RE: SUSPENSION OF ATTY. ROGELIO Z.

BAGABUYO

Fact:

Criminal Case was originally raffled to the sala of Judge Buyser, who denied the Demurrer to the
Evidence of the accused, declaring that the evidence thus presented by the prosecution was sufficient to
prove the crime of homicide and not the charge of murder. Consequently, the counsel for the defense
filed a Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond. Respondent Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, then Senior State
Prosecutor and the deputized prosecutor of the case, objected thereto mainly on the ground that the
original charge of murder, punishable with reclusion perpetua, was not subject to bail. Judge Buyser
inhibited himself from further trying the case because of the “harsh insinuation” of Senior Prosecutor
Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo that he “lacks the cold neutrality of an impartial magistrate,” by allegedly
suggesting the filing of the motion to fix the amount of bail bond by counsel for the accused. The case
was transferred to Judge Tan and Order favorably resolved the Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit. Respondent
appealed from the Orders to the CA. Instead of availing himself only of judicial remedies, respondent
caused the publication of an article regarding the Order granting bail to the accused in Mindanao Gold
Star Daily.

Respondent posted the required bond and was released from the custody of the law. He
appealed the indirect contempt order to the CA. Despite the citation of indirect contempt, respondent
presented himself to the media for interviews in Radio Station DXKS, and again attacked the integrity
of Judge Tan and the trial court’s disposition in the proceedings of criminal Case.

Issue: Whether the respondent is guilty of violating Rule 11.05, Canon 11 and Rule 13.02, Canon 13 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, and of violating the Lawyer’s Oath?

Held:

Yes. Respondent violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that Judge Tan was displaying
judicial arrogance in the article entitled, Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder
suspect to bail out, which appeared in the Mindanao Gold Star Daily. Respondent’s statements in the
article, which were made while criminal case was still pending in court, also violated Rule 13.02 of Canon
13, which states that “a lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending
case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.” In regard to the radio interview given to
Tony Consing, respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
not resorting to the proper authorities only for redress of his grievances against Judge Tan.
Respondent also violated Canon 11 for his disrespect of the court and its officer when he stated that
Judge Tan was ignorant of the law, that as a mahjong aficionado, he was studying mahjong instead of
studying the law, and that he was a liar. Respondent also violated the Lawyer’s Oath, as he has sworn
to “conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients.
 JUDGE UBALDINO A. LACUROM vs. ATTY. ELLIS F. JACOBA

Fact:

The Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for plaintiff Alejandro R. Veneracion in a civil
case for unlawful detainer against defendant Federico Barrientos. The MTC of Cabanatuan City
rendered judgment in favor of Veneracion but Barrientos appealed to the RTC. The case was raffled
where Judge Lacurom was sitting as pairing judge who issued a Resolution reversing the earlier
judgments rendered in favor of Veneracion. Veneracion’s counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration
that uses sardonic, strident and hard-striking adjectives.

Velasco-Jacoba insists, however, that she signed the 30 July 2001 motion only because of her
husband’s request but she did not know its contents beforehand.

Respondents nonetheless try to exculpate themselves by saying that every remark in the 30 July
2001 motion was warranted.

Issue: Whether the respondents use of sardonic, strident and hard-striking adjectives is in violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility?

Held:

Yes. Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to
criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.
However, even the most hardened judge would be scarred by the scurrilous attack made by the 30 July
2001 motion on Judge Lacurom’s Resolution. On its face, the Resolution presented the facts correctly
and decided the case according to supporting law and jurisprudence. Though a lawyer’s language may
be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal
profession. The use of unnecessary language is proscribed if we are to promote high esteem in the
courts and trust in judicial administration. In maintaining the respect due to the courts, a lawyer is not
merely enjoined to use dignified language but also to pursue the client’s cause through fair and honest
means.

In Re: Almacen

Fact:

Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen filed a “Petition to Surrender the Lawyer’s Certificate of Title” to
the Supreme Court as a sign of his protest as against to what he calls a tribunal “peopled by people
who are calloused to our pleas for justice…”. He also expressed strong words as against the judiciary
like “justice… is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb.” The petition rooted from the case he lost due
to the absence of time and place in his motion in the trial court. His appeal was dismissed in the Court of
Appeals by reason of jurisprudence. In a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court, it was again
dismissed thru a minute resolution. With the disappointments, he thought of this sacrificial move . He
claimed that this petition to surrender his title is only in trust, and that he may obtain the title again
as soon as he regained confidence in the justice system.

Issue: WON Atty. Almacen should be given disciplinary actions for his acts.

Held:

Yes. It has been pointed out by the Supreme Court that there is no one to blame but Atty.
Almacen himself because of his negligence. Even if the intentions of his accusations are so noble, in
speaking of the truth and alleged injustices, so as not to condemn the sinners but the sin, it has already
caused enough damage and disrepute to the judiciary.

Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as citizen, to
criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.

As a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but
also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he “professionally
answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal
animadversion as a citizen. Atty. Almacen is suspended from the practice of law until further orders.
 Joseph J. NOTOPOULOS v. STATEWIDE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE

Fact:

The plaintiff, an attorney, filed an application with the Probate Court for the district of West
Hartford seeking appointment as the conservator of his mother’s estate and person. The court, Berman,
J., appointed the plaintiff as conservator of his mother’s estate, Denny Fuller as conservator of her
person and Carolyn Levine to investigate her care and financial assets. The plaintiff had many
disagreements with Judge Berman including a disagreement regarding the fees of Levine and Fuller and
one regarding a do not resuscitate order issued to Fuller. On May 29, 1999, the plaintiff’s mother died,
and the plaintiff and his brother were appointed co-executors of her estate. Thereafter, the plaintiff
claimed that he did not receive timely notice of the probate decree closing his mother’s estate . The
plaintiff wrote a letter to Renee Bradley, a member of the court staff, and sent copies of this letter to his
brother and his mother’s physician. Bradley forwarded this letter to Judge Berman, who then filed a
complaint with the committee, claiming that the plaintiff “attacked him and the] court in a fashion that
violates the spirit and letter of the Rules of Professional Conduct.”

 The plaintiff first argues that he provided adequate evidence in support of his statements
that Judge Berman extorted funds, and that, because this was the only evidence in the record, the
committee failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that he violated rule 8.2(a) of the Rules of
Professional Conduct. (A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with
reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge).

The plaintiff next claims that the committee improperly applied rule 8.2(a) to him because he
was acting in his individual capacity as a pro se party when he wrote the letter and not in his
professional capacity as an attorney.

The plaintiff next claims that the court improperly concluded that there was clear and
convincing evidence that he violated rule 8.4(4), which prohibits lawyers from engaging in conduct that
is prejudicial to the administration of justice.

Issue: WON the plaintiff attorney, violated the code of professional responsibility.

Held:

Yes. The court did not improperly conclude that there was clear and convincing evidence that
the plaintiff violated rule 8.2(a). Rule 8.2(a) provides in relevant part:” A lawyer shall not make a
statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity
concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge.” Because the committee reasonably could have
found that the statements contained in the plaintiff’s letter were false in violation of rule 8.2(a), the
plaintiff must now provide evidence of an objective, reasonable belief that his statements were true.
The plaintiff has not met that burden.
 IN RE: Matthew COBB

Fact:

The respondent, Matthew Cobb, appeals from the judgment of a single justice disbarring him from the
practice of law for multiple violations of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct and the
former Canons of Ethics and Disciplinary Rules in three cases consolidated for hearing by the Board of
Bar Overseers.

In the first case, the respondent was found to have filed a motion containing improbable and false
allegations that he failed to corroborate, thereby exposing his client to sanctions.   He also made
groundless representations to the judge.

In the second case, the respondent filed a complaint against the attorneys for the adversaries of his
clients alleging claims that he knew or should have known were groundless. He also misrepresented to
his clients that they had been sanctioned, persisted in a frivolous appeal, converted his clients'
settlement proceeds to pay sanctions assessed against him personally, and without good ground or
support alleged in papers filed in the Appeals Court that the Superior Court judge who had sanctioned
him had been improperly influenced and was biased.

In the third case, the respondent settled a client's case without her authority.   Additionally, he
continued to represent her when their interests were in conflict, purportedly disclosed privileged client
communications without authorization, and made misrepresentations to a judge and to bar counsel.

Issue: WON his acts violated the Canons of Ethics and Disciplinary Rules.

Held:

 Yes. The hearing committee and the board found that, at the time of his misconduct, the
respondent had substantial experience in the practice of law. He has failed to acknowledge the nature,
effects, and implication of his misconduct. He continues to lack insight into his behavior and persists in
blaming everyone except himself. He has made unfounded allegations in these proceedings against the
hearing committee for failing to provide subpoenas and for engaging in ex parte communications with
bar counsel, unfounded allegations that closely resemble the conduct alleged in the petition for
discipline and found as fac

The respondent has demonstrated rather convincingly by his quick and ready disparagement of
judges, his disdain for his fellow attorneys, and his lack of concern for and betrayal of his clients that he
is utterly unfit to practice law. The only appropriate sanction is disbarment.
Rodriguez and Tulali vs. Blancaflor – about Rule 71

Rodriguez and Tulali was the prosecutor in an arson case which was dismissed by the Court. During the
pendency of the case, Tulali was implicated in a controversy involving an alleged bribery to assure
the acquittal of the accused and dismissal of the arson case. Day before the scheduled promulgation
of the decision in the arson case, Tulali filed an Ex-Parte Manifestation withdrawing his appearance in the
said case to prevent any suspicion of misdemeanor and collusion. However due to this manifestation,
Judge Blancaflor proceeded against them for direct contempt and violation of their oath of office.
Rodriguez only learned of the contempt proceedings upon his receipt of the July 30, 2009 Order, requiring
him to appear before the Court in order to clarify certain matters contained in the said order. Tulali, on the
other hand, only learned of the proceedings when he was ordered to submit his compliance to explain
how he came in possession of the administrative complaint against Awayan.
After the submission of petitioners’ respective position papers, Judge Blancaflor found petitioners
Rodriguez and Tulali guilty of direct contempt with a penalty of indefinite suspension from
practice of law and a fine of 100K and ordered them to issue a public apology to the court. should
they fail to do so after the finality of this Sentence, a warrant for their arrest will be issued, and they will
not be released unless they comply with the order of this Court.
Issue:
WON RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED DECISION AND ORDER CONSIDERING
THAT HE GROSSLY VIOLATED THE RULES ON CONTEMPT.
Held:
In this case, the Court cannot sustain Judge Blancaflor’s order penalizing petitioners for direct contempt
on the basis of Tulali’s Ex-Parte Manifestation.
Direct contempt is any misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the
proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward
others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when
lawfully required to do so.
Based on the foregoing definition, the act of Tulali in filing the Ex-Parte Manifestation cannot be construed
as contumacious within the purview of direct contempt. Its filing on the day before the promulgation of
the decision in the pending criminal case, did not in any way disrupt the proceedings before the
court. Accordingly, he should not be held accountable for his act which was done in good faith and
without malice.
Grave abuse of authority on the part of the judge is likewise manifested from the penalty imposed.
Under Section 1, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court, direct contempt before the RTC or a court of
equivalent or higher rank is punishable by a fine not exceeding ₱2,000.00 or imprisonment not exceeding
ten (10) days, or both. The penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law and to pay a fine of
₱100,000.00 each with the additional order to issue a public apology to the Court under pain of arrest, is
evidently unreasonable, excessive and outside the bounds of the law.
Petitioners also fault Judge Blancaflor for non-observance of due process in conducting the
contempt proceedings. It must be emphasized that direct contempt is adjudged and punished
summarily pursuant to Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules. Hence, hearings and opportunity to confront
witnesses are absolutely unnecessary.
In the same vein, the petitioners’ alleged "vilification campaign" against Judge Blancaflor cannot be
regarded as direct contempt. At most, it may constitute indirect contempt, as correctly concluded by the
OSG. For indirect contempt citation to prosper, however, the requirements under Sections 3 and 4, Rule
71 of the Rules must be satisfied, to wit:
Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – After a charge in writing has been filed, and an
opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be
heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

(d) any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;

Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. — Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the
court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to
show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.

In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting
particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance
with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt
charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt
shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in
its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and
decision.
In the present case, Judge Blancaflor failed to observe the elementary procedure which requires written
charge and due hearing. There was no order issued to petitioners. Neither was there any written or formal
charge filed against them. The fact that petitioners were afforded the opportunity to file their appropriate
pleadings is not sufficient as the proceedings ex-parte to hear the witnesses’ testimonies had already
been completed.
Likewise, Judge Blancaflor’s suspension order is also void as the basis for suspension is not one of the
causes that will warrant disciplinary action. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules enumerates the grounds for
disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar from his office as attorney, to wit: (1) deceit, (2)
malpractice, (3) gross misconduct in office, (4) grossly immoral conduct, (5) conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, (6) violation of the lawyer's oath, (7) willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, and for (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority
to do so. Judge Blancaflor failed to show that the suspension was for any of the foregoing
grounds.
In fine, having established that Judge Blancaflor committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, petitioners are entitled to the remedy of prohibition under Section 2, Rule 71 of the Rules on Contempt
which provides:

SEC. 2. Remedy therefrom. - The person adjudged in direct contempt by any court may not appeal therefrom, but
may avail himself of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition. The execution of the judgment shall be suspended
pending resolution of such petition, provided such person files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment
and conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment should the petition be decided against him.

Accordingly, an order of direct contempt is not immediately executory or enforceable. The contemnor must be
afforded a reasonable remedy to extricate or purge himself of the contempt. Where the person adjudged in direct
contempt by any court avails of the remedy of certiorari or prohibition, the execution of the judgment shall be
suspended pending resolution of such petition provided the contemnor files a bond fixed by the court which rendered
the judgment and conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment should the petition be decided against
him.

The power to punish a person in contempt of court is inherent in all courts to preserve order in judicial proceedings
and to uphold the orderly administration of justice. However, judges are enjoined to exercise the power judiciously
and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of
the dignity of the court, and not for retaliation or vindictiveness.

It bears stressing that the power to declare a person in contempt of court must be exercised on the preservative, not
the vindictive principle; and on the corrective, not the retaliatory, idea of punishment. Such power, being drastic and
extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice.
De Leon vs. Castelo

Facts:

This administrative case, which Jessie R. De Leon initiated on April 29, 2010, concerns respondent
attorney's alleged dishonesty and falsification committed in the pleadings he filed in behalf of the
defendants in the civil action in which De Leon intervened.

De Leon avers that the respondent committed dishonesty and falsification as follows:

xxx in causing it (to) appear that persons (spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu) have participated in
an act or proceeding (the making and filing of the Answers) when they did not in fact so
participate; in fact, they could not have so participated because they were already dead as of that
time. And that Respondent also made a mockery of the aforesaid judicial proceedings by representing
dead persons therein who, he falsely made to appear, as contesting the complaints, counter-suing and
cross-suing the adverse parties.

Issue:

WON respondent should be disbarred for violation of lawyer’s oath and code of professional
responsibility.

Held:

Complaint for disbarment was dismissed as the court held in this case that the respondent, as attorney,
did not commit any falsehood or falsification in his pleadings thus did not violate the Lawyer’s oath and
code of professional responsibility.

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or
allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

Lawyer shall bear in mind that as an officer of the court his high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law
and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion. The courts, on the other
hand, are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them. While a lawyer
has the solemn duty to defend his client's rights and is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of his client's
cause, his conduct must never be at the expense of truth.

Statements they make in behalf of their clients that are relevant, pertinent, or material to the subject of inquiry are
absolutely privileged regardless of their defamatory tenor. Such cloak of privilege is necessary and essential in
ensuring the unhindered service to their clients' causes and in protecting the clients' confidences. With the cloak of
privilege, they can freely and courageously speak for their clients, verbally or in writing, in the course of judicial and
quasi-judicial proceedings, without running the risk of incurring criminal prosecution or actions for damages.

The respondent did not misrepresent that Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were still living. On the
contrary, the respondent directly stated in the answer to the complaint in intervention with
counterclaim and cross-claim, supra, and in the clarification and submission, supra, that the
Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were already deceased.

Respondent was acting in the interest of the actual owners of the properties when he filed the answer with
counterclaim and cross-claim on April 17, 2006. As such, his pleadings were privileged and would not
occasion any action against him as an attorney. Secondly, having made clear at the start that the
Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were no longer the actual owners of the affected properties due to the
transfer of ownership even prior to the institution of the action, and that the actual owners (i.e., Leonardo
and William Lim) needed to be substituted in lieu of said spouses, whether the Spouses Lim Hio and
Dolores Chu were still living or already deceased as of the filing of the pleadings became immaterial.

Cornejo vs. Tan – direct contempt

Facts:

Atty. Miguel R. Cornejo was asked by the defendants Acacio to act as their counsel; but for his
convenience he requested his companion, Atty. Palacol, to handle it. During the hearing of the case,
Cornejo was presented as a witness. Whereupon Attorney Cornejo left the witness stand and approached
the attorney's table asking that his appearance for the defendants be noted. It was apparent he wanted to
say as counsel what he had been prevented from saying as witness. The respondent judge told him he
could not thus appear, there being already one lawyer and no substitution of counsel had been
accompanied in accordance with the rules.

In view of this, Attorney Cornejo submitted a memorandum in which he said, among other things, that the
judge had unduly favored the plaintiffs, to the extent of advising Attorney Palacol "to fix the case
because his position was hopeless," and the memorandum was filed as a protest against the "unjust,
hostile, vindictive and dangerous attitude of the judge." The memorandum further stated that copies
thereof had been sent to the Secretary of Justice, the Supreme Court, and the Office of the President of
the Senate.

Issue:

WON Atty. Cornejo submission of the memorandum is a direct contempt.

Ruling:

Yes, Atty. Cornejo should be charged with direct contempt.

That is indeed strong language. It is insulting and contemptuous. The judge may have erred in
some of his rulings; but mistakes never justify offensive language.

And the last paragraph informing the judge that copies of the memorandum had been furnished "the
Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, etc.", could rightly be interpreted as an attempt to intimidate the
court in the exercise of its judicial functions.

It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his client, should do so with
all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so for him to exercise said
right by restoring to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the
courts require. The reason for this is that respect of the courts guarantees the stability of their institution.

Madrid vs. Dealca – Canon 11

Facts:

Respondent (Atty. Dealca), a law practitioner, who had engaged in the unethical practice of filing
frivolous administrative cases against judges and personnel of the courts because the latter filed a
motion to inhibit (means to inhibit from proceeding to hear, try and decide the pending incidents of the
case to afford an impartial trial) Judge Madrid from hearing a pending case. Hence, the complainant
(Judge Madrid) has initiated this complaint for the disbarment of respondent on the ground of gross
misconduct and gross violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The motion to inhibit filed by Atty. Dealca contained the following averment, to wit:

Considering the adverse incidents between the incumbent Presiding Judge and the undersigned, he does
not appear before the incumbent Presiding Judge, and the latter does not also hear cases handled by the
undersigned x x x.

Issue:

WON Atty. Dealca violated Canon 11.

Held:

The Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. JUAN S. DEALCA GUILTY of violating Canon 1,
Rule 1.03 and Canon 11, Rule 11. 04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him
from the practice of law for one year effective from notice of this decision, with a STERN WARNING that
any similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Rule 11.04 — A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no
materiality to the case.

In light of the foregoing canons, all lawyers are bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the
courts, and to promote confidence in the fair administration of justice. It is the respect for the
courts that guarantees the stability of the judicial institution; elsewise, the institution would be
resting on a very shaky foundation.

The motion to inhibit filed by Atty. Dealca contained the following averment, to wit:

Considering the adverse incidents between the incumbent Presiding Judge and the undersigned, he does
not appear before the incumbent Presiding Judge, and the latter does not also hear cases handled by the
undersigned x x x.

Atty. Dealca’s averment that Judge Madrid did not hear cases being handled by him directly insinuated
that judges could choose the cases they heard, and could refuse to hear the cases in which hostility
existed between the judges and the litigants or their counsel. Such averment, if true at all, should have
been assiduously substantiated by him because it put in bad light not only Judge Madrid but all judges in
general. Yet, he did not even include any particulars that could have validated the averment. Nor did he
attach any document to support it.

Worth stressing, too, is that the right of a party to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who
does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent in handling the case must be
balanced with the latter’s sacred duty to decide cases without fear of repression. Thus, it was incumbent
upon Atty. Dealca to establish by clear and convincing evidence the ground of bias and prejudice in order
to disqualify Judge Madrid from participating in a particular trial in which Atty. Dealca was participating as
a counsel. The latter’s bare allegations of Judge Madrid’s partiality or hostility did not suffice, because the
presumption that Judge Madrid would undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and
the evidence and without fear or favor should only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary. As such, Atty. Dealca clearly contravened his duties as a lawyer as expressly stated in Canon
11 and Rule 11.04.

Baculi vs. Battung – Canon 11

Facts:

Judge Baculi filed a complaint for disbarment with the Commission on Discipline of the IBP against the
respondent, alleging that the latter violated Canons 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Judge Baculi claimed that during the hearing on the motion for reconsideration, the respondent was
shouting while arguing his motion. Judge Baculi advised him to tone down his voice but instead,
the respondent shouted at the top of his voice. When warned that he would be cited for direct
contempt, the respondent shouted, "Then cite me!" Judge Baculi cited him for direct contempt and
imposed a fine of P100.00. The respondent then left.

While other cases were being heard, the respondent re-entered the courtroom and shouted, "Judge, I
will file gross ignorance against you! I am not afraid of you!" Judge Baculi ordered the sheriff to
escort the respondent out of the courtroom and cited him for direct contempt of court for the second time.

After his hearings, Judge Baculi went out and saw the respondent at the hall of the courthouse,
apparently waiting for him. The respondent again shouted in a threatening tone, "Judge, I will file gross
ignorance against you! I am not afraid of you!" He kept on shouting, "I am not afraid of you!" and
challenged the judge to a fight. Staff and lawyers escorted him out of the building. Judge Baculi also
learned that after the respondent left the courtroom, he continued shouting and punched a table at the
Office of the Clerk of Court.

Issue: WON Atty. Battung violated Canon 11.

Ruling:

Respondent violated Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and was
suspended from the practice of law for 1 yr. Atty. Battung disrespected Judge Baculi by shouting at him
inside the courtroom during court proceedings in the presence of litigants and their counsels, and court
personnel. The respondent even came back to harass Judge Baculi. This behavior, in front of many
witnesses, cannot be allowed. We note that the respondent continued to threaten Judge Baculi and acted
in a manner that clearly showed disrespect for his position even after the latter had cited him for
contempt. In fact, after initially leaving the court, the respondent returned to the courtroom and disrupted
the ongoing proceedings. These actions were not only against the person, the position and the
stature of Judge Baculi, but against the court as well whose proceedings were openly and
flagrantly disrupted, and brought to disrepute by the respondent.

Litigants and counsels, particularly the latter because of their position and avowed duty to the courts,
cannot be allowed to publicly ridicule, demean and disrespect a judge, and the court that he represents.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due the courts and to judicial officers and should insist
on similar conduct by others.

Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.

A lawyer who insults a judge inside a courtroom completely disregards the latter’s role, stature
and position in our justice system. When the respondent publicly berated and brazenly threatened
Judge Baculi that he would file a case for gross ignorance of the law against the latter, the respondent
effectively acted in a manner tending to erode the public confidence in Judge Baculi’s competence and in
his ability to decide cases. Incompetence is a matter that, even if true, must be handled with sensitivity in
the manner provided under the Rules of Court; an objecting or complaining lawyer cannot act in a manner
that puts the courts in a bad light and bring the justice system into disrepute.

Santeco vs. Avance

Facts:

The case originated from an administrative complaint filed by Teresita D. Santeco against respondent
Atty. Luna B. Avance for mishandling her case for an action to declare a deed of absolute sale null and
void and for reconveyance and damages which the court found Atty Avance guilty. She was ordered
suspended from the practice of law for a period of five years.

Subsequently, while respondent’s five-year suspension from the practice of law was still in effect, Judge
Consuelo Amog-Bocar, Presiding Judge of the RTC of Iba, Zambales, Branch 71, sent a letter-report to
then Court Administrator informing the latter that respondent had appeared and actively participated in
three cases wherein she misrepresented herself as "Atty. Liezl Tanglao." When her opposing counsels
confronted her and showed to the court a certification regarding her suspension, respondent admitted and
conceded that she is Atty. Luna B. Avance, but qualified that she was only suspended for three years and
that her suspension has already been lifted.

Acting on said report, the Court, required respondent to comment within ten (10) days from notice.
Respondent, however, failed to file the required comment despite reiteration from the Court so she was
found guilty of indirect contempt. Despite due notice of this resolution, however, respondent failed to pay
the fine imposed. The Court finds respondent unfit to continue as a member of the bar.

Issue:

WON Atty. Avance should be disbarred.

Held:

Respondent ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE is hereby DISBARRED for gross misconduct and willful

As an officer of the court, it is a lawyer’s duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court. The highest
form of respect for judicial authority is shown by a lawyer’s obedience to court orders and processes.

Here, respondent’s conduct evidently fell short of what is expected of her as an officer of the court as she
obviously possesses a habit of defying this Court’s orders. She willfully disobeyed this Court when
she continued her law practice despite the five-year suspension order against her and even
misrepresented herself to be another person in order to evade said penalty. Thereafter, when she
was twice ordered to comment on her continued law practice while still suspended, nothing was heard
from her despite receipt of two Resolutions from this Court. Neither did she pay the ₱30,000.00 fine
imposed.
The Court held that failure to comply with Court directives constitutes gross misconduct, insubordination
or disrespect which merits a lawyer’s suspension or even disbarment.

Collantes vs. CA – Forum Shopping

Facts:

 Petitioner Collantes requested the assistance of the Career Executive Service Board relative to
the termination of his services as Undersecretary for Civilian Relations of the DND invoking his
right to security of tenure as a CESO.

 Collantes also instituted a Petition for Quo Warranto and Mandamus.

 Meanwhile, the CSC favorably acted on Collantes’ letter-request issuing a CSC resolution holding
that Collantes’ relief as Undersecretary of DND amounted to illegal dismissal as he was not given
another post concomitant to his eligibility.

 Then, the Court dismissed the Petition for Quo Warranto and Mandamus filed by Collantes.

 The controversy reached the Supreme Court but was considered closed and terminated when
Collantes manifested his desire not to pursue his appeal and withdraw his Petition for Review on
Certiorari. Thereafter, Collantes moved for the execution of CSC Resolution directing the DND to
give Collantes a position where his eligibility is appropriate and to pay his backwages and other
benefits from the time of his termination up to his actual reinstatement.

 However, said resolutions of CSC were reversed in view of the motion for reconsideration filed by
the Legal Affairs Division of DND that said resolutions were entirely in conflict with CA decision.
So per reverseal of CSC resolution, Collantes is deemed effectively resigned.

 Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with CA praying for the reversal of CSC resolution but it was
dismissed.

Issue:

WON petitioner is guilty of forum shopping.

What would happen, however, if two separate decisions, irreconcilably conflicting with each other, both
attained finality?

Held:

FIRST ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty of forum shopping.

Petitioner had been aware, that his request for assistance was referred to the CSC for appropriate action.
From that point on, he knew that two government agencies – the CSC and the Court of Appeals – were
simultaneously in the process of reaching their respective decisions on whether petitioner was entitled to
reinstatement or to a position appropriate to his eligibility. Therefore, it cannot be denied that petitioner
knew that he had effectively instituted two separate cases. Petitioner subsequently proceeded to
act like a true forum shopper – he abandoned the forum where he could not get a favorable
judgment, and moved to execute the Resolution of the forum where he succeeded.

Petitioner’s above actuation is, in fact, a violation of his certification against forum shopping with the Court
of Appeals, a ground for dismissal of actions distinct from forum shopping itself. As petitioner knew from
the receipt of the CESB letter that another claim was pending in a quasi-judicial agency concerning these
issues, he was bound by his certification with the Court of Appeals to report such fact within five days
from his knowledge thereof. This circumstance – of being surprised by the discovery of another pending
claim with another court or quasi-judicial agency – is the very situation contemplated by letter (c) in the
first paragraph of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court:

Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. – The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the
complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the
same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or
claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status
thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he
shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading
has been filed.

In sum, there is an identity of issues in the two cases which resulted in the two conflicting final and
executory decisions. But while, as stated above, the second petition can be dismissed on the ground of
either res judicata or non-compliance with the undertakings in petitioner’s certification against forum
shopping, these grounds can only be invoked when the case is still pending. As petitioner points out, the
Resolution of the CSC had already become final and executory.

The 30 August 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals, however, has also attained finality.

SECOND ISSUE: What would happen, however, if two separate decisions, irreconcilably
conflicting with each other, both attained finality?

Hence, we go back to the main issue in this petition: which of the two final and executory decisions
should be given effect, the 30 August 2001 Court of Appeals Decision dismissing the petitioner’s Petition
for Quo Warranto, or the 13 August 2001 CSC Resolution declaring petitioner Collantes to be illegally
removed as Undersecretary of the DND?

There are thus three solutions which we can adopt in resolving the case at bar: the first is for the parties
to assert their claims anew, the second is to determine which judgment came first, and the third is to
determine which of the judgments had been rendered by a court of last resort.

As there are conflicting jurisprudence on the second solution, it is appropriate for this Court to adopt
either the first or the third solution.

The first solution involves disregarding the finality of the two previous judgments and allowing the parties
to argue on the basis of the merits of the case anew. The third solution merely involves the determination
of which judgment has been rendered by this Court, the court of last resort in this jurisdiction.

Adopting the third solution will result in the denial of this Petition for Certiorari. Whereas the finality of the
CSC Resolution came about by the failure to file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal within the
proper reglementary periods.

The better solution, however, is to let the parties argue the merits of the case anew, and decide the case
on the basis thereof. We can do this either by remanding the case to a lower court, or by resolving the
issues in this disposition. The latter recourse is more appropriate, for three reasons: (1) all the facts,
arguments, and pleadings in support of the parties’ contentions are now before us, with the parties
advancing the very same contentions as those in this Petition; (2) a remand to the Court of Appeals
would entail asking the latter to resolve the very same issues it had passed upon twice; and (3) a remand
to the Court of Appeals would only entail another unnecessary delay in the termination of the case when
the case is now ripe for adjudication before us.

Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED.

Our rules on forum shopping are meant to prevent such eventualities as conflicting final decisions as in
the case at bar. We have ruled that what is important in determining whether forum shopping exists or not
is the vexation caused the courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks different courts and/or
administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes and/or grant the same or substantially the
same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different
fora upon the same issues.

More particularly, the elements of forum shopping are: (a) identity of parties or at least such parties as
represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of the rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for,
the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that
any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the action under consideration.

Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of
action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for
dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same
prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata);
and (3) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with different prayers (splitting of
causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata).  If the forum
shopping is not considered willful and deliberate, the subsequent cases shall be dismissed without
prejudice on one of the two grounds mentioned above. However, if the forum shopping is willful and
deliberate, both (or all, if there are more than two) actions shall be dismissed with prejudice.
 LEJANO V. PEOPLE

Facts:

In its Resolution of January 18, 2011, the Court directed Mr. Lauro G. Vizconde and Atty.
Ferdinand S. Topacio to substantiate their publicized claims that the Court had been paid to
acquit the accused in this case and that Justice Antonio Carpio, a member of the Court, worked
on his colleagues to ensure such acquittal. As for Mr. Dante La. Jimenez, the Court directed him to
show cause why he should not be held in contempt for uttering expletives against the Justices of the
Court in a television interview on account of their decision in the case.

Even before the Court's decision came out, Mr. Vizconde already heralded in public that
Justice Carpio had been exerting pressure on the other Justices to acquit accused Hubert Webb.
Mr. Vizconde publicly reiterated this alleged manipulation after the decision came out. The
implication is that the Justices who voted for acquittal succumbed to Justice Carpio's pressure. In
addition, Mr. Vizconde claims that the votes of the Justices had been bought.

Mr. Vizconde's above statements to the media are extremely serious. He accuses the Court of
being crooked and corrupt. Yet, when called to substantiate his accusations, all he can say is that it would
not be proper "at this time" to reveal to the Court the identities of his unimpeachable informants.

During a press conference held after the decision was released, Mr. Dante Jimenez, former
President of Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption (VACC), uttered the following: "Kayong mga P.I.
kayo, kayong mga Justices diyan na nakita po namin ang inyong ginawa po dito. Pinatay ninyo
ang criminal justice system! Mga P.I. kayo!

Justice Carpio inhibited himself from the case because he gave testimony at the trial that,
at about the time the crime took place, former Senator Freddie Webb called him and said that he
was in the United States and helping his son Hubert find work there. It would have been improper for
Justice Carpio, therefore, to try to influence his colleagues in the Court regarding the case. Actually,
Justice Carpio neither asked nor influenced any of his colleagues to vote for the acquittal of Hubert Webb
or any of the accused. But Atty. Topacio, a lawyer and, thus, an officer of the Court, told the media
that Justice Carpio did try to influence his colleagues and even served as point man for the
accused.

Atty. Topacio advised Mr. Vizconde to release his damaging accusation, which they were not
then prepared to substantiate, to one media entity.

They maintained their pronouncements regarding Mr. Justice Antonio Carpio were made in
reliance with the information given to them in confidence by unimpeachable sources.

Issue:
Held:

The Court Strongly ADMONISHES Mr. Lauro Vizconde for publicly stating that the Court had
been bought when it acquitted the accused and that Justice Antonio Carpio put pressure on its members
to vote for such acquittal when he, Mr. Vizconde, was not prepared to substantiate such statement;

FINDS Mr. Dante La. Jimenez guilty of contempt of court for badmouthing the members of the
Court and imposes on him the penalty of fine of P100,000.00;

DIRECTS Atty. Ferdinand S. Topacio to show cause within ten (10) days from receipt of
this resolution why he should not be held in contempt for publicly stating through the Philippine
Daily Inquirer, when he was not ready to substantiate the same with evidence, that three members of the
judiciary were privy to "the alleged efforts of [Justice] Carpio to convince fellow justices to vote for
the acquittal of Hubert Webb, principal accused in the massacre of Vizconde's wife and daughters
on June 30, 1991...that [Justice] Carpio was the 'point man in marshalling efforts to secure the acquittal of
Webb as early as the time when the case was still under review before the Court of Appeals."

As an officer of the Court, Atty. Topacio had a bounden duty to uphold its dignity and authority,
not promote distrust in its administration of justice." He ought not to unnecessarily destroy the people's
high esteem and regard for the courts, so essential to the proper administration of justice.