Guevara v.

Guevara

G.R. No. L-48840, 29 December 1943, 74:479

FACTS:

It appears that on August 26, 1931, Victorino L. Guevara executed a will,

apparently with all the formalities of the law. On September 27, 1933, he died.
His last will and testament, however, was never presented to the court for
probate, nor has any administration proceeding ever been instituted for the
settlement of his estate. Ever since the death of Victorino L. Guevara, his only
legitimate son Ernesto M. Guevara appears to have possessed the land
adjudicated to him in the registration proceeding and to have disposed of
various portions thereof for the purpose of paying the debts left by his father.

In the meantime Rosario Guevara, who appears to have had her father’s last
will and testament in her custody, presented the will to the court, not for the
purpose of having it probated but only to prove that the deceased Victirino L.
Guevara had acknowledged her as his natural daughter. Upon that proof of
acknowledgment she claimed her share of the inheritance from him, but on
the theory or assumption that he died intestate, because the will had not been
probated, for which reason, she asserted, the betterment therein made by the
testator in favor of his legitimate son Ernesto M. Guevara should be
disregarded. Both the trial court and the Court of appeals sustained that
theory.

ISSUE:

Whether or not probate is necessary for Rosario to be able to claim her

legitime as an acknowledged natural daughter.

RULING:

In the instant case there is no showing that the various legatees other than
the present litigants had received their respective legacies or that they had
knowledge of the existence and of the provisions of the will. Their right under
the will cannot be disregarded, nor may those rights be obliterated on account
of the failure or refusal of the custodian of the will to present it to the court for
probate.

Even if the decedent left no debts and nobody raises any question as to the
authenticity and due execution of the will, none of the heirs may sue for the
partition of the estate in accordance with that will without first securing its
allowance or probate by the court, first, because the law expressly provides
that “no will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and
allowed in the proper court”; and, second, because the probate of a will, which
is a proceeding in rem, cannot be dispensed with the substituted by any other
proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial, without offending against public policy
designed to effectuate the testator’s right to dispose of his property by will in
accordance with law and to protect the rights of the heirs and legatees under
the will thru the means provided by law, among which are the publication and
the personal notices to each and all of said heirs and legatees. Nor may the
court approve and allow the will presented in evidence in such an action for
partition, which is one in personam, any more than it could decree the
registration under the Torrens system of the land involved in an ordinary
action for reinvindicacion or partition.

Dela Cerna v. Potot, 12 SCRA 576, 1964

FACTS:

Spouses Bernabe de la Serna and Gervasia Rebaca, executed a joint last will
ad testament where they willed that their 2 parcels of land be given
to Manuela Rebaca, their niece and that while each of them are living, he/she
will continue to enjoy the fruits of the lands mentioned.

Bernabe died. Gervasia submitted the will for probated. By order of Oct. 31,

1939, the Court admitted for probate the said will but only for the part of
Bernabe.

When Gervasia died, another petition for probate was instituted by Manuela,
but because she and her attorney failed to appear in court, the petition was
dismissed. When the same was heard, the CFI declared the will void for being
executed contrary to the prohibition on joint wills. On appeal, the order was
reversed.

ISSUE:

W/N the will may be probated.

HELD:

Admittedly the probate of the will in 1939 was erroneous, however, because it
was probated by a court of competent jurisdiction it has conclusive effect and
a final judgment rendered on a petition for the probate of a will is binding upon
the whole world. However, this is only with respect to the estate of the
husband but cannot affect the estate of the wife; considering that a joint will is
a separate will of each testator.

The joint will being prohibited by law, its validity, in so far as the  estate of the
wife is concerned, must be reexamine and adjudicated de novo.
The undivided interest of the wife should pass upon her death to her intestate
heirs and not to the testamentary heir. Thus as to the disposition of the wife,
the will cannot be given effect.

A decree of probate decree is conclusive on the due execution and the formal

validity of the will subject to such probate

Gallanosa v. Arcangel, 83 SCRA 676 (1978)

FACTS:

Florentino Hitosis was a childless widower and was survived by his brother
Lito. In his will, Florentino bequeathed his ½ share in the conjugal estate to
his second wife, Tecla, and, should Tecla predecease him, as was the case,
his ½ share would be assigned to spouses Gallanosa. Pedro Gallanosa was
Tecla’s son by her first marriage who grew up under the care of Florentino.
His other properties were bequeathed to his protégé Adolfo Fortajada.

Upon his death, a petition for the probate of his will was wile. Opposition was
registered by Florentino’s brother, nephews and nieces.

After a hearing, where the oppositors did not present any evidence, the Judge
admitted the will to probate.

The testator’s legal heirs did not appeal from the decree of probate and from
the order of partition and distribution.

Later, the legal heirs filed a case for recovery of 61 parcels of land against
Pedro alleging that they had been in continuous possession of those lands
and praying that they be declared owners thereof.

Pedro moved for a dismissal which was later granted by the Judge on the
ground of res judicata.

The legal heirs did not appeal from the order of dismissal.

15 years after the dismissal of the first civil case and 28 years after the
probate of the will, the legal heirs filed a case for “annulment of the will”
alleging fraud and deceit.

The court dismissed said action. However, the court set aside the dismissal
after the heirs filed a motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether the will already probated may still be annulled.

HELD:

NO. The SC held that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion
in setting aside its order of dismissal and ignoring the testamentary case and
the first civil case which is the same as the instant case. It is evident that
second civil case is barred by res judicata and by prescription.

The decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution or formal validity

of the will. That means that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at
the time he executed the will and was not acting under duress, menace, fraud,
or undue influence; that the will was signed by him in the presence of the
required number of witnesses, and that the will is genuine.

Accordingly, these facts cannot again be questioned in a subsequent

proceeding, not even in a criminal action for the forgery of the will.

After the finality of the allowance of a will, the issue as to the voluntariness of
its execution cannot be raised anymore.

The SC also held that the decree of adjudication, having rendered in a

proceeding in rem, is binding upon the whole world. Moreover, the dismissal
of the first civil case, which is a judgment in personam, was an adjudication on
the merits. Thus. It constitutes a bar by former judgment under the Rules of
Court.

The SC also held that the lower court erred in saying that the action for the
recovery of the lands had not prescribed. The SC ruled that the Art. 1410 of
NCC (the action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract
does not prescribe) cannot apply to last wills and testaments.

The Rules of Court does not sanction an action for “annulment” of a will.

A final decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution of the will.

A decree of adjudication in a testate proceeding is binding on the whole

world.After the period for seeking relief from a final order or judgment under
Rule 38 of the Rules of court has expired, a final judgment or order can be set
aside only on the grounds of: (a) lack of jurisdiction or lack of due process of
law or (b) that the judgment was obtained by means of extrinsic or collateral
fraud. In the latter case, the period for annulling the judgment is four (4) years
from the discovery of fraud.
The Civil Law rule that an action for declaration of inexistence of a contract
does not prescribe cannot be applied to last wills and testaments.
Nepomuceno v. CA, 139 SCRA 206, 1985
SOFIA J. NEPOMUCENO, petitioner
RUFINA GOMEZ, OSCAR JUGO ANG, CARMELITA JUGO, respondents.

FACTS:
Martin Jugo left a duly executed and notarized Last Will and Testament before
he died. Petitioner was named as sole executor. It is clearly stated in the Will
that he was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two
legitimate children, but he had been estranged from his lawful wife. In fact, the
testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner were married despite the subsisting
first marriage. The testator devised the free portion of his estate to petitioner.
On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for probate. On May 13,
1975, Rufina Gomez and her children filed an opposition alleging undue and
improper influence on the part of the petitioner; that at the time of
the execution of the Will, the testator was already very sick and that petitioner
having admitted her living in concubinage with the testator.
The lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as the
testator admitted in his Will to cohabiting with the petitioner. Petitioner
appealed to CA. On June 2, 1982, the respondent court set aside the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal denying the probate of the will. The
respondent court declared the Will to be valid except that the devise
in favor of the petitioner is null and void.

ISSUE:
whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the
will, before ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void.

HELD:
No. The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the
Will to be validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will
and declared the devise in favor of the petitioner null and void. The general
rule is that in probate proceedings, the court’s area of inquiry is limited to an
examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule,
however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the
probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do
and pass upon certain provisions of the Will.
The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears
to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the
intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the
court should meet the issue (Nuguid v. Nuguid)
The Will is void under Article 739. The following donations shall be void: (1)
Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at
the time of the donation; and Article 1028. The prohibitions mentioned in
Article 739, concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to
testamentary provisions.
There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior existing
marriage when Martin Jugo executed his Will. The very wordings of the Will
invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the
properties to a person with whom he had been living in concubinage.

Baltazar v. Laxa, 2012

FACTS:

Paciencia was a 78 years old spinster when she made her last will and
testament in the Pampango dialect on Sept. 13, 1981. The will, executed in
the house of retired Judge Limpin, was read to Paciencia twice. After which,
Paciencia expressed in the presence of the instrumental witnesses that the
document is her last will and testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at
the end of the said document on page 3 and then on the left margin of pages
1, 2 and 4 thereof.

Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her
properties to respondent Lorenzo Laxa and his wife Corazon Laza and their
children Luna and Katherine. Lorenzo is Paciencia’s nephew whom she
treated as her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to know and treated
Paciencia as his own mother. Six days after the execution of the Will,
Paciencia left for USA. There, she resided with Lorenzo and his family until
her death.

Four years after the death of Paciencia, Lorenzo filed a petition with the RTC
of Guagua, Pampanga for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for the
issuance of Letters of Administration in his favor. Antonio Baltazar, petitioner
filed an opposition to Lorenzo’s petition and averred that the properties
subject of Paciencia’s Will belong to Nicomeda Mangalindan, his
predecessor-in-interest; hence, Paciencia had no right to bequeath them to
Lorenzo.

For petitioners, Rosie testified that her mother and Paciencia were first
cousins and that that Paciencia was referred to as magulyan or forgetful
because she would sometimes leave her wallet in the kitchen then start
looking for it moments later. On cross examination, it was established that
Rosie was neither a doctor nor a psychiatrist, that her conclusion that
Paciencia was magulyan was based on her personal assessment.

Petitioners filed an Amended Opposition asking the RTC to deny the probate
of Paciencias Will on the grounds that Paciencia was mentally incapable to
make a Will at the time of its execution, that she was forced to execute the
Will under duress or influence of fear or threat and that the execution of the
Will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence by
Lorenzo.

Lorenzo testified that at the time of Paciencias death, she did not suffer from
any mental disorder and was of sound mind, was not blind, deaf or mute.
Lorenzo belied and denied having used force, intimidation, violence, coercion
or trickery upon Paciencia to execute the Will as he was not in the Philippines
when the same was executed.

RTC denies the petition for probate of the will and concluded that when
Paciencia signed the will, she was no longer possessed of the sufficient
reason or strength of mind to have the testamentary capacity. On appeal, CA
reversed the decision of the RTC and granted the probate of the will. The
petitioner went up to SC for a petition for review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether the authenticity and due execution of the will was sufficiently
established to warrant its allowance for probate.

HELD:

Yes. A careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful compliance
with the formalities laid down by law. The signatures of the testatrix,
Paciencia, her instrumental witnesses and the notary public, are all present
and evident on the Will. Further, the attestation clause explicitly states the
critical requirement that the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses attested
and subscribed to the Will in the presence of the testator and of one another.
In fact, even the petitioners acceded that the signature of Paciencia in the Will
may be authentic although they question of her state of mind when she signed
the same as well as the voluntary nature of said act.

The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the
execution of the will lies on the shoulders of the petitioners. The SC agree
with the position of the CA that the state of being forgetful does not
necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to
execute a Will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind.
Besides, Art. 799 of the NCC states: “To be of unsound mind, it is not
necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties,
or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease,
injury or other cause. It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of
making the Will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper
objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.”

Courts are tasked to determine nothing more than the extrinsic validity of a
Will in probate proceedings. 64 This is expressly provided for in Rule 75,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which states:

Rule 75

Production of Will. Allowance of Will Necessary.

Section 1. Allowance necessary. Conclusive as to execution. – No will shall
pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the
proper court. Subject to the right of appeal, such allowance of the will shall be
conclusive as to its due execution.

Due execution of the will or its extrinsic validity pertains to whether the
testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by law.

The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the
execution of the will lies on the shoulders of the petitioners.

Petitioners, through their witness Rosie, claim that Paciencia was "magulyan"
or forgetful so much so that it effectively stripped her of testamentary capacity.
They likewise claimed in their Motion for Reconsideration 66 filed with the CA
that Paciencia was not only "magulyan" but was actually suffering from
paranoia.67

We are not convinced.

We agree with the position of the CA that the state of being forgetful does not
necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to
execute a Will.68 Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind.
Besides, Article 799 of the New Civil Code states:

Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full
possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken,
unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause.

It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to
know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his
bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.

In this case, apart from the testimony of Rosie pertaining to Paciencia’s

forgetfulness, there is no substantial evidence, medical or otherwise, that
would show that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution
of the Will. On the other hand, we find more worthy of credence Dra. Limpin’s
testimony as to the soundness of mind of Paciencia when the latter went to
Judge Limpin’s house and voluntarily executed the Will. "The testimony of
subscribing witnesses to a Will concerning the testator’s mental condition is
entitled to great weight where they are truthful and intelligent." 69 More
importantly, a testator is presumed to be of sound mind at the time of the
execution of the Will and the burden to prove otherwise lies on the oppositor. 

Bare allegations of duress or influence of fear or threats, undue and

improper influence and pressure, fraud and trickery cannot be used as
basis to deny the probate of a will.

Moreover, it bears stressing that "[i]rrespective x x x of the posture of any of

the parties as regards the authenticity and due execution of the will x x x in
question, it is the mandate of the law that it is the evidence before the court
and/or [evidence that] ought to be before it that is controlling." 74 "The very
existence of [the Will] is in itself prima facie proof that the supposed [testatrix]
has willed that [her] estate be distributed in the manner therein provided, and
it is incumbent upon the state that, if legally tenable, such desire be given full
effect independent of the attitude of the parties affected thereby." 75 This,
coupled with Lorenzo’s established relationship with Paciencia, the
evidence and the testimonies of disinterested witnesses, as opposed to
the total lack of evidence presented by petitioners apart from their self-
serving testimonies, constrain us to tilt the balance in favor of the
authenticity of the Will and its allowance for probate.

Spouses Pascual v. CA, G.R. No. 115925, August 15, 2003

FACTS:

PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD TO RECOVER PROPERTY OBTAINED BY FRAUD GIVING RISE TO

AN IMPLIED TRUST; PROBATE FOR WILL
SPOUSES RICARDO PASCUAL AND CONSOLACION SISON VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND
REMEDIOS EGUENIO-GINO
G.R. No. 115925. August 15, 2003

Facts: Petitioner Sison and respondent Eugenio-Gino are the niece and granddaughter ,
respectively of the late Canuto Sison. Canuto and 11 other individuals including his sister Catalina
and his brother Victoriano were co-owners of a property known as Lot 2 covered by an original
certificate of title.
On September 26, 1956, Canuto and Consolacion executed a Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan
under which, Canuto sold his share in Lot 2 in favor of Consolacion.
On October 23, 1968, the surviving children of Canuto, namely Felicidad and Beatriz, executed a
joint affidavit affirming the Kasulatan in favor of Consolacion, which the latter registered with the
Office of the Register of Deeds.
On February 4, 1988, Remedios filed a complaint against Consolacion and her spouse, Ricardo
Pascual for annulment of transfer of certificate of title because the former claimed that she is the
owner of the lots since Catalina devised the land to her in Catalina’s last will. Remedies also
added that the lots were obtained through fraudulent means since the area covered by the TCT is
twice the size of Canuto.
Petitioner sought to dismiss the complaint on the ground of prescription. Petitioners claim that the
basis of the action is fraud and the action should have been filed within four years from the
registration of Consolacion’s title on October 28, 1968 and not some 19 years later on February 4,
1988.
The trial court denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss holding that the reckoning of the prescriptive
period for filing complaint is evidentiary in nature and must await the presentation of the parties’
evidence during the trial.

ISSUE: Whether or not the action for annulment or cancellation of transfer of certificate of title by
Remedios has prescribed. Wther or not to petionion for probate has also prescribed-NO.

HELD:
The four-year prescriptive period relied upon by the trial court applies only if the fraud does not
give rise to an implied trust and the action is to annul a voidable contract under Article 1390 of the
Civil Code. In such a case, the four-year prescriptive period begins to run from the time of the
discovery of the mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.
It is now well-settled that the prescriptive period to recover property obtained by fraud or mistake,
giving rise to an implied trust under Article 1456 of the Civil Code is ten years pursuant to Article
1144. this ten-year prescriptive period begins to run from the date the adverse party repudiates the
implied trust which repudiation takes place when the adverse party registers the land.
Remedies filed her complaint on February 4, 1988 or more than 19 years after Consolacion
registered her title over the lot on October 28, 1968. Unquestionably, Remedios filed the complaint
late thus warranting its dismissal.
Remedies anchors her right in filing the suit on her being a devisee of Catalina’s last will. However,
since the probate court has not admitted Catalina’s last will, Remedios has not acquired any right
under the last will. Remedies is thus without any cause of action either to seek reconveyance of
Lot 2 or to enforce an implied trust over these lots.
It was inappropriate to order the reconveyance of the subject lots to Remedios in her capacity as
executrix of Catalina’s last will because she sued petitioners not in such capacity but as the
alleged owner of the disputed lots.

Mercado v. Santos, 66 Phil 216