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United States v. Trenton Potteries Co - 273 U.S. 392, 47 S. Ct. 377 (1927)

(1) Trenton Potteries Company and 22 other pottery companies that controlled 82% of the US bathroom pottery market were convicted of price fixing in violation of the Sherman Act. (2) The appeals court overturned the conviction, finding that price fixing could be allowed if the prices were reasonable. (3) The Supreme Court reinstated the conviction, finding that agreements to fix prices are illegal per se under the Sherman Act, regardless of the prices' reasonableness.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
316 views2 pages

United States v. Trenton Potteries Co - 273 U.S. 392, 47 S. Ct. 377 (1927)

(1) Trenton Potteries Company and 22 other pottery companies that controlled 82% of the US bathroom pottery market were convicted of price fixing in violation of the Sherman Act. (2) The appeals court overturned the conviction, finding that price fixing could be allowed if the prices were reasonable. (3) The Supreme Court reinstated the conviction, finding that agreements to fix prices are illegal per se under the Sherman Act, regardless of the prices' reasonableness.

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May Anasco
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© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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United States v. Trenton Potteries Co - 273 U.S. 392, 47 S. Ct.

377 (1927)

RULE:

Only those restraints upon interstate commerce which are unreasonable are
prohibited by the Sherman Act. It does not follow that agreements to fix or
maintain prices are reasonable restraints and therefore permitted by the statute,
merely because the prices themselves are reasonable. Reasonableness is not a
concept of definite and unchanging content. A court's view of what is a reasonable
restraint of commerce is controlled by the recognized purpose of the Sherman Anti-
Trust Law itself. 

FACTS:

Trenton Potteries Company and 22 other corporations in the business of making


pottery for use in bathrooms (the pottery companies) (defendants) coordinated to
fix the prices of their products. Together, the pottery companies controlled 82
percent of the business for bathroom-pottery fixtures in the United States. The
federal government (plaintiff) brought a complaint against the pottery companies,
alleging that the companies had conspired to fix prices in violation of the Sherman
Act. In district court, an instruction was submitted to the jury, stating that the
jurors should find the pottery companies guilty if the companies had engaged in a
price-fixing agreement, regardless of the reasonableness of the prices or the actual
effect of the agreement on the prices. The jury returned a guilty verdict. The court
of appeals overturned the verdict, holding that the jury instruction had misstated
the law. The government appealed the decision.

ISSUE:

Is an agreement of those controlling over 80% of the business of manufacturing


and distributing sanitary pottery, to fix and maintain uniform prices if the prices
were reasonable, valid?
ANSWER:

No.

CONCLUSION:

The United States Supreme Court reinstated the decision of the district court below
convicting respondents of violating the Sherman Anti-Trust Law. Respondents were
convicted of combining to fix and maintain uniform prices for the sale of sanitary
pottery, in restraint of interstate commerce. The circuit court of appeals reversed
the judgment. On appeal, the Court was faced with the issue of deciding whether
the trial judge correctly withdrew from the jury the consideration of the
reasonableness of particular restraints charged. As respondents made no request to
charge with respect to venue or the jurisdictional necessity of overt acts within the
district, they were not permitted to reap the benefit of their own omission. Further,
the Court held that the testimony of respondents' witness on cross-examination did
not prejudice the respondents in any substantial way so as to require a reversal.
Also, the Court could not say that the discretion of the district court was improperly
exercised in excluding the conclusions of the witnesses as to competitive conditions
when full opportunity was given to prove by relevant data the conditions of the
industry within the period in question.

ACC

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