his Soldiers
should move to the right. When he fires, his Soldiers fire. When using the lead-by-example
technique, it is essential for all Soldiers to maintain visual contact with their leader.
SQUAD FORMATIONS
2-73. The term squad formation refers to the relative locations of the fire teams. Squad
formations include the squad column, the squad line, and squad file. Table 2-3, page 2-24
compares squad formations.
Movement Characteristics
WHEN
MOVEMENT MOST FIRE
FORMATION OFTEN CAPABILITIES
USED CONTROL FLEXIBILITY SECURITY
AND
RESTRICTIONS
Aids Allows large
maneuver, volume of fire
The main
Squad good to the flanks
squad Good All-round
column dispersion but only limited
formation
laterally and volume to the
in depth front
Limited
Good to
Fore Not as maneuver Allows
the front,
maximum good as capability maximum
Squad line little to the
firepower the (both fire immediate fire
flank and
to the front column teams to the front
rear
committed)
Close
Allows
terrain,
Most difficult immediate fire
dense
formation to to the flanks,
Squad fire vegetation, Easiest Least
maneuver masks most fire
limited
from to the front and
visibility
rear
conditions
2-74. The squad leader adjusts the squad’s formation as necessary while moving,
primarily through the three movement techniques. The squad leader exercises mission
command primarily through the two team leaders and moves in the formation where he
can best achieve this. The squad leader is responsible for 360-degree security, for ensuring
the team’s sectors of fire are mutually supporting, and for being able to rapidly transition
the squad upon contact.
2-75. The squad leader designates one of the fire teams as the base fire team. The squad
leader controls the squad’s speed and direction of movement through the base fire team
while the other team and attachments cue their movement off the base fire team. This
concept applies when not in contact and when in contact with the enemy.
2-76. Weapons from the weapons squad (a medium machine gun or a Javelin) may be
attached to the squad for movement or throughout the operation. These high value assets
need to be positioned so they are protected and can be quickly brought into the engagement
when required. Ideally, these weapons should be positioned so they are between the two
fire teams.
SQUAD COLUMN
2-77. The squad column is the squad’s main formation for movement unless preparing
for an assault. (See figure 2-9.) It provides good dispersion both laterally and in-depth
without sacrificing control. It also facilitates maneuver. The lead fire team is the base fire
team. Squads can move in either a column wedge or a modified column wedge. Rough
terrain, poor visibility, and other factors can require the squad to modify the wedge into a
file for control purposes. As the terrain becomes less rugged and control becomes easier,
the Soldiers resume their original positions.
SQUAD LINE
2-78. The squad line provides maximum firepower to the front and is used to assault or
as a pre-assault formation. (See figure 2-10, page 2-26.) To execute the squad line, the
squad leader designates one of the teams as the base team. The other team cues its
movement off the base team. This applies when the squad is in close combat as well. From
this formation, the squad leader can employ any of the three movement techniques or
conduct fire and movement.
SQUAD FILE
2-79. The squad file has the same characteristics as the fire team file. (See figure 2-11.)
In the event the terrain is severely restrictive or extremely close, teams within the squad
file also may be in file. This disposition is not optimal for enemy contact, but provides the
squad leader with maximum control. He increases control over the formation moving
forward to the first or second position. Moving forward enables him to exert greater morale
presence by leading from the front, and to be immediately available to make vital
decisions. Moving a team leader to the last position can provide additional control over
the rear of the formation.
PLATOON FORMATIONS
2-83. The actual number of useful combinations of squad and fire team combat
formations within the platoon combat formations is numerous, creating a significant
training requirement for the unit. Add to the requirement to modify formations with
movement techniques, immediate action drills, and other techniques, and it is readily
apparent what the platoon leader needs a few simple methods. These methods should be
detailed in the unit SOP.
combat. Well-trained squads are able to employ combat formations, movement techniques,
actions on contact, and stationary formations.
PLATOON HEADQUARTERS
2-87. The platoon leader also has to decide how to disperse the platoon headquarters
elements (himself, his RTO, his interpreter, forward observer, platoon sergeant, and
medic). These elements do not have fixed positions in the formations. Rather, they should
be positioned where they can best accomplish their tasks. The platoon leader’s element
should be where he conducts actions on contact, where he can supervise navigation, and
where he can communicate with higher. The forward observer’s element should be where
he can best see the battlefield and where he can communicate with the platoon leader and
battalion fire support officer. This is normally in close proximity to the platoon leader. The
platoon sergeant’s element should be wherever the platoon leader is not. Typically, this
means the platoon leader is toward the front of the formation, while the platoon sergeant
is toward the rear of the formation. Because of the platoon sergeant’s experience, he should
be given the freedom to assess the situation and advise the platoon leader accordingly.
BASE SQUAD
2-88. The platoon leader designates one of the squads as the base squad. He controls the
platoon’s speed and direction of movement through the base squad, while the other squads
and attachments cue their movement off of the base squad.
$SULO
May be used when the leaders When the leaders
does not want everyone on line; wants all Soldiers
forward for maximum Platoon primary WHEN MOST OFTEN
but wants to be prepared for
firepower to the front movement formation USED
contact: when crossing a line of
departure near an objective and the enemy situation
is known
Easier than platoon column, Good for maneuver (fire
squads on line, but less than Difficult CONTROL
and movement)
platoon line, squads on line
ATP 3-21.8
Good firepower to the front and FIRE
Allows maximum Allows limited firepower
rear, minimum fires to the flanks; CAPABILITIES
firepower to the front, to the front and rear, but
not as good as platoon column, AND
little to flanks and rear high volume to the flanks
better than platoon line RESTRICTIONS
2-29
Offense
2-30
MOVEMENT
Platoon file Platoon wedge Platoon vee
FORMATION
Chapter 2
ATP 3-21.8
small element and still have FLEXIBILITY
which to maneuver rear for movement (fire and
two squads to maneuver
movement) upon contact from
the flank
FIRE
Allows immediate fires to the Provides heavy volume of Immediate heavy volume of
CAPABILITIES
flanks, masks most fires to front firepower to the front or firepower to the front or flanks,
AND
and rear flanks but minimum fires to the rear
RESTRICTIONS
Movement Characteristics
Extremely limited overall security Good security to the flanks Good security to the front SECURITY
Table 2-4. Comparison of platoon formations (continued)
$SULO
Offense
Platoon Column
2-92. In the platoon column formation, the lead squad is the base squad. (See figure 2-12.)
It normally is used for traveling only.
Platoon Vee
2-97. This formation has two squads up front to provide a heavy volume of fire on contact.
(See figure 2-15, page 2-34.) It also has one squad in the rear either overwatching or
trailing the other squads. The platoon leader designates one of the front squads as the
platoon’s base squad.
Platoon Wedge
2-98. This formation has two squads in the rear overwatching or trailing the lead squad.
(See figure 2-16.) The lead squad is the base squad. The wedge formation—
z Can be used with the traveling and traveling overwatch techniques.
z Allows rapid transition to bounding overwatch.
Platoon File
2-99. This formation may be set up in several methods. (See figure 2-17, page 2-36.) One
method is to have three-squad files follow one another using one of the movement
techniques. Another method is to have a single platoon file with a front security element
(point) and flank security elements. The distance between Soldiers is less than normal to
allow communication by passing messages up and down the file. The platoon file has the
same characteristics as the fire team and squad files. It normally is used for traveling only.
2-101. When mounted, the platoon uses the column, wedge, line, echelon, coil, and
herringbone formations (based on METT-TC variables). The platoon leader tracks his
platoon’s formation and movement in conjunction with the company’s formation.
Table 2-5 shows characteristics, advantages, and disadvantages of each type of standard
mounted formations.
Table 2-5. Mounted formation characteristics
Formation Control Fires Security
Front/Rear Flank
Column Easy Limited Excellent Overall Limited
Staggered
Easy Good Good Overall Good
Column
Good, especially for
Wedge Easy Excellent Good
flanks
Line Difficult Excellent Poor Least secure
Excellent for Good for echeloned
Echelon Difficult Excellent
echeloned side side
Column
2-102. The platoon uses the column when moving fast, when moving through restricted
terrain on a specific route, or when it does not expect enemy contact. Each vehicle
normally follows directly behind the vehicle in front of it. However, if the situation
dictates, vehicles can disperse laterally to enhance security. This is sometimes referred to
as a staggered column.
Staggered Column
2-103. The staggered column formation is a modified column formation with one section
leading, and one section trailing to provide overwatch. The staggered column permits good
fire to the front and flanks. It is used when speed is critical, when there is a limited area
for lateral dispersion, or when enemy contact is possible. Figure 2-18 (page 2-38) shows
this type of column movement.
Figure 2-18. Staggered column formation with dispersal for added security
Wedge
2-104. The wedge formation (see figure 2-19), permits excellent firepower to the front
and good fire to each flank. The platoon leader can easily control all vehicles and deploy
rapidly into other formations. The wedge formation is often used when the enemy situation
is vague. The orientation of the pairs is left and right. The platoon leader and platoon
sergeant control the other vehicle (wingman) of their pair by directing it to follow to the
outside and to orient its weapons toward the flanks.
2-105. When the platoon leader’s vehicle is slightly forward one flank has more
firepower. Depending on METT-TC, the platoon leader makes the adjustment to which
side needs the most fire power.
Line
2-106. When assaulting a weakly defended objective, crossing open areas, or occupying
a support-by-fire position, the platoon mainly uses the line formation shown in figure 2-20,
page 2-40. The platoon can use the line formation in the assault to maximize the platoon’s
firepower and shock effect. The platoon normally uses the line formation when no terrain
remains between it and the enemy, when the platoon has suppressed the enemy’s AT
weapons, or when the platoon is vulnerable to artillery fire and must move fast.
Echelon
2-107. When the company team wants to maintain security or observation of one flank,
and when the platoon does not expect enemy contact, the platoon uses the echelon
formation shown in figure 2-21.
Coil
2-109. The coil (see figure 2-22, page 2-42) provides all-round security and observation
when the platoon is stationary. It is useful for tactical refueling, resupply, and issuing
platoon orders. Security is posted to include air guards and dismounted fire teams. The
vehicle turrets are manned.
Herringbone
2-110. The platoon uses the herringbone to disperse when traveling in column formation
(see figure 2-23). They can use it during air attacks or when they must stop during
movement. It lets them move to covered and concealed positions off a road or from an
open area and set up all-round security without detailed instructions. They reposition the
vehicles as needed to take advantage of the best cover, concealment, and fields of fire. Fire
team members dismount and establish security.
SQUAD TRAVELING
2-113. Traveling is used when contact with the enemy is not likely and speed is needed.
(See figure 2-24.)
overwatching team will be and how he will receive his instructions. (See figure 2-26.) The
cover and concealment on the bounding team's route dictates how its Soldiers move.
TRAVELING
2-120. The platoons often use the traveling technique when contact is unlikely and speed
is needed. (See figure 2-28, page 2-48.) When using the traveling technique, all unit
elements move continuously. In continuous movement, all Soldiers travel at a moderate
rate of speed, with all personnel alert. During traveling, formations are essentially not
altered except for effects of terrain.
TRAVELING OVERWATCH
2-121. Traveling overwatch is an extended form of traveling in which the lead element
moves continuously but trailing elements move at varying speeds, sometimes pausing to
overwatch movement of the lead element. (See figure 2-29.) Traveling overwatch is used
when enemy contact is possible but not expected. Caution is justified but speed is
desirable.
2-122. The trail element maintains dispersion based on its ability to provide immediate
suppressive fires in support of the lead element. The intent is to maintain in-depth, provide
flexibility, and sustain movement in case the lead element is engaged. The trailing
elements cue their movement to the terrain, overwatching from a position where they can
support the lead element if needed. Trailing elements overwatch from positions and at
distances that do not prevent them from firing or moving to support the lead element. The
idea is to put enough distance between the lead units and trail units so that if the lead unit
comes into contact, the trail units will be out of contact but have the ability to maneuver
on the enemy.
2-123. Traveling overwatch requires the leader to control his subordinate’s spacing to
ensure mutual support. This involves a constant process of concentrating (close it up) and
dispersion (spread it out). The primary factor is mutual support, with its two critical
variables being weapon ranges and terrain. Infantry platoons’ and squads’ weapon range
limitations dictate units generally should not get separated by more than 300 meters. In
compartmentalized terrain this distance is closer, but in open terrain this distance is greater.
BOUNDING OVERWATCH
2-124. Bounding overwatch is similar to fire and movement in which one unit
overwatches the movement of another. (See figure 2-30, page 2-50.) The difference is there
is no actual enemy contact. Bounding overwatch is used when the leader expects contact.
The key to this technique is the proper use of terrain.
Weapons Squad
2-129. Medium machine guns normally are employed in one of two ways—
z Attached to the overwatch squad or the weapons squad supporting the overwatching
element.
z Awaiting orders to move (with the platoon sergeant) or as part of a bounding
element.
TRAVELING
2-132. The platoon travels mounted when contact with the enemy is not likely and speed
is desired. (See figure 2-32.) The leader analyzes the latest intelligence on the enemy and
determines if contact with the enemy is unlikely. Because units generally move faster when
traveling mounted, leaders must remember the increased potential for a break in contact.
Should a break in contact occur—
z The leader or detached element uses global positioning system (GPS) aids to
reestablish contact with the main body.
z The platoon’s main body can use an infrared or thermal source to regain visual
contact with the element and link it back to the main body.
TRAVELING OVERWATCH
2-133. The platoon leader uses traveling overwatch when he thinks contact could occur.
(See figure 2-33, page 2-54.) He designates one of his subordinate elements to provide
security forward of the main body. In some cases, the improved awareness might prompt
the security element to increase these distances. Leaders track the movement of forward
security elements. They get position updates to ensure the forward security element
remains on azimuth and within range of supporting direct fires.
BOUNDING OVERWATCH
2-134. When the platoon leader expects enemy contact, he uses bounding overwatch. He
initiates it based on planning reports received earlier about the enemy situation and on
SITREPs received during movement. He bounds elements using successive or alternate
bounds. (See figure 2-34.)
MANEUVER
2-136. Maneuver begins once a unit has made contact with the enemy. Direct fire is
inherent in maneuver, as is close combat. At the mounted platoon level, maneuver forms
the heart of every tactical operation and task. It combines maneuver, direct and indirect
fire, and other combat power. The platoon leader maneuvers his mounted element and
dismounted squads to close with, gain positional advantage over, and ultimately destroy
the enemy.
BASE-OF-FIRE ELEMENT
2-137. Combining fire and movement requires a base of fire. Some platoon elements
(usually a section, the weapons squad, and the BFVs or Stryker) remain stationary to
provide protection for bounding elements by suppressing or destroying enemy elements.
The dismounted mechanized platoon can maneuver while protected by the BFVs in a base-
of-fire position and then establish another base of fire with the weapons or a rifle squad.
2-138. Because maneuver is decentralized in nature, the platoon leader determines from
his terrain analysis where and when he wants to establish a base of fire. During actions on
contact, he adjusts maneuver plans as needed. Making maneuver decisions normally falls
to the leader on the ground, who knows what enemy elements can engage the maneuvering
element and what friendly forces can provide the base of fire.
2-139. The base-of-fire element occupies positions that afford the best possible cover
and concealment, a clear view, and clear fields of fire. The platoon leader normally
designates a general location for the base of fire, and the element leader selects the exact
location. Once in position, the base-of-fire element suppresses known, likely, or suspected
enemy elements while aggressively scanning its assigned area of operation. It identifies
previously unknown elements and then suppresses them with direct and indirect fires. The
base-of-fire element allows the bounding unit to keep maneuvering so it can retain the
initiative even when the enemy can see and fire on it. While maneuvering to or in position,
the base-of-fire element leader is constantly looking for other locations that may provide
better support for the maneuvering element.
BOUNDING ELEMENT
2-140. Maneuver is inherently dangerous. Enemy weapons, unknown terrain, and other
operational factors all increase the danger. When maneuvering, the platoon leader
considers the following:
z The bounding element must take full advantage of whatever cover and concealment
the terrain offers.
z Squad members must maintain all-round security at all times and continuously scan
their assigned area of operations.
z METT-TC variables dictate the length of the bounds. However, the bounding
element should never move beyond the range at which the base-of-fire element can
effectively suppress known, likely, or suspected enemy positions. General practice
is to limit movement to no more than two-thirds the effective range of the supporting
weapon system.
z In severely restricted terrain, the bounding element makes shorter bounds than it
would in more open areas.
z The bounding element must focus on its ultimate goal—gaining a positional
advantage. Once achieved, the element uses this advantage to destroy the enemy
with direct fires and dismounted infantrymen assault.
DISMOUNTING INFANTRY
2-141. When to dismount Infantry during maneuver is a critical decision for the platoon
leader. He must balance the vulnerability of his mounted element, the speed and
vulnerability of his dismounted infantrymen, and the effectiveness of the enemy’s fire. The
platoon leader can use successive bounds with his dismounted infantrymen moving along
covered and concealed routes to secure the next base-of-fire position.
2-142. Considerations for remaining mounted include:
z Open terrain.
z Good covered and concealed mounted routes.
2-149. The reserve platoon may be assigned one or more of the following missions:
z Protect the flank and rear of the unit.
z Conduct a counterattack or establish a blocking position.
z Maintain contact with adjacent units.
z Clear a position that has been overrun or bypassed by another unit.
z Establish a support-by-fire position.
z Assume the mission of an attacking unit.
z Attack from a new direction.
z Protect or assist in the consolidation and reorganization on the objective.
FORMS OF CONTACT
2-151. In offensive and defensive tasks, contact occurs when a member of the Infantry
unit encounters a situation requiring a lethal or nonlethal response to the enemy. These
situations may entail one or more forms of contact:
z Direct.
z Indirect.
z Non-hostile civilian contact.
z Obstacles.
z CBRN or CBRNE.
z Aerial.
z Visual.
z Electronic warfare.
2-159. Once the leader determines the size of enemy force encountered by the Infantry
unit, a report is sent to the platoon or company. However, after evaluating the situation,
the leader may discover there is not enough information to identify the necessary
operational considerations. To make this determination, the leader further develops the
situation according to the commander’s intent, using a combination of techniques such
as—
z Surveillance, employing Infantry squads, unmanned aircraft systems, and snipers
using binoculars and other optical aids.
z Maneuver, including flanking maneuvers to gain additional information by viewing
the enemy from another perspective.
z Indirect fire.
z Reconnaissance by fire.
z Control.
z Counterreconnaissance.
z Disengagement.
z Exfiltrate.
z Follow and assume.
z Follow and support.
z Occupy.
z Retain.
z Secure.
z Seize.
z Support by fire.
2-162. As execution continues, more information becomes available to the leader. Based
upon the emerging details of the enemy situation, the leader may have to alter his COA
during execution. For example, as the Infantry platoon maneuvers to destroy what appears
to be a dismounted squad, it discovers two additional squads in prepared positions. The
leader analyzes and develops the new situation. He then selects an alternate COA, such as
establishing a support-by-fire position to support another platoon’s maneuver against the
newly discovered enemy force.
z Make initial contact with small, mobile, self-contained forces to avoid decisive
engagement of the main body on ground chosen by the enemy. This allows the
leader maximum flexibility to develop the situation.
z Task-organizes the force and uses movement formations to deploy and attack
rapidly in all directions.
z Keep subordinate forces within supporting distances to facilitate a flexible response.
z Maintains contact regardless of the course of action adopted once contact is gained.
ORGANIZATION OF FORCES
2-166. Movement to contact is organized with a forward security force, either a covering
force or an advance guard, and a main body as a minimum. A portion of the main body
composes the leader’s sustaining base. Based on METT-TC, the leader may increase the
unit’s security by resourcing an offensive covering force and an advance guard for each
column, as well as flank and rear security. This is normally a screen or guard.
SECURITY FORCES
2-167. The primary attribute to this organization is the early and accurate reporting it
provides on the enemy and terrain. Depth is essential for providing early warning and
reaction time to leaders at the platoon, company, and battalion levels. It enables leaders to
conduct actions on contact, preserving the parent unit’s freedom of movement and
maneuver.
ADVANCE GUARD
2-168. When the platoon serves as the advance guard, its purpose is to protect the main
body from surprise attack, and develop the situation to protect the deployment of the main
body when it is committed to action. These responsibilities include—
z Providing security and early warning for the main body and facilitating its
uninterrupted advance.
z Conducting reconnaissance to locate enemy forces along the battalion’s axis of
advance.
z Conducting actions on contact to retain freedom of maneuver for the battalion.
z Calling for indirect fires to impede or harass the enemy.
z Destroying enemy reconnaissance elements.
z Finding, fixing, defeating, destroying, or containing enemy security forces to retain
freedom of maneuver for the battalion.
z Bypassing and reporting obstacles, or act as the battalion support or breach force
during breaching operations.
2-169. Composition of the advance guard depends upon METT-TC. In open terrain, it
may move mounted; but in restricted, close, complex, or urban terrain, dismounted
movement with vehicles in the overwatch may be a better choice. Engineers, tank, or
Infantry company platoons may be attached to the advance guard. The mortar platoon or
a mortar section may also support the advance guard.
2-170. The advance guard is the battalion commander’s main effort until the main body
is committed; then the priority of fires shifts to the main body. In planning the movement
to contact, each decision point should be based on the actions of the advance guard.
FLANK GUARD
2-171. To provide flank guard, platoon-size elements from one of the companies in the
battalion’s main body provide a moving flank screen under company control. These
elements remain at a distance from the main body, allowing the battalion time and space
to maneuver to either flank. Flank security elements also operate far enough out to prevent
the enemy from surprising the main body with direct fires. Indirect fires are planned on
major flank approaches to enhance security.
REAR GUARD
2-172. One platoon pulled from the main body may provide rear security, but combat
forces are not normally available to perform this mission. The battalion provides its own
rear security, assisted by rapid forward movement, which gives the enemy less opportunity
to react or reposition forces to attack.
MAIN BODY
2-173. The combat elements of the main body are prepared to deploy and maneuver
rapidly to a decisive point on the battlefield to destroy the enemy. The main body focuses
its movement to the advance guard. The main body, remaining attuned to the advance
guard’s situation, provides responsive support when the advance guard is committed.
2-174. Tasks the company or platoon can perform within the main body include—
z Find, fix, defeat, destroy, or contain the enemy’s fixing force followed by the enemy
assault force or site exploitation force, to retain freedom of maneuver for the
remainder of the BCT.
z Execute a course of action to defeat or destroy a designated enemy main body
element.
2-175. The use of standard formations and battle drills allows the battalion commander,
to shift combat power rapidly. Platoons and squads employ the appropriate movement
techniques within the company formation. Company commanders, based on their
knowledge of commander’s intent and their own situational awareness, anticipate the
battalion commander’s decisions for commitment of the main body and plan accordingly.
CONTROL MEASURES
2-176. Execution of this task usually starts from a LD at the time specified in the
operation order (OPORD). The leader controls the movement to contact by using phase
lines, contact points, and checkpoints as required. The leader controls the depth of
movement to contact by using a limit of advance (LOA) or a forward boundary. The leader
could designate one or more objectives to limit the extent of movement to contact and
orient the force. However, these are often terrain-oriented and used only to guide
movement. Although movement to contact may result in taking a terrain objective, the
primary focus should be on the enemy force. If the leader has enough information to locate
significant enemy forces, then the leader should plan some other type of offensive action.
2-177. Leaders use positive control over maneuver units, coupled with battle drills and
formation discipline. Normally platoons are not assigned their own area of operation
during a movement to contact.
2-178. The leader can designate a series of phase lines successively becoming the new
rear boundary of forward security elements as force advances. Each rear boundary
becomes the forward boundary of the main body and shifts as the security force moves
forward. The rear boundary of the main body designates the limit of responsibility of the
rear security element. This line also shifts as the main body moves forward. (Refer to
FM 3-90-1 for more information.)
ORDER OF EVENTS
2-179. As the platoon leader plans for a movement to contact, the following
considerations apply to most, but not all, offensive tasks:
z Assembly area (AA).
z Reconnaissance.
z Movement to the LD.
z Maneuver.
z Deployment.
z Assault.
z Consolidation and reorganization.
ASSEMBLY AREA
2-180. The AA is the area a unit occupies to prepare for an operation. To prepare the
platoon for upcoming battles, the platoon leader plans, directs, and supervises mission
preparations in the AA. This time allows the platoon and squads to conduct precombat
checks and inspections, rehearsals, and sustainment activities. The platoon typically
conducts these preparations within a company AA, as it rarely occupies its own AA.
RECONNAISSANCE
2-181. All leaders should aggressively seek information about the terrain and enemy.
Because the enemy situation and available planning time may limit a unit’s
reconnaissance, the platoon usually conducts reconnaissance to answer the company
commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs). The use of CCIRs cover friendly
forces information requirements (FFIRs), priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), and
essential elements of friendly information (EEFI) when dictated by the commander. An
example is reconnoitering and timing routes from the AA to the LD. The platoon also may
augment the efforts of the battalion reconnaissance platoon to answer the CCIRs. Other
forms of reconnaissance include maps and terrain software/databases. Updates from
reconnaissance can occur at any time while the platoon and squad are planning for,
preparing for, or executing the mission. As a result, the leader must be prepared to adjust
his plans.
MANEUVER
2-183. The platoon leader plans the approach to the movement to contact, ensuring
synchronization, security, speed, and flexibility by selecting the platoon’s routes,
movement techniques, formations, and methods of movement. He must recognize this
portion of the battle as a fight, not as a movement. He must be prepared to make contact
with the enemy. He must plan accordingly to reinforce the commander’s needs for
synchronization, security, speed, and flexibility. During execution, the platoon leader may
display disciplined initiative and alter his platoon’s formation, technique, or speed to
maintain synchronization with the other platoons and squads. This retains flexibility for
the company commander.
DEPLOYMENT
2-184. As the platoon deploys and moves on its movement to contact it minimizes delay
and confusion by analyzing what movement technique to use, traveling, traveling
overwatch, or bounding overwatch. These movements allow the platoon to move in the
best tactical posture before encountering the enemy. Movement should be as rapid as the
terrain, unit mobility, and enemy situation permits. A common control measure is the
probable line of deployment (PLD), which is used most often under conditions of limited
visibility. The PLD is a phase line the leader designates as a location where he intends to
deploy his unit into an assault formation before beginning the assault.
ASSAULT
2-185. During an offensive task, the platoon’s objective may be terrain-oriented or force-
oriented. Terrain-oriented objectives may require the platoon to seize a designated area,
and often requires fighting through enemy forces. If the objective is force-oriented, an
objective may be assigned for orientation while the platoon’s efforts are focused on the
enemy’s actual location. Actions on the objective begin when the company or platoon
begins placing direct and indirect fires on the objective. This may occur while the platoon
is still moving toward the objective from the assault position or PLD.
PLAN
2-188. Movement to contact is one of the most difficult missions to plan. The goal is
preventing a meeting engagement with the enemy. (Refer to FM 3-90-1 for more
information.) Planning movement to contact allows for flexibility and promoting
subordinate initiative. Planning begins by developing the concept of the operation with a
focus on ultimate control of the objective, and conducting a reverse planning sequence
from the objective to the LD. This is accomplished by issuing a clear commander’s intent,
developing a simple concept of the operation and developing a series of decision point to
execute likely maneuver options. Increased emphasis is placed on developing an
aggressive and flexible reconnaissance effort linking to the commander’s PIRs, which
normally focuses on locating and gathering information about the enemy’s strength,
disposition, and activities.
2-189. The Infantry leader conducts information collection to determine the enemy’s
location and intent while conducting security operations to protect the main body. This
includes the use of available manned and unmanned aircraft assets, allowing the main body
to focus on planning and preparation. This includes rehearsals on the conduct of hasty
operations, bypass maneuvers, and hasty defenses. The plan addresses actions anticipated
by the leader based on available information and intelligence and the conduct of meeting
engagements and other anticipated battle drills.
PREPARE
2-190. Preparation actions are performed by the platoon to improve its ability to execute
an operation. The platoon’s success during missions depend as much on preparation as
planning. Activities specific to preparation include:
z Revising and refining the plan.
z Rehearsals.
z Troop movements.
z Precombat checks and inspections.
z Sustainment preparations.
z Subordinate confirmation briefs and back briefs.
REHEARSALS
2-191. The platoon uses rehearsals to help understand their roles in upcoming operations,
practice complicated tasks, and ensure equipment and weapons function properly.
Following the last company rehearsal, the platoon should conduct a final rehearsal of its
own to incorporate adjustments to the company scheme of maneuver. (Refer to FM 6-0 for
more information.) The platoon rehearsal should cover the following subjects:
z Movement from current positions.
z Routes (to include passage points, contact points, checkpoints, and CCP).
INSPECTIONS
2-192. A precombat inspection (PCI) is a formal, time-intensive inspection that is done
before the mission. Its goal is to make sure Soldiers and vehicles are fully prepared to
execute the upcoming mission. In general, PCIs enable the platoon leader to check the
platoon’s operational readiness.
2-193. A precombat check (PCC) is less formal and more mission-specific than a PCI.
Precombat checks emphasize areas, missions, or tasks required for upcoming missions.
The squad and section leaders perform the PCC. It is essential that the entire platoon chain
of command know how to conduct PCCs and PCIs.
2-194. The platoon leader or platoon sergeant should observe each squad and mounted
crew during preparation for combat. They should conduct the inspection once the mounted
section and squad leaders report that they are prepared.
EXECUTE
2-195. Each element of the force synchronizes its actions with adjacent and supporting
units, maintaining contact and coordination as prescribed in orders and unit SOP. The
following paragraphs discuss executing movement to contact using the sequence of the
offense mentioned earlier in this chapter.
combat power of the security force are major factors determining the size of the enemy
force it can defeat without deploying the main body. The techniques the leader employs to
fix the enemy when both forces are moving are different from those employed when the
enemy force is stationary during the meeting engagement. In both situations, when the
security force cannot overrun the enemy by conducting a hasty frontal attack, a portion of
the main body is deployed. When this occurs, the unit is no longer conducting movement
to contact but an attack. (Refer to ADRP 3-90 for more information.)
MANEUVER
2-199. If the security force cannot overrun the enemy with a frontal attack, the leader
quickly maneuvers the main body to conduct a penetration or envelopment that
overwhelms the enemy force before it can react or reinforce. The leader attempts to defeat
the enemy in detail while still maintaining the momentum of advance. After an attack, the
main body leader resumes the movement to contact. If the enemy is not defeated, there are
three main options: bypass, transition to a more deliberate operation, or conduct some type
of defense.
2-200. Main body elements deploy rapidly to the vicinity of contact if the leader initiates
a frontal attack. Maneuvering unit leaders coordinate forward passage through friendly
forces in contact as required. The intent is to deliver the assault before the enemy can
deploy or reinforce his engaged forces. The leader may order an attack from a march
column for one of the main body's columns, while the rest of the main body deploys. The
leader also can wait to attack until bringing the bulk of the main body forward. This avoids
piecemeal commitment except when rapidity of action is essential, combat superiority at
the vital point is present, can be maintained throughout the attack, or when
compartmentalized terrain forces a COA. When trying to conduct envelopment, the leader
focuses on attacking the enemy's flanks and rear before preparing to counter these actions.
The leader uses the security force to fix the enemy while the main body maneuvers to look
for an assailable flank. The main body also can be used to fix the enemy while the security
force finds the assailable flank. (Refer to ADRP 3-90 for more information.)
FOLLOW THROUGH
2-201. If the enemy is defeated, the unit transitions back into movement to contact and
continue to advance. The movement to contact terminates when the unit reaches the final
objective or LOA, or transitions to a more deliberate operation, defense, or retrograde.
ASSESS
2-202. Assessment is the continuous monitoring and evaluation of a current situation,
and the progress of an operation. It involves deliberately comparing forecasted outcomes
to actual events in order to determine the overall effectiveness of force employment.
Assessment allows the leader to maintain accurate situational understanding, and amend
his visualization, which helps the commander make timely and accurate decisions.
Assessment of effects is determining how friendly actions have succeeded against the
SITUATION
2-203. Every combat situation is unique. Leaders do their best to accurately assess the
situation and make good decisions about employing their units. The environment of
combat, application of military principles, and the desired end state of Army operations
culminate with the close fight of Infantry platoons and squads. Leaders should understand
the larger military purpose and how their actions and decisions might affect the outcome
of the larger operation.
RISK ASSESSMENT
2-204. Risk assessment is the process leaders use to assess and to control risk. There are
two types of risk associated with combat actions: tactical hazards resulting from the
presence of the enemy and accidental hazards resulting from the conduct of operations.
All combat incurs both risks. The objective is to minimize them to acceptable levels. The
leader identifies risk to the unit and mission by—
z Defining the enemy action.
z Identifying friendly combat power shortfall.
z Identifying available combat multipliers, if any, to mitigate risk.
z Considering the risks are acceptable or unacceptable.
METT-TC ASSESSMENT
2-205. Infantry platoon leaders and squad leaders use METT-TC to understand and
describe the operational environment. These six widely known and used factors are
categories for cataloging and analyzing information. Leaders and Soldiers constantly
observe and assess their environment.
TERRAIN ASSESSMENT
2-206. The leader assesses the terrain in his proposed area of operation. In addition to
the standard Army map, the leader may have aerial photographs and terrain analysis
overlays from the parent unit, or he may talk with someone familiar with the area.
Reconnaissance
2-209. The reconnaissance force conducts a zone reconnaissance to reconnoiter
identified named areas of interest. The reconnaissance force is small enough to achieve
stealth, but large enough to provide adequate self-defense until the fixing and finishing
forces arrive.
Fixing
2-210. The fixing force develops the situation and executes one of two options based
upon the commander's guidance and METT-TC. The first option is to block identified
routes the detected enemy can use to escape or reinforce. The fixing force maintains
contact with the enemy and positions its forces to isolate and fix him before the finishing
force attacks. The second option is to conduct an attack to fix the enemy in his current
positions until the finishing force arrives. The fixing force can be a combination of
mounted and dismounted forces with enough combat power to isolate the enemy after the
reconnaissance force finds him. The fixing force attacks if action meets the commander's
intent and can generate sufficient combat power against the enemy.
Finishing
2-211. The finishing force is used to destroy the detected and fixed enemy during a
search and attack. This is accomplished by conducting hasty or deliberate operations,
maneuvering to block enemy escape routes while another unit conducts the attack, or
employing indirect fire or CAS. The leader may have his finishing force establish an area
ambush and use his reconnaissance and fixing forces to drive the enemy into the ambushes.
The finishing force must have enough combat power to destroy those enemy forces
expected in the platoon area of operation.
METT-TC. The first option is to block identified routes the detected enemy can use to
escape or bring in reinforcements. The fixing force maintains contact with the enemy and
positions its forces to isolate and fix him before the finishing force attacks. The second
option is to conduct an attack to fix the enemy in his current positions until the finishing
force arrives. The fixing force attacks if this action meets the commander's intent and it
can generate sufficient combat power against the detected enemy. Depending on the
enemy's mobility and likelihood of the reconnaissance force being compromised, the
leader may need to position the fixing force before the reconnaissance force enters the area
of operation.
Maneuver
2-220. The finishing force may move behind the reconnaissance and fixing forces, or
locate at a pickup zone and air assault into a landing zone near the enemy once he is
located. The finishing force/main body must be responsive enough to engage the enemy
before he can break contact with the reconnaissance force or the fixing force. The battalion
intelligence staff provides the leader with a time estimate for the enemy to displace from
his detected locations. The leader provides additional mobility assets so the finishing
force/main body can respond within the timeframe.
2-221. The leader may have the finishing force/main body establish an area ambush and
use the reconnaissance and fixing forces to drive the enemy into the ambushes.
Follow Through
2-222. The leader uses the finishing force to destroy the detected and fixed enemy during
a search and attack by conducting hasty or deliberate operations, maneuvering to block
enemy escape routes while another unit conducts the attack, or employing indirect fire or
CAS to destroy the enemy.
2-223. The most common tactical task during stability is a cordon and search. This
involves two potentially inflammatory processes: limiting freedom of movement and
searching dwellings. These two actions have a clear potential for negative consequences.
Therefore, organizing cordon and search elements requires extensive mission tailoring and
Infantry leaders always are prepared for a civil disturbance.
2-224. Searches are an important aspect of populace and resource control. The need to
conduct a search operation or to employ search procedures is a continuous requirement. A
search conducted by civil police and Soldiers can orient on people, materiel, buildings, or
terrain. Searches may be enabled by biometric or forensic exploitation.
2-225. Cordon and search involves isolating the target area and searching suspected
buildings to capture or destroy possible insurgents and contraband. It involves the
emplacement of a cordon, or security perimeter, to prevent traffic in and out of the area.
The cordon permits the search element to operate unimpeded within the secured area. The
purpose of cordon and search is to obtain weapon caches, materiel or information, persons
of interest, or a specific high-value target.
2-226. There are two cordon and search methods and the method selected to accomplish
the mission depends on a number of factors. The primary consideration is to capture the
designated personnel, site, or equipment but additional factors such as the enemy threat,
local populace support, and host-nation security force capabilities are taken into account
during planning this task.
2-227. The cordon and kick method is used to maintain speed, surprise, and timeliness
in entry to the target within the objective. In this instance, considerations of population
perceptions and integration of host-nation security force are less important than
accomplishing the task of capturing the target individual, site, or equipment.
2-228. If the mission is focused on increasing the legitimacy of the host-nation
government and security forces, it may be necessary to sacrifice a degree of surprise and
timeliness to achieve its goal by conducting a cordon and knock/ask. In this instance, the
unit focuses on maintaining a presence and control of an area by incorporating local
authorities into the mission. (Refer to ATP 3-06.20 for more information.)
main effort. The support element may be the reserve, provide support by fire, and be
prepared to perform the other cordon and search tasks.
Note. The United States Marine Corps uses the term “search/assault element
instead of “search element” for the United States Army. (Refer to ATP 3-06.20
for more information.)
Command Element
2-230. The command element is the headquarters executing mission command for
cordon and search. There may be several combat multipliers attached. Frequently, the
leader is given a variety of assets to assist him in accomplishing his mission. Ideally, the
leader task-organizes his assets in order to maintain control of three to five elements.
2-231. The location of the command element provides the ability to control the
subordinate teams and supporting assets of cordon and search mission. The ability to
observe the search element generally causes the command element to collocate with the
inner cordon. Visibility and communication capability are deciding factors in identifying
the best location for the command element during the actual mission.
2-232. The composition of the command element may be as small as the leader and an
RTO, or may include security vehicles, interpreters, host-nation officials and local
authorities. The command element remains mobile and able to move to all points within
the cordon and search operation, ensuring coordination of all elements and supporting
assets. When host-nation forces or authorities are involved in the mission, the command
element coordinates with them and integrates them as identified during the planning phase
of the operation. Operation and communication security are guiding principles when
conducting integrated operations with host-nation forces.
2-233. The command element is the single point of coordination for supporting assets
and status reporting to higher headquarters. As a critical component of cordon and search
operations, the command element designates a backup team in the event it becomes combat
ineffective. It ensures all actions are documented as required, and rules of evidence are
followed where necessary. In the event a person is detained, the command element
monitors the documentation, security, and transport of detainees. It also ensures damage
caused during the cordon and search is documented to identify legitimate future claims by
the occupants of the target.
Security Element
2-234. The primary task of the security element is total isolation of the target area, either
physically or by fire. The security element limits enemy or civilian influence in the
objective area and prevents targets from escaping the cordon. It may have to use multiple
avenues of approach and operate decentralized to accomplish its mission. It also may have
to establish multiple blocking positions and observation posts and conduct patrols in order
to isolate the target area. The security element may include the—
z Vehicle-mounted sections or platoons.
z Interpreters.
z Detainee teams.
z Crowd control teams.
z Observation posts.
z Traffic control post or blocking positions.
z Host-nation security force (military or police).
z Integrated aviation assets.
z Dismounted squads or platoons.
z Female search teams.
2-235. The execution of outer cordon missions is an integral part of the security element
in all cordon and search missions. The outer cordon isolates the objective area and prevents
enemy or civilian influence. This requires detailed planning, coordination, integration, and
synchronization to achieve the lethal and nonlethal combined arms effects required for
mission execution. Some considerations for outer cordon include—
z Vehicles for traffic control post and blocking positions.
z Operational environment fire planning and coordination.
z Overwatch positions.
z Aviation assets to observe the target area and inform the outer cordon if vehicles or
persons leave the target area. Constant communication between the aviation
element and outer cordon better facilitates the isolation of the target area.
z An initial detainee collection point for receipt and temporary holding of detainees.
z An initial materiel collection point for consolidation of captured materiel.
2-236. Each outer cordon element traffic control point blocking position has a designated
leader, and a clear task and purpose. Weapon systems to consider for outer cordon
positions are wheeled or tracked vehicles with weapons systems, crew-served weapons,
Javelin with the command launch unit (CLU), and snipers or designated marksman.
2-237. The leader of the outer cordon element develops and maintains situational
awareness of his area of responsibility and the areas of inner cordon and search elements.
This enables him to anticipate threat activity, control direct and indirect fires, and facilitate
the achievement of the outer cordon’s task and purpose. Aviation assets, communications
systems, and reporting procedures are implemented to facilitate situational awareness for
the entire element.
Search Element
2-238. The search element’s mission is to clear, and search the target in order to capture,
kill, or destroy the targeted individuals and materiel. The search element initiates action
once the outer and inner cordons are in place. The element accomplishes its mission by
gaining a foothold on or in the target to clear all enemy and noncombatant personnel, and
by conducting a systematic search of the target. These areas may be searched selectively
(only specific rooms/buildings/blocks) or systematically (everything within a given area).
Due to the split-second decisions made, it is imperative this element not only understands
but also complies with the ROE.
2-239. To accomplish its mission, the search element has three primary tasks: securing,
clearing, and searching the target. The search element may be task-organized into search,
security, and support teams in order to facilitate mission accomplishment. All these teams
understand and are prepared to assume the role of other teams in the search element.
Support Element
2-240. The support element reinforces, and is capable of accomplishing, the task and
purpose of the unit’s main effort. In addition, the leader may direct the support element to
accomplish priority-planning tasks. This means the support element leader is intimately
familiar with all aspects of cordon and search missions from planning through its
completion.
2-241. The leader identifies the tasks the support element may be required to execute.
These tasks are prioritized and given to the support element leader to plan and rehearse
these actions according to the commander’s plan. Probable tasks assigned to the support
element during a cordon and search operation are (but are not limited to)—
z Reinforce outer/inner cordon.
z Clear buildings.
z Search buildings.
z Biometric and forensic enabled collections. (Refer to ATP 2-22.85 for more
information.)
z Document and media exploitation. (Refer to ATP 2-91.8 for more information.)
z Secure, safeguard, and escort civilians or detainees.
z Secure and safeguard captured materiel or equipment.
2-242. Commitment criteria is a guide to assist the leader on when to commit the support
element, but is not intended to be a trigger for employment. (See figure 2-36, page 2-80.)
Possible commitment criteria can be—
z A hostile crowd forming around the inner cordon.
z Loss of main effort.
z Numerous rooms in the building being searched.
z More than a specified number of detainees.
z The enemy engages the inner cordon.
z Phase lines. Phase lines are helpful in controlling cordon and search elements
approaching the target from different directions or at different times.
z Restrictive fire lines (RFLs). RFL prohibit fires and their effects between
converging friendly forces.
2-244. Vital tips for cordon and search success includes—
z Positioning vital leaders so they can see and control all subordinate elements.
z Positioning essential assets such as crew-served weapons and interpreters at the
critical locations.
z Being prepared to move leadership and support assets from one location to another
during mission execution or as necessary.
z Positioning vehicles and personnel to be searched so the security element’s sectors
of fire face to the outside of the friendly element and away from noncombatants
when executing searches.
z Keeping the bulk of forces within the perimeter so if the situation escalates they are
essentially in a battle or support-by-fire position.
z Ensuring all personnel understand direct fire and contingency plans. For example:
What actions to take in the event a vehicle penetrates a traffic control point from
outside the established perimeter?
Who engages and with what weapons systems?
Engage crew-served weapons or should they use only M4?
When to cease fire, and what signal to use for cease-fire?
A-B, second floor, second window, fire when ready.” Due to the condensed and
compressed nature of the physical area, fires are precise and accurate, as opposed to high
volume.
CIVILIAN CONSIDERATIONS
2-254. All operations across the spectrum of warfare must take into account civilian
considerations in terms of their presence in the battlefield/operational environment,
infrastructure damage, injury to civilians, and so forth. Considering the likely operating
environments in which a cordon and search would be conducted, civilian considerations
represent a significant planning aspect for the commander. (Refer to ATP 3-06.20 for more
information.)
and well-rehearsed, thoroughly understood battle drills and SOPs. A hasty operation often
is the preferred option during continuous operations, enabling the leader to maintain
momentum while denying the enemy time for defense preparations.
ORGANIZATION OF FORCES
2-259. Once the scheme of maneuver is determined, the Infantry leader task-organizes
the force to ensure he has enough combat power to accomplish the mission. The leader
normally organizes a security force, main body, and a reserve, which are all supported by
some type of sustainment organization. The leader should complete all changes in task
organization on time to allow units to conduct rehearsals with their attached and supporting
elements.
SECURITY FORCES
2-260. Under normal circumstances, the leader resources dedicated security forces
during an attack only if the attack uncovers one or more flanks, or the rear of the attacking
force as it advances. In this case, the leader designates a flank or rear security force and
assigns it a guard or screen mission, depending on METT-TC. Normally an attacking unit
does not need extensive forward security forces as most attacks are launched from
positions in contact with the enemy, which reduces the usefulness of a separate forward
security force. The exception occurs when the attacking unit is transitioning from defense
to attack and had previously established a security area as part of the defense.
MAIN BODY
2-261. The Infantry leader organizes the main body into combined arms formations to
conduct the decisive operation and necessary shaping operations. The leader aims the
decisive operation toward the immediate and decisive destruction of the enemy force and
will to resist, seizure of a terrain objective, or the defeat of the enemy’s plan. The maneuver
scheme identifies the focus of the main effort. All forces’ available resources operate in
concert to assure the success of the main effort. The subordinate unit or units designated
to conduct the decisive operation can change during the course of attack. The leader
designates an assault, breach, and support force, if he expects to conduct a breach operation
during the attack.
2-262. If it is impractical to initially determine when or where the echelon’s main effort
will be, such as during a hasty operation, the leader retains flexibility by arranging forces
in-depth, holding out strong reserves, and maintaining centralized control of long-range
indirect fire support systems. As soon as the tactical situation develops enough to allow
the leader to designate the decisive point, the leader focuses available resources to support
the main efforts achievement of its objective.
RESERVE
2-263. The leader uses the reserve to exploit success, defeat enemy counterattacks, or
restore momentum to a stalled attack. For a company mission this usually is a squad size
force. For a battalion mission it is usually a platoon-size element. Once committed, the
reserve’s actions normally become or reinforce the echelon’s decisive operation. The
Infantry leader makes every effort to reconstitute another reserve from units made
available by the revised situation. Often the leader’s most difficult and important decision
concerns the time, place, and circumstances for committing the reserve. The reserve is not
a committed force and is not used as a follow-and-support force, or a follow-and-assumes
force.
2-264. In the attack, the combat power allocated to the reserve depends primarily on the
level of uncertainty about the enemy, especially the strength of all expected enemy
counterattacks. The leader only needs to resource a small reserve to respond to
unanticipated enemy reactions when detailed information about the enemy exists. When
the situation is relatively clear and enemy capabilities are limited, the reserve may consist
of a small fraction of the command. When the situation is vague, the reserve initially may
contain the majority of the Infantry leader’s combat power.
SUSTAINMENT ORGANIZATION
2-265. Leaders’ resource sustaining operations to support the attacking force. A
maneuver battalion commander organizes the supporting sustainment and other logistics
assets into combat and field trains. In an Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), a forward
support company (FSC) is part of the Infantry battalion. It is responsible for sustainment
of the Infantry battalion. The IBCT sustainment organization is different in structure from
the ABCT and SBCT. Higher echelon commanders appoint someone to control sustaining
operations within their echelon support areas.
2-267. Infantry leaders use all other control measures necessary to control the attack.
Short of the LD or LC, the leader may designate AA and attack positions where the unit
prepares for the offense or waits for the establishment of required conditions to initiate the
attack. Beyond the LD or LC, leaders may designate checkpoints, phase lines, PLD, assault
positions, and direct and indirect fire support coordination measures. Between the PLD
and objective, a final coordination line, assault positions, support by fire and attack by fire
positions, and time of assault to better control the final stage of attack can be used. Beyond
the objective, the Infantry leader can impose a LOA if an exploitation or pursuit is not
conducted. (Refer to FM 3-90-1 for more information.)
ORDER OF EVENTS
2-268. As the platoon leader plans for an attack, the order of events typically follow the
sequence described in the paragraphs below.
TRANSITION
2-275. After seizing the objective, the unit typically transitions to some other type of task.
This operation could be the site exploitation or pursuit, or perhaps a defense. Transitions
(through branches and sequels) are addressed and planned prior to undertaking the
offensive task. Transitions are discussed in section VI of this chapter.
PLAN
2-276. In an attack, friendly forces seek to place the enemy in a position where the enemy
can be defeated or destroyed easily. The leader seeks to keep the enemy off-balance while
continually reducing the enemy’s options. In an attack, the leader focuses movement and
maneuver effects, supported by the other warfighting functions, on those enemy forces
seeking to prevent the unit from accomplishing its mission and seizing its objective.
Planning helps the leader synchronize the effects of combat power through TLP. (Refer to
appendix A for more information.)
MISSION COMMAND
2-277. The leader states the desired effect of fires on the enemy weapon systems, such
as suppression or destruction, as part of his planning process. The leader assigns
subordinate units their missions and imposes those control measures necessary to
synchronize and maintain control over the operation.
2-278. Using the enemy situational and weapons templates previously developed, the
leader determines the probable LC and enemy trigger lines. As the leader arrays
subordinate elements to shape the battlefield, friendly weapon systems are matched against
the enemy has to determine the PLD. Once the leader determines the PLD, the leader
establishes how long it takes subordinates to move from the LD to the PLD and all support-
by-fire positions the attack requires. The leader establishes when and where the force must
maneuver into enemy direct-fire range.
2-279. In addition to accomplishing the mission, every attack plan must contain
provisions for exploiting success or all advantages may arise during the operation. The
leader exploits success by aggressively executing the plan, promoting subordinate leader
initiative, and using units that can rapidly execute battle drills.
echelons. However, simultaneous attacks provide a means to maximize the effects of mass
in the initial assault. They also prevent the enemy from concentrating defensive fires
against successive attacks.
2-281. The platoon leader often will find himself as the observer (and executor) of
company and battalion level fires. Understanding the concept of echelon fires is critical
for indirect fire plan to be synchronized with the maneuver plan. The purpose of
echeloning fires is to maintain constant fires on a target while using the optimum delivery
system up to the point of its risk-estimate distance in combat operations or minimum safe
distance (MSD) in training. Echeloning fires provides protection for friendly forces as they
move to and assault an objective, allowing them to close with minimal casualties. It
prevents the enemy from observing and engaging the assault by forcing the enemy to take
cover, allowing the friendly force to continue the advance unimpeded.
2-282. In planning Infantry leaders focus on the routes, formations, and navigational aids
they will use to traverse the ground from the LD or PD to the objective. Some terrain
locations may require the attacking unit to change its combat formation, direction of
movement, or movement technique when it reaches those locations. The unit can post
guides at these critical locations to ensure maintaining control over the movement.
INTELLIGENCE
2-283. To employ the proper capabilities and tactics, leader and subordinate leaders must
have detailed knowledge of the enemy’s organization, equipment, and tactics. They must
understand enemy’s strengths and weaknesses. The platoon leader may need to request
information through the CoIST, from the battalion staff to answer platoon information
requirements. (Refer to FM 3-21.10 for more information.)
2-284. Generally, if the leader does not have good intelligence and does not know where
the overwhelming majority of the enemy’s units and systems are located, the leader cannot
conduct a deliberate operation. The attacking unit must conduct a movement to contact,
conduct a hasty operation, or collect more combat information.
FIRES
2-285. The planning process synchronizes the unit’s scheme of maneuver with the
indirect fire support plan. It must identify critical times and places where the Infantry
leader needs the maximum effects from fire-support assets. Leaders combine maneuver
with fires to mass effects, achieve surprise, destroy enemy forces, and obtain decisive
results.
2-286. The goal of Infantry leader’s attack criteria is to focus fires on seizing the
initiative. The leader emphasizes simple and rapidly integrated direct and indirect fire
support plans. This is done using quick-fire planning techniques and good SOPs. Leader
integrates fire assets as far forward as possible in the movement formation to facilitate
early emplacement. Fires concentrate (mass) on forward enemy elements to enable
maneuver efforts to close with the enemy positions.
SUSTAINMENT
2-287. The leader and subordinate unit leaders must plan to provide support and services
to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance. Sustainment
is the provision of logistics, personnel services, and health service support (HSS) necessary
to maintain operations until mission accomplishment.
PROTECTION
2-288. Protection facilitates the Infantry leader’s ability to maintain force integrity and
combat power. Protection determines the degree to which potential threats can disrupt
operations and counters or mitigates those threats. Emphasis on protection increases during
preparation and continues throughout execution. Protection is a continuing activity; it
integrates all protection capabilities to safeguard bases, secure routes, and protect forces.
PREPARE
2-289. Even in fluid situations, attacks are best organized and coordinated in AA. If the
leader decides rapid action is essential to retain a tactical advantage, he may opt not to use
an AA. Detailed advance planning, combined with digital communications, SOP, and
battle drills, may reduce negative impacts of such a decision.
2-290. Unless already in an AA, the attacking unit moves into one during the preparation
phase. The unit moves with as much secrecy as possible, normally at night and along routes
preventing or degrading the enemy’s capabilities to visually observe or otherwise detect
the movement. It avoids congesting its AA and occupies it minimal possible time. While
in the AA, each unit is responsible for its own protection activities, such as local security.
2-291. The attacking unit should continue its TLP and priorities of work to the extent the
situation and mission allow before moving to attack positions. These preparations include
but are not necessarily limited to:
z Protecting the force.
z Conducting task organization.
z Performing reconnaissance.
z Refining the plan.
z Briefing the troops.
z Conducting rehearsals, to include test firing of weapons.
z Moving logistics and medical support forward.
z Promoting adequate rest for both leaders and Soldiers.
z Positioning the force for subsequent action.
2-292. As part of TLP, leaders at all levels should conduct a personal reconnaissance of
the actual terrain when this will not compromise operational security or result in excessive
risk to the unit leadership. Modern information systems can enable leaders to conduct a
virtual reconnaissance when a physical reconnaissance is not practical. If a limited-
visibility attack is planned, they also should reconnoiter the terrain at night.
EXECUTE
2-293. Executing an attack is a series of advances and assaults by attacking units until
they secure the final objective characterizes the attack. Leaders at all levels must use their
initiative to shift their main effort between units as necessary to take advantage of
opportunities and momentum to ensure the enemy’s rapid destruction. Attacking units
move as quickly as possible, following reconnaissance elements or probes through gaps in
the enemy’s defenses. They shift their strength to reinforce success and carry the battle
deep into the enemy’s rear. The leader does not delay the attack to preserve the alignment
of subordinate units or to adhere closely to the preconceived plan of attack.
2-294. The leader avoids becoming so committed to the initial plan that opportunities
are neglected, and is mentally prepared to abandon failed attacks in order to exploit all
unanticipated successes or enemy errors. This is achieved by designating another unit to
conduct the decisive operation in response to the changing situation.
2-295. The following sequence is used to execute an attack:
z Gain and maintain enemy contact.
z Disrupt the enemy.
z Fix the enemy.
z Maneuver.
z Follow through.
MANEUVER
2-301. The Infantry leader maneuvers his forces to gain positional advantage to seize,
retain, and exploit the initiative while avoiding the enemy’s defensive strength. He
employs tactics defeating the enemy by attacking through a point of relative weakness,
such as a flank or the rear. The key for success is to strike hard and fast, overwhelm a
portion of the enemy force, and quickly transition to the next objective or phase, thus
maintaining the momentum of attack without reducing the pressure. Examples of
maneuver include—
signals, engagement area, and TRP to control direct fires from these supporting positions
and normally employs RFL between converging forces.
Breaching Operations
2-304. To conduct breaching operations successfully, the platoon applies the breaching
fundamentals of suppress, obscure, secure, reduce, and assault (SOSRA). The support
force sets the conditions, the breach force reduces, clears, and marks the required number
of lanes through the enemy’s tactical obstacles to support the maneuver of the assault force.
The leader must clearly identify the conditions allowing the breach force to proceed to
avoid confusion. From the PLD, the assault force maneuvers against or around the enemy
to take advantage of support force’s efforts to suppress the targeted enemy positions.
(Refer to appendix H, section II of this publication for a more detailed explanation.)
objective and prevent the enemy from reinforcing or counterattacking. They also destroy
escaping enemy forces and systems.
FOLLOW THROUGH
2-315. After seizing the objective, the Infantry force has two alternatives: exploit success
and continue the attack or terminate the offensive mission. After seizing an objective, the
most likely on-order mission is to continue the attack. During consolidation, the unit
continues TLP in preparation for all on-order missions assigned by a higher headquarters.
ASSESS
2-316. Assessment refers to the continuous monitoring and evaluation of current
situation, particularly the enemy, and progress of an operation. Assessment precedes and
guides every operations process activity and concludes each operation or phase of an
operation. It involves a comparison of forecasted outcomes to actual events. Assessment
entails three tasks:
z Continuously assessing the enemy’s reactions and vulnerabilities.
z Continuously monitoring the situation and progress of operation towards the
commander’s desired end state.
z Evaluating the operation against measures of effectiveness and measures of
performance.
INITIAL ASSESSMENT
2-317. Upon receiving the mission, leaders perform an initial assessment of the situation
and METT-TC, focusing on the unit’s role in the larger operation, and allocating time for
planning and preparing. The two most important products from this initial assessment
should be at least a partial restated mission, and a timeline. Leaders issue their initial
WARNORD on this first assessment and time allocation.
INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
2-318. Army forces conduct (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) operations based on the
all-source intelligence assessment developed by the intelligence section. The all-source
intelligence assessment is expressed as part of the intelligence estimate. They are
continuous and occur throughout the operations process and intelligence process. Most
products resulting from all-source intelligence are initially developed during planning, and
updated as needed throughout preparation and execution based on information gained from
continuous assessment.
EXECUTION ASSESSMENT
2-319. During execution, assessment of risk assists the leader in making informed
decisions on changing task organization, shifting priorities of effort and support, and
shaping future operations. Effectiveness entails making accurate assessments and good
decisions about how to fight the enemy. Mission complements command by using the most
efficient means available. Vital supporting concepts are TLP, actions on contact, and risk
management. Leaders use the assessment process to generate combat power.
AMBUSH
2-321. An ambush is an assault by fire or other destructive means from concealed
positions on a moving or temporarily halted enemy. An ambush stops, denies, or destroys
enemy forces by maximizing the element of surprise. Ambushes can employ direct fire
systems as well as other destructive means, such as command-detonated mines, indirect
fires, and supporting nonlethal effects. They may include an assault to close with and
destroy enemy forces. In an ambush, ground objectives do not have to be seized and held.
2-322. The three forms of ambush are point, area, and antiarmor ambush. In a point
ambush, a unit deploys to attack a single kill zone. In an area ambush, a unit deploys into
two or more related point ambushes. Units smaller than a platoon normally do not conduct
an area ambush.
2-323. A typical ambush is organized into three elements: assault, support, and security.
The assault element fires into the kill zone. Its goal is to destroy the enemy force. When
used, the assault force attacks into and clears the kill zone. It also may be assigned
additional tasks, to include searching for items of intelligence value, capturing prisoners,
photographing new types of equipment and when unable to take enemy equipment,
completing the destruction of enemy equipment to avoid its immediate reuse. The support
element supports the assault element by firing into and around the kill zone, and it provides
the ambush’s primary killing power. The support element attempts to destroy the majority
of enemy combat power before the assault element moves into the objective or kill zone.
The security element isolates the kill zone, provides early warning of arrival of all enemy
relief forces, and provides security for the assault and support elements. It secures the
objective rally point (ORP) and blocks enemy avenues of approach into and out of the
ambush site, which prevents the enemy from entering or leaving. (Refer to chapter 6 this
publication for detailed discussion.)
COUNTERATTACK
2-324. A counterattack is an attack by part or all of a defending force against an enemy
attacking force, for such specific purposes as regaining ground lost or cutting off or
destroying enemy advance units. The general objective is to deny the enemy his goal in
attacking. The leader directs a counterattack normally conducted from a defensive posture,
to defeat or destroy enemy forces, exploit an enemy weakness such as an exposed flank,
or to regain control of terrain and facilities after an enemy success. A unit conducts a
counterattack to seize the initiative from the enemy through offensive action. A
counterattacking force maneuvers to isolate and destroy a designated enemy force. It can
be an assault by fire into an engagement area to defeat or destroy an enemy force, restore
the original position, or block an enemy penetration. Once launched, the counterattack
normally becomes a decisive operation for the leader conducting the counterattack.
2-325. To be decisive, the counterattack occurs when the enemy is overextended,
dispersed, and disorganized during his attack. All counterattacks should be rehearsed in
the same conditions they will be conducted. Careful consideration is given to the event
triggering the counterattack. Once committed, the counterattack force conducts the
decisive operation.
DEMONSTRATIONS
2-326. In military deception, a demonstration is a show of force in an area where a
decision is not sought but made to deceive a threat. It is similar to a feint, but no actual
contact with the threat is intended.
FEINTS
2-327. A feint is an attack used to deceive the enemy as to the location or time of the
actual decisive operation. Forces conducting a feint seek direct fire contact with the enemy
but avoid decisive engagement. As in the demonstration, leader use feints in conjunction
with other military deception activities.
RAID
2-328. A raid is a limited-objective, deliberate operation entailing swift penetration of
hostile terrain. A raid is not intended to hold territory; and it requires detailed intelligence,
preparation, and planning. The Infantry platoon and squad conducts raids as part of a larger
force to accomplish a number of missions, including the following:
z Capture prisoners, installations, or enemy materiel.
z Capture or destroy specific enemy command and control locations.
z Destroy enemy materiel or installations.
z Obtain information concerning enemy locations, dispositions, strength, intentions,
or methods of operation.
z Confuse the enemy or disrupt his plans.
z Liberate friendly personnel.
SPOILING ATTACK
2-329. A spoiling attack is a tactical maneuver employed to impair a hostile attack while
the enemy is in the process of forming or assembling for an attack. The spoiling attack
usually employs heavy, attack helicopter, or fire support elements to attack on enemy
assembly positions in front of a main line of resistance or battle position.
2-330. The objective of a spoiling attack is to disrupt the enemy’s offensive capabilities
and timelines while destroying targeted enemy personnel and equipment, not to secure
terrain and other physical objectives. Two conditions must be met to conduct a survivable
spoiling attack:
z The spoiling attack’s objective must be obtainable before the enemy being able to
respond to the attack in a synchronized and coordinated manner.
z The force conducting the spoiling attack must be prevented from becoming over
extended.
2-331. Infantry forces conduct a spoiling attack whenever possible during friendly
defensive missions to strike an enemy force while it is in AA or attack positions preparing
for its own offensive mission or is stopped temporarily.
ELECTRONIC WARFARE
2-332. Army electronic warfare operations seek to enable the land force commander to
support unified land operations through decisive action. Decisive action consists of the
simultaneous combination of offense, defense, and stability or defense support of civil
authorities appropriate to the mission and environment. The central idea of unified land
operations is to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain and maintain a position of
relative advantage in sustained land operations in order to create the conditions for
favorable conflict resolution.
2-333. The foundation of unified land operations is built on initiative, decisive action,
and mission command—linked and nested through purposeful and simultaneous execution
of both combined arms maneuver and wide area security—to achieve the commander’s
intent and desired end state. Appropriately applied, electronic warfare enables successful
unified land operations. Commanders and staffs determine which resident and joint force
electronic warfare capabilities to use in support of each element of decisive action. As they
apply the appropriate level of electronic warfare effort to support these elements,
commanders can seize, retain, and exploit the initiative within the electromagnetic
environment.
2-334. Once a commander can seize, retain, and exploit the initiative within the
electromagnetic environment, then control becomes possible. Commanders plan, prepare,
execute, and assess electronic warfare operations to control the electromagnetic spectrum.
2-335. To exercise electromagnetic spectrum control commanders effectively apply and
integrate electronic warfare operations across the warfighting functions: mission
command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection.
Infantry Soldier to see farther and with greater clarity. They provide an advantage over the
enemy. Infantry platoons and squads have—
z Night vision equipment mounted on the helmet of each Soldier.
z Weapon-mounted and handheld devices to identify and designate targets.
z Vision devices and thermal imagers on the BFV for both the driver and the vehicle
commander manning the turret.
2-337. Night vision devices provide good visibility in all but pitch-black conditions but
do somewhat limit the Soldier’s field of view. Since they do not transmit a light source,
the enemy detection devices cannot detect them.
2-338. The BFV is as effective at night as during the day. It can be driven and its weapon
systems can be fired during limited visibility. The driver has an enhanced vision capability,
and the vehicle commander has both an enhanced vision and thermal imaging capability.
The BFV is capable of accurately identifying its current location with the onboard GPS.
The common operational picture allows leaders to locate their subordinate units at all
times.
2-339. Infantry leaders and Soldiers have an increased ability to designate and control
fires during limited visibility. There are three types of advanced optics and equipment for
use in fire control:
z Target designators. Leaders can designate targets with greater precision using
infrared laser pointers that place an infrared light to designate targets and sectors of
fire and to concentrate fire. The leader lazes a target on which he directs his Soldiers
to place their fires. The Soldiers then use their weapon’s aiming lights to engage the
target.
z Aiming lights. Soldiers with aiming lights have greater accuracy of fires during
limited visibility. Each Soldier in the Infantry platoon is equipped with an aiming
light for his individual weapon. Aiming lights work with the individual Soldier’s
helmet-mounted night vision goggles. It puts an infrared light on the target at the
point of aim.
z Target illuminators. Leaders can designate larger targets using target illuminators.
Target illuminators are essentially infrared light sources that light the target, making
it easier to acquire effectively. Leaders and Soldiers use the infrared devices to
identify enemy or friendly personnel and then engage targets using their aiming
lights.
2-340. Illuminating rounds fired to burn on the ground can mark objectives. This helps
the platoon orient on the objective, but may adversely affect night vision devices.
2-341. Leaders plan but may not use illumination during limited visibility attacks.
Battalion commanders normally control conventional illumination, but may authorize the
company team commander to do so. If the commander decides to use conventional
illumination, he should not call for it until the assault is initiated or the attack is detected.
It should be placed on several locations over a wide area to confuse the enemy as to the
exact place of the attack. It should be placed beyond the objective to help assaulting
Soldiers see and fire at withdrawing or counterattacking enemy Soldiers.
2-342. The platoon leader, squad leaders, and vehicle commanders must develop
TACSOPs and sound COAs to synchronize the employment of infrared illumination
devices, target designators, and aiming lights during their assault on the objective. These
include using luminous tape or chemical lights to mark personnel and using weapons
control restrictions.
2-343. The platoon leader may use the following techniques to increase control during
the assault:
z Use no flares, grenades, or smoke on the objective.
z Use only certain personnel with night vision devices to engage targets on the
objective.
z Use a magnetic azimuth for maintaining direction.
z Use mortar or artillery rounds to orient attacking units.
z Use a base squad or fire team to pace and guide others.
z Reduce intervals between Soldiers and squads.
2-344. Like a daylight attack, indirect and direct fires are planned for a limited visibility
attack, but are not executed unless the platoon is detected or is ready to assault. Some
weapons may fire before the attack and maintain a pattern to deceive the enemy or to help
cover noise made by the platoon’s movement. This is not done if it will disclose the attack.
2-345. Smoke further reduces the enemy’s visibility, particularly if he has night vision
devices. The forward observer fires smoke rounds close to or on enemy positions so it does
not restrict friendly movement or hinder the reduction of obstacles. Employing smoke on
the objective during the assault may make it hard for assaulting Soldiers to find enemy
fighting positions. If enough thermal sights are available, smoke on the objective may
provide a decisive advantage for a well-trained platoon.
Note. If the enemy is equipped with night vision devices, leaders must evaluate
the risk of using each technique and ensure the mission is not compromised by
the enemy’s ability to detect infrared light sources.
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
2-347. Obscuration missions are important functions for mortars. Smoke missions must
be planned well in advance so that the mortar carriers are loaded with a sufficient number
of smoke rounds.
2-348. Atmospheric stability, wind velocity, and wind direction are the most important
factors when planning target effects for smoke and WP mortar rounds. The effects of
atmospheric stability can determine whether mortar smoke is effective at all or, if effective,
how much ammunition is needed. The considerations are—
z During unstable conditions, mortar smoke and WP rounds are almost ineffective—
the smoke does not spread but often climbs straight up and quickly dissipates.
z Under moderately unstable atmospheric conditions, base-ejecting smoke rounds are
more effective than BFV bursting WP rounds.
z Under stable conditions, both red phosphorous and WP rounds are effective.
z The higher the humidity, the better the screening effects of mortar rounds.
2-349. The terrain in the target area affects smoke and WP rounds. If the terrain in the
target area is swampy, rain-soaked, or snow-covered, then burning smoke rounds may not
be effective. These rounds produce smoke by ejecting felt wedges soaked in phosphorus.
These wedges then burn on the ground, producing a dense, long-lasting cloud. If the
wedges fall into mud, water, or snow, they can extinguish. Shallow water can reduce the
smoke produced by these rounds by as much as 50 percent. The terrain in the target area
affects BFV bursting WP rounds little, except that deep snow and cold temperatures can
reduce the smoke cloud by about 25 percent.
EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS
2-350. The vehicle smoke grenade launchers can provide a screening, incendiary,
marking, and casualty-producing effect. It produces a localized, instantaneous smoke
cloud by scattering burning WP particles. The 120-mm heavy mortar and 81-mm medium
mortar WP and red phosphorus rounds produce a long-lasting and wide area smoke screen
and can be used for incendiary effects, marking, obscuring, screening, and casualty
producing. The 60-mm lightweight company mortar WP round can be used as a screening,
signaling, and incendiary agent. All mortar smoke rounds can be used as an aid in target
location and navigation.
SECTION X – TRANSITIONS
2-351. The Infantry leader halts an offensive task when he accomplishes his mission,
culminates, or receives a change in mission from higher headquarters.
CONSOLIDATION
2-352. Consolidation is the process of organizing and strengthening a newly captured
position so it can be defended. Normally, the attacking unit tries to exploit its success
regardless the type of assault. In some situations, however, the unit may have to
consolidate its gains. Consolidation may vary from a rapid repositioning of forces and
security elements on the objective, to a reorganization of the attacking force, to the
organization and detailed improvement of positions for defensive missions.
2-353. Consolidation consists of actions taken to secure the objective and defend against
an enemy counterattack. Leaders use TLP to plan and prepare for this phase of operation.
They ensure the unit is ready to conduct the following actions that usually are part of
consolidation:
z Eliminate enemy resistance on the objective.
z Establish security beyond the objective by securing areas that may be the source of
enemy direct fires or enemy artillery observation.
z Establish additional security measures such as observation posts and patrols.
z Prepare for and assist the passage of follow-on forces (if required).
z Continue to improve security by conducting other necessary defensive actions.
These defensive actions include engagement area development, direct fire planning,
and battle position preparation.
z Adjust final protective fires and register targets along likely mounted and
dismounted avenues of approach.
z Protect the obstacle reduction effort.
z Secure enemy detainees.
z Prepare for enemy counterattack.
REORGANIZATION
2-354. Reorganization usually is conducted concurrently with consolidation. It consists
of actions taken to prepare units for follow-on operations. As with consolidation, unit
leaders plan and prepare for reorganization as they conduct TLP. Unit leaders ensure the
following actions are conducted:
z Provide essential medical treatment and evacuate casualties as necessary.
z Treat and evacuate wounded detainees and process the remainder of detainees.
z Cross-level personnel and adjust task organization as required to support the next
phase or mission.
z Conducts resupply operations, including rearming and refueling.
z Redistribute ammunition.
z Conduct required maintenance.
z Continue improvement of defensive positions as necessary.
CONTINUING OPERATIONS
2-355. For all attacks, Infantry units should and must plan to exploit success. However,
at the conclusion of an engagement, the unit leader may be forced to defend. For short
defenses, units make use of existing terrain to enhance their survivability. If a longer
defense is envisioned, engineer assets immediately should refocus their efforts on
providing survivability support (fighting positions and similar activities). Engineer assets
should do this even as they sustain mobility and integrate countermobility into the planned
defensive mission. The Infantry leader considers the higher commander’s concept of the
operation, friendly capabilities, and enemy situation when making the decision to defend
or continuing the offense.
TRANSITION TO STABILITY
2-358. As an offensive task approaches a culmination, or upon order from higher
headquarters, the Infantry leader could order a transition to stability focused mission.
These tasks establish a safe, secure environment facilitating reconciliation among local or
regional threat. Stability tasks aim to establish conditions supporting the transition to
legitimate host-nation governance, a functioning civil society, and a viable market
economy.
2-359. For the Infantry platoon the platoon leader must ensure contingencies are planned
to transition quickly from offense to stability and vice versa. For example, it may be
tactically wise for him to plan a defensive contingency with on-order offensive missions
or stability tasks could deteriorate.
2-360. Subordinate leaders must be fully trained to recognize activities initiating this
transition. Actions in one unit’s area of operation can affect whatever type operation an
adjacent unit is conducting. For example, an offensive task may cause noncombatants to
be displaced to another section of the city creating a humanitarian assistance mission for
the unit in the area of operation.
Defense
A defensive task is a task conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain
time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for
offensive or stability tasks. (Refer to ADRP 3-90 for more
information.) Normally, the defense alone cannot achieve a
decision. However, it can set conditions for a counteroffensive or
counterattack that enables Army forces to regain the initiative.
Other reasons for conducting defensive tasks include, retain
decisive terrain or deny a vital area to the enemy, attrition or fix the
enemy as a prelude to the offense, counter surprise action by the
enemy, or to increase the enemy’s vulnerability by forcing the
enemy commander to concentrate subordinate forces. This chapter
covers basics of the defense, common defensive planning
considerations, forms of the defense engagement area development,
and transitions.
PREPARATION
3-3. The defense has inherent strengths. The defender arrives in the area of operation
before the attacker and uses the available time to prepare. These preparations multiply the
defense’s effectiveness. Preparations end only when the defenders retrograde or begin to
fight. Until then, preparations are continuous. Preparations in-depth continues, even as the
close fight begins.
SECURITY
3-4. Security helps deceive the enemy as to friendly locations, strengths, and
weaknesses. It also inhibits or defeat enemy reconnaissance. Security measures provide
early warning and disrupt enemy attacks early and continuously.
DISRUPTION
3-5. Defenders disrupt attackers’ tempo and synchronization with actions designed to
prevent them from massing combat power. Disruptive actions attempt to unhinge the
enemy’s preparations and, ultimately, his attacks. Methods include defeating or
misdirecting enemy reconnaissance forces, breaking up his formations, isolating his units,
and attacking or disrupting his systems.
FLEXIBILITY
3-7. The defense requires flexible plans. Planning focuses on preparation in-depth, use
of reserves, and ability to shift the main effort. Leaders add flexibility by designating
supplementary positions, designing counterattack plans, and preparing to counterattack.
MANEUVER
3-8. Maneuver allows the defender to take full advantage of area of operation and to
mass and concentrate when desirable. Maneuver, through movement in combination with
fire, allows the defender to achieve a position of advantage over the enemy to accomplish
the mission. It also encompasses defensive actions such as security and support area
operations.
OPERATION IN-DEPTH
3-9. Simultaneous application of combat power throughout the area of operation
improves the chances for success while minimizing friendly casualties. Quick, violent, and
simultaneous action throughout the depth of the defender’s area of operation can hurt,
confuse, and even paralyze an enemy force just as it is most exposed and vulnerable. Such
actions weaken the enemy’s will and do not allow all early enemy successes to build the
confidence of the enemy’s Soldiers and leaders. In-depth planning prevents the enemy
from gaining momentum in the attack. Synchronization of decisive, shaping, and
sustaining operations facilitates mission success.
DEFENSIVE TASKS
3-10. There are three basic defensive tasks: area defense, mobile, and retrograde. Each
contains elements of the others, and usually contains both static and dynamic aspects.
Infantry platoons serve as the primary maneuver element, or terrain-controlling units for
the Infantry company. They can defend area of operation, positions; serve as a security
force or reserve as part of the Infantry company’s coordinated defense. (Refer to
FM 3-90-1 for more information.)
3-11. As part of a defense, the Infantry platoon can defend, delay, withdraw,
counterattack, and perform security tasks. The Infantry platoon usually defends, as part of
the Infantry company’s defense in the main battle area. It conducts the defense to achieve
one or more of the following:
z Gain time.
z Retain essential terrain.
z Support other operations.
z Preoccupy the enemy in one area while friendly forces attack in another.
z Wear down enemy forces at a rapid rate while reinforcing friendly operations.
AREA DEFENSE
3-12. An area defense concentrates on denying enemy forces access to designated terrain
for a specific time rather than destroying the enemy outright. The focus is on retaining
terrain where the bulk of the defending force positions itself in mutually supporting
positions and controls the terrain between positions. The defeat mechanism is fires into
engagement area, which reserve units can supplement. The leader uses the reserve force to
reinforce fires, add depth, block penetrations, restore positions, counterattack to destroy
enemy forces, and seize the initiative.
Organization of Forces
3-13. The leader organizes the defending force to accomplish information collection,
reconnaissance operations; security; main battle area; reserve; and sustainment missions.
The leader has the option of defending forward or defending in-depth. When the leader
defends forward within an area of operation, the force is organized so most of available
combat power is committed early in the defensive effort. To accomplish this, the leader
may deploy forces forward or plan counterattacks well forward in the main battle area or
even beyond the main battle area. If the leader has the option of conducting a defense in-
depth, security forces and forward main battle area elements are used to identify, define,
and control the depth of the enemy’s main effort while holding off secondary thrusts. This
allows the leader to conserve combat power, strengthen the reserve, and better resource
the counterattack.
Security
3-14. The leader balances the need to create a strong security force to shape the battle
with the resulting diversion of combat power from the main body’s decisive operation.
The leader usually allocates security forces to provide early warning and protect those
forces, systems, and locations necessary to conduct the decisive operation from
unexpected enemy contact.
Reserve
3-16. The reserve is not a committed force. The leader can assign it a wide variety of tasks
on its commitment, and it must be prepared to perform other missions. In certain situations,
it may become necessary to commit the reserve to restore the integrity of the defense by
blocking an enemy penetration or reinforcing fires into an engagement area.
Sustainment
3-17. The sustainment mission in an area defense requires a careful balance between
establishing forward supply stocks of petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL); barrier
materiel; and ammunition in adequate amounts to support defending units and having too
many supplies located in forward locations that they cannot be rapidly moved in reacting
to enemy advances. All suitable POL, barrier materiel, construction equipment, and
laborers can be lawfully obtained from the civil infrastructure reducing the defending
unit’s transportation requirements. Likewise, maintenance and medical support with their
associated repair parts and medical supplies also must be forward deployed.
Defense In-Depth
3-19. Defense in-depth reduces the risk of the attacking enemy quickly penetrating the
defense. The enemy is unable to exploit a penetration because of additional defensive
positions employed in-depth. (See figure 3-1.) The in-depth defense provides more space
and time to defeat the enemy attack.
Forward Defense
3-21. The intent of a forward defense is to prevent enemy penetration of the defense. (See
figure 3-2, page 3-6.) Due to lack of depth, a forward defense is least preferred. The
Infantry platoon deploys the majority of its combat power into forward defensive positions
near the forward edge of the battle area. While the Infantry company may lack depth, the
platoon and squads must build depth into the defense at their levels. The leader fights to
retain the forward position, and may conduct counterattacks against enemy penetrations,
or to destroy enemy forces in forward engagement area. Often, counterattacks are planned
forward of the forward edge of the battle area to defeat the enemy.
MOBILE DEFENSE
3-23. Mobile defense is a defensive task that concentrates on destruction or defeat of the
enemy through a decisive attack by a striking force. Mobile defenses focus on defeating
or destroying the enemy by allowing enemy forces to advance to a point where they are
exposed to a decisive counterattack by the striking force. The leader uses the fixing force
to hold attacking enemy in position, to help channel attacking enemy forces into ambush
areas, to retain areas from which to launch the striking force. Mobile defenses require an
area of operation of considerable depth. The leader must able to shape the battlefield,
causing an enemy to overextend its lines of communication, expose its flanks, and dissipate
its combat power. Likewise, the leader must be able to move friendly forces around and
behind the enemy force targeted to cut off and destroyed. Divisions or larger formations
normally execute mobile defenses. However, the platoon may participate as part of the
fixing force or the striking force.
Note. Units smaller than a division usually do not conduct a mobile defense
because of inability to fight multiple engagements throughout the width, depth,
and height of their area of operation, while simultaneously resourcing the
striking, fixing, and reserve forces. Typically, the striking force in a mobile
defense consists of one-half to two-thirds of the defender’s combat power.
3-24. Infantry platoons’ missions in a mobile defense are similar to missions in area
defense and offensive missions. They are either a part of the fixing force or part of the
striking force, not both. As part of the fixing force, platoons defend within their assigned
area of operation, although the area of operation might be larger than usual. As part of the
striking force, Infantry platoons plan, rehearse, and execute offensive tasks.
3-25. Platoons use the term “striking force” rather than the term “reserve” because
“reserve” indicates an uncommitted force. The striking force is a committed force that has
the resources to conduct a decisive counterattack as part of the mobile defense. The striking
force decisively engages the enemy as it becomes exposed in attempts to overcome the
fixing force. The striking force normally attacks a moving enemy force, normally armor
heavy.
RETROGRADE
3-26. Retrograde is a defensive task involving organized movement away from the
enemy. The enemy may force a retrograde or the leader may execute it voluntarily. In
either case, the higher commander of the force executing the operation must approve
retrograding.
3-27. Retrogrades are conducted to improve a tactical situation or preventing a worse
situation from developing. Platoons usually conduct retrogrades as part of a larger force
but may conduct independent retrogrades (withdrawal) as required. Retrograde operations
can accomplish the following:
z Resist, exhaust, and defeat enemy forces.
z Draw the enemy into an unfavorable situation.
z Avoid contact in undesirable conditions.
z Gain time.
z Disengage a force from battle for use elsewhere for other missions.
z Reposition forces, shorten lines of communication, or conform to movements of
other friendly units.
z Secure favorable terrain.
z Retirement.
Delay
3-29. Delays allow units to trade space for time, avoiding decisive engagement and
safeguard its forces. Ability of a force to trade space for time requires depth within the
area of operation assigned to the delaying force. The amount of depth required depends on
several factors, including the—
z Amount of time to be gained.
z Relative combat power of friendly and enemy forces.
z Relative mobility of forces.
z Nature of terrain.
z Ability to shape areas of operations with obstacles and fires.
z Degree of acceptable risk.
3-30. Delays succeed by forcing the enemy to concentrate forces to fight through a series
of defensive positions. Delays must offer a continued threat of serious opposition, forcing
the enemy to repeatedly deploy and maneuver. Delaying forces displace to subsequent
positions before the enemy is able to concentrate sufficient resources to decisively engage
and defeat delaying forces in current positions. The length of time a force can remain in
position without facing danger of becoming decisively engaged is primarily a function of
relative combat power, METT-TC and weather. Delays gain time to—
z Allow friendly forces to establish a defense.
z Cover withdrawing forces.
z Protect friendly force’s flanks.
z Allow friendly forces to counterattack.
single set of positions. If the leader expects the delay to last for longer periods, or sufficient
depth is available, delaying units may delay from either alternate or successive positions.
3-33. In both techniques, delaying forces normally reconnoiter subsequent positions
before occupying them if possible, and post guides on one or two subsequent positions.
Additionally, in executing both techniques, it is critical the delaying force maintains
contact with the enemy between delay positions. Advantages and disadvantages of the two
techniques are summarized in table 3-1.
Table 3-1. Advantages and disadvantages of delay techniques
METHOD
USE WHEN ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES
OF DELAY
Delay from x Area of x Masses fires of all x Limited depth to the
Subsequent operation is available combat delay positions.
Positions wide. elements. x Less available time
x Forces available to prepare each
do not allow position.
themselves to x Less flexibility.
be split.
Delay from x Area of x Allows positioning x Requires more
Alternate operation is in-depth. forces.
Positions narrow. x Provides best x Requires continuous
x Forces are security on most maneuver
adequate to be dangerous avenue coordination.
split between of approach. x Requires passage of
different x Allows more time for lines.
positions. equipment and x Engages only part of
Soldier the force at one
maintenance. time.
x Increases flexibility. x Risk losing contact
with enemy between
delay positions.
3-34. The alternate position technique normally is preferred when adequate forces are
available and areas of operation have sufficient depth. Delays from alternate positions, two
or more units in a single area of operation occupy delaying positions in-depth. (See
figure 3-3, page 3-10.) As the first unit engages the enemy, the second occupies the next
position in-depth and prepares to assume responsibility for the operation. The first force
disengages and passes around or through the second force. It then moves to the next
position and prepares to re-engage the enemy while the second force takes up the fight.
Withdrawal
3-36. Withdrawal is a planned retrograde operation, which a force in contact disengages
from an enemy force, and moves in a direction away from the enemy. Although the leader
avoids withdrawing from action under enemy pressure, it is not always possible.
Withdrawal is used to preserve the force or release it for a new mission.
3-37. Withdrawals are inherently dangerous. They involve moving units to the rear and
away from what is usually a stronger enemy force. The heavier the previous fighting and
closer the contact with the enemy, the more difficult the withdrawal. Units usually confine
rearward movement to times and conditions when the advancing enemy force cannot
observe the activity or easily detect the operation. OPSEC is extremely important,
especially crucial during the initial stages of a delay when most of the functional and
sustainment forces displace.
Planning a Withdrawal
3-38. The leader plans and coordinates a withdrawal in the same manner as a delay.
METT-TC applies differently because of differences between a delay and withdrawal. A
withdrawal always begins under the threat of enemy interference. Because the force is
most vulnerable when the enemy attacks, the leader plans for a withdrawal under pressure.
The leader then develops contingencies for a withdrawal without pressure. In both cases,
the leaders main considerations are to—
z Plan a deliberate break from the enemy.
z Displace the main body rapidly, free of enemy interference.
z Safeguard withdrawal routes.
z Retain sufficient maneuver, functional/multifunctional support and sustainment
capabilities throughout the operation supporting forces in contact with the enemy.
Assisted or Unassisted
3-39. Withdrawals may be assisted or unassisted. They may or may not take place under
enemy pressure. These two factors combined produce four variations. (See figure 3-5.)
The figure below depicts the mission graphic for a withdrawal and withdrawal under
enemy pressure. The withdrawal plan considers which variation the force currently faces.
z Required maneuver, direct fire support and sustainment, which can involve
conducting a counterattack to assist the withdrawing unit in disengaging from the
enemy.
3-42. During an unassisted withdrawal, the withdrawing unit establishes routes and
develops plans for the withdrawal. It establishes the security force as a rear guard while
the main body withdraws. Sustainment and protection forces usually withdraw first,
followed by combat forces. As the unit withdraws, the detachment left in contact (DLIC)
disengages from the enemy and follows the main body to its final destination.
3-43. In an unassisted platoon withdrawal, the platoon leader may designate one squad to
execute the DLIC mission for the platoon, or constitute the DLIC using elements from the
remaining rifle squads with the platoon sergeant as the DLIC leader. Figure 3-6 shows an
example of an unassisted withdrawal.
simultaneous withdrawal of all forces is not practical, the leader decides the order of
withdrawal. Several factors influence this decision:
z Subsequent missions.
z Availability of transportation assets and routes.
z Disposition of friendly and enemy forces.
z Level and nature of enemy pressure.
z Degree of urgency associated with the withdrawal.
Retirement
3-45. Retirement is a task employing to move a force not in contact to the rear. Retirement
is a form of retrograde, which a force not in contact with the enemy moves away from the
enemy. A retiring unit organizes for combat but does not anticipate interference by enemy
ground forces. Typically, another unit’s security force covers the movement of one
formation as the unit conducts a retirement. However, mobile enemy forces,
unconventional forces, air strikes, air assaults, or long-range fires may attempt to interdict
the retiring unit. The leader plans for enemy actions and organizes the unit to fight in self-
defense. The leader usually conducts retirement to reposition his forces for future
operations or to accommodate the current concept of the operation. Units conduct
retirements such as tactical road marches where security and speed are the most important
considerations. (Refer to chapter 5 of this publication for more information.)
ORDER OF EVENTS
3-46. Usually, as part of a larger element, the Infantry platoon conducts the defense
performing several integrated and overlapping activities. The following paragraphs focus
on the tactical considerations and procedures involved in each activity. This discussion
shows an attacking enemy that uses depth in its operations, but there will be situations
where a platoon must defend against an enemy that does not have a doctrinal operational
foundation. The platoon must be prepared to defend against such threats. This
unconventional (insurgent or terrorist force) enemy situation requires a more flexible plan
that allows for more responsive and decentralized control of combat power rather than
spreading it evenly throughout the platoon’s area of operation. The platoon also may
conduct ‘base-camp’ (Refer to FM 3-21.10 for more information.) or perimeter defense
along with offense and patrolling against terrorist and insurgent forces. (Refer to chapter 6
of this publication for a discussion on patrol base activities.)
3-47. As the platoon leader plans his defense, he generally follows this order of events:
z Reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) operations and enemy preparatory fires.
z Occupation and preparation.
z Approach of the enemy main attack.
z Enemy assault.
z Counterattack.
z Consolidation and reorganization.
Security Force
3-49. The security force’s goals normally include providing early warning, destroying
enemy reconnaissance units, and impeding and harassing enemy assault elements. The
security force continues its mission until directed to displace. The commander also may
use security forces in his deception effort to give the illusion of strength in one area while
establishing the main defense in another. While conducting this type of security operation,
the Infantry platoon may simultaneously have to prepare battle positions, creating a
challenging time-management problem for the commander and his subordinate leaders.
Guides
3-50. During this activity, the Infantry platoon might be required to provide guides to pass
the security force and might be tasked to close the passage lanes. The platoon also may
play a role in shaping the battlefield. The platoon leader may position the platoon to deny
likely enemy attack corridors to enhance flexibility and force enemy elements into friendly
engagement area. When it is not conducting security or preparation tasks, the platoon
normally occupies hide positions to avoid possible CBRN strikes or enemy artillery
preparation.
initiate CAS to weaken the enemy. Friendly forces occupy their actual defensive positions
before the enemy reaches direct fire range and may shift positions in response to enemy
actions or other tactical factors.
ENEMY ASSAULT
3-53. During an assault, the enemy deploys to achieve mass at a designated point,
normally employing assault and support forces. This may leave him vulnerable to the
combined effects of indirect and direct fires and integrated obstacles. The enemy may
employ additional forces to fix friendly elements and prevent their repositioning. Friendly
counterattack forces might be committed against the enemy flank or rear, while other
friendly forces may displace to alternate, supplementary, or subsequent positions in
support of the commander's scheme of maneuver. All friendly forces should be prepared
for the enemy to maximize employment of combat multipliers to create vulnerabilities.
The enemy also is likely to use artillery, CAS, and CBRN weapons to set the conditions
for the assault.
3-54. The platoon engages the enemy. Squad leaders and team leaders control their
Soldiers’ direct fires. Destroyed vital positions are reoccupied. Soldiers move to alternate
positions if the primary positions become untenable. Casualties are evacuated. Mines,
indirect fires to include mortars are fired. Javelins and other direct fire weapons target the
enemy’s support positions.
3-55. Under limited visibility, selected mortars and field artillery units initially may fire
infrared illumination if the enemy has not identified the defenders’ positions. Once the
platoon engages the enemy from its primary positions, regular illumination is used. If the
platoon has overhead cover and the enemy penetrates the tactical wire, fires may include
variable timed fuzed HE.
3-56. When required, final protective fires are initiated. Indirect fire systems to include
field artillery and heavy mortars; join in firing their final protective fires concentrations
until ordered to cease-fire or have exhausted their ammunition. Medium machine guns fire
along their final protective lines (FPL). Soldiers fire to the flank to provide mutual support.
Soldiers are resupplied with ammunition, and casualties evacuated.
COUNTERATTACK
3-57. As the enemy's momentum slows or stops, friendly forces may conduct a
counterattack. The counterattack might be for offensive purposes to seize the initiative
from the enemy. In some cases, the purpose of the counterattack is mainly defensive such
as reestablishing a position or restoring control of the sector. The Infantry platoon may
participate in the counterattack as a base-of-fire elementʊproviding support by fire for
the counterattack forceʊor as the actual counterattack force.
BATTLE POSITIONS
3-61. A battle position is a defensive location oriented on a likely enemy avenue of
approach. Units as large as battalion task forces and as small as squads or sections use
battle positions. They may occupy the topographical crest of a hill, a forward slope, a
reverse slope, or a combination of all areas. The leader selects his positions based on
terrain, enemy capabilities, and friendly capabilities. A leader can assign all or some
subordinates battle positions within the area of operation. The types of battle positions
are—
z Primary.
z Alternate.
z Supplementary.
z Subsequent.
z Strongpoint.
Primary Position
3-62. Primary positions cover the enemy’s most likely avenue of approach into the area.
(See figure 3-7, page 3-19.)
Alternate Position
3-63. Alternate positions are those assigned when the primary position becomes
untenable or unsuitable for carrying out the assigned task. (See figure 3-7.) These positions
allow the defender to carry out his original task. The following considerations apply for
an alternate battle position:
z It covers the same avenue of approach or sector of fire as the primary battle position.
z It is located slightly to the front, flank, or rear of the primary battle position.
z It may be positioned forward of the primary battle position during limited visibility
operations.
z It is employed to supplement or support positions with weapons of limited range,
such as dismounted positions.
Supplementary Position
3-64. A supplementary position is a defensive position located within a unit's assigned
area of operation providing sectors of fire and defensible terrain along an avenue of
approach not the enemy’s expected avenue of attack. (See figure 3-7.) For example, an
avenue of approach into a company's area of operation from one of its flanks could require
the company to direct its platoons to establish supplementary positions to allow the
platoons to engage enemy forces traveling along an avenue. The platoon leader formally
assigns supplementary positions when the platoon must cover more than one avenue of
approach.
Subsequent Position
3-65. Subsequent positions are those to which the unit expects to move during the course
of the battle. A defending unit may have a series of subsequent positions. (See figure 3-7.)
Subsequent positions also can have primary, alternate, and supplementary positions
associated with them.
Strong Point
3-66. A strongpoint is a heavily fortified battle position tied to a natural or reinforcing
obstacle to create an anchor for the defense or to deny the enemy decisive or key terrain.
(See figure 3-8.)The mission to create and defend a strongpoint implies retention of terrain
to stop or redirect enemy formations. Strongpoints require extensive time, engineer
support, and Class IV resources to construct. A strongpoint also is used to—
z Canalize enemy forces. Canalize is a mission task in which the leader restricts
enemy movement to a narrow zone by exploiting terrain coupled with the use of
obstacles, fires, or friendly maneuver.
z Contain enemy forces. Contain is a mission task requiring the leader to stop, to hold,
or to surround enemy forces or to cause them to center their activity on a given front
and prevent them from withdrawing any part of forces for use elsewhere.
3-71. These steps may not occur sequentially; they may occur simultaneously. The first
three steps are usually shaping operations and depending on the circumstances, either of
the last two steps may be the decisive operation. (Refer to FM 3-90-1 for more
information.)
conjunction with military judgment, to determine the point at which the enemy commits
to a COA.
3-73. Early detection of the enemy’s decisive operation provides the leader with reaction
time to adjust the fixing force’s positions and shape the enemy penetration, which, in turn,
provides the time necessary to commit the striking force. The striking force leader requires
as close to real-time updates of enemy situation as possible to ensure the striking force
engages the enemy at the right location and time.
MANEUVER
3-79. During the defense, the decisive operation occurs in the main battle area. This is
where the effects of shaping operations, coupled with sustaining operations, combine with
the decisive operations of the main battle area force to defeat the enemy. The leader’s goal
is to prevent the enemy’s increased advance through a combination of fires from prepared
positions, obstacles, and possible counterattack.
3-80. Situational understanding is critical in establishing the conditions initiating the
striking force’s movement and in determining the general area serving as a focus for
counterattacking. It includes identifying those points in time and space where the
counterattack proves decisive. A force-oriented objective or an engagement area usually
indicates the decisive point.
FOLLOW THROUGH
3-81. The purpose of the defense is to retain terrain and create conditions for a
counteroffensive regaining the initiative. The area defense does this by causing the enemy
to sustain unacceptable losses short of all decisive objectives. An area defense allows the
leader transition to an attack. An area defense also could result in a stalemate with both
forces left in contact with each other. Finally, it could result in the defender being
overcome by the enemy attack and needing to transition to a retrograde. All decisions to
withdraw must take into account the current situation in adjacent defensive areas. Only the
leader who ordered the defense can designate a new forward edge of the battle area or
authorize a retrograde.
3-82. The intent of the defense is creating the opportunity to transition to the offense. In
a mobile defense, a transitional opportunity generally results from the success of the
striking force’s attack. The leader exploits success and attempts to establish conditions for
a pursuit if the result of the leader’s assessment of the striking force’s attack shows there
are opportunities for future offensive missions. If the conduct of the mobile defense is
unsuccessful and enemy retains the initiative, the leader must either reestablish a viable
defense or conduct a retrograde.
PRIORITY OF WORK
3-83. Priority of work is a set method of controlling the preparation and conduct of a
defense. Tactical SOPs should describe priority of work including individual duties. The
platoon leader changes priorities based on the situation. All leaders in the platoon should
have a specific priority of work for their duty position. Although listed in sequence, several
tasks are performed at the same time. An example priority of work sequence is as follows:
z Post local security.
z Position and assign sectors of fire for each BFV or ICV.
z Establish the platoons reconnaissance and surveillance.
z Position Javelins, machine guns, and Soldiers; assign sectors of fire.
z Position other assets (platoon command post).
z Designate final protective lines and final protective fires.
z Clear fields of fire and prepare range cards and area of operations sketches.
z Adjust indirect fire final protective fires. The firing unit fire direction center should
provide a safety box clearing of all friendly units before firing adjusting rounds.
z Prepare fighting positions.
z Install wire communications, if applicable.
z Emplace obstacles and mines.
z Mark (or improve marking for) target reference points and direct fire-control
measures.
z Improve primary fighting positions such as overhead cover.
z Prepare alternate and supplementary positions.
z Establish sleep and rest plan.
z Reconnoiter movements.
z Rehearse engagements and disengagements or displacements.
z Adjust positions and control measures as required.
z Stockpile ammunition, food, and water.
z Dig trenches between positions.
z Reconnoiter routes.
z Continue to improve positions.
PLATOON LEADER
3-84. Many duties can be delegated to subordinates, but the platoon leader ensures they
are done. This includes:
z Ensuring local security and assigning observation post responsibility.
z Conducting a leader's reconnaissance with the platoon sergeant and selected
personnel.
z Confirming or denying significant deductions or assumptions from the mission
analysis.
z Confirming the direct fire plan, to include engagement area, sectors of fire, position
essential weapons, and fire control measures.
z Designating primary, alternate, supplementary, and subsequent positions
supporting the direct fire plan, for platoons, sections, and supporting elements.
z Requiring squads to conduct coordination. Integrating indirect fire plan and
obstacles to support the direct fire plan.
z Designating the general platoon command post location, and positioning essential
weapons.
z Checking the platoon command post and briefing the platoon sergeant on the
situation and logistics requirements.
z Upon receipt of the squads’ area of operations sketches, makes two copies of the
platoon defensive area of operations sketch and fire plan, retaining one copy and
forwarding the other copy to the company. (See figure 3-9, page 3-24.)
z Confirming the direct fire plan and squad positions before digging starts.
Coordinating with the left and right units.
z Checking with the company commander for all changes or updates in the orders.
z Finishing the security, deception, counterattack, and obstacle plans.
z Walking the platoon positions after they are dug.
z Confirming clear fields of fire and complete coverage of the platoon’s entire area
of operations by all essential weapons.
z Looking at the defensive plan from an enemy point of view, conceptually and
physically.
z Checking dissemination of information, interlocking fires, and dead space.
z Ensuring immediate correction of deficiencies.
z Ensuring rehearsals are conducted and obstacle locations reported.
PLATOON SERGEANT
3-85. Duties and responsibilities include:
z Establishing the platoon command post and ensures wire communications link the
platoon, squads, and attached elements, if applicable.
z Establishing casualty collection points, platoon logistics release points, and
detainee collection points, and locating company level points.
z Briefing squad leaders on the platoon command post location, logistics plan, and
routes between positions.
z Assisting the platoon leader with the sector of fire and area of operations sketch.
z Requesting and allocating pioneer tools, barrier materiel, rations, water, and
ammunition.
z Walking the positions with the platoon leader. Supervising emplacement of squads,
essential weapons, check range cards, and area of operations sketches.
z Establishing routine security or alert plans, radio watch, and rest plans and briefing
the platoon leader.
z Supervising continuously and assisting the platoon leader with other duties as
assigned.
z Selecting slit trench location and ensuring it is properly marked.
SQUAD LEADERS
3-86. The squad leader—
z Emplaces local security.
z Confirms positioning and assigned sectors of fire for his squad.
z Confirms positioning and assigned sectors of fire for the CCMS and medium
machine gun teams.
z Positions and assigns sectors of fire for automatic rifleman, grenadiers, and
riflemen.
z Establishes command post and wire communications.
z Confirms designate FPL and final protective fires.
z Clears fields of fire and prepares range cards.
z Prepares squad range card and area of operations sketches.
z Digs fighting positions.
z Establishes communication and coordination within the platoon, and adjacent units.
z Coordinates with adjacent units. Reviews sector of fire and area of operations
sketches.
z Emplaces antitank and Claymores, then wire and other obstacles.
z Marks or improves marking for target reference points and other fire control
measures.
z Improves primary fighting positions and adds overhead cover (stage 2).
z Prepares supplementary and alternate positions (same procedure as the primary
position).
FORWARD OBSERVER
3-87. The FO—
z Assists the platoon leader in planning the indirect fires to support defensive
missions.
z Advises the platoon leader on the status of all firing units, and on the use of
obscurants or illumination.
z Coordinates with the Infantry company fire support officer, firing units, and squad
leaders to ensure the fire plan is synchronized and fully understood.
z Ensures the indirect fire plan is rehearsed and understood by all.
z Ensures all final protective fires are adjusted as soon as possible.
z Develops an observation plan.
z Coordinates and rehearses all repositioning of observers within the platoon area of
operations to ensure they can observe targets or areas of responsibility.
z Develops triggers.
z Reports information collection activities.
z Ensures redundancy in communications.
COORDINATION
3-89. In the defense, coordination ensures that units provide mutual support and
interlocking fires. In most circumstances, the platoon leader conducts face-to-face
SECURITY
3-91. Security in the defense includes all active and passive measures taken to avoid
detection by the enemy, deceive the enemy, and deny enemy reconnaissance elements
accurate information on friendly positions. The two primary tools available to the platoon
leader are observation posts and patrols. In planning for the security in the defense, the
platoon leader considers the military aspects of terrain: observation and fields of fire,
avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles and cover, and concealment. He uses his map
to identify terrain that will protect the platoon from enemy observation and fires, while
providing observation and fires into the engagement area. He uses intelligence updates to
increase his situational understanding, reducing the possibility of the enemy striking at a
time or in a place for which the platoon is unprepared.
3-92. Current mission commands systems allow mechanized squads to digitally transmit
enemy situation and observation reports. This simplifies the reporting process without
compromising security. Dismounted observation posts still render reports by frequency
modulation radio transmission.
OBSERVATION POSTS
3-93. An observation post provides the primary security in the defense. Observation posts
provide early warning of impending enemy contact by reporting direction, distance, and
size. It detects the enemy early and sends accurate reports to the platoon. The platoon
leader establishes observation posts along the most likely enemy avenues of approach into
the position or into the area of operation. Leaders ensure that observation posts (mounted
or dismounted) have communication with the platoon.
3-94. Early detection reduces the risk of the enemy overrunning the observation post.
Observation post may be equipped with a Javelin command launch unit; class 1 unmanned
aircraft system; seismic, acoustic, or frequency detecting sensors to increase its ability to
detect the enemy. They may receive infrared trip flares, infrared parachute flares, infrared
M203 or M320 rounds, and even infrared mortar round support to illuminate the enemy.
The platoon leader weighs the advantages and disadvantages of using infrared illumination
when the enemy is known to have night vision devices that detect infrared light. Although
infrared and thermal equipment within the platoon enables the platoon to see the
observation post at a greater distance, the observation post should not be positioned outside
the range of the platoon’s small-arms weapons.
3-95. To further reduce the risk of fratricide, observation posts use GPS to navigate to the
exit and entry point in the platoon’s position. The platoon leader ensures he submits an
observation post location to the company team commander to ensure a no fire area is
established around each observation post position.
PATROLS
3-96. Platoons actively patrol in the defense. Patrols enhance the platoon’s ability to fill
gaps in security between observation posts. The platoon leader forwards his tentative
patrol route to the commander to ensure they do not conflict with other elements within
the company team. The commander forwards the entire company team’s patrol routes to
the task force. This allows the operations and intelligence staff officers to ensure all routes
are coordinated for fratricide prevention and no gaps are present. The patrol leader may
use a GPS to enhance his basic land navigational skills as he tracks his patrol’s location
on a map, compass, and pace count or odometer reading.
REMOUNT POINT
3-102. The platoon leader selects a remount point that permits the rapid loading of the
dismounted element into vehicles, while minimizing both the dismounted Soldier’s and
vehicles exposure to enemy fire. He tries to locate the remount point as close as possible
to his dismounted element. Squad leaders ensure that their Soldiers know the remount
point location. When moving to the vehicles, the dismounted element ensures that they do
not mask the BFV or ICV fields of fire.
3-103. Three remount point locations exist: near the dismounted element, near the
mounted element, or between the two. Positioning the remount point near the dismounted
element is preferred if it does not unnecessarily expose the vehicles to enemy fire. Based
on the situation however, the platoon leader may have to accept risk and expose his BFVs
or ICVs to remount his platoon. Locating the remount point near the vehicle is preferred
if the area around or the mounted route to the dismounted element is exposed to enemy
fire, and include a covered dismounted route back to the vehicles. The platoon leader
selects a remount point between the two elements when both can reach it without
unnecessarily exposing themselves to enemy fire.
Note. To avoid redundancy, the six warfighting functions for the offense are
similar to the six-warfighting functions for the defense. Commander’s intent and
METT-TC determines how they are applied.
MISSION COMMAND
3-105. The first step is the expression of the leader’s vision of anticipated enemy actions
integrated with the Infantry companies IPB. The Infantry battalion and company IPB
should not differ significantly, giving the Infantry platoon and squad a clear understanding
of how the Infantry battalion and company commanders envision the enemy fight and plan
for the operation. The Infantry company commander and CoIST refine the IPB to focus on
the details of the operation in the company area of operation. The platoon leader refines
his IPB to focus on the details of the mission in the Infantry platoon and squad area of
operation. The Infantry battalion commander usually defines where and how the Infantry
battalion will defeat or destroy the enemy. The Infantry company commander and platoon
leader then defines how they envision how their units will execute their portion of the
battalion fight.
FLANK POSITIONS
3-109. Flank positions enable a defending force to fire on an attacking force moving
parallel to the defender's forces. A flank position provides the defender with a larger and
more vulnerable target while leaving the attacker unsure of the defense location. Major
considerations for employment of a flank position are the defender's ability to secure the
flank and his ability to achieve surprise by remaining undetected. Fire control and
fratricide avoidance measures are critical considerations in the employment of flank
positions. (See appendix B of this publication for more information.)
DISPLACEMENT PLANNING
3-110. Disengagement and displacement allow the platoon to retain its flexibility and
tactical agility in the defense. The ultimate goals of disengagement and displacement are
to enable the platoon to avoid being fixed or decisively engaged by the enemy. The
overarching factor in a displacement is to maintain a mobility advantage over the enemy.
The platoon leader must consider several important factors in displacement planning.
These factors include, among others:
z The enemy situation, for example, an enemy attack with one company-size enemy
unit might prevent the platoon from disengaging.
z Disengagement criteria.
z Availability of direct fire suppression that can support disengagement by
suppressing or disrupting the enemy.
z Availability of cover and concealment, indirect fires, and obscurants to assist
disengagement.
z Obstacle integration, including situational obstacles.
z Positioning of forces on terrain that provides an advantage to the disengaging
elements such as linear obstacles.
z Identification of displacement routes and times when disengagement or
displacement will take place. Routes and times are rehearsed.
z The size of the friendly force that must be available to engage the enemy in support
of the displacing unit.
3-111. While disengagement and displacement are valuable tactical tools, they can be
extremely difficult to execute in the face of a rapidly moving enemy force. In fact,
displacement in contact poses such great problems that the platoon leader thoroughly plans
for it and rehearses displacement before conducting the defense. He then carefully
evaluates the situation when displacement in contact becomes necessary to ensure it is
feasible and does not result in unacceptable personnel or equipment losses.
DISENGAGEMENT CRITERIA
3-112. Disengagement criteria dictate to subordinate elements the circumstances, in
which they will displace to alternate, supplementary, or subsequent positions. The criteria
are tied to an enemy action, such as an enemy unit advancing past a certain phase line.
They also are linked to the friendly situation. For example, the criteria might depend on
whether artillery or an overwatch element can engage the enemy. Unique disengagement
criteria are developed during the planning process for each specific situation.
prior to contact. Rehearsals increase the speed at which they can conduct the move and
provide an added measure of security. The platoon leader makes a concerted effort to
allocate available time to rehearse movement in limited visibility and degraded conditions.
OBSTACLE INTEGRATION
3-116. Obstacles are integrated with direct and indirect fires. By slowing and disrupting
enemy movement, obstacles provide the defender with the time necessary for displacement
and allow friendly forces to employ direct and indirect fires against the enemy. The
Modular Pack Mine System (MOPMS) also can be employed in support of the
disengagement, to either block a key displacement route once the displacing unit has
passed through it or close a lane through a tactical obstacle. The location of obstacles in
support of disengagement depends on METT-TC. Ideally, an obstacle should be positioned
far enough away from the defender that enemy elements could be engaged on the far side
of the obstacle while keeping the defender out of range of the enemy's massed direct fires.
MOBILITY
3-117. Mobility operations in the defense ensure the ability to reposition forces, delay,
and counterattack. Initially during defensive preparations, mobility operations focus on the
ability to resupply, reposition, and conduct rearward and forward passage of forces,
materiel, and equipment. Once defensive preparations are complete, the focus normally
shifts to supporting the platoon reserve, local counterattacks, and the higher headquarters
counterattack or reserve. Priorities set by the company may specify routes for
improvement in support of such missions. Normally, most engineer assets go to
survivability and countermobility. At a set time or trigger, engineers disengage from
obstacle and survivability position construction and start preparing for focused mobility
missions. The platoon leader analyzes the scheme of maneuver, obstacle plan, and terrain
to determine mobility requirements. Critical considerations may include:
z Lanes and gaps in the obstacle plan.
z Lane closure plan and subunit responsibility.
z Route reconnaissance, improvement, and maintenance.
COUNTERMOBILITY
3-118. To succeed in the defense, the platoon leader integrates individual obstacles into
direct and indirect fire plans, considering the intent for each obstacle group. (Refer to
ATTP 3-90.4 for more information on countermobility in the defense.) Obstacles are
normally constructed by engineers with help from the platoon. In the defense, the platoon
or squad uses obstacles to:
z Slow the enemy’s advance to give the platoon or squad more time to mass fires on
him.
z Protect defending units.
z Canalize the enemy into places where he can easily be engaged.
z Separate the enemy’s tanks from his infantry.
z Strengthen areas that are lightly defended.
3-119. Obstacle intent includes the target and desired effect (clear task and purpose) and
the relative location of the obstacle group. The purpose influences many aspects of the
operation, from selecting and designing obstacle sites to conducting the defense. Normally,
the company commander designates the purpose of an obstacle group. When employing
obstacles, the leader considers the following principles:
z Support the tactical plan. Obstacles supplement combat power, decrease the
mobility of the enemy, and provide security for the platoon. While considering
enemy avenues of approach, he also considers his own movement requirements,
such as routes for resupply, withdrawal, counterattacks, patrols, and observation
posts.
z Tie in. He ties in his reinforcing obstacles with existing obstacles. He must also tie
in the obstacle plan with his plans for fires.
z Covered by observation and fire. He ensures that all obstacles are covered by
observation and fire. This reduces the enemy’s ability to remove or breach the
obstacles and increases the possibilities of placing fire on the enemy when he
encounters the obstacle.
z Constructed in-depth. He emplaces obstacles so that each new obstacle encountered
by the enemy attrites the enemy force and causes a desired and controlled reaction.
Proper use of obstacles in-depth wears the enemy down and significantly increases
the overall effect.
z Employed for surprise. An obvious pattern of obstacles would divulge locations of
units and weapons. Friendly forces must avoid readily discernable, repetitive
patterns.
Tactical Obstacles
3-120. The company commander assigns obstacle groups, and tells the platoon leaders
and engineers what he wants to do to the enemy, and then he resources the groups
accordingly. Obstacle intent includes these elements:
z The target, which is the enemy force that the commander wants to affect with fires
and tactical obstacles. The commander identifies the target's size, type, echelon,
avenues of approach, or any combination of these.
z The obstacle effect describes how the commander wants to attack enemy maneuver
with obstacles and fires. Tactical obstacles block, turn, fix, or disrupt. Obstacle
effect integrates the obstacles with direct and indirect fires.
z The relative location is where the commander wants the obstacle effect to occur
against the targeted enemy force. The commander initiates the obstacle integration
process after identifying where on the terrain the obstacle will most decisively affect
the enemy.
z For example, the company commander might say, "Deny the enemy access to our
flank by turning the northern, mechanized Infantry battalion into our engagement
area. Allow companies B and C to mass their fires to destroy the enemy."
Scatterable minefield systems and submunitions are the main means of constructing
tactical obstacles. These systems, with their self- and command-destruct
capabilities, are flexible, and they aid in rapid transitions between offensive and
defensive tasks. They do this better than other constructed obstacles. The force
constructs conventional minefields and obstacles only for a deliberate, long-term
defense. In those cases, the company and platoons usually are augmented with
assets from a divisional engineer battalion. Table 3-2 shows the symbols for each
obstacle effect, and it describes the purpose and characteristics of each.
Table 3-2. Obstacle effects
Protective Obstacles
3-121. Infantry platoons plan and construct their own protective obstacles. For best
effect, protective obstacles are tied into existing or tactical reinforcing obstacles. The
platoon can use mines and wire, or it might receive additional materiel from company,
Class IV or V supply point. The platoon also might conduct any other required
coordination, such as needed in a relief in place, to recover or destroy the obstacle:
z In planning protective obstacles, the platoon leader evaluates the potential threat to
the platoon’s position. Then, employs the best system for that threat.
z Protective obstacles usually are located beyond hand grenade distance (40 to 100
meters) from the Soldier's fighting position, and may extend out 300 to 500 meters
to tie into tactical obstacles and existing restricted terrain. As with tactical obstacles,
the platoon leader should plan protective obstacles in-depth and try to maximize the
range of his weapons.
z When planning protective obstacles, the platoon leader considers preparation time,
the burden on the logistical system, the Soldiers' loads, and the risk of loss of
surprise.
3-122. The three types of wire obstacles (see figure 3-11) are protective, tactical, and
supplementary:
z Protective wire can be a complex obstacle providing all-around protection of a
platoon perimeter. It also might be a simple wire obstacle on the likely dismounted
avenue of approach into a squad ambush position. Command-detonated
M18 Claymores can be integrated into the protective wire or used separately.
z Tactical wire is positioned to increase the effectiveness of the platoon's fires.
Usually, it is positioned along the friendly side of the medium machine gun FPL.
Tactical minefields also may be integrated into these wire obstacles or used
separately.
z Supplementary wire obstacles can break up the line of tactical wire. This helps
prevent the enemy from locating friendly weapons (particularly the medium
machine guns) by following the tactical wire.
Obstacle Lanes
3-123. The platoon might be responsible for actions related to lanes through obstacles.
These duties can include marking lanes in an obstacle, reporting locations of the start and
ends of each lane, operating contact points, providing guides for elements passing through
the obstacle, and closing the lane.
Situational Obstacle
3-124. A situational obstacle is planned and possibly prepared before a mission, but it
executes only if specific criteria are met. It gives the platoon leader the flexibility to
emplace tactical obstacles based on battlefield development—
z The platoon leader anticipates situations that require maneuver and fire plan
modifications to defeat the threat, and considers the use of situational obstacles to
support these modifications.
z By their very nature, situational obstacles must be quickly installable, but still
achieve the desired effect. Therefore, scatterable mines (SCATMINEs) such as
MOPMS, Hornets, and Volcanoes are the most common versions used at the
platoon level. However, situational obstacles can consist of any type of individual
obstacle.
z The platoon leader considers where he can employ situational obstacles. He ensures
the combination of fires and obstacles are enough to achieve the obstacle effect.
z The platoon leader identifies execution triggers; situational obstacles are triggered
based on friendly actions, enemy actions, or a combination of both.
z Finally, the platoon leader withholds execution of a situational obstacle until the
obstacle effect is required. Once committed, those assets are no longer available to
support any other mission. The platoon leader also considers that SCATMINEs
have a self-destruct time. Emplacing an obstacle too soon can cause the mines to
self-destruct before the enemy arrives.
INTELLIGENCE
3-125. The Infantry platoon leader never has all the information needed about the enemy.
Therefore, the platoon leader obtains or develops the best possible IPB products, conducts
continuous reconnaissance, and integrates new and updated intelligence throughout the
operation. He may need to request information through the CoIST from the battalion staff
to answer platoon information requirements. (Refer to FM 3-21.10 for more information.)
3-126. As with all tactical planning, IPB is a critical part of defensive planning. It helps
the platoon leader define where to concentrate combat power, where to accept risk, and
where to plan potential decisive operations. To aid in the development of a flexible
defensive plan, the IPB must present all feasible enemy courses of action. The essential
areas of focus are—
z Analyze terrain and weather.
z Determine enemy force size and likely courses of action with associated decision
points.
FIRES
3-128. For indirect fire plan to be effective in the defense, the Infantry platoon plans and
executes fires in a manner, which achieves the intended task and purpose of each target.
Indirect fires serve a variety of purposes in the defense, including the following:
z Slow and disrupt enemy movement.
z Prevent the enemy from executing breaching operations.
z Destroy or delay enemy forces at obstacles using massed fires or precision
munitions.
z Disrupt enemy support-by-fire elements.
z Defeat attacks along avenues of approach with the use of final protective fires.
z Disrupt the enemy to enable friendly elements to disengage or conduct
counterattacks.
z Obscure enemy observation or screen friendly movement during disengagement
and counterattacks.
z Provide obscurants screens to separate enemy echelons or to silhouette enemy
formations to facilitate direct fire engagement.
z Provide illumination as necessary.
z Execute suppression of enemy air defense missions to support aviation operations.
3-129. In developing the fire plan, the platoon leader evaluates the indirect fire systems
available to provide support. Considerations when developing the plan include tactical
capabilities, weapons ranges, and available munitions. These factors help the platoon
leader and forward observer determine the best method for achieving the task and purpose
for each target in the fire plan. The Infantry company fire support personnel contribute
significantly to the platoon fight. Positioning is critical. The platoon leader, in coordination
with the company fire support officer, selects positions providing his forward observer
with unobstructed observation of the area of operation, ensuring survivability.
SUSTAINMENT
3-130. In addition to the sustainment functions required for all missions, the platoon
leader’s planning process includes pre-positioning of ammunition caches, identifying the
positioning of company trains, and Class IV and V supply points and mine dumps.
3-131. The platoon leader’s mission analysis may reveal the platoon's ammunition
requirements during an upcoming mission exceed its basic load. This requires the platoon
to coordinate with the company to preposition ammunition caches. The platoon usually
positions ammunition caches at alternate or subsequent positions. The platoon also may
dig in these caches and guard them to prevent their capture or destruction by the enemy.
3-132. The Infantry company trains usually operate 500 to 1000 meters or one terrain
feature to the rear of the company to provide immediate recovery and medical support.
The company trains conduct evacuation (of those wounded in action [WIA], weapons, and
equipment) and resupply as required. The company trains are located in covered and
concealed positions close enough to the company to provide responsive support, but out
of enemy direct fire. The company first sergeant or executive officer positions the trains
and supervises sustainment operations with the platoon. It is the Infantry company
commander’s responsibility to ensure all subordinate units know the locations of battalion
combat and field trains as well as the company CCP, BAS, and medical and casualty
evacuation procedures. The platoon leader’s analysis determines the measures for every
mission.
PROTECTION
3-133. Air and missile defense support to the platoon may be limited. Units should
expect to use their organic weapons systems for self-defense against enemy air threats.
Plan for CBRN reconnaissance at likely locations for enemy employment of CBRN agents
and hazards. Use obscurants to support disengagement or movement of forces. Assign
sectors of fire to prevent fratricide and friendly fire.
3-134. Survivability construction includes fighting positions, protective positions, and
hardening. These are prepared to protect vehicles, personnel and weapons systems.
Positions can be constructed and reinforced with overhead cover to increase the
survivability of dismounts and crew-served weapons against shrapnel from airbursts.
Vehicle fighting positions can be constructed with both hull and turret-defilade
observation positions. In addition, the Infantry platoon and squad may use digging assets
for ammunition caches at alternate, supplementary, or subsequent positions. All leaders
must understand survivability plans and priorities. Typically, at platoon level the engineer
platoon leader creates a leader’s card, which enables the platoon leader to track the
survivability effort. One person in the platoon, usually the platoon sergeant is designated
to enforce the plan and priorities, and ensure the completion status is reported accurately,
tracked, and disseminated down to subordinate squads and attachments.
URBAN TERRAIN
3-136. Infantry forces defend urban areas to defeat an attack, gain time, economize
forces, protect infrastructure, protect a populace, and shape conditions for offensive or
stability urban operations. Usually two or more purposes apply to urban defense tasks in
urban terrain. Defensive urban operations provide leaders opportunities to turn the
environment’s characteristics to the advantage of Army forces. Urban areas are ideal for
the defense and enhance the combat power of defending units.
3-137. In a built-up area, the defender takes advantage of inherent cover and
concealment afforded by urban terrain. Restrictions to the attacker's ability to maneuver
and observe are taken into consideration. By using the terrain and fighting from well-
prepared and mutually supporting positions, a defending force can delay, block, fix, turn,
disrupt, or destroy a much larger attacking force. The defense of a built-up area is
organized around key terrain features, buildings, and areas that preserves the integrity of
the defense and provide the defender ease of movement. The defender organizes and plans
defensive missions by considering OAKOC, fire hazards, and communications
restrictions. (Refer to ATTP 3-06.11 for more information.)
SUBTERRANEAN THREATS
3-138. The enemy will likely use tunnels and may have the advantage of marked routes
and detailed reconnaissance. Because he is able to select ambush positions and withdrawal
routes, the defender typically has the element of surprise. A defended position in an
underground facility can be very effective in countering enemy subterranean operations.
The best underground defensive positions are well protected and canalize the enemy into
a killing zone to inflict maximum casualties.
3-139. When moving through tunnels, take great care to avoid booby traps. These are
normally deployed near junctions and are often operated by tripwires. Standing water in
tunnels provides excellent camouflage for antipersonnel mines and booby traps scattered
on likely routes. With the battle above continuing, flooding and cave-ins are highly
possible due to the likelihood of artillery barrages and the use of demolitions. Thus,
identifying escape routes is essential.
3-140. Chemical defense is a constant concern for Soldiers conducting subterranean
operations. In tunnels, Soldiers may encounter chemical warfare agents as well as
industrial chemicals in dense concentrations. A chemical agent alarm system, carried by
the point man, provides instantaneous warning of the presence of chemical warfare agents.
M8 and M9 detection papers also test for the presence of chemical agents. (Refer to
ATTP 3-06.11 for more information.)
MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN
3-141. Defensive tasks in mountainous areas are conducted to resist, defeat, or destroy
an enemy attack to support subsequent offensive tasks. Infantry leaders use the defense to
withstand an enemy attack while preparing to seize the initiative and develop conditions
favorable for transitioning to the offense. During the defense, friendly forces withstand
enemy attacks and hold the enemy while preparing to seize the initiative and transition to
an attack or to conduct stability tasks. A thorough understanding of the commander's intent
is especially critical in the defense, which demands precise integration of all combat
power.
3-142. Forces operating in mountainous terrain often possess weapons and equipment
more advanced in technology than the enemy does. Knowing this, enemy offensive tactics
commonly involve short violent engagements followed by a hasty withdrawal through
preplanned routes. They often strike quickly and fight only as long as the advantage of
initial surprise is in their favor. Attacks may include direct fires, indirect fires, or IEDs and
may be against stationary or moving forces. (Refer to ATTP 3-21.50 for more
information.)
3-148. This form of defense may be used when defensible terrain is available in the
forward portion of the platoon's area of operation, or to take advantage of a major linear
natural obstacle. It also is used when the enemy is mainly Infantry; the platoon conducts a
security mission such as counter infiltration, or as directed by company. This technique
allows interlocking and overlapping observation and fields of fire across the platoon's
front. (See figure 3-12.) The bulk of the platoon's combat power is well forward. Sufficient
resources must be available to provide adequate combat power to detect and stop an attack.
The platoon relies on fighting from well-prepared mutually supporting positions. It uses a
high volume of direct and indirect fires to stop the attacks. The main concern when fighting
this form of defense is the lack of flexibility and the difficulty of both seizing the initiative
and seeking out enemy weaknesses. Obstacles, indirect fires, and contingency plans are
vital to this maneuver. The platoon depends upon surprise, well-prepared positions, and
deadly accurate fires to defeat the enemy. The reserve is usually small, perhaps a squad.
penetrated, block the advance with the reserve and shift fire from the forward squads onto
the enemy flanks. Then, counterattack with the platoon reserve or the least committed
squad with intense fires. The purpose is to destroy isolated or weakened enemy forces and
regain key terrain.
3-150. The counterreconnaissance effort is critical when fighting to deny the enemy the
locations of the platoon's forward positions. If the enemy locates the forward positions, he
will concentrate combat power where he desires while fixing the rest of the platoon to
prevent their maneuver to disrupt his attack. This effort might be enhanced by initially
occupying and fighting from alternate positions forward of the primary positions. This
tactic enhances the security mission and deceives the enemy reconnaissance that may get
through the security force.
PERIMETER DEFENSE
3-151. The platoon leader can employ the perimeter defense as an option when
conducting an area or mobile defense. A perimeter defense is a defense oriented in all
directions. (See figure 3-13, page 3-44.) The Infantry platoon uses it for self-security, and
to protect other units located within the perimeter. The platoon can employ a perimeter
defense in urban or woodland terrain. The platoon might be called upon to execute the
perimeter defense under a variety of conditions, including:
z When it must secure itself against terrorist or insurgent attacks in an urban area.
z This technique also may apply if the platoon must conserve or build combat power
in order to execute offensive tasks or patrolling missions.
z When it must hold critical terrain in areas where the defense is not tied in with
adjacent units.
z When it has been bypassed and isolated by the enemy and must defend in place.
z When it conducts occupation of an independent assembly area or reserve position.
z When it begins preparation of a strongpoint.
z When it is directed to concentrate fires into two or more adjacent avenues of
approach.
PREPARATIONS
3-152. The Infantry platoon prepares a perimeter defense when there are no friendly
units adjacent to it. A perimeter defense might be used in a reserve position, in an AA or
patrol base, on a follow-on decentralized platoon operation during resupply or when the
platoon is isolated. The following actions constitute setting up a perimeter defense:
z Preparing a perimeter defense is like preparing any other position defense, but the
platoon must disperse in a circular configuration for all-round security. (The actual
shape depends on the terrain.) The platoon must be prepared to defend in all
directions.
z The platoon leader assigns squads to cover the most likely approach, and prepares
alternate and supplementary positions within the perimeter.
z Javelins cover likely armor approaches.
z They may use hide positions and move forward to fire as the enemy appears. The
platoon leader assigns several firing positions. If there are few positions for them,
they are assigned a primary position and are dug in.
Y-SHAPE VARIATION
3-153. The Y-shaped perimeter defense is a variation of the perimeter defense that uses
the terrain effectively. This defense is used when the terrain, cover and concealment, or
fields of fire do not support the physical positioning of the squads in a circular manner.
The Y-shaped perimeter defense is so named because the squad’s battle positions are
positioned on three different axes radiating from one central point. (See figure 3-14, page
3-46.) It is still a perimeter defense because it is effective against an attack from any
direction. The Y-shaped defense provides all-round perimeter fires without having to
position Soldiers on the perimeter. It is likely to be most effective in mountainous terrain,
but it also may be used in a dense jungle environment due to limited fields of fire. All of
the fundamentals of a perimeter defense previously discussed apply, with the following
adjustments and special considerations:
z Although each squad battle position has a primary orientation for its fires, each
squad must be prepared to reorient to mass fires into the engagement areas to its
rear.
z When no most likely enemy approach is identified, or in limited visibility, each
squad may have half its Soldiers oriented into the engagement areas to the front
and half into the engagement areas to the rear. Ideally, supplementary individual
fighting positions are prepared, allowing Soldiers to reposition when required to
mass fires into one engagement area.
z When a most likely enemy avenue of approach is identified, the platoon leader may
adjust the normal platoon orientations to concentrate fires (see figure 3-15) for the
following reasons:
This entails accepting risk in another area of the perimeter.
The platoon security plan should compensate for this with additional observation
posts, patrols, or other measures.
z The positioning of the platoon command post, reserve, or any sustainment assets is
much more difficult due to a lack of depth within the perimeter.
3-154. The most difficult aspect of the Y-shape perimeter defense is the fire control
measures required. To fight this defense without casualties from friendly fire, the leaders
must ensure the limits of fire for each weapon do not allow fires into the adjacent squad
positions. In a mountainous environment, firing downward into the engagement area may
make this simpler. Some measures to consider include:
z Position medium machine guns near the apex of the "Y" to allow a final protective
line that covers the platoon front while firing away from the adjacent units.
z Cover the areas of the engagement areas closest to the apex with Claymores, non-
persistent mines, or obstacles to reduce the need for direct fires in these areas.
z Identify those positions at most risk to friendly fires and prepare the fighting
position to protect the Soldier from fires in this direction.
z The loss of one squad position may threaten the loss of the entire platoon. To
prevent this, plan and rehearse immediate counterattacks with a reserve or the least
committed platoon.
z Consider allowing the enemy to penetrate well into the engagement areas and
destroy him as in an ambush.
z Be aware that if a Y-shape defense is established on the prominent terrain feature
and the enemy has the ability to mass fires, he may fix the platoon with direct fires
and destroy it with massed indirect fires.
REVERSE-SLOPE DEFENSE
3-155. An alternative to defending on the forward slope of a hill or a ridge is to defend
on a reverse slope. (See figure 3-16.) In such a defense, the Infantry platoon is deployed
on terrain that is masked from enemy direct fire and ground observation by the crest of a
hill. Although some units and weapons might be positioned on the forward slope, the crest,
or the counter-slope (a forward slope of a hill to the rear of a reverse slope), most forces
are on the reverse slope. The key to this defense is control the crest by direct fire.
FUNDAMENTALS
3-156. Planning fundamentals to a defense on a reverse slope include:
z Positioning forward squads so they block enemy approaches and exploit existing
obstacles. Plans should—
Permit surprise fire on the crest and on the approaches around the crest.
Have rear and overhead cover to protect friendly Soldiers from fratricide while
in forward fighting positions.
z Positioning observation posts, on the crest or the forward slope of the defended hill.
Plans should—
Increase observation posts and patrols to prevent infiltration at night.
Consider attaching medium machine guns to observation posts.
z Positioning the squad in-depth or reserve where it can provide the most flexibility,
support the forward squads by fire, protect the flanks and the rear of the platoon,
and counterattack, if necessary. It might be positioned on the counterslope to the
rear of the forward squad if that position allows it to fire and hit the enemy when he
reaches the crest of the defended hill.
z Positioning the platoon command post to the rear where it will not interfere with
the reserve or supporting units. Plans should consider that—
The platoon leader may have an observation post on the forward slope or crest
and another on the reverse slope or counterslope.
The observation post is used on the forward slope or crest before the battle starts
when the platoon leader is determining the enemy's intentions.
During the fight, he moves the observation post on the reverse slope or
counterslope.
z Planning indirect fire well forward of, on, and to the flanks of the forward slope,
crest, reverse slope, and counterslope.
z Planning direct final protective fires on the crest of the hill to control the crest and
stop assaults.
z Reinforcing existing obstacles.
z Knowing that protective obstacles on the reverse slopeʊjust down from the crest
where it can be covered by fireʊcan slow the enemy's advance and hold him under
friendly fire.
z Knowing that the platoon leader normally plans for counterattacks and plans to
drive the enemy off the crest by fire, if possible.
z Knowing that the platoon leader is prepared to drive the enemy off by fire and
movement.
EMPLOYMENT
3-157. The Infantry leader can adopt a reverse slope position when—
z Enemy fire makes the forward slope untenable.
z Lack of cover and concealment on the forward slope makes it untenable.
z The forward slope has been lost or not yet been gained.
z The forward slope is exposed to enemy direct fire weapons fired from beyond the
effective range of the defender's weapons. Moving to the reverse slope removes the
attacker's standoff advantage.
z The terrain on the reverse slope provides better fields of fire than the forward slope.
z Surprising and deceiving the enemy as to the true location of the Infantry platoon’s
defensive positions is essential.
z Enemy weapons systems have overmatch in range and lethality.
3-158. When executing a reverse slope defense, the leader places special emphasis on—
z A direct and indirect fire support plan to prevent the enemy’s occupation and using
crest of the hill.
z The use of observation posts or reconnaissance elements on the forward slope to
provide observation across the entire front and security to the main battle positions.
z A counterattack plan specifying measures necessary to clear the crest or regain it
from the enemy.
z Direct and indirect fire support to destroy disrupt, and attrition of enemy forces on
the forward slope.
3-159. The forward edge of positions should be within small arms range of the crest. It
should be far enough from the crest, which fields of fire, allow the defender time to place
well-aimed fire on the enemy before he reaches friendly positions. The platoon establishes
observation posts on or forward of the topographical crest. This allows long-range
observation over the entire front and indirect fire coverage of forward obstacles.
Observation posts usually are provided by the unit owning the terrain being observed, and
may vary in size from a few Soldiers to a reinforced squad. They should include forward
observers. At night, their number should be increased to improve security.
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS
3-160. These are some considerations leaders may apply when defending on a reverse
slope:
z Observation of the enemy is more difficult.
z Soldiers in this position see forward no farther than the crest. This makes it hard to
determine exactly where the enemy is as he advances, especially when visibility is
poor.
z Observation posts must be placed forward of the topographic crest for early warning
and long-range observation.
z Egress from the position might be more difficult.
z Fields of fire are usually short.
z Obstacles on the forward slope can be covered only with indirect fire or by units on
the flanks of the company unless some weapons systems are placed forward
initially.
z If the enemy gains the crest, he can assault downhill. This may give him a
psychological advantage.
z If observation posts are insufficient or improperly placed, the defenders might have
to fight an enemy who suddenly appears in strength at close range.
z A reverse slope engagement is decisive resulting in one or both forces being
severely attritted. Very difficult to break contact.
z Placing the vehicles at the bottom of the hill and the Infantry on counter slope allows
the platoon to maximize its firepower into the engagement area as the enemy crests
the slope.
z The defender often has the opportunity to take the first shot at the attacker.
DISMOUNTED
3-162. Fighting positions protect Soldiers by providing cover from direct and indirect
fires and concealment through positioning and proper camouflage. Because the battlefield
conditions confronting Soldiers are never standard, no single standard fighting position
design fits all tactical situations.
3-163. Refer to Training Circular (TC) 3-21.75 for details on the construction of—
z Hasty fighting positions.
z Fighting positions for crew-served weapons, to include machine guns and Javelins.
z Fighting positions for one, two, and three men.
z Shoulder-launched munitions positions.
MOUNTED
3-164. Vehicles use natural cover and concealment in hide positions initially to increase
survivability. As time, assets, and situations permit, positions are prepared using organic
excavation equipment or engineer support. Priority is given to those vehicles containing
essential equipment or supplies. Crews use these fighting positions for individual
protection as well.
3-165. Parapets positioned at the front of or around major weapon systems provide
improved protection from direct fire and from blast and fragments of indirect fire, artillery,
mortar, and rocket shells. At its base, the parapet should be at least 8 feet thick. The parapet
functions as a standoff barrier for impact-detonating direct fire high explosive antitank and
ATGM projectiles. The parapet should cause the fuzes to activate, thereby increasing
survivability for the protected vehicles. If the enemy uses kinetic energy, direct fire armor-
piercing, or hypervelocity projectiles, it is impractical to construct parapets thick enough
for protection. To protect against these projectiles, deep-cut, hull defilade, or turret
defilade positions are prepared. Fighting and protective positions for essential vehicles
should be constructed no larger than needed.
3-166. Success in the area of operation requires maneuver between fighting positions
between main gun firings. Maximum use of terrain is required to conceal fighting vehicles
maneuvering between fighting positions. After a major weapon system fires its main gun,
the vehicle should move concealed to another position before firing again. If the major
weapon system immediately reappears in the old position, the enemy knows where to fire
his next round.
HASTY
3-167. Hasty fighting positions for combat vehicles, to include armored personnel
carriers and mortar carriers, take advantage of natural terrain features. These positions are
prepared with at least construction effort. A frontal parapet, as high as practical without
interfering with the vehicle’s weapon systems, shields the position from frontal attack and
provides limited concealment if properly camouflaged. Protection is improved if the
position is made deeper and the parapet extended around the vehicle’s sides. Parapets
provide a false sense of security against kinetic energy and hypervelocity projectiles;
therefore, hasty vehicle fighting positions with parapets are not recommended for vehicles
Hasty fighting positions offer protection from HE antitank projectiles and provide limited
concealment if properly camouflaged. As the tactical situation permits, hasty positions are
improved to deliberate positions.
DELIBERATE
3-168. Deliberate fighting positions must protect a vehicle from kinetic energy and
hypervelocity projectiles. The position is constructed in four parts: hull defilade, concealed
access ramp or route, hide location, and turret defilade. (See figure 3-17 and figure 3-18,
page 3-54.)
Note. When possible, select battle positions while moving in the engagement
area. Using the enemy’s perspective enables the Infantry leader to assess
survivability of positions.
REHEARSALS
3-179. The purpose of rehearsals is to ensure every leader and Soldier understands the
plan and elements are prepared to cover their assigned areas with direct and indirect fires.
The rehearsal should cover—
z Rearward passage of security forces (as required).
z Closure of lanes (as required).
z Movement from the hide position to the battle position.
z Use of fire commands, triggers, and maximum engagement lines (MELs) to initiate
direct and indirect fires.
z Shifting of fires to refocus and redistribute fire effects.
z Disengagement criteria.
z Identification of displacement routes and times.
z Location of remount points, the times remount operations will take place, and
movement considerations for conduct of a remount in contact.
z Preparation and transmission of critical reports using radio and digital systems, as
applicable.
z Assessment of the effects of enemy weapon systems.
z Displacement to alternate, supplementary, or subsequent battle positions.
z Cross-leveling or resupply of Class V.
z Evacuation of casualties.
3-180. The platoon leader should coordinate rehearsals with higher headquarters to
ensure there are no conflicts with other units. Coordination leads to efficient use of
planning and preparation time for all units involved with the operation. It eliminates
dangers of misidentifying friendly forces in the rehearsal area, which could result in
fratricide.
SECTION VI – TRANSITIONS
3-181. During the planning for operations, the Infantry leader must discern from the
higher headquarters OPORD what the potential follow-on missions are and begin to plan
how they intend to achieve them. During this planning, the leader determines the possible
timeline and location for consolidation and reorganization best facilities future operations
and provides adequate protection.
CONSOLIDATION
3-182. Small unit leaders plan and prepare for consolidation during TLP. The following
actions are usually a part of consolidation:
z Eliminate enemy resistance on the objective.
z Establish security beyond the objective by securing areas that may be the source of
enemy direct fires or enemy artillery observation.
z Establish additional security measures such as observation posts and patrols.
z Prepare for and assist the passage of follow-on forces, if required.
z Continue to improve security by conducting other necessary defensive actions.
These defensive actions include engagement area development, direct fire planning,
and battle position preparation.
z Adjust final protective fires and register targets along likely mounted and
dismounted avenues of approach.
z Protect the obstacle reduction effort.
z Secure detainees.
z Prepare for enemy counterattack.
REORGANIZATION
3-183. Reorganization usually is conducted concurrently with consolidation. It consists
of actions taken to prepare the unit for follow-on tasks. As with consolidation, small unit
leaders plan and prepare for reorganization during TLP. During reorganization, the small
unit leader ensures the following actions are taken:
CONTINUING OPERATIONS
3-184. At the conclusion of an engagement, the Infantry platoon may continue the
defense, or if ordered, transition to the offense or stability. The platoon leader considers
the higher commander’s concept of the operation, friendly capabilities, and enemy
situation when making this decision. All missions should include plans for exploiting
success or assuming a defensive posture.
3-185. A defending unit may transitions from defensive tasks to the retrograde as a part
of continuing operations. A retrograde usually involves a combination of a delay,
withdrawal, and retirement that may occur simultaneously or sequentially. As in other
missions, the leader’s concept of the operation and intent drive planning for the retrograde.
Each form of retrograde has its unique planning considerations, but considerations
common to all retrogrades are risk, the need for synchronization and security.
TRANSITION TO STABILITY
3-188. It may be tactically wise for the leader to plan a defensive contingency with on-
order offensive tasks for operations focused on stability tasks. Subordinate leaders must
be fully trained to recognize activities, which initiate this transition. Leaders and Soldiers
must be aware that elements of the BCT could be conducting offensive, defensive, and
stability missions simultaneously within a small radius of each other. Actions in one unit’s
area of operation can affect a change in whatever type task an adjacent unit is conducting.
For example, an engagement with an enemy force may have caused noncombatants to be
displaced to another section of the city leaving the area of operation open to theft, looting,
and vandalism by belligerents.
Stability
Stability components of an operation leverage the coercive and
constructive capabilities of the military force to establish a safe and
secure environment, facilitate reconciliation between local or
regional adversaries; establish political, legal, social, and economic
institutions; and facilitate the transition of responsibility to a
legitimate civil authority. This chapter discusses Infantry platoon
and squad support to stability tasks; it addresses tactical actions and
tasks in support of stability, planning considerations and transitions.
(Refer to ADRP 3-07 for more information.)
STABILITY FRAMEWORK
4-5. A stability framework based on conditions within the area of operations of initial
response, transformation, and fostering stability, helps the unit determine the required
training and task organization of forces prior to initial deployment, and serves as a guide
to actions in an operation focused on stability tasks. (Refer to ATP 3-07.5 for more
information.) Stability tasks occur in three phases described in the following paragraphs.
These phases facilitate identifying lead responsibilities and determining priorities and
describe the conditions on the operational environment.
TRANSFORMATION PHASE
4-7. Stabilization, reconstruction, and capacity-building are transformation phase
actions that are performed in a relatively secure environment. Transformation phase
actions take place in either crisis or vulnerable states. There is the presence of a legitimate
authority either interim or established as well as indigenous host nation security forces.
These actions aim to build host-nation capacity across multiple sectors. Transformation
phase actions are essential to the continuing stability of the environment. These actions are
essential to fostering stability within the area.
STABILITY TASKS
4-9. Army forces conduct the following five primary stability tasks: civil security, civil
control, restore essential services, support to governance, and support to economic and
infrastructure development. At brigade level and below, the primary stability tasks are too
broad to focus effort appropriately; at lower tactical echelons, lines of effort are best
designed using standard mission-essential tasks. Lines of effort may focus on specific
aspects of the local situation, such as the restoration of essential civil services. There,
activities of military forces often are shaped using lines of effort based on (sewage, water,
electricity, academics, trash, medical, security, and other considerations) while addressing
the need to provide food aid and shelter.
SUPPORT TO GOVERNANCE
4-15. Stability tasks establish conditions enabling interagency and host nation actions to
succeed. Military forces focus on transferring control to a legitimate civil authority
according to the desired end state. At the platoon and squad level, supports to governance
tasks are dependent on those of the Infantry battalion and IBCT. Those tasks focus
primarily on continuing civil security and civil control operations to provide a safe and
secure environment. As in other stability tasks, leader and Soldier engagement with local
officials and the population are ongoing.
4-16. Company level and below tasks commonly support external agencies along specific
themes nested with higher efforts. Targeted civil reconnaissance, and in some cases
surveillance of the population, groups, and institutions, is ongoing to monitor the efficacy
of programs, policies, and procedures established by a transitional or civil authority. Early
identification of developing problems provides a means to focus additional tasks and
available resources to support the appropriate authority before becoming a source of
instability and dissent among the populace.
MISSION COMMAND
4-20. Stability tasks tend to be decentralized in nature, over extended distances. As such,
Infantry unit activities will consist largely of independent small-unit operations conducted
across an assigned area of operation. Units must conduct these operations with
consistency, impartiality, and discipline to encourage cooperation from unified action
partners for a cohesive effort.
4-21. Stability tasks, more so than offensive and defensive tasks, present a unique
challenge. Where offense and defense typically focuses on the defeat of an enemy force,
stability focuses on the people. In setting the tone for planning, the Infantry leader
provides—
z Understanding.
z The intent and planning guidance.
z Concept of operation.
4-22. The platoon leader must clearly understand mission, situation, commander’s intent
and he must ensure his subordinate units understand as well. He must plan for continuous
operations, and, as with offense and defense, planning and preparation time is often
limited. The plan must facilitate adjustment based upon changes in the situation.
Additional considerations and activities include:
z Civil-military operations (CMO).
z Civil affairs operations.
z Military information support operations (MISO).
z Rules of engagement. (Refer to chapter 1, section I of this publication for more
information.)
z Rules of interaction, which include:
Persuasion.
Negotiation.
Communication skills.
z Task organization, which includes:
Augmentation. Required individual augmentees and augmentation cells to
support force-tailoring requirements and personnel shortfalls. Augmentation
supports coordination with the media, government agencies, nongovernmental
organizations, international organizations, other multinational forces, and civil-
military elements. Analyses of METT-TC drive augmentation.
Liaison. Task-organized small liaison teams to deal with situations that develop
with the local population. Depending the situation requirements, unit ministry,
engineers, MISO, civil affairs, counterintelligence, linguistics, and logistics
personnel may be task-organized to make up these liaison teams. These teams can
free up maneuver elements (may require security from platoon) and facilitate
negotiation. Negotiation teams must have linguists and the personnel who have
the authority to negotiate.
Operations with outside agencies. Includes other U.S. armed services or
government agencies as well as international organizations (including
nongovernmental organizations, coalition, and United Nation military forces or
agencies). Coordination and integration of civilian and military activities must
take place at every level. Coordinating centers such as the civil-military
operations center are designed to accomplish this task. These operations centers
should include representatives from as many agencies as required.
z Media. Soldiers must be aware of current media reports from about the area and be
willing to work with journalists in efforts to promote good relationship and combat
4-27. The public affairs officer develops command information and public information
messages. Army public information is information of a military nature, the dissemination
of which is consistent with security and the DOD principles of information. Command
information is communication from the commander to help members of the command
understand organizational goals, operations, and significant developments. (Refer to
FM 3-61 for more information.)
4-28. Psychological messages convey specific information to selected foreign audiences
to influence their perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, and behavior. The military information
support planner or unit develops these messages. MISO messages and actions support
themes established in the approved MISO program for that particular mission. (Refer to
JP 3-13.2 and ADRP 3-05 for detailed information on MISO.)
LIN ES OF EFFORT
4-31. All activities in the information environment communicate in some way. They
serve to make an impression on minds of those that observe or hear those
communications. Leaders and staffs distinguish the two lines of effort by intention of
the communicator and the message. Sometimes, a communication intended merely to
inform might eventually lead to a changed opinion or behavior. A communication
designed to influence may not achieve the desired outcome. (Refer to FM 3-13 for more
information.)
based on the commander’s intent informed by whatever situational awareness they have
developed.
4-34. Leaders must be prepared to rely on direct and indirect fire support, protection, and
sustainment elements to assist movement and maneuver. When new requirements develop,
these same elements must be ready to shift priorities.
4-35. Establishing the force’s presence in the area of operation is often the first
requirement of the platoon’s stability mission. Being on the ground establishes links with
the local populace. Through Soldier engagement, the populace begins to trust and relate to
friendly forces. Driving around in an armored convoy may degrade situational awareness.
It can make Soldiers targets and often is more dangerous than moving on foot and
remaining close to the populace.
4-36. Upon arrival in the area of operation, it may not be advisable to go straight for the
main aggressor stronghold or to try to take on villages that support criminals and criminal
networks or other hostile actors. Start from secure areas and work gradually outward.
Extend influence through local networks. First, win the confidence of a few villages, and
then work with those with whom they trade, intermarry, or do business. This tactic
develops local allies, a mobilized populace, and trusted networks.
4-37. Seek a victory early during stability to demonstrate dominance of the area of
operation. This does not require a combat victory. Often victories can be attained by
building relationships rather than by combat. Early combat without accurate situational
understanding may create unnecessary collateral damage and ill will. Instead, victories
may involve using leader engagement to resolve a long-standing issue or co-opt a key local
leader. Achieving even a small early victory can set the tone for the mission and help
commanders seize the initiative.
4-38. The platoon may be tasked to establish a quick reaction force for the security of
checkpoints, outposts, observation post, and work sites, and to support patrols, meetings,
and convoys in the area of operation. Planning should provide a force of the appropriate
size for a quick reaction force to separate local hostile parties before potential violent
situations grow out of control. The force must have the ability to respond anywhere in the
area of operation, and be rapidly reinforced by augmentation and maneuver elements.
4-39. Mobility, countermobility, survivability, and general engineering capabilities
support critical tasks applied through the movement and maneuver warfighting function.
These capabilities provide a major role in protecting positions, headquarters, support
facilities, base camps, and highly vulnerable assets.
INTELLIGENCE
4-40. Intelligence plays an important role in the accomplishment of any stability task. The
small unit leader uses all available information collection to help accomplish the mission.
Every member of the platoon plays a role in gathering information to support higher
echelon planning. The company commander uses his CoIST to produce intelligence for
his subordinate unit. The CoIST manages the information collection effort to ensure every
member of the company headquarters and its subordinate units understands the operational
environment and plays an active role in the development of the common operational
picture. (Refer to FM 3-21.10 for more information.)
4-41. During stability, threats must be identified and decisive points defined. Leaders
focus information collection activities to identify sources of instability. Platoon tasks will
have different requirements, time frames, ROE, and other differences influencing what
information collection is required in order to provide recommendations or decisions for
platoon and higher echelon planning. Predictive assessment contributes to future planning
and force disposition the end state and its defining conditions for every task. (Refer to
FM 3-55 for more information.)
4-42. Collaboration and interaction with local populace is essential. Once the platoon
occupies an area of operation, its next task is to build trust and relationships with the local
populace. Relationships are built with community leaders and local security forces. Over
time, these relationships may lead to partnership and collaboration in support with stability
tasks.
4-43. Threat mitigation during stability is intelligence driven. The platoon often develops
much of its own intelligence in relation to the amount they receive from higher
headquarters. Small unit leaders organize their assets to collect local information
unavailable to higher sources of intelligence. Linguists are important in the collection of
local information, but like any other scarce resource, must be allocated and utilized
effectively. Biometrics collections and its use prior to conducting essential tasks or
activities enhance protection. Soldiers utilizing the biometrically enabled watchlist
(BEWL) loaded on handheld devices or other biometrics collect/match systems can
identify individuals via prior biometric enrollments so that regardless of who they say they
are their identities are known with certainty. Social network analysis and other analytical
tools can be useful for promoting situational understanding of the operational environment
for stability tasks as well as counterinsurgency. (Refer to FM 3-24.2 for more information.)
4-44. Civil reconnaissance (Refer to chapter 6, section III of this publication) focuses
specifically on the civil component, the elements of which may best be represented by
ASCOPE. Civil reconnaissance can be conducted by civil affairs personnel or by other
forces, as required. It differs from other reconnaissance in that it usually is not targeted at
a specific enemy; instead, it focuses on answering information requirements for civil
situation awareness. (Refer to JP 3-57 for more information.)
FIRES
4-45. Although indirect fire support planning for stability is the same as for offense and
defense, the use of indirect fire support may be very restricted and limited. (Refer to
appendix C of this publication for more information.) The Infantry leader integrates
indirect fire support into his plan considering the ROE. The ROE may impose restrictions
on the use of certain munitions and detail release authority/strike approval authorization.
Special considerations include the following:
z Procedures for rapid clearance of fires.
z Close communication and coordination with host country officials.
z Increased security for indirect firing positions.
z Restricted use of certain munitions such as dual purpose improved conventional
munitions, area denial artillery munitions, or remote antiarmor mine.
SUSTAINMENT
4-46. The operational environment the Infantry platoon and squad operates in during
stability may be very austere, creating special sustainment considerations. (Refer to
chapter 7 of this publication for more information.) These factors include, but are not
limited to, the following:
z Reliance on local procurement of certain items.
z Shortages of various critical items, including repair parts, Class IV supply materials,
and lubricants.
z Special Class V supply requirements.
z Reliance on bottled water.
z Class IV supplies for construction of fixed observation posts and checkpoints.
z Use of existing facilities or new construction for quarters; water, sewer, and power
utilities; reinforced hardstand areas for maintenance.
z Barriers or berms to protect ammunition and fuel.
z Use of female Soldiers to assist with searching host-nation female suspects.
z Class IX items.
PROTECTION
4-47. Protection of the force during stability is essential for success at all levels. Infantry
leaders continually balance protection needs between military forces and civil populations.
Frequent interaction between U.S. forces and local population make protection planning
difficult and essential. Threats often blend in with the local populace during stability and
are difficult to identify, making heightened levels of awareness the norm. The close
proximity of civilians and Soldiers also can promote health issues (such as communicable
disease) through close contact with local civilians, detainees, or local foods.
4-48. The protection of civil institutions, processes, and systems required to reach the end
state conditions of stability strategy often can be the most decisive factor in stability
because its accomplishment is essential for long-term success. Civil areas typically contain
structured and prepared routes, roadways, and avenues canalizing traffic. This can lead to
predictable friendly movement patterns that maybe exploited by the enemy. An additional
planning consideration during stability tasks is to protect the force while using the
minimum force consistent with the approved ROE. Additional protection considerations
during stability include:
z Reducing the unexploded ordnance and mine threat in the area of operations.
z Fratricide and friendly fire prevention and minimizing escalation of force (EOF)
incidents through combat, civilian, and coalition identification measures.
z Developing rapid and efficient personnel recovery techniques and drills.
z Clear operations security procedures account for close proximity of civilians,
nongovernmental organizations, and contractors.
z Disciplined information management techniques to preserve access to computer
networks.
z Containment of toxic industrial materiel is present in the civilian environment.
z Survivability requirements for static facilities, positions, or outposts.
4-49. Small unit leaders must implement appropriate security measures to protect the
force. Establishment of checkpoints, base camp security procedures, and aggressive
patrolling are examples of protecting the force. Protecting the force requires special
considerations in stability tasks. This is because threats may be different and, in some
cases, opposing forces seek to kill or wound U.S. Soldiers, or destroy or damage property
for political purposes.
4-50. Leaders must always consider the aspects of protection and how they relate to the
ROE. Some examples of protective measures are—
z Secure the inside perimeter if the host nation secures the outside perimeter.
z Avoid becoming an easy target and do not become predictable.
z Include security in each plan, SOP, operations order, and movement order.
z Develop specific security programs such as threat awareness and operational
security.
z Restrict access of unassigned personnel to the unit's location.
z Constantly maintain an image of professionalism and readiness.
z Base the degree of security established on a continuous threat assessment.
4-51. The Army protects human and automated decisionmaking in peacetime and in
conflict using OPSEC. It’s a leader’s responsibility supported by Soldiers, supporting
civilian staff members and operators. OPSEC enhances mission success by preserving
advantages of secrecy and surprise. OPSEC is a force multiplier. It includes reducing
predictability and eliminating indicators of operations. Leaders use OPSEC
countermeasures to deny adversaries knowledge of friendly operations. This requires
adversaries to expend more resources to obtain critical information needed to make
decisions. (Refer to ADRP 3-37 for more information on OPSEC.)
CIVIL AFFAIRS
4-53. Civil affairs forces support leaders by engaging civil component (interagency,
indigenous population and institutions, host nation, intergovernmental organizations or
private sector) of an operational environment conducting civil affairs operations and
support to the commander's civil-military operations. Civil affairs forces ensure sustained
legitimacy of the mission and transparency and credibility of the military force before,
during, or after other military missions. This support involves applying specialty skills
(normally responsibility of a local, regional, or national government) to enhance conduct
of civil-military operations. As they relate to information related capabilities civil affairs
operations and civil-military operations differ in purpose, focus, and specialization. Civil-
military operations are a leader’s activities establishing, maintaining, influencing, or
exploiting relations among military forces, governmental, nongovernmental civilian
organizations, authorities, and civilians.
PUBLIC AFFAIRS
4-55. Public affairs operations fulfill the Army’s obligation to keep the American people
and Army informed. They help to establish conditions leading to confidence in the Army
and its readiness to conduct unified land operations. Public affairs operations strive to
enhance public understanding and garner American, as well as global, support for the
Army by engaging with both domestic and foreign media entities. (Refer to FM 3-61 for
more information.)
MEDIA CONSIDERATIONS
4-59. The presence of the media is a reality that confronts every Soldier involved in all
operations. All leaders and Soldiers must know how to deal effectively with broadcast and
print reporters and photographers. This should include an understanding of subjects they
are authorized to discuss and subjects the public affairs officer must address.
4-60. The objective of the Infantry battalion commander in dealing with the media is to
ensure that operations are presented to the public in proper context. All leaders and soldiers
must know how to deal effectively with reporters and photographers. They should
understand which subjects they are authorized to discuss and which ones they must refer
to the public affairs officer.
INFORMATION OPERATIONS
4-62. Military information support Soldiers provide subject matter expertise in the
information operations. As primary members of the information operations working
group, they advise, plan, provide operations oversight, and assess messages and actions
having potential or actual psychological effects. Military information support units also
provide analysis, development, production, distribution, and dissemination capabilities
for MISO and are the primary executors for purposes of informing and influencing
target audiences. Military information support Soldiers, provide dedicated intelligence
support can also provide post-delivery measures of performance and measures of
effectiveness. The information operations element utilizes military information support
analyses of audiences and their environments. The information operations element also
assesses adversary information and capability, including information for effects,
misinformation, disinformation, and propaganda.
4-63. Military information support planners and attached military information support
units help leaders in executing Soldier and leader engagement efforts in areas of
operations. Military information support Soldiers are trained, educated, equipped, and
organized to plan, monitor, and assess engagement with foreign populations and select
audiences. This engagement includes planning engagements with foreign populations,
leaders, key communicators, and others with specific intent to influence to support leader
objectives. Military information support planners plan, manage, and assess Soldier and
leader engagement efforts. They support the leader’s larger engagement strategy.
COMBAT CAMERA
4-64. Combat camera video specialists provide leaders with still and video imagery
capabilities to support operational and planning requirements. These forces use video
documentation capabilities ranging from aerial to underwater photography. They access
areas and events inaccessible to other personnel or media. Furthermore, combat camera
teams have a technological capability to transmit real-time images in turn serve to
reinforce other information-related capability efforts. Likewise, their documentation of
operations provides imagery support countering misinformation or propaganda. (Refer
to ATP 3-55.12 for more information on combat camera.)
NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
4-66. If present in the host nation, intergovernmental organizations such as the United
Nations, African Union, European Union, and others can be valuable partners for
stabilization and reconstruction because of their knowledge of the local situation, ties, and
experience. They may have military or nonmilitary components and will operate under
their own mandates and direction. Their forces may be best suited for a relatively benign
peacekeeping role and less militarily capable than U.S. Army units, but they are generally
perceived as legitimate by a wide range of actors. By maintaining a safe and secure
environment, nonmilitary organizations—such as the United Nations World Food Program
and World Health Organization—often prove vital in providing humanitarian assistance
and development. Enabling such organizations may be one of the most important stability
objectives. Although U.S. forces often view nongovernmental organizations as partners to
be integrated, most nongovernmental organizations prefer a clearly neutral posture and
avoid being associated with any military force.
AREA SECURITY
4-68. Established to preserve freedom of movement to; position fire support assets,
conduct mission command operations, provide for sustainment operations, prevent threat
ground reconnaissance, and prevent threat ground maneuver forces from penetrating
defensive perimeters established by the platoon leader. (See appendix D, section I of this
publication for more information.) Area security missions require a significant amount of
time and normally operate from outposts such as a base camp or combat outposts. Like an
AA or defensive strongpoint, the base camp also provides some protection because it
requires all-round security. (Refer to FM 3-21.10 for more information.)
4-69. To add security, aid in information gathering and provide for a strong presence in
an operation area. Security patrols and civil reconnaissance usually occur in urban areas
and leaders must be aware of the ROE and the purpose of the patrol. (Refer to chapter 6 of
this publication for more information.)
4-70. Establish observation posts are created for a specified time and purpose. Some
observation posts are overt (clearly visible) and deliberately constructed. Others are covert
and designed to observe an area or target without the knowledge of the local population.
Each type of observation post must be integrated into supporting direct and indirect fire
plans and into the overall observation plan. (Refer to appendix D, section II of this
publication for more information.)
4-71. Checkpoints are another technique used to provide area security and gain
information. To establish a checkpoint to achieve one or more of the following: control
movement, obtain information, disrupt enemy movement or actions. (Refer to appendix D,
section III of this publication for more information.)
4-72. Convoy escort is a task to provide close-in protection from direct fire while on the
move. Infantry forces must be augmented with additional transportation assets to carry out
this mission. (Refer to appendix D, section IV of this publication for more information.)
CONDUCT SEARCHES
4-73. To conduct search operations or to employ search procedures is a continuous
requirement. A search can orient on people, materiel, buildings, or terrain. (Refer to
chapter 6 of this publication for more information.) Techniques include Search and Attach
and Cordon and Search. Often during these tasks, site exploitation is conducted.
SITE EXPLOITATION
4-74. Site exploitation is the synchronized and integrated application of scientific and
technological capabilities and enablers to answer information requirements, facilitate
subsequent operations, and support host-nation rule of law. (ATP 3-90.15) Site
exploitation is guided by the unit’s information collection plan. (Refer to JP 2-0 and
FM 3-55 on doctrine pertaining to information collection and collection planning.) The
information collection plan enables the commander to focus assets on collecting
information to answer specific information requirements. (ATP 3-90.15)
4-75. Primarily, site exploitation is a means of gaining information supporting the
intelligence process. Site exploitation missions doctrine emphasizes three purposes:
z To answer information requirements (usually the commander’s critical information
requirements).
z To facilitate subsequent missions (already planned or not yet anticipated).
z To facilitate criminal prosecution by host nation, coalition, or international
authorities (related to war crimes).
4-76. Site exploitation missions may focus on one fundamental purpose or involve all
three simultaneously. The purpose of the site exploitation should be considered throughout
TLP. The development of intelligence, through immediate analysis or off site processing
can enable the leader to target additional objectives. At the platoon level, many of the site
exploitation related activities answer higher headquarters information requirements.
4-77. Site exploitation forces provide critical data for inclusion in the intelligence process,
which subsequently supports operations already planned or not yet anticipated. They
identify information, materiel, and persons of interest, collect and preserve these items,
and, after the mission is completed, debriefed by appropriate intelligence representatives,
usually the S-2 or CoIST. The information (in any medium or form), materiel, and persons
collected are processed by the appropriate agencies and analyzed to produce intelligence
supporting ongoing or subsequent operations.
4-78. During stability tasks, units can use site exploitation to gain information supporting
criminal prosecution by host nation authorities. Clearly documenting the details
surrounding the initial detention, preserving evidence, and maintaining chain of custody
are critical and aid in determining if further detention is warranted, in classifying the
detainee, in developing intelligence, and in prosecuting detainees suspected of committing
criminal acts. Documentation should be detailed and answer the six Ws—who, what,
when, where, why, and witnesses. Record these details on the DD Form 2745 (Enemy
Prisoner of War (EPW) Capture Tag), DA Form 2823 (Sworn Statement), DA Form 4137
(Evidence/Property Custody Document), and locally developed forms if necessary. (Refer
to ATP 3-90.15 for more information.)
NEGOTIATIONS
4-80. The Infantry platoon and squad may face a number of situations in which leaders
need to conduct negotiations. There are two general types of negotiations, situational and
planned. Units conduct situational negotiations in response to a requirement for on-the-
spot discussion and resolution of a specific issue or problem. For example, a unit is
patrolling its area of operation when a local official approaches it; the local official wishes
to discuss an assault that occurred in the area. Units conduct planned negotiations when
they foresee a problem, or identify a situation that must be resolved through advanced
planning and coordination. For example, the platoon leader conducts a coordination
meeting, otherwise known as key leader engagement, between leaders of two belligerent
groups to determine route clearance responsibilities.
4-81. At the Infantry platoon and squad level, situational negotiations are far more
common than the planned type. In fact, stability operations require the leader, his
subordinate leaders, and other Soldiers to conduct some form of negotiations almost daily.
This requires them to have a thorough understanding of the ROE.
4-82. Infantry platoon and squad members apply this working knowledge to the process
of discussing and, whenever possible, resolving issues or problems that may arise between
opposing parties, including the platoon itself. A critical aspect of this knowledge is the
negotiator’s ability to recognize that the options under the ROE and rules of interaction
are exhausted and turns the discussion over to a higher authority. Negotiations continue at
progressive levels of authority until the issue is resolved.
Note. Soldiers should be trained and would benefit the unit if they receive training
on cultural, local customs, and courtesies.
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS
4-92. Tactical-level CMO include support of stakeholders at local levels, and promoting
the legitimacy and effectiveness of U.S. presence and operations among locals, while
minimizing friction between the military and the civilian organizations in the field. These
may include local security operations, processing and movement of displaced civilians,
project management and project nomination, civil reconnaissance, and basic HSS. (Refer
to JP 3-57 for further information.)
4-93. Civil affairs operations are those military operations planned, supported, or
executed by civil affairs forces that—
z Enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in localities
where military forces are present.
z Require coordination with other interagency organizations, intergovernmental
organizations, nongovernmental organizations, indigenous populations and
institutions, and the private sector.
z Involve application of functional specialty skills that normally are the responsibility
of civil government to enhance the conduct of CMO. They involve application of
civil affairs functional specialty skills, in areas usually the responsibility of civil
government. These activities are fundamental to executing stability tasks.
OTHER
4-95. Monitor compliance with an agreement involves observing belligerents and
working with them to ensure they meet the conditions of one or more applicable
agreements. (See section II of this chapter for more information.) Expeditionary forensic
collection missions. Involves tasked support to the collection and analysis of materials in
an area of operation, applies to both IED and non-IED events. Includes collecting,
identifying, and labeling portable items for future exploitation, and the collection of
fingerprints, DNA, and other biometric data from nontransportable items at a scene, such
as a bomb maker’s table and chairs. (Refer to ATP 2-22.82 for more information.)
4-96. Support relief operations in a foreign country using the Army to respond with a
wide array of capabilities and services to aid authorities in the following types of actions:
protecting public health, restoring public order, assisting in disaster recovery, alleviating
large-scale suffering, and protecting critical infrastructure. (Refer to chapter 4 of this
publication for more information.)
SECTION V – TRANSITIONS
4-97. Transitions mark a change of focus between phases or between the ongoing
operation and execution of a branch or sequel. Shifting priorities between the elements of
unified land operations, such as from offense to stability, also involves a transition.
Transitions require planning and preparation well before their execution to maintain the
momentum and tempo of operations. The force is naturally more vulnerable during
transitions, thus requiring leaders to establish clear conditions for their execution.
Transitions may create unexpected opportunities; they also may make forces vulnerable to
enemy threats.
TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY
4-102. Often during stability, a relief in place is referred to as a transfer of authority. In
addition to the normal responsibilities of a relief, leaders and Soldiers also must deal with
civilians or coalition partners. During stability, units generally know whether they will be
relieved at the end of their tour. Planning for a transfer of authority begins as soon as the
unit occupies the area of operation.
4-103. Before the transfer of authority, the departing unit develops a continuity book
with the necessary information on the area of operation. The book should include lessons
learned, details about the populace, village and patrol reports, updated maps, and
photographs; anything helping the incoming unit master the outgoing unit’s operational
environment. Computerized databases are suitable. Leaders should ensure these continuity
books are updated during the unit’s tour of duty. This extensive effort reduces casualties
and increase the current and succeeding units’ efficiency and knowledge of operations.
4-104. A consistent theme from recent operations is the importance of the transition
training (right seat/left seat rides) with incoming Soldiers during a transfer of authority. A
detailed and programmed transfer of authority allows Soldiers to learn the culture and work
with host nation personnel during the deployment. Typical training during the relief
includes:
z Use of theater-unique equipment not available before the transfer of authority.
z Enemy tactics, techniques and procedures for improvised explosive devices specific
to the area of operations.
z Personal meetings with nongovernmental organizations, contractors, interpreters,
informants, and local police operating in the unit area of operations.
z Negotiation techniques with local tribal, religious and government officials.
z Operations and intelligence handover of databases, plans, products, and briefings.
z Information collection procedures, processes and policies.
Movement
Tactical movement involves movement of a unit assigned a mission
under combat conditions when not in direct ground contact with the
enemy. Tactical movement is based on the anticipation of early
ground contact with the enemy, either en route or shortly after
arrival at the destination. Movement ends when ground contact is
made or the unit reaches its destination. Movement is not maneuver.
Maneuver happens once a unit has made contact with the enemy
and combines movement with direct fires to gain a position of
advantage over the enemy. Because tactical movement shares many
of the characteristics of an offensive action, the area of operation is
organized in a manner similar to other offensive actions. This
chapter discusses troop movement, the basics and formations of
tactical movement.
ADMINISTRATIVE MOVEMENT
5-8. Administrative movement is a movement in which troops and vehicles are arranged
to expedite their movement and conserve time and energy when no enemy ground
interference, except by air, is anticipated. (Refer to FM 3-90-2 for more information.)
Administrative movements only are conducted in secure areas. They include rail and
highway movement within the continental United States. Once deployed into theater of
war, administrative movements normally are not conducted.
Open Column
5-17. The open column is the most common tactical march technique because it offers the
most security while still providing a reasonable degree of control. It normally is used
during daylight but also may be used at night with infrared lights, blackout lights, or
passive night-vision equipment. Using an open column roughly doubles the column’s
length and thereby doubles the time it takes to clear a point when compared to a close
column moving at the same speed.
5-18. Vehicle distance varies from 50 to 100 meters, and may be greater if required. The
distance between dismounted Soldiers varies from two to five meters to allow for
dispersion and space for marching comfort. Any distance that exceeds five meters between
dismounted Soldiers increases the length of the column and hinders control. In an open
column, vehicle density varies from 15 to 20 vehicles per kilometer. A single Infantry
company, with intervals between its platoons, occupies roughly a kilometer of road or trail.
Close Column
5-19. A close column normally is employed for marches during darkness under blackout
driving conditions or for marches in restricted terrain. This march technique takes
maximum advantage of the traffic capacity of a route but provides little dispersion.
Distance between vehicles varies from 20 to 25 meters. At night, vehicles are spaced so
each driver can see the two lights in the blackout marker of the vehicle ahead. Normally,
vehicle density is from 40 to 50 vehicles per kilometer along the route in a close column.
5-20. The dismounted equivalent to the close column is a limited-visibility march. The
distance between individual Soldiers is reduced to one to three meters to help maintain
contact and facilitate control. Limited-visibility marches are characterized by close
formations, difficult mission command and reconnaissance, a slow rate of march, and good
concealment from enemy observation and air attack.
Infiltration
5-21. Infiltration provides the best possible passive defense against enemy observation
and attack. It is suited when time, space, security, deception, and dispersion are necessary.
During infiltration, vehicles are dispatched in small groups, or at irregular intervals, at a
rate that keeps the traffic density low and prevents undue massing of vehicles during the
movement.
5-22. The disadvantages of an infiltration are that more time is required to complete the
move, column control is nearly impossible, and recovery of broken-down vehicles by the
trail party is more protracted when compared to vehicle recovery in close and open
columns. Additionally, unit integrity is not restored until the last vehicle arrives at the
destination, complicating the unit’s onward deployment. Infiltration during troop
movement should not be confused with infiltration as a form of maneuver as discussed in
chapter 2 of this publication.
5-23. During extended road marches, halts are necessary to rest personnel, service
vehicles, and adjust movement schedules. The march order or unit SOP regulates when to
take halts, and addresses actions for various tapes of halts, such as maintenance, security,
and unexpected halts. During halts, each unit normally clears the march route and moves
to a previously selected AA to prevent route congestion and avoid being a lucrative target.
Units establish security and take other measures to protect the force.
5-24. In motor movements, short halts are scheduled every two to three hours of
movement and halts may last up to an hour. Long halts occur on marches that exceed 24
hours and last no more than two hours. Long halts are not scheduled at night, which allows
maximum time for night movement. Unit leaders promptly notify commanders of the time
and approximate length of unscheduled halts.
APPROACH MARCH
5-25. An approach march is the advance of a combat unit when direct contact with the
enemy is intended. However, it emphasizes speed over tactical deployment. The approach
march is employed when the enemy’s approximate location is known, since it allows the
force to move with greater speed and less physical security or dispersion. In an approach
march, units are task-organized to allow them to transition to an on-order or a be-prepared
mission without making major organizational adjustments. The approach march terminates
in a march objective, such as an attack position, AA, or assault position, or it can be used
to transition to an attack.
5-26. The key to movement involves selecting the best combination of combat formation
and movement technique for each situation. Leaders consider METT-TC in selecting the
best route and appropriate formation and movement technique. The leader's selection must
allow the moving unit to—
z Maintain cohesion.
z Maintain communication.
z Maintain momentum.
z Provide maximum security.
Note. Soldiers should be proficient in land navigation. They shouldn’t always rely
on technology alone.
NAVIGATION AIDS
5-31. There are two categories of navigational aids: linear; and point. Linear navigational
aids are terrain features such as trails, streams, ridgelines, wood lines, power lines, streets,
and contour lines. Point terrain features include hilltops, and prominent buildings.
Navigation aids usually are assigned control measures to facilitate communication during
the movement. Typically, linear features are labeled as phase lines while point features are
labeled as checkpoints (or rally points). There are three primary categories of navigation
aids: catching features; handrails; and navigational attack points.
CATCHING FEATURES
5-32. Catching features are obvious terrain features which go beyond a waypoint or
control measure and can be either linear or point. The general idea is if the unit moves past
the objective, LOA, or checkpoint the catching feature will alert it that it has traveled too
far.
HANDRAILS
5-35. Handrails are linear features parallel to the proposed route. The general idea is to
use the handrail to keep the unit oriented in the right direction. Guiding off of a handrail
can increase the unit’s speed while also acting as a catching feature.
ROUTE PLANNING
5-37. Route planning must take into account enabling tasks specific to tactical movement.
These tasks facilitate the overall operation. Tactical movement normally contains some or
all of the following enabling tasks:
z Planning movement with global positioning system waypoints or checkpoints
utilizing navigation skills.
z Movement to and passage of friendly lines.
z Movement to an objective rally point.
z Movement to a phase line of deployment.
z Movement to a limit of advance.
z Linkup with another unit.
z Movement to a patrol base or assembly area.
z Movement back to and reentry of friendly lines.
5-38. Leaders first identify where they want to end up (the objective or LOA). Then,
working back to their current location, they identify all of the critical information and
actions required as they relate to the route. For example, navigational aids, tactical
positions, known and templated enemy positions, and friendly control measures. Using
this information, they break up their route in manageable parts called legs. Finally, they
capture their information and draw a sketch on a route chart. There are three decisions
leaders make during route planning:
z The type of (or combination of) navigation to use.
z The type of route during each leg.
z The start point and end point of each leg.
5-39. The leader assesses the terrain in his proposed area of operation. In addition to the
standard Army map, the leader may have aerial photographs and terrain analysis overlays
from the parent unit, or he may talk with someone familiar with the area.
5-40. To control movement, a leader uses axis of advance, directions of attack, infiltration
lanes, phase lines, PLD, checkpoints (waypoints), final coordination line, rally points, AA,
and routes.
TYPES OF NAVIGATION
5-41. There are three types of navigation: terrain association, general azimuth method,
and point navigation. Leaders use whichever type or combination best suits the situation.
TERRAIN ASSOCIATION
5-42. Terrain association is the ability to identify terrain features on the ground by the
contour intervals depicted on the map. The leader analyzes the terrain using the factors of
OAKOC, and identifies major terrain features, contour changes, and man-made structures
along his axis of advance. As the unit moves, he uses these features to orient the unit and
to associate ground positions with map locations. The major advantage of terrain
association is it forces the leader to continually assess the terrain. This leads to identifying
tactically-advantageous terrain and using terrain to the unit’s advantage.
POINT NAVIGATION
5-44. Point navigation, also called dead reckoning, is done by starting from a known point
and strictly following a predetermined azimuth and distance. This form of navigation
requires a high level of leader control because even a slight deviation over the course of a
movement can cause navigation errors. This method uses the dismounted compass and a
distance from the pace man (or a vehicle’s odometer when mounted) to follow a prescribed
route. Point navigation requires the leader to follow these steps:
z Use the compass to maintain direction.
z Use the pace man’s pace or a vehicle odometer to measure the distance traveled for
each leg or part.
z Review the written description of the route plan to help prevent navigational errors.
Note. Do not take compass reading from inside vehicles. Move away from
vehicles when using lensatic compass.
5-45. When performed correctly, point navigation is very reliable, but time-consuming.
It is best used when the need for navigational accuracy outweighs the importance of using
terrain. Point navigation is particularly useful when recognizable terrain features do not
exist or are too far away to be helpful. For example, deserts, swamps, and thick forest make
terrain association difficult. Using point navigation early on in a long movement can stress
the compass man and it may be advisable to switch him. One of the problems with point
navigation is negotiating severely restrictive terrain or danger areas.
COMBINATION
5-46. Leaders can benefit from combining the three types of navigation. Terrain
association and general azimuth method enable leaders to set a rough compass bearing and
move as quickly as the situation allows toward a catching feature or a navigational attack
point. Once reached, leaders switch to point navigation by paying close attention to detail,
taking as much time as necessary to analyze the situation and find their point. Terrain
association and general azimuth method allow for some flexibility in the movement, and
do not require the same level of control as point navigation. Point navigation, on the other
hand, enables leaders to precisely locate their objective or point.
ROUTE TYPES
5-49. There are three types of routes leaders can choose from: those which follow linear
terrain features; those which follow a designated contour interval; and those which go cross
compartment. Terrain association can be used with all three route types. The general
azimuth method is used with the contour and terrain feature method. Point navigation is
used primarily with cross compartment.
TERRAIN FEATURE
5-50. Following a terrain feature is nothing more than moving along linear features such
as ridges, valleys, and streets. The advantage of this method is the unit is moving with the
terrain. This is normally the least physically taxing of the methods. The disadvantage is
following terrain features also means following natural lines of drift, which leads to a
higher probability of chance contact with the enemy.
CONTOURING
5-51. Contouring (remaining at the same height the entire leg) follows the imaginary
contour line around a hill or along a ridgeline. Contouring has two advantages. First, it
prevents undue climbing or descending. Second, following the contour acts as handrail or
catching feature. The disadvantage of contouring is it can be physically taxing.
CROSS COMPARTMENT
5-52. Cross compartment means following a predetermined azimuth and usually means
moving against the terrain. The advantage of this method is it provides the most direct
route from the start point to the end point of the leg or route. There are two primary
disadvantages to this type of route. First, this method can be physically taxing. Second, the
unit might expose itself to enemy observation.
DEVELOP A LEG
5-53. The best way to manage a route is to divide it into segments called “legs.” By
breaking the overall route into several smaller segments, the leader is able to plan in detail.
Legs typically have only one distance and direction. A change in direction usually ends
the leg and begins a new one.
5-54. A leg must have a definite beginning and ending, marked with a control measure
such as a checkpoint or phase line. (When using GPS, these are captured as waypoints.)
When possible, the start point and end point should correspond to a navigational aid
(catching feature or navigational attack point).
5-55. To develop a leg, leaders first determine the type of navigation and route best suiting
the situation. Once these two decisions are made, the leader determines the distance and
direction from the start point to the end point. He then identifies critical METT-TC
information as it relates to the specific leg. Finally, leaders capture this information and
draw a sketch on a route chart. (See figure 5-3.)
DETERMINE LOCATION
5-57. A leader always must know his unit’s location during movement. Without accurate
location, the unit cannot expect to receive help from supporting arms, integrate reserve
forces, or accomplish their mission. To ensure accurate location, a leader uses many
techniques, including:
z Executing common skills.
z Designating a compass man and pace man.
z Using Mission Command Systems.
Common Skills
5-58. All Infantry Soldiers, particularly leaders, must be experts in land navigation.
Important navigation tasks common to all include:
z Locating a point using grid coordinates. Using a compass (day/night).
z Determining location using resection, intersection, or modified resection.
z Interpreting terrain features.
z Measuring distance and elevation.
z Employing Mission Command Systems.
Compass Man
5-59. The compass man assists in navigation by ensuring the lead fire team leader remains
on course at all times. The compass man should be thoroughly briefed. His instructions
must include an initial azimuth with subsequent azimuths provided as necessary. The
platoon leader or squad leader also should designate an alternate compass man. The leader
should validate the patrol’s navigation with GPS devices.
Pace Man
5-60. The pace man maintains an accurate pace at all times. The platoon leader or squad
leader should designate how often the pace man reports the pace. The pace man also should
report the pace at the end of each leg. The platoon leader or squad leader should designate
an alternate pace man.
Note. Leaders need to remember GPS and digital displays are not the only
navigational tools they can use. The best use of GPS or digital displays is for
confirming the unit’s location during movement. Terrain association and map-
reading skills still are necessary, especially for point navigation. Over reliance of
GPS and digital displays can cause leaders to ignore the effects of terrain, travel
faster than conditions allow, miss opportunities, or fail to modify routes when
necessary.
z Streams. Select a narrow spot in the stream offering concealment on both banks.
Observe the far side carefully. Emplace near- and far-side security for early
warning. Clear the far side and cross rapidly but quietly.
z Wire obstacles. Avoid wire obstacles. (The enemy covers obstacles with
observation and fire.)
Note. Same principles stated above are used when crossing a smaller unit (such
as a squad) across a danger area.
5-66. The platoon leader or squad leader decides how the unit will cross based on the time
he has, size of the unit, size of the danger area, fields of fire into the area, and amount of
security he can post. An Infantry platoon or squad may cross all at once, in buddy teams,
or one Soldier at a time. A large unit normally crosses its elements one at a time. As each
element crosses, it moves to an overwatch position or to the far-side rally point until told
to continue movement.
used to save time. The squad or platoon moves using the bounding overwatch technique
any point in the open area where enemy contact may be expected. The technique also may
be used once the squad or platoon comes within range of enemy small-arms fire from the
far side (about 250 meters). Once beyond the open area, the squad or platoon re-forms and
continues the mission.
5-74. If time and terrain permit, the unit should either bypass a danger area or dismount
Infantry to reconnoiter and clear it. However, the distances between covered and concealed
positions may make this impractical. If time constraints prevent these options, the unit uses
a combination of traveling overwatch and bounding overwatch to negotiate the danger
area. As with dismounted actions at a danger area, the leader must be prepared to quickly
transition to maneuver in case the unit makes contact with the enemy.
DEFILE
5-79. A defile is a narrow passage that constricts the movement of Soldiers. It is the ideal
ambush site. If a defile is encountered that forces the platoon to move in single vehicle file
for a significant distance the platoon leader might choose to lead with dismounted Infantry.
(See figure 5-9.) Common defiles for mechanized platoons are roads or trails across
streams, though swamps or heavy forests, or narrow valleys in rolling or mountainous
terrain. When clearing a defile, the dismount element clears each side far enough from the
choke point to make sure that there are no ambushes. It also checks the surface for evidence
of mines or IEDs. Because contact should be expected at defiles, the leading squad should
use bounding overwatch.
his laser systems to point out the rally points at a distance. If the platoon has a difficult
time linking up at the rally point, the first element to arrive should mark the rally point
with an infrared light source. This helps direct the rest of the platoon to the location. During
movement to the rally point, position updates allow separated elements to identify each
other’s locations. These updates help them linkup at the rally point by identifying friends
and foes.
PLANNING
5-84. Once ordered to conduct a relief in place, the leader of the relieving unit contacts
the leader of the unit to be relieved. The collocation of unit command posts also helps
achieve the level of coordination required. If the relieved unit’s forward elements can
defend the area of operation, the relieving unit executes the relief in place from the rear to
the front. This facilitates movement and terrain management.
5-85. When planning for a relief in place, the Infantry platoon leader takes the following
actions:
z Issues an order immediately.
z Sends himself or key leader with platoon advance party to conduct detailed
reconnaissance and coordination.
z As the relieving unit, adopts the outgoing unit’s normal pattern of activity as much
as possible.
z As the relieving unit, determines when the platoon will assume responsibility for
outgoing unit’s position.
z As the relieving unit, collocates with the relieved unit’s headquarters.
z Maximizes operations security to prevent the enemy from detecting the relief
operation.
Note. When possible, conduct the relief at night or under other limited visibility
conditions.
z Plans for relief of sustainment elements after combat elements are relieved.
z As the unit being relieved, plans for transfer of excess ammunition, wire, petroleum,
oil, and lubricants, and other materiel of tactical value to the incoming unit.
z Controls movement by reconnoitering, designating, and marking routes, and
providing guides.
COORDINATION
5-86. The incoming and outgoing unit leaders meet to exchange tactical information,
conduct a joint reconnaissance of the area, and complete other required coordination. The
two leaders carefully address passage of command and jointly develop contingency actions
to deal with enemy contact during the relief. This process usually includes coordination of
the following information:
z Location of vehicle and individual fighting positions (to include hide, alternate, and
supplementary positions). Leaders should verify fighting positions both by
conventional map and using the latest Mission Command Systems available.
z The enemy situation.
z The outgoing unit’s tactical plan, including graphics, company and platoon fire
plans, and individual vehicles’ area of operations sketches.
z Direct and indirect fire support coordination, including indirect fire plans and time
of relief for supporting artillery and mortar units.
z Types of weapons systems being replaced.
z Time, sequence, and method of relief.
z Location and disposition of obstacles, and time when the leaders will transfer
responsibility.
z Supplies and equipment to be transferred.
z Movement control, route priority, and placement of guides.
z Command and signal information.
Note. Units conduct relief on the radio nets of the outgoing unit to facilitate
control during the relief.
SEQUENTIAL RELIEF
5-88. Sequential relief is the most time-consuming relief method. The relieving unit
moves to an AA to the rear of the unit to be relieved. Subordinate elements are relieved
one at a time. This can occur in any order, with the relief following this general sequence:
z The outgoing and incoming unit’s collocates their headquarters and trains elements
to facilitate mission command and transfer of equipment, ammunition, fuel, water,
and medical supplies.
z The first element being relieved (such as a platoon) moves to its alternate fighting
positions or battle positions while the relieving element moves into the outgoing
element’s primary fighting positions. The incoming element occupies vehicle and
individual fighting positions as appropriate.
z Incoming and outgoing elements complete the transfer of equipment and supplies.
z The relieved element moves to the designated assembly area behind its position.
z Once each outgoing element clears the rally point en route to its assembly area, the
next relieving element moves forward.
SIMULTANEOUS RELIEF
5-89. Simultaneous relief is the fastest, but least secure, method. All outgoing elements
are relieved at once, with the incoming unit usually occupying existing positions, including
battle positions, and vehicle and individual fighting positions. The relief takes place in this
general sequence:
z Outgoing elements move to their alternate battle positions or vehicle and individual
positions.
z Incoming elements move along designated routes to the outgoing elements’ primary
fighting positions.
z The units complete the transfer of equipment and supplies.
z Relieved elements move to the designated unit assembly area.
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
5-92. The controlling Infantry company is responsible for planning and coordinating a
passage of lines involving the Infantry platoon and squad. In some situations, such as the
company using multiple passage routes for example, a separate route for each platoon, the
company commander takes responsibility for planning and coordinating each phase of the
operation.
5-93. When planning a passage of lines, the following tactical factors and procedures are
considered: passage lanes, use of deception, battle handover, obstacles, air defense,
sustainment responsibilities, mission command, reconnaissance and coordination, forward
passage of lines, and rearward passage of lines.
SECTION VI – LINKUP
5-99. A linkup is a meeting of friendly ground forces, which occurs in a variety of
circumstances. It happens when an advancing force reaches an objective area previously
seized by an airborne or air assault; when an encircled element breaks out to rejoin friendly
forces or a force comes to the relief of an encircled force; and when converging maneuver
forces meet. Both forces may be moving toward each other, or one may be stationary.
Whenever possible, joining forces exchange as much information as possible before
starting an operation.
5-100. The headquarters ordering the linkup establishes—
z A common operational picture.
z Command relationship and responsibilities of each force before, during, and after
linkup.
z Coordination of direct and indirect fire support before, during, and after linkup,
including control measures.
z Linkup method.
z Recognition signals and communication procedures to use, including pyrotechnics,
armbands, vehicle markings, gun-tube orientation, panels, colored smoke, lights,
and challenge and passwords.
z Operations to conduct following linkup.
CONTROL MEASURES
5-101. The leader who orders the linkup establishes control measures for units
conducting the linkup—
z Assigns each unit an area of operations defined by left and right boundaries and a
restrictive fire line also acts as a limit of advance.
z Establishes a no fires area around one or both units and establishes a coordinated
fire line beyond the area where the unit’s linkup.
z Establishes a no fires area to ensure unclear air-delivered munitions or indirect fires
do not cross either the restrictive fire line or a boundary and impact friendly forces.
5-102. The coordinated fire line allows available fires to quickly attack enemy targets
approaching the area where the linkup is to occur. The linkup forces use the linkup points
established by the leader to make physical contact with each other. The leader designates
alternate linkup points, since enemy action may interfere with the primary linkup points.
Control measures are adjusted during the operation to provide for freedom of action as
well as positive control.
EXECUTION
5-103. There are two linkup methods. The preferred method is when the moving force
has an assigned LOA near the other force and conducts the linkup at predetermined contact
points. Units then coordinate additional operations. The leader uses the other method
during highly fluid mobile operations when the enemy force escapes from a potential
encirclement, or when one of the linkup forces is at risk and requires immediate
reinforcement. In this method, the moving force continues to move and conduct long-range
recognition via radio or other measures, stopping only when it makes physical contact with
the other force.
PHASE 2 – COORDINATION
5-106. Before initiating movement to the linkup point, the forces must coordinate
necessary tactical information including the following:
z The known enemy situation.
column, line, echelon, vee, and wedge are fundamental combat formations for combat
vehicles. After the leader combines the mounted and Infantry elements into one combat
formation, it is his responsibility to ensure proper communication and fire control
measures are implemented to maximize lethality and prevent fratricide.
5-110. After selecting the combat formations for combat vehicles and Infantry, the leader
can decide whether to lead with combat vehicles, Infantry Soldiers, or a combination of
the two. The default technique is to lead with Infantry Soldiers.
Note. Tanks fire high-velocity, armor-piercing, discarding sabot rounds that pose
hazards to Infantry. Dismounted Soldiers should be at 300 meters to the left or
right of the line of fire and at least 1300 meters to the front of a firing tank. Any
Infantry within this danger area must have adequate cover as defined in
Department of the Army Pamphlet 385-63 from the rear.
Note. The exhaust from an M1-series tank may reach more than 1700 degrees.
Dismounted Soldiers following behind the tank must position themselves either
to the side of the exhaust grill or, if they are directly behind the vehicle, at a safe
distance away. Exhaust shield will overcome this problem. The shield is a critical
element in tanks recovering other tanks, so they should be readily available in the
tank platoons. Consideration should be given to fabricating enough for all tanks
as a leader will not know when he will be working with the Infantry
MOUNTED MOVEMENT
5-115. Mounted movement is similar to dismounted movement. Depending on the
vehicle type, a platoon may have a squad in multiple vehicles. Units with more than four
vehicles should consider splitting the vehicles into two or more sections and control these
sections much the same way squads control their teams.
5-116. Units augmented with four or more vehicles can use any of the seven formations.
They use them within the context of the three movement techniques (See chapter 2, section
IV for more information.) and should be prepared to execute immediate action drills when
transitioning to maneuver. When the mounted unit stops, they use the coil and herringbone
formations to ensure security.
5-117. In mounted successive bounds, vehicles keep their relative positions in the
column. The first and second vehicles operate as a section in moving from one observation
point to another. The second vehicle is placed in a concealed position, occupants
dismounting if necessary, to cover movement of the first vehicle to an observation point.
On reaching this point, occupants of the first vehicle observe and reconnoiter, dismounting
if necessary. When the area is determined to be clear, the second vehicle is signaled
forward to join the first vehicle.
5-118. The commander of the first vehicle observes the terrain to the front for signs of
enemy forces and selects the next stopping point. The first vehicle then moves out and the
process is repeated. Movement distance of the lead vehicle does not exceed the limit of
observation or the range of direct fire support from the second vehicle. The lead vehicle
and personnel are replaced frequently to ensure constant alertness. The other vehicles in
the column move by bounds from one concealed position to another. Each vehicle
maintains visual contact with the vehicle ahead but avoids closing up. (See figure 5-17.)
However, as a rule, vehicles always work in pairs and should never be placed in a situation
where one vehicle is not able to be supported by the second.
5-119. In mounted alternate bounds, all except the first two vehicles keep their relative
places in the column. The first two vehicles alternate as lead vehicles on each bound. Each
covers the bound of the other. This method provides a more rapid advance than movement
by successive bounds, but is less secure. Security is obtained by the vehicle commander
who assigns each Soldier a direction of observation (to the front, flank[s], or rear). This
provides each vehicle with some security against surprise fire from every direction, and
provides visual contact with vehicles to the front and rear.
WARNING
Operating on single-lane or steeply crowned
rural roads with no shoulders, roads with soft
shoulders or washouts around culverts,
especially road bordering water (such as canal,
irrigation ditch, or pond) requires extreme
caution. The majority of MRAP vehicle rollovers
are due to road, shoulder or bridge approaches
giving way under the MRAP vehicle’s weight and
high center of gravity.
5-126. Figure 5-18 shows possible mounted movement with MRAP vehicles both
file/column or staggered. The leader based on information and intelligence, commander’s
intent and METT-TC makes the determination which mounted maneuvering technique
will be used.
Note. Refer to TC 7-31 for more information on the MRAP family of vehicles.
CONVOYS
5-127. A convoy is a group of vehicles organized for purposes of control and orderly
movement with or without escort protection moving over the same route at the same time
under one commander. (Refer to ADRP 1-02 for more information.)
5-128. The platoon conducts motor marches, usually in trucks or armored protected
vehicles. Some of the special considerations may include:
z Protection. Sandbag the bottom of non-mine protected trucks to protect from mines.
Ensure crew-served weapons are manned with qualified gunners.
z Observation. Ensure Soldiers sit facing outward and remove bows and canvas to
allow 360-degree observation and rapid dismount.
z Inspection. Inspect vehicles and drivers to ensure they are ready. Perform before,
during, and after preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS). Ensure
drivers’ knowledge of the route, speed, and convoy distance.
z Loading. Keep fire team, squad, and platoon integrity when loading vehicles. Fire
teams and squads are kept intact on the same vehicle. Platoon vehicles are together
in the same march serial. Key weapons and equipment are cross loaded with platoon
leader and platoon sergeant in different vehicles.
z Rehearsals. Rehearse immediate action to enemy contact (near and far ambushes,
air attack). Ensure drivers know what to do.
z Air Guards. Post air guards for each vehicle, with special consideration on the
placement of crew- served weapons.
ENEMY
5-132. Leaders have to decide whether they are going to move aggressively to make
contact, or stealthily to avoid contact. Either way, leaders have to anticipate enemy contact
throughout. If possible, leaders should avoid routes with obvious danger areas such as
built-up areas, roads, trails, and known enemy positions. If these places cannot be avoided,
risk management should be conducted to develop ways to reduce danger to the unit. If
stealth is desired, the route should avoid contact with local inhabitants, built-up areas, and
natural lines of drift.
5-133. Movement techniques help the leader manage the amount of security his unit has
during movement. Traveling is the least secure and used when contact is unlikely.
Traveling overwatch is used when contact is likely but not imminent. Bounding overwatch
is used when contact is imminent. The leader establishes the PLD to indicate where the
transition from traveling overwatch to bounding overwatch should occur. When in contact
with the enemy, the unit transitions from movement to maneuver (fire and movement)
while the leader conducts actions on contact. (See figure 5-19.)
TERRAIN
5-134. When planning movements, the leader must consider how terrain affects security
while simultaneously considering METT-TC. Some missions may require the unit to move
on other than covered and concealed routes. While the leader may not be able to prevent
the unit’s detection, he can ensure it moves on the battlefield in a time and place for which
the enemy is unprepared. Particularly when moving in the open, the leader must avoid
predictability and continue to use terrain to his advantage.
SECURITY HALTS
5-137. Units conducting tactical movement frequently make temporary halts. These halts
range from brief to extended periods. For short halts, platoons use a cigar-shaped perimeter
intended to protect the force while maintaining the ability to continue movement. When
the platoon leader decides not to immediately resume tactical movement, he transitions the
platoon to a perimeter defense. The perimeter defense is used for longer halts or during
lulls in combat.
CIGAR–SHAPED PERIMETER
5-138. When the unit halts, if terrain permits, Soldiers should move off the route and
face out to cover the same sectors of fire they were assigned while moving, allowing
passage through the center of the formation. This results in a cigar-shaped perimeter.
Actions by subordinate leaders and their Soldiers occur without an order from the leader.
Soldiers are repositioned as necessary to take advantage of the best cover, concealment,
and fields of fire.
PERIMETER DEFENSE
5-139. When operating independently, the platoon uses a perimeter defense during
extended halts, resupply, and issuing platoon orders or lulls in combat. Normally the unit
first occupies a short halt formation. Then after conducting a leader’s reconnaissance of
the position and establishing security, the unit moves into the perimeter defense.
concealed positions off a road or from an open area and establishes all-round security
without issued detailed instructions. The truck commander repositions their vehicles as
necessary to take advantage of the best cover, concealment, and fields of fire. Fire team
members dismount and establish security. (See figures 5-21 and 5-22.)
ACTIONS AT HALTS
5-143. Table 5-3 (page 5-46) lists the standard actions taken at halts by the Soldier, squad
leader, and platoon leader.
AIR MOVEMENT
5-145. Air movement operations include both airdrops and air landings. Planning for air
movements is similar to other missions. In addition to the normal planning process,
however, air movement planning must cover specific requirements for air infiltration and
exfiltration:
z Coordinate with the supporting aviation units.
z Plan and rehearse with the supporting aviation unit before the mission if possible.
If armed escort accompanies the operation, the platoon leader and company
commander, as well as the assault or general support aviation unit, should ensure
aircrews are included in the planning and rehearsals.
z Gather as much information as possible, such as the enemy situation, in preparation
of the mission.
z Plan and coordinate joint suppression of enemy air defense.
5-146. The unit also should plan different ingress and egress routes, covering the
following:
z Planned insertion and extraction points.
z Emergency extraction rally points.
z Lost communications extraction points.
5-147. Planned extraction points and emergency extraction rally points require
communications to verify the preplanned pickup time or coordinate an emergency pickup
time window. Planning must include details for extraction when communications between
higher headquarters and unit are lost. The lost communications extraction point involves
infiltration teams moving to the emergency extraction point after two consecutive missed
communications windows and waiting up to 24 hours for pickup. (Refer to FM 3-04.113
for more information.)
MOVEMENT BY WATER
5-148. Platoons avoid crossing water obstacles when possible. Before crossing,
however, leaders should identify weak or nonswimmers and pair them with good
swimmers in their squads.
5-149. When platoons or squads must move into, through, or out of rivers, lakes, streams,
or other bodies of water, they treat the water obstacle as a danger area. While on the water,
the platoon is exposed and vulnerable. To offset the disadvantages, the platoon—
CONTROL
5-153. When visibility is poor, the following methods aid in control—
z Use of night vision devices.
z Infrared chemical lights.
z Leaders move closer to the front.
z The platoon reduces speed.
z Soldiers use two small strips of luminous tape on the rear of their helmet, allowing
Soldiers behind them to see them from the rear.
z Leaders reduce the interval between Soldiers and units to make sure they can see
each other.
z Leaders conduct headcounts at regular intervals and after each halt to ensure
personnel accountability.
NAVIGATION
5-154. To assist in navigation during limited visibility, leaders use—
z Terrain association (general direction of travel coupled with recognition of
prominent map and ground features).
z Dead reckoning, compass direction and specific distances or legs. (At the end of
each leg, leaders should verify their location.)
SECURITY AT NIGHT
5-155. For stealth and security in night moves, squads and platoons—
z Designate a point man to maintain alertness, the lead team leader to navigate, and a
pace man to count the distance traveled. Alternate compass and pace men are
designated.
z Ensure good noise and light discipline.
z Use radio-listening silence.
z Camouflage Soldiers and equipment.
z Use terrain to avoid detection by enemy surveillance or night vision devices.
z Make frequent listening halts.
z Mask the sounds of movement with artillery fires.
SECTION I – OVERVIEW
6-1. If a patrol is made up of a single unit, such as a rifle squad sent out on a
reconnaissance patrol, the squad leader is responsible. If a patrol is made up of mixed
elements from several units, then the senior officer or NCO is designated as the patrol
leader. This temporary title defines his role and responsibilities during the mission. The
patrol leader may designate an assistant, normally the next senior man in the patrol, and
subordinate element leaders he requires.
6-2. A patrol can consist of a unit as small as a fire team but are usually squad and
platoon-sized. For larger combat tasks such as for a raid, the patrol is sometimes a
company. The planned action determines if the patrols are combat and reconnaissance.
Regardless of the type of patrol, the unit needs a clear task and purpose.
6-3. The leader of any patrol, regardless of the type or the tactical task assigned, has an
inherent responsibility to prepare and plan for possible enemy contact while on the
mission. Patrols always are assigned a tactical mission. On his return to the main body, the
patrol leader reports to the commander and describes the patrol's actions, observations, and
condition.
PURPOSE OF PATROLLING
6-4. There are several specific purposes which can be accomplished by patrolling—
z Gathering information on the enemy, on the terrain, or on the populace.
z Regaining contact with the enemy or with adjacent friendly forces.
z Engaging the enemy in combat to destroy him or inflict losses.
z Reassuring or gaining the trust of a local population.
z Preventing public disorder.
z Deterring and disrupting insurgent or criminal activity.
ORGANIZATION OF PATROLS
6-5. A patrol is organized to perform specific tasks. It must be prepared to secure itself,
navigate accurately, identify and cross danger areas, and reconnoiter the patrol objective.
If it is a combat patrol, it must be prepared to breach obstacles, assault the objective, and
support those assaults by fire. Additionally, a patrol must be able to conduct detailed
searches as well as deal with casualties and detainees.
6-6. The leader identifies those tasks that must be or will likely be conducted during the
patrol and decides which elements will perform which tasks. Where possible, he should
maintain squad and fire team integrity. Squads and fire teams may perform more than one
task during the time a patrol is away from the main body or it may be responsible for only
one task. The leader must plan carefully to ensure he has identified and assigned all
required tasks in the most efficient way.
6-7. Elements and teams for platoons conducting patrols include the common and
specific elements for each type of patrol. The following elements are common to all
patrols.
HEADQUARTERS ELEMENT
6-8. The headquarters element normally consists of the platoon leader and his RTO. The
platoon sergeant may be designated as the assistant patrol leader. Combat patrols may
include a forward observer, perhaps his RTO and a medic.
Note. In this chapter the patrol leader is the person in charge of the patrol. In a
platoon-size element that person would most likely be the platoon leader. The
assistant patrol leader is the second person in charge of the patrol. In a platoon-
size element that person most likely is the platoon sergeant.
DETAINEE TEAMS
6-10. Detainee teams are responsible for processing detainees, according to the five Ss
(search, silence, segregate, speed, safeguard) and leader's guidance. These teams also may
be responsible for accounting for and controlling recovered personnel.
SURVEILLANCE TEAMS
6-11. Surveillance teams are used to establish and maintain covert observation of an
objective for as long as it takes to complete the patrol’s mission.
EN ROUTE RECORDER
6-12. An en route recorder can be designated to record all information collected during
the mission.
ASSAULT TEAMS
6-14. Combat patrols designate assault teams to close with the enemy on the objective or
to clear the ambush kill zone.
SUPPORT TEAMS
6-15. Combat patrols designate teams to provide direct fire in support of the breach and
assault teams.
BREACH TEAMS
6-16. Combat patrols have breach teams to assist the assault team in getting to the
objective.
SEARCH TEAMS
6-17. Search teams are designated to conduct a cursory or detailed search of the objective
area.
6-21. Items coordinated between the leader and battalion staff, company commander or
CoIST include:
z Changes or updates in the enemy situation.
z Best use of terrain for routes, rally points, and patrol bases.
z Light and weather data.
z Changes in the friendly situation.
z The attachment of Soldiers with special skills or equipment (engineers, sniper
teams, military working dog teams, forward observers, or interpreters).
z Use and location of landing or pickup zones.
z Departure and reentry of friendly lines.
z Direct and indirect fire support on the objective and along the planned routes,
including alternate routes.
z Rehearsal areas and times. The terrain for rehearsal should be similar to the
objective, to include buildings and fortifications if necessary. Coordination for
rehearsals includes security of the area, use of blanks, pyrotechnics, and live
ammunition.
z Special equipment and ammunition requirements.
z Transportation support, including transportation to and from rehearsal sites.
z Signal plan, call signs frequencies, code words, pyrotechnics, and challenge and
password.
6-22. The leader coordinates with the unit through which his platoon or squad conducts
its forward and rearward passage of lines. The leader also coordinates patrol activities with
the leaders of other units patrolling in adjacent areas at the same time.
LEADER’S RECONNAISSANCE
6-23. The leader’s reconnaissance reconnoiters the objective just before an attack or prior
to sending elements forward to locations where they will support by fire. It confirms the
condition of the objective, gives each subordinate leader a clear picture of the terrain where
he will move, and identifies parts of the objective he must seize or suppress. The leader’s
reconnaissance patrol can consist of the unit leader or representative, the leaders of major
subordinate elements, and (sometimes) security personnel and unit guides. It gets back to
the main body as quickly as possible. The leader can use the aid in (see figure 6-1) to help
in remembering the five-point contingency plan which is used when a leader or other
individuals separate from the main body.
Note. A leader’s reconnaissance may alert the enemy a patrol is in the area by
evidence of movement or noise, before the patrol begins its mission.
SIGNALS
6-29. The leader should consider the use of special signals. These include hand-and-arm
signals, flares, pyrotechnics, voice, whistles, radios, and visible or nonvisible lasers. All
signals are rehearsed to ensure all patrol members understand what they mean.
Running Password
6-32. Signal operating instructions also may designate a running password. This code
word alerts a unit that friendly are approaching in a less than organized manner and
possibly under pressure. The number of friendly approaching follows the running
password. For example, if the running password is “eagle," and seven friendly are
approaching, they would say “eagle seven."
LOCATION OF LEADERS
6-33. The leader considers where he, the platoon sergeant or assistant patrol leader, and
other essential leaders should be located for each phase of the patrol mission. The platoon
sergeant or assistant patrol leader normally is with the following elements for each type of
patrol:
z On a raid or ambush, he normally controls the support element.
z On an area reconnaissance, he normally supervises security in the objective rally
point.
z On a zone reconnaissance, he normally moves with the reconnaissance element
setting up the linkup point.
COORDINATION
6-36. The platoon leader must coordinate with the commander of the forward unit and
leaders of other units patrolling in the same or adjacent areas. The coordination includes
automated network control device information, signal plan, fire plan, running passwords,
procedures for departure and reentry of lines, planned dismount points, IRPs, actions at
departure and reentry points, and information about the enemy:
z The platoon leader provides the forward unit leader with the unit identification, size
of the patrol, departure, return times, and area of operation.
z The forward unit leader provides the platoon leader with the following:
Additional information on terrain just outside the friendly unit lines.
Known or suspected enemy positions in the near vicinity.
PLANNING
6-37. In planning for departure of friendly lines, the leader should consider the following
sequence of actions:
z Making contact with friendly guides at the contact point.
z Moving to a coordinated initial rally point just inside friendly lines.
z Completing final coordination.
z Moving to and through the passage point.
z Establishing a security-listening halt beyond the friendly unit's final protective fires.
USE
6-39. Patrol bases typically are used—
z To avoid detection by eliminating movement.
z To hide a unit during a long detailed reconnaissance.
z To perform maintenance on weapons, equipment, eat and rest.
z To plan and issue orders.
z To reorganize after infiltrating an enemy area.
z To establish a base from which to execute several consecutive or concurrent
operations.
SITE SELECTION
6-40. The leader selects the tentative site from a map or by aerial reconnaissance. The
site’s suitability must be confirmed and secured before the unit moves into it. Plans to
establish a patrol base must include selecting an alternate patrol base site. The alternate
site is used if the first site is unsuitable or if the patrol must unexpectedly evacuate the first
patrol base.
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
6-41. Leaders planning for a patrol base must consider the mission, passive and active
security measures. A patrol base must be located so it allows the unit to accomplish its
mission:
z Observation posts and communication with observation posts.
z Patrol or platoon fire plan.
z Alert plan.
z Withdrawal plan from the patrol base to include withdrawal routes and a rally point,
rendezvous point, or alternate patrol base.
z A security system that makes sure specific individuals are awake at all times.
z Enforcement of camouflage, noise, and light discipline.
z The conduct of required activities with minimum movement and noise.
z Priorities of work.
SECURITY MEASURES
6-42. The following security measures should be taken into consideration as a minimum:
z Select terrain the enemy probably would consider of little tactical value.
z Select terrain off main lines of drift.
z Select difficult terrain impeding foot movement, such as an area of dense
vegetation, preferably bushes and trees spreading close to the ground.
z Select terrain near a source of water.
z Select terrain defendable for a short period and offers good cover and concealment.
z Avoid known or suspected enemy positions.
z Avoid built up areas.
z Avoid ridges and hilltops, except as needed for maintaining communications.
z Avoid small valleys.
z Avoid roads and trails.
OCCUPATION
6-43. A patrol base is reconnoitered and occupied in the same manner as an ORP, with
the exception the platoon will typically plan to enter at a 90-degree turn. The leader leaves
a two-Soldier observation post at the turn; the patrol covers tracks from the turn to the
patrol base.
6-44. The platoon moves into the patrol base. Squad-sized patrols generally will occupy
a cigar shaped perimeter; platoon-sized patrols generally will occupy a triangle shaped
perimeter.
6-45. The leader inspects and adjusts the entire perimeter, as necessary.
6-46. After the leader has checked each squad’s portion of the perimeter, each squad
leader sends a two-Soldier R&S team to the leader at the patrol’s command post. The
leader issues the three R&S teams a contingency plan, reconnaissance method, and
detailed guidance on what to look for (enemy, water, built up areas or human habitat, roads,
trails, or possible rally points).
6-47. Where each R&S team departs is based on the leader’s guidance. The R&S team
moves a prescribed distance and direction, and reenters where the leader dictates:
z R&S teams will prepare a sketch of the area to the squad front if possible.
z The patrol remains at 100 percent alert during this recon.
z If the leader feels the patrol was tracked or followed, he may elect to wait in silence
at 100 percent alert before sending out R&S teams.
z The R&S teams may use reconnaissance methods such as a box or fan discussed
later in this chapter. Regardless of the method chosen; the R&S team must be able
to provide the leader with the same information.
z Upon completion of the information collection by the R&S teams, the platoon
leaders makes a decision to either stay in the current patrol base and begin priorities
of work or move the patrol base to an alternate location.
PRIORITIES OF WORK
6-48. Once the leader is briefed by the R&S teams and determines the area is suitable for
a patrol base, the leader establishes or modifies defensive work priorities in order to
establish the defensive posture of the patrol base. Priorities of work are not a laundry list
of tasks to be completed, priorities of work must consist of a task, a given time, and a
measurable performance standard. For each priority of work, a clear standard must be
issued to guide the element in the accomplishment of each task. It also must be designated
whether the work will be controlled in a centralized or decentralized manner. Priorities of
work are determined in accordance with METT-TC. Priorities of work may include the
tasks described below, but are not limited to them.
Continuous Security
6-49. Prepare to use all passive and active measures to cover the entire perimeter all of
the time, regardless of the percentage of weapons used to cover all the terrain. Employ all
elements, weapons, and personnel to meet conditions of the terrain, enemy, or situation.
Withdraw Plan
6-50. The leader designates the signal for withdrawal, order of withdrawal, platoon
rendezvous point, and alternate patrol base.
Continuous Communication
6-51. Communications must be maintained with higher headquarters, observation posts,
and within the unit. Other Soldiers within the patrol may rotate duties with the platoon’s
RTO allowing accomplishment of continuous radio monitoring, radio maintenance, act as
runners for leader, or conduct other priorities of work.
Water Resupply
6-54. The platoon sergeant or assistant patrol leader organizes watering parties as
necessary. The watering party carries canteens in an empty rucksack or duffel bag, and
must have communications and contingency plans related to their making enemy contact
en route or returning from the water point or if the patrol base has to displace during their
absence prior to their departure from the patrol base.
Mess Plan
6-55. At a minimum, security and weapons maintenance are performed prior to mess.
Normally no more than half the platoon eats at one time. Soldiers typically eat one to three
meters behind their fighting positions to avoid distracting those Soldiers providing
security.
6-57. The platoon leader must develop and enforce the unit sleep plan that provides
Soldiers with a minimum of 4 hours of uninterrupted sleep in a 24-hour period. If sleep is
interrupted, then 5 hours should be given. During continuous operations when
uninterrupted sleep is not possible, blocks of sleep which add up to 6 hours in a 24-hour
period are adequate for most people. Remember, 4 hours each 24-hour period is far from
ideal. Do not go with only 4 hours sleep each 24 hours for more than two weeks before
paying back sleep debt. Recovery time should be approximately 8 to 10 hours sleep each
24 hours over a 5- to 7-day period.
Resupply
6-59. Distribute or cross load ammunition, meals, equipment, and so on.
RALLY POINTS
6-61. The leader considers the use and locations of rally points. A rally point is a place
designated by the leader where the platoon moves to reassemble and reorganize if it
becomes dispersed.
Note. Isolated Soldiers still able to function on their own will make an attempt to
move to the objective rally point, or a rally point designated in the patrol plan.
z Reentry rally point. The RRP is located out of sight, sound, and small-arms weapons
range of the friendly unit through which the platoon will return. This also means the
RRP should be outside the FPFs of the friendly unit. The platoon occupies the RRP
as a security perimeter.
z Near-and far-side rally points. These rally points are on the near and far side of
danger areas. If the platoon makes contact while crossing the danger area and
control is lost, Soldiers on either side move to the rally point nearest them. They
establish security, reestablish the chain of command, determine their personnel and
equipment status, continue the patrol mission, and linkup at the ORP.
MOUNTED PATROLS
6-64. An analysis of the METT-TC variables determines whether the patrol is mounted
or dismounted. The planning and coordination required for both types of patrols is the
same. Some factors to consider when determining which mode to use include—
z Mission, especially where distance and speed are factors.
z Onboard visibility, navigation, and communication.
z Firepower and protection.
z Stealth and surprise.
z Terrain.
CONSIDERATIONS
6-65. Mechanized and Stryker Infantry units frequently conduct mounted patrols. The
same considerations that apply to dismounted patrol apply to vehicle mounted patrols. The
platoon leader should additionally consider the following:
z Organize and orient vehicle gunners and vehicle commanders to maintain all-round
security and, for urban areas, high-low security. Carefully consider leader locations
in each vehicle and within the convoy.
z Rehearse mounted battle drills, reaction to contact, roll over drills, and mounting
and dismounting in contact. If water hazards are present include evacuation of the
vehicle from the top hatches. Include drivers in all rehearsals.
z Plan alternate routes to avoid civilian traffic and roadblocks.
patrol will take in the event it loses communications. The unit may have established
these actions in its tactical SOP, but all patrol members should be briefed on the
communication plan and be given the appropriate frequencies, contact numbers, and
passwords in effect.
Electronic warfare countermeasures plan. This is especially important if the IED
threat level is high. The patrol leader should clearly explain to all patrol members
which electronic warfare devices are being employed and their significant
characteristics. These issues may be covered by the unit’s tactical SOP, but all patrol
members should be briefed on the electronic warfare plan in effect during the patrol.
Standard and special uniforms and equipment. Equipment should be distributed
evenly among the patrol members. The location of essential or unique equipment
should be known by all members of the patrol. SOPs should be developed to
stipulate what uniform is to be worn for various types of patrols. The dress state
will be linked to threats and posture of the patrol, so patrol members should be
briefed in sufficient time to enable proper preparations. All patrols must have a day
and night capability regardless of the expected duration of the patrol.
+ Medical. Every Soldier should carry their own individual improved first aid kit
per unit tactical SOP. The leader should ensure that every patrol has a medic and
one CLS qualified Soldier with a CLS bag. All patrol members must know who is
responsible for carrying the pack and know how to use its contents.
Attachments. The patrol leader must ensure all personnel attached to the patrol are
introduced to the other patrol members and briefed thoroughly on the tactical SOP;
all patrol special orders; and existing chain of command. The following personnel
may be attached to a unit going out on patrol:
Interpreters
Host-nation police, military police or local security forces.
Explosive ordnance disposal teams.
Female Soldiers specifically designated and trained to search local women.
Military working dog teams.
Foreign security forces.
Host-nation forces.
Provincial reconstruction teams.
EQUIPMENT
6-69. Equipment carried by the patrol will be environment- and task-specific and should
cover—
Radios and electronic warfare equipment. Radios and electronic warfare equipment
should be checked prior to every patrol ensuring it is serviceable and operates
correctly. Batteries must be taken for expected duration of the patrol plus some extra
for backup. Patrol members must be trained in the operation of all electronic warfare
and radio equipment. It is the patrol leader’s responsibility to ensure radios and
electronic warfare equipment is switched on and working and communication
checks are conducted prior to leaving the base location.
Weapons. All weapons must be prepared for firing prior to departure from the larger
unit. Slings should be used to ensure weapons do not become separated from
Soldiers who became incapacitated. This also ensures a weapon cannot be snatched
away from a distracted Soldier while he is speaking with locals and used against
him.
Ammunition. Sufficient ammunition, signal pyrotechnics, obscurants, and nonlethal
munitions must be carried to enable the patrol to conduct its mission. The amount a
patrol carries may be established by the unit’s tactical SOP or by the patrol leader
based upon an evaluation of the situation the patrol faces.
Load-carrying equipment. Patrol members should carry sufficient team and
personal equipment to enable them to accomplish other missions such as
reassignment to a cordon position before returning to the larger unit for resupply.
The unit’s tactical SOP should establish the standard amount of equipment and
supplies to be carried. The leader carefully considers the burden being placed on
Soldiers going on a foot patrol, especially in extreme weather conditions or rugged
terrain.
Documentation. Team leaders are responsible to the patrol leader for ensuring
appropriate documentation is carried by individuals for conducting the mission.
Under normal circumstances, Soldiers should carry just their identification card and
tags. The unit tactical SOP may prohibit or require the carrying of other appropriate
theater specific documentation such as cards with rules on EOF or ROE.
6-70. A number of equipment checks should be conducted prior to the patrol departing.
These checks can include the following:
Individual equipment check. It is the responsibility of every patrol member to check
their individual equipment. Soldiers should ensure all loose items of carried
equipment are secured.
Team leader’s equipment check. Leaders must ensure individual team members
limit what they carry to which is required for the patrol. Team equipment must be
checked for serviceability.
Patrol leader’s equipment check. Patrol leaders should check individual and team
equipment from each team prior to deploying, paying particular attention to the
serviceability of mission specific equipment.
REHEARSALS
6-72. Patrols should rehearse all specific tactical actions or drills for situations the patrol
leader anticipates encountering.
COMMUNICATIONS CHECKS
6-73. Communications checks should be conducted with the unit headquarters or
command post before every patrol. Patrols should not leave the vicinity of the main body
until all communication systems are operating correctly.
PATROL MANIFEST
6-74. When the situation allows, the patrol leader should submit a written patrol manifest
to the commander or to command post personnel prior to departing the main body.
Regardless of the situation, whenever the unit sends out a patrol there should be a specific
list of the patrol members made before it departs. The unit tactical SOP may establish a
specific format for this manifest, but generally it should contain the following information:
Patrol number or call sign designation.
Unit designation of unit sending the patrol out.
Patrol task and purpose (mission).
Names and rank of patrol leader and all subordinate leaders.
Estimated date-time-group out.
Estimated date-time-group in.
Brief description of the patrol’s intended route.
Complete names, rank, and unit of all members of the patrol, including attachments.
Number, nomenclature, and serial number of all weapons with the patrol.
Number, nomenclature, and serial number of all electronic warfare devices, radios,
and other special or sensitive equipment with the patrol.
Vehicle type and registration number, if appropriate.
6-75. The purpose of the manifest is to allow the higher headquarters to keep track of all
the patrols which are out and those having returned. If the patrol engages the enemy or
fails to return on time without reporting, the headquarters has information on the size,
capability and intentions of the patrol that it may need. If the patrol suffers casualties or
has a vehicle disabled, this manifest can be used to check that all personnel, weapons and
sensitive items were recovered.
DEPARTURE REPORT
6-76. The patrol leader should render a departure report just as the patrol departs the main
body location or the base. Depending on the procedure established by the unit’s tactical
SOP, this might include a detailed listing of the patrol’s composition. It also may simply
state the patrol’s call sign or patrol number and report its departure.
WEAPONS STATUS
6-77. Immediately upon leaving an established base or the main body position, the patrol
leader, vehicle commanders, and team leaders should ensure all the patrol weapons are
loaded and prepared for in accordance with ROE. Electronic warfare equipment should be
checked to ensure it is turned on if appropriate and all radio frequency settings should be
confirmed.
6-78. When the patrol returns to the base, each Soldier should clear his weapon
immediately after entering the protected area. The unit’s tactical SOP normally will
establish precise procedures for this clearing. Patrol leaders should ensure all individual
and crew-served weapons are unloaded.
string or wire run across a path, mounds of fresh soil, or other suspicious signs. Check the
area at ground level through to above head height.
6-83. When the patrol makes a planned halt, the patrol leader identifies an area for
occupation and stops 50 meters short of it. While the remainder of the patrol provides
security, the patrol leader carries out a visual check using binoculars. After moving the
patrol forward 20 meters from the position, the patrol leader conducts a visual check using
optics on the weapon or with unaided vision.
6-84. Before actually occupying the position, each Soldier conducts a thorough visual and
physical check for a radius of five meters. Each Soldier must be systematic, take time and
show curiosity. Use touch and, at night, white light if appropriate.
6-85. Obstacles must be physically checked for command wires. Fences, walls, wires,
posts and ground immediately underneath must be carefully felt by hand, without gloves.
RAID
6-87. Raids are surprise attacks against a position or installation for a specific purpose
other than seizing and holding the terrain. It is conducted to destroy a position or
installation, to destroy or capture enemy soldiers or equipment, or to free prisoners. A raid
patrol retains terrain just long enough to accomplish the intent of the raid. A raid always
ends with a planned withdrawal off the objective and a return to the main body.
AMBUSH
6-88. An ambush is a surprise attack from a concealed position on a moving or
temporarily halted target. An ambush patrol does not need to seize or hold terrain. It can
include an assault to close with and destroy the target, or an attack by fire only.
SECURITY PATROL
6-89. A security patrol is sent out from a unit location when the unit is stationary or during
a halt to search the local area, detect enemy forces near the main body, and to engage and
destroy the enemy within the capability of the patrol. This form of combat patrol normally
is sent out by units operating in close terrain with limited fields of observation and fire.
Although this form of combat patrol seeks to make direct enemy contact and to destroy
enemy forces within its capability, it should try to avoid decisive engagement. A security
patrol detects and disrupts enemy forces conducting reconnaissance of the main body or
massing to conduct an attack. Security patrols normally are away from the main body of
the unit for limited periods, returning frequently to coordinate and rest. They do not operate
beyond the range of communications and supporting fires from the main body, especially
mortar fires.
ASSAULT ELEMENT
6-91. The assault element is the combat patrol’s main effort. Its task is to conduct actions
on the objective. In most cases, the assault element will accomplish the overall purpose.
This element must be capable (through inherent capabilities or positioning relative to the
enemy) of destroying or seizing the target of the combat patrol. Tasks typically associated
with the assault element include:
z Conduct of assault across the objective to destroy enemy equipment, capture or kill
enemy, and clearing of key terrain and enemy positions.
z Maneuver close enough to the objective to conduct an immediate assault if detected.
z Being prepared to support itself if the support element cannot suppress the enemy.
z Providing support to a breach element in reduction of obstacles, if required.
z Planning detailed fire control and distribution.
z Conducting controlled withdrawal from the objective.
6-92. Analysis of METT-TC, particularly for a raid, may result in the requirement to
organize a separate breach force. At times this may include reducing an obstacle.
Additional tasks/special purpose teams assigned may include:
z Search teams. To find and collect documents, equipment and information which can
be used to produce intelligence.
z Detainee teams. To capture, secure, and document detainees.
z Demolition teams. To plan and execute the destruction of obstacles and when
necessary enemy equipment.
z Breach team. To create lanes in protective obstacles to facilitate the completion of
the patrol’s primary task.
z Aid and litter teams. To identify, collect, render immediate aid and coordinate
casualty evacuation.
SUPPORT ELEMENT
6-93. The support element suppresses the enemy on the objective using direct and
indirect fires. The support element is a shaping effort setting conditions for mission’s main
effort. This element must be capable of supporting the assault element. The support force
can be divided up into two or more elements if required.
6-94. The support element is organized to address a threat of enemy interference with
the assault elements. The support force suppresses, fixes, or destroys elements on the
objective. The support force’s primary responsibility is to suppress enemy to prevent
reposition against main effort. The support force—
z Initiates fires and gains fire superiority with crew-served weapons and indirect fires.
z Controls rates and distribution of fires.
z Shifts/ceases fire on signal.
z Supports the withdrawal of the assault element.
SECURITY ELEMENT
6-95. The security element is a shaping force having three roles. The first is to isolate
the objective from enemy personnel and vehicles attempting to enter the objective area.
These actions range from simply providing early warning, to blocking enemy movement.
This element may require several different forces located in various positions. The patrol
leader is careful to consider enemy reserves or response forces that will be alerted once
the engagement begins. The second role is to prevent enemy from escaping the objective
area. The third role is to secure the patrol’s withdrawal route.
6-96. There is a subtle yet important distinction to the security element. All elements
of the patrol are responsible for their own local security. What distinguishes the security
element is they are protecting the entire patrol. Their positions must be such they can, in
accordance with their engagement criteria, provide early warning of approaching enemy.
6-97. The security element is organized to address the primary threat to the patrol, being
discovered and defeated by security forces prior to execution of actions on the objective.
To facilitate the success of the assault element, the security element must fix or block (or
at a minimum screen) all enemy security or response forces located on parts of the
battlefield away from the raid.
LEADER LOCATIONS
6-98. Leaders locate where they can best influence the situation, which is usually with
either the support element or assault element. The second-in-charge normally locates at
the opposite location of the leader.
patrol retains terrain just long enough to accomplish the intent of the raid. A raid always
ends with a planned withdrawal off the objective and a return to the main body.
6-100. Raids are characterized by the following:
z Destruction of essential systems or facilities (command and control nodes, logistical
areas, other high value areas).
z Provide or deny critical information.
z Securing of hostages or prisoners.
z Confusing the enemy or disrupting his plans.
z Detailed information collection (significant collection assets committed).
z Mission command from the higher headquarters to synchronize the operation.
z Creating a window of opportunity.
6-101. Raids normally are conducted in five phases—(See figure 6-5, page 6-26.)
1) Approach the objective.
2) Isolate the objective area.
3) Set conditions for the assault element.
4) Assault the objective.
5) Tactical movement away from the objective area.
TERMINOLOGY
6-108. During terrain analysis, leaders identify at least four different locations: the
ambush site, the kill zone, security positions, and rally points. As far as possible, so-called
"ideal" ambush sites should be avoided because alert enemies avoid them if possible and
increase their vigilance and security when they must be entered. Therefore, surprise is
difficult to achieve. Instead, unlikely sites should be chosen when possible. Following are
characteristics of these four ideal positions.
Ambush Site
6-109. The ambush site is the terrain on which a point ambush is established. The ambush
site consists of a support-by-fire position for the support element and an assault position
for the assault element. An ideal ambush site—
z Has a good field of fire into the kill zone.
z Has good cover and concealment.
z Has a protective obstacle.
z Has a covered and concealed withdrawal route.
z Makes it difficult for the enemy to conduct a flank attack.
Kill Zone
6-110. The kill zone is the part of an ambush site where fire is concentrated to isolate or
destroy the enemy. An ideal kill zone has the following characteristics:
z Enemy forces are likely to enter it.
z It has natural tactical obstacles.
z Large enough to observe and engage the anticipated enemy force.
6-111. A near ambush is a point ambush with the assault element within reasonable
assaulting distance of the kill zone (less than 50 meters). Close terrain, such as an urban
area or heavy woods, may require this positioning. It also may be appropriate in open
terrain in a "rise from the ground" ambush.
6-112. A far ambush is a point ambush with the assault element beyond reasonable
assaulting distance of the kill zone (beyond 50 meters). This location may be appropriate
in open terrain offering good fields of fire or when attack is by fire for a harassing ambush.
Security Positions
6-113. An ideal security position—
z Does not mask fires of the main body.
z Provides timely information to the main body. (Gives the leader enough time to act
on information provided.)
z Can provide a support-by-fire position.
Rally Points
6-114. The platoon leader considers the use and locations of rally points. The rally point
is a place designated by the leader where the platoon moves to reassemble and reorganize
if it becomes dispersed.
6-115. The leader physically reconnoiters routes to select rally points whenever possible.
He selects tentative points if he can only conduct a map reconnaissance. He confirms them
by actual inspection as the platoon moves through them. Rally points must—
z Be easy to find.
z Have cover and concealment.
z Be away from natural lines of drift.
z Be defendable for short periods.
FORMATIONS
6-116. Many ambush formations exist. This section only discusses the linear, L-shaped,
and V-shaped (see figures 6-7 through 6-9, pages 6-30 through 6-32.) All of these
formations require leaders to exercise strict direct fire control. Leaders need to understand
strengths and weaknesses of their units and plan accordingly. The formation selected is
based on the following: terrain, visibility, Soldiers available, weapons and equipment, ease
of control, and target to be attacked.
Linear Ambush
6-117. In an ambush using a linear formation, the assault and support elements parallel
the target's route. This positions the assault and support elements on the long axis of the
kill zone and subjects the target to flanking fire. (See figure 6-7.) Only a target that can be
covered with a full volume of fire can be engaged in the kill zone. A dispersed target might
be too large for the kill zone. This is the disadvantage of linear formations.
6-118. The linear formation is good in close terrain restricting the target's maneuver, and
in open terrain where one flank is blocked by natural obstacles or can be blocked by other
means such as Claymores. Claymores or explosives can be placed between the assault and
support elements and kill zone to protect the unit from counter-ambush actions.
6-119. When the ambushing unit deploys this way, it leaves access lanes through the
obstacles so it can assault the target. An advantage of the linear formation is the relative
ease by which it can be controlled under all visibility conditions.
L-Shaped Ambush
6-120. An ambush in the L-shaped formation (see figure 6-8) is a variation of the linear
formation. The long leg of the L (assault element) is parallel to the kill zone. This leg
provides flanking fire. The short leg (support element) is at the end of and at a right angle
to the kill zone. This leg provides enfilade fire working with fire from the other leg. The
L-shaped formation can be used at a sharp bend in a trail, road, or stream.
FINAL PREPARATIONS
6-124. Final preparations begin with the unit occupying an ORP and end with the main
body prepared to depart for the ambush site. The unit halts at the ORP and establishes
security. When ready, the leader conducts his reconnaissance to confirm the plan, positions
the security element, and returns to the ORP. The security element leaves the ORP first.
Teams of the security element move to positions from which they can secure the ORP and
flanks of the ambush site. (See figure 6-10.)
Note. Security elements should use a release point if there is a large distance
between the ORP and objective.
Time of Occupation
6-126. As a rule, the ambush force occupies the ambush site at the latest possible time
permitted by the tactical situation and amount of site preparation required. This reduces
the risk of discovery and time Soldiers must remain still and quiet in position.
Positions
6-129. Each Soldier must be hidden from the target and have LOS into the kill zone. At
the ambush site, positions are prepared with minimal change in the natural appearance of
the site. Soldiers conceal debris resulting from preparation of positions.
Figure 6-11. Assault and support elements moving to the ambush site
target. When the target is to be assaulted, the ceasing or shifting of fire also must be precise.
If it is not, the assault is delayed, and the target has a chance to react. Sector stakes should
be used if possible.
Withdrawal
6-135. The withdrawal begins once the assault element completes its actions on the
objective and ends with consolidation/reorganization at a designated rally point. On signal,
the unit withdraws to the ORP, reorganizes, and continues its mission. At a set terrain
feature, the unit halts and disseminates information. If the ambush fails and enemy pursues,
the unit withdraws by bounds. Units should use obscurants to help conceal the withdrawal.
Obstacles already set along the withdrawal routes can help stop the pursuit.
enemy’s most likely avenue of approach and escape routes from the principal ambush site.
Squads normally are responsible for each ambush site.
6-139. The platoon leader considers METT-TC to determine the best employment of the
weapons squad. He normally locates the medium machine guns with the support element
in the principal ambush site.
6-140. Squads or sections responsible for outlying ambushes do not initiate their
ambushes until the principal one has been initiated. They then engage to prevent enemy
forces from escaping the principal ambush or reinforcing the ambushed force.
function as support-security elements in the same manner as the other forms of ambushes
to cover dismounted enemy avenues of approach into the ambush site.
6-143. In a platoon antiarmor ambush, the company commander selects the general site
of the ambush with the platoon leader finding a specific site restricting the movement of
enemy armored vehicles out of the designated kill zone. The platoon leader should emplace
his weapons so an obstacle is between the platoon and the kill zone. In a squad antiarmor
ambush, the platoon leader selects the general site of the ambush and the squad leader then
finds a site restricting the movement of enemy armored vehicles out of the kill zone.
6-144. The leader should consider the method for initiating the antiarmor ambush. The
preferred method should be a mass casualty-producing signal initiated by a reliable
weapon system or explosive, such as a main gun round from a tank or infantry carrier, the
detonation of mines or explosives, or other direct fire crew-served weapons that fire from
a closed bolt. The Javelin can be used to initiate the ambush, but even with its limited
signature, it may be less desirable than an antitank mine.
6-145. The armor-killer team destroys the first and last vehicle in the enemy formation,
if possible. All other weapons begin firing once the ambush has been initiated.
6-146. The leader must determine how the presence of dismounted enemy soldiers with
armored vehicles will affect the success of the ambush. The leader’s choices include:
z Initiate the ambush as planned.
z Withdraw without initiating the ambush.
z Initiate the ambush with medium machine guns without firing antiarmor weapons.
6-147. Because of the speed enemy armored forces can reinforce the ambushed enemy
with, the leader should plan to keep the engagement short and have a quick withdrawal
planned. The platoon, based on METT-TC, may not clear the kill zone as in other forms
of ambushes.
6-151. The platoon leader instructs the security element (or teams) to notify him of the
enemy’s approach into the kill zone using the SALUTE reporting format. The security
element also must keep the platoon leader informed if additional enemy forces are
following the lead enemy force. This will allow the platoon leader to know if the enemy
force meets the engagement criteria directed by the company commander. The platoon
leader must be prepared to give free passage to enemy forces too large or do not meet the
engagement criteria. He must report to the company commander or CoIST enemy forces
passing through the ambush unengaged.
6-152. The platoon leader initiates the ambush with the greatest casualty-producing
weapon, typically a command-detonated Claymore. He also must plan a back-up method,
typically a medium machine gun, to initiate the ambush should the primary means fail. All
Soldiers in the ambush must know the primary and back-up methods. The platoon should
rehearse with both methods to avoid confusion and loss of surprise during execution of the
ambush.
6-153. The platoon leader must include a plan for engaging the enemy during limited
visibility. Based on the company commander’s guidance, the platoon leader should
consider the use and mix of tracers and employment of illumination, night vision devices,
and thermal weapon sights. For example, if Javelins are not used during the ambush, the
platoon leader still may employ the CLU with its thermal sights in the security or support
element to observe enemy forces.
6-154. The platoon leader also may include the employment of indirect fire support in
his plan. Based upon the company commander’s guidance, the platoon leader may employ
indirect fires to cover flanks of the kill zone. This isolates an enemy force or assists the
platoon’s disengagement if the ambush is compromised or the platoon departs the ambush
site under pressure.
6-155. The platoon leader has a good plan (day and night) that signals the advance of the
assault element into the kill zone to begin its search and collection activities. He should
take into consideration the existing environmental factors. For example, obscurants may
not be visible to the support element because of limited visibility or the lay of the terrain.
Soldiers must know and practice relaying the signal during rehearsals to avoid the potential
of fratricide.
6-156. The assault element must be prepared to move across the kill zone using
individual movement techniques if there is return fire once they begin to search. Otherwise,
the assault element moves across by bounding fire teams.
6-157. The assault element collects and secures all EPWs and moves them out of the kill
zone to an established location before searching dead enemy bodies. The EPW collection
point should provide cover and should not be easily found by enemy forces following the
ambush. The friendly assault element searches from the far side of the kill zone to the near
side.
6-158. Once the bodies have been thoroughly searched, search teams continue in this
manner until all enemy personnel in and near the kill zone have been searched. Enemy
bodies should be marked once searched; for example, folded arms over the chest and legs
crossed to ensure thoroughness and speed and to avoid duplication of effort.
6-159. The platoon identifies and collects equipment to be carried back and prepares it
for transport. Enemy weapon chambers are cleared and put on safe. The platoon also
identifies and collects at a central point the enemy equipment to be destroyed. The
demolition team prepares the fuse and awaits the signal to initiate. This is normally the last
action performed before departing the ambush site. The flank security element returns to
the ORP after the demolition team completes its task.
6-160. The flank security teams also may emplace antiarmor mines after the ambush has
been initiated if the enemy is known to have armored vehicles which can quickly reinforce
the ambushed enemy force. If a flank security team makes enemy contact, it fights as long
as possible without becoming decisively engaged. It uses prearranged signals to inform
the platoon leader it is breaking contact. The platoon leader may direct a portion of the
support element to assist the security element in breaking contact.
6-161. The platoon leader must plan the withdrawal of the platoon from the ambush site.
The planning process should include the following:
z Elements normally are withdrawn in the reverse order they established their
positions.
z Elements may return to the release point, then to the ORP, depending on the distance
between the elements.
z The security element at the ORP must be alert to assist the platoon’s return. It
maintains security of the ORP while the remainder of the platoon prepares to depart.
6-162. Actions back at the ORP include, but are not limited to, accounting for personnel
and equipment, stowing captured equipment, and first aid (as necessary). Upon return
personnel within the patrol are reorganized as required and ammunition and equipment
redistributed for movement out of the ORP.
SECURITY PATROLS
6-163. Security patrols prevent surprise of the main body by screening to the front, flank,
and rear of the main body and detecting and destroying enemy forces in the local area.
Security patrols do not operate beyond the range of communication and supporting fires
from the main body; especially mortar fires, because they normally operate for limited
periods, and are combat-oriented.
6-164. Security patrols are employed both when the main body is stationary and when it
is moving. When the main body is stationary, the security patrol prevents enemy
infiltration, reconnaissance, or attacks. When the main body is moving, the security patrol
prevents the unit from being ambushed or coming into surprise chance contact.
z Civil.
z Tracking.
POINT RECONNAISSANCE
6-168. Point reconnaissance patrol goes straight to a specific location and determines the
situation there. As soon as it does so, it either reports the information by radio or returns
to the larger unit to report. This patrol can obtain, verify, confirm, or deny extremely
specific information for the platoon leader or commander.
CONTACT RECONNAISSANCE
6-169. Contact reconnaissance patrol is a special type of reconnaissance patrol sent from
one unit to physically contact and coordinate with another. Modern technology has
reduced, but not eliminated, the need for contact patrols. They most often are used today
when a U.S. force must contact a non-U.S. coalition partner who lacks compatible
communications or position-reporting equipment. Contact patrols may either go to the
other unit's position, or the units can meet at a designated contact point. The leader of a
contact patrol provides the other unit with information about the location, situation, and
intentions of his own unit, and obtains and reports the same information about the
contacted unit back to his unit. The contact patrol also observes and reports pertinent
information about the area between the two units.
CIVIL RECONNAISSANCE
6-170. Civil reconnaissance patrol is a targeted, planned, and coordinated observation
and evaluation of specific civil aspects of the environment. Civil reconnaissance focuses
on the civil component, the elements of which are best represented by ASCOPE. Priority
information requirements focus on civil reconnaissance for purposes of collecting civil
information to enhance situational understanding and facilitate decisionmaking. (Refer to
FM 3-57 for more information.) Potential sources of civil information which a coordinated
civil reconnaissance plan considers include:
z Ongoing ASCOPE assessments of the area of operations.
z Identified unknowns in civil information:
Gaps identified during collation and analysis.
Gaps remaining in the area study and area assessment.
z Civil affairs interaction, including but not limited to:
Host-nation government officials.
Religious leaders.
Tribal or clan leaders.
Dislocated civilian camp leadership.
Dislocated civilians on the move.
Infrastructure managers and workers.
Local industry personnel.
Medical and educational personnel.
TRACKING RECONNAISSANCE
6-171. Tracking reconnaissance patrol is normally a squad-size, possibly smaller,
element. It is tasked to follow the trail of a specific enemy unit in order to determine its
composition, final destination, and actions en route. Patrol members look for subtle signs
left by the enemy as he moves. As they track, they gather information about the enemy
unit, the route it took, and surrounding terrain. Normally, a tracking patrol avoids direct
fire contact with the tracked unit. Tracking patrols often use tracker dog teams to help them
maintain the track.
CONTROL MEASURES
6-175. Control measures help leaders anticipate being detected. They include:
FUNDAMENTALS OF RECONNAISSANCE
6-176. Leaders use the seven fundamentals of reconnaissance to organize their patrols
into two forces: a reconnaissance element, and a security element. The seven fundamentals
are—
z Ensure continuous reconnaissance.
z Do not keep reconnaissance assets in reserve.
z Orient on the reconnaissance objective.
z Report information rapidly and accurately.
z Retain freedom of maneuver.
z Gain and maintain enemy contact.
z Develop the situation rapidly.
RECONNAISSANCE ELEMENTS
6-177. The reconnaissance element’s task is to obtain information requirements for the
purposes of facilitating tactical decisionmaking. The primary means is R&S enabled by
tactical movement and continuous, accurate reporting. The reconnaissance patrol leader
decides how in-depth the reconnaissance will be. A thorough and accurate reconnaissance
is important. However, avoiding detection is equally important.
6-178. Below are some of the additional tasks normally associated with a reconnaissance
element:
z Reconnoiter all terrain within the assigned area, route, or zone.
z Determine trafficability routes or potential avenues of approach (based on the
personnel or vehicles to be used on the route).
Inspect and classify all bridges, overpasses, underpasses, and culverts on the
route.
Locate fords or crossing sites near bridges on the route.
z Determine the time it takes to traverse the route.
z Reconnoiter to the limit of direct fire range.
Terrain influencing the area, route, or zone.
Built-up areas.
Lateral routes.
Note. Infantry platoons and squads typically do not have the expertise to complete
a full technical inspection of bridges, roads, and culverts; this task normally
requires Engineer augmentation. Infantry platoons and squads do, however; have
the ability to conduct a general assessment.
SECURITY ELEMENTS
6-179. The security element has two tasks: provide early warning of approaching enemy;
and provide support by fire to the reconnaissance elements if they come in contact with
the enemy. The security element’s purpose is to protect the reconnaissance element,
thereby allowing it to obtain the information requirement. Security elements tasked to
provide early warning must be able to observe avenues of approach into and out of the
objective area. If the reconnaissance element is compromised, the security element must
be able to quickly support it. It does so by occupying positions enabling it to observe the
objective as well as cover the reconnaissance element. Soldiers in these positions must be
able to engage the enemy with direct and indirect fire. They also must be able to facilitate
communication to higher as well as all supporting assets. This worst-case scenario must
be well rehearsed and well thought out.
6-180. Regardless of how the R&S elements are organized, each element always
maintains responsibility for its own local security. In a small reconnaissance patrol, the
patrol headquarters may form a part of one of the subordinate elements rather than being
a separate element. The number and size of the various teams and elements must be
determined through the leader’s METT-TC analysis. There are three ways to organize the
R&S elements. (See figure 6-14.)
6-181. The first technique is to organize the reconnaissance elements separate from
security elements. This technique is used when the security element is able to support the
reconnaissance element from one location. This requires the reconnaissance objective to
be defined clearly and area to be fairly open.
6-182. The second technique is to organize the reconnaissance elements and security
elements together into R&S teams. This technique is used when the reconnaissance
objective is not defined clearly or the teams are not mutually supporting and each
reconnaissance element potentially needs its own security force. Within the R&S team, the
reconnaissance can be done by one or two individuals while the rest of the element
provides security. The number of Soldiers in an R&S team varies depending on the
mission. Usually a fire team (three to four Soldiers) is required for an adequate
reconnaissance and still provide local security.
6-183. The third technique is to establish R&S teams with an additional, separate
security element. The separate security element also-can act as a reserve or as a quick
reaction force.
INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
6-186. Information requirements are the basis for the development of the CCIRs, the
answers to which are needed to allow commanders to make tactical decisions. The
controlling headquarters must clearly define the information requirements it wants the
patrol to determine. The patrol leader must clarify these information requirements prior to
conducting the mission. Table 6-2 (page 6-48) illustrates an example matrix used to
capture the information requirements for the headquarters’ collection plan.
OBSERVATION PLAN
6-191. Once the patrol leader understands the information requirement, he then
determines how he will obtain it by developing an observation plan. The leader captures
the observation plan as part of the patrol leader’s COA sketch. This is done by asking two
basic questions:
z What is the best location to obtain the information required?
z What is the best way to obtain the information without compromising the patrol?
6-192. The answer to the first question is: all vantage points and observation posts from
which the patrol can best obtain the required information. A vantage point is a temporary
position enabling observation of the enemy. It is meant to be occupied only until the enemy
activity is confirmed or denied. The answer to the second question is: use the routes and
number of teams necessary to occupy the vantage points and observation posts. An
observation post is a position where military observations can be made, and fire can be
directed and adjusted. Observation posts must possess appropriate communications. The
observation post can be short-term (12 hours or less) or long-term, depending upon
guidance from higher. Unlike a vantage point, the observation post normally is occupied
and surveillance is conducted for a specified period.
6-193. The patrol views the reconnaissance objective from as many perspectives as
possible, using whatever combinations of observation posts and vantage points are
necessary. The leader selects the tentative locations for patrol’s vantage points,
observation posts, and movement after analyzing METT-TC. These locations are proposed
and are confirmed and adjusted as necessary by the actual leader on the ground. From his
analysis, the leader determines how many vantage points and observation posts he must
establish and where to position them. Once he decides on these general locations, he
designs the routes for necessary movement between these and other control measures (such
as the release points and linkup points). Positions should have the following
characteristics:
z Covered and concealed routes to and from each position.
z Unobstructed observation of the assigned area, route, or zone. Ideally, the fields of
observation of adjacent positions overlap to ensure full coverage.
z Cover and concealment. Leaders select positions with cover and concealment to
reduce their vulnerability on the battlefield. Leaders may need to pass up a position
with favorable observation capability but no cover and concealment to select a
position affording better survivability.
z A location not attracting attention. Positions should not be sited in such locations as
a water tower, an isolated grove of trees, or a lone building or tree. These positions
draw enemy attention and may be used as enemy artillery target registration posts.
z A location not skylining the observers. Avoid hilltops. Locate positions farther
down the slope of the hill or on the side, provided there are covered and concealed
routes into and out of the position.
6-194. The locations selected by the patrol are either long range or short range. Long-
range positions must be far enough from the objective to be outside enemy’s small-arms
weapons, sensors, and other local security measures. Long-range positions are the most
desirable method for executing a reconnaissance because the patrol does not come in close
enough to be detected. If detected, the patrol is able to employ direct and indirect fires.
Therefore, it is used whenever METT-TC permits the required information to be gathered
from a distance. Security must be maintained by—
z Selecting covered and concealed observation posts.
z Using covered and concealed routes in and around the operations area.
z Deploying security elements, including sensors, to give early warning, and
providing covering fire if required.
6-195. Short-range positions are within the range of enemy local security measures and
small-arms fire. When information required cannot be obtained by a long-range position,
reconnaissance elements move closer to the objective. The vantage points and routes used
during short-range observation should be planned carefully and verified prior to using
them. Doing so prevents detection by the enemy or friendly units from stumbling into one
another or covering ground already passed over by another element.
SHORT RANGE
6-200. On nearing the objective, the patrol leader should establish a forward release
point. It should be sited so it is well-hidden, no closer than 200 meters from known enemy
patrol routes, observation posts, or sentry positions. The forward release point provides
the patrol leader with a temporary location close to the objective from which he can
operate. While the close reconnaissance is in progress, it should be manned by the patrol
second in charge and RTO. Only vital transmissions should be made while in the forward
release point. The volume setting should be as low as possible on the radio, and if available,
the operator should use an earphone.
6-201. The close reconnaissance team should make its final preparation in the forward
release point. Movement from the forward release point must be slow and deliberate.
Leaders should allow sufficient time for the team to obtain the information. If time is
limited, the team should only be required to obtain essential information. If the enemy
position is large, or time is limited, the leader may employ more than one close
reconnaissance team. If this occurs, each patrol must have clearly defined routes for
movement to and from the forward release point. They also must have clearly defined areas
in which to conduct their reconnaissance in order to avoid clashes.
6-202. The close reconnaissance team normally consists of one to two observers and two
security men. The security men should be close enough to provide protection to the
observer, but far enough away so his position is not compromised. When moving in areas
close to the enemy position, only one man should move at one time. Accordingly, bounds
should be short.
6-203. Once in position, the patrol observes and listens to acquire the needed
information. No eating, no talking, and no unnecessary movement occurs at this time. If
the reconnaissance element cannot acquire the information needed from its initial position,
it retraces the route and repeats the process. This method of reconnaissance is extremely
risky. The reconnaissance element must remember the closer it moves to an objective, the
greater the risk of being detected.
SECURITY ELEMENT
6-206. The subordinate leader responsible for security establishes security at the ORP
and positions other security teams as required on likely enemy avenues of approach into
the objective area.
CONDUCT
6-208. Route reconnaissance is conducted to obtain and locate the following:
z Detailed information about trafficability on the route and all adjacent terrain.
z Detailed information about an enemy activity or enemy force moving along a route.
z Sites for emplacing hasty obstacles to slow enemy movement.
z Obstacles, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear contamination, and so
forth.
6-209. The Infantry platoon and squad also can be tasked to survey a route in a planned
infiltration lane. After being briefed on the proposed infiltration, the patrol leader conducts
a thorough map reconnaissance and plans a series of fans along the route. (See figure 6-16.)
The coverage must reconnoiter all intersecting routes for a distance greater than the range
at which enemy direct-fire weapons could influence the infiltrating forces.
6-211. If all or part of the proposed route is a road, the leader must treat the road as a
danger area. The platoon moves parallel to the road, using a covered and concealed route.
When required, R&S teams move close to the road to reconnoiter important areas. The
platoon plans a different route for its return.
CONTROL MEASURES
6-212. Control measures for a route reconnaissance create an area of operation for the
unit conducting the reconnaissance. (Refer to ATP 3-20.98 for more information.) The
leader should submit the patrol report in an overlay format including:
z Two grid references (required).
z Magnetic north arrow (required).
z Route drawn to scale (required).
z Title block (required).
z Route classification formula (required).
z Road curves with a radius of less than 45 degrees.
z Steep grades and maximum gradients.
z Road width of constrictions such as bridges and tunnels, with the widths and lengths
of the traveled ways (in meters).
z Underpass limitations with limiting heights and widths.
z Bridge bypasses classified as easy, hard, or impossible.
z Civil or military road numbers or other designations.
z Locations of fords, ferries, and tunnels with limiting information.
z Causeways, snow sheds, or galleries if they are in the way. Data about clearance
and load-carrying capacity should be included to permit an evaluation to decide
whether to strengthen or remove them.
Fan Method
6-215. When using the fan method, the leader first selects a series of ORPs throughout
the zone to operate from. The patrol establishes security at the first ORP. Upon confirming
the ORP location, the leader confirms reconnaissance routes out from and back to the ORP.
These routes form a fan-shaped pattern around the ORP. The routes must overlap to ensure
the entire area is reconnoitered. Once the routes are confirmed, the leader sends out R&S
teams along the routes. When all R&S teams have returned to the ORP, the platoon collects
and disseminates all information to every Soldier before moving on to the next ORP.
6-216. Each R&S team moves from the ORP along a different fan-shaped route
overlapping with others to ensure reconnaissance of the entire area. (See figure 6-17.)
These routes should be adjacent to each other. Adjacent routes prevent the patrol from
potentially making contact in two different directions. The leader maintains a reserve at
the ORP.
Box Method
6-217. When using the box method, the leader sends his R&S teams from the ORP along
routes forming a boxed-in area. He sends other teams along routes through the area within
the box. (See figure 6-18.) All teams meet at a linkup point at the far side of the box from
the ORP.
DEBRIEF
6-224. The patrol leader should conduct a “debrief” with the entire patrol as soon as
possible after entering the base or rejoining the main body. This allows him to capture low-
level information while the Soldiers’ memories are fresh and information relevant. He
should go over the notes taken by the patrol scribe chronologically to facilitate the
discussion. Every patrol member should participate. If there was an interpreter or other
attachments with the patrol, they should be debriefed as a source of human intelligence by
allowing them to pass on information they obtained during the patrol. The patrol leader
includes significant information necessary during the debriefing of his patrol report to the
commander.
6-225. Normally the debriefing is oral. Sometimes a written report is required.
Information on the written report should include:
z Size and composition of the unit conducting the patrol.
z Mission of the platoon such as type of patrol, location, and purpose.
z Departure and return times.
z Routes. Use checkpoints, grid coordinates for each leg or include an overlay.
z Detailed description of terrain and enemy positions identified.
z Results of contact with the enemy.
z Unit status at the conclusion of the patrol mission, including the disposition of dead
or wounded Soldiers.
z Number of isolated Soldiers platoon/squad unable to recover during execution of
the mission.
z Conclusions or recommendations.
PATROL REPORT
6-226. The patrol leader is responsible for the patrol report, and may be assisted by his
assistant patrol leader and specialist personnel attached to the patrol. Immediately after the
debriefing, the patrol leader should render his patrol report to the commander. This report
may be verbal or written, simple, or elaborate depending on the situation and commander’s
requirements.
6-227. The commander may have the patrol leader render his report to the battalion
intelligence officer or to the duty officer at the battalion command post, especially during
stability. The patrol report (see figure 6-23, page 6-60) should include a description of the
actual route taken by the patrol (as opposed to the planned route), including halt locations.
If the unit uses digital mission command systems automatically tracking and displaying
the patrol’s route, the information is known already. If not, the patrol leader reports it.
6-228. When GPS devices are used by the patrol, gathering route information is easier
and faster. The actual route the patrol took is important for planning future patrol routes
and actions. Enemy intelligence operations attempt to identify pattern settings by U.S. and
coalition patrols, including the locations of halts. This may result in attack against locations
regularly used by security forces.
6-229. Additional information may include the number of biometric enrollments and
identification on the BEWL; was anyone detained according to the instructions on the
BEWL; and what is the status?
Sustainment
Sustainment is the provision of logistics, personnel services, and
HSS necessary to maintain operations until successful mission
completion. In the Infantry platoon, the BFV platoon, and the
Stryker platoon, the platoon leader handles sustainment; the platoon
sergeant and squad leader have the ultimate responsibility for
sustainment. The platoon sergeant is the platoon’s primary
sustainment operator; he works closely with the company executive
officer and first sergeant to ensure he receives the required support
for the platoon’s assigned missions. Sustainment responsibilities
and procedures in the platoon remain basically the same. The
company normally forecasts supplies and “pushes” rather than
“pulls” them to the platoon. This chapter covers: responsibilities,
unit combat and basic loads, trains, and functions of sustainment.
SECTION I – RESPONSIBILITIES
7-1. The Infantry platoon and squad must plan, prepare, and execute its portion of the
Infantry company sustainment plan. Concurrent with other operational planning, the
platoon develops its sustainment plan during the mission analysis and refines it in the war-
gaming portion of the TLP. Rehearsals normally are conducted at each echelon to ensure
the smooth, continuous flow of materiel and services.
7-2. Sustainment responsibilities for the Infantry platoon and squad include—report and
request support requirements through the company and ensure sustainment operations are
properly executed when support elements arrive in the platoon area. The platoon sergeant
is normally in charge of these functions, with guidance and oversight provided by the
platoon leader. The platoon sergeant must submit accurate personnel and logistical reports,
along with other necessary information and requests.
PLATOON LEADER
7-3. The platoon leader is responsible for his platoon’s execution of the sustainment plan
at platoon level. He plans and relays support requirements for mission accomplishment to
the company headquarters where it is consolidated and passed on.
PLATOON SERGEANT
7-4. The platoon sergeant is the platoon’s primary sustainment planner, coordinator, and
operator; reporting directly to the platoon leader. He executes the platoon’s logistical plan,
relying heavily on platoon and company SOPs. The platoon sergeant directly supervises
and controls the platoon’s assets. During preparations of the mission, he works closely
with the platoon leader and squad leaders to determine specific support requirements of
the tactical plan. He then ensures proper arrangements are made to provide those support
requirements. The platoon sergeant also performs these logistical functions:
z Determines the location of the platoon’s resupply point based on data developed
during planning and war-gaming process.
z Compiles DA Form 2404 (Equipment Inspection and Maintenance Worksheet) or
DA Form 5988-E (Equipment Maintenance and Inspection Worksheet), from the
squad leaders and provides updates to the platoon leader as required.
z Ensures the platoon executes sustainment operations according to the company’s
sustainment plan.
z Leads the sustainment rehearsal in coordination with squad leaders to ensure
integration into the platoon’s rehearsal.
z Assists the platoon leader in developing sustainment priorities and guidance
according to the Infantry company’s concept of support, and enforces those
priorities.
z Conducts close coordination with the company executive officer and first sergeant
for planning and to resource platoon missions.
z Coordinates and synchronizes human resources support with the company first
sergeant. This includes personnel accountability reports, casualty reports,
replacement operations, personnel readiness management, mail operations,
essential personnel services, and other administrative or personnel requirements.
z Meets the logistics package (LOGPAC) at the company logistics release point
(LRP); guides it to the Infantry platoon resupply point and supervises resupply
operations.
z Provides an Infantry platoon orientation for new personnel and, in consultation with
the platoon leader makes recommendations on replacements to the platoon’s
leadership.
z Directs and supervises evacuation of casualties, detainees, and damaged equipment.
z Directs and supervises the collection, initial identification, and evacuation of human
remains to the mortuary affairs collection point.
z Maintains the Infantry platoon manning roster.
z Cross-leveling supplies and equipment throughout the platoon.
z Coordinating logistics/personnel requirements with attached or operational control
units.
SQUAD LEADER
7-5. Squad leader sustainment duties include:
z Ensuring Soldiers perform proper maintenance on all assigned equipment.
z Ensuring Soldiers maintain personal hygiene.
z Compiling personnel and logistics reports of the platoon and submitting them to the
platoon sergeant as directed or in accordance with unit SOP.
Obtaining supplies, equipment (except Class VIII), and mail from the platoon
sergeant and ensuring proper distribution.
Cross-leveling supplies and equipment throughout the squad.
Note. It is vital the squad leader ensures all squad members carry their own
improved first aid kit to sustain survivability.
COMBAT LIFESAVER
7-6. CLS is a nonmedical Soldier trained to provide advanced first aid and lifesaving
procedures beyond the level of self-aid or buddy aid. The CLS is not intended to take the
place of platoon combat medic or medical personnel. His specialized training can slow
deterioration of a wounded Soldier's condition until treatment by medical personnel is
possible. + Each certified CLS is issued a CLS aid bag. Whenever possible, the platoon
leader or platoon sergeant ensures there is at least one CLS qualified Soldier in each fire
team.
TRAINING
7-7. + Because combat lifesavers are an organic capability, the platoon should make the
Combat Lifesaver Program a training priority.
DUTIES
7-8. + The CLS ensures the squad CLS bag and litters are properly packed. Identifies
Class VIII shortages to the platoon medic, and participates in all + CLS and litter-carry
drills. His advanced first-aid skills are called upon in the field until casualties can be
evacuated or medical personnel arrive. The CLS knows the location of the CCP and SOP
for establishing it.
Note. The CLS should have a laminated quick reference nine-line medical
evacuation card.
SOLDIER LOAD
7-10. The Soldier’s load is a main concern of the leader. How much is carried, how far,
and in what configuration are important mission considerations. Commanders and leaders
must balance the risk to their soldiers from the enemy against the risk to mission
accomplishment due to excess loads, soldier exhaustion, and injury. Leaders must ensure
that soldiers travel as light as possible. Commanders and leaders must be willing to accept
calculated risks to reduce the soldier’s load and they should base load limits on well
thought out METT-TC analysis.
7-11. Personal protection equipment constitutes the largest weight category of Soldiers
load. The greatest PPE weight is body armor that additionally limits the Soldier’s ability
to maintain body core temperature and, to varying degrees, regulate breathing due to
constriction of the torso. Depending on mission variables and environmental conditions,
commanders and leaders may adjust the level of body armor protection or even remove
body armor balancing an increased risk to individual soldiers to improve the likelihood of
mission accomplishment.
7-12. Equipment and ammunition loads must be tailored to mission requirements and the
likely enemy threat. For example, if the enemy threat does not include armor formations,
leaders may not include the Javelin CCMS. In certain circumstances, it may be appropriate
for units to carry additional small arms ammunition due to sustainment constraints. In other
circumstances, based on the enemy threat and historical analysis it may be necessary to
carry mine detectors but not ECM equipment.
7-13. The platoon’s planning and preparation processes will include detailed load
planning and calculation. This assists leaders and Soldiers in organizing tactical loads to
manage energy expenditure and combat effectiveness. (See table 7-1.)
CONSIDERATIONS
LOAD ANALYSIS
MISSION
TERRAIN
TROOPS
ENEMY
CIVIL
TIME
Platoon Dismounted Expected 3 squads Severely None Approach
(as a part Infantry duration plus restricted march load
of a platoon with is 24 to weapons terrain, without body
company) small arms 48 hours squad rolling hills, armor, only
clears by dense light antitank
conducting vegetation, (AT)/bunker
a high defeat
movement humidity, munitions
to contact high (BDM)
to defeat temperature weapons, 2x
enemy stripped
forces in meals ready
the area of to eat (MRE)
operation
(AO)
Platoon Dismounted Expected 3 squads Severely Non- Fighting
(as a part Infantry duration plus restricted combatant load, body
of a reinforced is less weapons urban terrain, s present armor with
company) squad than 24 squad limited in vicinity front/back/sid
raids to hours visibility, the target e plates
seize an moderately objective
objective high
to capture temperature
or kill
enemy
elements
CONSIDERATIONS
LOAD ANALYSIS
TERRAIN
MISSION
TROOPS
ENEMY
CIVIL
TIME
Stryker Mechanize Expected 3 squads Restricted Non- Fighting
platoon d Infantry duration plus terrain, combatants load, body
(as a part defending is less weapons moderate present in armor with
of a in vicinity a than 24 squad vegetation, vicinity the front/back
company) small hours moderate target plates,
attacks to village, temperature objective Javelin
seize an Former combat
enemy Soviet missile
objective Union systems
(FSU) (CCMS) with
Armored 2x additional
Infantry rounds
Combat
Vehicle
(BMP1)-
FSU
Armored
Personnel
Carrier
(BTR) mix
7-14. Maximum effort should be placed on echeloning excess loads. Leaders must resist
the mindset that we must carry everything to be prepared for every eventuality. Leaders at
the lowest levels must enforce load discipline to ensure that soldiers do not voluntarily
carry excess weight. Additionally, leaders must rely on the chain of command to deliver
equipment forward for subsequent operations.
Note. The ability of an Infantry Soldier to fight is directly related to the load he
must carry.
7-15. An excessive load reduces energy and agility. A Soldier carrying an excessive load
is at a disadvantage when he must react to enemy contact. Conversely, if the load is tailored
to be light, leaders may make a decision to leave behind mission-essential or crucial
equipment to balance the load. Sometimes a Soldier must carry more than the
recommended combat load. However, leaders must realize how this will affect the unit's
overall effectiveness. (FM 21.18 provides additional information on a Soldier's load.)
7-16. Infantry forces are designed to be flexible and responsive in all types of terrain and
environments, and for this reason, they consist mainly of foot-mobile fighters. Their
success depends on the ability of Infantry Soldiers to deliver the appropriate weapon
systems and materiel, to the decisive place on the battlefield in a timely manner; while at
the same time, maintaining the ability to defeat the enemy and survive. The Soldier’s load
is managed at the company and platoon level; however, standards are established at the
battalion level using planning considerations to ensure Soldiers are properly equipped, and
mentally and physically ready for combat.
COMBAT LOADS
7-17. A combat load is determined by the mission leader and consists of only what is
necessary to fight and survive immediate combat operations. The levels of combat loads
are—
z Fighting loads.
z Approach march loads
z Emergency approach march loads.
FIGHTING LOAD
7-18. A fighting load is the essential items the Soldier needs to fight, such as, weapon,
UBL of ammo and grenades, night vision goggles, and protective mask. Items can be added
or removed based on METT-TC and other factors. Excessive combat loads of assaulting
troops must be configured so the excess can be redistributed or shed (leaving only the
fighting load) before or upon contact with the enemy.
quantity of most unit basic load supply items depends on how many days in combat the
platoon might have to sustain itself without resupply. For Class V ammunition, the higher
commander or SOP specifies the platoon’s basic load.
SUSTAINMENT LOAD
7-23. A sustainment load consists of the equipment required by the company commander
for sustained operations. This equipment usually is stored by the company supply section
in the field trains and brought forward when needed. A sustainment load can include
rucksacks, squad duffel bags, and sleeping bags. In combat, protective items for specific
threats may be stored in preconfigured unit loads.
PLANNING CONSIDERATION
7-24. Planning sustainment operations is primarily a company- and battalion-level
operation. While the company commander and executive officer plan the operation, the
platoon leader is responsible for execution at platoon level.
7-25. Sustainment at the Infantry platoon level is characterized by the following:
z Responsiveness.
z Economy.
z Flexibility.
z Integration.
z Survivability.
RESPONSIVENESS
7-26. To be effective sustainment needs to be responsive. This requires users to provide
timely requests for supplies and support while requiring providers to anticipate user needs
in advance.
ECONOMY
7-27. To be efficient, sustainment providers and users exercise conservation. Because
resources always are limited, it is in the best interest of everyone to use only what is
needed. The principle of economy necessitates that Soldiers, leaders, and their units
conserve resources whenever possible. This also ensures other Soldiers and units will have
the supplies they need.
FLEXIBILITY
7-28. The principle of flexibility embodies the chaotic nature of combat. Providers and
users alike remain aware that, despite the best efforts of all involved, things seldom go as
planned; shipments are delayed, convoys are attacked, and supplies are destroyed.
Supporting the needs of both the individual unit and the rest of the units on the battlefield
requires both the user and provider to know what they need, when they need it and possible
substitutes.
INTEGRATION
7-29. To function properly, sustainment considerations must be integrated into every
aspect of an operation. Sustainment is not branch or rank specificʊ it is an essential part
of all operations at all levels by all Soldiers. Again, without sustainment units cannot
accomplish their mission.
SURVIVABILITY
7-30. On the whole, sustainment assets are necessary yet finite resources that are easily
destroyed. Units without their classes of supply cannot fight. Accordingly, survivability of
sustainment assets is a high priority for everyone. This affects the platoon in two ways.
First, units may be required to conduct security missions for sustainment assets, such as
convoy security, base security, and response force activities. Second, units must ensure the
survivability of their own supplies and any asset that might be under their charge by
properly safeguarding them.
7-31. Sustainment for mounted platoons are additionally characterized by the following:
z Anticipation.
z Simplicity.
z Continuity.
z Improvisation.
7-34. The sustainment plan should provide answers to operational questions such as the
following:
z Types of support. Based on the nature of the operation and specific tactical factors,
what types of support will the platoon need?
z Quantities. In what quantities will this support be required?
Will emergency resupply (Class III and V) be required during the battle?
Does this operation require prestocked supplies?
z Threat. What are the composition, disposition, and capabilities of the expected
enemy threat? How will these affect sustainment plan during execution?
Where and when will the expected contact occur?
What are the platoon’s expected casualties and vehicle losses based on the nature
and location of expected contact?
What impact will the enemy’s special weapons capabilities (such as CBRN) have
on the battle and on expected sustainment requirements?
How many EPWs are expected, and where?
z Terrain and weather. How will terrain and weather affect sustainment plan during
the battle?
What ground will provide the best security for maintenance and CCPs?
What are the platoon’s vehicle and casualty evacuation routes?
What are the company’s dirty routes for evacuating contaminated personnel,
vehicles, and equipment?
z Time and location. When and where will the platoon need sustainment?
Based on the nature and location of expected contact, what are the best sites for
the CCP?
Where will the EPW collection points be located?
z Requirements. What are the support requirements, by element and type of support?
Which section has priority for emergency Class III resupply?
Which section or squad has priority for emergency Class V resupply?
z Risk. Will lulls in the battle permit support elements to conduct resupply operations
in relative safety?
z Resupply techniques. Based on information developed during the sustainment
planning process, which resupply technique should the platoon use?
7-36. Supplies are divided into 10 major categories, which are referred to as classes. They
are:
Class I – Food, rations and water.
Class II – Clothing.
Class III – Petroleum, oil, and lubricants.
Class IV– Fortification and barrier materiels.
Class V – Ammunition.
Class VI – Personal items.
Class VII – Major end items.
+ Class VIII – Medical materiel and supplies (including blood, blood products, and
repair parts for medical items).
Class IX – Repair parts.
Class X – Miscellaneous supplies.
7-37. Resupply operations fall into one of three classifications: routine, emergency, or
prestock. The platoon and company SOP specifies cues for each method. The platoon
should rehearse or conduct resupply operations every time they conduct field training. The
actual method selected for resupply in the field depends on METT-TC.
COMPANY TRAINS
7-38. The company trains provide sustainment for subordinate platoons of the Infantry
company during combat operations. Company trains usually include the first sergeant;
supply sergeant, armorer. Casualty evacuation team’s maybe collocated in the trains based
on the situation. Usually, the FSC provides a field maintenance team, with capabilities for
maintenance, recovery, and limited combat spares. The supply sergeant can collocate in
the combat trains, if it facilitates LOGPAC operations. The 1SG usually directs movement
and employment of the company trains; although the company commander may assign the
responsibility to the company XO. Generally, company trains are located between 500 and
1000 meters or a major terrain feature away from the company’s combat operations. By
placing at least one terrain feature between it and the enemy, company trains will be out
of the enemy’s direct fire weapons.
Note. METT-TC ultimately dictates the actual distance at which the company
trains operates.
ROUTINE RESUPPLY
7-39. Routine resupply operations cover items in Classes I, III, V, and IX as well as mail
and other items the Infantry platoon and squad requests. Whenever possible, the Infantry
company should conduct routine resupply daily, ideally during limited visibility. BFVs
and other large combat vehicles use large amounts of fuel, so the platoon must resupply
Class III at every opportunity.
Logistics Package
7-40. The LOGPAC technique is a simple, efficient way to accomplish routine resupply
operations. The key feature is a centrally organized resupply convoy originating at the unit
trains. It carries all items needed to sustain the Infantry platoon and squad for a specific
period, usually 24 hours or until the next scheduled LOGPAC. Infantry company and
Infantry battalion SOPs specify the exact composition and march order of the LOGPAC.
Preparation
7-41. The Infantry platoon must provide supply requests to the company in order to
receive supplies. Based on the requests, he then assembles the LOGPAC under the
supervision of the FSC or the headquarters company (HHC) or FSC commander. He
obtains the following:
Class I, Class III (bulk and packaged products), and Class V supplies from the
forward support company. This usually entails employment of one or two fuel
heavy expanded mobility tactical trucks (HEMTT) and one or two cargo HEMTT.
Class II, Class IV (basic load resupply only), Class VI, and Class VII supplies from
Infantry battalion S-4 personnel in the field trains.
Routine Class IX supplies and maintenance documents (as required) from the
prescribed load list section in the field trains.
Replacement personnel and Soldiers returning from a medical treatment facility.
Vehicles returning to the company area from maintenance.
Mail and personnel action documents (including awards and finance and legal
documents) from the battalion S-1 section.
7-42. When LOGPAC preparations are completed, the supply sergeant initiates tactical
movement to the LRP under the supervision of the FSC, support platoon leader. The supply
sergeant and LOGPAC linkup with the company element (company XO, 1SG or security
element from a platoon) at the LRP.
Resupply Procedures
7-44. The time required for resupply is an important planning factor. Units must conduct
resupply as quickly and efficiently as possible to ensure operational effectiveness, and to
allow the Infantry company LOGPAC to return to the LRP on time.
7-45. Once the unit completes resupply operations, the unit prepares the LOGPAC
vehicles for the return trip. The Infantry company vehicles requiring recovery for
maintenance or salvage are lined up and prepared for towing. Cargo trucks, fuel trucks, or
damaged vehicles transport those KIA and detainees ride in the cargo trucks, and are
guarded by capable friendly wounded or other capable company personnel. All supply
requests, human resources actions, and outgoing mail are consolidated for forwarding to
the field trains, where the appropriate staff section processes them for the next LOGPAC.
7-46. The company representative leads the LOGPAC back to the LRP, where he links
up with the FSC, support platoon leader. Whenever possible, the reunited task force
LOGPAC convoy returns to the field trains together. When METT-TC dictates or when
the LOGPAC arrives too late to rejoin the larger convoy, the Infantry company vehicles
must return to the field trains on their own. Because only minimal security assets are
available, this situation should be avoided.
Resupply Methods
7-47. As directed by the commander or executive officer, the first sergeant establishes the
Infantry company’s resupply point using the service station method or the tailgate method
or in-position method. He briefs each LOGPAC driver on which method or methods to
use. When the resupply point is ready, the first sergeant informs the commander, who in
turn directs each platoon or element to conduct resupply based on the tactical situation.
The platoon sergeant can resupply the squads the same way the first sergeant resupplies
the platoons.
Note. The platoon order should state the sequence for moving squads or Soldiers
out of position. Companies may vary the technique by establishing a resupply
point for each platoon or squad and moving the supplies to that point.
Tailgate Resupply
7-51. The first sergeant or platoon sergeant normally uses the tailgate method in the AA.
(See figure 7-2.) Individual Soldiers rotate through the feeding area. While there, they pick
up mail and sundries and refill or exchange water cans. They centralize and guard EPW.
They take Soldiers KIA and their personal effects to the holding area (normally a location
downwind and out of sight of the platoon/company), where the first sergeant assumes
responsibility of them.
7-52. Tailgate resupply usually requires significantly more time than do service station
operations. Usually, units use the tailgate method only when the tactical situation allows
or dictates. Combat vehicles remain in their vehicle positions or back out a short distance
to allow trucks carrying Class III and Class V supplies to reach them. Individual
crewmembers rotate through the feeding area, pick up mail and sundries, and fill or
exchange water cans. Detainees are centralized and guarded. Soldiers KIA and their
personal effects are brought to the holding area, where the first sergeant takes charge of
them.
In-Position Resupply
7-54. In-position resupply is used during operations when contact with the enemy is
imminent; the in-position resupply method (see figure 7-3) may be required to ensure
adequate supplies are available to the squads. This method requires the company to bring
forward supplies, equipment, or both to individual fighting positions. The platoon
normally provides a guide to ensure the supplies are distributed to the most critical position
first. This method:
z Is used when an immediate need exists.
z Is used to resupply single classes of supply.
z Enables leaders to keep squad members in their fighting positions.
Note. If resupply vehicles cannot move near platoon positions, platoon Soldiers
may need to help resupply personnel, move supplies and equipment forward.
EMERGENCY RESUPPLY
7-55. Occasionally (usually during combat operations), platoons have such an urgent need
for resupply it cannot wait for a routine LOGPAC. Emergency resupply may involve
Classes III, V, and VIII, as well as CBRN equipment and, on rare occasions, Class I. The
battalion usually uses the FSC’s supply and transportation platoon, and medical assets
located in the Infantry battalion combat trains to conduct emergency resupply of the
element.
7-56. Emergency resupply can be conducted using either the service station or tailgate
method although procedures may have to be adjusted when the platoon, squad and
companies are in contact with the enemy. In the service station method, individual vehicles
pull back during a lull in combat on order of the commander or platoon leader; they
conduct resupply and return to the fight. With tailgate resupply, the Infantry company
brings limited supplies forward to the closest concealed position behind each vehicle or
element.
PRE-POSITIONED SUPPLIES
7-57. In defensive operations, or other times as appropriate, the platoons will most likely
need prestocked supplies, also known as pre-positioned or “cached” resupply. Normally,
the platoon only pre-positions Class IV and V items, but they can pre-position Class III
supplies. However, they must refuel platoon vehicles before they move into fighting
positions, while first occupying the battle position, or while moving out of their fighting
position to refuel.
7-58. All levels must carefully plan and execute prestock operations. All leaders, down
to the squad leader level, must know the exact locations of prestock sites. They verify these
locations during reconnaissance or rehearsals. The platoon takes steps to ensure the
survivability of the prestock supplies. These measures include selecting covered and
concealed positions and digging in the prestock positions. The platoon leader must have a
removal and destruction plan to prevent the enemy from capturing prepositioned supplies.
7-59. During the offense, the company or platoon can preposition supplies on trucks well
forward on the battlefield. This works well if the company or platoon expects to use a large
volume of fire, with corresponding ammunition requirements. It allows the platoons to
quickly resupply during consolidation or during lulls.
AERIAL SUSTAINMENT
7-60. Aerial sustainment is an aviation mission consisting of moving personnel,
equipment, materiel, and supplies by utility, cargo, and fixed-wing assets for use in
operations. Overland resupply might not work due to terrain, distance, or the existing
enemy threat. The platoon must initiate a request for resupply and must push it through
company to battalion. The platoon must prepare to receive the supplies at the specified
time and location.
7-61. An aerial sustainment with speed balls is a technique with preconfigured loads to
resupply Infantry platoons and squads in urban areas. Sustainment personnel prepackage
supplies in aviation kit bags, duffle bags, or other suitable containers. Helicopters fly as
close to the drop point as possible, reduce speed, drop supplies, and leave the area quickly.
Supplies should be packaged in bubble wrap or other shock-absorbing material to
minimize damage.
7-62. When employing aerial delivery, the following should be considered:
z The use of aerial delivery requires the coordination of the Infantry battalion staff,
BCT S-3, S-4, and air defense airspace management/brigade aviation element
sections. Special focus must be placed on the enemy air defense capability.
z The FSC must be prepared to both receive and package bulk supplies by sling-load
operations or joint precision airdrop system. To conduct these operations, sling load
trained personnel are required in the FSC’s distribution platoon.
z Receiving unit must know how to select landing zone/drop zone to receive aerial
resupply. The delivered supplies immediately are transported away from the landing
zone/drop zone.
z Units should return the sling or air delivery equipment to its owning unit.
Planning
7-63. Planning for aerial resupply requires close coordination, with elements reviewing
the entire mission and resolving all limitations and problem areas. If a resupply item poses
a problem it cannot resolve, leaders should consider another mode of transport. Planning
factors include the following:
z Priorities of cargo/unit resupply.
z Integration of the resupply operation into the tactical plan.
z Selection, identification, and marking of the pickup zone or landing zone.
z Type/amount of cargo.
z Helicopter assets available.
z Requirements for slings, cargo nets, and cargo containers.
z Ground crew training requirements; such as those for ground guides and hookup
personnel.
z Pickup zone and landing zone security.
z Flight routes.
7-64. The selection of a usable pickup zone or landing zone is extremely important. The
platoon leader or company commander analyzes logistical and tactical considerations
taking into account pickup zone or landing zone positioning is at the right place to support
the ground unit. The area also must be accessible to the aircraft involved in the resupply
operation. The air mission commander, the pilot in command, an aviation liaison officer
(ALO), or a Pathfinder-qualified officer or NCO make the final decision on pickup zone
or landing zone selection and acceptance.
7-65. The Infantry platoon or squad receiving the supplies is responsible for preparing the
pickup zone or landing zone. In addition to the general pickup zone and landing zone
responsibilities, Soldiers in the platoon or company perform the following specific tasks
for aerial resupply:
z Recover and assemble equipment and supplies.
z Train available ground crews in guiding the aircraft during approach, landing,
unloading/loading, departure, and derigging the load.
z Train hookup personnel.
z Coordinate with the sending unit for control and return of the unit’s transport
equipment, such as slings and A-22 bags.
z Prepare, coordinate, and inspect backloads (such as slings and A-22 bags) and have
them ready for hookup or loading when the aircraft arrives.
MAINTENANCE
7-66. The maintenance of weapons and equipment is continuous. Every Soldier must
know how to maintain his weapon and equipment according to the related technical
manual. The platoon leader, platoon sergeant, and squad leaders must understand
maintenance for every piece of equipment in the platoon.
7-67. Maintenance includes inspecting, testing, servicing, repairing, requisitioning,
recovering, and evacuating vehicles and equipment. Maintenance at the platoon and squad
level comprises thorough preventive maintenance checks and services and accurate
reporting of maintenance problems to the company.
7-68. Maintenance and the early identification of problems prevent equipment down-time
and the reduction of combat effectiveness. The result of good PMCS is a properly
completed equipment inspection and maintenance forms. These forms (DA Form 2404 or
DA Form 5988-E) are the primary means through which the platoon and squads obtain
maintenance support or repair parts. The forms follow a pathway from crew level to the
brigade support area and back. Per unit SOP, the company executive officer or 1SG
supervises the flow of these critical maintenance documents and parts. The flow of
reporting and repairing equipment includes the following:
z The squad leaders or vehicle commanders collect the maintenance forms and send
them via Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below or give them to the
platoon sergeant, who consolidates the forms for the platoon.
z The platoon sergeant forwards an electronic version or gives a hard copy of the
forms to the executive officer or 1SG, who reviews and verifies problems and
deficiencies and requests parts needed for maintenance and repairs.
z The electronic versions of the forms are consolidated at company level and then
transmitted to the battalion and it’s supporting combat repair team.
z During the next LOGPAC operation, the completed hard copy forms are returned
to the combat repair team to document completion of the repair.
z In the brigade support area, required repair parts are packaged for delivery during
the next scheduled resupply or through emergency resupply means.
z If the repair or installation of the part requires higher skills and equipment than the
operator, a combat repair team is dispatched to assess the repair and to install the
part on site.
z The operator conducts initial maintenance, repair, and recovery actions on site.
Once it is determined that the crew cannot repair or recover the vehicle or
equipment, the platoon contacts the executive officer or 1SG. If additional
assistance is needed, the combat repair team assesses the damaged or broken
equipment and makes necessary repairs to return the piece of equipment to fully
mission-capable or mission-capable status, if appropriate.
7-69. The unit SOP should detail when maintenance is performed, to what standards, and
who inspects it. The squad leader is most often the one who inspects maintenance work,
with the platoon sergeant and platoon leader conducting spot-checks. Besides operator
maintenance, selected Soldiers are trained to perform limited maintenance on damaged
weapons and battle damage assessment and repair.
SCHEDULED SERVICES
7-71. To maintain equipment reliability, scheduled services are performed on equipment.
Equipment services are specified maintenance actions performed when required where
equipment, components, and systems are routinely checked, adjusted, lubed, and so on,
according to engineer specifications. Maintenance personnel use scheduled services to
replace faulty items and avoid projected component failures based on analysis and
engineering documentation.
LEVELS OF MAINTENANCE
7-72. The Army employs the field and sustainment levels of maintenance as described in
the following paragraphs.
Field Maintenance
7-73. Field maintenance is on-system maintenance, and mainly involves preventive
maintenance and replacement of defective parts. The goal of field maintenance is to repair
and return equipment to the Soldier. It covers tasks previously assigned to operator/crew,
organization/unit, and direct support maintenance levels. It includes some off-system
maintenance critical to mission readiness.
7-74. Platoon leaders ensure vehicles (if equipped) crews and equipment operators
perform PMCS. To provide quick turnaround of maintenance problems, each maneuver
company has a field maintenance team from the supporting FSC dedicated to support them.
These field maintenance teams have forward repair systems and mechanics trained in the
company’s and platoon’s equipment.
Sustainment Maintenance
7-75. Sustainment maintenance consists of repairing components off the user’s platform.
To maximize unit combat readiness, maintenance personnel must repair and return the
equipment to the user as quickly as possible. (See appendix E of this publication for more
information.)
Vehicle Recovery
7-76. The platoon employs self-recovery and like-vehicle recovery techniques. If the unit
is unable to perform the recovery mission, it reports the need for recovery to the company.
HUMAN RESOURCES
7-77. Human resources supports all functions affecting the Soldier’s status, readiness, and
welfare. It includes casualty operations, which comprises production, dissemination,
coordination, validation and synchronization of information regarding each casualty.
Human resources teams are responsible for casualty reporting, casualty notification,
casualty assistance, line-of-duty determination, disposition of remains, and disposition of
personal effects, military burial honors, and casualty mail coordination.
+ CASUALTY OPERATIONS
7-78. Casualty operations include production, dissemination, coordination, validation
and synchronization of information regarding each casualty. This information includes
casualty reporting, casualty notification, casualty assistance, line-of-duty determination,
disposition of remains, and disposition of personal effects, military burial honors, and
casualty mail coordination.
7-79. Unit SOPs and OPORDs must address + first aid procedures and casualty
evacuation in detail + to include aid for chemical casualties with particular emphasis on
lifesaving tasks. They should cover the duties and responsibilities of essential personnel,
the evacuation of CBRN contaminated casualties (on routes separate from
noncontaminated casualties), and priority for manning essential weapons and positions.
They should specify preferred and alternate methods of evacuation and make provisions
for retrieving and safeguarding the weapons, ammunition, and equipment of casualties.
Slightly wounded personnel are treated + at the appropriate role of care and returned to
duty + as soon as possible. Platoon medics evaluate sick Soldiers and either treat or
evacuate them as necessary. Medical and casualty evacuations should be rehearsed like
other critical part of an operation.
7-80. + Specific procedures should be followed +when providing aid, evacuation, and
reporting of combat casualties.
+ CASUALTY CARE
7-81. When combat begins and casualties occur, the platoon first must provide + aid to
those WIA. + Casualty care is provided by combat medics who are assisted by nonmedical
personnel performing first aid procedures to alleviate potential life-threatening situations
and ensure maximum survivability on the battlefield. + This support is most commonly
provided by enlisted personnel and includes first aid (self-aid/buddy aid), enhanced first
aid (by the CLS), and EMT (platoon medic). Casualties are cared for at the point of injury
or under nearby cover and concealment.
7-82. The tactical situation will determine how quickly fellow Soldiers can + provide aid
for wounded Soldiers. Understandably, fewer casualties occur if Soldiers focus on
destroying or neutralizing the enemy causing the casualties. This is a critical situation
discussed and rehearsed by the squads and platoons prior to executing a mission.
7-83. During the fight, casualties should remain under cover. As soon as the situation
allows, squad leaders arrange for casualty evacuation to the platoon CCP. The platoon
normally sets up the CCP in a covered and concealed location to the rear of the platoon
position. At the CCP, the platoon medic conducts triage on all casualties, takes steps to
stabilize their conditions, and starts the process of moving them to the rear for advanced
treatment.
7-84. Before the platoon evacuates casualties to the CCP or beyond, leaders should
remove all essential operational items and equipment from each person. Removal should
include an automated network control device, GPS maps, position-locating devices, and
laser pointers. Every unit should establish an SOP for handling the weapons and
ammunition of its WIA.
MOVEMENT
7-85. Timely movement of casualties from the battlefield is important not only for safety
and care for the wounded, but also for troop morale. Squad leaders are responsible for
casualty evacuation from the battlefield to the platoon CCP. At the CCP, the senior medic
assists the platoon sergeant and first sergeant in arranging evacuation by ground or air
ambulance or by nonstandard means. Leaders must minimize the number of Soldiers
required to evacuate casualties.
7-86. Casualties with minor wounds can walk or even assist with carrying the more
seriously wounded. Soldiers can make field-expedient litters by cutting small trees and
putting the poles through the sleeves of zippered Army combat uniform blouses or
ponchos. A travois, or skid, may be used for casualty evacuation. This is a type of litter on
which wounded can be strapped; it can be pulled by one person. It can be fabricated locally
from durable, plastic rolls on which tie-down straps are fastened. In rough terrain (or on
patrols), casualties may be evacuated all the way to the BAS by litter teams. From there
they can be carried with the unit until transportation can reach them, or left at a position
and picked up later.
7-87. From the platoon area, casualties normally are evacuated to the company CCP and
back to the BAS. The company first sergeant, with the assistance of the platoon sergeant,
normally is responsible for movement of the casualties from the platoon CCP to the
company CCP. The unit SOP should address this activity, including the marking of
casualties during limited visibility operations. Small, standard, or infrared chemical lights
work well for this purpose. Once the casualties are collected, evaluated, and treated, they
are sent to company CCP. Once they arrive, the above process is repeated while awaiting
their evacuation back to the BAS.
7-88. When the company is widely dispersed, the casualties may be evacuated directly
from the platoon CCP by vehicle or helicopter. Helicopter evacuation may be restricted
due to the enemy air defense artillery or small arms/rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) threat.
In some cases, casualties must be moved to the company CCP or battalion combat trains
before helicopter evacuation. When there are not enough battalion organic ambulances to
move the wounded, unit leaders may direct supply vehicles to “backhaul” casualties to the
BAS after supplies are delivered. Normally, urgent casualties will move by ambulance.
Less seriously hurt Soldiers are moved by other means. If no ambulance is available, the
most critical casualties must get to the BAS as quickly as possible. In some cases, the
platoon sergeant may direct platoon litter teams to carry casualties to the rear.
7-89. The senior military person present determines whether to request medical or
casualty evacuations and assigns precedence. These decisions are based on the advice of
the senior medical person at the scene, the patient’s condition, and tactical situation.
Casualties will be picked up as soon as possible, consistent with available resources and
pending missions. Following are priority categories of precedence and criteria used in their
assignment:
Priority I-Urgent—assigned to emergency cases being evacuated as soon as
possible and within a maximum of one hour in order to save life, limb, or eyesight;
to prevent complications of serious illness; or to avoid permanent disability.
Priority IA-Urgent-Surgical—assigned to patients who must receive far forward
surgical intervention to save their lives and stabilize them for further evacuation.
Priority II-Priority—assigned to sick and wounded personnel requiring prompt
medical care. The precedence is used when special treatment is not available
locally; the individual will suffer unnecessary pain or disability (becoming
URGENT precedence) if not evacuated within four hours.
Priority III-Routine—assigned to sick and wounded personnel requiring evacuation
but whose condition is not expected to deteriorate significantly. The sick and
wounded in this category should be evacuated within 24 hours.
Priority IV-Convenience—assigned to patients for whom evacuation by medical
vehicle is a matter of medical convenience rather than necessity.
MEDICAL EVACUATION
7-90. Medical evacuation is the term used to refer to movement of casualties by air or
ground utilizing medical vehicles or aircraft. Medical evacuation operations normally
involve the initial movement of wounded or injured Soldiers to the nearest medical
treatment facility. Medical evacuation includes the provision of en route medical care,
whereas casualty evacuations might not provide medical care during movement. (Refer to
ATP 4-02.5 and ATP 4-02.2 for more information.) (See table 7-2a, page 7-24, and table
7-2b, page 7-25 on the 9-line request for medical evacuation procedures.
7-91. When possible, medical platoon ambulances provide evacuation and en route care
from the Soldier’s point of injury or the platoon’s or company’s CCP to the BAS. The
ambulance team supporting the company works in coordination with the senior + combat
medic supporting the platoons. In mass casualty situations, nonmedical vehicles may be
used to assist in casualty evacuation as directed by the Infantry company commander or
leader. However, plans for use of nonmedical vehicles to perform casualty evacuations
should be included in the unit SOP.
CASUALTY EVACUATION
7-92. Casualty evacuation is a term used to refer to the movement of casualties aboard
nonmedical vehicles or aircraft.
WARNING
Casualties transported in this manner may not
receive proper en route medical care or be
transported to the appropriate medical treatment
facility to address the patient’s medical
condition. If the casualty’s medical condition
deteriorates during transport, or the casualty is
not transported to the appropriate medical
treatment facility, an adverse impact on his
prognosis and long-term disability or death may
result.
7-93. If dedicated medical evacuation platforms (ground and air) are available, casualties
should be evacuated on these conveyances to ensure they receive proper en route medical
care.
7-94. Since casualty evacuation operations can reduce combat power and degrade the
efficiency of the Army health system (AHS), units should only use casualty evacuation to
move Soldiers with less severe injuries when medical evacuation assets are overwhelmed.
Planners should ensure casualty evacuations operations are addressed in the operation plan
(OPLAN)/OPORD as a separate operation, as these operations require preplanning,
coordination, synchronization, and rehearsals. The casualty evacuation plan should ensure
casualties with severe or life threatening injuries are prioritized for evacuation and are
evacuated on dedicated medical evacuation platforms.
7-95. When possible, nonmedical vehicles/aircraft transporting casualties should be
augmented with a + combat medic or CLS. (On nonmedical aircraft, sufficient space may
not be available to permit a caregiver to accompany the casualties.) + (Refer to ATP 4-
25.13 for more information.) The type of en route monitoring and medical care/first aid
provided is limited by the following factors:
Skill level of the individual providing care. (The combat medic is military
occupational specialty [MOS]-qualified [MOS 68W] to provide EMT; the CLS is
trained to provide enhanced first aid). The combat medic can provide emergency
medical intervention, whereas the CLS only can monitor the casualty and ensure
the basic lifesaving first-aid tasks are accomplished.
Medical equipment available.
Number of casualties being transported.
Accessibility of casualties—if nonstandard evacuation vehicle is loaded with the
maximum number of casualties, the combat medic or CLS may not be able to attend
to the casualties while the vehicle is moving. If the condition of a casualty
deteriorates and emergency measures are required, the vehicle will have to be
stopped to permit care to be given.
UNIT REPORTING
7-96. As casualties occur, the nearest observer informs the platoon sergeant who then
informs the first sergeant via the most expedient method available; for example, free text
within Mission Command Systems, radio voice. The first sergeant submits a personnel
status report to the Infantry battalion S-1 section. This report documents duty status
changes on all casualties. Casualties are taken to CCP for classification of injury type
(routine, urgent, return to duty), evacuation, and integration into the medical treatment
system.
7-97. A casualty report is filled out when a casualty occurs, or as soon as the tactical
situation permits. This usually is done by the Soldier’s squad leader and turned in to the
platoon sergeant, who forwards it to the first sergeant. A brief description of how the
casualty occurred (including the place, time, and activity being performed) and who or
what inflicted the wound is included. If the squad leader does not have personal knowledge
of how the casualty occurred, he gets this information from Soldiers who have the
knowledge.
7-98. DA Form 1156, Casualty Feeder Card (see figure 7-4a and figure 7-4b), are used
to report those Soldiers who have been killed and recovered, and those who have been
wounded. This form also is used to report KIA Soldiers who are missing, captured, or not
recovered. The Soldier with the most knowledge of the incident should complete the
witness statement. This information is used to inform the Soldier’s next of kin and to
provide a statistical base for analysis of friendly or enemy tactics. Once the casualty’s
medical condition has stabilized, the company commander may write a letter to the
Soldier’s next of kin. During lulls in the battle, the platoon forwards casualty information
to the company headquarters. The first sergeant ensures a completed DA Form 1156 is
forwarded to the Infantry battalion S-1, who then enters the data into the defense casualty
information processing system.
KILLED IN ACTION
7-99. The platoon leader designates a location of the collection of KIAs. All personal
effects remain with the body. However, squad leaders remove and safeguard equipment
and issue items. They keep these until they can turn the equipment and issue items over to
the platoon sergeant. The platoon sergeant turns over the KIA to the first sergeant. As a
rule, the platoon should not transport KIA remains on the same vehicle as wounded
Soldiers. KIAs normally are transported to the rear on empty resupply trucks, but this
depends on unit SOP.
7-100. Commanders and first sergeants must establish procedures to ensure the Soldier’s
next of kin are notified properly and according to procedure. The potential for unofficial
communications exist with KIA and casualty operations. The use of cell phones and
computers in proximity to the area of operation enables many Soldiers to contact their
home station regarding the casualty. Such communication is unofficial and unacceptable.
The next of kin for Soldiers WIA or KIA should not receive notification through unofficial
means. There usually is a communication blackout until the next of kin is notified. No
internet or phone calls home are permitted.
MEDICAL/PERSONNEL ACCOUNTING
7-101. When a Soldier becomes a casualty, the platoon combat medic or senior combat
medic records the medical treatment the Soldier receives on the Soldier’s DD Form 1380.
The BAS and brigade support medical company read the Soldier’s DD Form 1380 when
they treat the Soldier. The Infantry battalion S-1 should electronically receive a
notification message to update the Soldier’s patient tracking status. In turn, this message
should be forwarded to the company. In this manner, a casualty’s location can be
determined and Soldiers properly accounted for by the company.
Planning
Troop leading procedures provide small unit leaders a framework
for planning and preparing for operations. Smaller units, company
and below lack formal staffs and use TLP to plan and prepare for
operations. This places the responsibility for planning primarily on
the small-unit leader.
SECTION I – PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
A-1. Planning is the process by which the small-unit leader translates his visualization
into a specific COA for preparation and execution, focusing on the expected results.
Planning to determine the relationship among METT-TC begins with the analysis and
assessment of the conditions in the operational environment, with particular emphasis on
the enemy. It involves understanding and framing the problem and envisioning the set of
conditions representing the desired end state. Based on the higher commander’s guidance,
the platoon leader’s planning includes formulating one or more suitable COA to
accomplish the mission. Planning continues as necessary during preparation and
execution. The platoon leader relies on intuitive decisionmaking and direct contact with
subordinate leaders to integrate activities when circumstances are not suited for TLP.
A-2. Preparation consists of activities performed by units to improve their ability to
execute an operation. Preparation includes, but is not limited to, plan refinement;
rehearsals; information collection; coordination; inspections; and movement.
A-3. Execution is putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the
mission and using situational understanding to assess progress and make execution and
adjustment decision.
A-4. Assessment refers to the continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current
situation, particularly the enemy, and progress of an operation. Assessment precedes and
guides every operations process activity and concludes each operation or phase of an
operation. It involves a comparison of forecasted outcomes to actual events. Assessment
entails three tasks:
z Continuously assessing the enemy’s reactions and vulnerabilities.
z Continuously monitoring the situation and progress of the operation towards the
leader’s desired end state.
z Evaluating the operation against measures of effectiveness and measures of
performance.
A-5. Leaders use TLP when working alone or with a small group to solve tactical
problems. For example, a platoon leader may use the platoon sergeant, squad leaders, and
the forward observer to assist during TLP. The type, amount, and timeliness of information
passed from higher to lower directly impact the lower unit leader’s TLP. (Refer to FM 6-0
for more information.)
A-6. Parallel planning occurs when two or more echelons plan the same operation at
about the same time. Parallel planning is easiest when the higher unit continuously shares
information on future operations with subordinate units. Rather than waiting until
company commander finishes planning, the platoon leader starts to develop his unit’s
missions as information is received, and fleshes out his missions as more information
becomes available.
A-7. The platoon leader starts by identifying his unit’s missions, stating his intent, and
ensuring his intent reflects the operational concepts of his higher and second higher
command. He chooses the tasks most likely to be assigned to his unit, and develops mission
statements based on the information received. At all levels, developing and describing the
vision of leaders requires time, explanation, and ongoing clarification. All leaders
understand that their next higher commander's concept of the operation continues to
mature, and continue parallel planning as it does so, up until execution. Figure A-1
illustrates the parallel sequences of the MDMP of a battalion, TLP of a company with the
TLP of its platoons.
A-8. Normally, the first three steps (receive the mission, issue a WARNORD, and make
a tentative plan) of TLP occur in order. However, the sequence of subsequent steps is based
on the situation. The tasks involved in some steps example, initiate movement and conduct
reconnaissance may occur several times. The last step, supervise and refine, occurs
throughout.
A-9. A tension exists between executing current operations and planning for future
operations. The small unit leader must balance both. If engaged in a current operation,
there is less time for TLP. If in a lull, transition, or an AA, leaders have more time to use
TLP thoroughly. In some situations, time constraints or other factors may prevent leaders
from performing each step of TLP as thoroughly as they would like. For example during
the step, make a tentative plan; small-unit leaders often develop only one acceptable COA
vice multiple COA. If time permits, leaders may develop, compare, and analyze several
COA before arriving at a decision on which one to execute.
A-10. The platoon leader begins TLP when he receives the initial WARNORD or receives
a new mission. As each subsequent order arrives, he modifies his assessments, updates
tentative plans, and continues to supervise and assess preparations. In some situations the
platoon leader may not receive or issue the full sequence of WARNORDs; security
considerations or tempo may make it impractical. Leaders carefully consider decisions to
eliminate WARNORDs. Subordinates always need to have enough information to plan
and prepare for their mission. In other cases, TLP are started before receiving a
WARNORD based on existing plans and orders (contingency plans or be-prepared
missions) and on subordinate leader’s understanding of the situation.
A-11. Parallel planning hinges on distributing information as it is received or developed.
Subordinate leaders cannot complete their plans until they receive their unit mission. If
each successive WARNORD contains enough information, the higher command’s final
order will confirm what subordinate leaders have already analyzed and put into their
tentative plans. In other cases, the higher command’s order may change or modify the
subordinates’ tasks enough additional planning and reconnaissance are required.
SECTION II – STEPS OF TROOP LEADING PROCEDURES
A-12. TLP provide small-unit leaders a framework for planning and preparing for
operations. TLP begin when the platoon leader receives the first indication of an upcoming
mission and continues throughout the operational process (plan, prepare, execute, and
assess). The TLP comprise a sequence of actions helping the leader use available time
effectively and efficiently to issue orders and execute operations.
A-13. TLP are not a hard and fast set of rules. Some actions may be performed
simultaneously or in an order different than shown in figure A-2 (page A-4). They are a
guide being applied consistent with the situation and experience of the platoon leader and
his subordinate leaders. The tasks involved in some actions (such as initiate movement,
issue the WARNORD, and conduct reconnaissance) may recur several times during the
process.
A-14. The last action (activities associated with supervising and refining the plan) occurs
continuously throughout TLP and execution of the operation. The following information
concerning TLP assumes the small unit leader will plan in a time-constrained environment.
All steps should be done, even if in abbreviated fashion. As such, the suggested techniques
are oriented to help a leader quickly develop and issue a combat order. (Refer to FM 6-0
for more information.)
issues the third WARNORDs or the OPORDs themselves. However, in the course of
parallel planning, small-unit leaders already will have deduced their tentative missions.
A-16. Leaders can receive their missions in several ways. They can get them in the form
of WARNORDs or, if higher chooses to wait for more information, an actual OPORD.
Sometimes higher chooses not to send WARNORDs, opting instead to wait and send a full
OPORD. Worst case, leaders receive new missions due to situational changes occurring
during the execution of a prior mission. In addition to receiving (or deducing) their
missions during this step, the leaders must also—
z Assess the time available to prepare for and execute the mission.
z Prepare an initial timeline for planning and executing the mission.
z Conduct an initial planning-time analysis.
z Determine the total amount of time to plan and prepare.
z As planning continues, use the initial planning-time analysis to conduct a detailed
time analysis.
z Analyze the time his unit has available.
z Prepare an initial timeline.
A-17. The most important element of the leader's WARNORD is the initial timeline for
planning. They also may convey other instructions or information they think will help their
subordinates prepare for the upcoming mission.
WARNING ORDER
A-20. The WARNORD follows the five-paragraph OPORD format and includes the
following items, at a minimum:
z Type of operation.
z General location of operation.
z Initial operational timeline.
z Reconnaissance to initiate.
z Movement to initiate.
z Planning and preparation instructions (to include planning timeline).
z Information requirements.
z Commander’s critical information requirements.
MISSION ANALYSIS
A-22. The platoon leader begins mission analysis when receiving the mission. During
mission analysis, the platoon leader—
z Restates the mission.
z Conducts an initial risk assessment.
z Identifies a tentative decisive point.
z Defines his own intent.
A-23. He conducts mission analysis to help him start developing his vision, and to confirm
what he must do to accomplish his mission. At the lower levels, leaders conduct their
mission analyses by evaluating METT-TC. He makes significant deductions about the
terrain, enemy, and own forces affecting operations. These significant deductions drive the
planning process and execution of operations. A leader must convey to his subordinates
the importance of these deductions, and effect they will have on the units operations. In
the end, the usefulness of mission analysis lies in recognizing and capitalizing on
opportunities. The answers to the following questions become inputs into developing a
COA. Mission analysis has no time standard. A leader may take as much time as needed,
while still adhering to the one-third/two-thirds rule. Mission analysis answers the four
questions of the leader's visualization:
z What is my mission?
z What is the current situation?
z How do we accomplish the mission?
z What are the risks?
METT-TC
A-24. Analyzing METT-TC is a continuous process. Leaders constantly receive
information, from the time they begin planning through execution. During execution, their
continuous analyses enable them to issue well-developed FRAGORDs. They must assess
if the new information affects their missions and plans. If so, then they must decide how
to adjust their plans to meet these new situations. They need not analyze METT-TC in a
particular order. How and when they do so depends on when they receive information as
well as on their experience and preferences. One technique is to parallel the TLP based on
the products received from higher. Using this technique, they would, but need not, analyze
mission first; followed by terrain and weather; enemy; troops and support available; time
available; and finally civil considerations.
Analysis of Mission
A-25. A mission is task and purpose clearly indicating the action to be taken and reason
for the action. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military units, a mission
is a duty or task assigned to an individual or unit. The mission is always the first factor
leaders consider and most basic question: What have I been told to do, and why?
A-26. Leaders at every echelon must understand the mission, intent, and operational
concept one and two levels higher. This understanding makes it possible to exercise
disciplined initiative. Leaders capture their understanding of what their units are to
accomplish in their revised mission statements. They take five steps to fully analyze their
assigned mission as directed from —
z Higher headquarters’ (two levels up) mission, intent, and concept.
z Immediate higher headquarters’ (one level up) mission, intent, and concept.
z Unit’s purpose.
z Constraints.
z Specified, implied, and essential tasks.
z Restated mission.
Immediate Higher Headquarters’ (One Level Up) Mission, Intent, and Concept
A-28. Leaders understand their immediate headquarters’ concept of the operation. They
identify their headquarters’ tasks and purposes as well as their own contributions to this
fight. They must clearly understand their immediate higher up intent from the OPORD.
Also, they identify the tasks, purposes, and dispositions for all adjacent maneuver elements
under headquarters’ control.
Unit’s Purpose
A-29. Leaders find their units' purposes in the concepts of the operation in the immediate
higher headquarters’ OPORDs. The operation’s purpose usually matches or achieves the
purpose of the immediate higher headquarters. Similarly, shaping operation purposes must
relate directly to those of the decisive operation. Sustaining operation purposes relate
directly to those of the decisive and shaping operations. Leaders must understand how their
units' purposes relate to higher. They must understand why their leaders one level up
assigned their unit’s particular purposes. Then, they determine how those fit into their
superior’s concepts of the operation.
Constraints
A-30. Constraints either prohibit or require an action. Leaders identify all constraints the
OPORD places on their units' ability to execute their missions. The two types of constraints
are proscriptive (required; mandates action) and prohibitive (not allowed; limits action).
Tasks
A-31. Leaders must identify and understand tasks required to accomplish a given mission.
The three types of tasks are specified, implied, and essential.
A-32. Specified Tasks. Specified tasks are specifically assigned to a unit by a higher
headquarters and are found throughout the OPORD. Specified tasks also may be found in
annexes and overlays; for example—"Seize OBJ FOX.;" "Reconnoiter route BLUE;"
"Assist the forward passage of 1st platoon, B Company." "Send two Soldiers to assist in
the loading of ammunition."
A-33. Implied Tasks. Implied tasks are those being performed to accomplish a specified
task, but that are not stated in a higher headquarters’ order. Implied tasks derive from a
detailed analysis of higher up orders, from the enemy situation and COA, from the terrain,
and from knowledge of doctrine and history. Analyzing the unit's current location in
relation to future area of operation as well as the doctrinal requirements for each specified
task might reveal the implied tasks. Only those requiring resources should be used. For
example, if the specified task is "Seize Objective Fox," and new intelligence has OBJ FOX
surrounded by reinforcing obstacles, this intelligence would drive the implied task of
"Breach reinforcing obstacles vicinity Objective Fox."
A-34. Essential Task. The essential task is the mission taskʊit accomplishes the assigned
purpose. It, along with the platoon’s purpose, is usually assigned by the higher
headquarters’ OPORD in concept of the operation or Tasks to Maneuver Units. For
decisive operations, since the purposes are the same (nested concept) the essential task
also accomplishes the higher headquarters’ purpose. For shaping operations, it
accomplishes the assigned purpose, which shapes the decisive operation. For sustaining
operations, it accomplishes the assigned purpose, which enables both the shaping and
decisive operation (again, nested concept).
Restated Mission
A-35. Leaders conclude their mission analyses by restating their missions. To do this, they
answer the five Ws:
z Who (the unit).
z What (the unit's essential task and type of operation).
z When (this is the time given in the company OPORD).
z Where (the objective or location stated in company OPORD), and.
z Why (the units purpose, taken from the companies concept of the operation).
observations of the terrain such as "This is high ground," or "This is a stream." They must
determine how the terrain and weather will affect the enemy and their units. Additionally,
they apply these conclusions when they develop COA for both enemy forces and their
units. At company level and below, leaders develop a graphic terrain analysis overlay. This
product is similar to the MCOO in it shows the critical military aspects of terrain. Not only
does it facilitate planning, but it also aids in briefing subordinates.
Visual Aids
A-40. Leaders prepare a graphic depiction of terrain to help explain their findings about
the effects of terrain and weather on the mission. The graphic depiction of terrain can be a
photograph, overlay for a map sheet, or a terrain model. In it, leaders show terrain mobility
classifications, key terrain, intervisibility lines, known obstacles, avenues of approach, and
mobility corridors.
OAKOC
A-41. Military aspects of terrain OAKOC are used to analyze the ground. The sequence
can vary. The leader determines the effects of each aspect of terrain on both friendly and
enemy forces. These effects translate directly into conclusions applying to friendly or
enemy COA. Even if time is tight, the leader should allocate as much time as possible to
factor, starting at the objective area, and analyzing other aspects of key terrain. Terrain and
weather are the most important aspects. Conclusions include at least the following:
z Template of enemy forces and essential weapon systems.
z Positioning of own assets.
z Understanding of time and space relationships of events, leading to thorough
contingency plans.
Obstacles
A-42. Leaders identify existing (inherent to terrain and either natural or man-made) and
reinforcing (tactical or protective) obstacles limiting mobility in his area of operation.
Reinforcing obstacles are constructed, emplaced, or detonated by military force:
z Existing obstacles, natural include rivers; forests; mountains; ravines; gaps and
ditches more than three meters wide; tree stumps and large rocks more than 18
inches high; forests with trees eight inches or more in diameter, with less than four
meters between trees.
z Existing obstacles, man-made include towns; canals; railroad embankments;
buildings; power lines; telephone lines.
z Reinforcing obstacles, tactical—tactical (reinforcing) obstacles inhibit the ability of
the opposing force to move, mass, and reinforce. Examples include mine fields
(conventional and situational); antitank ditches; wire obstacles.
z Reinforcing obstacles, protective (reinforcing) obstacles offer close-in protection
and are important to survivability.
z Offensive considerations when analyzing obstacles and restricted terrain:
How is the enemy using obstacles and restricted terrain features?
What is the composition of the enemy's reinforcing obstacles?
How will obstacles and terrain affect the movement or maneuver of the unit?
If necessary, how can I avoid such features?
How do I detect and, if desired, bypass the obstacles?
Where has the enemy positioned weapons to cover the obstacles, and what type
of weapons is he using?
If I must support a breach, where is the expected breach site and where will the
enemy be overwatching the obstacle?
How will the terrain affect the employment of mortars, medium machine guns,
and Javelin missiles?
z Defensive considerations when analyzing obstacles and restricted terrain:
Where does the enemy want to go? Where can I kill him? How do I get him to go
there?
How will existing obstacles and restricted terrain affect the enemy?
How can I use these features to force the enemy into its engagement area, deny
him an avenue, or disrupt his movement?
How will the terrain affect the employment of mortars, medium machine guns,
and Javelin missiles?
z Categories of terrain, unrestricted—terrain free of restrictions to movement, so no
actions are needed to enhance mobility. For armored forces, unrestricted terrain
typically is flat or moderately sloped, with scattered or widely spaced obstacles such
as trees or rocks. This terrain generally allows wide maneuver and offers unlimited
travel over well-developed road networks. It allows the platoon and squads to move
with little hindrance.
z Categories of terrain, restricted—terrain hindering movement somewhat. Little
effort is needed to enhance mobility, but units might have to zigzag or make
frequent detours. They could have a hard time maintaining optimum speed, moving
in some types of combat formations, or transitioning from one formation to another.
For armored forces, restricted terrain typically means moderate to steep slopes or
moderate to dense spacing of obstacles such as trees, rocks, or buildings. Swamps
and rugged ground are two examples of restricted terrain for Infantry forces. Poorly
developed road systems may hamper logistical or rear area movement.
z Categories of terrain, severely restricted—terrain which severely hinders or slows
movement in combat formations unless some effort is made to enhance mobility.
Engineer forces might be needed to improve mobility or platoon and squads might
have to deviate from doctrinal tactics. For example, they might have to move in
columns rather than in lines. Or, they might have to move much more slowly than
they would like. For armored forces, steep slopes, densely spaced obstacles, and
absence of a developed road system characterize severely restricted terrain.
Avenues of Approach
A-43. An avenue of approach is an air or ground route of an attacking force leading to an
objective or key terrain. Avenues of approach are classified by type (mounted, dismounted,
air, or subterranean), formation, and speed of the largest unit traveling on it.
A-44. The leader groups mutually supporting mobility corridors to form an avenue of
approach. If he has no mutually supporting mobility corridors, then a single mobility
corridor might become an avenue of approach. Avenues of approach are classified the
same as mobility corridors. After identifying these avenues, the leader evaluates each and
determines its importance.
A-45. Offensive considerations the leader can include in his evaluation of avenues of
approach:
z How can I use each avenue of approach to support my movement and maneuver?
z How will each avenue support movement techniques, formations and, once we
make enemy contact, maneuver?
z Will variations in trafficability force changes in formations or movement
techniques, or require clearance of restricted terrain?
z What are the advantages and disadvantages of each avenue?
z What are the enemy's likely counterattack routes?
z What lateral routes could we use to shift to other axes, and which could the enemy
use to threaten our flanks?
z How will each avenue of approach affect the rate of movement of each type force?
A-46. Defensive considerations the leader can include in his evaluation of avenues of
approach:
z What are all likely enemy avenues into my area of operations?
Key Terrain
A-47. Key terrain is locations or areas whose seizure, retention, or control gives a marked
advantage to either combatant. It is a conclusion, usually arrived at after enemy analysis
and COA development, rather than an observation.
A-48. A prominent hilltop overlooking an avenue of approach might or might not be key
terrain. Even if it offers clear observation and fields of fire, it offers nothing if the enemy
can easily bypass it, or if the selected course of action involves maneuver on a different
avenue of approach. However, if it offers cover and concealment, observation, and good
fields of fire on multiple avenues of approach, or on the only avenue of approach, then it
offers a definite advantage to whoever controls it.
A-49. The leader must assess what terrain is essential to mission accomplishment. Another
example of essential terrain for a platoon and squad in the attack is high ground
overlooking the enemy's reverse-slope defense. Controlling this area could prove critical
in establishing a support-by-fire position to protect a breach force.
A-50. Decisive terrain. Leaders also must determine if terrain is decisive. This is key
terrain which seizure, retention, or control is necessary for mission accomplishment. Some
situations have no decisive terrain. If a leader identifies terrain as decisive, this means he
recognizes seizing or retaining it is necessary to accomplish the mission.
A-51. Tactical considerations in analyzing key terrain. Terrain is important for friendly
observation, both for commanding and controlling and for calling for fire? What terrain is
important to the enemy and why? Is it important to me? What terrain has higher
headquarters named as key? Is this terrain also important to the enemy? Is the enemy
controlling this key terrain? How do I gain or maintain control of key terrain? What terrain
is essential for communications nodes dictating the employment of digital communications
equipment?
employment or trajectory of the Javelin, or 60-mm mortars. It can do this by masking the
target or by reducing overhead clearance. When possible, the observer conducts a ground
reconnaissance from both enemy and friendly perspectives. He might do it personally, by
map, or with his subordinate units, or he can use the assets and information provided by
the battalion reconnaissance platoon. This reconnaissance helps him to see the ground
objectively and to see how it will affect both forces.
A-54. Offensive considerations in analyzing observation and fields of fire include:
z Are clear observation and fields of fire available on or near the objective for enemy
observers and weapon systems?
z Where can the enemy concentrate fires?
z Where will the enemy be unable to concentrate fires?
z Where is the enemy vulnerable?
z Where can I support the movement of a friendly force with mortar, medium machine
gun, or Javelin?
z Where can friendly forces conduct support by fire or assault by fire?
z Where are the natural target registration points?
z Where do I position indirect fire observers?
Visibility
A-59. The leader identifies critical conclusions about visibility factors such as light data,
fog, and smog; and about battlefield obscurants such as smoke and dust. He considers light
data and identifies critical conclusions about BMNT, sunrise, sunset, EENT, moonrise,
moonset, and percentage of illumination. Some additional visibility considerations
include:
z Will the sun rise behind my attack or in my eyes? Will I attack toward the sunrise?
z How can I take advantage of the limited illumination?
z How will this affect friendly and enemy target acquisition?
z Will the current weather favor the use of smoke to obscure during breaching?
z When are night vision devices effective?
Winds
A-60. Winds of sufficient speed can reduce the combat effectiveness of a force downwind
as the result of blowing dust, obscurants, sand, or precipitation. The upwind force usually
has better visibility. CBRN operations usually favor the upwind force. Windblown sand,
dust, rain, or snow can reduce the effectiveness of radar and other communication systems.
Strong winds also can hamper the efficiency of directional antenna systems by inducing
antenna wobble. Strong winds and wind turbulence limit airborne, air assault, and aviation
operations.
A-61. Evaluation of weather in support of these operations requires information on the
wind at the surface as well as at varying altitudes. Near the ground, high winds increase
turbulence and may inhibit maneuver. At greater altitudes, it can increase or reduce fuel
consumption. Wind always is described as "from…to" as in "winds are from the east
moving to the west." The leader must answer these questions:
z Will wind speed cause obscurants to dissipate quickly?
z Will wind speed and direction favor enemy use of obscurants?
z Will wind speed and direction affect the employment of available mortars?
z What is the potential for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
contamination?
Precipitation
A-62. Precipitation affects soil trafficability, visibility, and functioning of many electro-
optical systems. Heavy precipitation can reduce the quality of supplies in storage. Heavy
snow cover can reduce the efficiency of many communication systems as well as degrade
the effects of many munitions and air operations. The leader identifies critical factors such
as type, amount, and duration of precipitation. Some precipitation questions to answer
include:
z How will precipitation (or lack of it) affect the mobility of the unit or of enemy
forces?
z How can precipitation (or lack of it) add to the unit achieving surprise?
Cloud Cover
A-63. Cloud cover affects ground operations by limiting illumination and solar heating of
targets. Heavy cloud cover can degrade many target acquisition systems, infrared guided
munitions, and general aviation operations. Heavy cloud cover often canalizes aircraft
within air avenues of approach and on the final approach to the target. Partial cloud cover
can cause glare, a condition attacking aircraft might use to conceal their approach to the
target. Some types of clouds reduce the effectiveness of radar systems. The leader
identifies critical factors about cloud cover, including limits on illumination and solar
heating of targets. Some cloud cover questions include?
z How will cloud cover affect unit operations at night? How will it affect the enemy?
z How will cloud cover affect the target acquisition of the command launch unit?
z How will cloud cover affect helicopter and close air support?
ANALYSIS OF ENEMY
A-65. The second mission variable to consider is the enemy. Leaders analyze the enemy's
dispositions, compositions, strengths, doctrine, equipment, capabilities, vulnerabilities,
and probable COA. The line between enemy combatants and civilian noncombatants is
sometimes unclear. This requires the leader to understand the laws of war, the ROE, and
local situation.
Questions
A-66. Analyzing the enemy answers the question, "What is the enemy doing and why?"
Leaders also answer—
z What is the composition and strength of the enemy force?
z What are the capabilities of his weapons? Other systems?
z What is the location of current and probable enemy positions?
z What is the enemy's most probable course of action? (DRAW-D [defends, reinforce,
attack, withdraw, or delay]).
Assumptions
A-67. Leaders must understand assumption the battalion S-2 uses to portray the enemy's
COA. Furthermore, their own assumptions about the enemy must be consistent with those
of their higher commander. Leaders must continually improve their situational
understanding of the enemy and update their enemy templates as new information or trends
become available. Deviations or significant conclusions reached during their enemy
analysis could positively or negatively affect the battalion's and company’s plan should be
shared immediately with the battalion, company commander and S-2.
A-68. In analyzing the enemy, the leader must understand the IPB. Although he usually
does not prepare IPB products for his subordinates, he must be able to use the products of
the higher headquarters’ IPB.
Composition
A-71. Leader’s analysis must determine the types of vehicles, Soldiers, and equipment the
enemy could use against his unit. He should be familiar with the basic characteristics of
the units and platforms identified.
Disposition
A-72. Higher headquarters’ information, he determines how the enemy is (or might be)
arrayed. If the information is available, he determines the echelon force where the enemy
originated. He determines the disposition of the next two higher enemy elements. From
this analysis, he might be able to determine patterns in the enemy's employment or troops
and equipment.
Strength
A-73. Identifies the enemy's strength by unit. He can obtain this information by translating
percentages given from higher headquarters to the actual numbers in each enemy element
or from information provided the COP.
Capabilities
A-74. Based on the S-2’s assessment and enemy's doctrine and current location, the leader
must determine the enemy's capabilities. This includes studying the maximum effective
range for each weapon system, the doctrinal rates of march, and timelines associated with
the performance of certain tasks. One technique is to use the warfighting functions as a
checklist to address every significant element the enemy brings to the fight. The leader
also determines the capabilities of the next higher enemy element. These capabilities
should include reasonable assets the next higher element, or other higher enemy
headquarters, may provide. This should include at least the employment of reserves,
CBRN weapons, artillery or mortar locations and ranges, and reconnaissance assets.
Recent Activities
A-75. Gaining complete understanding of the enemy's intentions can be difficult when his
situation templates, composition, and disposition are unclear. In all cases, the enemy's
recent activities must be understood, because they can provide insight into his future
activities and intentions. If time permits, the leader might be able to conduct a pattern
analysis of the enemy's actions to predict future actions. In the operational environment,
this might be the most important analysis the leader conducts and is likely to yield the most
useful information to the leader.
A-78. The leader must avoid developing his situation template independently of the higher
commander's guidance and S-2's product. The product must reflect the results of
reconnaissance and shared information. Differences between the situation templates must
be resolved before the leader can continue analyzing the enemy. Finally, given the scale
with which the leader often develops his situation template, on a 1:50,000 maps, the
situation template should be transferred to a graphic depiction of terrain for briefing
purposes, as the situation allows. This is not for analysis, but to show subordinates the
details of the anticipated enemy COA. Once he briefs the enemy analysis to his
subordinates, he must ensure they understand differences between what he knows, what
he suspects, and what he just templates (estimates). Unless given the benefit of information
collection, his situation template is only an estimate of how the enemy might be disposed.
He must not take these as facts. This is why the leader must develop a tactically sound and
flexible plan. It is also why he must clearly explain his intent to his subordinates. This
allows them to exercise initiative and judgment to accomplish the unit's purpose.
Reconnaissance is critical in developing the best possible enemy scenario.
Information Requirements
A-79. The CCIRs identify and filter information needed by leaders to support their vision
and to make critical decisions, especially to determine or validate COA. CCIRs also helps
focus the efforts of subordinates and aids in the allocation of resources. Commanders
should limit their CCIRs to essential information. The two key elements are friendly forces
information and priority intelligence requirements.
A-80. Priority intelligence requirements are information a leader needs to know about
terrain or enemy to make a critical decision. PIR are best expressed in a question being
answered yes or no.
A-81. Friendly forces information requirements include information leaders need to know
about their units or about adjacent units to make critical decisions.
A-82. Although EEFIs are not part of the CCIRs, they still become priorities when the
leader states them. EEFI are the critical aspects of a friendly operation if known by the
enemy, that subsequently would compromise or lead to failure of the operation.
Consequently, this information must be protected from identification by the enemy.
A-84. Perhaps the most critical aspect of mission analysis is determining the combat
potential of one’s own force. The leader must realistically and unemotionally determine
all available resources and new limitations based on level of training or recent fighting.
This includes troops who are either attached to or in direct support of his unit. It also
includes understanding the full array of assets in support of the unit. He must know, how
much indirect fire, by type, is available and when it will become available.
A-85. Because of the uncertainty always present in operations at the small unit level,
leaders cannot be expected to think of everything during their analysis. This fact forces
leaders to determine how to get assistance when the situation exceeds their capabilities.
Therefore, a secondary product of analysis of troops and support available should be an
answer to the question, how do I get help?
A-87. During all phases, leaders consider critical times, unusable time, the time it takes to
accomplish activities, the time it takes to move, priorities of work, and tempo of
operations. Other critical conditions to consider include visibility and weather data, and
events such as higher headquarters tasks and required rehearsals. Implied in the analysis
of time is leader prioritization of events and sequencing of activities.
A-88. As addressed in step 1 of the TLP, time analysis is a critical aspect to planning,
preparation, and execution. Time analysis is often the first thing a leader does. The leader
must not only appreciate how much time is available, but he also must be able to appreciate
the time/space aspects of preparing, moving, fighting, and sustaining. He must be able to
see his own tasks and enemy actions in relation to time. Most importantly, as events occur,
he must adjust the time available to him and assess its impact on what he wants to
accomplish. Finally, he must update previous timelines for his subordinates, listing all
events affecting the platoon and its subordinate elements.
A-90. Higher headquarters provides the leader with civil considerations affecting the next
echelon’s mission. The memory aid the higher headquarters may use to analyze and
describe these civil considerations is ASCOPE. (Refer to ATP 2-01.3 for more
information.)
Areas
A-91. The population within a prescribed area of operation comprises several different
groups, both ethnically and politically. Leaders must understand each group’s perceptions
about the United States, the Army, and specific units operating within that area. Population
statuses overlays can best describe groups and define what feelings the group has toward
American forces. This is extremely important in understanding when and where to commit
combat power, what relationships can be reinforced with certain groups versus what
relationships need to start or cease, and ultimately what second and third order effects our
actions will have in the area of operation. Information related capabilities also can be
properly focused with a healthy understanding of the perceptions of the civilian
population.
A-92. This characteristic addresses terrain analysis from a civilian perspective. Analyze
how vital civilian areas affect the missions of respective forces and how military operations
affect these areas. Factors to consider include political boundaries, locations of
government centers, by-type enclaves, special regions such as mining or agricultural, trade
routes, and possible settlement sites.
Structures
A-93. Include traditional high-payoff targets, protected cultural sites, and facilities with
practical applications. The analysis is a comparison of how a structure’s location,
functions, and capabilities as compared to costs and consequences of such use.
Capabilities
A-94. Assess capabilities in terms of those required to save, sustain, or enhance life, in
that order. Capabilities can refer to the ability of local authorities to provide essential
functions and services. These can include areas needed after combat operations and
contracted resources and services.
Organizations
Consider all nonmilitary groups or institutions in the area of operation. These may be
indigenous, come from a third country or U.S. agencies. They influence and interact with the
populace, force, and each other. Current activities, capabilities, and limitations are some of
the information necessary to build situational understanding. This often becomes a union of
resources and specialized capabilities.
People
A-95. People is a general term describing all nonmilitary personnel military forces
encountered in the area of operation. This includes those personnel outside the area of
operation whose actions, opinions, or political influence can affect the mission. Identify
the essential communicators and formal and informal processes used to influence people.
In addition, consider how historical, cultural, and social factors shape public perceptions
beliefs, goals, and expectations.
Events
A-96. Routine, cyclical, planned, or spontaneous activities which significantly affect
organizations, people, and military operations, including seasons, festivals, holidays,
funerals, political rallies, and agricultural crop/livestock and market cycles and paydays.
Other events, such as disasters and those precipitated by military forces, stress and affect
the attitudes and activities of the populace and include a moral responsibility to protect
displaced civilians. Template events and analyze them for their political, economic,
psychological, environmental, and legal implications.
A-97. The leader also must identify civil considerations affecting his mission. Civil
considerations are important when conducting operations against terrorist or insurgent
forces in urban areas. Most terrorists and insurgents depend on the support or neutrality of
the civilian population to camouflage them. Leaders must understand impact of their
actionsʊas well as their subordinate’s actionsʊon the civilian population, and effects
they will have on current and future operations. Considerations may include:
z Ethnic dynamics.
z Organizations of influence.
z Patterns.
z Leaders and influencers.
z Economic environment.
A-98. Ethnic dynamics include religion, cultural mores, gender roles, customs,
superstitions, and values certain ethnic groups hold dear which differ from other groups.
Leaders who analyze the ethnic dynamics of their area of operation can best apply combat
power, shape maneuver with information related capabilities, and ultimately find the
common denominator all ethnic varieties have in common and focus unit efforts at it.
Gaining local support can best be accomplished by the leader who demonstrates dignity
and respect to the civilian population he is charged to protect and train.
A-99. Organizations of influence force the leader to look beyond preexisting civilian
hierarchical arrangements. By defining organizations within the community, leaders can
understand what groups have power and influence over their own smaller communities
and what groups can assist our forces. After these groups have been defined, analyzing
them and determining their contributions or resistance to friendly operations is easier.
Many Eastern cultures rely upon religious organizations as their centers of power and
influence, whereas Western culture’s power comes from political institutions by elected
officials. Defining other influential organizations or groups of influence allows for
information collection.
A-100. Every culture, every group of people, has patterns of behavior. Whether it is set
times for prayer, shopping or commuting, people follow patterns. Understanding these
patterns helps leaders plan and execute information collection, combat operations, and
logistical resupply. Also, unit leaders who study the history of civic culture can better
understand and explain to others how and why the people have fought previous wars and
conflicts. Starting with a baseline pattern and keeping a mission analysis on how the
population is responding or have responded in the past under similar circumstances will
assist leaders in using patterns to the unit's advantage.
A-101. Know who is in charge and who can influence and enable unit leaders to
exercise governance and monitor security within a prescribed area. Many times, the
spiritual leader is not necessarily the decision maker for a community, but the spiritual
leader must approve the decision maker's actions. Commanders and staff officers who
make link-diagrams of leadership including religious, political, and criminal personnel
allow focused planning and decentralized execution which bolsters legitimacy within the
population. Using the targeting methodology of D3A (decide, detect, deliver, and assess)
may prove useful in determining whether a leader or influencer would best facilitate an
operation, when to engage them, and what to expect.
A-102. Money and resources drive prosperity and stability. Leaders who identify the
economic production base of their area of operation can execute civil-military campaigns
within their area of operation bolstering the economic welfare of the people. These
campaigns include infrastructure rebuild projects, creation of labor opportunities, and
education. By focusing on the motivations for civilian labor and creating essential services
and prosperity where there was none, unit leaders/commanders can win the support of the
civilian who now can feed and clothe his family and now has clean running water. This
aspect of civil considerations reinforces the security of the community against poverty and
other enablers to instability.
RISK ASSESSMENT
A-103. Risk assessment is the identification and assessment of hazards allowing a
leader to implement measures to control hazards. Leaders assess risk to protect the force
and aid in mission accomplishment. The leader must consider two kinds of risk: tactical
and accident. Tactical risk is associated with hazards existing due to the enemy's presence.
The consequences of tactical risk take two major forms:
z Enemy action where the leader has accepted risk such as an enemy attack where the
friendly leader has chosen to conduct an economy of force.
z Lost opportunity, such as movement across terrain severely restricts the speed of
traverse. This then would restrict the unit's ability to mass the effects of combat
power.
A-104. Accident risk includes all operational risk other than tactical risk and can
include hazards concerning friendly personnel, equipment readiness, and environment.
Fratricide is an example of an accident risk.
A-105. The leader must identify risks based on the results of his mission analysis. Once
identified, risk must be reduced through controls. For example, fratricide is a hazard
categorized as an accident risk; surface danger zones and risk estimate distance are used
to identify the controls, such as TRP and phase lines, to reduce this accidental risk. When
the leader decides what risks he is willing to accept, he also must decide in his COA how
to reduce risk to an acceptable level.
determines how to achieve success and accomplish his purpose. The leader develops his
entire COA from the decisive point. Without determining a valid decisive point, the leader
cannot begin to develop a valid or tactically sound COA. The leader, based on his initial
analysis of METT-TC, his situational awareness, his vision, and insight into how such
factors can affect the unit's mission, should visualize where, when, and how his unit's
ability to generate combat power (firepower, protection, maneuver, leadership, and
information) can overwhelm the enemy's abilities to generate combat power. The decisive
point might orient on terrain, enemy, time, or a combination of these. The decisive point
might be where or how, or from where, the unit will combine the effects of combat power
against the enemy. The decisive point might be the event or action (with respect to terrain,
enemy, or time, and generation of combat power) will ultimately and irreversibly lead to
the unit achieving its purpose.
A-107. The decisive point does not simply restate the unit's essential task or purpose;
it defines how, where, or when the unit will accomplish its purpose. The unit's decisive
operation always focuses at the decisive point, and always accomplishes the unit's purpose.
Designating a decisive point is critical to the leader's vision of how he will use combat
power to achieve the purpose, how he will task-organize his unit and how his shaping
operations will support the decisive operation, and how the decisive operation will
accomplish the unit's purpose. This tentative decisive point forms the basis of his planning
and COA development; it also forms the basis of communicating the COA to his
subordinates. The leader should clearly explain what the decisive point is to his
subordinate leaders and why it is decisive; this objective, in conjunction with his
commander's intent, facilitates subordinate initiative. A valid decisive point enables the
leader to clearly and logically link how the application of combat power elements with
respect to terrain, enemy, and time allows the unit to accomplish its purpose. If the leader
determines his tentative decisive point is not valid during COA development or analysis,
then he must determine another decisive point and restart COA development.
SCREENING CRITERIA
A-110. A COA should be suitable, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and complete:
z Suitable. If executed, the COA accomplishes the mission consistent with the higher
commander's concept and intent.
z Feasible. The unit has the technical and tactical skills and resources to accomplish
the COA, with available time, space, and resources.
z Acceptable. The military advantage gained by executing the COA must justify the
cost in resources, especially casualties. This assessment is largely subjective.
z Distinguishable. If more than one COA is developed, it must be sufficiently
different from the others to justify full development and consideration.
z Complete. The COA covers the operational factors of who, what, when, where, and
how, and must show from start to finish how the unit will accomplish the mission.
The COA must address the doctrinal aspects of the mission. For example, in an
attack against a defending enemy, the COA must address the movement to,
deployment against, assault of, and consolidation upon the objective.
ACTIONS
A-111. Next, the leader analyzes relative combat power, generates options, arrays his
forces, develops a concept of the operation, assigns responsibility, and prepares a COA
statement and sketch.
A-113. The purpose of this step is to compare the combat power of friendly and enemy
forces. It is not merely a calculation and comparison of friendly and enemy weapons
numbers or units with the aim of gaining a numerical advantage. Using the results of all
previous analyses done during mission analysis, the leader compares his unit's combat
power strengths and weaknesses with those of the enemy. He seeks to calculate the time
and manner in which his force (and enemy) can maximize the effects of maneuver,
firepower, protection, leadership, and information in relation to the specific terrain,
disposition, and composition of each force. The leader also determines how to avoid enemy
strengths or advantages in combat power. In short, he strives to determine where, when,
and how his unit's combat power (the effects of maneuver, firepower, protection,
leadership, and information) can overwhelm the enemy's ability to generate combat power.
An analysis of the ability to generate combat power will help the leader confirm or deny
his tentative decisive point.
Generate Options
A-114. Most missions and tasks can be accomplished in more than one way. The goal
of this step, generating options, is to determine one or more of those ways quickly. First,
leaders consider TTP from doctrine, unit SOPs, history, or other resources to determine if
a solution to a similar tactical problem exists already. If it does, the leader's job is to take
the existing solution and modify it to his unique situation. If a solution does not exist, the
leader must develop one. Second, leaders confirm the mission’s decisive point. Then, using
doctrinal requirements as a guide, the leader assigns purposes and tasks to decisive, and
shaping, and sustaining operations.
A-115. This doctrinal requirement provides a framework for the leader to develop a
COA. For example, a breach requires an assault element, support element, breach element,
security element, and possibly a reserve. Beginning with the decisive point identified
during mission analysis, the leader identifies the decisive operation's purpose and purposes
of his shaping and sustaining operations. The decisive operation's purpose is nested to his
unit's overall purpose and is achieved at his decisive point. The shaping operation’s
purposes are nested to the decisive operation's purpose by setting the conditions for success
of the decisive operation. The sustaining operation’s purposes are nested to the decisive
and shaping operation's purposes by providing sustainment, operational area security,
movement control, terrain management, and infrastructure. The leader then determines the
tactical mission tasks for the decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations. These tasks must
be accomplished to achieve the subordinate unit’s purpose.
Array Forces
A-116. Using the product from generating options, the leader then determines what
combinations of Soldiers, weapons, and other systems are needed to accomplish each task.
This is known as "arraying forces" or "assigning troops to task." This judgment call is
unique to the specific METT-TC conditions the leader faces. He then must task organize
his forces specific to the respective essential tactical tasks and purposes assigned to his
subordinate elements. He determines the specific quantity of squads, weapons (by type),
and fire support necessary to accomplish each task against the enemy array of forces. He
allocates resources required for the decisive operation's success first and determines the
resources needed for shaping operations in descending order of importance.
missions is engagement area development and preparation of the battle positions, actions
in the engagement area, counterattack, and consolidation and reorganization. In
developing the concept of the operation, the leader clarifies in his mind the best ways to
use the available terrain and to employ the unit's strengths against the enemy's weaknesses.
He includes the requirements of indirect fire to support the maneuver. He then develops
the maneuver control measures necessary to convey his intent, enhance the understanding
of the schemes of maneuver, prevent fratricide, and clarify the tasks and purposes of the
decisive shaping, and sustaining operations. He also determines the sustainment aspects of
the COA.
Assign Responsibilities
A-118. Leaders assign responsibility for each task to a subordinate. Whenever possible
and depending on the existing chain of command, they avoid fracturing unit integrity. They
try to keep their span of control between two to five subordinate elements. The leader
ensures every unit in his command is employed, every asset is attached and adequate
mission command is provided for each element. The leader must avoid unnecessary
complicated mission command structures and maintain unit integrity where feasible.
A-120. The COA sketch should identify how the unit intends to focus the effects of
overwhelming combat power at the decisive point. When integrated with terrain, the
refined product becomes the unit's operations overlay.
A-122. COA analysis (war gaming) brings together friendly and enemy forces on the
actual terrain to visualize how the operation will unfold. It is a continuous cycle of action,
reaction, and counteraction. This process highlights critical tasks, stimulates ideas, and
provides insights rarely gained through mission analysis and COA development alone.
War gaming is a critical step in the planning process and should be allocated more time
than the other steps. War gaming helps the leader fully synchronize friendly actions, while
considering the likely reactions of the enemy. The product of this process is the
synchronization matrix. War gaming, depending on how much time is devoted to planning,
provides—
z An appreciation for time, space, and triggers needed to integrate direct and indirect
fire support, obscurants, engineers, air defense artillery, and chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear with maneuver platoons (Infantry, antiarmor, or tank) to
support unit tasks and purposes identified in the scheme of maneuver.
z Flexibility built into the plan by gaining insights into possible branches to the basic
plan.
z The need for control measures, such as checkpoints, contact points, and target
registration points, aid in control, flexibility, and synchronization.
z Coordinating instructions to enhance execution and unity of effort, and to ease
confusion between subordinate elements.
z Information needed to complete paragraphs three, four, and five of the OPORD.
Assessments regarding on-order and be-prepared missions.
observation posts to gain additional information. Leaders also can incorporate Javelin
CLUs as surveillance tools (day or night), based on an analysis of METT-TC.
A-128. The nature of the reconnaissance, including what it covers and how long it lasts,
depends on the tactical situation and time available. The leader should use the results of
the COA development process to identify information and security requirements of the
unit's reconnaissance operations.
A-129. The leader must include disseminating results and conclusions arrived from
reconnaissance into his time analysis. He also must consider how to communicate changes
in the COA to his subordinates and how these changes affect his plans, actions of the
subordinates, and other supporting elements.
A-135. Complete the order with a confirmation brief. At a minimum, each subordinate
leader should be able to back brief the unit mission and intent, the immediate higher
commander's intent, his own tasks and purpose, and time he will issue his unit's OPORD.
Each subordinate should confirm he understands the commander’s vision and how the
mission is accomplished with respect to the decisive point. This confirmation brief
provides an opportunity to highlight issues or concerns.
A-136. The five-paragraph OPORD format (see figure A-4, page A-34), helps the
leader paint a picture of all aspects of the operation, from the terrain to the enemy, and
finally to the unit's own actions from higher to lower. The format helps him decide what
relevant details he must include and in providing subordinates with a smooth flow of
information from beginning to end. At the same time, the leader must ensure the order is
not only clear and complete but also as brief as possible. If he has already addressed an
item adequately in a previous WARNORD, he can simply state "No change," or provide
necessary updates. The leader is free to brief the OPORD in the most effective manner to
convey information to his subordinates.
REHEARSALS
A-138. Rehearsals are practice sessions conducted to prepare units for an upcoming
operation or event. They are essential in ensuring thorough preparation, coordination, and
understanding of the commander's plan and intent. Leaders should never underestimate the
value of rehearsals.
A-139. Rehearsals require leaders and, when time permits, other platoon Soldiers to
perform required tasks, ideally under conditions as close as possible to those expected for
the actual operation. At their best, rehearsals are interactive; participants maneuver their
actual vehicles or use vehicle models or simulations while verbalizing their elements’
actions. During every rehearsal, the focus is on the how element, allowing subordinates to
practice the actions called for in their individual scheme of maneuver.
A-140. The leader uses well-planned, efficiently run rehearsals to accomplish the
following:
z Reinforce training and increase proficiency in critical tasks.
z Reveal weaknesses or problems in the plan, leading to more refinement of the plan
or development of additional branch plans.
z Integrate the actions of subordinate elements.
z Confirm coordination requirements between the platoon and adjacent units.
z Improve each Soldier's understanding of the concept of the operation, the direct fire
plan, anticipated contingencies, and possible actions and reactions for various
situations may arise during the operation.
z Ensure seconds-in-command are prepared to execute in their leaders’ absence.
REHEARSAL TYPES
A-141. Leaders may use several types of rehearsals, which include:
z Backbrief.
z Combined arms rehearsal.
z Support rehearsal.
z Battle drill or standard operating procedure rehearsal.
Backbrief
A-142. A backbrief is a briefing by subordinates to the commander to review how
subordinates intend to accomplish their mission. Normally, subordinates perform
backbriefs throughout preparation. These briefs allow commanders to clarify the
commander’s intent early in subordinate planning. Commanders use the backbrief to
identify problems in the concept of the operation.
Support Rehearsal
A-144. The support rehearsal helps synchronize each warfighting function with the
overall operation. This rehearsal supports the operation so units can accomplish their
missions. Throughout preparation, units conduct support rehearsals within the framework
of a single or limited number of warfighting functions. These rehearsals typically involve
coordination and procedure drills for aviation, fires, engineer support, or casualty
evacuation. Support rehearsals and combined arms rehearsals complement preparations
for the operation. Units may conduct rehearsals separately and combine them into full-
dress rehearsals. Although these rehearsals differ slightly by warfighting function, they
achieve similar results.
operation. All echelons use these rehearsal types; however, they are most common for
platoons, squads, and sections. They are conducted throughout preparation and are not
limited to published battle drills.
METHODS OF REHEARSALS
A-146. Rehearsals should follow the crawl-walk-run training methodology whenever
possible. This prepares the platoons and subordinate elements for increasingly difficult
conditions. (Refer to FM 6-0 for more information).Units can conduct these forms of
rehearsals if mission variables permit—
z Full-dress rehearsal.
z Reduced-force rehearsal.
z Terrain-model rehearsal.
z Digital terrain-model rehearsal.
z Sketch-map rehearsal.
z Map rehearsal.
z Network rehearsal.
Full-Dress Rehearsal
A-147. A full-dress rehearsal produces the most detailed understanding of the
operation. It includes every participating Soldier and system. Leaders rehearse their
subordinates on terrain similar to area of operation, initially under good light conditions,
and then in limited visibility. Leaders repeat small unit actions until executed to standard.
Full-dress rehearsals help Soldiers clearly understand what commanders expect of them.
It helps them gain confidence in their ability to accomplish the mission. Supporting
elements, such as aviation crews, meet and rehearse with Soldiers to synchronize the
operation.
Reduced-Force Rehearsal
A-148. Circumstances may prohibit a rehearsal with all members of the unit. A
reduced-force rehearsal involves only key leaders of the organization and subordinate
units. It normally takes fewer resources than a full-dress rehearsal. Terrain requirements
mirror those of a full-dress rehearsal, even though fewer Soldiers participate. The
commander first decides the level of leader involvement. Then selected leaders rehearse
the plan while traversing actual or similar terrain. Often commanders use this technique to
rehearse fire control measures for an engagement area during defensive operations.
Commanders often use a reduced-force rehearsal to prepare key leaders for a full-dress
rehearsal. It may require developing a rehearsal plan mirroring the actual plan but fits the
rehearsal terrain.
Terrain-Model Rehearsal
A-149. The terrain-model rehearsal is the most popular rehearsal technique. It takes
less time and fewer resources than a full-dress or reduced-force rehearsal. (A terrain-model
rehearsal takes a platoon between one to two hours to execute to standard.) An accurately
constructed terrain model helps subordinate leaders visualize the commander’s intent and
concept of the operation. When possible, commanders place the terrain model where it
overlooks the actual terrain of the area of operation. However, if the situation requires
more security, they place the terrain model on a reverse slope within walking distance of
a point overlooking the area of operation. The model’s orientation coincides with the
terrain. The size of the terrain model can vary from small (using markers to represent units)
to large (on which the participants can walk). A large model helps reinforce the
participants’ perception of unit positions on the terrain.
Sketch-Map Rehearsal
A-151. Commanders can use the sketch-map technique almost anywhere, day or night.
The procedures are similar to a terrain-model rehearsal except the commander uses a
sketch map in place of a terrain model. Large sketches ensure all participants can see as
each participant walks through execution of the operation. Participants move markers on
the sketch to represent unit locations and maneuvers. Sketch-map rehearsals take less time
than terrain-model rehearsals and more time than map rehearsals.
Map Rehearsal
A-152. A map rehearsal is similar to a sketch-map rehearsal except the commander
uses a map and operation overlay of the same scale used to plan the operation. The map
rehearsal itself consumes the most time. A map rehearsal is normally the easiest technique
to set up since it requires only maps and graphics for current operations. Units gear a map
rehearsal’s operation overlay to the echelon conducting the rehearsal. Multi-echelon
rehearsals using this technique are difficult. This rehearsal can present operations security
risks if the area around the rehearsal site is not secured. This technique requires the least
terrain of all rehearsals. A good site ensures participants can easily find it yet stay
concealed from the enemy. An optimal location overlooks the terrain where the unit will
execute the operation.
Network Rehearsal
A-153. Units conduct network rehearsals over wide-area networks or local area
networks. Commanders and staffs practice these rehearsals by talking through critical
portions of the operation over communications networks in a sequence the commander
establishes. The organization rehearses only critical parts of the operation. These
rehearsals require all information systems needed to execute portions of the operation. All
participants require working information systems, operation order, and overlays.
Command posts can rehearse battle tracking during network rehearsals.
B-1. Fire control requires a unit to acquire the enemy and mass the effects of fires rapidly
to achieve decisive results in the close fight. When planning and executing direct fires, the
platoon leader and subordinate leaders must know how to apply several fundamental
principles. The purpose of the principles of direct fire is not to restrict the actions of
subordinates. Applied correctly, they help the platoon to accomplish its primary goal in
direct fire engagements both to acquire first and shoot first. These principles give
subordinates the freedom to act quickly upon acquisition of the enemy. This discussion
focuses on the following principles:
z Mass the effects of fire.
z Destroy the greatest threat first.
z Avoid target overkill.
z Employ the best weapon for specific target.
z Minimize friendly exposure and avoid fratricide.
z Plan for limited visibility conditions.
z Develop contingencies
Note. Vehicles equipped with thermal sights can assist squads in detecting and
engaging enemy Infantry forces in conditions such as heavy obscurants and low
illumination.
DEVELOP CONTINGENCIES
B-9. Leaders initially develop plans based on their units’ maximum capabilities; they
make backup plans for implementation in the event of casualties or weapon damage or
failure. While leaders cannot anticipate or plan for every situation, they should develop
plans for what they view as the most probable occurrences. Building redundancy into these
plans, such as having two systems observe the same area of operation, is an invaluable
asset when the situation (and number of available systems) permits. Designating alternate
sectors of fire provides a means of shifting fires if adjacent elements are knocked out of
action.
SECTION II – FIRE CONTROL PROCESS
B-10. To bring direct fires against an enemy force, leaders must continuously apply the
steps of the fire control process. At the heart of this process are two critical actions: rapid,
accurate target acquisition and massing of fire to achieve decisive effects on the target.
Target acquisition is the detection, identification, and location of a target in sufficient detail
to permit the employment of weapons. Massing entails focusing fires at critical points and
distributing the fires for optimum effect.
B-11. The following discussion examines target acquisition and massing of fires using
these basic steps of the fire control process:
z Identify probable enemy locations and determine the enemy scheme of maneuver.
z Determine where and how to mass fires.
B-17. The platoon leader plans direct fires as part of the TLP. Determining where and how
the platoon can and will mass fires is an essential step as the platoon leader develops his
concept of the operation.
LEADER PLANNING
B-6 ATP 3-21.8 $SULO
Direct Fire Planning and Control
B-18. Leaders plan direct fires in order to be able to distribute and control their fire.
Determining where and how leaders can mass fires is an essential step in this process.
B-19. Based on where and how they want to focus and distribute fires, leaders can
establish the weapons ready postures of their elements as well as triggers for initiating
fires. During mission preparation, leaders plan and conduct rehearsals of direct fires (and
of the fire control process) based on METT-TC.
B-20. The platoon leader plans direct fires in conjunction with development of his mission
analysis and completion of the plan. Determining where and how the platoon can and will
mass fires are also essential steps as the platoon leader develops his concept of the
operation.
B-21. The platoon leader plans direct fires in conjunction with development of his mission
analysis and completion of the plan. Determining where and how the platoon can and will
mass fires are also essential steps as the platoon leader develops his concept of the
operation.
B-22. After identifying probable enemy locations, the platoon leader determines points or
areas where he can focus combat power. His visualization of where and how the enemy
will attack or defend assists him in determining the volume of fires he must focus at
particular points to have a decisive effect. In addition, if he intends to mass the fires of
more than one subordinate element, the platoon leader must establish the means for
distributing fires.
B-23. Based on where and how they want to focus and distribute fires, the platoon leader
and subordinate leaders can then establish the weapons ready postures for platoon elements
as well as triggers for initiating fires. Additionally, they must evaluate the risk of fratricide,
friendly fire and establish controls to prevent it; these measures include the designation of
recognition markings, weapons control status, and weapons safety posture.
B-24. After determining where and how they will mass and distribute fires, the platoon
leader and subordinate leaders then must orient elements so they can rapidly and accurately
acquire the enemy. They also can war-game the selected COA or concept of the operation
to determine probable requirements for refocusing and redistributing fires and to establish
other required controls. Also during mission preparation, the platoon leader plans and
conducts rehearsals of direct fires (and of the fire control process) based on his mission
analysis.
B-25. The platoon leader and his subordinate leaders must continue to apply planning
procedures and considerations throughout execution. They must be able to adjust direct
fires based on a continuously updated mission analysis, combining situational awareness
with the latest available intelligence. When necessary, they also must apply direct fire
SOPs, which are covered in the following discussion.
of his force and on anticipated conditions and situations. SOP elements should include
standing means for focusing fires, distributing their effects, orienting forces, and
preventing fratricide and friendly fire. The platoon leader should adjust the direct fire SOP
whenever changes to anticipated and actual METT-TC become apparent.
B-27. If the platoon leader does not issue other instructions, the squads begin the
engagement using the SOP. Subsequently, the platoon leader can use a fire command to
refocus or redistribute fires. The following paragraphs discuss specific SOP provisions for
focusing fires, distributing fires, orienting forces, and preventing fratricide and friendly
fire.
FOCUSING FIRES
B-28. TRP are a common means of focusing fires. One technique is to establish a standard
respective position for TRP in relation to friendly elements and to consistently number the
TRP, such as from left to right. This allows leaders to quickly determine and communicate
the location of the TRP.
DISTRIBUTING FIRES
B-29. Two useful means of distributing the platoon’s fires are engagement priorities and
target array. One technique is to assign an engagement priority, by type of enemy vehicle
or weapon, for each type of friendly weapons system. The target array technique can assist
in distribution by assigning specific friendly elements to engage enemy elements of
approximately similar capabilities.
ORIENTING FORCES
B-30. A standard means of orienting friendly forces is to assign a principal direction of
fire (PDF), using a TRP, to orient each element on a probable enemy position or likely
avenue of approach. To provide all-around security, the SOP can supplement the PDF with
sectors using a friendly-based quadrant. The following example SOP elements illustrate
the use of these techniques:
The center (front) squad’s PDF is TRP 2 (center) until otherwise specified; the
squad is responsible for the front two quadrants.
The left flank squad’s PDF is TRP 1 (left) until otherwise specified; the squad is
responsible for the left two friendly quadrants (overlapping with the center squad).
The right flank squad’s PDF is TRP 3 (right) until otherwise specified; the squad is
responsible for the right two friendly quadrants (overlapping with the center squad).
B-33. The small unit leader communicates to his subordinates the manner, method, and
time to initiate, shift, and mass fires, and when to disengage by using direct fire control
measures. The leader should control his unit’s fires so he can direct the engagement of
enemy systems to gain the greatest effect. The leader uses IPB and information collection
to determine the most advantageous way to use direct fire control measures to mass the
effects on the enemy and reduce fratricide and friendly fire from direct fire systems. (Refer
to ATP 2-01.3 and FM 3-55 for more information.)
Engagement Area
B-37. This fire control measure is an area along an enemy avenue of approach where the
leader intends to mass the fires of available weapons to destroy an enemy force. The size
and shape of the engagement area is determined by the degree of relatively unobstructed
intervisibility available to the unit’s weapons systems in their firing positions and by the
maximum range of those weapons. Typically, the platoon leader delineates responsibility
within the engagement area by assigning each squad a sector of fire or direction of fire.
Sector of Fire
B-38. A sector of fire is a defined area being covered by direct fire. Leaders assign sectors
of fire to subordinate elements, crew-served weapons, and individual Soldiers to ensure
coverage of sectors; they also may limit the sector of fire of an element or weapon to
prevent accidental engagement of an adjacent unit. In assigning sectors of fire, platoon
leader and subordinate leaders consider the number and types of weapons available. In
addition, they must consider acquisition system type and field of view in determining the
width of a sector of fire. For example, while unaided vision has a wide field of view, its
ability to detect and identify targets at range and in limited visibility conditions is
restricted. Conversely, most fire control acquisitions systems have greater detection and
identification ranges than the unaided eye, but their field of view is narrow. Means of
designating sectors of fire include the following:
z Target registration points.
z Clock direction.
z Terrain-based quadrants.
z Friendly-based quadrants.
z Azimuth or cardinal direction.
Direction of Fire
B-39. A direction of fire is an orientation or point used to assign responsibility for a
particular area on the battlefield being covered by direct fire. Leaders designate directions
of fire for purposes of acquisition or engagement by subordinate elements, crew-served
weapons, or individual Soldiers. Direction of fire is most commonly employed when
assigning sectors of fire would be difficult or impossible because of limited time or
insufficient reference points. Means of designating a direction of fire include the
following:
z Closest target registration point.
z Clock direction.
z Azimuth or cardinal direction.
z Tracer on target.
z Infrared laser pointer.
z M203 smoke round.
Quadrants
B-40. Quadrants are subdivisions of an area created by superimposing an imaginary pair
of perpendicular axes over the terrain to create four separate areas or sectors. Establish
quadrants on the terrain, friendly forces, or on the enemy formation.
Note. Techniques in which quadrants are based on enemy formations usually are
referred to as target array; it is covered in discussion of threat-based fire control
measures.
B-41. The method of quadrant numbering is established in the unit SOP; however, care
must be taken to avoid confusion when quadrants based on terrain, friendly forces, and
enemy formations are used simultaneously.
Terrain-Based Quadrant
B-42. A terrain-based quadrant entails use of a TRP, either existing or constructed, to
designate the center point of the axes dividing the area into four quadrants. This technique
can be employed in both the offense and defense. In the offense, the platoon leader
designates the center of the quadrant using an existing feature or by creating a reference
point. For example, using a ground burst illumination round, an obscurant marking round,
or a fire ignited by incendiary or tracer rounds. The axes delineating the quadrants run
parallel and perpendicular to the direction of movement. In the defense, the platoon leader
designates the center of the quadrant using an existing or constructed TRP.
B-43. In examples shown in figure B-5, quadrants are marked using the letter “Q” and a
number (Q1 to Q4); quadrant numbers are in the same relative positions as on military
map sheets (from Q1 as the upper left-hand quadrant clockwise to Q4 as the lower left-
hand quadrant).
Friendly-Based Quadrant
B-44. The friendly-based quadrant technique entails superimposing quadrants over the
unit’s formation. The center point is based on the center of the formation, and axes run
parallel and perpendicular to the general direction of travel. For rapid orientation, the
friendly quadrant technique may be better than the clock direction method; because
different elements of a large formation rarely are oriented in the same exact direction and
the relative dispersion of friendly forces causes parallax to the target. Figure B-6 (page
B-14) illustrates use of friendly-based quadrants.
Rules of Engagement
B-49. ROE specify the circumstances and limitations under which forces may engage;
they include definitions of combatant and noncombatant elements and prescribe the
treatment of noncombatants. Factors influencing ROE are national command policy,
mission, commander’s intent, the operational environment, and the law of war. ROE
always recognize a Soldier’s right of self-defense; while at the same time, they clearly
define circumstances in which he may fire.
B-50. For example, during a cordon and search mission, the command may establish a
weapons control status of WEAPONS TIGHT for antiarmor weapons. The commander
does this because higher command directives explicitly restrict the use of antiarmor
weapons as an explosive breach technique.
considerations for the platoon when using the four weapons safety postures, listed in
ascending order of restrictivenessņ
z AMMUNITION LOADED.
z AMMUNITION LOCKED.
z AMMUNITION PREPARED.
z WEAPONS CLEARED.
B-54. When setting and adjusting the weapons safety posture, the platoon leader must
weigh the desire to prevent accidental discharges against the requirement for immediate
action based on the enemy threat. If the threat of direct contact is high, the platoon leader
could establish the weapons safety posture as AMMUNITION LOADED. If the
requirement for action is less immediate, he might lower the posture to AMMUNITION
LOCKED or AMMUNITION PREPARED. Additionally, the platoon leader can designate
different weapons safety postures for different elements of the unit.
fire, the more restrictive the weapons control status. The three levels, in descending order
of restrictiveness, are—
z WEAPONS HOLD. Engage only if engaged or ordered to engage.
z WEAPONS TIGHT. Engage only targets positively identified as enemy.
z WEAPONS FREE. Engage targets not positively identified as friendly.
B-56. As an example, the platoon leader may establish the weapons control status as
WEAPONS HOLD when friendly forces are conducting a passage of lines. By maintaining
situational understanding of his own elements and adjacent friendly forces, however, he
may be able to lower the weapons control status. In such a case, the platoon leader may be
able to set a WEAPONS FREE status when he knows there are no friendly elements in the
vicinity of the engagement. This permits his elements to engage targets at extended ranges
even though it is difficult to distinguish targets accurately at ranges beyond 2000 meters
under battlefield conditions. Another consideration is the weapons control status are
extremely important for forces using combat identification systems. Establishing the
weapons control status as WEAPONS FREE permits leaders to engage an unknown target
when they fail to get a friendly response.
Engagement Priorities
B-57. Engagement priorities, which entail the sequential ordering of targets to be engaged,
can serve one or more of the following critical fire control functions:
z Prioritize high-payoff targets. In concert with his concept of the operation, the
platoon leader determines which target types provide the greatest payoff; he then
can set these as a unit engagement priority. For example, he may decide destroying
enemy engineer assets is the best way to prevent the enemy from reducing an
obstacle.
z Employ the best weapons to the target. Establishing engagement priorities for
specific friendly systems increases the effectiveness with which the unit employs
its weapons. For example, the engagement priority of the Javelin could be enemy
tanks first, then enemy personnel carriers; this would decrease the chance the
platoon’s lighter systems will have to engage enemy armored vehicles.
z Distribute the unit’s fires. Establishing different priorities for similar friendly
systems helps to prevent overkill and achieve distribution of fires. For example, the
platoon leader may designate the enemy’s tanks as the initial priority for the
weapons squad, while making the enemy’s personnel carriers the priority for one of
his rifle squads. This would decrease the chances of units launching multiple tube
launched, optically tracked, wire guided missiles (TOW) against two enemy tanks,
while ignoring the dangers posed by the personnel carriers.
Trigger
B-58. A trigger is a specific set of conditions dictating initiation of fires. Often referred to
as engagement criteria, a trigger specifies the circumstances in which subordinate elements
should engage. The circumstances can be based on a friendly or enemy event. For example,
the trigger for a friendly platoon to initiate engagement could be three or more enemy
combat vehicles passing or crossing a given point or line. This line can be natural or man-
made linear feature, such as a road, ridge line, or stream. It also may be a line perpendicular
to the unit’s orientation, delineated by one or more reference points.
Engagement Techniques
B-59. Engagement techniques are effects-oriented fire distribution measures. The
following engagement techniques are common in platoon operations:
z Point fire.
z Area fire.
z Simultaneous.
z Alternating fire.
z Observed fire.
z Sequential fire.
z Time of suppression.
z Reconnaissance by fire.
Point Fire
B-60. Entails concentrating the effects of a unit’s fire against a specific, identified target
such as a vehicle, machine gun bunker, or ATGM position. When leaders direct point fire,
all of the unit’s weapons engage the target, firing until it is destroyed or the required time
of suppression has expired. Employing converging fires from dispersed positions makes
point fire more effective because the target is engaged from multiple directions. The unit
may initiate an engagement using point fire against the most dangerous threat, and revert
to area fire against other, less threatening point targets.
Note. Use of point fire is fairly rare because a unit seldom encounters a single,
clearly identified enemy weapon.
Area Fire
B-61. Involves distributing the effects of a unit’s fire over an area in which enemy
positions are numerous or are not obvious. If the area is large, leaders assign sectors of fire
to subordinate elements using a terrain-based distribution method such as the quadrant
technique. Typically, the primary purpose of the area fire is suppression; however,
sustaining suppression requires judicious control of the rate of fire.
Simultaneous Fire
B-62. To rapidly mass the effects of their fires or to gain fire superiority. For example, a
unit may initiate a support-by-fire operation with simultaneous fire, then, revert to
alternating or sequential fire to maintain suppression. Simultaneous fire also is employed
to negate the low probability of the hit and kill of certain antiarmor weapons. For example,
a rifle squad may employ simultaneous fire with its M136 AT4 series to ensure rapid
destruction of an enemy armored fighting vehicle engaging a friendly position.
Alternating Fire
B-63. Pairs of elements continuously engage the same point or area target one at a time.
For example, an Infantry company may alternate fires of two platoons; an Infantry platoon
may alternate the fires of its squads; or an Infantry platoon may alternate the fires of a pair
of medium machine guns. Alternating fire permits the unit to maintain suppression for a
longer duration than does volley fire; it also forces the enemy to acquire and engage
alternating points of fire.
Observed Fire
B-64. Usually is used when the platoon is in protected defensive positions with
engagement ranges in excess of 2500 meters for stabilized systems and 1500 meters for
unstabilized systems. It can be employed between elements of the platoon, such as the
squad lasing and observing while the weapons squad engages. The platoon leader directs
one squad to engage. The remaining squads observe fires and prepare to engage on order
in case the engaging element consistently misses its targets, experiences a malfunction, or
runs low on ammunition. Observed fire allows for mutual observation and assistance while
protecting the location of the observing elements.
Sequential Fire
B-65. Entails the subordinate elements of a unit engaging the same point or area target
one after another in an arranged sequence. Sequential fire also can help to prevent the
waste of ammunition, as when a platoon waits to see the effects of the first Javelin before
firing another. Additionally, sequential fire permits elements already have fired to pass on
information they have learned from the engagement. An example would be a Soldier who
missed an enemy armored fighting vehicle with M136 AT4 series fires passing range and
lead information to the next Soldier preparing to engage the enemy armored fighting
vehicle with an M136 AT4 series.
Time of Suppression
B-66. Is the period, specified by the platoon leader, during which an enemy position or
force is required to be suppressed. Suppression time is typically dependent on the time it
will take a supported element to maneuver. Usually, a unit suppresses an enemy position
using the sustained rate of fire of its automatic weapons. In planning for sustained
suppression, a leader must consider several factors: the estimated time of suppression, the
size of the area being suppressed, the type of enemy force to be suppressed, range to the
target, rates of fire, and available ammunition quantities.
Reconnaissance by Fire
B-67. Is the process of engaging possible enemy locations to elicit a tactical response,
such as return fire or movement? This response permits the platoon leader and subordinate
leaders to make target acquisition and to mass fires against the enemy element. Typically,
the platoon leader directs a subordinate element to conduct the reconnaissance by fire. For
example, he may direct an overwatching squad to conduct the reconnaissance by fire
against a probable enemy position before initiating movement by a bounding element.
Fire Patterns
B-68. Fire patterns are a threat-based measure designed to distribute the fires of a unit
simultaneously among multiple, similar targets. Platoons use those most often to distribute
fires across an enemy formation. Leaders designate and adjust fire patterns based on terrain
and anticipated enemy formation. The basic fire patterns, illustrated in figure B-7 (page
B-22), include:
z Frontal fires.
z Cross fires.
z Depth fires.
B-69. Leaders may initiate frontal fire when targets are arrayed in front of the unit in a
lateral configuration. Weapons systems engage targets to their respective fronts. For
example, the left flank weapon engages the left-most target; the right flank weapon
engages the right-most target. As weapons systems destroy targets, weapons shift fires
toward the center of the enemy formation from near too far.
B-70. Leaders initiate cross fire when targets are arrayed laterally across the unit’s front
in a manner permitting diagonal fires at the enemy’s flank, or when obstructions prevent
unit weapons from firing frontally. Right flank weapons engage the left-most targets; left
flank weapons engage the right-most targets. Firing diagonally across an engagement area
provides more flank shots, thus increasing the chance of kills; it also reduces the possibility
of the enemy detecting friendly elements should the enemy continue to move forward. As
friendly elements destroy targets, weapons shift fires toward the center of the enemy
formation.
B-71. Leaders initiate depth fire when enemy targets disperse in-depth, perpendicular to
the unit. Center weapons engage the closest targets; flank weapons engage deeper targets.
As the unit destroys targets, weapons shift fires toward the center of the enemy formation.
Target Array
B-72. Target array enables the leader to distribute fires when the enemy force is
concentrated and terrain-based controls are inadequate. Forces create this threat-based
distribution measure by superimposing a quadrant pattern on the enemy formation.
Soldiers center the pattern the enemy formation, with the axes running parallel and
perpendicular to the enemy’s direction of travel. The target array fire control measure is
effective against an enemy with a well-structured organization and standardized doctrine.
However, it may prove less effective against an enemy presenting few organized
formations, or does not follow strict prescribed tactics. Leaders describe quadrants using
the quadrants’ relative locations. The examples in figure B-8 illustrate the target array
technique.
FIRE COMMANDS
B-73. Fire commands are oral orders issued by leaders to focus and distribute fires as
required achieving decisive effects against the enemy. They allow leaders to rapidly and
concisely articulate their firing instructions using a standard format (Refer to TC 3-20.31-4
for more information). Unit fire commands include these elements, which are discussed in
the following paragraphs:
z Alert.
z Weapon or ammunition (optional).
z Target description.
z Direction.
z Range (optional).
z Method
z Control (optional).
z Execution.
z Termination
ALERT
B-74. The alert specifies the elements directed to fire. It does not require the leader
initiating the command to identify him. Examples of the alert element (call signs and code
words based on unit SOP) include the following:
z “GUIDONS” (all subordinate elements).
z “RED” (1st platoon only).
TARGET DESCRIPTION
B-76. Target description designates which enemy elements are to be engaged. Leaders
may use the description to focus fires or achieve distribution. Examples of target
description include the following:
z “TROOPS IN TRENCH.”
z “BUNKER.”
z “PCs.”
DIRECTION
B-77. This element identifies the location of the target. There are several ways to designate
the location of target, including the following:
z Closest TRP. Example: “TRP 13.”
z Clock direction. Example: “ONE O’CLOCK.”
z Terrain quadrant. Example: “QUADRANT ONE.”
z Friendly quadrant. Example: “LEFT FRONT.”
z Target array. Example: “FRONT HALF.”
z Tracer on target. Example: “ON MY TRACER.”
z Laser pointer. Example: “ON MY POINTER.”
RANGE (OPTIONAL)
B-78. The range element identifies the distance to the target. Announcing range is not
necessary for systems ranging finder-equipped or employing command-guided or self-
guided munitions. For systems requiring manual range settings, leaders have a variety of
means for determining range, including the followingņ
z Predetermined ranges to target registration points or phase lines.
z Handheld range finders.
z Range stadia.
z Mil reticle.
METHOD
B-79. Method describes to the firer the way or method the target(s) are engaged. Leaders
use this element when presented with multiple targets to identify which target to engage
first. For collective fire commands, this can also indicate the fire pattern used to engage
the threats. Multiple methods may be used in one fire command.
CONTROL (OPTIONAL)
B-80. The platoon leader may use this optional element to direct desired target effects,
distribution methods, or engagement techniques. Subordinate leaders may include the
control element to supplement the platoon leader’s instructions and achieve distribution.
Examples of information specified in the control element include the following:
z Target array. Example: “FRONT HALF.”
z Fire pattern. Example: “FRONTAL.”
z Terrain quadrant. Example: “QUADRANT ONE.”
z Engagement priorities. Example: “M203/M320 ENGAGE BUNKERS; MACHINE
GUNS ENGAGE TROOPS.”
z Engagement technique. Example: “VOLLEY.”
z Target effect. Example: “AREA.”
EXECUTION
B-81. The execution element specifies when fires will be initiated. The platoon leader may
wish to engage immediately, delay initiation, or delegate authority to engage. Examples of
this element include the following:
z “FIRE.”
z “AT MY COMMAND.”
z “AT YOUR COMMAND.”
z “AT PHASE LINE ORANGE.”
TERMINATION
B-82. Termination is the ninth element of the fire command. It informs the Soldiers to
stop firing all weapons and systems in their control. All fire commands are terminated.
This command may be given by any Soldier or crewmember for any reason, typically
safety.
B-83. The leader that issued the fire command is required to terminate the fire command
at the completion of every engagement, regardless if another Soldier or crewmember
announced it. All fire commands, regardless of type or who issued them, are terminated
by the announcement of, CEASE FIRE.
SECTION V – RANGE CARD AND SECTOR SKETCHES
B-84. Range cards are used to record firing data for individual or crew-served weapons
and sector sketches are used to record a unit’s positioning of its weapons and direct fire
control measures.
RANGE CARDS
$SULO ATP 3-21.8 B-25
Appendix B
B-85. A range card (DA Form 5517, Standard Range Card) is a sketch of the assigned
area for a direct fire weapon system on a given sector of fire. (Refer to TC 3-21.75 for
more information.) A range card aids in planning and controlling fires and aids the crews
and squad gunners in acquiring targets during limited visibility. Range cards show possible
target areas and terrain features plotted with a firing position. The process of walking and
sketching the terrain to create a range card allows the individual Soldier or gunner to
become more familiar with his area of operation. He should continually assess the area
and, if necessary, update his range card. The range card is an aid for replacement personnel
or platoons or squads to move into the position and orient on their area of operation. The
individual Soldier or BFV gunner should make the range card so that he becomes more
familiar with the terrain in his area of operation. To prepare a range card, the individual
Soldier or BFV gunner must know the following information:
z Sectors of fire. A sector of fire is a piece of the battlefield for which a gunner is
responsible.
z Target reference points. Leaders designate natural or man-made features as
reference points. A Soldier uses these reference points for target acquisition and
range determination.
z Dead space. Dead space is an area that cannot be observed or covered by direct-
fire systems within the sector of fire.
z Maximum engagement line. The maximum engagement line is the depth of the
area and is normally limited to the maximum effective engagement range of the
weapons systems.
z Weapons reference point. The weapons reference point is an easily recognizable
terrain feature on the map used to assist leaders in plotting the vehicle, squad, or
weapon position.
B-86. The individual Soldier or gunner prepares two copies of the range card. If alternate
and supplementary firing positions are assigned, two copies are required for these as well.
A copy is kept with the vehicle or weapons position, and the other given to the section
leader for his sketch. The Soldier or gunner prepares the range card according to
TC 3-21.75.
B-87. An example range card for a BFV is shown in figure B-9 (page B-28). It
incorporates all of the standard components of a range card but with more detail for the
maximum engagement line and data section.
DATA SECTION
B-89. The gunner completes the position identification, date, weapon, and circle value
according to TC 3-21.75. The table information is as follows:
z Number. Start with left and right limits, then list TRPs and reference points in
numerical order.
z Direction and Deflection. The direction is in degrees and taken from a lensatic
compass. The most accurate technique is to have the gunner aim at the terrain
feature, and to have the driver dismount and align himself with the gun barrel and
the terrain feature to measure the azimuth. To achieve correct deflection and
elevation readings of the terrain feature, select TOW. Show the deflection reading
taken from the BFV’s azimuth indicator in the deflection block next to the magnetic
azimuth.
z Elevation. Show the gun elevation reading in tens or hundreds of mils. The smallest
increment of measure on the elevation scale is tens of mils. Any number other than
“0” is preceded by a “plus” or “minus” symbol to show whether the gun needs to
be elevated or depressed. Ammunition and range must be indexed to have an
accurate elevation reading.
z Range. This is the distance, in meters, from vehicle position to L and R limits and
TRPs and reference points.
z Ammunition. List types of ammunition used.
z Description. List the name of the object.
z Remarks. Enter the weapons reference point data. As a minimum, weapons
reference point data include a description of what the weapons reference point is, a
six-digit or eight-digit grid coordinate of the weapons reference point, the magnetic
azimuth and the distance from the weapons reference point to the vehicle position.
SECTOR SKETCHES
B-90. Individual Soldiers in squads and BFV gunners prepare range cards. Squad and
platoon leaders prepare sector sketches. Section leaders may have to prepare sector
sketches if they are assigned separate positions. The platoon leader reviews his squad’s,
and if applicable section’s, sector sketches and ensures the sketches are accurate and meet
his requirements. If he finds gaps or other flaws, the platoon leader adjusts weapons
locations within the area of operation. Once the platoon leader approves the squad and
section sector sketches, he prepares a consolidated report for the company team
commander and incorporates this into a consolidated platoon sector sketch. The platoon
leader or platoon sergeant physically prepares the platoon sector sketch. The sector sketch
can be on acetate taped to a map or it can be a hand drawn sketch. Accurate and detailed
sketches aid in direct fire planning, and in direct fire control and distribution.
C-1. Fire planning starts as soon as the leader gets a mission. Once begun, fire planning
continues through the operation’s completion. The primary aim of fire planning is to
develop how fire is to be massed, distributed and controlled to best support the leader’s
concept of the operation. (See table C-1, page C-2, for capabilities of indirect fire support.)
C-2. Fires are either targets of opportunity, or planned targets. Targets of opportunity are
not planned in advance, but are engaged as they present themselves in accordance with
established engagement criteria and ROE. Planned targets are ones on which fires are
prearranged, although the degree of this prearrangement may vary. The degree of
prearrangement influences the time it takes to receive fires. The greater the
prearrangement, the faster the reaction time. The subject of this section is planned fires.
C-3. Planned targets are categorized as scheduled, or on-call. Scheduled fires are fired
in accordance with a pre-established time schedule and sequence. On-call targets are fired
in response to a request for fires. Priority targets are a special type of on-call target. Priority
targets have quick reaction times because the firing unit has guns set on a specific target
when not engaged in other fire missions.
C-4. Fires must be integrated and synchronized in time, space, and purpose over the
entire concept of the operation. Integration means all available assets are planned and used
throughout an operation. Synchronization means these assets are sequenced in time, space,
and purpose in an optimal manner, producing complementary and reinforcing effects of
the maneuver element.
CAS from a supporting unit, the leader normally receives someone from that organization
to assist them. Attached fire support team and Joint Terminal Attack Controllers are
examples. Developing the concept of fire should be fairly straight forward during
deliberate operations because of the ability to conduct reconnaissance, planning, and
preparation. However, during hasty operations the unit may have to rely on its internal
SOPs and more hands on control by the leader.
DEFENSIVE ECHELONMENT
C-9. In defensive missions, echeloning fires are scheduled based on their optimum
ranges to maintain continuous fires on the enemy, disrupting his formation and maneuver.
Echelonment of fires in the defense places the enemy under increasing volumes of fire as
he approaches a defensive position. Aircraft and long-range indirect fire rockets and
artillery deliver deep supporting fires. Close supporting fires such as final protective fires
are integrated closely with direct fire weapons such as Infantry weapons, tank support, and
antiarmor weapons systems. Figure C-1 illustrates an example of defensive echelonment.
OFFENSIVE ECHELONMENT
C-10. In the offense, weapons are scheduled based on the point of a predetermined safe
distance away from maneuvering friendly troops. When scheduled, fires provide
protection for friendly forces as they move to and assault an objective. They also allow
friendly forces to get in close with minimal casualties and prevent the defending enemy
from observing and engaging the assault by forcing him to take cover. The overall
objective of offensive scheduled fires is to allow the friendly force to continue the advance
unimpeded. (See figure C-2, page C-5.)
to cease all fires on the objective. Direct fire assets in the form of supporting fires also are
maintained until the final assault, then ceased or shifted to targets beyond the objective.
Figure C-4. 81-mm mortars shift, 60-mm mortars and supporting fires begin
target information to ensure fire is equally distributed across the entire unit’s area
of operations and sufficient control measures are established.
z Completes the unit’s fire plan and gives a sketch to his higher headquarters.
C-16. In defensive missions, fires are planned in three locations – in front of the unit’s
position, on the position final protective fires, and behind the position. Figure C-7 shows
fires massed in front of a company-sized position. Fire plans are best developed using the
seven steps of engagement area development technique:
(1) Identify likely enemy avenues of approach.
(2) Identify the enemy scheme of maneuver.
(3) Determine where to kill the enemy.
(4) Emplace weapon systems.
(5) Plan and integrate obstacles.
(6) Plan and integrate indirect fires
(7) Conduct rehearsals.
in the engagement area to achieve the unit's purpose. Completing the steps of engagement
area development is not a lengthy process. Particularly at the Infantry platoon level,
engagement area development can occur rapidly without an elaborate decisionmaking
process.
Table C-2. Normal final protective fires dimensions for each number of
mortars
RISK RISK
NUMBER
WIDTH DEPTH ESTIMATED ESTIMATED
WEAPON OF
(METERS) (METERS) DISTANCE, DISTANCE,
TUBES
.1% PI 10% PI
MORTARS
120 mm 4 300 75 400 m 100 m
120 mm 2 150 75
81 mm 4 150 50 230 m 80 m
81 mm 2 75 50
60 mm 2 60 30 175 m 65 m
LEGEND
m – meters; mm – millimeters
C-25. Offensive fire planning is divided into two categories ʊ preparatory and supporting
fires. The concept of fires has artillery and mortars in support of an attack to gain and
maintain fire superiority on the objective until the last possible moment. When this indirect
fire ceases, the enemy should be stunned and ineffective for a few moments. Take full
advantage of this period by executing any or all of the following:
z Combat vehicles. Vehicles used in the attack, or as direct fire support, continue to
give close support.
z Maintaining fire superiority. Small-arms fire from local and internal support by fire
is continued as long as possible.
z Maneuver elements. Assaulting troops must try to fire as they advance. Troops must
observe fire discipline, as in many cases fire control orders will not be possible.
They must not arrive at the objective without ammunition.
z Audacity. Where the ground and vegetation do not prohibit movement, leading
sections should move quickly over the last 30 or 40 meters to the enemy positions
to minimize exposure.
C-26. When planning fires for the offense, leaders verify the fire element’s task
organization and ensure their plans coordinate measures for the attack, site exploitation,
pursuit, and contingency plans. Leaders develop or confirm with the responsible level
authority supporting systems are positioned and repositioned to ensure continuous fires
throughout the operation. Mutual support of fire systems promotes responsive support and
provides the commanders of maneuver units freedom of action during each critical event
of the engagement or battle
C-27. There exists a diverse variety of munitions and weapon systems, direct and indirect,
to support close offensive missions. To integrate direct and indirect fire support, the leader
must understand the mission, commander’s intent, concept of the operation, and critical
tasks to be accomplished. The leader plans fires to focus on enemy capabilities and systems
being neutralized. Critical tasks include:
z Continuous in-depth support (accomplished by proper positioning of systems).
z Isolating enemy forces.
z Softening enemy defenses by delivering preparatory fires.
z Suppressing and obscuring enemy weapon systems to reduce enemy standoff
capabilities.
z Interdicting enemy counterattack forces, isolating the defending force, and
preventing its reinforcement and resupply.
SECTION II – TARGET EFFECTS PLANNING
C-28. Not only must indirect fire support planners determine what enemy targets to hit,
and when, but also must decide how to attack each enemy target. Leaders should consider
all the aspects of target effects when planning fires. Although this section is specific to
mortars, the following concepts generally apply to most indirect fires . (Refer to ATP 3-
09.32 for more information.)
HIGH-EXPLOSIVE AMMUNITION
C-29. When mortar rounds impact they throw fragments in a pattern never truly circular,
and may even travel irregular, based on the round’s angle of fall, the slope of the terrain,
and type soil. However, for planning purposes, each mortar HE round is considered to
have a circular lethal bursting area. Figure C-10 shows a scale representation of the lethal
bursting areas of mortar rounds.
FUZE SETTING
C-30. The decision concerning what fuze setting to use depends on the position of the
enemy.
C-31. Exposed enemy troops standing up are best engaged with impact or near surface
burst fuze settings. The round explodes on, or near, the ground. Shell fragments travel
outward perpendicular to the long axis of the standing target. (See figure C-11, page C-18.)
in open fighting positions, the charge with the lowest angle of fall should be chosen. It
produces almost two times as much effect as the same round falling with the steepest angle.
C-39. If the enemy has prepared fighting positions with overhead cover, only impact-
fuzed and delay-fuzed rounds will have much effect. Proximity-fuzed rounds can restrict
the enemy’s ability to move from position to position, but they will cause few, if any,
casualties. Impact-fuzed rounds cause some blast and suppressive effect. Delay-fuzed
rounds can penetrate and destroy a position but must achieve a direct hit. Only the 120-mm
mortar with a delay-fuze setting can damage a Soviet-style strongpoint defense. Heavy
bunkers cannot be destroyed by light or medium mortar rounds.
C-42. The bursting WP round provides a screening, incendiary, marking, and casualty-
producing effect. It produces a localized, instantaneous obscurants cloud by scattering
burning WP particles.
C-43. The WP round is used mainly to produce immediate, close point obscuration. It can
be used to screen the enemy’s field of fire for short periods, which allows troops to
maneuver against him. The 60-mm WP round is not sufficient to produce a long-lasting,
wide-area obscurants screen, but the much larger WP round from the heavy mortar is.
C-44. WP rounds generally should not be used solely to produce casualties due to the law
of war principle of unnecessary suffering. Unnecessary suffering would be implicated
because of the persistent burning WP causes in the wounds it produces and the availability
of a superior round for producing casualties, the HE round. While the bursting WP round
can produce casualties among exposed enemy troops the casualty-producing radius of the
WP round is much less than that of the HE round. Generally, more casualties can be
produced by firing HE ammunition than by firing WP. A few WP rounds mixed into a fire
mission of HE rounds for a valid purpose (that is target marking) may increase the
suppressive effect of the fire because of the significant psychological effect a WP burst
may have on exposed troops.
C-45. When WP is used for its incendiary and casualty-producing effects it should not be
used against the civilian population, or civilian objects. The Law of Armed Conflict also
prohibits the use of incendiary weapons against military objectives located in
"concentrations of civilians," unless the military objective is separated sufficiently from
civilians and civilian objects to prevent collateral damage.
C-46. The WP rounds can be used to mark targets, especially for attack by aircraft. Base-
ejecting obscurants rounds, such as the 81-mm M819 red phosphorous round, produce a
dispersed obscurants cloud, normally too indistinct for marking targets.
C-47. The effects of atmospheric stability can determine whether mortar obscurants is
effective at all or, if effective, how much ammunition will be needed:
z During unstable conditions, mortar obscurants and white phosphorous rounds are
almost ineffective the obscurant does not spread but often climbs straight up and
quickly dissipates.
z Under moderately unstable atmospheric conditions, base-ejecting obscurants’
rounds are more effective than bursting white phosphorous rounds. The M819 red
phosphorous round of the M252 mortar screens for over 2 and a half minutes.
z Under stable conditions, both red phosphorous and white phosphorous rounds are
effective.
z The higher the humidity, the better the screening effects of mortar rounds.
C-48. The M819 red phosphorous round loses up to 35 percent of its screening ability if
the ground in the target area is covered with water or deep snow. During extremely cold
and dry conditions over snow, up to four times the number of obscurant’s rounds than
expected may be needed to create an adequate screen. The higher the wind velocity, the
more bursting WP rounds are, and less effective burning obscurant’s rounds become.
C-49. If the terrain in the target area is swampy, rain-soaked, or snow-covered, then
burning obscurant’s rounds may not be effective. These rounds produce obscurants by
ejecting felt wedges soaked in red phosphorus. These wedges then burn on the ground,
producing a dense, long-lasting cloud. If the wedges fall into mud, water, or snow, they
can be extinguished. Shallow water can reduce the obscurants produced by these rounds
by as much as 50 percent. Bursting WP rounds are affected little by the terrain in the target
area, except deep snow and cold temperatures which can reduce the obscurants cloud by
about 25 percent.
C-50. Although bursting WP rounds are not designed to cause casualties, the fragments
of the shell casing and bits of burning WP can cause injuries. Burning obscurant rounds
do not cause casualties and have little suppressive effect.
ILLUMINATION
C-51. Illumination rounds can be used to disclose enemy formations, to signal, or to mark
targets. There are illumination rounds available for all mortars.
C-52. The 60-mm illumination round available now is the standard cartridge, illuminating,
M83A3. This round has a fixed time of delay between firing and start of the illumination.
The illumination lasts for about 25 seconds, providing moderate light over a square
kilometer.
C-53. The 60-mm illumination round does not provide the same degree of illumination as
do the rounds of the heavier mortars and field artillery. However, it is sufficient for local,
point illumination. The small size of the round can be an advantage where illumination is
desired in an area but adjacent friendly forces to not want to be seen. The 60-mm
illumination round can be used without degrading the night vision devices of adjacent
units.
C-54. The medium and heavy mortars can provide excellent illumination over wide areas.
The 120-mm mortar illumination round provides one million candlepower for 60 seconds.
C-55. The M203/M320 40-mm grenades, as well as all mortars have the capability to
deliver infrared illumination rounds in addition to the more common white light.
high winds. The obscurants cloud from a WP round will be blown quickly downwind. The
obscurants from the burning illumination round will continue to originate from the same
point, regardless of the wind.
C-61. Army attack aviation uses maneuver to concentrate and sustain combat power at
critical times and places to find, fix, and destroy enemy forces. Aviation units design,
tailor, and configure their assets for specific operational support based on mission
guidance and specific theater in which the units operate. (See chapter 1, figure 1-6 of this
publication for information on a 5-line attack aviation call for fire briefing ground to air).
EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS
C-63. Mission success in attack aviation call for fire employment depends on leaders
conducting detailed planning and coordination between the aerial attack team and ground
unit already engaged in close combat. Once execution begins, there must be integration of
the fires and movement of both maneuver and aerial elements. (See table C-4 for attack
aviation call for fire capabilities.)
C-64. Planning for attack reconnaissance helicopter support usually begins at battalion
level or above. The battalion provides the aviation brigade or Infantry battalion with
information on locations, routes, and communications before the attack team’s departure
from its AA. As part of this effort, the Infantry platoons usually provide information for
attack aviation call for fire employment. All platoon Soldiers should familiarize
themselves with the procedures used to call for attack reconnaissance helicopter support.
If attack reconnaissance helicopter assets are working for their battalion, the platoon and
company provides suppressive fires on any known or suspected threat air defense artillery
locations.
C-65. Critical elements of the planning process are the procedures and resources used in
marking and identifying targets and friendly positions. Leaders consider these factors
thoroughly, regardless of the time available to the ground and air commanders.
C-66. The aerial attack team coordinates directly with the lowest-level unit in contact on
the Infantry platoon and company radio command net. Whenever practicable, before the
attack team launches the attack aviation call for fire operation, the leader or commander
conducts final coordination with the attack reconnaissance helicopters in a concealed
position known as the aerial holding area. The holding area is a point in space within the
supported unit’s area of operation oriented toward the threat; it allows the attack team to
receive requests for immediate attack aviation call for fire and expedite the attack. The
aerial holding area could be an alternate battle position positioned out of range of the
threat’s direct fire and indirect fire weapons ranges.
C-67. Final coordination between the ground and helicopter units must include agreement
on methods of identifying and marking friendly and threat positions. This should take
advantage of the equipment and capabilities of the attack team, including the forward-
looking infrared system, the thermal imaging system, and night vision devices.
C-68. Coordination also should cover the battle position, and assault by fire, or support-
by-fire positions used by the attack reconnaissance helicopters. The leader should offset
these positions from the ground maneuver unit to maximize the effects of the attack team’s
weapons and to minimize the risk of fratricide and friendly fire. To prevent indirect fires
within the area of operation or zone from posing a danger to the helicopters, the
commander informs direct support artillery and organic mortars of the aerial positions.
(Refer to ATP 3-09.32 for more information.)
Security
Security is the measures taken by the platoon or squad to protect it
against all acts designed to impair its effectiveness. Security
measures are an inherent aspect of all military operations and can
be moving or stationary.
SECTION I – SECURITY TASKS
D-1. Infantry platoons and squads conduct security tasks independently or part of a larger
force. Security tasks are screen, guard, cover, area security, and local security. These tasks
are executed in the larger unit’s security zone (advance, flank, or rear of the main body).
Leaders given these tasks or participating in the task of a larger unit must, at a minimum,
understand their engagement criteria and whether or not to become decisively engaged.
(Refer to FM 3-90-2 for more information.) Security tasks include the following options:
z Screen. Screen is a security task that primarily provides early warning to the
protected force. (Refer to FM 3-90-2 for more information.) A screen at platoon
level may consist of a combination of observation post and security patrols.
z Guard. Guard is a term with a dual meaning; the difference is the size of the element.
When used to refer to individuals, a guard is the individual responsible to keep
watch over, protect, shield, defend, warn, or duties prescribed by general orders or
special orders. Guards also are referred to as a sentinels, sentries, or lookouts. When
used in reference to units, a guard is a security task to protect the main force by
fighting to gain time while also observing and reporting information and preventing
enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body. Units
conducting a guard mission cannot operate independently because they rely upon
fires and functional and multifunctional support assets of the main body. (Refer to
FM 3-90-2 for more information.) A platoon participating in a guard tasks may
conduct a combination of observation posts, battle positions, combat patrols,
reconnaissance patrols, or movement to contact for protection.
z Cover. Cover is a security task to protect the main body by fighting to gain time
while also observing and reporting information and preventing the enemy ground
observation and direct fire against the main body for an extended period of time.
(Refer to FM 3-90-2 for more information.) Ordinarily only brigade -sized and
larger elements have the assets necessary to conduct this type of security operation.
z Area security. Area security is a security task conducted to protect friendly forces,
installations, routes, and actions within a specific area. (Refer to FM 3-90-2 for
more information.) During conventional operations area security refers the security
measures used in friendly controlled areas. Many of the tasks traditionally
associated with stability and small scale contingencies fall within the scope of area
security. These include road blocks, traffic control post, route security, convoy
security, and searches.
z Local security. Local security is a security task that includes low-level security
activities conducted near a unit to prevent surprise by the enemy. (ADRP 3-90)
Local security measures are the same as those outlined for exterior guards in
FM 22-6.
D-2. The screen, guard, and cover are the security measures used primarily by battalion-
sized units to secure themselves from conventional enemy units. These measures,
respectively, contain increasing levels of combat power and provide increasing levels of
security of the main body. Along with the increase of combat power, there is an increase
in the unit’s requirement to fight for time, space, and information on the enemy.
Conceptually, the measures serve the same purpose as the local security measures by
smaller units. For example, a battalion will employ a screen for early warning while a
platoon or squad will emplace an observation post. The purpose is the same, early warning,
only the degree and scale are different.
D-3. Local and area security are related since they both focus on the enemy threat within
a specified area. Again, the difference is one of degree and scale. Local security is
concerned with protecting the unit from enemy in the immediate area, whereas area
security is concerned with enemy anywhere in the leader’s area of operation.
SECURITY FUNDAMENTALS
D-4. The techniques employed to secure a larger unit are generally the same as those of
the offense and defense. It is the application of those techniques that differ. Table D-1 lists
the most common techniques used, information required executing the operation, and
principles used to employ them.
SCREEN
D-5. A screen primarily provides early warning to the main body. A unit performing a
screen observes, identifies, and reports enemy actions. Screen is defensive in nature but
not passive in execution. It is employed to cover gaps between forces, exposed flanks, or
the rear of stationary or moving forces. Generally, a screening force fights in a limited
engagement where it can quickly destroy an enemy element without revealing its own
position or engages high payoff targets the severely degrades the enemies capabilities.
However, it may engage enemy reconnaissance elements within its capability
(counterreconnaissance). A screen provides the least amount of protection of all security
missions. It does not have the combat power to develop the situation. It is used when the
likelihood of enemy contact is remote, the expected enemy force is small, or the friendly
main body needs only a minimum amount of time once it is warned to react
D-6. Screen tasks are to—
z Allow no enemy ground element to pass through the screen undetected and
unreported.
STATIONARY SCREEN
D-7. When tasked to conduct a stationary screen (see figure D-1), the leader first
determines likely avenues of approach into the main body’s perimeter. The leader
determines the location of potential observation posts along these avenues of approach.
Ideally, the leader assigns observation posts in-depth if he has the assets available. If
necessary, he identifies additional control measures (named areas of interest, phase lines,
TRP, or checkpoints) to assist in controlling observation, tracking of the enemy, and
movement of his own forces. The unit conducts mounted and foot patrols to cover ground
not being observed from observation posts. Once the enemy is detected from an
observation post, the screening force may engage him with indirect fires. This prevents the
enemy from penetrating the screen line and does not compromise the location of the
observation post. If enemy pressure threatens the security of the screening force, the unit
reports the situation to the controlling headquarters and requests permission to displace to
a subsequent screen line or follow-on mission.
MOVING SCREEN
D-8. Platoons may conduct a moving screen to the flanks or rear of the main body force.
The movement of the screen is tied to time and distance factors associated with the
movement of the friendly main body.
D-9. Responsibilities for a moving flank screen begin at the front of the main body’s lead
combat element and end at the rear of the protected force. In conducting a moving flank
screen, the unit either occupies a series of temporary observation posts along a designated
screen line to overwatch the main body, or if the main body is moving too fast, continues
to move while maintaining surveillance. The screening force uses one or more of the three
basic movement techniques to control movement along the screened flank (traveling,
traveling overwatch, and bounding overwatch).
GUARD
D-10. A guard differs from a screen in a guard force contains sufficient combat power to
defeat, cause the withdrawal of, or fix the lead elements of an enemy ground force before
it can engage the main body with direct fires. A guard force uses all means at its disposal,
including decisive engagement, to prevent the enemy from penetrating the security zone.
It operates within the range of the main body’s indirect fire weapons, deploying over a
narrower front than a comparable-size screening force to permit concentrating combat
power. The three types of guard operations are: advance; flank; and rear guard.
D-11. Platoons as part of a company can be assigned a guard mission conduct all of the
measures associated with a screen. Additionally they—
z Destroy the enemy advance guard.
z Cause the enemy main body to deploy, report its disposition, composition, strength,
and capabilities.
COVER
D-12. The covering force, or portions of it, often becomes decisively engaged with enemy
forces. Therefore, the covering force must have substantial combat power to engage the
enemy and accomplish its mission. The platoon along with the company team may
participate in covering force operations but does not conduct them on its own. The
covering force develops the situation earlier than a screen or a guard force. It fights longer
and more often and defeats larger enemy forces.
AREA SECURITY
D-13. Area security is used by units to secure their area of operation from smaller enemy
units (special purpose forces, guerrillas).
D-14. During area security operations civilians will be present. Therefore, leaders must
ensure Soldiers understand current ROE. However, leaders always are responsible for
protecting their forces and consider this responsibility when applying the ROE.
Restrictions on conducting operations and using force must be explained clearly and
understood by everyone. Soldiers must understand their actions, no matter how minor,
may have far-reaching positive or negative effects. They must realize both friendly or
hostile media and adversary information activities quickly can exploit their actions,
especially the manner in which they treat the civilian population.
D-15. Leaders executing area security measures in a densely populated area must assess
the effect of imposing a degree of control on both traffic and pedestrians carefully. For
instance, during the rush hour period, however efficient the traffic control point, a crowd
of impatient civilians or cars and trucks can quickly build-up and precipitate the very
situation the traffic control point leader is trying to avoid.
D-16. Population and resource control operations cause inconvenience and disruption to
all aspects of community life. Therefore, it is important members of the civil community
appreciate the purpose of such operations. In particular, they must understand control
measures are protective and not punitive. All personnel involved in operations designed to
ensure security must be thoroughly conversant with their duties and responsibilities. They
must be able to work quickly and methodically to prevent delay and disruption to
legitimate activities. They also must work to avoid unnecessary damage to personnel,
vehicles, and property. To achieve their purpose they must be thorough. Leaders, at all
levels, must ensure adequate security is in place to counter all assessed risks
LOCAL SECURITY
D-17. Local security prevents a unit from being surprised and is an important part of
maintaining the initiative. Local security includes local measure taken by units against
enemy actions. It involves avoiding detection by the enemy or deceiving the enemy about
friendly positions and intentions. It also includes finding any enemy forces in the
immediate vicinity and knowing as much about their positions and intentions as possible.
The requirement for maintaining local security is an inherent part of all operations. Table
D-2 lists a sample of active and passive local security measures.
Table D-2. Active and passive security measures
ACTIVE AND PASSIVE SECURITY MEASURES
Combat formations, movement techniques, movement to contact,
Active spoiling attacks.
Measures Moving as fast as conditions allow preventing enemy detection and
(moving) adaptation.
Skillful use of terrain.
Outside the perimeter:
Observation posts, security patrols.
Battle positions, combat patrols, and reconnaissance patrols.
Employing early warning devices.
Active Establishing roadblocks / checkpoints.
Measures Inside the perimeter:
(stationary) Establishing access points (entrance and exits).
Establishing the number and types of positions to be manned.
Establishing readiness control levels.
Designating a reserve/response force.
Establishing stand-to measures.
Camouflage, cover and concealment, and deception measures.
Passive
Signal security.
Measures
Noise and light discipline.
D-18. The observation post, the primary means of maintaining surveillance of an assigned
avenue or named areas of interest, is a position from where units observe the enemy and
direct and adjust indirect fires against him. From the observation post, platoons or squads
send SALUTE reports to their controlling headquarters when observing enemy activity.
it has limited flexibility, taking time to displace and limited firepower to protect itself if
detected.
D-21. The main advantages of a mounted observation post are the flexibility coming from
vehicle mobility as well as the additional combat power resident in the vehicle’s optics,
communications, weapons, and protection. The main disadvantage is vehicles inherently
are easier to detect and can prevent the unit from accomplishing its mission.
a position affording better survivability. This position should not attract attention or
skyline the observer.
z Observation posts should be placed no further than half maximum effective range
of the weapon system overwatching them assuming a clear line of fire. If the line of
fire is less than the maximum effective range then it should be no further than half
the distance than the farthest visible point.
decreases with time. Three or more Soldiers are required to increase security. For extended
periods (12 hours or more), the unit occupies long-duration observation post by squad-
sized units. Essential equipment of the observation post includes the following:
z Map of the area.
z Compass/GPS.
z Communications equipment.
z Observation devices (binoculars, observation telescope, thermal sights, and night
vision devices).
z Automated net control device essential information.
z Report formats contained in the SOP.
z Weapons.
z Protective obstacles and early warning devices.
z Camouflage, cover and concealment, and deception equipment as required.
z Lighting.
z Communications equipment.
z Handheld translation devices.
TYPES OF CHECKPOINTS
D-31. There are two types of checkpoints: deliberate and hasty.
DELIBERATE CHECKPOINT
D-32. A deliberate checkpoint is permanent or semi-permanent. It is established to control
the movement of vehicles and pedestrians, and to help maintain law and order. They
typically are constructed and employed to protect an operating base or well-established
roads. Like defensive positions, deliberate checkpoint should be improved continuously.
Deliberate checkpoints—
z Control all vehicle and pedestrian traffic so crowds cannot assemble.
z Allow known offenders or suspected enemy personnel to be arrested.
z Enforce curfews.
z Deter illegal movement.
z Prevent the movement of supplies to the enemy.
z Deny the enemy contact with the local inhabitants.
z Dominate the area around the checkpoint. (This includes maintaining law and order
by local patrolling to prevent damage to property or injury to persons.)
z Collect information.
HASTY CHECKPOINT
D-33. A hasty checkpoint differs from a deliberate checkpoint in it is not, in most cases,
preplanned. A hasty checkpoint usually will be activated as part of a larger tactical plan or
in reaction to hostile activities such as a bomb, mine incident, or sniper attack, and can be
lifted on the command of the controlling headquarters. A hasty checkpoint always will
have a specific task and purpose. Most often used to avoid predictability and targeting by
the enemy. It should be set up to last from five minutes to up to two hours using an ambush
mentality. The short duration reduces the risk of the enemy organizing an attack against
the checkpoint. The maximum time suggested of the checkpoint to remain in place would
be about eight hours, as this may be considered to be the limit of endurance of the units
conducting the checkpoint and may invite the checkpoint to enemy attacks.
D-34. Characteristics of a hasty checkpoint (see figure D-7) include:
z Located along likely enemy avenues of approach.
z Achieve surprise.
z Temporary.
z Unit is able to carry and erect construction materiels without additional assistance.
z Uses vehicles as an obstacle between the vehicles and personnel, and reinforces
them with concertina wire.
z Soldiers are positioned at each end of the checkpoint.
z Soldiers are covered by mounted or dismounted automatic weapons.
z Assault force/response force is concealed nearby to attack or assault in case the site
is attacked.
D-35. The hasty checkpoint’s success is brought about by swift and decisive operations.
In many cases, there may be no clear orders before the checkpoint is set up. Leaders must
rely on common sense and instinct to determine which vehicles or pedestrians to stop for
questioning or searching. They are moved quickly into position, thoroughly conducted,
and just as swiftly withdrawn when lifted or once the threat has passed .
PHYSICAL LAYOUT
D-36. A checkpoint should consist of four areas: canalization zone, turning or deceleration
zone, search zone, and safe zone. (See figure D-8, page D-16.)
z The reverse slope of a hill. (Hidden from the direction of the main flow of traffic.)
z Just beyond a sharp curve.
CANALIZATION ZONE
D-40. The canalization zone uses natural obstacles or artificial obstacles to canalize the
vehicles into the checkpoint:
z Place warning signs out forward of the checkpoint to warn drivers of the checkpoint
ahead (at least 100 meters).
z Canalize the vehicles so they have no way out until they have the consent of
personnel controlling the checkpoint.
z This zone encompasses the area from maximum range to maximum effective range
of your weapon systems. It usually consists of disrupting or turning obstacles.
SEARCH ZONE
D-43. The search zone is a relatively secure area where personnel and vehicles are
positively identified and searched. A decision is made to confiscate weapons and
contraband, detain a vehicle, or allow it to pass. The area is set up with a blocking obstacle
denying entry/exit without loss of life or equipment. When searching—
z Isolate the vehicle being checked from other cars by an obstacle of some type, which
is controlled by a Soldier.
z Emplace an overwatch position with a crew-served weapon in an elevated position
to cover the vehicle, particularly the driver. The crew-served weapon should be
mounted on a T/E and tripod.
D-44. The search zone is further subdivided into three subordinate areas:
z Personnel search zoneʊis where personnel are positively identified, searched, or
detained. This may include partitioned or screened areas to provide privacy,
especially when searching women and children. Use female Soldiers to search
women, if available.
z Vehicle search zoneʊ is where vehicles are positively identified, and searched.
z Reaction force zone ʊ is where a reaction force is located to reinforce the
checkpoint and immediately provide assistance using lethal and nonlethal force.
Additionally, engineers, and EOD personnel may be collocated here to assist in
analyzing and diffusing/destroying ammunition, demolitions, or IED traps. This
element is organized and equipped to conduct close combat. This element engages
in accordance with the established engagement criteria and ROE. This element has
a position which allows it to overwatch the checkpoint as well as block or detain
vehicles trying to avoid the checkpoint.
D-46. Placing the search area to the side of the road permits two-way traffic. If a vehicle
is rejected, it is turned back. If vehicle is accepted for transit, it is permitted to travel
through the position. If the vehicle is a threat, the checkpoint leader determines whether to
attack or apprehend.
D-47. When confronted by a potentially threatening vehicle, —
z The search element alerts the checkpoint leader, moves to a safe/fortified position,
and may engage or allow the vehicle to pass based on leader instructions and ROE.
z If the vehicle passes through the escape lane, the leader may direct the assault
element to engage the vehicle based on ROE.
SAFE ZONE
D-48. The safe zone is the assembly area for the checkpoint, which allows personnel to
eat, sleep, and recover in relative security.
TASK ORGANIZATION
D-49. The basic organization of a checkpoint includes a security element, a search
element, an assault element, and a mission command element. The actual strength and
composition of the force is determined by the nature of the threat, road layout, type of
checkpoint required, and anticipated number of vehicles to be processed. Table D-3 details
typical duties of these elements as well as a general list of do’s and don’ts.
Table D-3. Task organization
MISSION COMMAND
Overall Responsibility
Exercises mission command.
Maintains communications with controlling HQ.
Maintains a log of all activities.
Coordinates relief in place as required.
Coordinates linkups as required.
Coordinates local patrols.
Integrates reserve / quick response force.
If available, the mission command element should have a vehicle for patrolling, for moving
elements, or administrative actions.
SECURITY ELEMENT
D-56. The nature of the checkpoint makes it particularly vulnerable to enemy attack.
Protection should be provided for overall position as well as those of subordinate positions.
Concealed sentries should also be positioned on the approaches to the checkpoint to
observe and report approaching traffic, and to prevent persons or vehicles from evading
the checkpoint. When available, early warning devices or radar may be used to aid guards
on the approaches to the checkpoint.
D-57. The security element stays alert for changes of scenery around the checkpoint.
Crowds gathering for no apparent reason or media representatives waiting for an event are
all indicators something may happen.
ESCALATION OF FORCE
D-58. Escalation of force is a sequential action beginning with nonlethal force measures
(visual signals to include flags, spotlights, lasers and pyrotechnics) which can escalate to
lethal force measures to protect the force. Soldiers at the checkpoint must ensure they
follow ROE and EOF guidance when reacting to situations.
D-59. An imminent hostile threat can be engaged at any time, but if not yet determined to
be a threat, use reasonable non-deadly force or EOF as the situation dictates, to protect
yourself and to develop the situation.
D-60. Soldiers at every level must understand EOF procedures – before, during, and after
an EOF event; to include the possible Strategic Impacts of EOF incidents on Local
Nationals’ negative perceptions.
z Soldiers must train and rehearse EOF procedures.
z EOF never limits a Soldier’s inherent right to self-defense.
z All Soldiers understand in order to prevent hesitation.
z Leaders must include EOF in planning and preparation for operations.
z Correct equipment reduces unnecessary casualties.
D-61. The use of nonlethal weapons and munitions provide a safer, less-than-lethal
alternative to warn and deter individuals during potential EOF incidents. Units should use
nonlethal munitions and tools whenever possible during EOF incidents. Soldiers should
conduct proper training, familiarization, and certification with each type of nonlethal
munitions and tools prior to their use.
D-62. When time and circumstances permit;
z Use audible warning (horn, loudspeaker, flash/bang device, or siren).
z Use visual aids (lights, laser pointers, flares, colored flags, signs).
z Show weapon and demonstrate intent to use it.
z Use other non-lethal means (stop strips, physical barrier, vehicle, visual/audio
signal, signs).
z Fire disabling fire (tires, engine block, windows).
SEARCH ELEMENT
D-63. Soldiers may be required to conduct both vehicle and personnel searches at
checkpoint.
Vehicle Searches
D-64. Two members of the search team position themselves at both rear flanks of the
vehicle undergoing a search, putting the occupants at a disadvantage. These Soldiers
maintain eye contact with the occupants once they exit the vehicle and react to threat
attempts by the occupants during the vehicle search.
D-65. The actual search is conducted by two Soldiers. One Soldier conducts interior
searches; the other performs exterior searches. They instruct the occupants (with
interpreters if available) to exit the vehicle during the interior search and instruct the driver
to watch the vehicle search. Once the interior search is complete, they escort the driver to
the hood of the vehicle and instruct him to open it. After the engine compartment has been
examined, they instruct the driver to open the other outside compartments (tool boxes, gas
caps, trunks). The driver removes loose items not attached to the vehicle for inspection.
Search team members rotate positions to allow for mental breaks.
D-66. Soldiers use mirrors and metal detectors to thoroughly search each vehicle for
weapons, explosives, ammunition, and other contraband. Depending on the threat level,
the vehicle search area provides blast protection of the surrounding area.
Personnel Searches
D-67. Every attempt should be made for host-nation authorities to conduct, or at least
observe, searches of local nationals. Additionally, leaders must plan for same-gender
searches. Personnel searches are conducted only when proper authorization has been
obtained, usually from higher headquarters, according to the ROE, Status of Forces
Agreement, or host nation agreements. This does not preclude units from searching
individuals posing a threat to U.S. or other friendly forces.
D-68. Units may have to detain local nationals who become belligerent or uncooperative
at checkpoint. The OPORD and ROE must address the handling of such personnel. In self-
protection measures should be planned and implemented according to the orders from
higher headquarters.
D-69. Searches of local nationals should be performed in a manner preserving the respect
and dignity of the individual. Special consideration must be given to local customs and
national cultural differences. In many cultures it is offensive for men to touch or even talk
to women in public. Searchers must be polite, considerate, patient, and tactful. Leaders
must make every effort not to unnecessarily offend the local population. Such situations
can have a negative impact on peace operations and can quickly change popular opinion
toward U.S. and other friendly forces.
D-70. Each captive is searched for weapons and ammunition, items of intelligence value,
and other inappropriate items. Use of digital cameras will record detainees, weapons,
ammunition, and evidence of contraband.
D-71. When possible, conduct same gender searches. However, this may not always be
possible due to speed and security considerations. If females are not available, use medics
or NCOs with witnesses. Perform mixed gender searches in a respectful manner using all
possible measures to prevent actions interpreted as sexual molestation or assault. The
onsite supervisor carefully controls Soldiers doing mixed-gender searches to prevent
allegations of sexual misconduct.
D-72. Soldiers conduct individual searches in search teams consisting of the following:
z Searcher. A searcher is the Soldier actually conducting the search. He is in the
highest-risk position.
z Security. Security includes at least one Soldier to provide security. He maintains
eye contact with the individual being searched.
D-75. Convoy security missions are conducted when insufficient friendly forces are
available to continuously secure lines of communication in an area of operation. They also
may be conducted in conjunction with route security missions. A convoy security force
operates to the front, flanks, and rear of a convoy element moving along a designated route.
Convoy security missions are offensive in nature and orient on the force being protected.
D-76. To protect a convoy, the security force must accomplish the following critical tasks:
z Reconnoiter and determine the trafficability of the route the convoy will travel.
z Clear the route of obstacles or positions from where the threat could influence
movement along the route.
z Provide early warning and prevent the threat from impeding, harassing, containing,
seizing, or destroying the convoy.
z Protect the escorted force from enemy contact
z React decisively to enemy contact
D-77. Company-sized units utilizing its platoons and larger organizations usually perform
convoy or route security missions. Convoy security provides protection for a specific
convoy. Route security aims at securing a specific route for a designated period, during
which multiple convoys may use the route. These missions include numerous tasks such
as reconnaissance, security, escorting, and establishing a combat reaction force. These
tasks become missions for subordinate units. The size of the unit performing the convoy
or route security operation depends on many factors, including the size of the convoy,
terrain, and length of the route. For example, a platoon or squad can escort convoys,
perform route reconnaissance, and establish traffic control post along main supply routes.
ORGANIZATION OF FORCES
D-78. During convoy security operations, the convoy security commander and leaders
must establish and maintain security in all directions and throughout the platoon. As noted,
several factors, including convoy size affect this disposition. The vital consideration is
whether the unit is operating as part of a larger escort force or is executing the escort
mission independently. Additional considerations include the employment of rifle squads
during the mission. (Fire teams ride in escorted vehicles.)
D-79. The unit also should be reinforced with engineers to reduce obstacles along the
route. Higher headquarters should coordinate additional information collection assets to
support the security mission. unmanned aircraft system s or aerial reconnaissance should
reconnoiter the route in advance of the unit’s lead elements.
D-80. When the platoon executes a convoy escort mission independently, the convoy
commander and platoon leader disperse tactical vehicles throughout the convoy formation
to provide forward, flank, and rear security. Engineer assets, if available, should be located
near the front to respond to obstacles. At times, engineer assets may be required to move
ahead of the convoy with scouts to proof the convoy route. In some independent escort
missions, variations in terrain along the route may require the unit to operate using a
modified traveling overwatch technique. In it, one section leads the convoy while the other
trails the convoy. Dispersion between vehicles in each section is sufficient to provide flank
security. The terrain may not allow the trail section to overwatch the movement of the lead
section.
D-81. When sufficient forces are available, the convoy security should be organized into
four elements: reconnaissance element; screen element; escort element; and a reaction
element. (See figure D-10, page D-26.) The platoon or squad may be assigned one of the
four tasks, but as a general rule, probably cannot be assigned all four.
ADVANCED GUARD
D-82. The advance guard reconnoiters and proofs the convoy route. The advanced guard
element performs tasks associated with movement to contact and zone or route
reconnaissance forward of the convoy. It searches for signs of enemy activity such as
ambushes and obstacles. This element focuses on identifying enemy forces able to
influence the route, route trafficability, dislocated civilians or civilian traffic disrupting
movement. Engineers are attached to the unit to assist reconnoitering and classifying
bridges, fords, and obstacles along the route. The advanced guard normally operates from
three to four kilometers ahead of the main body of the convoy. If available, unmanned
aircraft system s or aerial reconnaissance should precede the reconnaissance element by
five to eight kilometers dependent on the terrain and visibility conditions.
D-83. Within its capabilities, the advanced guard attempts to clear the route and provides
the convoy commander with early warning before the arrival of the vehicle column. In
some cases, an individual vehicle, a squad, or a platoon-sized element may be designated
as part of the advanced guard and may receive additional combat vehicle support (tank
with a mine plow, or mine roller). The leader plans for integrating engineer assets to aid
ESCORT ELEMENT
D-86. The escort element provides close-in protection to the convoy. The convoy may be
made of many types of vehicles, including military sustainment and mission command as
well as civilian trucks and buses. The escort element also may provide a reaction force to
assist in repelling or destroying threat contact. The unit assigned the escort mission to
provide local security throughout the length of the convoy. The escort element defeats
close ambushes and marks bypasses or breaches obstacles identified by reconnaissance as
necessary. If the reaction force is not available in sufficient time, the escort element may
be required to provide a reaction force to defeat far ambushes or block attacking threat
forces. The platoon or squad may perform a convoy escort mission either independently
or as part of a larger unit’s convoy security mission. Aviation units also may be a part of
the escort force and leaders of both ground and air must be able to contact each other
quickly.
RESPONSE FORCE
D-87. The response force provides firepower and support to the elements above in order
to assist in developing the situation or conducting a hasty operation. It also may perform
duties of the escort element. The reserve will move with the convoy or be located at a
staging area close enough to provide immediate interdiction against the enemy.
MISSION COMMAND
D-88. Because of the task organization of the convoy escort mission, mission command
is especially critical. The relationship between the platoon or squad and convoy
commander must provide unity of command and effort if combat operations are required
during the course of the mission. In most cases, the unit will execute the escort mission
under the control of the security force commander, who is usually under operational
control or attached to the convoy commander.
D-89. The leader should coordinate with the security force commander or the escorted
unit to obtain or exchange the following information:
z Time and place of linkup and orders brief.
z Number and type of vehicles to be escorted.
z High value assets within the convoy.
z Available weapon systems, ammunition, and ordnance (crew-served, squad, and
individual).
z Vehicle maintenance status and operating speeds.
z Convoy personnel roster.
z Unit’s or escorted unit SOP, as necessary.
z Rehearsal time and location.
D-90. It is vital the convoy commander issues a complete movement OPORD to all
convoy vehicle commanders before executing the mission. This is important because the
convoy may itself be task-organized from a variety of units, and some vehicles may not
have tactical radios or mission command systems. The order should follow the standard
five-paragraph OPORD format (see table D-4, pages D-10 through D-11), but special
emphasis should be placed on—
z Route of march (including a strip map for each vehicle commander).
z Order of march.
z Actions at halts.
z Actions in case of vehicle breakdown.
z Actions on contact.
z Chain of command.
z Communication and signal information.
ACTIONS AT AN AMBUSH
D-92. An ambush is one of the most effective ways to interdict a convoy. Reaction to an
ambush must be immediate, overwhelming, and decisive. Actions on contact must be
planned for and rehearsed so they can be executed quickly.
D-93. In almost all situations, the unit will take several specific, instantaneous actions
when it reacts to an ambush. (See figures D-12 and D-13, page D-32.) However, if the
convoy is moving fuel and other logistics, the best method might be to suppress the enemy,
continue to move and report. These steps, illustrated in figure D-12 (page D-32) in include
the following:
z As soon as they encounter an enemy force, the escort vehicles take action toward
the enemy. They seek covered positions between the convoy and enemy; suppress
the enemy with the highest volume of fire permitted by the ROE. Contact reports
are submitted to higher headquarters as quickly as possible.
z The convoy commander retains control of the convoy vehicles and continues to
move them along the route at the highest possible speed.
z Convoy vehicles, if armed, may return fire only if the escort has not positioned itself
between the convoy and the enemy force.
z Leaders may request damaged or disabled vehicles be abandoned and pushed off
the route.
z The escort leader uses SPOTREP to keep the convoy security commander informed.
If necessary, the escort leader or the convoy commander requests support from the
reaction force and or calls for and adjusts indirect fires.
Note. Indirect fire support for areas behind the forward line of troops is
planned and coordinated on an area basis (such as a base operations center,
base cluster operations center, or rear area operations center). This planning
may provide direct and indirect fire support to main supply routes (MSRs) or
other routes. Convoy commanders are responsible of direct and indirect fire
support plans for their convoy and for ensuring escort security leaders are
familiar with the plan.
D-94. Once the convoy is clear of the kill zone, the escort element executes one of the
following COA:
z Continues to suppress the enemy as combat reaction forces move to support. (See
figure D-14.)
z Uses the Infantry to assault the enemy. (See figure D-15, page D-34.)
z Breaks contact and moves out of the kill zone.
z Request immediate air support to cut off escape routes.
D-95. In most situations, platoons or squads will continue to suppress the enemy or
execute an assault. Contact should be broken only with the approval of the controlling
commander.
ACTIONS AT AN OBSTACLE
D-96. Obstacles are a major impediment to convoys. The purpose of reconnaissance ahead
of a convoy is to identify obstacles and either breach or bypasses. In some cases the enemy
or its obstacles may avoid detection by the reconnaissance element.
D-97. Obstacles can be used to harass the convoy by delaying it. If the terrain is favorable,
the obstacle may stop the convoy altogether. Obstacles also may be used to canalize the
convoy to set up an enemy ambush. When an obstacle is identified, the convoy escort faces
two problems: reducing or bypassing the obstacle, and maintaining protection of the
convoy. Security becomes critical, and actions at the obstacle must be accomplished
quickly. The convoy commander must assume the enemy is covering the obstacle with
direct- and indirect-fire weapons systems.
D-98. To reduce time the convoy is halted and to reduce its vulnerability, the following
actions should occur when the convoy escort encounters a point-type obstacle:
z The lead element identifies the obstacle and directs the convoy to make a short halt
to establish security. The convoy escort overwatches the obstacle and requests the
breach element force to move forward. (See figure D-16.)
z The convoy escort maintains 360-degree security of the convoy and provides
overwatch as the breach force reconnoiters the obstacle in search of a bypass.
D-99. Once all reconnaissance are complete, the convoy commander determines which of
the following COA is suitable for mission accomplishment:
z Bypass the obstacle.
z Breach the obstacle with assets on hand.
z Breach the obstacle with reinforcing assets.
D-100. The convoy security commander relays a SPOTREP and requests support by
combat reaction forces, engineer assets (if they are not part of the convoy), and aerial
reconnaissance elements. Artillery units are alerted to prepare to provide indirect fire
support.
QUARTERING PARTY
D-105. Usually, the Infantry platoon and squad participates in the higher headquarters
quartering party (also known as an advance party) to assist in the occupation of an AA. A
quartering party is a group of unit representatives dispatched to a probable new site of
operations in advance of the main body to secure, reconnoiter, and organize the site before
the main body’s arrival and occupation.
D-106. The Infantry platoon and squad participates in the quartering party according to
their SOP. For example, the quartering party could consist of one vehicle per platoon and
a vehicle from the headquarters section. At company level the company executive officer,
first sergeant or a senior NCO usually leads the quartering party. The quartering party’s
actions at the AA include the following:
z Reconnoiter for enemy forces and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
contamination.
z Evaluate the condition of the route leading into the assembly area and suitability of
the area (drainage, space, internal routes).
z Organize the area based on the commander’s guidance; designate and mark
tentative locations for platoons’ vehicles, command post vehicles, and trains.
z Improve and mark entrances, exits, and internal routes.
z Mark bypasses or removes obstacles (within the party’s capabilities).
z Develop digital assembly area overlay and send overlays to Infantry company main
body and Infantry battalion main command post.
Note. The Infantry platoon and squad usually coordinates test-firing with its
higher headquarters.
D-110. Detainees and captured enemy equipment or materiels often provide excellent
combat information. This information is of tactical value only if the platoon processes and
evacuates prisoners and materiel to the rear quickly. In tactical situations, the platoon will
have specific procedures and guidelines for handling prisoners and captured materiel.
D-111. All persons captured, personnel detained or retained by U.S. Armed Forces
during the course of military operations, are considered “detained” persons until their
status is determined by higher military and civilian authorities. The BCT has an organic
military police platoon organic to the brigade special troops battalion to take control of
and evacuate detainees. (See figure D-19.) However, as a practical matter, when Infantry
squads, platoons, companies, and battalions capture enemy personnel, they must provide
the initial processing and holding for detainees. Detainee handling is a resource-intensive
and politically sensitive operation requiring detailed training, guidance, and supervision.
backs of their heads. Do not use duct tape or other adhesives, place a cloth or either
objects inside the mouth, or apply physical force to silence detainees.
z Segregate. Segregate detainees according to policy and SOPs. (Segregation
requirements differ from operation to operation.) The ability to segregate detainees
may be limited by the availability of manpower and resources at the POC. At a
minimum, try to segregate detainees by grade, gender, age (keeping adults from
juveniles and small children with mothers), and security risk. Military intelligence
and military police personnel can provide additional guidance and support in
determining the appropriate segregation criteria.
z Safeguard. Protect detainees and ensure the custody and integrity of all confiscated
items. Soldiers must safeguard detainees from combat risk, harm caused by other
detainees, and improper treatment or care. Report all injuries. Correct and report
violations of U.S. military policy that occur while safeguarding detainees. Acts,
omissions or both that constitute inhumane treatment are violations of the law of
war and, as such, must be corrected immediately. Simply reporting violations is
insufficient. If a violation is ongoing, a Soldier has an obligation to stop the
violation and report it.
z Speed to a safe area/rear. Quickly move detainees from the continuing risks
associated with other combatants or sympathizers who still may be in the area of
capture. If there are more detainees than the Soldiers can control, call for additional
support, search the detainees, and hold them in place until reinforcements arrive.
Evacuate detainees from the battlefield to a holding area or facility as soon as
possible. Transfer captured documents and other property to the forces assuming
responsibility of the detainees.
z Tag. Ensure that each detainee is tagged using DD Form 2745. (See figure D-20a.)
Confiscated equipment, personal items, and evidence will be linked to the detainee
using the DD Form 2745 number. When a DA Form 4137, Evidence/Property
Custody Document, is used to document confiscated items, it will be linked to the
detainee by annotating the DD Form 2745 control number on the form or by field
expedient means. Field expedient means should include tagging with date and time
of capture, location of capture, capturing unit, and circumstances of capture. There
are three parts to this form. DD Form 2745, Unit Record Card, Part B, is the unit
record copy. (See figure D-20b, page D-44). DD Form 2745, Document/Special
Equipment Weapons Card, Part C, is for detainee confiscated property. (See figure
D-20c, page D-44). Tagging is critical. If it does not happen the ability of higher
headquarters to obtain pertinent tactical information quickly is reduced greatly.
D-114. Detainees should be evacuated as soon as is practical to the BCT detainee
collection point. Tactical questioning of detainees is allowed relative to collection of
CCIRs. However, detainees must always be treated in accordance with the U.S. Law of
War Policy as set forth in the Department of Defense Directive 2311.01E, DoD Law of
War Program.
D-115. Soldiers capturing equipment, documents, and detainees should tag them (using
the DD Form 2745, Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Capture Tag, Part A [see figures
D-20a, D20b, and D20c on pages D-43 through D-44]), take digital pictures, and report
the capture immediately. Detainees are allowed to keep protective equipment such as
E-1. The primary roles of the combat vehicles discussed in this appendix are to provide
Infantry platoons and squads with mobility, allowing them to maneuver. Combat vehicles
also provide bases of fire; protection, breaching capabilities, enhanced communication
platforms, and a variety of sustainment assets, including re-supply and medical evacuation
capabilities. Integration of these forces provides complementary and reinforcing effects to
Infantry and mounted forces.
PRINCIPLES OF EMPLOYMENT
E-2. The general principles for employing combat vehicles with Infantry Soldiers are—
z So the combat power capabilities of the vehicle can support the maneuver of the
Infantry.
z So the combat power of the Infantry platoon or squad can support the maneuver of
combat vehicle sections or platoons.
z The wingman concept. To achieve mutual support, combat vehicles almost always
work in this concept. The wingman concept is similar to the buddy team concept
that Infantry Soldiers employ (operating in two-vehicle sections). Just as Infantry
Soldiers never fight alone, combat vehicles never operate without the mutual
support and evacuation capability the combat vehicle wingman provides.
Mobility
E-5. The following is a list of the primary mobility functions combat vehicles provide
an Infantry platoon and squads during combat operations:
z Assist opposed entry of Infantry Soldiers into buildings or bunkers.
z Breach or reduce obstacles by fire.
z Provide mobility to the dismounted force.
z Provide enhanced communication platforms and multiple communications systems.
z Sustainment, medical evacuation, and resupply.
Firepower
E-6. The following is a list of the primary firepower functions combat vehicles provide
an Infantry platoon or squad during combat operations:
z Speed and shock effect to assist the Infantry in rapidly executing an assault.
z Lethal and accurate direct fire support.
z Suppression of identified sniper positions.
z Heavy volume of suppressive fires and a mobile base of fire of the Infantry.
z Employment of technical assets (thermal viewers and range finders) to assist in
target acquisition and ranging.
z Neutralization or suppression of enemy positions with direct fire as Infantry closes
with and destroys the enemy.
z Assaults by fire other targets designated by the Infantry.
z Accurate direct fires even while the vehicle is moving at high speeds with stabilized
gun systems.
z Destruction of enemy tanks and armored personnel carriers.
Protection
E-7. The following are ways combat vehicles protect an Infantry platoon or squads
during combat operations:
Mobility
E-9. Mobility functions Infantry provide to units with vehicles during combat operations
include:
z Seize and retain terrain.
z Clear defiles and restrictive urban terrain ahead of vehicular forces.
Firepower
E-10. Firepower functions the Infantry provides to units with vehicles during combat
operations include:
z Actions on the objective (such as clear trenches, knock out bunkers, enter and clear
buildings).
z Employ antitank systems (Javelin) to destroy armored threats.
Protection
E-11. Ways the Infantry protects units with vehicles during combat operations include:
z Provide local security over dead space and blind spots that weapon systems on
combat vehicles cannot cover.
z Consolidate and reorganize perform enemy prisoners of war procedures, and direct
medical evacuation.
TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES
E-12. Infantry leaders must have a basic understanding of the technical capabilities of
combat vehicles. These include vehicle characteristics, firepower and protection.
VEHICLE CHARACTERISTICS
E-13. To win in battle, leaders must have a clear understanding of the capabilities and
limitations of their equipment. The Abrams tank, BFV, Stryker ICV, armament carrier
HMMWV and the MRAP. Each has their own capabilities, limitations, characteristics, and
logistical requirements. Even though their role to the Infantry is virtually the same, these
vehicles provide support in different ways. To employ combat vehicles, leaders must
understand specific capabilities and limitations of vehicles that are attached under
operational control to their unit. The following information is a brief overview of the
combat vehicles’ characteristics as they apply to combat power. Table E-1 displays vehicle
characteristics. (Specifics vary by vehicle and modifications.)
Table E-1. Mobility characteristics of combat vehicles
ARMAMENT
VARIABLES
(BRADLEY)
(STRYKER)
MAXXPRO
(ABRAMS)
CARRIER
HMMWV
M-ATV
MRAP
DASH
TANK
BFV
ICV
Tracks
or Wheels Wheels Tracks Tracks Wheels Wheels
Wheels
42 41.5
Speed 65 mph 60 mph 68 mph 62 mph
mph mph
LEGEND
ATV – all-terrain vehicle; BFV – Bradley fighting vehicle; HMMWV – high-mobility
multipurpose wheeled vehicle; ICV – Infantry carrier vehicle; lbs – pounds;
mph – miles per hour; MRAP – mine resistant ambush protected
Firepower
E-14. The weapons and ammunition of vehicular units are designed to defeat specific
enemy targets, though many are multipurpose. An Infantry leader with a basic
understanding of these weapons and ammunition types will be able to better employ
vehicular units to defeat the enemy. Table E-2 (page E-6) lists the basic weapons and
ammunition types offered by vehicular units that generally support Infantry platoons and
squads. These weapons systems are organic to several vehicles while they are mounted on
others. METT-TC driven.
Note. When referring to the heavy machine gun in this manual, it refers to the M2
or M2A1 .50-caliber heavy machine gun. The M2A1 heavy machine gun is the
next generation of heavy machine gun, currently being fielded and will be
replacing the M2 heavy machine gun. (See appendix F for more information.)
Protection
E-15. All combat vehicles offer varying degrees of protection from direct and indirect
fire. Figure E-1 (page E-8) illustrates the generally progressive degrees of protection
offered by combat vehicles.
TANK
E-16. The M1-series Abrams tank provides rapid mobility combined with excellent
protection and highly lethal, accurate fires. They are most effective in generally open
terrain with extended fields of fire.
Mobility Advantages
E-17. The tank's mobility comes from its capability to move at high speed on and off road.
The tank’s ability to cross ditches; ford streams and shallow rivers; and push through small
trees, vegetation, and limited obstructions allows movement in various types of terrain.
Mobility Disadvantages
E-18. Tanks consume large quantities of fuel. They are noisy and must be started
periodically in cold weather, or when using thermal night sights and radios to ensure the
batteries stay charged. The noise, obscurants, and dust generated by tanks make it difficult
for the Infantry in their vicinity to capitalize on stealth to achieve surprise. Tanks cannot
cross bodies of water deeper than four feet without deep water fording kits or bridging
equipment. Due to the length of the tank main gun, the turret will not rotate if a solid object
such as a wall, post, or tree is blocking it. Tracked vehicles also can “throw track.” This
occurs when the track loses tension on the sprockets, support arms, or both, and the track
becomes disconnected from the tank. Repairing the track can be a lengthy process.
Firepower Advantages
E-19. The tank's main gun is extremely accurate and lethal at ranges out to 4000 meters.
Tanks with stabilized main guns can fire even when moving at high speeds cross-country.
The tank remains the best AT weapon on the battlefield. The various machine guns (M1-
series Abrams tank’s caliber .50 and 7.62-mm coax and loader's 7.62-mm machine gun)
provide a high volume of supporting fires for the Infantry. The target acquisition
capabilities of the tank exceed the capability of all systems in the Infantry battalion. The
thermal sight provides a significant capability for observation and reconnaissance. It also
can be used during daylight hours to identify heat sources (personnel and vehicles), even
through vegetation. The laser range finder provides an increased capability for the Infantry
force to establish fire control measures (such as trigger lines and TRP), and to determine
exact locations.
Firepower Disadvantages
E-20. The normal, basic load of the tank’s main gun is primarily armor piercing discarding
sabots with tracer (APDS-T) antitank rounds. These rounds are not as effective against
light-armored or wheeled vehicles, bunkers, trench lines, buildings, or enemy personnel.
They also present a safety problem when fired over the heads of exposed Infantry Soldiers
due to the discarded sabot pieces falling to the ground. HE ammunition provides better
destructive effects on the above-mentioned targets, except enemy personnel, against which
the tank's machine guns are most effective. The resupply of all tank ammunition is difficult
and requires logistic support from the armored battalion. The main gun of an M1A2 only
can elevate +20 degrees and depress -9 degrees. Figure E-2 (page E-10) illustrates M1A2
fields of fire on the urban terrain.
Protection Advantages
E-21. Generally, tank armor provides excellent protection to the crew. Across the frontal
60-degree arc, the tank is impenetrable to all weapons, except heavy antitank missiles or
guns, and the main gun-on-enemy tanks. When fighting with the hatches closed, the crew
is impenetrable to all small-arms fire, artillery rounds (except a direct hit), and
antipersonnel mines. The tank's smoke grenade launcher and on-board smoke generator
provide rapid concealment from all but thermal observation.
Protection Disadvantages
E-22. The tank is most vulnerable to lighter antitank weapons from the flanks, and
especially the top and rear. The top is vulnerable to precision-guided munitions (artillery
or air delivered). Antitank mines also can destroy or disable the vehicle. When fighting
with hatches down, the tank crew's ability to see and engage targets (especially close-in
Infantry) is reduced greatly.
Information Advantages
E-23. Mission Command Systems and inertial position navigation systems allow today’s
tanks the mobility to arrive at virtually any designated location with greater speed and
accuracy than ever before. Use of visual signals and the single channel ground airborne
radio system (SINCGARS) facilitates rapid and secure communication of orders and
instructions. This capability allows tank crews to mass the effects of their weapon systems
quickly while remaining dispersed to limit the effects of the tanks, armored vehicles, and
fortifications using the main gun, and to suppress enemy positions, personnel, and light-
armored targets with the tank’s machine guns.
Information Disadvantages
E-24. Not all tanks are equipped with digitally enhanced Mission Command Systems. At
present, the situational awareness and enemy situation acquired by the Mission Command
Systems cannot be shared easily with Infantry units on the ground.
Mobility Advantages
E-26. The mobility of the BFV is comparable to the tank. In addition to the three-man
crew, the vehicle is designed to carry seven additional Infantry Soldiers with combat load.
Mobility Disadvantages
E-27. The BFV consumes significant quantities of fuel, but less than a M1-series Abrams
tank. The BFV is louder than the M1-series Abrams tank, and like the M1-series Abrams
tank, its engine must be started periodically in cold weather or when using the thermal
night sight and radios to ensure the batteries stay charged. Like all heavy vehicles, the
noise, obscurants, and dust generated by the BFV makes it difficult for the Infantry to
capitalize on its ability to move with stealth and avoid detection when moving on the same
approach. Improvised barricades, narrow streets and alleyways, or large amounts of rubble
can block a BFV in an urban area, and heavy woods will restrict their movement in rural
areas. The 25-mm cannon does not project out over the front of the Bradley like a tank,
but protrudes over the sides when the gunner is aiming at 3 o’clock or 9 o’clock. This
causes some problems for the Bradley when trying to negotiate narrow avenues of
approach. Attaching and removing rucksacks to the exterior of the vehicle can be a lengthy
process, and rucksacks are exposed to enemy fire.
Firepower Advantages
E-28. The primary weapon on the BFV is the 25-mm chain gun firing APDS-T, high
explosive incendiary with tracer. This weapon is extremely accurate and lethal against
light-armored vehicles, bunkers, trench lines, and personnel at ranges out to 2000 meters.
The stabilized gun allows fires even when moving cross-country. The TOW provides a
weapon for destroying enemy tanks or other point targets at extended ranges to 3750
meters. The 7.62-mm coax provides a high volume of suppressive fires for self-defense
and supporting fires of the Infantry up to 800 meters. The combination of the stabilized
turret, thermal sight, high volume of fire, and reinforcing effects of weapons and
ammunition makes the BFV an excellent suppression asset supporting Infantry assaults.
The thermal sight provides a significant capability for observation and reconnaissance. It
can be used during the day to identify heat sources (personnel and vehicles) even through
light vegetation. Figure E-3 (page E-12) shows the 25-mm supporting Infantry in an urban
setting.
Firepower Disadvantages
E-29. When operating the thermal sight with the BFV engine off, a "clicking" sound can
be heard at a considerable distance from the vehicle. The resupply of ammunition is
difficult and requires external logistic support.
Protection Advantages
E-30. Overall, the BFV provides good protection. When fighting with the hatches closed,
the crew is well protected from small-arms fire, fragmentation munitions, and
antipersonnel mines. The BFV smoke-grenade launcher and on-board smoke generator
provide rapid concealment from all but thermal observation.
Protection Disadvantages
E-31. The vehicle is vulnerable from all directions to antitank weapons and especially
enemy tanks. Antitank mines can destroy or disable the vehicle. When the crew is
operating the vehicle with the hatches open, it is vulnerable to small-arms fire.
Information Advantages
E-32. The target acquisition capabilities of the BFV exceed the capability of the other
systems in the Infantry battalion. The thermal sight provides a significant capability for
observation and reconnaissance. It also can be used during the day to identify heat sources
(personnel and vehicles) even through light vegetation. Many models of the BFV are
equipped with the latest Mission Command Systems, while others are still equipped with
the outdated systems.
Information Disadvantages
E-33. Bradley vehicle crewmembers have poor all-round vision through their vision
blocks and are easily blinded by obscurants or dust. Therefore, the Bradley vehicle should
not be approached while it is in contact because the crew may have difficulty seeing
Infantry Soldiers outside of the vehicle. The Bradley commander must be informed where
the dismounted Infantry Soldiers are located to prevent accidents on the battlefield.
Mobility Advantages
E-35. The Stryker vehicle enables the team to maneuver in close and urban terrain,
provide protection in open terrain, and transport Infantry quickly to critical battlefield
positions. With a 4x8 and 8x8 wheel drive, the Stryker is designed for all-weather use over
all types of terrain and can ford hard-bottomed bodies of water to a depth of 67 inches.
Stryker vehicles have a maximum speed of 60 miles per hour and a range of 300 miles on
a tank of fuel. The vehicles are swift, easily maintainable, and include features designed
for Soldiers’ safety. The Stryker’s has run-flat tires inflated or deflated from inside the
vehicle to adapt to surfaces ranging from deep mud to hardtop. It also has a built-in fire
suppression system, and a self-recovery winch. The vehicles run quieter than current
armored personnel carriers, increasing their stealth. Steel-belted tires with run-flat liners
enable vehicle mobility for five miles (eight km) when all tires are flat.
Mobility Disadvantages
E-36. For vehicles weighing 10-20 tons, wheels are inferior to tracks in crossing sand,
mud, and snow. Driving more than five miles on a flattened tire can cause a fire.
Improvised barricades, narrow streets and alleyways, or large amounts of rubble can block
Stryker vehicles in urban areas. Dense forests can block it in rural areas.
Firepower Advantages
E-37. The ICV has an RWS with a universal soft mount cradle mounting either a
.50-caliber M2/M2A1 machine gun, an MK19 40-mm grenade launcher, or an
M240-series 7.62-mm machine gun. It is also armed with four M6 smoke grenade
launchers. Stowed ammunition includes:
z 32 66-mm smoke grenades.
Firepower Disadvantages
E-39. The ICV loses some of the ammunition effects that tanks and BFV can provide the
Infantry Soldier. For this reason the ICV can suppress light-skinned vehicles, bunkers,
buildings, and enemy Infantry, but is not as effective as a BFV or tank against enemy light-
armored or armored vehicles.
Protection Advantages
E-40. The basic ICV provides armored protection of the two-man crew and a squad of
nine Infantry Soldiers. The ICV’s armor protection stops .50-caliber bullets and protects
against 152-mm airburst shells. The basic armor package on every Stryker vehicle is a
steel hull protecting against 7.62-mm bullets; and a ceramic, added-on appliqué giving
protection against 14.5-mm machine guns. Hull floor plate and fuel tank armor protect
from blast and fragment effects of antipersonnel mine detonations. Low silhouette and
noise output make the vehicle a difficult target to detect and to engage.
Protection Disadvantages
E-41. The ICV is vulnerable to all antitank fires and tanks. The effectiveness of RPG fire
can be mitigated with a slat-armor application (cage) causing a premature detonation of
the RPG warhead away from the hull of the ICV.
Information Advantages
E-42. Mission Command Systems provide real-time situational awareness of both enemy
and friendly positions. It enables leaders and Soldiers to receive process and distribute
information products in real time. Stryker platoons and squads have a variety of systems
to communicate directly within and outside the platoon. These are mounted on the ICV
and carried by Soldiers. The platoon can monitor and transmit on the company and platoon
radio nets. The forward observer transmits on the fires net.
Information Disadvantages
E-43. The Stryker ICV vehicle crewmembers have limited vision when at name tape
defilade in their vehicle commander's hatches. The addition of air guards stationed in the
overhead hatches and a rearview camera provide more situational awareness around the
vehicle, but does not mitigate all the blind spots.
Mobility Advantages
E-45. The HMMWV rests on a four-wheel chassis. Its four-wheel drive enables it to
operate in a variety of terrain and climate conditions. It is capable of fording water up to
30 inches in depth, and can ford depths of up to 60 inches with the deep water fording kit.
The HMMWV’s size allows it to travel in the narrow streets of urban terrain with minimal
damage to the infrastructure. Some models of the HMMWV (M1026, M1036, M1046, and
M1114) employ a winch aiding in self-recovery and recovery of similar vehicles.
Mobility Disadvantages
E-46. Although generally equipped with run-flat tires, HMMWV tires are susceptible to
enemy fire. HMMWVs have much less ability to breach obstacles than tracked vehicles.
The HMMWV can be blocked by hasty and complex obstacles and can be easily rolled,
especially with the armored M1114.
Firepower Advantages
E-47. The HMMWV can employ a variety of weapon systems offering excellent direct
fire support to Infantry forces. The TOW, M2/M2A1, MK19, M240-series, and M249 can
all be mounted in HMMWV models with turrets. The capabilities of these weapon systems
are discussed in greater detail in table E-2 (page E-6).
Firepower Disadvantages
E-48. In almost all instances, the HMMWV can mount only one weapon system. This
makes it less effective than tanks or BFVs that employ antitank and antipersonnel weapons
simultaneously.
Protection Advantages
E-49. The M1114 is an up-armored HMMWV providing ballistic, artillery, and mine-
blast protection to vehicle occupants. The M1114 can protect occupants from 7.62-mm
assault rifle armor-piercing rounds and 155-mm artillery airbursts, and provides 12 pounds
front and four pounds of rear antitank mine protection. Other protection features include
complete perimeter ballistic protection, mine blast protection, and a turret shield for the
gunner. Supplemental armor packages are available for many models of the HMMWV.
This armor has been shown to be effective against IEDs.
Protection Disadvantages
E-50. All models other than the M1114 offer extremely limited protection from direct or
indirect fire. Leaders should not plan or direct the use of these vehicles for cover from
enemy small arms, indirect fire, or rocket-propelled grenades. Gunners are exposed while
manning their weapon system to direct and indirect fire. The lack of internal space causes
difficulties if transporting a casualty.
Information Advantages
E-51. The HMMWV has a variety of features making it excellent for gathering and
managing information. The crew and passengers of the HMMWV generally have excellent
situational awareness due to a large front windshield and large windows located on the
door at each seat. HMMWVs can carry two SINCGARS-class radio systems. They also
can employ a power amplifier to extend the communications range to 35 kilometers in
open terrain. The HMMWV can be configured to carry the latest Mission Command
Systems. The weapon systems of the HMMWV can employ sights with night vision,
thermal, and range-finding capabilities with high resolution and magnification in some
systems.
Information Disadvantages
E-52. Many of the digital and electronic devices of the HMMWV require constant power
sources. The need to start the HMMWV to keep the batteries charged can present a tactical
problem if stealth is desired during an operation.
vehicle occupants from small arms fire, fragmenting munitions, and blast. The
objective gunner protective kit can mount an M249 5.56 squad automatic weapon
for self-defense.
Mobility Advantages
E-54. MRAP vehicles have relatively quick acceleration and a high top speed for vehicles
of their weight and size, 62 to 68 mph maximum speed. Most operations will not require
use of all the speed the MRAP vehicle can deliver. Its dash speed permits rapid movement
between covered and concealed positions or breaking contact. Ultimately, the commander
determines and sets the rate of movement based on a thorough understanding of
METT-TC. It’s a 4x4 all terrain armored vehicle with the capacity to handle a maximum
slope of 60 percent grade with a 30 percent side slope grade. Can ford water obstacles up
to 36 inches deep. Can operate in excess of 300 miles without refueling. Operates on all
terrain and in all-weather temperatures and conditions.
Mobility Disadvantages
E-55. Operating MRAP vehicles at high speed in a tactical environment can develop into
a dangerous situation before the driver can counter or react. Traveling at high speeds
(anything greater than 25 mph) significantly decreases the ability to accurately visually
scan the road surface. MRAP vehicles are generally tall with a high center of gravity that
greatly increases the chance of a roll or tip over. Slow speeds reduce the possibility of an
accident, tip over, or rollover. MRAP vehicles will not accelerate or stop at the rate drivers
may be accustomed to with other vehicles.
E-56. The overall size of the MRAP limits its mobility in urban and rough terrain
conditions. Drivers and leaders consider the following information when operating in
restricted terrain:
z Narrow streets and gates may make turns and turning around difficult.
z There is the potential for increased difficulty in navigating through traffic.
z Cross-country speeds are reduced significantly due to the high center of gravity.
Tall vehicles pose a greater risk of tip or rollover when negotiating slopes, trenches,
ditches, and other obstacles.
z Take special consideration for low-hanging wires. (Crews need to have a wire-strike
plan. Leaders must account for antenna heights for counter radio-controlled IED
electronic warfare (CREW) and radio antennas when operating in urban terrain.
z The MRAP will ascend longitudinal slopes of up to 60 percent; however, extreme
caution must be exercised on slopes greater than 50 percent. The MRAP vehicle is
capable of operating on side slopes of up to 30 percent. (Use extreme caution on
side slopes greater than 25 percent.) The critical rollover angles vary among variants
and will differ depending on the load plan used. Load heavier items as low in the
vehicle as possible to decrease the possibility of rollovers or tip over when operating
on side slopes.
z All drivers must be well-trained in judging terrain and negotiating various terrain
conditions.
z Many operations and movements are at night. Driver training should focus on driver
vision enhancer training along with training the vehicle commander and gunner
using night vision devices.
Protection Advantages
E-59. Designed from the ground-up to reduce casualties and increase crew and passenger
survivability from mine explosions, IED detonations, and small-arms fire. Armored
vehicles with blast-resistant body design (characterized by a V-shaped hull, integrated
armor, raised chassis, and blow-off wheels). Blast forces are deflected away from the crew
by the vehicles V-shaped hull. Equipped with automatic fire suppression system run-flat
tires and antilock brakes. Equipped with blast-resistant suspension type seats, and ballistic
windshield and windows.
Protection Disadvantages
E-60. While the MRAP vehicle provides a more stable firing platform than the HMMWV,
it also significantly limits the gunner’s field of fire (limited turret traversing due to
antennas and limited capability to fully depress). There is significant dead space to the
front, rear, and sides of the vehicle. Every MRAP vehicle crewmember should know the
dead space their specific vehicle, which will assist in covering the dead space for other
vehicles while on the move. This is especially important in an RKG-3 (anti-tank hand
grenades) threat area.
E-61. While the MRAP vehicle appears large, the armor protection and V-shaped hull
significantly reduce the interior space. When fully loaded with Soldiers and their combat
gear, little space is left for additional mission equipment not directly designed into the
vehicle.
E-62. Exiting the vehicle in response to an ambush and loading or unloading equipment
and casualties are difficult due to the doors, steps, and back hatch on some MRAP variants.
Soldiers and units must train and rehearse as individuals and teams to streamline the
process for mounting and dismounting operations under various conditions. Experience
has shown the heavy doors and hatches are causing serious injuries to Soldiers’ fingers
(amputation), elbows (shattering), ankles (sprains and breaks), and backs due to pinching
in doors and hatches and from falling off vehicles.
Information Advantages
E-63. Includes accessories such as the, driver vision enhancer, AN/VRC 92 dual long-
range radio system, Mission Command Systems, and CROWS II XM153.
Information Disadvantages
E-64. Due the different types of communication systems and accessories in the MRAP,
Soldiers might not be familiar with the equipment, which will cause lack of usage. Leaders
must consider how dismounted Soldiers will communicate with the mounted crew and
other dismounted Soldiers. Communication with Mission Command Systems can be
hampered in an urban area or even jammed by enemy forces. Antennas on the MRAP
vehicle must be lowered or protected from contact with power lines since serious injury or
death, as well as vehicle damage can occur. Know which antennas present the most hazards
due to radio frequency burns, and keep out of the danger areas when transmitting.
TACTICAL CAPABILITIES
E-68. Infantry units may have combat vehicle sections attached for combat operations.
INFANTRY TASKS
E-70. Infantry units may be attached to armored units during combat operations. Table
E-4 shows a list of tasks Infantry units may perform while attached or under the operational
control of combat vehicular units.
E-71. Leaders of combat vehicle units often fail to recognize the speed with which the
Infantry can move when operating dismounted. Numerous factors can affect the rate of
march the Infantry forces including, tactical considerations, weather, terrain, march
discipline, acclimatization, availability of water and rations, morale, and individual loads.
Table E-5 summarizes dismounted rates of march for normal terrain. The normal distance
covered by an Infantry force in a 24-hour period is from 20 to 32 kilometers, marching
from five to eight hours at a rate of 4 kilometers per hour (kph). A march in excess of 32
kilometers in 24 hours is considered a forced march. Forced marches increase the number
of hours marched, not the rate of march. Absolute maximum distances for dismounted
marches are 56 kilometers in 24 hours, 96 kilometers in 48 hours, or 128 kilometers in 72
hours.
Table E-5. Dismounted rates of march (ideal terrain)
TIME ROADS CROSS-COUNTRY
Day 4.0 kph 2.4 kph
Night 3.2 kph 1.6 kph
Tanks
E-75. Riding on tanks reduces tank maneuverability and may restrict firepower. Infantry
Soldiers may be injured if the tank slews its turret to return fire on a target. Consequently,
Soldiers must dismount to clear danger areas or as soon as enemy contact is made.
E-76. Soldiers ride on tanks by exception and depending on the likelihood of contact.
There are several tactical and safety considerations before Infantry Soldiers ride on a tank.
The M1-series Abrams tank is not designed to carry riders easily. Riders must not move
to the rear deck. Engine operating temperatures make this area unsafe for riders. (See
figure E-4.)
E-77. One Infantry squad can ride on the turret. Soldiers must mount in such a way their
legs cannot become entangled between the turret and hull by an unexpected turret
movement. Rope may be used as a field-expedient rail to provide secure handholds.
E-78. Everyone must ride to the rear of the smoke grenade launchers. This automatically
keeps everyone clear of the coaxial machine gun and laser range finder.
E-79. Infantry Soldiers always must be prepared for sudden turret movement. Leaders
should caution Soldiers about sitting on the turret blowout panels. This safety knowledge
is critical because 250 pounds of pressure will prevent the panels from working properly.
If there is an explosion in the ammunition rack, the panels blow outward to lessen the blast
effect in the crew compartment.
E-80. If enemy contact is made, the tank should stop in a covered and concealed position
and allow Infantry Soldiers time to dismount and move away from the tank. This action
needs to be practiced before movement.
E-81. Infantry Soldiers should not ride with anything more than their battle gear. Personal
gear should be transported elsewhere.
Figure E-6. Seating diagram inside the M2A2/ODS and M2A3 BFV
ICV. Infantry Soldiers who are not familiar with the ICV should be trained thoroughly on
its exit points, fire drills, and rollover drills prior to riding in the vehicle. Figure E-7
illustrates the carrying capacity of the ICV.
E-86. The intent of this section is to familiarize leaders conducting operations with
combat vehicles. METT-TC and commander’s intent always must be taken into
consideration when executing these types of operations.
PLAN
E-87. Employment of combat vehicles requires thorough understanding and integration
of the vehicle with the Infantry unit. The following paragraphs focus on planning
considerations for combat vehicles and dismounted Infantry integration.
Guidelines
E-93. None of the techniques described are inherently better than another one. The task
organization must be tailored to accomplish the mission. Regardless of the technique
selected, the following guidelines should be followed.
E-94. It is preferable for combat vehicles to operate as sections. This is an integral
component of how combat vehicle units train and fight. If the company commander is
controlling the combat vehicles, he needs to move forward to a position where he can
maneuver the combat vehicles in support of the Infantry.
E-95. Combat vehicles should be used to shield squads and teams (minus the unarmored
versions of the armament carrier HMMWV) from building to building. As part of the
maneuver plan, the leader of the forward element controls the combat vehicles.
E-96. The task organization should support the span of control. If the company
commander is going to control the combat vehicles, there is no reason to task organize the
tanks by section under Infantry platoons.
E-97. Combat vehicles need Infantry support when the two elements are working
together. Do not leave combat vehicles alone because they are not well-suited to provide
local security during the operation. Combat vehicles are extremely vulnerable to
dismounted attack when operating in urban terrain. They are most vulnerable and need
local security when Infantry Soldiers are in the process of clearing buildings.
RISK MANAGEMENT
E-98. Infantry leaders must identify and implement controls to mitigate risks associated
with conducting operations with combat vehicles. These risks are divided into two
categories: tactical and accidental risk. Table E-6 contains a basic list of risks and control
measures leaders should consider when conducting operations with combat vehicles. Table
E-7 (page E- 30) contains a list of possible accidental hazards and control measures.
E-99. Many Infantry Soldiers are not familiar with the hazards arising during operations
with combat vehicles. The most obvious of these include the dangers associated with main-
gun fire, and inability of combat vehicle crews to see people and objects near their vehicles.
Leaders of Armored and Infantry units alike must ensure their troops understand the
following points of operational safety.
Discarding Sabot
E-100. Tank 120-mm sabot rounds and 25-mm BFV rounds discard stabilizing petals
when fired, posing a downrange hazard for Infantry Soldiers. The aluminum petals of the
tank rounds are discarded in an area extending 300 meters to the left and right of the gun-
target line out to a range of 1300 meters. (See figure E-10.) Sabot petals create a hazard
area extending 70 meters on each side of the gun target line, out to a range of 1 kilometer
(See figure E-11, page E-32.) The danger zone for plastic debris from BFV rounds extends
60 degrees to the left and right of the gun-target line, and out to 100 meters from the
vehicle. (See figure E-12, page E-33.) Infantry Soldiers should not be in or near the direct
line of fire of the tank main gun or BFV cannon unless they are under adequate overhead
cover.
Note. M1-series Abrams tanks are deceptively quiet and may be difficult for
mounted Infantry Soldiers to hear as they approach. As noted, vehicle crews and
Infantry Soldiers share the responsibility of eliminating potential dangers in this
situation.
PREPARE
E-104. The key to planning operations with combat vehicles is rehearsals that gain the
trust and confidence of vehicle crews and Infantry Soldiers. Appendix A, section II of this
publication describes rehearsal techniques. (Refer to FM 6-0 for more information
regarding rehearsals.)
EXCHANGE INFORMATION
E-105. Task organizations of units are likely to change during combat operations. When
this occurs, some basic exchange information must occur to ensure success. First, an area
must be chosen providing security for the exchange to take place. The METT-TC may
dictate the exchange must occur over radio or digital communications. However, when
possible, leaders should meet and speak face-to-face. General exchange information
includes:
z Number of personnel in the unit.
z Number of vehicles in the unit.
z Sensitive items list.
z Weapons capabilities.
z Logistical capability (particularly Class I, III, and V).
z Status/problems with logistics.
z Radio frequencies, call signs, and time hack.
z Graphics and overlays.
z Soldier uniform types.
z Day/night marking systems.
z Enemy situation updates.
z Terrain/route information.
SECURITY
E-107. Security must be maintained at all times during combat operations. Combat
vehicles and Infantry Soldiers provide complementary effects to one another with respect
to security.
SUSTAINMENT
E-110. Infantry leaders should be aware of the robust logistical requirements of combat
vehicles during combat operations. Normally, the leaders of attached vehicular units are
responsible for bringing the majority of their logistical needs with them due to the austere
and different logistical support system of Infantry units. Table E-9 (page E-38) provides
leaders an overview of some logistical planning factors for combat operations.
E-111. Combat vehicle sections attached to Infantry units also may receive resupply
through a LOGPAC (logistical resupply) from their parent unit. These LOGPACs
generally occur in the tailgate or service station method.
E-112. As directed by the commander or executive officer, the first sergeant establishes
the companies resupply point. He uses either the service station or tailgate method, and
briefs each LOGPAC driver on which method to use. When he has the resupply point
ready, the first sergeant informs the commander. The company commander then directs
each unit or element to conduct resupply based on the tactical situation. (See chapter 7 of
this publication for more information.)
MAINTENANCE
E-114. Leaders must plan for regular maintenance halts throughout extended operations.
Combat vehicles require regular maintenance to perform consistently throughout combat
operations. Combat vehicles can become non mission capable due to a number of variables
including, direct and indirect enemy fire, mines and IEDs, vehicle accidents, and parts
failure. Infantry leaders should enforce regular PMCS of all combat vehicles attached to
their unit. PMCS is operator-level maintenance conducted before, during, and after
equipment operations. Comprehensive PMCS identifies actual and potential problems and
ensures repairs are made in a timely manner to minimize vehicle downtime. Early
detection and correction of these faults can decrease the possibility of the combat vehicle
breaking down during combat operations and prevent minor faults from deteriorating into
major faults. It is the vehicle crew’s responsibility to conduct PMCS. It is the leader’s job
to ensure the PMCS is conducted regularly and to standard.
E-115. Leaders should plan vehicle security of the vehicle crews as they conduct PMCS,
based on the enemy situation. Additionally, leaders should establish a maintenance
rotation to ensure all their combat vehicles are not conducting maintenance at the same
time. This will maximize the combat power of the unit. Leaders should also—
z Verify all current and updated technical manuals and references are available or
requisitioned for unit assigned equipment.
z Verify all tools, POL, personnel, and other resources are available for PMCS.
z Observe operators performing PMCS at prescribed intervals.
z Review maintenance forms and reporting procedures for accuracy and
completeness.
z Verify operators have correctly identified and corrected, or recorded, faults on DA
Form 2404. (See figure E-14.)
z Confirm non mission capable faults are corrected before dispatch.
attachment. Leaders should plan for two possibilities. One, the maintenance team moves
to the combat vehicles. This may require additional security and or escorts from Infantry
Soldiers. Two, the combat vehicles must move to the maintenance team. Maintenance
teams often are located at the parent unit’s maintenance collection point. Infantry leaders
may have the responsibility of providing security or escort duties. Additionally, leaders
should plan on the nonmission capable vehicles to be absent from their task organization
if a major maintenance fault is discovered.
RECOVERY OPERATIONS
E-117. Leaders are responsible for recovery operations occurring within their units.
However, leaders should consult the senior officer or noncommissioned officer of the
attached vehicular unit for technical aspects of the recovery operation. Infantry leaders
must have a thorough recovery plan ensuring their combat vehicles can be recovered
throughout the operation. Recovery operations extricate damaged or disabled equipment
and move it to locations where repairs can be made. Recovery is the primary responsibility
of the using unit. The primary role of the Infantry during recovery operations is to provide
security and assist with the recovery under supervision of the vehicle crew.
E-118. Recovery operations can be dangerous. Recovery should be conducted under the
supervision of the Infantry leader, using the experience and technical competence of the
combat vehicle crew. The general rule in recovering a vehicle simply non mission capable
in simple terrain is like vehicles can recover each other. For example, tanks recover tanks,
and BFV recover BFV. However, there are vehicles specifically designed for recovery
operations. These vehicles should be used if vehicles become stuck, flipped over, or
severely damaged. The M-936 medium wrecker can be used to recover some wheeled
vehicles, to include the armament carrier HMMWV.
E-119. The M984A2 Heavy expanded mobility tactical truck (HEMTT) wrecker can be
used to recover heavy or medium sized wheeled vehicle like all the variations of the ICV
and MRAP. The MK36 MTVR wrecker can be used as well. One of the best recovery
vehicles being utilized for wheeled vehicles is the Interim Stryker recovery system (ISRS).
It can handle a towing payload of 60,000 lbs. The M88A1 medium recovery vehicle
(MRV) is a full-tracked armored vehicle used to perform battlefield rescue and recovery
missions. The M88A1 MRV performs hoisting, winching, and towing operations in
support of recovery operations and evacuation of heavy tanks and other tracked combat
vehicles. It has a fuel/defuel capability and is fully equipped to provide maintenance and
recovery support of the main battle tank family and similar vehicles. These functions can
be performed in all types of terrain during all weather conditions.
E-120. Leaders need to ensure every Soldier knows his specific job when it comes to
vehicle recovery operations. It is vital every Soldier knows vehicle recovery battle drills.
Every vehicle recovery may be different based on METT-TC and type of vehicle to be
recovered. It is up to the leader to ensure rehearsals are conducted on a regular basis,
METT-TC dependent.
F-1. Leaders must know the technical characteristics of their assigned weapon systems
and associated ammunition to maximize their killing and suppressive fires while
minimizing the risk to friendly forces. This section discusses machine gun technical data
and considerations of the Infantry platoon and squad.
F-2. Machine gun fire has different effects on enemy targets depending on the type
system, ammunition used, range to target, and nature of the target. It is important gunners
and leaders understand technical aspects of each system and different ammunition
available to ensure the machine guns are employed in accordance with their capabilities.
Machine guns use several different types of standard military ammunition. Soldiers should
use only authorized ammunition manufactured to U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) specifications.
F-3. The following paragraphs discuss weapons specification of the tactical employment
of M249, M240-series, M2/M2A1, and MK19 machine guns. Refer to the specific FM of
the machine guns listed in table F-1 (page F-2) for complete information regarding their
technical specifications.
M240-
WEAPON M249 M2/M1A2 MK19
SERIES
850 RPM in 650-950 RPM
continuous in continuous 450-550 RPM
Cyclic Rate of 325-375 RPM in
burst Barrel burst Barrel in continuous
Fire continuous burst
change every change every burst
1 minute 1 minute
Bipod/point:
600 m
Bipod/point: Tripod/point:
600 m 800 m Point: 1,500
Bipod/area: Bipod/area: m (single
Maximum
800 m 800 m shot) Area: Point: 1,500 m
Effective
Tripod/area: Tripod/area: 1,830 m Area: 2,212 m
Ranges
1,000 m 1,100 m Grazing: 700
Grazing: 600 Suppression: m
m 1,800 m
Grazing: 600
m
Maximum
3600 m 3725 m 6764 m 2212 m
Range
Note. The M249 SAW might be replaced by the MK48 light machine gun (LMG).
Figure F-2. M240B medium machine gun, bipod and tripod mounted
F-7. Available M240B medium machine gun ammunition is classified as follows (see
table F-3):
z M80 7.62-mm Ball. For use against light materiel and personnel.
z M61 7.62-mm Armor Piercing. For use against lightly-armored targets.
z M62 7.62-mm Tracer. For observation of fire, incendiary effects, signaling, and for
training. When tracer rounds are fired, they normally are mixed with ball
ammunition in a ratio of four ball rounds to one tracer round.
Table F-3. M240B medium machine gun ammunition
MAXIMUM TRACER
AVAILABLE M240B
RANGE BURNOUT USES
CARTRIDGES
(METERS) (METERS)
Light materiels,
Ball, M80 3725 —
personnel
Lightly-armored
Armor Piercing, M61 3725 —
targets
Observation
and adjustment
of fire,
Tracer, M62 3725 900
incendiary
effects,
signaling
F-15. This section is designed to illustrate the characteristics of machine gun fire, the
types of enemy targets engaged, and how to apply machine gun fire on those enemy targets.
F-16. Read the appropriate field manual as shown in table F-1 (page F-2) for more
weapon-specific information on engaging enemy targets with a particular machine gun.
CHARACTERISTICS OF FIRE
F-17. The gunner’s or leader’s knowledge of the machine gun is not complete until he
learns about the action and effect of the projectiles when fired. The following definitions
will help the leader, gunner, and assistant gunner understand characteristics of fire of the
platoon’s weapon’s squad machine guns.
LINE OF SIGHT
F-18. LOS is an imaginary line drawn from the firer’s eye through the sights to the point
of aim.
BURST OF FIRE
F-19. A burst of fire is a number of successive rounds fired with the same elevation and
point of aim when the trigger is held to the rear. The number of rounds in a burst can vary
depending on the type of fire employed.
TRAJECTORY
F-20. Trajectory is the curved path of the projectile in its flight from the muzzle of the
weapon to its impact. The major factors influencing trajectory are the velocity of the round,
gravity, rotation of the round, and air resistance. As the range to the target increases, so
does the curve of trajectory. (See figure F-7.)
MAXIMUM ORDINATE
F-21. Maximum ordinate is the highest point above the LOS the trajectory reaches
between the muzzle of the weapon and base of target. It always occurs at a point about
two-thirds of the distance from weapon to target and increases with range. Like trajectory,
maximum ordinate increases as the range increases. (See figure F-7.)
CONE OF FIRE
F-22. The cone of fire is the pattern formed by the different trajectories in each burst as
they travel downrange. Vibration of the weapon and variations in ammunition and
atmospheric conditions all contribute to the trajectories making up the cone of fire. (See
figure F-8, page F-12.)
BEATEN ZONE
F-23. The beaten zone is the elliptical pattern formed when the rounds within the cone of
fire strike the ground or target. The size and shape of the beaten zone change as a function
of the range to and slope of the target, but is normally oval or cigar shaped and density of
rounds decreases toward the edges. Gunners and AR should engage targets to take
maximum effect of the beaten zone. The simplest way to do this is to aim at the center base
of the target. Most rounds will not fall over the target, and falling short creates ricochets
into the target. (See figure F-8, page F-12.)
On ground sloping away from the gun, the beaten zone becomes longer but remains the
same width.
DANGER SPACE
F-27. This is the space between the muzzle of the weapon and target where trajectory does
not rise above 1.8 meters (the average height of a standing Soldier) including the beaten
zone. Gunners should consider the danger space of weapons when planning overhead fires.
Dead Space
F-32. Folds or depressions in the ground preventing a target from being engaged from a
fixed position are termed dead space. Paragraph F-80 discusses methods of determining
dead space.
Grazing Fires
F-33. Automatic weapons achieve grazing fire when the center of the cone of fire does
not rise more than one meter above the ground. Grazing fire is employed in the FPL in the
defense and is only possible when the terrain is level or sloping uniformly. Dead space
encountered along the FPL must be covered by indirect fire, such as from an M203/M320.
When firing over level or uniformly sloping terrain, the machine gun M240-series and
M249 can attain a maximum of 600 meters of grazing fire. The M2/M2A1 can attain a
maximum of 700 meters. Paragraphs F-77 and F-78 discuss the FPL.
Plunging Fires
F-34. Plunging fire occurs when there is little or no danger space from the muzzle of the
weapon to the beaten zone. It occurs when weapons fire at long range, when firing from
high ground to low ground, when firing into abruptly rising ground, or when firing across
uneven terrain, resulting in a loss of grazing fire at points along the trajectory. (See figure
F-10.)
Enfilade Fire
F-37. Enfilade fire occurs when the long axis of the beaten zone coincides or nearly
coincides with the long axis of the target. It can be frontal fire on an enemy column
formation or flanking fire on an enemy line formation. This is the most desirable class of
fire with respect to the target because it makes maximum use of the beaten zone. Leaders
and gunners always should strive to position the guns to the extent possible engaging
enemy targets with enfilade fire. (See figures F-11, page F-16, and F-13, page F-17.)
Frontal Fire
F-38. Frontal fire occurs when the long axis of the beaten zone is at a right angle to the
front of the target. This type of fire is highly desirable when engaging a column formation.
It then becomes enfilade fire as the beaten zone coincides with the long axis of the target.
(See figures F-11, page F-16, and F-12, page F-17.) Frontal fire is not as desirable when
engaging a line formation because the majority of the beaten zone normally falls below or
after the enemy target.
Flanking Fire
F-39. Flanking fire is delivered directly against the flank of the target. Flanking fire is
highly desirable when engaging an enemy line formation. It then becomes enfilade fire as
the beaten zone will coincide with the long axis of the target. (See figures F-11, page F-16,
and F-12, page F-17.) Flanking fire against an enemy column formation is least desirable
because the majority of the beaten zone normally falls before or after the enemy target.
Oblique Fire
F-40. Gunners and automatic riflemen achieve oblique fire when the long axis of the
beaten zone is at an angle other than a right angle to the front of the target. (See figures
F-11, page F-16, and F-13, page F-17.)
Fixed Fire
F-42. Fixed fire is delivered against a stationary point target when the depth and width of
the beaten zone covers the target with little or no manipulation needed. After the initial
burst, the gunners follow changes or movement of the target without command.
Traversing Fire
F-43. Traversing disperses fires in width by successive changes in direction, but not
elevation. It is delivered against a wide target with minimal depth. When engaging a wide
target requiring traversing fire, the gunner selects successive aiming points throughout the
target area. These aiming points should be close enough together to ensure adequate target
coverage. However, they do not need to be so close wasting ammunition by concentrating
a heavy volume of fire in a small area.
Searching Fire
F-44. Searching distributes fires in-depth by successive changes in elevation. It is
employed against a deep target or a target having depth and minimal width, requiring
changes in only the elevation of the gun. The amount of elevation change depends upon
the range and slope of the ground.
Swinging Traverse
F-46. Swinging traverse fire is employed against targets requiring major changes in
direction but little or no change in elevation. Targets may be dense, wide, in close
formations moving slowly toward or away from the gun, or vehicles or mounted troops
moving across the front. If tripod mounted, the traversing slide lock lever is loosened
enough to permit the gunner to swing the gun laterally. When firing swinging traverse, the
weapon normally is fired at the cyclic rate of fire. Swinging traverse consumes a lot of
ammunition and does not have a beaten zone because each round seeks its own area of
impact.
Free Gun
F-47. Free gun fire is delivered against moving targets rapidly engaging with fast changes
in both direction and elevation. Examples are aerial targets, vehicles, mounted troops, or
Infantry in relatively close formations moving rapidly toward or away from the gun
position. When firing free gun, the weapon normally is fired at the cyclic rate of fire. Free
gun fire consumes a lot of ammunition and does not have a beaten zone because each round
seeks its own area of impact.
APPLICATION OF FIRE
F-48. Application of fire consists of the methods the gunner uses to cover an enemy target
area. Training these methods of applying fire can be accomplished only after the weapons
squad leader and gunners have learned how to recognize the different types of targets they
may find in combat. They also must know how to distribute and concentrate their fire, and
how to maintain the proper rate of fire. Normally, the gunner is exposed to two types of
targets in the squad or platoon area of operation: enemy soldiers and supporting automatic
weapons. Leaders must ensure targets have priority and are engaged immediately.
F-49. Machine gun fire must be distributed over the entire target area. Improper
distribution of fire results in gaps allowing the enemy to escape or use its weapons against
friendly positions without opposition.
F-50. The method of applying fire to a target is generally the same for either a single gun
or a pair of guns. Direct lay is pointing the gun for direction and elevation so the sights are
aligned directly on the target. Fire is delivered in width, depth, or in a combination of the
two. To distribute fire properly, gunners must know where to aim, how to adjust their fire,
and direction to manipulate the gun. The gunner must aim, fire, and adjust on a certain
point of the target. Binoculars may be used by the leader to facilitate fire adjustment.
SIGHT PICTURE
F-51. A correct sight picture has the target, front sight post, and rear sight aligned. The
sight picture has sight alignment and placement of the aiming point on the target. The
gunner aligns the front sight post in the center of the rear sight and aligns the sights with
the target. The top of the front sight post is aligned on the center base of the target.
BEATEN ZONE
F-52. The gunner ensures throughout his firing the center of the beaten zone is maintained
at the center base of the target for maximum effect from each burst of fire. When this is
done, projectiles in the upper half of the cone of fire will pass through the target if it has
height, and projectiles in the lower half of the beaten zone may ricochet into the target.
(See figure F-15.)
Figure F-15. Line of aim and placement of center of beaten zone on target
F-53. The gunner must move his beaten zone in a certain direction over the target. The
direction depends on the type of target and whether the target is engaged with a pair of
guns or a single gun. When engaging targets other than point targets with a pair of guns,
the targets are divided so fire is distributed evenly throughout the target area. Fire delivered
on point targets or a specific area of other target configurations is called concentrated fire.
F-56. When a single gunner is assigned targets he is responsible for covering the entire
target. When a pair of gunners engage an enemy target, each gunner normally is
responsible for covering one half of the target. The gunners must be prepared to engage
the entire target should the other gun go down.
F-57. The machine gun can provide units with a self-defense capability against hostile
low-flying, low-performance aircraft. These guns are employed in the air defense role as
part of the unit’s local defense. The machine guns are not components of an integrated and
coordinated air defense system. Unless otherwise directed, hostile aircraft within range of
the gun (about 800 meters maximum effective range) should be engaged. The decision will
be made by the commander or leader. Typical targets are surveillance, reconnaissance, and
liaison aircraft; troop carriers; helicopters; and drones.
sufficient numbers should site them within mutual support distances of 90 to 360 meters.
Each gun is assigned a primary and secondary sector of fire. Weapon crews maintain
constant vigilance in their primary sectors of fire, regardless of the sector in which the
guns actually are engaged.
RAPID FIRE
F-62. Rapid rate of fire places an exceptionally high volume of fire on an enemy position.
Machine gunners normally engage targets at the rapid rate to suppress the enemy quickly.
Rapid fire requires more ammunition than sustained fire and requires frequent barrel
changes.
SUSTAINED FIRE
F-63. Once the enemy has been suppressed, machine gunners fire at the sustained rate.
Sustained fire conserves ammunition and requires only infrequent barrel changes, but it
might not be enough volume of fire to suppress or destroy.
F-66. Gunners should engage targets only when they can identify the targets, unless
ordered to do otherwise. For example, if one gunner detects a target and engages it, the
other gunner observes the area fired upon and adds his fire only if he can identify the target
or if ordered to fire.
F-67. Tracer ammunition helps a gunner engage targets during limited visibility and
should be used if possible. It is important to note in certain circumstances the enemy will
have an easy time identifying the machine gun’s position if the gunner uses tracer
ammunition. The need to engage targets must be balanced with the need to keep the guns
safe before deciding to employ tracers. If firing unaided, gunners must be trained to fire
low at first and adjust upward. This overcomes the tendency to fire high.
F-68. When two or more gunners are engaging linear targets, linear targets with depth, or
deep targets, they do not engage these targets as they would when visibility is good. With
limited visibility, the center and flanks of these targets may not be defined clearly.
Therefore, each gunner observes his tracers and covers what he believes to be the entire
target.
TECHNIQUES
F-69. Techniques of fire include assault fire; overhead fire; and fire from a defilade
position. Only automatic rifles use assault fire.
ASSAULT FIRE
F-70. Automatic riflemen use assault fire when in close combat. Assault fire involves
firing without the aid of sights using the hip, shoulder, and underarm positions. The
underarm position is best when rapid movement is required. In all three positions,
automatic riflemen adjust their fire by observing the tracer and impact of the bullets on the
target area. Additional considerations for automatic riflemen using assault fire include:
z Maintaining alignment with the rest of the assault element.
z Reloading rapidly.
z Aiming low and adjusting the aim upward toward the target.
z Distributing fires across the objective when not engaging enemy automatic
weapons.
OVERHEAD FIRE
F-71. Gunners can use overhead fire when there is sufficient low ground between the
machine gun and target area of the maneuver friendly forces. A machine gun on a tripod
is capable of delivering this type of fire because of the small and uniform dispersion of the
cone of fire. Gunners must estimate accurately range to the target and establish a safety
limit imaginary line parallel to the target where fire would cause casualties to friendly
Soldiers. Gun crews and leaders must be aware of this safety limit. Leaders must designate
signals for lifting or shifting fires. Gunners should not attempt overhead fires if the terrain
is level or slopes uniformly, if the barrel is badly worn, or if visibility is poor.
Gunner’s Rule
F-72. The gunner’s rule can be applied when the friendly troops are at least 350 meters in
front of the gun position and range to the target is 850 meters or less. (See figure F-17.)
The rule follows:
z Lay the gun on the target with the correct sight setting to hit the target.
z Without disturbing the lay of the gun, set the rear sight at a range of 1600 meters.
z Look through the sights and notice where the new line of aim strikes the ground.
This is the limit of troop safety. When the feet of the friendly troops reach this point,
fire must be lifted or shifted.
Leader’s Rule
F-73. When the range to the target is greater than 850 meters, overhead fire should be
delivered only in an emergency. Even then, fire should extend only to a range at which the
tracers or strike of the bullets can be seen by the gunner. In this situation the leader’s rule
applies. (See figure F-18.) The platoon or section leader uses the leader’s rule only when
the target is greater than 850 meters. The rule follows:
z Select a point on the ground where it is believed friendly troops can advance with
safety.
z Determine the range to this point by the most accurate means available.
z Lay the gun on the target with the correct sight setting to hit the target.
z Without disturbing the lay of the gun, set the rear sight to 1600 meters or the range
to the target plus 500 meters, whichever is the greater of the two ranges? Under no
conditions should the sight setting be less than 1500 meters.
z Note the point where the new line of aim strikes the ground:
If it strikes at the selected point, that point marks the limit of safety.
If it strikes short of the selected point, it is safe for troops to advance to the point
where the line of aim strikes the ground and to an unknown point beyond. If fire
is called for after friendly troops advance farther than the point where the line of
aim strikes the ground, this farther point is determined by testing new selected
points until the line of aim and selected point coincide.
If it clears the selected point, it is safe for troops to advance to the selected point
and to an unknown point beyond. If it is advantageous to have troops advance
beyond the selected point, this farther point must be determined by testing new
selected points until the line of aim and selected point coincide. This point marks
the line of safety.
F-75. Predetermined fires organize the battlefield for gunners. They allow the leader and
gunner to select potential targets or target areas most likely being engaged or have tactical
significance. This includes dismounted enemy avenues of approach, likely positions for
automatic weapons, and probable enemy assault positions. The gunners do this by using
sectors of fire, FPL, or a PDF and selected target areas. This preparation maximizes the
effectiveness of the machine gun during good as well as limited visibility. It enhances fire
control by reducing the time required to identify targets, determine range, and manipulate
the weapon onto the target. Abbreviated fire commands and previously recorded data
enable the gunner to aim or adjust fire on the target quickly and accurately. Selected targets
should be fired on in daylight whenever practical to confirm data. The range card identifies
the targets and provides a record of firing data. DA Form 5517 provides a record of firing
data and aids defensive fire planning.
TERMINOLOGY
F-76. Gunners need to know several terms associated with predetermined fire.
SECTOR OF FIRE
F-77. A sector of fire is an area to be covered by fire assigned to an individual, a weapon,
or a unit. Gunners normally are assigned a primary and a secondary sector of fire.
fixed in direction and elevation. However, a small shift for search must be employed to
prevent the enemy from crawling under the FPL and to compensate for irregularities in the
terrain or the sinking of the tripod legs into soft soil during firing. Fire must be delivered
during all conditions of visibility.
F-80. A good FPL covers the maximum area with grazing fire. Grazing fire can be
obtained over various types of terrain out to a maximum of 600 meters. To obtain the
maximum extent of grazing fire over level or uniformly sloping terrain, the gunner sets the
rear sight at 600 meters. He then selects a point on the ground he estimates to be 600 meters
from the machine gun, and he aims, fires, and adjusts on that point. To prevent enemy
soldiers from crawling under grazing fire, he searches (downward) by lowering the muzzle
of the weapon.
log or board. (The gunner may mark the sector limits by notching or placing stops on the
log or board. The gunner uses the bipod firing position and grip.)
F-91. Fire control includes all actions of the leader and Soldiers in planning, preparing,
and applying fire on a target. The leader selects and designates targets. He also designates
the midpoint and flanks or ends of a target, unless they are obvious to the gunner. The
gunner fires at the instant desired. He then adjusts fire, regulates the rate of fire, shifts from
one target to another, and ceases fire. When firing, the gunner should continue to fire until
the target is neutralized or until signaled to do otherwise by the leader.
F-92. Predetermined targets, including the FPL or PDF, are engaged on order or by SOP.
The signal for calling these fires normally is stated in the defensive order. Control these
predetermined targets by using arm-and-hand signals, voice commands, or pyrotechnic
devices. Gunners fire the FPL or PDF at the sustained rate of fire unless the situation calls
for a higher rate. When engaging other predetermined targets, the sustained rate of fire
also is used unless a different rate is ordered.
ORAL
F-94. The oral fire control method can be effective, but sometimes the leader may be too
far away from the gunner, or the noise of the battle may make it impossible for him to
hear. The primary means of the oral fire control method is the issuance of a fire command.
ARM-AND-HAND SIGNALS
F-95. Arm-and-hand signals are an effective fire control method when the gunner can see
the leader. All gunners must know the standard arm-and-hand signals. The leader gets the
gunner's attention and points to the target. When the gunner returns the READY signal,
the leader commands FIRE.
PREARRANGED SIGNALS
F-96. Prearranged signals are either visual or sound signals such as casualty-producing
devices (rifle or Claymore), pyrotechnics, whistle blasts, or tracers. These signals should
be included in SOPs. If the leader wants to shift fire at a certain time, he gives a prearranged
signal such as obscurants or pyrotechnics. Upon seeing the signal, the gunner shifts his fire
to a prearranged point.
PERSONAL CONTACT
F-97. In many situations, the leader must issue orders directly to individual Soldiers.
Personal contact is used more than other methods by Infantry leaders. The leader must use
maximum cover and concealment to keep from disclosing the position or himself.
RANGE CARDS
F-98. When using the range card method of fire control, the leader must ensure all range
cards are current and accurate. Once this is accomplished, the leader may designate certain
targets for certain weapons with the use of limiting stakes or with fire commands. He also
should designate no-fire zones or restricted fire areas to others. The vital factor in this
method of fire control is gunners must be well-disciplined and pay attention to detail.
FIRE COMMANDS
F-100. A fire command is given to deliver fire on a target quickly and without confusion.
When the leader decides to engage a target not obvious to the squad, he must provide it
with the information needed to engage the target. He must alert the Soldiers; give a target
direction, description, and range; name the method of fire; and give the command to fire.
There are initial fire commands and subsequent fire commands.
F-101. It is essential the commands delivered by the weapons squad leader are
understood and echoed by the assistant gunner or gun team leader and gunner. Table F-7
provides an example of the weapons squad fire commands and actions used by the
weapons squad leader, assistant gunner, gun team leader, and gunner.
Table F-7. Weapons squad fire commands and actions
AG/GTL
WSL GUNNER GUNNER
ACTION COMMANDS
COMMANDS ACTIONS RESPONSES
AND ACTIONS
Gunner looks
“Light-skinned for laser and
“Light-skinned truck, identifies TGT.
WSL or GTL Gunner “TGT
truck, 3 o’clock,
identifies TGT traverses and identified.”
3 o’clock, 400 m,
within gun gets on TGT.
400 m, on my laser,
team’s sector. Gunner “TGT acquired.”
on my laser.” once on TGT, engages TGT
engage.” with correct
rate of fire.
Repeats “Gun
Gun team
1-Bipod” and Gets down “Gun 1 up”
(or weapons “Gun
identifies beside once ready to
squad) go to 1-Bipod.”
location for AG/GTL. fire.
bipod.
gun.
Gunner makes
WSL identifies “Gun 1, left, Using necessary
sector of fire for center, right binoculars adjustments,
“Sector
gun teams. sectors on my identifies tells AG/GTL
identified”
Day-marks with mark. Do you sectors and whether he
to AG/GTL
tracer. identify?” states, “Gun 1 identifies
(Always identifies.” once he
Night-marks or not.
marks left to Adjusts gunner identifies.
with Engages or
PEQ/tracer. right.) onto target. makes further
adjustments.
WSL gives
Talking the Repeats rate
gun teams
gun teams of fire and
the rate of Repeats rate of fire
(ensuring maintains
fire. (As long command, keeps
one gun proper count,
as they are own count. Fires “Sustained __
fires during telling gunner
keeping when told to fire. seconds.”
the other when to fire.
correct Adjusts rate of fire
gun’s Adjusts rate of
interval, they off of lead gun.
interval and fire off of lead
should “talk”
vice versa). gun.
themselves.)
Repeats command.
Ceases all fire onto
Repeats
the objective.
“Lift fire, lift command to
Maintains
fire, lift fire.” gunner, Echoes “lift
Lift fire overwatch and
Or “Gun 1, lift ensures fire.”
scans objective
fire.” gunner lifts
until told to
fire.
reengage or go out
of action.
AG/GTL
continuously
If need to
links rounds
know round Gunner echoes
and gives WSL “Gun 1,
Round count count, prompt round count to
round count 200 rounds.”
“Gun 1, round ensure it is heard.
every 100.
count.”
“Gun 1, 200
rounds.”
Repeats
command,
searches Repeats command, “Gun 1,
“Gun 1, watch objective for searches objective
“Watch and watch and
and shoot.” targets of for targets of
shoot” or shoot.”
“Gun 1, opportunity opportunity in
“Traverse and within sector. “Gun 1,
traverse and sector. Confirms
search” traverse and
search.” target with AG/GTL
before engaging. search.”
LEGEND
AG – assistant gunner; GTL – gun team leader; TGT – target; WSL – weapons squad
leader
ELEMENTS
F-103. Fire commands for all direct-fire weapons follow a pattern including similar
elements. There are six elements in the fire command of the machine gun: alert; direction;
description; range; method of fire; and command to open fire. The gunners repeat each
element of fire command as it is given.
ALERT
F-104. This element prepares the gunners for more instructions. The leader may alert
both gunners in the squad and may have only one fire, depending upon the situation. To
alert and have both gunners fire, the leader announces FIRE MISSION. If he desires to
alert both gunners but have only one fire, he announces GUN NUMBER ONE, FIRE
MISSION. In all cases, upon receiving the alert, the gunners load their machine guns and
place them on FIRE.
Direction
F-105. This element indicates the general direction to the target and may be given in one
or a combination of the following methods.
Oral
F-106. The leader orally gives the direction to the target in relation to the position of the
gunner example, FRONT, LEFT FRONT, RIGHT FRONT.
Pointing
F-107. The leader designates a small or obscure target by pointing with his finger or
aiming with a weapon. When he points with his finger, a Soldier standing behind him
should be able to look over his shoulder and sight along his arm and index finger to locate
the target. When aiming his weapon at a target, a Soldier looking through the sights should
be able to see the target. Leaders also may use lasers in conjunction with night vision
devices to designate a target to the gunner.
Tracer Ammunition
F-108. Tracer ammunition is a quick and sure method of designating a target not clearly
visible. When using this method, the leader first should give the general direction to direct
the gunner's attention to the target area. To prevent the loss of surprise when using tracer
ammunition, the leader does not fire until he has given all elements of the fire command
except the command to fire. The leader may fire his individual weapon. The firing of the
tracers then becomes the last element of the fire command, and it is the signal to open fire.
CAUTION
Soldiers must be aware night vision devices,
temporary blindness ("white out") may occur when
firing tracer ammunition at night or when exposed to
other external light sources. Lens covers may reduce
this effect.
Reference Points
F-109. Another way to designate obscure targets is to use easy-to-recognize reference
points. All leaders and gunners must know terrain features and terminology used to
describe them. (Refer to TC 3-25.26 for more information.) When using a reference point,
the word "reference" precedes its description. This is done to avoid confusion. The general
direction to the reference point should be given.
Description
F-110. The target description creates a picture of the target in the gunners’ minds. To
properly apply their fire, the Soldiers must know the type of target they are to engage. The
leader should describe it briefly. If the target is obvious, no description is necessary.
Range
F-111. The leader always announces the estimated range to the target. The range is given,
so the gunner knows how far to look for the target and what range setting to put on the rear
sight. Range is announced in meters. However, since the meter is the standard unit of range
measurement, the word "meters" is not used. With machine guns, the range is determined
and announced to the nearest hundred or thousand example, THREE HUNDRED, or ONE
THOUSAND.
Method of Fire
F-112. This element includes manipulation and rate of fire. Manipulation dictates the
class of fire with respect to the weapon. It is announced as FIXED, TRAVERSE,
SEARCH, or TRAVERSE AND SEARCH. Rate controls the volume of fire (sustained,
rapid, and cyclic). Normally, the gunner uses the sustained rate of fire. The rate of fire is
omitted from the fire command. The method of fire of the machine gun is usually 3- to 5-
round bursts (M249) and 6- to 9-round bursts (M240-series).
command FIRE at the specific time desired. If immediate fire is required, the command
FIRE is given without pause and gunners fire as soon as they are ready.
Oral
F-119. The leader may want to place the fire of one machine gun on an enemy machine
gun and quickly tells the gunner to fire on that gun.
Arm-and-Hand Signals
F-120. Battlefield noise and distance between the gunner and leader often make it
necessary to use arm-and-hand signals to control fire. (See figure F-21.) When an action
or movement is to be executed by only one of the gunners, a preliminary signal is given to
the gunner only. The following are commonly used signals for fire control:
z Ready. The gunner indicates he is ready to fire by yelling UP or having the AG raise
his hand above his head toward the leader.
z Commence firing or change rate of firing. The leader brings his hand (palm down)
to the front of his body about waist level, and moves it horizontally in front of his
body. To signal an increase in the rate of fire, he increases the speed of the hand
movement. To signal slower fire, he decreases the speed of the hand movement.
z Change direction or elevation. The leader extends his arm and hand in the new
direction and indicates the amount of change necessary by the number of fingers
extended. The fingers must be spread so the gunner can easily see the number of
fingers extended. Each finger indicates one meter of change of the weapon. If the
desired change is more than five meters, the leader extends his hand the number of
times necessary to indicate the total amount of change. For example, right nine
would be indicated by extending the hand once with five fingers showing and a
second time with four fingers showing for a total of nine fingers.
z Interrupt or cease firing. The leader raises his arm and hand (palm outward) in front
of his forehead and brings it downward sharply.
z Other signals. The leader can devise other signals to control his weapons. A detailed
description of arm-and-hand signals is given in FM 21-60.
F-121. Despite their post-Civil War development, modern machine guns did not exhibit
their full potential in battle until World War I. Although the machine gun has changed, the
role of the machine gun and machine gunner has not. The mission of machine guns in
battle is to deliver fires when and where the leader wants them in both the offense and
defense. Machine guns rarely, if ever, have independent missions. Instead, they provide
their unit with accurate, heavy fires to accomplish the mission.
F-123. Infantry platoons normally will have an organic weapons squad consisting of a
weapons squad leader and two gun teams. Depending on the unit’s organization or the
platoon’s and squad’s mission, there could be additional machine gun teams attached or
organic to the platoon or squad.
F-124. The weapon squad consists of a weapons squad leader and medium machine gun
teams. Each medium machine gun team has a gunner, assistant gunner, and ammunition
bearer. In some units the senior member of the gun team is the gunner. In other units the
assistant gunner is the senior gun team member who also serves as the gun team leader.
Table F-8 illustrates equipment carried by the weapons squad. Table F-9 (page F-42)
illustrates the duty positions within the weapons squad and gives possible duty descriptions
and responsibilities. The tables serve to show possible position and equipment use only.
Individual unit SOPs and available equipment dictate the exact role each weapons squad
member plays within his squad.
Table F-8. Weapons squad equipment by position example
AMMUNITION
WSL AG/GTL GUNNER
BEARER
M4-series M240-series
M4-series (w/ 7 M4-series (w/
Weapon (w/ 7 (50-100
magazines*) 7 magazines)
magazines*) rounds)
M145
M68 or M150 M68 or M150
Day Optic Machine M68 Optics
Optics Optics
Gun Optic
Laser PEQ-2 PEQ-2 PEQ-2 PAQ-4/PEQ-2
3x
Additional magnifier** 3x
3x magnifier** Tripod T&E
Equipment Spare magnifier**
barrels***
Senior squad leader within the platoon. Responsible for all training and
employment of the medium machine guns. The WSL’s knowledge,
WSL
experience, and tactical proficiency influence the effectiveness of
the squad.
AG/GTL is a team leader with the responsibilities of a fire team leader.
GTL is responsible for his team members and all the gun equipment.
GTL and his team will be tactically proficient and knowledgeable on this
FM and applicable FMs and TMs applying to the medium machine
gun.
GTL assists the WSL on the best way to employ the M240-series.
GTL enforces field discipline while the gun team is employed.
GTL leads by example in all areas. He sets the example in all things.
GTL assists the WSL in all areas. He advises him of problems either
tactical or administrative.
AG is responsible for all action concerning the gun.
AG/GTL AG/GTL calls the ammunition bearer if ammunition is needed or actively
seeks it out if the ammunition bearer is not available. Constantly
updates the WSL on the round count and serviceability of the M240-
series.
When the gun is firing, AG/GTL spots rounds and makes corrections to
the gunner’s fire. Also watches for friendly troops to the flanks of the
target area or between the gun and target.
If the gunner is hit by fire, AG/GTL immediately assumes the role of the
gunner.
AG/GTL is always prepared to change the gun’s barrel (spare barrel is
always out when the gun is firing). Ensures the hot barrel is not
placed on live ammunition or directly on the ground when it comes
out of the gun.
SECURITY
F-125. Security includes all command measures to protect against surprise, observation,
and annoyance by the enemy. The principal security measures against ground forces
include employment of security patrols and detachments covering the front flanks and rear
of the unit’s most vulnerable areas. The composition and strength of these detachments
depends on the size of the main body, its mission, and nature of the opposition expected.
The presence of machine guns with security detachments augments their firepower to
delay, attack, and defend, by virtue of inherent firepower.
F-126. The potential of air and ground attacks on the unit demands every possible
precaution for maximum security while on the move. Where this situation exists, the
machine gun crew must be thoroughly trained in the hasty delivery of antiaircraft fire and
of counterfire against enemy ground forces. The distribution of the medium machine guns
in the formation is critical. The medium machine gun crew is constantly on the alert,
particularly at halts, ready to deliver fire as soon as possible. If the leader expects a halt to
exceed a brief period, he carefully chooses medium machine gun positions to avoid unduly
tiring the medium machine gun crew. If he expects the halt to extend for a long period, he
can have the medium machine gun crew take up positions in support of the unit. The crew
covers the direction from which he expects enemy activity as well as the direction from
which the unit came. The leader selects positions permitting the delivery of fire in the most
probable direction of enemy attack, such as valleys, draws, ridges, and spurs. He chooses
positions offering obstructed fire from potential enemy locations.
z Slower rate to conserve ammunition (sustained rate) while still preventing return
fire as the assault moves forward.
z Increased rate as the assault nears the objective.
z Lift and shift to targets of opportunity.
F-132. All vocal commands from the leaders to change the rates of fire are accompanied
simultaneously by arm-and-hand signals.
F-133. Machine guns in the support by fire role should be set in and assigned a primary
and alternate sector of fire as well as a primary and alternate position.
F-134. Machine guns are suppressive fire weapons used to suppress known and
suspected enemy positions. Therefore, gunners cannot be allowed to empty all their
ammunition into one bunker simply because it’s all they can identify at the time.
F-135. The support-by-fire position, not the assault element, is responsible for ensuring
there is no masking of fires. The assault element might have to mask the support-by-fire
line because it has no choice on how to move. It is the support-by-fire gunner’s job to shift
fires continually, or move gun teams or the weapons squad to support the assault and
prevent masking.
F-136. Shift and shut down the weapon squad gun teams one at a time, not all at once.
M203/M320 and mortar or other indirect fire can be used to suppress while the medium
machine guns are moved to where they can fire.
F-137. Leaders must take into account the surface danger zones of the machine guns
when planning and executing the lift and or shift of the support-by-fire guns. The
effectiveness of the enemy on the objective will play a large role in how much risk should
be taken with respect to the lifting or shifting of fires.
F-138. Once the support-by-fire line is masked by the assault element, fires are shifted
and or lifted to prevent enemy withdrawal or reinforcement.
fire over their assigned zone or sector. In terms of engagement ranges, the medium
machine gun in the assault engages within 300 meters of its target and frequently at point-
blank ranges.
F-142. Where the area or zone of action is too wide to allow proper coverage by the
platoon’s or weapons squad organic medium machine guns, the platoon or squads can be
assigned additional medium machine guns or personnel from within the company. This
may permit the platoon or squads to accomplish its assigned mission. The medium
machine guns are assigned a zone or a sector to cover and move with the maneuver
element.
AMMUNITION PLANNING
F-156. Leaders must carefully plan the rates of fire to be employed by machine guns as
they relate to the mission and amount of ammunition available. The weapons squad leader
must understand fully the mission the amount of available ammunition and application of
machine gun fire needed to support fully all vital events of the mission. Planning ensures
the guns do not run out of ammunition.
F-157. A mounted platoon or squad might have access to enough machine gun
ammunition to support the guns throughout its operation. A dismounted platoon or squad
with limited resupply capabilities has to plan for only the basic load to be available. In
either case, leaders must take into account vital events the guns must support during the
mission. They must plan the rate of machine gun fire needed to support the vital events,
and amount of ammunition needed for scheduled rates of fire.
F-158. The leader must make an estimate of the total amount of ammunition needed to
support all the machine guns. He then must adjust the amount of ammunition used for each
event to ensure enough ammunition is available for all phases of the operation. Examples
of planning rates of fire and ammunition requirements for a platoon’s or weapons squad’s
machine guns in the attack follow.
require. Coupling this knowledge with an accurate estimate of the length of time and rates
of fire their guns are scheduled to fire will ensure enough ammunition resources to cover
the entire mission. As part of an example of the planning needed to use M240-series in
support-by-fire roles, the rates of fire of the M240-series are listed in table F-10.
Table F-10. M240-series rates of fire
x 100 rounds per minute
x Fired in 6- to 9-round bursts
SUSTAINED
x 4-5 seconds between bursts (Barrel change every 10
minutes.)
x 200 rounds per minute
x Fired in 10- to 12-round bursts
RAPID
x 2-3 seconds between bursts (Barrel change every two
minutes.)
x 650-950 rounds per minute
CYCLIC
x Continuous burst (Barrel change every minute.)
AMMUNITION REQUIREMENT
F-160. Leaders must calculate the number of rounds needed to support every machine
gun throughout all phases of the operation. Ammunition must be allocated for each vital
event and to support movement with suppressive fires.
G-1. SLM and CCMS are used against field fortifications, enemy vehicles, or other
similar enemy targets. SLM are issued to Infantry Soldiers as rounds of ammunition in
addition to their assigned weapons. While Javelins are organic to the Infantry weapons
squad, TOW missile weapon systems are found in the assault platoons in the Infantry
battalions weapon company. This section discusses the specific types of SLM and CCMS
the Infantry platoon employs. Section II discusses their employment considerations.
Section III discusses safety. For complete information refer to TM 3-23.25, Shoulder-
Launched Munitions; TC 3-22.37, Javelin-Close Combat Missile System, Medium;
FM 3-22.34, TOW Weapon System; and TC 3-22.32, Improved Target Acquisition System,
M41.
SHOULDER-LAUNCHED MUNITIONS
G-2. SLM include the M136A1 AT4 combined space (AT4CS), M136 AT4; the
M72A2/A3 light antitank weapon (LAW), improved M72A4/5/6/7 LAW; and M141
BDM. The M141 BDM also has been referred to as the shoulder-launched multipurpose
assault weapon-disposable (SMAW-D). Table G-1 lists select SLM specifications.
G-3. All SLM are lightweight, self-contained, single-shot, disposable weapons
consisting of unguided free flight, fin-stabilized, rocket-type cartridges packed in
expendable, telescoping launchers (except the M 136 AT4/AT4CS which does not
telescope) also serve as storage containers. The only requirement for their care is a visual
inspection. SLM can withstand extreme weather and environmental conditions, including
arctic, tropical, and desert climates.
G-4. SLM increase the lethality and survivability of the Infantryman and provide him a
direct fire capability to defeat enemy personnel within armored platforms. BDM provides
the Soldier a direct fire capability to defeat enemy personnel located within field
fortifications, bunkers, caves, masonry structures, and lightly armed vehicles and to
suppress enemy personnel in lightly armored vehicles.
G-5. The individual Soldier will use SLM to engage threat combatants at close ranges,
across the street or from one building to another. The Soldier may employ SLM as a
member of a support-by-fire element to incapacitate threat forces threatening the assault
element. When the assault element clears a building, the leader may reposition the SLM
gunner inside to engage a potential counterattack force.
Note. Several numbers in table G-1 have been rounded off and might not
represent exact numbers.
SHOULDER- M72A4/5/6/7
M141 BDM
LAUNCHED IMPROVED LAW
MUNITION DODIC HA08
DODIC HA29
Field Manual TM 3-23.25 TM 3-23.25
Carry Weight 8.0 lbs. 16.0 lbs.
Length: 31 inches 32 inches
Carry Extended: 39 inches 55 inches
Caliber 60-mm 83-mm
200 m/s 217 m/s
Muzzle Velocity
656 f/s 712 f/s
Operating -40 to 60 C -32 to 49 C
Temperature -40 to 140 F -20 to 120 F
Maximum
220 m 500 m
Effective Range
Maximum Range 1400 m 2000 m
Minimum Arming
25 m 15 m
Range
M72A3
G-10. The M72A3 contains a nonadjustable propelling charge and a 66-mm rocket. Every
M72A3 has an integral HEAT warhead in the rocket’s head (or body) section. (See figure
G-4, page G-6.) Although the M72A3 mainly is employed as an antiarmor weapon, it may
be used with limited success against secondary targets such as gun emplacements,
pillboxes, buildings, or light vehicles.
G-15. The M141 BDM can destroy bunkers, but is not optimized to kill the enemy soldiers
within masonry structures in urban terrain or armored vehicles. The M141 BDM can
penetrate masonry walls, but multiple rounds may be necessary to deliver sufficient
lethality against enemy personnel behind the walls.
G-16. The M141 BDM has been used with great success in destroying personnel and
equipment in enemy bunkers, field fortifications, and caves in recent operations.
JAVELIN
G-18. The Javelin is a fire-and-forget, shoulder-fired, man-portable CCMS consisting of
a reusable M98A1 (Block 0) and the improved M98A2 (Block 1), CLU and a round. (See
figure G-8.) The CLU houses the daysight, night vision sight (NVS), controls, and
indicators. The round consists of the missile, the launch tube assembly (LTA), and battery
coolant unit (BCU). The LTA serves as the launch platform and carrying container of the
missile. (Refer to TC 3-22.37 for more information.)
G-19. The Javelin CCMS’ primary role is to destroy enemy armored vehicles out to 2000
meters with the M98A1 and 2500 meters with the M98A2. The Javelin can be employed
in a secondary role of providing FS against point targets such as bunkers and crew-served
weapons positions. In addition, the Javelin CLU can be used alone as an aided vision
device for reconnaissance, security operations, and surveillance. When BFV are part of a
combined-arms team, the Javelin becomes a secondary antiarmor weapons system. It
supports the fires of tanks and TOWs, covers secondary armor avenues of approach, and
provides observation posts with an antiarmor capability. The Javelin gunner should be able
to engage up to three targets in two minutes, making him effective against armor threat.
Missile
G-22. The Javelin missile consists of the guidance section; the midbody section, the
warhead, the propulsion section, and control actuator section. A discussion of the guidance
section and warhead follows.
Guidance Section
G-23. The guidance section provides target tracking and flight control signals. It is the
forward section of the missile and includes the seeker head section and guidance
electronics unit.
Warhead Section
G-24. The Javelin missile uses a dual-charged warhead (see figure G-9) containing a
precursor charge and main charge:
z Precursor charge. The precursor charge is an HE AT shaped charge. Its purpose is
to cause reactive armor on the target to detonate before the main charge reaches the
armor. Once the reactive armor is penetrated, the target’s main hull is exposed to
the warhead’s main charge. If the target is not equipped with reactive armor, the
precursor provides additional explosives to penetrate the main armor.
z Main charge. The main charge is the second charge of a dual-charge warhead and
is also an HE-shaped charge. The primary warhead charge is designed to penetrate
the target’s main armor to achieve a target kill.
G-29. The TOW CCMS consists of multiple configurations with numerous types of
missiles. These configurations mainly consist of minor modified work orders transparent
to the operator and are continually updated. All configurations use the same basic airframe,
aerodynamic control system, command-link wire, and missile electronics designs. The
current missile types are listed below:
z Improved TOW (ITOW). The ITOW missile has an improved five-inch warhead
from the original TOW missile including extended probes for greater standoff and
penetration. It can destroy targets at a minimum range of 65 meters and a maximum
range of 3750 meters.
z TOW 2. The TOW 2 missile has a full-caliber six-inch warhead including an
extended probe. In addition to the infrared radiator of the ITOW missile, TOW 2
has a second infrared radiator to provide hardened system performance against
battlefield obscurants and countermeasures. The second radiator is called the
thermal beacon and provides link compatibility with the electro-optical infrared
nightsight, which is part of the TOW 2 launcher system.
z TOW 2A. The TOW 2A adds a small explosive charge in the tip of the extended
probe causing enemy reactive armor to detonate prematurely, thus allowing the
TOW 2A’s warhead to penetrate the main armor.
z TOW 2B. The TOW 2B has an entirely different warhead and kill mechanism than
the previous TOW missiles. It is a top-attack missile (fly over/shoot down)
defeating enemy armor at its most vulnerable pointthe top deck of the turret and
hull. The TOW 2B has a tandem warhead firing two explosively formed projectiles
down through the thin upper deck armor of the enemy vehicle. The gunner tracks
the target the same as other TOW missile with the crosshairs on center mass, but
the missile automatically flies 2.25 meters above LOS. When the missile senses it’s
directly above the target (by means of the target’s shape and magnetic field), it
automatically fires its warhead. The TOW 2B missile can destroy targets at a
minimum range of 288 meters when fired from the ground mount and 200 meters
when fired from the HMMWV or BFV. The TOW 2B has a maximum range of
3750 meters whether ground- or vehicle-mounted.
z TOW 2B GEN 1. The TOW 2B GEN 1 is similar to the TOW 2B but includes the
addition of the GEN 1 Counter Active Protection System (CAPS), which is used to
defeat enemy active protection systems.
z TOW 2B Aero. The TOW 2B Aero is an extended range version of the TOW 2B
missile with an aerodynamic nose and has an effective range of 4500 meters. (See
figure G-10, page G-16.) This longer range (compared to the 3750 meter range of
the previous TOW missiles) allows a TOW crew to fire well beyond the weapons
range of its targeted vehicle.
z TOW 2B Aero With GEN 1, 2, and 3A CAPS. These versions of TOW 2B Aero have
the addition of different generations of CAPS to defeat an enemy target’s active
protection system, allowing the TOW 2B missile to engage armored vehicles up to
4500 meters. (See figure G-10, page G-16.)
z TOW BB. The TOW BB replaces the TOW 2A warhead with a fragmenting bulk
charge for nonarmor targets. (See figure G-11.) The TOW BB has a range of 3750
meters. Its missile is capable of defeating bunkers, creating a lane through masonry
walls, and engaging targets in support of urban operations.
G-33. The ITAS provides the Infantry platoon and squads with advanced optics during
daylight and limited visibility to aid in surveillance and target acquisition in both offensive
and defensive missions.
G-34. The ITAS can be vehicle-mounted or ground-emplaced (tripod-mounted) for
operation. Missiles can be launched from either operational mode. The entire system can
be carried by a single crew for short distances. Moving it over long distances without the
vehicle will require two crews, which causes two systems to be out of operation at the
same time. The vehicle-mounted launcher is more mobile and can be prepared quickly for
use. The launcher can be assembled and disassembled without the use of tools.
SECTION II – EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS
G-35. The objective of the Army’s warfighting doctrine is to concentrate decisive combat
power at the right time and place, by massing fires rather than by massing forces, and by
presenting the enemy with multiple threats. This section discusses SLM and CCMS
employment considerations. A lethal mix of CCMS and SLM provide the Infantry unit
with the flexibility to employ multiple systems designed to deliver maximum direct fire
lethality and destroy enemy formations at both long range and in close combat. At close
combat range (15-300 meters), SLM provide Soldiers with the ability to deliver direct fire
lethality at close proximity to the enemy. At extended range (300-4500 meters), a mix of
Javelin and TOW provides the Infantry leader with overwhelming combat overmatch.
These weapons serve as vital components by applying overlapping and interlocking fires
to achieve synergy and mutual support for his maneuver force.
engagement distance limits firing opportunities in the confines of densely built-up areas,
CCMS may not be the weapon of choice in the urban environment. Urban area hazards
include, fires caused by both friendly and enemy forces may cause target acquisition and
lock-on problems, clutter on the battlefield may cause lock-on problems, and LOS
communications limited by structures. CCMS unique flight path forces the gunner to think
in three dimensions. Other urban environment hazards include overhead obstacles such as
street signs, light poles, and wires, which could impede the missile’s flight path.
limits its use in built-up areas. The TOW 2B has a minimum range of 200 meters
and a maximum range of 3750, which limits its use in built-up areas.
z Crossover. Sometimes the Javelin seeker or TOW round will not be able to
distinguish between the background and target because the two have the same
temperature (crossover).
z Time. When a gunner comes across a target of opportunity, he may not be able to
take advantage of it. The cool down time of the Javelin’s NVS is 2.5 to 3.5 minutes.
Javelin seeker cool down takes about 10 seconds. Once the BCU is activated, the
gunner has a maximum of four minutes to engage the target before the battery
coolant unit is depleted.
z Back blast. The soft launch capability of the Javelin enables the gunner to fire from
inside buildings because there is little overpressure or flying debris.
z Weapon penetration. The dual-charge Javelin warhead penetrates typical urban
targets. The direct attack mode is selected when engaging targets in a building.
Enemy positions or bunkers in the open closer than 150 meters are engaged using
the direct attack mode. Positions in the open farther than 150 meters are engaged
using either the top or direct attack mode, depending on the situation.
z Breaching structural walls. The Javelin and TOW (except the TOW BB) are not
effective when breaching structural walls. ATGMs are not designed to breach
structural walls. All CCMS are designed to produce a small hole, penetrate armor,
and deliver the explosive charge. Breaching calls for the creation of a large hole.
CCMS are better used against armored vehicles or the destruction of enemy-
fortified fighting positions.
ANTIARMOR ROLE
G-43. In the past decade, there has been a revolution in armor technology. Research and
new developments have come from Europe, the United States, and Israel. These
improvements also are becoming much more common in Third World armies. In addition,
many older tanks and other armored fighting vehicles are being retrofitted with improved
armor protection. These advanced armor configurations improve the vehicles’
survivability against all weapons. They are designed specifically to protect against HEAT
warheads and essentially fall into four categories: reactive, laminated, composite, and
appliqué. Improved armor types include the following:
z Reactive armor. Reactive armor comes in several varieties, but the principle is
essentially the same for all. The armor consists of blocks of explosives sandwiched
between two metal plates and bolted on the outside of the vehicle. Small-arms and
artillery shrapnel will not set off the blocks. However, when a HEAT round strikes
the block, the explosive ignites and blows outward. The blast and moving steel
plates disperse and deflect the jet of the HEAT warhead, dramatically reducing its
ability to penetrate armor.
z Laminated armor. Laminated armor consists of flat layers of steel armor plates with
layers of ceramics, fiberglass, or other nonmetallic materiel’s in between. This
armor is highly effective against all types of weapons, but is difficult and expensive
to manufacture. Vehicles with laminated armor are characterized by flat, slab sides,
such as on the M1-series Abrams tank and the German Leopard II.
z Composite armor. Composite armor consists of a nonmetallic core (usually some
kind of ceramic) around which the rest of the steel of the hull or the turret is molded.
This is much more effective than conventional steel armor against all types of
weapons, but less so than laminated armor.
z Appliqué armor. Appliqué armor is essentially extra plates mounted or welded on
top of the hull or turret of a vehicle. It can be made of any material, but is frequently
made of ceramic or laminated materials. Like reactive armor, appliqué armor is an
easy and cost-effective way of improving the protection of older vehicles.
G-43. Natural or manmade obstacles can be used to force the armored vehicle to slow,
stop, or change direction. This pause enables the shooter to achieve a first-round hit. If he
does not achieve a catastrophic kill on the first round, he or another shooter must be ready
to engage the target vehicle immediately with another round.
G-44. The white area in figure G-13 shows the most favorable direction of attack when
the turret is facing to the front. The gray area shows the vehicle’s PDF and observation
when the turret is facing to the front). Volley fires can degrade the additional protection
appliqué and reactive armors provide to the target vehicle greatly.
METHODS OF ENGAGEMENT
G-51. The four engagement methods for SLM include single, sequence, pair, and volley
firing. The leader evaluates the situation on the ground to determine which of these
methods to use. Regardless of whether they are used singly or in combination,
communications are needed as well. The methods of engagement are rehearsed in
accordance with unit SOP.
Single Firing
G-52. A single Soldier with one SLM may engage an armored vehicle, but this is not the
preferred method of engagement. Several SLM normally are required to kill an armored
vehicle. A single gunner firing one round must hit a vital part of the target in order to do
damage. (See figure G-15.) A single shooter can engage targets out to 225 meters with the
LAW, or 300 meters with the M136 AT4 (when he knows the actual range).
Sequence Firing
G-53. A single shooter, equipped with two or more SLM prepared for firing, engages the
target. After engaging with the first round and observing the impact, the shooter adjusts
his point of aim. He then engages with another round until he destroys the target or runs
out of rounds. (See figure G-16.)
Pair Firing
G-54. Two or more shooters, equipped with two or more SLM prepared for firing, engage
a single target. Before firing, the first shooter informs the others of the estimated speed
and distance to the target. If the impact of his round proves his estimate to be correct, the
other shooters engage the target until it is destroyed. If the impact of the round proves his
estimate to be incorrect, the second shooter informs the others of his estimate, and he
engages the target. This continues until the target is destroyed or all rounds are expended.
(See figure G-17.)
Volley Firing
G-55. Two or more shooters can engage a single target when the range is known. These
shooters engage the target at the same time on a prearranged signal such as a command,
whistle, mine, or TRP. This can be the most effective means of engagement as it places
the most possible rounds on one target at one time, increasing the possibility of a kill. (See
figure G-18.)
OFFENSE
G-59. CCMS contribute to the offense by providing long-range fires destroying enemy
armor and protect the force from armored counterattacks. In the absence of armored
targets, CCMS can engage enemy fortifications and hovering helicopters. CCMS normally
are used in a support-by-fire role during the offense. The primary consideration for such
employment is the availability of appropriate fields of fire and armored threat. CCMS
crews can protect flanks against armored threats and also can provide overwatch for unit
movement. (See figure G-20.)
DEFENSE
G-60. During planning, the leader considers the enemy armor threat, then positions
antiarmor weapons accordingly to cover armor avenues of approach. He also considers the
fields of fire, tracking time, and minimum engagement distance of each weapon. The
section leader or squad leader selects a primary position and sector of fire for each
antiarmor weapon. He also picks alternate and supplementary positions for them. Each
position should allow flank fire and have cover and concealment. The leader should
integrate the ITAS into his limited visibility security and observation plan. The squad
leader selects the fighting position and assigns the sector of fire. Considering the
fundamentals of antiarmor employment will improve the crew’s survivability greatly.
ITAS crews must coordinate with adjacent units to ensure security. The TOW’s 3750-
meter maximum range makes it difficult for the enemy to engage the crew with direct fire,
which forces the enemy to deploy earlier than intended. The gunner prepares a range card
for his primary position. If time permits, he also prepares them for his alternate and
supplementary positions. (See table G-10, page G-34.)
G-61. Reserve forces armed with SLM may be employed to assist counterattacks to regain
essential positions. They also are used to block enemy penetrations, to meet unexpected
enemy thrusts, and to provide support by fire to endangered friendly units during
disengagements and withdrawals. In the event defensive positions are in danger of being
overrun by enemy armored vehicles, SLM may be used against armored vehicles and
lightly armored vehicles posing an immediate threat, including light tanks. The maximum
range provides leaders with greater flexibility in positioning each round and provides a
means of achieving overlapping sectors of fire for increased survivability.
Table G-10. Personnel duties
SECTION GUNNER
TASKS TO BE PERFORMED TL
SERGEANT /AG
Integrate CCMS into the platoon tactical plan:
xSelect general weapons positions. X
xAssign sectors of fires. X
xCoordinate mutual support. X
xCoordinate with adjacent units. X
Positions (primary, alternate, and supplementary)
and routes between positions. X
Supervise continual preparation and improvement X
of positions. X
Coordinate security of the CCMS teams. X
Confirm or make adjustments. X X
Supervise preparation of range card. X X
Control movement of gunners between positions. X X
Issue fire commands to gunners. X X
Coordinate resupply and collection of extra X
rounds carried in platoon.
Identify enemy avenues of approach. X
Prepare fighting position (primary, alternate, X
supplementary).
Prepare range card. X X
Designate TRP. X
Pre-stock rounds. X X
Prepare round for firing. X
React to fire commands. X
Engage targets. X
LEGEND
AG – assistant gunner; CCMS – close combat missile system ; TL – team leader;
TRP – target reference point
G-62. Leaders must employ SLM and CCMS to minimize danger to friendly Soldiers
caused by the surface danger zones or back blast danger zones. They must weigh the risk
of firing the missile in close proximity to friendly assault forces against the need to
suppress or destroy enemy fortifications or vehicles from the support by fire or assault
position. This section discusses SLM and CCMS safety.
SHOULDER-LAUNCHED MUNITIONS
G-63. Figures G-21 through G-30 (pages G-35 through G-41) and table G-11 (page G-36)
illustrate surface danger zones and back blast danger zone information for SLM. (Refer to
DA Pamphlet 385-63 and TM 3-23.25 for more information.)
Figure G-23. Surface danger zones area F for firing M136 AT4
Figure G-25. Surface danger zones area for firing M136A1 AT4CS
Overhead Fire
G-68. SLM should not be fired over the heads of friendly Soldiers, unless the Soldiers
have adequate protection against direct impact or other hazards.
JAVELIN
G-69. Figure G-33 (page G-44) shows the Javelin back blast danger area and surface
danger zones. The primary danger area is a 60-degree sector, with the apex of the sector at
the aft end of the missile launch motor.
Figure G-33. Javelin back blast area and surface danger zones
z Structural damage. Escaping gases from the missile’s first-stage motor are hot and
flammable. The materials that can catch fire easily are removed before firing. For
example, some types of curtains and throw rugs.
z Hearing protection. All personnel within 25 meters of the Javelin must wear hearing
protection.
z Face shield. The face shield protects the gunner’s face. It is possible to damage the
face shield absorber between the indentation and CLU main housing. If this part of
the face shield is missing, the gunner must switch from firing the Javelin with the
right eye to the left eye.
FIRING LIMITATIONS
G-72. Some conditions may limit the firing and engagement capabilities of the TOW. The
following information should be considered before engaging targets:
z Firing over bodies of water. Maximum and limited range firing over water varies
by missile type. If the range is less than 1100 meters, the missile’s range is not
affected. However, if it is wider than 1100 meters it can reduce the range of the
TOW. A TOW position should be as high above and as far back from the water as
the tactical situation allows. The squad or section leader should analyze his sector
as soon as the position is occupied to determine if water will affect the employment
of the TOW. Signals being sent through the command-link wires are shorted out
when a large amount of wire is submerged in water.
z Firing over electrical lines. If the command-link wires make contact with a live
high-voltage power line, personnel can be injured or control of the missile could be
lost. The launcher electronics also may be damaged. In addition to power lines,
other high-voltage sources include street cars, electric train ways, and some moving
target trolleys on training ranges.
z Firing in windy conditions. Gusty, flanking, or quartering winds can cause the
launch tube to vibrate and spoil the tracking performance. The effect is similar to
driving in a strong crosswind. Strong winds can move the missile around during
flight, but as long as the crosshairs are kept on the center mass of the target, the
weapon system can compensate for wind effects.
z Firing through obscurants and area fires. Smoke can obscure the LOS and hide the
target when using the daysight tracker. A smooth tracking rate should be maintained
as the target disappears into an obscurant cloud so the missile will still be on target
or close as the vehicle goes out the other side of the obscurants cloud. (This
technique should be practiced during field tracking exercises.) A fire can burn
through the command-link wire, causing loss of control of the missile.
z Caution area 2. The caution area 2 is an extension of the primary danger area with
the same associated hazards and personnel protection required. The radius of this
area is 75 meters.
z 200-meter zone. The 200-meter zone is the danger area for aerial firings 15.25
meters or more above ground level.
Figure G-35. Surface danger zones for firing basic TOW, TOW 2A, and TOW
2B missiles
z Phony obstacles deceive the attacking force concerning the exact location of real
obstacles. They cause the attacker to question his decision to breach and may cause
him to expend his reduction assets wastefully.
Phony minefields are used to degrade enemy mobility and preserve-friendly
mobility.
Intended to simulate live minefields and deceive the enemy, they are used when
lack of time, personnel, or materiel prevents use of actual mines.
They also may be used as gaps in live minefields.
A phony minefield must look like a live minefield, so Soldiers must bury metallic
objects or make the ground look as though objects are buried.
Obstacles are employed by both friendly and enemy forces. The main categories of
obstacles are:
z Existing obstacles.
z Reinforcing obstacles.
EXISTING OBSTACLES
Existing obstacles are those natural or cultural restrictions to movement that are part
of the terrain. Existing obstacles can be reinforced into more obstacles. They normally are
in defilade from enemy observation (located where observation and fires can prevent the
opposing force from breaching them), and are difficult to bypass. Existing obstacles
include two types, natural and cultural. The following are examples: (Refer to ATP 3-34.22
for more information.)
z Natural.
Swamps.
Dense forests.
Deep, steep-sloped ravines.
Rivers.
Streams.
Hills or mountains with excessive slopes.
z Cultural.
Urban areas.
Quarries.
Railroad beds.
Built-up or elevated roads.
Potential storage sites.
REINFORCING OBSTACLES
Reinforcing obstacles are used by both friendly and enemy forces to tie together,
anchor, strengthen, and extend existing obstacles. Careful evaluation of the terrain to
determine its existing obstructing or canalizing effect is required to achieve maximum use
of reinforcing obstacles. Installation time and manpower usually are the two most
important factors. The reinforcing obstacles are—
z Land mines.
z Constructed obstacles.
z Demolition obstacles.
z Improvised obstacles.
LAND MINES
Land mine is a munition on or near the ground or other surface area that is designed
to be exploded by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or vehicle. Land mines
can be employed in quantities within a specific area to form a minefield, or they can be
used individually to reinforce nonexplosive obstacles. Land mines fall into the following
two general categories: persistent and nonpersistent. Persistent means they are not capable
of self-destructing or self-deactivating. Nonpersistent means they are capable of self-
destructing or self-deactivating. (See figure H-1.) (Refer to ATP 3-34.20 for more
information.)
CONSTRUCTED OBSTACLES
Units create constructed obstacles with manpower or equipment without the use of
explosives. Examples of constructed obstacles include:
z Ditches. Ditches across roads and trails are obstacles. Large ditches in open areas
require engineer equipment.
z Log hurdles. Log hurdles act as "speed bumps" on roads. They are installed easily
and are most effective when used in conjunction with other obstacles.
z Log cribs. A log crib is constructed of logs, dirt, and rocks. The logs are used to
make rectangular or triangular cribs filled with dirt and rock.
These are used to block narrow roads and defiles. Unless substantially built, log
cribs will not stop tanks.
z Log posts. Log posts embedded in the road and employed in-depth can stop tracked
vehicles. If they are not high enough to be pushed out of the way, posts can cause a
tracked vehicle to throw a track if it tries to climb over. If employed with wire and
mines, they also can slow enemy Infantry.
z Wire entanglements. Wire entanglements impede the movement of dismounted
enemy Infantry, and in some cases, tracked and wheeled vehicles.
Triple standard concertina is a common wire obstacle. However, there are other
types, such as double apron, tanglefoot, and general-purpose barbed-tape
obstacles.
Figures H-2a through H-2c (pages H-5 through H-6) illustrate examples of wire
and log obstacles. The materials used in constructing wire entanglements are
relatively lightweight (compared to other obstacles) and inexpensive, considering
the protection they afford.
DEMOLITION OBSTACLES
Units create demolition obstacles by detonating explosives. ATP 3-34.20 covers
demolitions in detail. There are many uses for demolitions, but some examples are road
craters and abatis.
Road craters are obstacles on roads or trails if the areas on the flanks of the crater
are tied into steep slopes or mined areas. Road craters can compel the opposing force to
use earthmoving equipment, blade tanks, or mechanical bridging assets.
Abatis are only effective if large enough trees, telephone poles, or other similar
objects are available to stop the opposing force. An abatis is an obstacle created by cutting
down trees so their tops are crisscrossed and pointing toward the expected enemy direction.
It is most effective for stopping vehicles in a forest or narrow movement routes. This
obstacle may be reinforced with claymore or non- persistent mines.
IMPROVISED OBSTACLES
Improvised obstacles are designed by Soldiers and leaders with imagination and
ingenuity when using available materiel and other resources. An example of obstacles in
urban terrain is shown in figure H-3. Improvised obstacles include the following:
z Rubble. Rubble from selected masonry structures and buildings in a built-up area
will limit movement through an area and provide fortified fighting positions.
z Battle damage. Damaged vehicle hulks or other debris are used as roadblocks.
z Flooding. Flooded areas are created by opening floodgates or breaching levees.
BREACHING FUNDAMENTALS
Suppress, obscure, secure, reduce, and assault (SOSRA) are the breaching
fundamentals being applied to ensure success when breaching against a defending enemy.
These obstacle reduction fundamentals always will apply, but they may vary based on
METT-TC.
SUPPRESS
Suppression is a tactical task used to employ direct or indirect fires or an electronic
attack on enemy personnel, weapons, or equipment to prevent or degrade enemy fires and
observation of friendly forces. The purpose of suppression during breaching operations is
to protect forces reducing and maneuvering through an obstacle. Suppression is a mission-
critical task performed during breaching operation. Suppression generally triggers the rest
of the actions at the obstacle. Fire control measures ensure all fires are synchronized with
other actions at the obstacle. Although suppressing the enemy overwatching the obstacle
is the mission of the support force, the breach force should provide additional suppression
against an enemy the supporting force cannot suppress.
OBSCURE
Obscuration must be employed to protect forces conducting obstacle reduction and
passage of assault forces. Obscuration hampers enemy observation and target acquisition
by concealing friendly activities and movement. Obscuration smoke deployed on or near
the enemy’s position minimizes its vision. Screening obscurants employed between the
reduction area and the enemy conceals movement and reduction activities. It also degrades
enemy ground and aerial observations. Obscuration must be planned carefully to provide
maximum degradation of enemy observation and fires, but it must not degrade friendly
fires and control significantly.
SECURE
Friendly forces secure reduction areas to prevent the enemy from interfering with
obstacle reduction and passage of the assault force through lanes created during the
reduction. Security must be effective against outposts and fighting positions near the
obstacle and against overwatching units as necessary. The far side of the obstacle must be
secured by fires or be occupied before attempting efforts to reduce the obstacle. The
attacking unit’s higher headquarters is responsible for isolating the breach area by fixing
adjacent units, attacking enemy reserves in-depth, and providing counterfire support.
Identifying the extent of the enemy’s defenses is critical before selecting the
appropriate technique to secure the point of breach. If the enemy controls the point of
breach and cannot be suppressed adequately, the force must secure the point of breach
before it can reduce the obstacle.
The breach force must be resourced with enough maneuver assets to provide local
security against the forces supporting force cannot engage sufficiently. Elements within
the breach force securing the reduction area also may be used to suppress the enemy once
reduction is complete. The breach force also may need to assault to the far side of the
breach and provide local security so the assault element can seize its initial objective.
REDUCE
Reduction is the creation of lanes through or over an obstacle to allow an attacking
force to pass. The number and width of lanes created varies with the enemy situation, the
assault force’s size, composition, and scheme of maneuver. The lanes must allow the
assault force to rapidly pass through the obstacle. The breach force will reduce proof (if
required), mark, and report lane locations and lane-marking method to higher command
headquarters. Follow-on units will reduce or clear the obstacle when required. Reduction
cannot be accomplished until suppression and obscuration are in place, the obstacle has
been identified, and point of breach is secure.
ASSAULT
A breaching operation is not complete until:
z Friendly forces have assaulted to destroy the enemy on the far side of the obstacle
as the enemy is capable of placing or observing direct and indirect fires on the
reduction area.
z Battle handover with follow-on forces has occurred, unless no battle handover is
planned.
BREACHING ORGANIZATION
A commander or platoon leader organizes friendly forces to accomplish breaching
fundamentals quickly and effectively. This requires him to organize support, breach, and
assault forces with the necessary assets to accomplish their roles. For tactical obstacle
breaches, platoons and squads normally are assigned as either one or part of the following
forces.
SUPPORT FORCE
The support force’s primary responsibility is to eliminate the enemy’s ability to
place direct or indirect fire on friendly force and interfere with a breaching operation. It
must—
z Isolate the reduction area with fires and establish a support-by-fire position to
destroy, fix, or suppress the enemy. Depending on METT-TC, this may be the
weapons squad or the entire platoon.
z Mass, control direct and indirect fires to suppress the enemy and to neutralize
weapons able to bring fires on the breach force.
z Control obscuring smoke to prevent enemy-observed direct and indirect fires.
BREACH FORCE
The breach force assists in the passage of the assault force by detecting, creating,
proofing (if necessary), marking and reporting lanes. The breach force is a combined-arms
force. It may include engineers, reduction assets, and enough maneuver forces to provide
additional suppression and local security. The entire Infantry platoon or squad may be part
of the breach force. The breach force may apply portions of the following breaching
fundamentals as it reduces an obstacle.
Suppress
The breach force must be allocated enough maneuver forces to provide additional
suppression against various threats, including:
z Enemy direct-fire systems that cannot be observed and suppressed by the support
force due to the terrain or the masking of the support force’s fires by the breach
force as it moves forward to reduce the obstacle.
z Counterattacking and or repositioning forces that cannot be engaged by the support
force.
Obscure
The breach force employs smoke pots, vehicle mounted smoke, handheld smoke or
indirect fire obscurants if necessary, for self-defense and to cover lanes while the assault
force is passing.
Secure
The breach force secures itself from threat forces providing close-in protection of
the obstacle. The breach force also secures the lanes through the tactical obstacles once
they are created to allow safe passage of the assault force.
Reduce
The breach force performs its primary mission by reducing the obstacle. To support
the development of a plan to reduce the obstacle, the composition of the obstacle system
must be an information requirement. If the obstacles are formidable, Infantry platoons and
squads will be augmented with engineers to conduct reduction. Without engineers and
special equipment such as Bangalore torpedoes and line charges, mine fields must be
probed.
ASSAULT FORCE
The breach force assaults through the point of breach to the far side of an obstacle
and seizes the foothold. The assault force’s primary mission is to destroy the enemy and
seize terrain on the far side of the obstacle to prevent the enemy from placing direct fires
on the created lanes. The assault force may be tasked to assist the support force with
suppression while the breach force reduces the obstacle.
The assault force must be sufficient in size to seize the point of penetration. Combat
power is allocated to the assault force to achieve a minimum 3:1 ratio on the point of
penetration. The breach and assault assets may maneuver as a single force when
conducting breaching operations as an independent company team conducting an attack.
If the obstacle is defended by a small enemy force, assault and breach forces’
missions may be combined. This simplifies mission command and provides more
immediate combat power for security and suppression.
Fire control measures are essential because support and breach forces may be firing
on the enemy when the assault force is committed. Suppression of overwatching enemy
positions must continue and other enemy forces must remain fixed by fires until the enemy
has been destroyed. The assault force must assume control for direct fires on the assault
objective as support and breach force fires are ceased or shifted. Table H-1 illustrates the
relationship between the breaching organization and breaching fundamentals.
Table H-1. Relationship between breaching organization and breaching
fundamentals
BREACHING BREACHING
RESPONSIBILITIES
ORGANIZATION FUNDAMENTALS
Suppress enemy direct fire systems
covering the reduction area.
Suppress Control obscuring smoke.
Support force
Obscure Prevent enemy forces from
repositioning or counterattacking to
place direct fires on the breach force.
Suppress (provides
additional Create, proof and mark the necessary
suppression) lanes in an obstacle.
Obscure (provides
Secure the near side and far side of
additional
Breach force an obstacle.
obscuration in the
reduction area) Defeat forces placing immediate direct
fires on the reduction area.
Secure (provides
local security) Report the lane status/location.
Reduce
Destroy the enemy on the far side of
an obstacle if the enemy is capable of
placing direct fires on the reduction
area.
Assault
Assist the support force with
Assault force Suppress
suppression if the enemy is not
(if necessary) suppressed.
Be prepared to breach follow-on and
or protective obstacles after passing
through the reduction area.
As part of reducing obstacles, units also must detect, report, proof, and mark.
Detection is the actual confirmation of the location of obstacles. It may be
accomplished through reconnaissance. It also can be unintentional (such as a vehicle
running into a mine or wire). Detection is used in conjunction with information collection,
bypass reconnaissance, and breaching/clearing operations. Specific detection methods for
mines and IEDs are discussed more in this section.
Intelligence concerning enemy minefields is reported by the fastest means
available. A SPOTREP should be sent to higher headquarters when Infantry platoons or
squads have detected a minefield or other obstacle. This should be done whether they are
sent on a specific minefield or obstacle reconnaissance mission, or if they encounter one
in the course of normal operations. The SPOTREP should contain as much information
possible including the type, location, size of the obstacle, and results of reduction efforts.
Proofing normally is done by engineers by passing a mine roller or another mine-
resistant vehicle through the minefield to verify a lane is free of mines. If the risk of live
mines remaining in the lane does not exceed the risk of loss to enemy fires while waiting,
proofing may not be practical. Some mines are resistant to specific breaching techniques.
For example, magnetically fused mines may be resistant to some explosive blasts. So
proofing should be done when the time available, the threat, and mission allows. Proofing
also involves verifying other obstacles (such as wire) are free of explosive or injurious
devices.
Marking breach lanes and bypasses is critical to obstacle reduction.
REDUCE A MINEFIELD
Most types of obstacles do not cause casualties directly. Minefields do have this
potential, and will cause direct casualties if not reduced. Buried mines usually are found
in a highly prepared defense. When training the reduction of surface-laid and buried
minefields, always assume the presence of AHDs and trip wires until proven otherwise.
MINEFIELD DETECTION
The three types of minefield detection methods the platoon or squad might employ
visual, physical (probing), and electronic.
Visual Detection
Visual detection is part of all combat operations. Soldiers should constantly be alert
for minefields and all types of enemy obstacles. Soldiers visually inspect the terrain for
the following obstacle indicators:
z Trip wires and wires leading away from the side of the road. They may be firing
wires that are partially buried.
z Signs of road repair (such as new fill or paving, road patches, ditching, and culvert
work).
z Signs placed on trees, posts, or stakes. Threat forces may mark their minefields to
protect their own forces.
Electronic Detection
Electronic detection is effective for locating mines, but this method is time-
consuming and exposes personnel to enemy fire. In addition, suspected mines must be
confirmed by probing. As in probing, 20 to 30 minutes is the maximum amount of time an
individual can use the detector.
The AN/PSS-14 uses ground penetrating radar (GPR) and metal detection sensing
for the detection of AP and AT mines. (See figure H-5.) Both the metal detection and GPR
are active search methods that transmit electronic signals into the ground and analyze the
signals that return. The metal detection and GPR audio signal can be used separately and
in combination as required by local conditions. (Refer to TC 3-34.14 for more
information.)
WARNING
Do not modify the Bangalore torpedo. Cutting the
Bangalore in half or performing other
modification could cause the device to explode.
Different manual reduction techniques for surface-laid and buried minefields are
discussed below.
Surface-Laid Minefield
First use grappling hooks from covered positions to check for trip wires in the lane.
The limited range of the tossed hook requires the procedure to be repeated through the
estimated depth of the obstacle. A demolition team then moves through the lane. The team
places a line main down the center of the lane, ties the line from the explosive into the line
main, and places blocks of explosive next to surface laid mines. After the mines are
detonated, the team makes a visual check to ensure all mines were cleared before directing
a proofing roller and other traffic through the lane. Demolition team members are assigned
special tasks such as grappler, detonating-cord man, and demolitions man. All members
should be cross-trained on all procedures. Demolitions are prepared for use before arriving
at the point of breach. The platoon and squad must rehearse reduction procedures until
execution is flawless, quick, and technically safe. During reduction, the platoon or squad
will be exposed in the lane for five minutes or more depending on the mission, the
minefield depth, and Infantry platoon’s or squad’s level of training.
Buried Minefield
Manually reducing a buried minefield is extremely difficult to perform as part of a
breaching operation. If mine burrows are not easily seen, mine detectors and probes must
be used to locate mines. Mines then are destroyed by hand-emplaced charges. As an
alternative, mines can be removed by using a grappling hook and, if necessary, a tripod.
(See figure H-10.) Using a tripod provides vertical lift on a mine, making it easier to pull
the mine out of the hole.
The leader organizes Soldiers into teams with distinct, rehearsed missions including
grappling, detecting, marking, probing, and emplacing demolitions and detonating cord.
Platoons or squads are exposed in the obstacle for long periods.
Grappling Hook
The grappling hook is a multipurpose tool used for manual obstacle reduction.
Soldiers use it to detonate mines from a standoff position by activating trip wires and
AHDs. After the grapnel is used to clear trip wires in a lane, dismounted Soldiers can move
through the minefield, visually locate surface laid mines, and prepare mines for
demolition. In buried minefields, Soldiers grapple and enter the minefield with mine
detectors and probes.
Multiple grapplers can clear a lane of trip wires quickly and thoroughly, but they
must time their efforts and follow procedures simultaneously. A hit on a trip wire or a
pressure fuse can destroy the grappling hook and cord, so the platoon and squad should
carry extras.
There are two types of grappling hooks: hand-thrown and weapon-launched.
Hand-thrown. A 60+-meter light rope is attached to the grappling hook for hand
throwing. The throwing range is usually no more than 25 meters. The excess rope is used
for standoff distance when the thrower begins grappling. The thrower tosses the grappling
hook and seeks cover before the grappling hook and rope touch the ground in case their
impact detonates a mine. He then moves backward, reaches the end of the excess rope,
takes cover, and begins grappling. Once the grappling hook is recovered, the thrower
moves forward to the original position, tosses the grapnel, and repeats the procedure at
least twice. He then moves to the end of the grappled area and repeats this sequence
through the depth of the minefield.
Weapon-launched. A 150-meter lightweight rope is attached to a lightweight
grappling hook designed to be fired from an M16 or M4-series rifle using an M855
cartridge. The grappling hook is pushed onto the rifle muzzle with the opening of the
retrieval-rope bag oriented toward the minefield. The shooter is located 25 meters from
the minefield’s leading edge and aims the rifle muzzle at a 30-to 40-degree angle for
maximum range. Once fired, the grappling hook travels 75 to 100 meters from the firer’s
position. After the weapon-launched grappling hook (WLGH) has been fired, the firer
secures the rope, moves 60 meters from the minefield, moves into a prone position, and
begins to grapple. The WLGH can be used only once to clear a minefield, but it can be
reused up to 20 times for training because blanks are used to fire it.
Demolitions
Different types of demolitions can be used for minefield obstacle reduction. (See
table H-2, page H-22.) FM 3-34.214 covers each different type of demolition available to
support all Infantry missions. Demolitions are used differently against certain types of
mines:
z Pressure-Fused AP Mine. Place at least a one-pound charge within 15.2 centimeters
of simple pressure-fused mines. Ensure the charge is placed within 2.54 centimeters
of blast-hardened mines.
z Trip-Wire/Break-Wire-Fused AP Mine. Place at least a one-pound charge within
15.2 centimeters of the mine after the mine at the end of a trip wire has been located.
Soldiers can use elevated charges if necessary against the Claymore and stake-type
mines.
Bangalore Torpedo
After the Bangalore torpedo has been assembled and pushed through the wire
obstacle, prime it with either an electric or nonelectric firing system. (See figure H-12,
page H-24.) To prevent early detonation of the entire Bangalore torpedo if you hit a mine
while pushing it through the obstacle, attach an improvised (wooden) torpedo section to
its end. The section can be made out of wooden poles or sticks the size of a real torpedo
section. Attach the nose sleeve to the end of the wooden section. Once the Bangalore
torpedo has been fired, use wire cutters to cut away wire not cut by the explosion.
BREACH LOCATIONS
The success of the assault element often depends on the speed with which it gains
access into the building. It is important the breach location provide the assault element
with covered or concealed access, fluid entry, and ability to be overwatched by the support
element.
Creating Mouseholes
Mouse-holes provide a safe means of moving between rooms and floors. C4 plastic
explosive can be used to create mouse-holes when lesser means of mechanical reduction
fail. Because C4 comes packaged with an adhesive backing or can be emplaced using
pressure-sensitive tape, it is ideal for this purpose. When using C4 to blow a mouse-hole
in a lath and plaster wall, one block or a strip of blocks should be placed on the wall from
neck-to-knee height. Charges should be primed with detonating cord or modernized
demolition initiator (MDI) to obtain simultaneous detonation blowing a hole large enough
for a man to fit through.
MECHANICAL REDUCTION
This method requires increased physical exertion by one or more Soldiers using
hand tools such as axes, saws, crowbars, hooligan’s tools, or sledgehammers to gain
access. Although most Soldiers are familiar with these tools, practice on various
techniques increases speed and effectiveness. The mechanical reduction is not the
preferred primary method because it may be time-consuming and defeat the element of
surprise. However, the ROE and situation may require the use of these tools, so Soldiers
should be proficient in their use.
Typically, the order of movement for a mechanical breach is the initial assault team,
followed by the breach man or element. At the breach point, the assault team leader brings
the breach team forward while the assault team provides local security. After the reduction
is conducted, the breach team moves aside and provides local security as the assault team
enters the breach. (Refer to ATTP 3-06.11 for more information.)
When developing an urban operations mechanical breach kit SOP, Infantry units
must consider their mission essential task list (METL) and unit tactical SOPs.
BALLISTIC REDUCTION
Ballistic reduction requires the use of a weapon firing a projectile at the breach
point. Ballistic reduction is not a positive means of gaining entry and should not be
considered the primary method for gaining initial entry into a structure. It may not supply
the surprise, speed, and violence of action necessary to minimize friendly losses on initial
entry. In certain situations, it may become necessary to use ballistic reduction as a back-
up entry method. A misfire of an explosive charge or the compromise of the assault
element during its approach to the target may necessitate the use of ballistic reduction as
a means of initial entry into the structure. Ballistic reduction may have to be followed up
with a fragmentation, concussion, or stun grenade before entry.
Once initial entry is gained, shotgun ballistic reduction may become the primary
method for gaining access to subsequent rooms within the structure. Surprise is lost upon
initial entry, and other reduction methods are often too slow, tending to slow the
momentum of the assault team. If a door must be used for entry, several techniques can be
used to open the door. Doors should be considered a fatal funnel because they usually are
covered by fire, or may be booby-trapped. (Refer to ATTP 3-06.11 for more information.)
Unless a deliberate breach is planned, the platoon or squad can employ a series of
progressive reductions. An example is an attempt to open a door by using the doorknob
first, then shotgun reduction, then explosive reduction as a final option. Mechanical
reduction can be used to clean up a failed attempt of a shotgun or explosive reduction, but
also can be used as the primary reduction technique. Based on the multiple situations the
complex urban environment presents, the leader needs latitude in his options.
Exterior Walls
For exterior walls, the use of a BFV or artillery piece in the direct fire role is ideal
if the structure will support it and if the ROE will allow it. The BFV’s 25-mm cannon is a
reduction weapon when using HE rounds and firing a spiral firing pattern. (See figure
H-13.) The main gun of an M1-series Abrams tank is effective when using the HEAT
round. However, the APDS-T round rarely produces the desired effect because of its
penetrating power.
WARNING
Fragmentation and ricochet effects of standard
small arms (5.56 mm and 7.62 mm) as breaching
rounds is unpredictable and considered
extremely dangerous. Do not attempt in training.
normally part of the assault element but rather a part of the breaching or support element.
This allows the RLEM to be fired from one position while the assault element waits in
another position. In the event the first round does not affect the reduction, the firer should
prepare a second round for reduction or a second firer should be prepared to engage the
target.
WARNING
The firer must be a minimum of 10 meters from
the target to safely employ a 150-gram round.
Note. Exact MSDs for firers and assault elements have not been established for
the 150-gram round.
Shotgun Reduction
Various shotgun rounds can be used for ballistic reduction. Breaching and clearing
teams need to be familiar with the advantages as well as the disadvantages of each type of
round. Leaders must consider the potential for over penetration on walls and floors in
multi-story buildings to avoid potential fratricide incidents or killing of noncombatants:
z Rifled slugs. Rifled slugs defeat most doors encountered, including some heavy
steel doors. However, rifled slugs present a serious over penetration problem and
could easily kill or injure anyone inside the room being attacked. Rifled slugs are
excellent AP rounds and can be used accurately up to 100 meters.
z Bird shot. Bird shot (No. 6 through No. 9 shot) is used in close-range work up to 15
meters. A 2 ¾-inch shell of No. 9 shot typically contains an ounce of shot (though
it can be loaded to 1 ½-ounce with an accompanied increase in recoil). The major
advantage of bird shot is it does not over penetrate. Therefore, bird shot poses little
hazard to fellow team members in adjoining rooms. When used at close range, bird
shot offers the same killing potential as buckshot, especially in a full choke shotgun
intended for dense shot patterns. Another advantage of bird shot is low recoil. This
feature allows for faster recovery and quicker multi-target engagements. A
disadvantage with bird shot is rapid-energy bleed-off reducing penetration at
medium and long ranges. Moreover, the small size of the individual pellets requires
hits be made with a majority of the shot charge to be effective. A hit with one-third
of the No. 9 shot charge may not be fatal, unless the shot is at extremely close range.
These disadvantages are negated when birdshot is fired from a full choke shotgun
where it will produce a pattern quite small inside of 10 meters. Inside five meters,
all of the shot will be clumped like a massive single projectile.
z Buckshot. Buckshot is used in close- to medium-range work, up to 30 meters.
Because of its larger size, buckshot is more lethal than bird shot. A 2 ¾-inch shell
of buckshot contains nine .30-caliber pellets. One .30-caliber ball of the 00 buckshot
charge hit can prove fatal. Buckshot also retains its energy longer. Therefore, it is
lethal at longer ranges than bird shot. A disadvantage of buckshot is over
penetration. Because buckshot typically is loaded with heavier shot charges, it also
has heavy recoil. This problem becomes apparent when numerous shots have been
taken and can result in fatigue.
z Ferret rounds. Ferret rounds contain a plastic slug filled with liquid chemical irritant
(CS). When shot through a door or wall (drywall or plywood), the plastic slug
breaks up and a fine mist of CS is sprayed into the room. The effectiveness of one
round is determined by the size of the room on the other side of the door or the wall
and also the ventilation in that room.
z When using the shotgun as an alternate reduction method to gain entry, shooters
must consider the following target points on the door.
z Doorknob. Never target the doorknob itself because when the round impacts, the
doorknob has a tendency to bend the locking mechanism into the doorframe. In
most cases this causes the door to be bent in place and prevents entry into the room.
z Locking mechanism. When attacking the locking mechanism, focus the attack on
the area immediately between the doorknob and doorframe. Place the muzzle of the
shotgun no farther than one inch away from the face of the door directly over the
locking mechanism. The angle of attack should be 45 degrees downward and at a
45-degree angle into the doorframe. After breaching the door, kick it swiftly. This
way, if the door is not completely open, a strong kick usually will open it. When
kicking the door open, focus the force of the kick at the locking mechanism and
close to the doorjamb. After the locking mechanism has been reduced, this area
becomes the weakest part of the door.
z Hinges. The hinge breach technique is performed much the same as the doorknob
reduction, except the gunner aims at the hinges. He fires three shots per hinge, the
first at the middle, then at the top and bottom. He fires all shots from less than an
inch away from the hinge. Because the hinges are often hidden from view, the hinge
reduction is more difficult. Hinges are generally 8 to 10 inches from the top and
bottom of the door. The center hinge is generally 36 inches from the top, centered
on the door. Regardless of technique used, immediately after the gunner fires, he
kicks the door in or pulls it out. He then pulls the shotgun barrel sharply upward
and quickly turns away from the doorway to signal the breach point has been
reduced. This rapid clearing of the doorway allows the following man in the fire
team a clear shot at enemy who may be blocking the immediate breach site. (Refer
to ATTP 3-06.11 for more information.)
When the assault team members encounter a door to a “follow-on” room, they
should line up on the side of the door giving them a path of least resistance upon entering.
When the door is encountered, the first Soldier to see it calls out the status of the door,
OPENED or CLOSED. If the door is open, Soldiers should never cross in front of it to
give themselves a path of least resistance. If the door is closed, the No. 1 man maintains
security on the door and waits on the No. 2 man to gain positive control of the No.1 man.
The No. 1 man begins the progressive breaching process by taking his nonfiring hand and
checking the doorknob to see if it is locked. If the door is unlocked, the No. 1 man (with
his hand still on the door) pushes the door open as he enters the room. If the door is locked,
the No. 1 man releases the doorknob (while maintaining security on the door) and calls out
the breacher, BREACHER UP.
Once the breacher arrives at the door (with round chambered), he places the muzzle
of the shotgun at the proper attack point, takes the weapon off safe, and signals the No. 2
man by nodding his head. At that time, the No. 2 man (with one hand maintaining positive
control of the No. 1 man) takes his other hand (closest to the breacher) and forming a fist,
places it within the periphery of the breacher and pumps his fist twice saying, READY
BREACH. This action allows the breacher to see if a flash-bang or grenade is to be used.
Once the breacher defeats the door, he steps aside and allows the assault team to enter. He
then either assumes the position of the No. 4 man if he is acting as a member of the assault
team or remains on-call as the breacher for follow-on doors. He should keep the shotgun
magazine full at all times. There may be several doors, and stopping to reload will slow
the momentum of the assault.
Note. The shotgun should not be used as a primary assault weapon because of
its limited magazine capacity and difficulty of reloading.
Exterior Walls
One of the most difficult breaching operations of the assault team is reducing
masonry and reinforced concrete walls. C4 normally is used for explosive reduction
because it is safe, easy to use, and readily available. Engineers usually are attached to the
platoon or squad if explosive reduction operations are expected. The attached engineers
will conduct the reduction themselves or provide technical assistance to the Infantry
Soldiers involved. The typical thickness of exterior walls is 15 inches or less, although
some forms of wall construction are several feet thick. Assuming all outer walls are
constructed of reinforced concrete, a rule of thumb for reduction is to place 10 pounds of
C4 against the target between waist and chest height. When detonated, this charge
normally blows a hole large enough for a man to go through. On substandard buildings,
however, a charge of this size could level the building. When explosives are used to reduce
windows or doors, the blast should eliminate IEDs in the vicinity of the window or
doorframe. (Refer to ATTP 3-06.11 for more information.)
Note. Not all charges are mentioned in this manual, only the most commonly
used by Infantry Soldiers. (Refer to ATP 3-34.20 for more information.)
Charge Placement
Place the charges (other than shape charges) directly against the surface to be
reduced. When enemy fire prevents an approach to the wall, a potential technique is to
attach the charge, untamped, to a pole and slide it into position for detonation at the base
of the wall. Small-arms fire will not detonate C4 or TNT. Take cover before detonating
the charge.
Tamping
Whenever possible, explosives should be tamped or surrounded with materiel to
focus the blast to increase effectiveness. Tamping materiels could be sandbags, rubble,
desks, chairs, and even intravenous bags. For many exterior walls, tamping may be
impossible due to enemy fire. An untamped charge requires approximately twice the
explosive charge of a tamped charge to produce the same effect.
Second Charges
Charges will not cut metal reinforcing rods inside concrete targets. If the ROE
permit, hand grenades should be thrown into the opening to clear the area of enemy. Once
the area has been cleared of enemy, the reinforcing rods can be removed using special
steel-cutting explosive charges or mechanical means.
Door Charges
Various charges can be utilized for explosive reduction of doors. Leaders must
conduct extensive training on the use of the charges to get proper target feedback.
The general-purpose charge, rubber band charge, and flexible linear charge are
field-expedient charges that can be used to reduce interior and exterior doors. These
charges give the breach element an advantage because they can be made ahead of time and
are simple, compact, lightweight, and easy to emplace. (Refer to ATTP 3-06.11 for more
information.)
General-Purpose Charge
This charge is the most useful ready charge for reducing a door or other barrier.
It can cut mild steel chain and destroy captured enemy equipment. To construct the general
purpose charge—
z Take a length of detonation cord about two feet long. Using another length of
detonation cord, tie two uli knots around the 2-foot long cord.
z The uli knots need to have a minimum of six wraps and be loose enough for them
to slide along the main line, referred to as an uli slider.
z Trim the excess cord from the uli knots and secure them with tape.
z Cut a block of C4 explosive to a two-inch square.
z Tape one slider knot to each side of the C4 block, leaving the length of detonation
cord free to slide through the knots.
To place the charge, perform the following:
z To reduce a standard door, place the top loop of the charge over the doorknob. Slide
the uli knots taped to the C4 so the charge is tight against the knob.
z Prime the loose ends of the detonation cord with an MDI firing system and detonate.
Note. To cut mild steel chain, place the loop completely around the chain link
to form a girth hitch. Tighten the loop against the link by sliding the uli knots.
Overpressure
Overpressure is the pressure per square inch (PSI) released from the concussion
of the blast. Both outside and into the interior of the building or room, which can injure,
incapacitate, or kill.
Missile Hazard
Missile hazards are fragmentation or projectiles sent at tremendous speed from
the explosion area. This occurs from either the charge or target being breached.
CAUTION
Always handle explosives carefully. Never divide
responsibility for preparing, placing, priming, and
firing charges. Always use proper eye and ear
protection and cover exposed skin to prevent injuries.
Explosives may produce hazardous fumes, flames,
fragments, and overpressure. Use AR 385-63,
FM 3-34.214, and risk assessment to determine
MSDs. Take into consideration whether the door is
flush or receded when considering MSD.
Note. Whenever mission variables allow call EOD or engineers for removal of
IEDs.
When dealing with IEDs, the following rules and safety procedures can save lives:
z Suspect objects appearing to be out of place or artificial in its surroundings.
Remember, what you see may well be what the enemy wants you to see. If you did
not put it there, do not pick it up.
z Examine mines and IEDs from all angles, and check for alternative means of
detonating before approaching them.
z Ensure only one man works on a booby trap.
z Do not use force. Stop if force becomes necessary.
z Do not touch a trip wire until both ends have been investigated and all devices are
disarmed and neutralized.
z Trace trip wires and check for additional traps along and beneath them.
z Treat all parts of a trap with suspicion, because each part may be set to actuate the
trap.
z Wait at least 30 seconds after pulling a booby trap or a mine. There might be a delay
fuse.
z Mark all traps until they are cleared.
z Expect constant change in enemy techniques.
z Never attempt to clear IEDs by hand if pulling them or destroying them in place is
possible and acceptable.
IEDs might be found in recently contested areas, so no items or areas that have
not been cleared should be considered safe. By anticipating the presence of traps, it might
be possible to isolate and bypass trapped areas. If this is not possible, employ
countermeasures such as avoiding convenient and covered resting places along routes
where mines or other explosive devices can be located. Collective training in booby-trap
awareness and rapidly disseminating booby-trap incident reports to all levels is vital. This
allows Soldiers to develop an understanding of the enemy’s method of operation and a feel
for what might or might not be targets.
REDUCTION METHODS
Reducing IEDs and nuisance mines in area of operation is done primarily by
engineers, especially in secured areas. However, some IEDs may have to be cleared by
Infantry Soldiers to accomplish a mission during combat. The method used to disarm a
trap depends on many things including, time constraints, personnel assets, and type of trap.
A trap cannot be considered safe until the blasting cap or the detonation cord has been
removed from the charge.
Use the safest method available to neutralize a trap. For example, if the firing
device and detonation cord are accessible, it is usually safer to cut the detonation cord.
This method does not actuate the trap, but inserting pins in the firing device might. Unit
resources or locally-manufactured or acquired aids often are used to clear traps. In areas
with a high incidence of IEDs, assemble and reserve special clearing kits. Mark all IEDs
found.
Nonexplosive traps typically are used in tropical or rain forest regions. Ideal
construction materiels abound and concealment in surrounding vegetation is relatively
easy. No prescribed procedures exist for clearing nonexplosive traps. Each trap must be
cleared according to its nature.
SECTION III – OBSTACLE EMPLOYMENT
Obstacles are used to reinforce the terrain. When combined with fires, they
disrupt, fix, turn, or block an enemy force. Obstacles are used in all operations, but are
most useful in defensive missions. Leaders must always consider what materiels are
needed and how long the obstacle will take to construct. (Refer to ATTP 3-90.4 for more
information.)
A primary concern of the platoon and squad in the defense is to supplement their
fortified positions with extensive protective obstacles, both antipersonnel and
antivehicular (particularly AP). AP obstacles, both explosive and nonexplosive, include
all those mentioned in Section I of this chapter (such as wire entanglements, AP mines,
and field expedient devices), and are used to prevent enemy troops from entering a friendly
position. Antipersonnel obstacles usually are integrated with fires and are close enough to
the fortification for adequate surveillance by day or night, but beyond effective hand
grenade range. Obstacles also are used within the position to compartmentalize the area in
the event outer protective barriers are breached.
In the offense, the platoon/squad uses obstacles to:
z Aid in flank security.
MINES
A mine is an explosive device employed to kill, destroy, or incapacitate enemy
personnel and equipment. Mines can be employed in quantities within a specific area to
form a minefield, or they can be used individually to reinforce nonexplosive obstacles.
Equipment targets include ground vehicles, boats, and aircraft. Land mines fall into the
following two general categories:
z (U) Persistent
z (U) Non-Persistent
Within each of these categories, the mines and munitions can be more clearly
defined as antitank or antipersonnel. Mines are one of the most effective tank killers on
the battlefield. The type of minefield that a platoon or squad most commonly emplaces is
the hasty protective. It is important to distinguish the difference between the types of
minefield and means of emplacement. Volcano, MOPMS, standard-pattern, and row
mining are not types of minefields; they are just some of the means used to emplace
tactical, situational, nuisance, and protective minefields. They also may be the method of
emplacement that is replicated by a phony minefield.
Note. U.S. forces are not authorized to employ persistent mines, except in
Korea. Some countries employ AHDs on antipersonnel mines, but U.S. forces
are not authorized to employ AHDs on antipersonnel mines, except in Korea.
SCATTERABLE MINES
SCATMINEs are laid without regard to a classical pattern. They are designed to
be delivered remotely by aircraft, artillery, missile, or a ground dispenser. All U.S.
SCATMINEs have a limited active life and self-destruct after life has expired. The
duration of the active life varies with the type of mine and delivery system.
SCATMINEs enable minefield emplacement in enemy-held territories,
contaminated territories, and in most other areas where it is impossible for engineers, the
platoon or squad to emplace countermobility obstacles. They may be used to support the
platoon’s and squad’s mission by turning, fixing, disrupting, and blocking the enemy.
However they are used, they must be planned and coordinated to fit into the overall
obstacle plan. (Refer to ATP 3-90.8 for more information.)
CONVENTIONAL MINES
Conventional mines are hand-emplaced mines requiring manual arming. This type
of mine laying is labor, resource, and transport-intensive. Soldiers emplace conventional
mines within a defined, marked boundary and lay them individually or in clusters. They
record each mine location so the mines can be recovered. Soldiers can surface lay or bury
conventional mines and may place AHDs on antitank mines.
Antitank Mines
The M15 and M21 AT mines are used by U.S. forces. They are shown in figure
H-15. Their characteristics are listed in table H-6 (page H-42).
CONTAINER
EXPLOSIVE
MINES PER
WARHEAD
WEIGHT
WEIGHT
DODIC
FUSE
MINE
MINE
AHD
M15
with
K180 pressure blast yes 9.9 kg 13.5 kg 1
M603
fuse
M15 K180
with (mine)
tilt rod blast yes 9.9 kg 13.5 kg 1
M624 K068
fuse (fuse)
tilt rod or
M21 K181 SFF yes* 4.95 kg 7.6 kg 4
pressure
*Conventional AHDs will not couple with this mine. However, the M142
multipurpose firing device can be emplaced under this mine.
LEGEND
kg – kilogram; SFF – self-forging fragmentation
Antipersonnel Mines
The M14 and M16 AP mines are used by U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula.
They also are used by many other countries. These mines are shown in figure H-16. Their
characteristics are listed in table H-7.
CONTAINER
EXPLOSIVE
MINES PER
WARHEAD
WEIGHT
WEIGHT
DODIC
FUSE
MINE
MINE
AHD
SPECIAL-PURPOSE MUNITIONS
Special-purpose munitions the platoon or squad might employ include the M18A1
Claymore and selectable lightweight attack munitions (SLAM).
M18A1 CLAYMORE
The M18A1 Claymore (see figure H-17) is a fragmentation munitions containing
700 steel balls and 682 grams of composition C4 explosive. It weighs 1.6 kilograms and
is command-detonated.
When employing the Claymore with other munitions or mines, separate the
munitions by the following minimum distances:
z Fifty meters in front of or behind other Claymores.
z Three meters between Claymores placed side by side.
z Ten meters from antitank or fragmentation antipersonnel munitions.
z Two meters from blast antipersonnel munitions.
SLAM
The M4 SLAM is a multipurpose munitions with an anti-tamper feature. (See
figure H-18.) It is compact and weighs only a kilogram. It is easily portable and is intended
for use against armored personnel carriers, parked aircraft, wheeled or tracked vehicles,
stationary targets (such as electrical transformers), small (less than 10,000 gallon) fuel-
storage tanks, and ammunition storage facilities. The explosive formed penetrator warhead
can penetrate 40 millimeters of homogeneous steel. The SLAM has two models (the self-
neutralizing [M2] and self-destructing [M4]). The SLAM’s four possible employment
methods include: bottom attack, side attack, timed demolition, and command detonation.
M93 HORNET
The Hornet is a man-portable, nonrecoverable, AT/antivehicular, off-route
munitions made of lightweight materiel (35 pounds) one person can carry and employ. It
is capable of destroying vehicles by using sound and motion detection methods. It will
automatically search, detect, recognize, and engage moving targets by using top attack at
a standoff distance up to 100 meters. It can be a stand-alone tactical obstacle or can
reinforce other conventional obstacles. (See figure H-19, page H-46.)
It disrupts and delays the enemy, allowing long-range, precision weapons to
engage more effectively. This feature is particularly effective in non-LOS engagements. It
normally is employed by combat engineers, Rangers, and SOF. The RCU is a handheld
encoding unit interfacing with the Hornet when the remote mode is selected at the time of
employment. After encoding, the RCU can be used to arm the Hornet, reset its self-destruct
times, or destroy it. The maximum operating distance of the RCU is two kilometers.
NETWORKED MUNITIONS
Networked munitions are designed to leverage our network centric fighting
abilities. Ground-emplaced networked munitions are recoverable, reusable, and scalable.
Existing fields may be reseeded and will accept added munitions into the network. Field
sizes may vary from small, hasty protective fields to larger tactical fields. The network
provides remote control, situational understanding, various attack modes, and various
employment means. All networked munitions have self-destruct features.
FEATURES
Remote control, in barrier operations, is the ability of a user to actuate a charge or
change the state of a mine from a distance. Remote control features include:
z ON-OFF-ON.
z Command destruct.
z Variable self-destruct features.
z Select lethal or nonlethal effects.
z Anti-tamper or anti-spoofing.
z Unmanned sentinel.
Individual units emplace and remove their own protective obstacles. Therefore, it
is usually not necessary for the emplacing unit to turn over the obstacle to the overwatching
force. If a nonorganic emplacing unit, such as an engineer platoon, emplaces the protective
obstacle, the emplacing unit transfers the obstacle. Units mark protective minefields on all
four sides. Units mark lanes and gaps according to ATTP 3-90.4. Commanders decide
whether to mark other inherently dangerous obstacles based on the risk assessment.
Protective munition fields are recorded using a +DD Form 3007 (Hasty Protective Row
Minefield Record) as shown in figure H-20 (page H-48). Protective minefields are
recorded using a scatterable minefield record. (Refer to JP 3-15 and ATP 3-34.20 for more
information.)
Units also depict protective minefields and munition fields on their sector
sketches. If the minefield or munition field is transferred to another unit, the transferring
unit leader briefs the receiving unit leader and provides the necessary obstacle records. If
the minefield or munition field is abandoned unexpectedly, the unit forwards the record to
higher headquarters. (Refer to ATP 3-90.8 for more information on protective obstacles.)
WIRE OBSTACLES
The platoon or squad normally employs wire obstacles as part of the protective
obstacle plan in the defense. Wire obstacles include barbed-wire, triple-standard
concertina, four-strand cattle fences, and tanglefoot. Construction methods for two of the
more common wire obstacles the platoon or squad employs, triple standard concertina, and
tanglefoot are shown in figures H-21 through H-25 (pages H-50 through H-52). (Refer to
ATTP 3-90.4 for more information.)
First, lay out and install pickets from left to right (facing the enemy). Put the long
picket’s five paces apart and short (anchor) picket’s two paces from the end of the long
pickets. (See figure H-21, page H-50.) The enemy and friendly picket rows are offset and
are placed three feet apart. Now lay out rolls of concertina. Place a roll in front of the third
picket on the enemy side, and two rolls to the rear of the third picket on the friendly side.
Repeat this step every fourth picket thereafter. Install the front row concertina and
horizontal wire. (See figure H-22, page H-50.) Place the concertina over the pickets. Install
the rear row of concertina and horizontal wire. Install the top row of concertina and join
the rear horizontal wire. (See figure H-23, page H-50.)
CONCERTINA ROADBLOCK
The concertina roadblock is placed across roadways and designed to block
wheeled or tracked vehicles. The roadblock is constructed of 11 concertina rolls or coils
placed together, about 10 meters in depth, reinforced with long pickets five paces apart.
The rolls or coils should not be tautly bound allowing them to be dragged and tangled
around axles, tank road wheels, and sprockets. Additionally, wire is placed horizontally
on top of the concertina rolls or coils. (See figure H-24.)
TANGLEFOOT
Tanglefoot is used where concealment is essential and to prevent the enemy from
crawling between fences and in front of emplacements. (See figure H-25, page H-52.) The
obstacle should be employed in a minimum width of 32 feet. The pickets should be placed
at irregular intervals of 2 ½ feet to 10 feet. The height of the barbed wire should vary
CBRN Operations
CBRN operations are the employment of tactical capabilities that
counter the entire range of CBRN threats and hazards. These are
done through CBRN proliferation prevention, CBRN counterforce,
CBRN defense, and CBRN consequence management activities in
support of operational and strategic objectives to combat CBRN and
operate safely in CBRN environments. Many state and nonstate
actors (to include terrorists and criminals) possess or have the
capability to possess, develop, or proliferate CBRN weapons. U.S.
policy prohibits the use of chemical or biological weapons under
any circumstances, but it reserves the right to employ nuclear
weapons. Many potential enemies are under no such constraint.
(Refer to FM 3-11 for more information.)
SECTION I – MISSION-ORIENTED PROTECTIVE POSTURE
ANALYSIS
I-1. Protecting Soldiers from the harmful hazards associated with CBRN attacks in an
area of operation is essential to preserving combat power. When the probability of
CBRN threats exists, commanders and leaders must conduct a deliberate analysis to
posture and equip forces for survival and mission effectiveness. CBRN and medical
personnel consider mission variables and related information to provide
recommendations on protection requirements that are reflected in the mission-oriented
protective posture (MOPP) level.
I-2. Leader involvement is necessary to ensure safe and sustained operations under
various climatic conditions. Leaders should develop standard responses and COAs for
each projected mission. If the probability of CBRN threats exists all soldiers will carry
a protective mask, and ensure that individual protective gear is available within two
hours. Second set available in six hours. The standard MOPP are—
z MOPP0. Carry a protective mask, and ensure that individual protective gear is
within arm’s reach.
z MOPP1. Suit worn. Mask, gloves and boots carried.
z MOPP2. Suit and boots worn. Gloves and mask carried.
z MOPP3. Suit, boots and mask worn. Gloves carried.
z MOPP4. All protection worn.
I-3. Leaders know that they cannot expect the same work rates in MOPP4 as they
achieved in MOPP0. They reevaluate the ability to meet mission requirements and
communicate changes to the force. MOPP reduction decisions are between the most
difficult to make because of the many considerations that affect the final decision.
Commanders must evaluate the situation from the Soldier and mission perspectives.
Factors include the criticality of the current mission, potential effects of personnel
exposure, and the impact on the casualty care system.
I-4. Leaders determine the appropriate MOPP level by assessing mission variables and
weighing the impact of increased protection levels. Higher headquarters provide MOPP-
level directives to subordinate elements.
I-5. When a CBRN attack is recognized, everyone in the company team must receive
the warning and assume the appropriate MOPP level. Soldiers in immediate danger need
warnings they can see or hear. The alarm or signal must be simple and unmistakable if
it is to produce a quick and correct reaction.
I-6. If a CBRN hazard is located, the contaminated area should be marked. The CBRN
warning and reporting system and standardized contamination markers contribute to
orderly warning procedures. Warning methods include automatic alarms, vocal alarms
(a shout of “GAS” is the most frequently used alarm), nonvocal alarms (horn blasts or
banging of metal-to-metal objects), and visual alarms, most commonly the appropriate
hand-and-arm signals.
SECTION II – UNMASKING PROCEDURES
I-7. Soldiers should unmask as soon as possible except when a live biological or toxin
attack is expected. Use the procedures outlined in the following paragraphs to determine
if unmasking is safe.
4. Element leaders control the fire of their Soldiers by using standard fire commands
(initial and supplemental) containing the following elements:
a. Alert.
b. Weapon or ammunition (optional).
c. Target description.
d. Direction.
e. Range.
f. Method.
g. Control (optional).
h. Execution.
g. Termination.
5. Soldiers and vehicle commanders maintain contact (visual or oral) with the leader,
other Soldiers, and vehicles on their left or right.
6. Soldiers maintain contact with the team leader and indicate the location of the enemy
positions. Vehicle commanders relay all commands to the mounted Infantry squads.
7. Unit leaders (visually or orally) check the status of their personnel.
8. Element leaders maintain visual contact with the unit leader.
9. The unit leader moves up to the element in contact and links up with its leader.
a. Unit leader brings the radio-telephone operator, forward observer, element leader
of the nearest element, one crew-served weapon team (machine gun team if
available).
b. Element leaders of the elements not in contact move to the front of their element.
c. The platoon sergeant moves forward with the remaining crew-served weapons and
links up with the unit leader and assumes control of the support element. (See
figure J-2.)
11. The unit leader determines whether or not the unit can gain and maintain suppressive
fires with the element already in contact (based on the volume and accuracy of enemy
fires against the element in contact).
12. The unit leader makes an assessment of the situation identifies—
a. The location of the enemy position and obstacles.
b. The size of the enemy force engaging the unit in contact. (The number of enemy
automatic weapons, the presence of any vehicles, and the employment of indirect
fires are indicators of enemy strength.)
c. Vulnerable flanks.
d. Covered and concealed flanking routes to the enemy positions.
13. The unit leader decides whether to conduct an assault, bypass (if authorized by the
company commander), or break contact.
14. The unit leader reports the situation to higher headquarters and begins to maneuver
the unit.
(a) The trail squad leader assumes control of the base-of-fire element (squad
in contact, machine gun teams, and any other squads designated by the
platoon leader).
(b) The platoon sergeant assumes control of the vehicle section and base-of-
fire element (squad in contact and machine gun teams designated by the
platoon leader).
(c) The platoon FO calls for and adjusts fires based on the platoon leader's
directions. (The platoon leader does not wait for indirect fires before
continuing with his actions.)
(2) If the answer is still NO, the platoon leader deploys the last squad to provide
flank and rear security; guide the rest of the company forward, as necessary;
and report the situation to the company commander. Normally, the platoon
becomes the base-of-fire element for the company and may deploy the last
squad to add suppressive fires. The platoon continues to suppress or fix the
enemy with direct and indirect fire, and responds to orders from the company
commander.
11. Platoon assaults the enemy position. If the squad(s) in contact together with the
machine gun(s) and vehicle element can suppress the enemy, the platoon leader
determines if the remaining squad(s) that are not in contact can maneuver.
a. The platoon leader makes the following assessment:
(1) Location of enemy positions and obstacles.
(2) Size of enemy force. (The number of enemy automatic weapons, the presence
of any vehicles, and the employment of indirect fires are indicators of enemy
strength.)
(3) Vulnerable flank.
(4) Covered and concealed flanking route to the enemy position.
b. If the answer is YES, the platoon leader maneuvers the squad(s) into the assault:
(1) Once the platoon leader has ensured that the base-of-fire element is in position
and providing suppressive fires, he leads the assaulting squad(s) to the assault
position.
(2) If the vehicle section can effectively suppress the enemy element, the platoon
leader may reposition the weapons squad or machine gun to an intermediate or
local support-by-fire position to provide additional suppression during the
assault.
(3) Once in position, the platoon leader gives the prearranged signal for the base-
of-fire element to lift or shift direct fires to the opposite flank of the enemy
position. (The assault element MUST pick up and maintain effective fires
throughout the assault. Handover of responsibility for direct fires from the
base-of-fire element to the assault element is critical.)
(4) The platoon platoon forward observer shifts indirect fires to isolate the enemy
position.
(5) The assaulting squad(s) fight through enemy positions using fire and
maneuver. The platoon leader controls the movement of the squads, assigns
specific objectives for each squad, and designates the main effort or base
maneuver element. The base-of-fire element must be able to identify the near
flank of the assaulting squad(s).
(6) In the assault, the squad leader determines the way in which to move the
elements of the squad based on the volume and accuracy of enemy fire against
the squad and the amount of cover afforded by the terrain. In all cases, each
Soldier uses individual movement techniques, as appropriate.
(a) The squad leader designates one fire team to support the movement of the
other team by fires.
(b) The squad leader designates a distance or direction for the team to move
and accompanies one of the fire teams.
(c) Soldiers must maintain contact with team members and leaders.
(d) Soldiers time their firing and reloading in order to sustain their
rate of fire.
(e) The moving fire team proceeds to the next covered position. Teams use
the wedge formation when assaulting. Soldiers move in rushes or
by crawling.
(f) The squad leader directs the next team to move.
(g) If necessary, the team leader directs Soldiers to bound forward as
individuals within buddy teams. Soldiers coordinate their movement and
fires with each other within the buddy team, and maintain contact with
their team leader.
(h) Soldiers fire from covered positions. They select the next covered
position before moving and rush forward (no more than five seconds), or
use high or low crawl techniques based on terrain and enemy fires.
b. If the answer is NO, or the assaulting squad(s) cannot continue to move, the platoon
leader deploys the squad(s) to suppress the enemy and reports to the company
commander. The platoon continues suppressing enemy positions and responds to
the orders of the company commander.
12. The platoon consolidates on the objective once the assaulting squad(s) has seized the
enemy position.
a. Establishes local security.
b. The platoon leader signals for the base-of-fire element to move up into
designated positions.
c. The platoon leader assigns sectors of fire for each squad and vehicle.
d. The platoon leader positions key weapons and vehicles to cover the most dangerous
avenue(s) of approach.
e. The platoon sergeant begins coordination for ammunition resupply.
f. Soldiers take up hasty defensive positions.
g. The platoon leader and FO develop a quick fire plan.
h. The squads place out observation points to warn of enemy counterattacks.
13. Platoon organizes by:
a. Reestablishing the chain of command.
b. Redistributing and resupplying ammunition.
c. Manning crew-served weapons first.
d. Redistributing critical equipment such as radios; CBRN; and night vision devices.
e. Treating casualties and evacuating wounded.
f. Filling vacancies in key positions.
a. The squad leader determines if the fire team in contact can gain suppressive fire
based on the volume and accuracy of the enemy fire.
b. If the answer is YES, the fire team leader continues to suppress the enemy:
(1) The fire team destroys or suppresses enemy crew-served weapons first.
(2) The fire team places smoke (M203/320) on the enemy position to obscure it.
(3) The fire team leader continues to control fires using tracers or standard fire
commands. Fires must be well-aimed and continue at a sustained rate with
no lulls.
(4) Buddy teams fire their weapons so that both are not reloading their weapons
at the same time.
c. If the answer is NO, the squad leader then deploys the fire team not in contact to
establish a support-by-fire position. The squad leader reports the situation to the
platoon leader. Normally, the squad becomes the base-of-fire element for the
platoon. The squad continues to suppress the enemy and responds to orders from
the platoon leader. (The platoon leader, radio telephone operator, FO, one
machine gun team, squad leader of the next squad, platoon sergeant, and the other
machine gun team are already moving forward according to Battle Drill 2, Platoon
Assault.)
5. The unit leader maneuvers the assault elements into the assault.
a. Squad leader adjusts fires (both direct and indirect) based on the rate of the assault
element movement and the minimum safe distances of weapons systems.
b. Once in position, the squad leader gives the prearranged signal for the supporting
fire team to shift direct fires to the opposite flank of the enemy position.
c. The assaulting fire team assumes and maintains effective fires throughout the
assault. Handover of responsibility for direct fires from support element to the
assault element is critical to prevent fratricide.
d. If available, unit leader directs the forward observer to shift indirect fire
(including smoke) to isolate the enemy position.
6. The assaulting element(s) fight through enemy position(s) using fire and movement.
a. Team leader controls the movement of the team.
b. Team leader assigns specific objectives for each buddy team and designates a base
maneuver element.
c. Base-of-fire elements maintain visual contact of the near flank of the assaulting
element.
d. The assault element conducts fire and movement based on volume and accuracy
of enemy fires against his element and the amount of cover afforded by the
terrain.
(1) Assault element leader designates a distance and direction for the assault
element and moves with that element.
(2) Soldiers maintain contact with team members and leaders.
(3) Team leaders direct Soldiers to move as individuals or teams.
(4) Soldiers fire from covered positions. Soldiers move using 3- to 5-second
rushes or the low or high crawl techniques, taking advantage of available
cover and concealment.
(5) Soldiers time their firing and reloading in order to sustain their rate of fire.
(6) Team leaders maintain contact with the unit leader and pass signals to
element members.
(7) If the assault element cannot continue to move, the unit leader deploys the
element(s) to suppress the enemy and reports to higher headquarters.
7. The squad consolidates and reorganizes.
a. Squad leaders establish local security.
b. The squad leader signals for the base-of-fire element to move up into designated
positions.
c. The squad leader assigns sectors of fire for each element.
d. The squad leader positions key weapons to cover the most dangerous avenue of
approach.
e. The squad leader begins coordination for ammunition resupply.
f. Soldiers establish hasty fighting positions.
g. Squad leader develops a quick fire plan.
h. Squad leader place out observation posts to warn of enemy counterattacks.
i. Reestablishes the chain of command.
j. Redistributes and resupplies ammunition.
k. Mans crew-served weapons, first.
l. Redistributes critical equipment such as radios; CBRN; and night vision devices.
m. Treats and evaluates wounded.
n. Fills vacancies in key positions.
o. Searches, silences, segregates, safeguards, speeds, and tags detainees.
p. The unit leader consolidates ammunition, casualties’ and equipment reports.
8. Squad leader reports situation to platoon leader.
CUE: This drill begins when the unit leader gives the command to break contact.
STANDARDS: The unit breaks contact using fire and movement, and continues to move
until the enemy cannot observe or place fire on them. The unit leader reports the contact to
higher headquarters.
TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES
1. The unit leader directs an element to suppress the enemy.
2. The unit leader directs the vehicles to support the disengagement of the dismounted
element. (If the vehicles cannot support the disengagement of the dismounted element,
the platoon leader directs one squad or fire team to suppress by fire to support the
disengagement of the remainder of the element.)
3. The unit leader orders a distance and direction, terrain feature, or last rally point of the
movement of the element in contact.
4. The unit leader employs indirect fires to suppress enemy position(s). (See figure J-3.)
Note. For a mounted element, the platoon leader directs the vehicles to move to
a rally point and linkup with the dismounted element.
10. The leader should consider changing the unit's direction of movement once
contact is broken. This reduces the ability of the enemy to place effective indirect
fire on the unit.
11. Elements and Soldiers that become disrupted stay together and move to the last
designated rally point.
12. Unit leaders account for Soldiers, reports the situation to higher leadership,
reorganize as necessary, and continue the mission.
unit has support and security elements positioned at the initial foothold and outside the
building.
CUE: This drill begins on the order of the unit leader or on the command of the clearing
team leader.
STANDARDS: The unit clears and secures the room by killing or capturing the enemy while
minimizing friendly casualties, noncombatant casualties, and collateral damage. The team
complies with ROE, maintains a sufficient fighting force to repel an enemy counterattack,
and continues operations.
the room. During movement, the Soldier scans the sector and eliminates all
immediate threats.
c. The second Soldier (normally the clearing team leader) enters the room
immediately after the first Soldier and moves in the opposite direction of the first
Soldier to his point of domination. During movement the Soldier eliminates all
immediate threats in the sector.
Notes. During high intensity combat the Soldiers enter immediately after the
grenade detonates. Both Soldiers enter firing aimed bursts into their sectors
engaging all threats or hostile targets to cover their entry.
If the first or second Soldier discovers the room is small or a short room (such
as a closet or bathroom), he announces, “SHORT ROOM or SHORT.” The
clearing team leader informs the third and fourth Soldiers whether or not to stay
outside the room or to enter.
d. The third Soldier moves in the opposite direction of the second Soldier while
scanning and clearing the sector and assuming the point of domination. (See figure
J-10, page J-20.)
Figure J-10. Clear a room, third Soldier enters clearing his sector
e. The fourth Soldier moves opposite of the third Soldier to a position dominating
his sector. (See Figure J-11.)
Figure J-11. Clear a room, third Soldier enters dominating his sector
f. All Soldiers engage enemy combatants with precision aimed fire and identify
noncombatants to avoid collateral damage.
g. The clearing team leader announces to the unit leader when the room is CLEAR.
3. Marks the entry point according to unit SOP.
a. Makes a quick assessment of room and threat.
b. Determines if unit has fire power to continue clearing their assigned sector.
c. Reports to the higher unit leader the first room is clear.
d. Requests needed sustainment to continue clearing his sector.
e. Marks entry point according to unit SOP.
4. The unit consolidates and reorganizes, as needed.
7. The base-of-fire squad moves to the breach point and establishes a base of fire.
8. The PSG moves forward to the base-of-fire squad with the second machine gun and
assumes control of the squad.
9. The platoon leader leads the breach and assault squads along the covered and concealed
route.
10. The platoon FO calls for and adjusts indirect fires, as directed by the platoon leader to
support the breach and assault.
11. The breach squad executes actions to breach the obstacle (footpath). The squad leader
takes the following actions:
a. Directs one fire team to support the movement of the other fire team to the
breach point.
b. Designates the breach point.
c. Ensures the support-by-fire team continues to provide suppressive fires and to
isolate the breach point. (See figure J-15.)
d. The breaching fire team with the squad leader, moves to the breach point using the
covered and concealed route.
(1) The squad leader and breaching fire team leader employs smoke grenades to
obscure the breach point. The platoon base-of-fire element shifts direct fires
away from the breach point and continues to suppress adjacent enemy
positions.
(2) The breaching fire team leader positions himself and the automatic rifleman
on one flank of the breach point to provide close-in security.
(3) The grenadier and rifleman (or the antiarmor specialist and automatic
rifleman) of the breaching fire team probe for mines and cut the wire obstacle,
marking their path as they proceed. (Bangalore is preferred, if available.)
(4) Once the obstacle is breached, the breaching fire team leader and automatic
rifleman move to the far side of the obstacle using covered and concealed
positions. They signal the squad leader when they are in position and ready to
support.
e. The squad leader signals the base-of-fire team leader to move the fire team up and
through the breach. The fire team leader then moves through the obstacle and joins
the breaching fire team, leaving the grenadier (or antiarmor specialist) and rifleman
of the supporting fire team on the near side of the breach to guide the rest of the
platoon through.
f. Using the same covered and concealed route as the breaching fire team, the support-
by-fire team moves through the breach and to a covered and concealed position on
the far side.
12. The breach squad leader reports the situation to the platoon leader and posts guides at
the breach point.
13. The platoon leader leads the assault squad through the breach in the obstacle and
positions it on the far side.
14. The breaching squad continues to widen the breach to allow vehicle section to pass
through and secure the far side.
15. The platoon leader provides a SITREP to the company commander and directs his
breaching squad to move through the obstacle. The platoon leader appoints guides to
guide the company through the breach point.
ordered. If stationary, drivers start their vehicles and move in the direction and distance
ordered. Unit leaders report the contact to higher headquarters.
TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES
1. Dismounted. Unit personnel take the following actions:
a. Any Soldier announces, “INCOMING!”
b. Soldiers immediately assume the prone position or move to immediate available
cover during initial impacts.
c. The unit leader orders the unit to move to a rally point by giving a direction
and distance.
d. Soldiers move rapidly in the direction and distance to the designated rally point,
after the impacts.
e. The unit leaders report the contact to higher headquarters.
2. Mounted. Unit personnel take the following actions:
a. Any Soldier announces, “INCOMING!”
b. Vehicle commanders repeat the alert over the radio.
c. The leaders give the direction and linkup location over the radio.
d. Soldiers close all hatches, if applicable to the vehicle type; gunners stay below turret
shields or get down into the vehicle.
e. Drivers move rapidly out of the impact area in the direction ordered by the leader.
f. Unit leaders report the contact to higher headquarters.
CUE: Any Soldier gives an oral or visual signal for a chemical attack, or a chemical alarm
activates. Standard MOPP conditions do not exist for this task. See the MOPP statement for
specific conditions.
STANDARDS: All Soldiers don their protective mask within nine seconds (or fifteen
seconds for masks with a hood). Soldiers assume MOPP4 within eight minutes. The element
identifies the chemical agent using M8 chemical detector paper and the M256 kit. The squad
or platoon leader reports that the unit is under a chemical attack and submits a CBRN 1 report
to higher headquarters.
TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES
1. Element dons their protective mask.
Note. The mask gives immediate protection against traditional warfare agents.
The mask may not completely protect you from certain toxic industrial
chemicals, but it provides the best available protection to enable you to evacuate
the hazard area. You may be required to evacuate to a minimum safe distance
at least 300 meters upwind from the contamination (if possible), or as directed
by the commander.
(a) Immediate: stops the unit maneuver and mission capability, or threatens
critical assets vital to the mission.
(b) Indirect: stops the unit maneuver and mission capability, or threatens
critical assets important to the mission.
(c) Minor: reduces the unit maneuver and mission capability, or threatens
noncritical assets.
(d) No threat: has little or no effect on the capabilities or assets of the unit.
WARNING
Be alert for suspicious personnel exiting
the cordon.
c. Clear: the unit clears the area around the device of all personnel, working from the
device outwards. If an IED has been confirmed, the unit must clear the area. The
safe distance is determined by several factors: the tactical situation, avoiding
predictability, and moving several hundred meters away from the IED.
Note. In the event of larger elements, personnel who are deemed nonessential
for the purpose of cordoning the area can use an alternate route of movement
and continue the mission or return to the nearest safe area. Theater-specific
guidance or mission necessities may require the unit to react to the IED in a
different manner, such as reporting and bypassing.
DANGER
The element varies the minimum safe distance
when moving away from the IED to avoid
establishing predictability because of possible
secondary/tertiary IEDs. Avoid using any
communication or electronic equipment (other
than crew devices) within the secured exclusion
area.
d. Cordon: establish a security cordon around the danger area by setting up blocking
positions to prevent foot and vehicle traffic from approaching the IED. An effective
cordon will deny the enemy observation of friendly TTPs, along with denying them
IED effectiveness. Continue to check for secondary/tertiary IEDs, make use of
available cover, and establish an incident command post.
WARNING
To reduce exposure of personnel, the patrol
leader should minimize the number of
dismounted soldiers used in performing the
25-meter search.
e. Control: the unit must control the area inside the cordon to ensure authorized access.
Since the distance of all personnel from the IED directly affects their safety,
Soldiers should control the site to prevent someone from straying dangerously close
until the threat has been neutralized.
(1) 5-meter check: identify a position to halt. Search five meters out from your
vehicle through the window before opening the door. Conduct a systematic
visual check using binoculars or other optics. Check for abnormalities such
as disturbed earth, suspicious objects, or loose bricks in walls and security
ties. Work from the ground up and continue above head height. Take your
time, search methodically, and use a white flashlight during hours of reduced
visibility.
(2) 25-Meter check: once a 5-meter check is completed and if deemed necessary
by the patrol leader; exit the vehicle and close the door in order to protect
occupants from the potential blast and sniper threats. Immediately perform a
visual search under the vehicle and continue visually clear the area out to 25
meters, while simultaneously checking for potential IED indicators or
anything out of the ordinary. During the 5/25/200 meter checks, the patrol
(including Soldiers remaining inside the vehicle), must remain outwardly
focused while searching from far-to-near looking for suspected enemy
activity such as a triggerman, cameraman, or sniper.
(3) The driver and the gunner should remain inside the vehicle for
security purposes.
SECTION I – ACRONYM/ABBREVIATIONS
AA assembly area
ABCT Armor brigade combat team
ADRP Army doctrine reference publication
AR Army regulation
ASCOPE areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events
AT antitank
ATGM antitank guided missile
ATP Army techniques publication
ATTP Army tactics, techniques, and procedures
BAS battalion aid station
BCT brigade combat team
BDM bunker defeat munition
BEWL biometrically enabled watchlist
BFV Bradley fighting vehicle
BHL battle handover line
BMNT begin morning nautical twilight
CAS close air support
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CCIR commander’s critical information requirement
CCMS close combat missile systems
CCP casualty collection point
CLS combat lifesaver
CLU command launch unit
CMO civil-military operations
COA course of action
COP common operational picture
CoIST company intelligence support team
DA Department of the Army
DLIC detachment left in contact
DOD Department of Defense
SECTION II – TERMS
*combat patrol
A patrol that provides security and harasses, destroys, or captures enemy troops,
equipment, or installations.
*patrol
A detachment sent out by a larger unit to conduct a specific mission that operates semi-
independently and return to the main body upon completion of mission.
RELATED PUBLICATIONS
ARMY PUBLICATIONS
Most Army doctrinal publications and regulations are available at:
http://www.apd.army.mil.
Most joint publications are available online at:
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/doctrine.htm.
Other publications are available on the Central Army Registry on the Army Training
Network, https://atiam.train.army.mil.
ADP 3-07, Stability, 31 August 2012.
ADRP 1, The Army Profession, 14 June 2015.
ADRP 2-0, Intelligence, 31 August 2012.
ADRP 3-0, Unified Land Operations, 16 May 2012.
ADRP 3-05, Special Operations, 31 August 2012.
ADRP 3-07, Stability, 31 August 2012.
ADRP 3-09, Fires, 31 August 2012.
ADRP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 14 June 2013.
ADRP 3-37, Protection, 31 August 2012.
ADRP 3-90, Offense and Defense, 31 August 2012.
ADRP 5-0, The Operations Process, 17 May 2012.
ADRP 6-0, Mission Command, 17 May 2012.
ADRP 6-22, Army Leadership, 1 August 2012.
AR 350-1, Army Training and Leader Development, 19 August 2014.
AR 40-66, Medical Record Administration and Health Care Documentation,
17 June 2008.
AR 385-63, Range Safety, 30 January 2012.
ATP 2-01.3, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace,
10 November 2014.
ATP 2-22.82, Biometrics-Enabled Intelligence, 2 November 2015.
ATP 2-22.85, Biometrics Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
for Tactical Employment of Biometrics in Support of Operations, 1 April
2014.
ATP 2-91.8, Techniques for Document and Media Exploitation, 5 May 2015.
ATP 3-06.20, Cordon and Search Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for Cordon and Search Operations, 10 May 2013.
ATP 3-07.5, Stability Techniques, 31 August 2012.
ATP 3-07.10, Advising Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
for Advising Foreign Security Forces, 1 November 2014.
ATP 3-09.32, J-Fire Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for
Joint Application of Firepower, 21 January 2016.
ATP 3-20.98, Reconnaissance Platoon, 5 April 2013.
ATP 3-21.11, SBCT Infantry Rifle Company, 4 February 2016
ATP 3-34.20, Countering Explosive Hazards, 21 January 2016.
ATP 3-34.22, Engineer Operations-Brigade Combat Team and Below,
5 December 2014.
ATP 3-55.12, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Combat
Camera (COMCAM) Operations, 12 April 2013.
ATP 3-90.1, Armor and Mechanized Infantry Company Team, 27 January
2016.
ATP 3-90.8, Combined Arms Countermobility Operations,
17 September 2014.
ATP 3-90.15, Site Exploitation, 28 July 2015.
ATP 3-90.90, Army Tactical Standard Operating Procedures,
1 November 2011.
ATP 4-02.2, Medical Evacuation, 12 August 2014.
ATP 4-02.5, Casualty Care, 10 May 2013.
ATP 4-15, Army Watercraft Operations, 3 April 2015.
+ ATP 4-25.13, Casualty Evacuation, 15 February 2013
ATTP 3-06.11, Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain, 10 June 2011.
ATTP 3-21.50, Infantry Small-Unit Mountain Operations, 28 February 2011.
ATTP 3-90.4, Combined Arms Mobility Operations, 10 August 2011.
DA Pamphlet 385-63, Range Safety, 16 April 2014.
FM 3-04.113, Utility and Cargo Helicopter Operations, 07 December 2007.
FM 3-07, Stability, 2 June 2014.
FM 3-11, Multi-Service Doctrine for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and
Nuclear Operations, 1 July 2011.
FM 3-13, Inform and Influence Activities, 25 January 2013.
FM 3-21.10, The Infantry Rifle Company, 27 July 2006.
FM 3-22, Army Support to Security Cooperation, 22 January 2013.
FM 3-22.9, Rifle Marksmanship, M16/M4 Series Weapons, 12 August 2008.
JOINT PUBLICATIONS
Most joint publications are available online at:
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/doctrine.htm.
JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military Operations, 17 August 2011.
JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 October 2013.
JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 August 2011.
JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations, 21 November 2014.
JP 3-15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations,
17 June 2011.
JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, 12 July 2010.
JP 3-27, Homeland Defense, 29 July 2013.
JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, 11 September 2013.
RECOMMENDED READINGS
ARMY PUBLICATIONS
Most Army doctrinal publications and regulations are available at:
http://www.apd.army.mil.
Other publications are available on the Central Army Registry on the Army Training
Network, https://atiam.train.army.mil.
ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations, 10 October 2011.
ATP 3-90.37, Countering Improvised Explosive Devices, 29 July 2014.
FM 3-34, Engineer Operations, 2 April 2014.
FM 4-02, Army Health System, 26 August 2013.
TC 3-90.119, U.S. Army Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Training,
23 June 2009.
PRESCRIBED FORMS
+Unless otherwise indicated, DA forms are available on the Army Publishing
Directorate (APD) web site (http://www.apd.army.mil).
+DA Form 5517, Standard Range Card.
REFERENCED FORMS
Unless otherwise indicated, DA forms are available on the Army Publishing
Directorate (APD) web site (http://www.apd.army.mil).
+DD Forms are available on the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) web site
(www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/forms/index.htm).
WEBSITES
Most Army doctrinal publications and regulations are available online at:
http://www.apd.army.mil.
Central Army Registry, https://rdl.train.army.mil/catalog/dashboard.
Most joint publications are available online at:
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/doctrine.htm.
Other publications are available on the Central Army Registry on the Army Training
Network, https://atiam.train.army.mil.
Department of Defense Issuances are available at:
http://dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/dir.html.
DD Form 2745, Enemy host nation, 1-10. main battle area, 3-11.
Prisoner of War host nation, 2-228. march
Capture Tag, 4-78. approach, 5-25.
host nation, 4-67.
dismounted element, 1- dismounted, 5-3.
83. I forced, 5-7.
improvised explosive mounted, 5-4.
E tactical road, 5-9.
devices, 4-104.
enemy prisoners of war, METT-TC, 1-35.
1-29. individual movement
techniques, 1-55. METT-TC, 1-4.
enemy prisoners of war,
3-58. individual movement METT-TC, 2-12.
techniques, 2-125. METT-TC, 2-164.
enemy prisoners of war,
7-51. Infantry brigade combat METT-TC, 2-64.
team, 2-265.
essential elements of METT-TC, 2-9.
friendly information, Infantry carrier vehicles,
1-35. METT-TC, 4-107.
2-181.
Infantry rifle platoons METT-TC, 5-26.
essential elements of
and squads minimum safe distance,
friendly information,
role of, 1-34. 2-281.
3-107.
Infantry squad fire team, mission variables, 1-10.
F 1-38. mounted element, 1-82.
final coordination line, 2- Infantry squad, 1-40. MRAP, 5-120.
267.
Infantry weapons squad,
final protective fires, 2- 1-42.
O
353. OAKOC, 1-10.
infiltration, 2-17.
final protective fires, 3- OAKOC, 2-39.
initial rally points, 5-63.
56. OAKOC, 3-137.
intelligence preparation
final protective lines, 3- objective rally point, 2-
of the battlefield, 3-30
56. 323.
intelligence preparation
fire support team, 1-68. operational
of the battlefield, 2-
fire support team, 3-178. 213. environment, 1-2.
fire team international law, 1-29. operational
formations, 2-68. environment, 1-5.
wedge, 2-70. K
operational
flanking attack, 2-18. kill zone, 6-110. environment, 2-205.
forward observer, 1-69. L operational
forward support environment, 4-106.
limit of advance, 2-64
company, 2-265. operational
limit of advance, 5-32.
forward support environment, 4-46.
logistics release point,
company, 7-38. t operational
7-42.
environment, 6-68.
G logistics release points,
operational framework,
grenadier, 1-57. 3-85.
1-22.
gunner, 1-64. M operational variables, 1-
H machine gun team, 1- 3.
host nation, 4-3 43.
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