A.

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

COMMON PROVISIONS
Section 6
1. Aruelo v. CA 227 SCRA 311’
Aruelo and Gatchalian were rival candidates for the office of the Vice-Mayor of the
Municipality of Balagtas, Bulacan.
Gatchalian won over Aruelo by a margin of 4votes, and was duly proclaimed therefor
Aruelo filed with the (COMELEC) a petition seeking to annul Gatchalian's proclamation
grounded on fraudulent alteration and tampering; he then filed with the RTC a petition
protesting the same election but informed the trial court of the pendency of the pre-
proclamation case before the COMELEC.
The present petition questions the acts of the CA allowing the answer of Gatchalian filed
out of time based on the rules of COMELEC
SC: COMELEC rules do not apply to regular courts
the COMELEC can not adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings in the
regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and
procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court
laws governing election protests must be liberally construed to the end that the popular
will, expressed in the election of public officers, will not, by purely technical reasons, be
defeated; PETITION DISMISSED

2. Mamerto T. Sevilla vs. Comelec, March 19, 2013

Sevilla and So were candidates for the position of Punong Barangay in Muntinlupa City
during the 2010 Barangay and SK Elections; Sevila was proclaimed as the winner; So
filed a protest alleging fraud, anomalies and irregularities pinpointing 20% of the total
number of the protested precincts
MeTC dismissed the election protest; So filed an MR but was denied being a prohibited
pleading
So then filed a petition for certiorari with the Comelec, alleging grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the MeTC Judge. So faults the MeTC for its non-observance of the rule that
in the appreciation of ballots, there should be a clear and distinct presentation of the
specific details of how and why a certain group of ballots should be considered as having
been written by one or two persons;
COMELEC found in favor of So stating that the MeTC was in grave abuse of discretion
Sevilla elevated the case to the SC arguing gravely abused its discretion when it
entertained So’s petition despite its loss of jurisdiction to entertain the petition after the
court a quo’s dismissal order became final and executory due to So’s wrong choice of
remedy and that So’s petition for certiorari should not have been given due course since it
is not a substitute for an appeal and may only be allowed if there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
SC: We resolve to DISMISS the petition for having been prematurely filed with this
Court, and remand the case to the COMELEC for its appropriate action.
Comelec en banc’s Resolution lacks legal effect as it is not a majority decision required
by the Constitution and by the Comelec Rules of Procedure
the equally divided voting between three Commissioners concurring and three
Commissioners dissenting is not the majority vote that the Constitution and the Comelec
Rules of Procedure require for a valid pronouncement
the vote of four (4) members must always be attained in order to decide, irrespective of
the number of Commissioners in attendance.
Section 7
3. Cua v. Comelec 156 SCRA 582
The First Division of the COMELEC rendered a 2-1 decision favoring the herein
petitioner Cua but nevertheless suspended his proclamation as winner due to the lack of
the unanimous vote required by the procedural rules in
three members voted to sustain the First Division, with two dissenting and one abstaining
(one member having died earlier)
On the strength of this 3-2 vote, Cua moved for his proclamation and took his oath the
same day, but the next day Puzon filed with the COMELEC an urgent motion to suspend
Cua's proclamation or to annul or suspend its effect if already made but was enjoined by
COMELEC from assuming his membership
Petitioner: 2-1 decision of the First Division was a valid decision of the COMELEC
according Article IX-A, Section 7 of the new Constitution
SC: 2-1 decision rendered by the First Division was a valid decision under Article IX-A,
Section 7 of the Constitution.
The 3 members who voted to affirm the First Division constituted a majority of the five
members who deliberated and voted thereon en banc and their decision is also valid under
the aforecited constitutional provision. Hence, the proclamation of Cua on the basis of the
two aforecited decisions was a valid act that entitles him now to assume his seat in the
House of Representatives.

4. Acena v. Civil Service Commission 193 SCRA 623

a petition for certiorari to annul CSC resolution which set aside the order declaring the
herein petitioner as the legitimate Administrative Officer of Rizal Technological
Colleges.
petitioner was appointed as an Administrative Officer of Rizal Technological Colleges
(RTC) by Dr. Profeta, then the President of RTC which appointment was approved as
permanent by the Civil Service Commission
Dr. Profeta then extended to petitioner a promotional appointment as Associate Professor
of Rizal Technological Colleges despite his designation as Acting Administrative Officer
Estolas (who replaced Profeta) revoked the designation of petitioner as Acting
Administrative Officer and appointed Salvador and Profeta later on withdrew the
appointment of Acena as Associate Professor
but CSC-NCR approved as temporary the appointment of petitioner Acena as Associate
Professor because he lacks the master's degree required for the position and opined that
petitioner is still the Administrative Officer of RTC because his appointment as Associate
Professor had been withdrawn.
MSPB issued an order dismissing petitioner complaint for illegal termination anchored
on the findings that petitioner Acena was validly appointed to the position of Associate
Professor and he was merely designated as Administrative Officer which designation
could be revoked anytime by the appointing authority. However, on March 23, 1988,
acting on petitioner Acena's letter dated February 12, 1988 informing the MSPB of the
opinion of CSC Chairman Gotladera, the MSPB reversed itself and set aside its order
dated February 3, 1988.
The resolution of the SC was centered on the proper remedy to question the decision of
the CSC which should have been petition for certiorari under R. 65 there being a question
on jurisdiction

5. Vital-Gozon v. Court of Appeals 212 SCRA 235

 Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction, in a special civil action of
mandamus against a public officer, to take cognizance of the matter of damages sought to
be recovered from the defendant officer
This is about the reappointment of Dr. Alejandro S. de la Fuente who was the Chief of
the Clinics of the National Children's Hospital
He received notice from the DOH that he would be re-appointed "Medical Specialist II
which he Considered to be a demotion by no less than two ranks from his post ; thus he
filed a protest with the DOH Reorganization Board
CSC considered his demotion as illegal as the department was not abolished
De la Fuente then sent 2 letters to Dr. Vital-Gozon demanding the implementation of the
Commission's decision
On the other hand, no one in the DOH Legal Department bothered to reply to Dr. de la
Fuente, or to take steps to comply or otherwise advise compliance, with the final and
executory Resolution of the Civil Service Commission
After 3 months of inaction, Dr. de al Fuente repaired to the Civil Service Commission
and asked it to enforce its judgment where he was told to file in court a petition for
mandamus because of the belief that the Commission had no coercive powers — unlike a
court — to enforce its final decisions/resolutions

6. Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop v. Ferrer 135 SCRA 25

Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a suit involving an
order of the COMELEC dealing with an award of contract arising from its invitation to
bid;
Petitioners joined the bidding initiated by COMELEC to answer for the necessities of the
upcoming elections
SC: it is the Supreme Court, not the RTC, which has exclusive jurisdiction to review on
certiorari final decisions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC relative to the conduct of
elections and enforcement of election laws
the COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in favor of Acme was not issued
pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent
administrative functions over the conduct of elections, and hence, the said resolution may
not be deemed as a "final order" reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court. Being
non-judicial in character, no contempt may be imposed by the COMELEC from said
order, and no direct and exclusive appeal by certiorari to this Tribunal lie from such
order. Any question arising from said order may be well taken in an ordinary civil action
before the trial courts.

7. Mateo v. CA 247 SCRA 284

Upon complaint of some Morong Water District (MOWAD) employees, petitioners, all
Board Members of MOWAD, conducted an investigation on private respondent Edgar
Sta. Maria, then General Manager.; he was then placed under preventive suspension and
Maximo San Diego was designated in his place as Acting General Manager. He was later
dismissed
Respondent filed a Special Civil Action for Quo Warranto and Mandamus before the
RTC challenging his dismissal
Petitioners, in turn, moved to dismiss the case on two (2) grounds one of which is that the
court had no jurisdiction over disciplinary actions of government employees which is
vested exclusively in the Civil Service Commission
 Petitioners then elevated the matter to this Court through a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 which was referred to respondent Court of Appeals for adjudication but was
denied by the lower court
ISSUE: whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over dismissal of an employee of quasi-
public corporation.
SC: We hold that it has no jurisdiction. RTCs have no jurisdiction to entertain cases
involving dismissal of officers and employees covered by the Civil Service Law.
8. Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95
Rules Governing appeals to the Court of Appeals from Judgment or Final Orders of the
Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies .

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONS

Section 2
9. TUPAS v. National Housing Corporation 173 SCRA 33
TUPAS filed a petition to conduct certification election to DOLE to determine EBR of
NHC but was dismissed as NHC is a GOCC and its employees cannot form or join
unions for purposes of collective bargaining
SC: workers of NHC has the right to form unions and associations
Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters" or legislative charters, that is those created by an act of Congress or by special
law, and not those incorporated under and pursuant to a general legislation.
The right to unionize or to form organizations is now explicitly recognized and granted to
employees in both the governmental and the private sectors .

10. Salazar v. Mathay 73 SCRA 285

ISSUE: whether or not the services of petitioner as "confidential agent" in the Office of
the Auditor, GSIS was validly terminated on the alleged ground of loss of confidence,
and if not, whether or not she could still be reinstated to said position after accepting-the
position of Junior Examiner in the same office
Salazar was appointed by the Auditor General "confidential agent" in the Office of the
Auditor General, Government Service Insurance System which was noted by the CSC but
was later on terminated
She was then reappointed but she requested that she be reinstated to being a confidential
agent which prompted her to file a mandamus to compel the Auditor General for the
reinstatement
ISSUE: whether it is primarily confidential or not. If it is, then her services as
confidential agent can be terminated any time at the pleasure of the appointing power.
SC: There are two instances when a position may be considered primarily confidential:
(1) When the President upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Civil Service (now
Civil Service Commission) has declared the position to be primarily confidential; or (2)
In the absence of such declaration when by the nature of the functions of the office, there
exists "close intimacy between the appointee and appointing power which insures
freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgiving or betrayals of
personal trust or confidential matters of state."
Executive Order No. 265, 14 declares confidential agents in the several departments and
offices of the Government, unless otherwise directed by the President, to be primarily
confidential" which are primarily confidential.
 petitioner falls under the first category of primarily confidential positions and being such
she cannot complain that the termination of her services as confidential agent in the
Office of the Auditor, GSIS is in violation of her security of tenure.
petitioner was not removed from her office as confidential agent in the office of the
Auditor, GSIS, but that her term in said position has already expired when the appointing
power terminated he services.

11. Corpus v. Cuaderno 13 SCRA 591

Defendant was Governor of the Central Bank while petitioner was appointed as
Economist of a department of the central bank
Respondent was the subject of several complaints from his co-employees and was
suspended upon recommendation of defendant
He was however reinstated but again was the subject of administrative complaints
causing another suspension which he now questions
SC: We found there that he had been removed not for any of the charges in the
administrative complaint against him in 1958 — charges as to which no specific findings
were made by the Monetary Board — but by reason of loss of confidence by the
Governor of the Bank; and held that loss of confidence alone is not a sufficient and
legitimate cause for removal even if the position involved, as in appellant's case, belongs
to the category of policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical positions
referred to in the Constitution. In that case, therefore, We ordered appellant's
reinstatement in the service.

12. Luego v. Civil Service Commission 143 SCRA 327

Petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer 11, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City
which was described as permanent" but the Civil Service Commission approved it as
"temporary," subject to the final action taken in the protest filed by the private respondent
and another employee, and provided "there (was) no pending administrative case against
the appointee, no pending protest against the appointment nor any decision by competent
authority that will adversely affect the approval of the appointment."
Civil Service Commission found the private respondent better qualified than the
petitioner for the contested position and directed Felicula Tuozo be appointed to the
position in place of Luego whose appointment as Administrative Officer II is hereby
revoked
ISSUE: is the Civil Service Commission authorized to disapprove a permanent
appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and,
on the basis of this finding, order his replacement by the latter?
SC: No. The stamping of the words "APPROVED as TEMPORARY" did not change the
character of the appointment, which was clearly described as "Permanent"
What was temporary was the approval of the appointment, not the appointment it sell and
what made the approval temporary was the fact that it was made to depend on the
condition specified therein and on the verification of the qualifications of the appointee to
the position.
The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended
by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the
appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law.
When the appointee is qualified and authorizing the other legal requirements are satisfied,
the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the
Civil Service Laws.
13. PAGCOR v. Rilloraza June 25, 2001
Admin charges for dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service, loss of confidence were filed against defendant, a casino operations
manager of PAGCOR in addition to his dismissal
Respondent appealed to the CSC which denied it which was then affirmed by CA but
ordered petitioner to reinstate private respondent with payment of full backwages plus all
tips, bonuses and other benefits accruing to his position and those received by other
casino operations managers for the period starting January 5, 1998 until his actual
reinstatement.
Petitioner’s MR was denied ; Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: WON there is sufficient cause to warrant the dismissal, not merely the
suspension, of respondent who, petitioner maintains, occupies a primarily confidential
position.
Petitioner: respondent is a primarily confidential employee and holds such office at the
pleasure of the appointing power and may be removed upon the cessation of confidence
in him by the latter.
SC: it is the nature of the position which finally determines whether a position is
primarily confidential, policy-determining or highly technical; executive pronouncements
can be no more than initial determinations that are not conclusive in case of conflict. It
must be so, or else it would then lie within the discretion of the Chief Executive to deny
to any officer, by executive fiat, the protection of Section 4, Article XII (now Section
2[3], Article IX-B) of the Constitution.
first, the classification of a particular position as primarily confidential, policy-
determining or highly technical amounts to no more than an executive or legislative
declaration that is not conclusive upon the courts, the true test being the nature of the
position. Second, whether primarily confidential, policy-determining or highly technical,
the exemption provided in the Charter pertains to exemption from competitive
examination to determine merit and fitness to enter the civil service. Such employees are
still protected by the mantle of security of tenure. Last, and more to the point, Section 16
of P.D. 1869, insofar as it declares all positions within PAGCOR as primarily
confidential, is not absolutely binding on the courts.
respondent’s duties and responsibilities call for a great measure of both ability and
dependability. They can hardly be characterized as routinary, for he is required to
exercise supervisory, recommendatory and disciplinary powers with a wide latitude of
authority. His duties differ markedly from those we previously ruled as not primarily
confidential
he is a tier above the ordinary rank-and-file in that his appointment to the position entails
faith and confidence in his competence to perform his assigned tasks.
Lacking, therefore, is that amplitude of confidence reposed in him by the appointing
power so as to qualify his position as primarily confidential.
casino operations manager reports directly to the Branch Manager or; It does not appear
from the record to whom the Branch Manager (or the Branch Manager for Operations, as
the case may be) reports. It becomes unmistakable, though, that the stratum separating the
casino operations manager from reporting directly to the higher echelons renders remote
the proposition of proximity between respondent and the appointing power.
There is no showing of that element of trust indicative of a primarily confidential position
We find that the CSC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, correctly attributed good faith
on the part of respondent. Accordingly, the modified penalty imposed by the Civil
Service Commission on the respondent which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, was
proper under the premises.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
14. SSS Employees Association v. Court of Appeals 175 SCRA 686
ISSUE: WON RTC can enjoin SSS employees (SSSEA) from striking and order the
striking employees to return to work; WON SSS employees have the right to strike
SSSEA staged a strike for failure of the SSS to act upon the union’s demands including
implementation of CBA provisions
Petitioners: RTC has no jurisdiction over the case as it is under the juris of DOLE
SC: commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or assoc without
including the right to strike

15. Lopez v. Civil Service Commission 194 SCRA 269

Petitioner assails the nullification of the CSC of his appointment as Harbor Master of the
Manila South Harbor
Petitioner was appointed to such position after considering his qualifications which is
being questioned by respondent Luz (placing 3rd)
Luz appealed to the CSC which ruled that while the candidates were all qualified, there
was no finding as to who was the most qualified and competent for the appointment
SC: In the appointment, placement and promotion of civil service employees according to
merit and fitness, it is the appointing power, especially where it is assisted by a screening
committee composed of persons who are in the best position to screen the qualifications
of the nominees, who should decide on the integrity, performance and capabilities of the
future appointees.
the Commission's power does not extend to considerations other than those enumerated
in the law such as the belief that there are others more qualified.
The law limits the Commission's authority only to whether or not the appointees possess
the legal qualifications and the appropriate civil service eligibility, nothing else.

16. University of the Phils. And Alfredo de Torres v. CSC April 3, 2001
Torres is an Associate Professor of UP Los Baños (UPLB) who went on a vacation leave
of absence without pay for 3 years but was extended resulting to more or less 5 years of
leave; as a result, he was declared AWOL and was advised to reapply which was
affirmed by the CSC
ISSUE: whether petitioner was indeed dropped from the service by the University
SC: Petitioner De Torres was never actually dropped from the service by UP. He
remained in the UPLB's roll of academic personnel, even after he had been warned of the
possibility of being dropped from the service if he failed to return to work within a stated
period.
As part of its academic freedom, the University of the Philippines has the prerogative to
determine who may teach its students. The Civil Service Commission has no authority to
force it to dismiss a member of its faculty even in the guise of enforcing Civil Service
Rules.

17. Navarro v. CSC 226 SCRA 522

Petitioner was a suspect for taking P21,250 worth of cable drums, was found guilty
thereof and was terminated
He appealed to the MSPB which ordered his reinstatement (but was later on reversed by
the CSC) while criminal case for theft filed in the RTC was dismissed
SC: CSC has no appellate jurisdiction over MSPB’s decisions exonerating officers and
employees from administrative charges
18. Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy April 29, 1999
a complaint against Pedro O. Dacoycoy was filed for habitual drunkenness, misconduct
and nepotism.
CSC found no substantial evidence to support habitual drunkenness and misconduct but
for nepotism as a result of the appointment of his two sons, Rito and Ped Dacoycoy, as
driver and utility worker, respectively, and their assignment under his immediate
supervision and control as the Vocational School Administrator Balicuatro College of
Arts and Trades, and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from the service but was
reversed by the CA
SC: We agree with the Civil Service Commission that respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy
was guilty of nepotism and correctly meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service.

19. Santos v. Yatco 106 PHIL 745

Petition for certiorari to revoke the order of the respondent judge cancelling his
previous order of execution.
Parties submitted a compromise agreement to CFI Quezon referring to the sale by
installment of a parcel of land made by plaintiffs to defendant Francisco
Mendoñez; court issued an order approving the agreement

It is not clear happened at the hearing on March 22, 1958. According to plaintiffs,
Mendoñez admitted he violated the agreement, asked for, and was granted, two
days to settle with plaintiffs, but he failed to do so. According to defendant there
was a misunderstanding at the hearing. The fact is, the court issued on March 25,
1958, an order of execution. However, defendant Mendoñez filed on April 17,
1958, an urgent motion to quash the writ of execution, asserting under oath that
"immediately after the execution of the compromise agreement . . . plaintiff Pacita
V. de los Santos and defendant Francisco Mendoñez entered into a verbal
agreement whereby the former assured and led defendant to believe that provided
he could pay in full and at one time the balance of his indebtedness to her through
a GSIS Government Service Insurance System) loan which she is willing to
facilitate for defendant, she would execute the necessary deed of absolute sale in
favor of the defendant for Lot No. 4, Block No. 13-C, Pcs-3312-AMD of T.C.T.
No. 25094 of Quezon City and would consider the terms and conditions favorable
to her in their compromise agreement unenforceable against defendant. . . ."

Defendant further alleged, also under oath, among other things, that he applied for
and secured the necessary loan from the GSIS; that plaintiffs had been so advised
on March 28, 1958; but plaintiff Pacita V. de los Santos "arbitrarily and illegally
demands and continuous demanding of defendant that before she complies with
the content of said (verbal) agreement, defendant should pay her P1,000.00 by
way of attorney's fees plus the balance of defendant's indebtedness computed by
her in the amount of P14,363.00, excluding interest yet, all to be taken from
defendant's GSIS loan as approved, and that the P1,000.00 already paid by
defendant to her as stated in paragraph 4, supra, is considered by her forfeited in
her favor. . . ."
This urgent motion was taken up on April 19, 1958. After listening to the parties,
the judge in open court ordered; "in view of the statement of counsel for plaintiffs
that they are still open to an amicable settlement, action on the motion to quash
writ of execution of the defendant is held in abeyance for two (2) weeks during
which period they can settle the case amicably and report to the Court whatever
with agreement they may have reached."

On April 28, 1958, defendant manifested in writing that he conferred with

plaintiff Pacita V. de los Santos on April 22, 1958, that he made known to her
"that he is ready to pay and is offering her the sum of P13,563, his balance
indebtedness to her, in accordance with their verbal agreement on December 9,
1957 . . . Plaintiff Pacita V. de los Santos brushed aside defendant's offer of
payment, and instead, stated that she will abide by their said agreement only if she
will be paid P14,500.00. She added that she is demanding now, P14,500.00 after
she has forfeited the P1,000.00 already paid by defendant to her, and that she can
not allow the P1,000.00 be deducted from the remaining balance of P14,563.00."

The judge called the parties to a pre-trial or conference on June 2, 1958. Noting
defendant's insistance on non-violation of the compromises agreement, he set the
case for hearing on June 3, 1958. On said date according to the Judge, Atty.
Bernardo (for plaintiffs) refused to attend the hearing, and defendant proved the
material allegations of his urgent motion as hereinabove set forth.

Wherefore, convinced that there was no justification or the issuance of the writ of
execution, the Hon. Nicasio Yatco, Judge, quashed it by his order of June 4,
1958.lawphi1.net

Hence this petition for certiorari to revoke that particular order, which petition
must necessarily be based on lack of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion. 1

There is no question in this country that a judge has jurisdiction to quash a writ of
execution issued by him, particularly where it was improvidently issued.
(Dimayuga vs. Raymundo, 76 Phil., 143, 42 Off. Gaz., 2121). See also Garcia vs,
Muñoz, 103 Phil., 628.

Was there abuse of discretion? We think not. In the first place, there being
opposition on the part of the defendant, who alleged and proved a subsequent
verbal agreement amending the compromise, execution could not validly be
decreed without a hearing. As we said in Co. vs. Lucero, 100 Phil., 160, 52 Off.
Gaz., (17), 7255, when under similar circumstances a breach of the compromise
agreement is alleged, "there arises a cause of action which must be passed upon
by the court requiring a hearing to determine whether such breach had really
taken place." 2

In the second place, the allegations proved by Mendoñez about their verbal
agreement, his having secured a loan from the GSIS and his consequent ability to
 discharge his obligation seemingly justified the court's refusal to eject defendant
from the premises (on execution) was the consequent forfeiture in favor of the
plaintiffs of more than P12,000.00 already paid by defendant as previous
installments of the purchase price, 3not to mention the of defendants use of the
house and theatre erected that parcel of land. Upon the other hand, the respondent
judge's action caused no irreparable or undue harm plaintiffs, because the latter
still have the judgment Mendoñez. Note particularly that their unpaid continuous
to earn 10% interest.

Wherefore, as the court had jurisdiction and has committed not grave abuse of
discretion, the writ of certiorari may not be issued.

Petition denied, with costs against petitioners.

20. CSC, Anicia De Lima v. Larry M. Alfonso, June 11. 2009

Respondent Alfonso is the Director of the Human Resources Management Department of
PUP and was charged with grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the Service, and violation of Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.
respondent repeatedly abused his authority as head of PUP’s personnel department when
the latter prepared and included his name for overnight services, ostensibly authorizing
him to work for 24 hours straight which resulted to him making considerable earnings for
allegedly working in humanly impossible conditions 24 hours straight daily, for three
consecutive weeks.
ISSUE: whether the CSC has jurisdiction to hear and decide the complaint filed against
Alfonso.
SC: We find in favor of petitioner.
the CSC has jurisdiction to supervise the performance of and discipline, if need be, all
government employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters such as PUP.
Accordingly, all PUP officers and employees, whether they be classified as teachers or
professors pursuant to certain provisions of law, are deemed, first and foremost, civil
servants accountable to the people and answerable to the CSC in cases of complaints
lodged by a citizen against them as public servants.
CSC has appellate jurisdiction over disciplinary cases decided by government
departments, agencies and instrumentalities. However, a complaint may be filed directly
with the CSC, and the Commission has the authority to hear and decide the case,
although it may opt to deputize a department or an agency to conduct the investigation.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Section 1
1. Cayetano v. Monsod 201 SCRA 210

2. Brillantes v. Yorac 192 SCRA 358

The petitioner is challenging the designation by the President of the Philippines of
Associate Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Commission on
Elections, in place of Chairman Hilario B. Davide
 Petitioner: the choice of the Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections is an
internal matter that should be resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion
of the President of the Philippines violates their independence
SC: Article IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional
Commissions as "independent." Although essentially executive in nature, they are not
under the control of the President in the discharge of their respective functions. Each of
these Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own
rules and in the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject
only to review on Certiorari by this Court as provided by the Constitution in Article IX-
A, Section 7.
The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes under
that discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the
President of the Philippines.
A designation as Acting Chairman is by its very terms essentially temporary and
therefore revocable at will. No cause need be established to justify its revocation.
Assuming its validity, the designation of the respondent as Acting Chairman of the
Commission on Elections may be withdrawn by the President of the Philippines at any
time and for whatever reason she sees fit. It is doubtful if the respondent, having accepted
such designation, will not be estopped from challenging its withdrawal.
The problem allegedly sought to be corrected, if it existed at all, did not call for
presidential action. The situation could have been handled by the members of the
Commission on Elections themselves without the participation of the President, however
well-meaning.
In the choice of the Acting Chairman, the members of the Commission on Elections
would most likely have been guided by the seniority rule as they themselves would have
appreciated it. In any event, that choice and the basis thereof were for them and not the
President to make.
the designation by the of respondent Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Commission on
Elections is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL without prejudice to the incumbent
Associate Commissioners of the Commission on Elections restoring her to the same
position if they so desire, or choosing another member in her place, pending the
appointment of a permanent Chairman by the President of the Philippines with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments

3. Lindo v. Comelec 194 SCRA 25

Petitioner Lindo and respondent Velasco were candidates for the position of municipal
mayor in Cavite whereby Lindo was the elected mayor prompting respondent to file a
protest with the RTC
RTC ruled in favor of petitioner; an MR by respondent was denied; thus, he elevated the
case to the COMELEC which set aside the order of the trial court
A petition for certiorari was later filed before this Court by Lindo impugning the order of
the COMELEC but the SC dismissed the petition and affirmed the decision of the
COMELEC.
Lindo was proclaimed by the RTC as the winner

Section 2
4. Gallardo v. Judge Tabamo 218 SCRA 253
Petitioners would have Us prohibit, restrain and enjoin public respondent Tabamo, Jr.,
from continuing with the taxpayer's suit, docketed therein as Special Civil Action No.
465 and entitled
 petitioner was the incumbent Governor of Camiguin and was seeking re-election
respondent filed against petitioners to prohibit and restrain them from pursuing or
prosecuting certain public works projects; from releasing, disbursing and/or spending any
public funds for such projects; and from issuing, using or availing of treasury warrants or
any device for the future delivery of money, goods and other things of value chargeable
against public funds in connection with the said projects
(1) said projects were undertaken in violation of the 45-day ban on public works imposed
by the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) because although they were
initiated a few days before 27 March 1992, the date the ban took effect, they were not
covered by detailed engineering plans, specifications or a program of work which are
preconditions for the commencement of any public works project; hence, they could not
have been lawfully and validly undertaken;
ISSUE: whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Special
Civil Action No. 465 (enforcement of laws involving the conduct of elections)
SC: the acts sought to be restrained in Special Civil Action No. 465 before the court a
quo are matters falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC
the appointment or hiring of new employees or the creation or filling up of new positions
in any government office, agency or instrumentality, whether national or local, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, is banned during the period of forty-five
(45) days before a regular election and thirty (30) days before a special election if made
without the prior authority of the Commission on Elections. A violation thereof
constitutes an election offense.
The Constitution itself grants to it (RTC) exclusive original jurisdiction over contests
involving elective municipal officials.
Petition GRANTED

5. Relampagos v. Cumba 243 SCRA 690

ISSUE: WON the COMELEC has jurisdiction over petitions for, certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus in election cases
petitioner and private respondent were candidates for the position of Mayor in Agusan
del Norte; and the latter was proclaimed the winning candidate, with a margin of only 22
votes over the former.
petitioner filed an election protest with RTC Agusan which found petitioner to have won
by 6 votes
respondent appealed to the COMELEC
respondent filed with the COMELEC a petition to annul the aforesaid order of the RTC
granting the motion for execution pending appeal and the writ of execution; where
granted the petition.
In upholding its jurisdiction in certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus cases, the
respondent COMELEC maintains that there is a special law granting it such jurisdiction;
hence the present petition
The RTC acted with palpable and whimsical abuse of discretion in granting the
petitioner's motion for execution pending appeal and in issuing the writ of execution is all
too obvious.
Upon the perfection of the appeal, the trial court was divested of its jurisdiction over the
case.
Accordingly, since the respondent COMELEC has the jurisdiction to issue the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, then it correctly set aside
the challenged order granting the motion for execution pending appeal and writ of
execution issued by the trial court.
petition is DENIED
6. Edding v. Comelec 246 SCRA 502
ISSUE: whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction to issue Writs of Certiorari
against the interlocutory order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in election cases.
petitioner Edding and Respondent Bernardo were among the candidates for the office of
the municipal mayor in Zamboanga del Norte where Bernardo was declared winner
Edding filed an election protest with the RTC which proclaimed Edding as the winner ;
Bernardo filed a Notice of Appeal while Edding moved for the immediate execution of
RTCs decision
Bernardo opposed Edding's motion, claiming that the RTC has no jurisdiction to order
execution pending appeal & the RTC approved Bernardo's Notice of Appeal but granted
Edding's Motion for Immediate Execution, and ordered the records of the case to be
forwarded to the COMELEC.6
Bernardo filed with the COMELEC a Petition to enjoin the Order of the RTC granting
execution pending appeal which gave it due course
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner: in the absence of any conferment on the COMELEC, under the Constitution or
by any statute, the COMELEC lacks jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari and that the
power of the RTC to grant execution pending appeal in election cases has ready been
confirmed by jurisprudence
Respondents: COMELEC has the power to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, invoking Sections 2(2) and 3 of Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides in part:
SC: COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in the instant case when it enjoined
the order of the RTC which granted petitioner's motion for immediate execution. It
appears however that on July 8, 1993, the same day when private respondent filed his
notice of appeal with the RTC
The settled rule is that the mere filing of a notice of appeal does not divest the trial court
of its jurisdiction over a case and resolve pending incidents.
Since the court has jurisdiction to act on the motion at the time it was filed, that
jurisdiction continued until the matter was resolved and was not lost by the subsequent
action of the opposing party.

7. Regina Ongsiako Reyes vs. Comelec, October 22, 2013

Petitioner is asking the Court to affirm the jurisdiction of the HRET to solely and
exclusively pass upon such qualifications and to set aside the COMELEC Resolutions for
having denied Petitioner her right to due process and for unconstitutionally adding a
qualification not otherwise required by the constitution.”
petitioner is a duly proclaimed winner and having taken her oath of office as member of
the House of Representatives, all questions regarding her qualifications are outside the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC and are within the HRET exclusive jurisdiction.
ISSUE: WON petitioner could be proclaimed on 18 May 2013. Differently stated, was
there basis for the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013?

8. Jose Miguel Arroyo vs. DOJ et. al., July 23, 2013
Comelec and the DOJ issued an Order creating and constituting a Joint Committee and
Fact-Finding Team (Joint Panel) on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud
and manipulation cases which was mandated to conduct the necessary preliminary
investigation on the basis of the evidence gathered and the charges recommended by the
Fact-Finding Team.
 The Fact-Finding Team, on the other hand, was created for the purpose of gathering real,
documentary, and testimonial evidence which can be utilized in the preliminary
investigation to be conducted by the Joint Committee.
the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007
senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato, and Maguindanao was
indeed perpetrated & recommended that (1) petitioner Abalos be subjected to preliminary
investigation for electoral sabotage for conspiring to manipulate the election results in
North and South Cotabato; (2) that GMA and Abalos be subjected to another preliminary
investigation for manipulating the election results in Maguindanao; and (3) that Mike
Arroyo be subjected to further investigation.
The Comelec resolved that an information for electoral sabotage be filed against GMA
and Abalos, while the charges against Mike Arroyo be dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence.
The Court dismissed the petition and the Fact- Finding Team’s Initial Report are declared
VALID; Hence, these motions for reconsideration.
Arroyo: the creation of the Joint Panel undermines the decisional independence of the
Comelec; DOJ should conduct preliminary investigation only when deputized by the
Comelec but not exercise concurrent jurisdiction
GMA: maintains that it is the Comelec and not the Joint Committee that has the primary,
if not exclusive, authority to conduct preliminary investigation of election cases.
ISSUE: whether the Comelec has the exclusive power to investigate and prosecute cases
of violations of election laws
SC: under the present law, the Comelec and other prosecuting arms of the government,
such as the DOJ, now exercise concurrent jurisdiction in the investigation and
prosecution of election offenses.
there is no prohibition on simultaneous exercise of power between two coordinate bodies.
What is prohibited is the situation where one files a complaint against a respondent
initially with one office (such as the Comelec) for preliminary investigation which was
immediately acted upon by said office and the re-filing of substantially the same
complaint with another office (such as the DOJ). The subsequent assumption of
jurisdiction by the second office over the cases filed will not be allowed. Indeed, it is a
settled rule that the body or agency that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.
The Comelec and the DOJ themselves agreed that they would exercise their concurrent
jurisdiction jointly. Although the preliminary investigation was conducted on the basis of
two complaints – the initial report of the Fact-Finding Team and the complaint of Senator
Pimentel – both complaints were filed with the Joint Committee. Consequently, the
complaints were filed with and the preliminary investigation was conducted by only one
investigative body.
Notwithstanding the grant of concurrent jurisdiction, the Comelec and the DOJ
nevertheless included a provision in the assailed Joint Order whereby the resolutions of
the Joint Committee finding probable cause for election offenses shall still be approved
by the Comelec in accordance with the Comelec Rules of Procedure.

9. Salic Dumarpa vs. Comelec, April 2, 2013

Challenged in this petition is a resolution issued by the COMELEC en banc
Dumarpa was a congressional candidate last 2010 elections in Lanao del Sur.
COMELEC declared a total failure of elections in seven (7) municipalities, including the
three (3) Municipalities situated in the 1st Congressional District of Province of Lanao
del Sur.
 COMELEC issued a Resolution resetting the special elections to due to failure of
elections
COMELEC then issued the herein assailed resolution which provided for the constitution
of Special Board of Election Inspectors (SBEI) which was the subject to petitioners MR
but was not acted upon by the COMELEC
petitioner: both provisions on Re-clustering of Precincts (Section 12) and constitution of
SBEIs [Special Board of Election Inspectors] (Section 4) affect the Muncipality of
Masiu, Lanao del Sur, and will definitely doom petitioner to certain defeat, if its
implementation is not restrained or prohibited by the Honorable Supreme Court (as at the
time of the filing of this petition, he was leading by a slim margin)
SC: We dismiss the petition; the COMELEC's broad power to "enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum and recall," carries with it all necessary and incidental powers for it to
achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.13
The Commission on Elections, by constitutional mandate, must do everything in its
power to secure a fair and honest canvass of the votes cast in the elections.
In the performance of its duties, the Commission must be given a considerable latitude in
adopting means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective
for which it was created - to promote free, orderly, and honest elections.
The choice of means taken by the Commission on Elections, unless they are clearly
illegal or constitute grave abuse of discretion, should not be interfered with

10. Marc Douglas Cagas vs. Comelec, October 25, 2013

Petition for Prohibition by Cagas, in his capacity as taxpayer, to prohibit the COMELEC
from conducting a plebiscite for the creation of the province of Davao Occidental
simultaneously with the 28 October 2013 Barangay Elections within the whole province
of Davao del Sur , except in Davao City.
The opposition was based on the following: (1) COMELEC is without authority or legal
basis to AMEND or MODIFY Section 46 of Republic Act No. 10360 by mere MINUTE
RESOLUTION because it is only CONGRESS who can validly amend, repel, or modify
existing laws; (2) COMELEC is without authority or legal basis to hold a plebiscite for
the creation of the Province of Davao Occidental because Section 46 of Republic Act No.
10360 has already lapsed
The OSG: (1) The 1987 Constitution does not fix the period to hold a plebiscite for the
creation of a local government unit; (2) There was logistical and financial impossibility
for the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite at a mere two months’ notice;
ISSUE: Did the COMELEC act without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it resolved to hold
the plebiscite for the creation of the Province of Davao Occidental on 28 October 2013,
simultaneous with the Barangay Elections?
SC: NO: The COMELEC’s power to administer elections includes the power to conduct
a plebiscite beyond the schedule prescribed by law.
The Constitution does not specify a date as to when plebiscites should be held. This is in
contrast with its provisions for the election of members of the legislature in Section 8,
Article VI18 and of the President and Vice-President in Section 4, Article VII.19 The
Constitution recognizes that the power to fix the date of elections is legislative in nature,
which is shown by the exceptions in previously mentioned Constitutional provisions, as
well as in the election of local government officials.
The Constitution, however, grants the COMELEC the power to "enforce and administer
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum and recall."The COMELEC has "exclusive charge of the enforcement and
 administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring
free, orderly and honest elections." The text and intent of Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) is
to give COMELEC "all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the
objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections."
To comply with the 60-day period to conduct the plebiscite then, as insisted, petitioner
would have the COMELEC hold off all of its above tasks. If COMELEC abandoned any
of its tasks or did not strictly follow the timetable for the accomplishment of these tasks
then it could have put in serious jeopardy the conduct of the May 2013 National and
Local Elections. The COMELEC had to focus all its attention and concentrate all its
manpower and other resources on its preparation for the May 2013 National and Local
Elections, and to ensure that it would not be derailed, it had to defer the conduct of all
plebiscites including that of R.A. No. 10360.
The COMELEC’s questioned Resolution then directing the holding of the plebiscite for
the ratification of R.A. No. 10360 simultaneously with the Barangay Elections was not an
abuse of its discretion but simply an exercise of prudence
The determination of the feasibility of holding a plebiscite on a given date is within the
competence and discretion of the COMELEC. Petitioner cannot therefore simply insist
that the COMELEC should have complied with the period specified in the law when
doing so would be virtually impossible under the circumstances.

11. Comelec v. Judge Silva et. al. 286 SCRA 177

This case presents for determination the extent of control which those designated by the
Commission on Elections have in the prosecution of election offenses.
the COMELEC charged private respondents violation of R.A. No. 6646; respondents
were accused of having tampered, in conspiracy with one another, with the certificates of
canvass by increasing the votes received by then senatorial candidate Juan Ponce Enrile
in certain municipalities of Bataan which cases were raffled to the sala of Silva who
consequently dismissed the cases
COMELEC appealed the dismissal to the CA but the judges denied due course to its
appeal due to the fact that the prosecutor, whom the COMELEC had deputized to
prosecute the cases, had earlier taken a contrary stand against the COMELEC.
Hence this petition for certiorari and mandamus seeking the nullification of the orders of
the two judges, denying due course to the Notices of Appeal of the COMELEC.
ISSUE: who has authority to decide whether or not to appeal from the orders of dismissal
the COMELEC or its designated prosecutor?
RTC: the Chief State Prosecutors decision not to appeal the dismissal of the cases,
consistent with his earlier decision to leave the determination of the existence of probable
cause to the trial courts, was binding on them.
The authority to decide whether or not to appeal the dismissal belongs to the COMELEC.
Art. IX-C, 2(6) of the Constitution expressly vests in it the power and function to
investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws,
including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
COMELEC is empowered to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving
election offenses for the purpose of helping the Judge determine probable cause and for
filing an information in court. This power is exclusive with COMELEC.
Prosecutors designated by the COMELEC to prosecute the cases act as its deputies. They
derive their authority from it and not from their offices.
Consequently, it was beyond the power of Chief State Prosecutor Zuo to oppose the
appeal of the COMELEC. For that matter, it was beyond his power, as COMELEC-
designated prosecutor, to leave to the trial courts the determination of whether there was
probable cause for the filing of the cases and, if it found none, whether the cases should
 be dismissed. Those cases were filed by the COMELEC after appropriate preliminary
investigation.
If the Chief State Prosecutor thought there was no probable cause for proceeding against
private respondents, he should have discussed the matter with the COMELEC and
awaited its instruction. If he disagreed with the COMELECs findings, he should have
sought permission to withdraw from the cases. But he could not leave the determination
of probable cause to the courts and agree in advance to the dismissal of the cases should
the courts find no probable cause for proceeding with the trial of the accused.
It was, therefore, grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judges to rely on
the manifestation of Chief State Prosecutor Zuo as basis for denying due course to the
notices of appeal filed by the COMELEC.

12. Torres v. Comelec 270 SCRA 583

Richard I. Gomez (Gomez) and respondent Codilla filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for representative of Leyte under the Liberal Party of the Philippines.
Buenaventura O. Juntilla (Juntilla), a registered voter of Leyte, filed a Verified
Petition for Gomez's disqualification with the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) First Division on the ground that Gomez lacked the residency
requirement
COMELEC granted Juntilla's Petition and disqualified Gomez.
Gomez filed a Manifestation alleging that he was accepting the aforementioned
Resolution with finality, in order to enable his substitute to facilitate the filing of
the necessary documents for substitution.
Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez then filed her Certificate of Candidacy as substitute
for her husband; Juntilla questioned the validity of the proposed substitution of
Gomez by petitioner; COMELEC allowed the substitution
petitioner emerged as the winner promptiong Codilla to file an Motion to Suspend
the Proclamation of Substitute Candidate Lucy Marie T. Gomez
petitioner was then proclaimed the winning candidate whereas Codilla filed a
Petition with HRET
HRET issued the assailed Resolution and denied the MR of petitioner
Petitioner: what is in question in the Election Protest is her qualification as a
Member of the House of Representatives, and not the number of votes cast; her
qualification is allegedly not a proper ground for an election protest, in which the
issues should be the appreciation of ballots and the correctness and number of
votes of each candidate.
Codilla: contests the counting of 101,250 votes in favor of petitioner. He claims
that the denial of the Certificate of Candidacy of Gomez rendered the latter a non-
candidate, who therefore could not have been validly substituted, as there was no
candidacy to speak of.
SC: Petition is dismissed for failure to show any grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the HRET.
HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives.
An election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is
strictly a contest between the defeated and the winning candidates, based on the
grounds of electoral frauds and irregularities. Its purpose is to determine who
 between them has actually obtained the majority of the legal votes cast and is
entitled to hold the office.
The issues raised hi Codilla's Election Protest are proper for such a petition, and is
within the jurisdiction of the HRET.

Section 3
13. Sarmiento v. Comelec 212 SCRA 307
14. Reyes v. RTC of Oriental Mindoro 244 SCRA 41

Section 4
15. National Press Club v. Comelec 207 SCRA 1
Questions the constitutionality of Sec. 11 RA 6646
Petitioners are representatives of the mass media who were prevented from selling or
donating space and time for political advertisements; two (2) individuals who are
candidates for office (one for national and the other for provincial office) in the coming
May 1992 elections; and taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed of
election issues and of credentials of the candidates is being curtailed.
Petitioners: Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 abridges the freedom of speech of
candidates, and that the suppression of media-based campaign or political propaganda
except those appearing in the Comelec space of the newspapers and on Comelec time of
radio and television broadcasts, would bring about a substantial reduction in the quantity
or volume of information concerning candidates and issues in the election thereby
curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and opinion.
ISSUE: WON the assailed legislative or administrative provisions constitute a
permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the operations of
communication and information enterprises during an election period, or whether such
act has gone beyond permissible supervision or regulation of media operations so as to
constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. NO
SC: The Comelec has been expressly authorized by the Constitution to supervise or
regulate the enjoyment or utilization of the franchises or permits for the operation of
media of communication and information.
objective of Section 11 (b) is the equalizing of the situations of rich and poor candidates
by preventing the former from enjoying the undue advantage offered by huge campaign
"war chests." Section 11 (b) prohibits the sale or donation of print space and air time "for
campaign or other political purposes" except to the Commission on Elections
("Comelec").
Sections 90 and 92 of the Omnibus Election Code require the Comelec to procure
"Comelec space" in newspapers of general circulation in every province or city and
"Comelec time" on radio and television stations.
Comelec is statutorily commanded to allocate "Comelec space" and "Comelec time" on a
free of charge, equal and impartial basis among all candidates within the area served by
the newspaper or radio and television station involved.
Section 11 (b) is limited in its scope of application as it purports to apply only to the
purchase and sale, including purchase and sale disguised as a donation, 4 of print space
and air time for "campaign or other political purposes”; it does not purport in any way to
restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or television stations of news or news-
worthy events relating to candidates, their qualifications, political parties and programs of
government.
Section 11 (b) exempts from its prohibition the purchase by or donation to the Comelec
of print space or air time, which space and time Comelec is then affirmatively required to
 allocate on a fair and equal basis, free of charge, among the individual candidates for
elective public offices in the province or city served by the newspaper or radio or
television station.
Section 11 (b) does, of course, limit the right of free speech and of access to mass media
of the candidates themselves. The limitation, however, bears a clear and reasonable
connection with the constitutional objective set out in Article IX(C) (4) and Article II
(26) of the Constitution.
J. Cruz: the financial disparity among the candidates is a fact of life that cannot be
corrected by legislation except only by the limitation of their respective expenses to a
common maximum. The flaw in the prohibition under challenge is that while the rich
candidate is barred from buying mass media coverage, it nevertheless allows him to
spend his funds on other campaign activities also inaccessible to his strained rival." True
enough Section 11 (b) does not, by itself or in conjunction with Sections 90 and 92 of the
Omnibus Election Code, place political candidates on complete and perfect equality inter
se without regard to their financial affluence or lack thereof. But a regulatory measure
that is less than perfectly comprehensive or which does not completely obliterate the evil
sought to be remedied, is not for that reason alone constitutionally infirm. The
Constitution does not, as it cannot, exact perfection in governmental regulation. All it
requires, in accepted doctrine, is that the regulatory measure under challenge bear a
reasonable nexus with the constitutionally sanctioned objective. That the supervision or
regulation of communication and information media is not, in itself, a forbidden modality
is made clear by the Constitution itself in Article IX (C) (4).
It is believed that, when so viewed, the limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the right to
free speech of the candidates themselves may be seen to be not unduly repressive or
unreasonable. For, once again, there is nothing in Section 11 (b) to prevent media
reporting of and commentary on pronouncements, activities, written statements of the
candidates themselves. All other fora remain accessible to candidates, even for political
advertisements. The requisites of fairness and equal opportunity are, after all, designed to
benefit the candidates themselves.
PETITION DISMISSED

16. Telecommunications & Broadcast Attorneys of the Phils. V. GMA 289 SCRA 337
Petitioners challenge the validity of 92 on the ground (1) that it takes property without
due process of law and without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television
broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the
power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of
communication or information during the period of election.
Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing
COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and the 1995
senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so
again this year.
Petitioners: BP Blg. 881 violates the due process clause and the eminent domain
provision of the Constitution by taking air time from radio and television broadcasting
stations without payment of just compensation; the GMA Network, Inc. lost
P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time of one (1) hour every morning from Mondays
to Fridays and one (1) hour on Tuesdays and Thursday from 7:00 to 8:00 p.m. (prime
time) and, in this year's elections, it stands to lose P58,980,850.00 in view of
COMELEC'S requirement that radio and television stations provide at least 30 minutes of
prime time daily for the COMELEC Time.
SC: Petitioners' argument is without merit, All broadcasting, whether by radio or by
television stations, is licensed by the government; a franchise is thus a privilege subject,
 among other things, to amended by Congress in accordance with the constitutional
provision that "any such franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject to amendment,
alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires."
What better measure can be conceived for the common good than one for free air time for
the benefit not only of candidates but even more of the public, particularly the voters, so
that they will be fully informed of the issues in an election?
In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not
own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and
images. They are merely given the temporary privilege of using them. Since a franchise is
a mere privilege, the exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the
performance by the grantee of some form of public service.
To affirm the validity of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 is to hold public broadcasters to their
obligation to see to it that the variety and vigor of public debate on issues in an election is
maintained. For while broadcast media are not mere common carriers but entities with
free speech rights, they are also public trustees charged with the duty of ensuring that the
people have access to the diversity of views on political issues. This right of the people is
paramount to the autonomy of broadcast media. To affirm the validity of §92, therefore,
is likewise to uphold the people's right to information on matters of public concern. The
use of property bears a social function and is subject to the state's duty to intervene for
the common good. Broadcast media can find their just and highest reward in the fact that
whatever altruistic service they may render in connection with the holding of elections is
for that common good.
PETITION DISMISSED

17. Adiong v. Comelec 207 SCRA 712

ISSUE: WON COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on "mobile"
places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting
areas that it fixes.
Petitioner is a senatorial candidate and avers that being a neophyte in the field of politics
stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition. The posting of decals
and stickers on cars and other moving vehicles would be his last medium to inform the
electorate that he is a senatorial candidate
SC: petition is impressed with merit. The COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals
and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in designated areas
provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds.
The so-called balancing of interests — individual freedom on one hand and substantial
public interests on the other — is made even more difficult in election campaign cases
because the Constitution also gives specific authority to the Commission on Elections to
supervise the conduct of free, honest, and orderly elections.
Considering that the period of legitimate campaign activity is fairly limited and, in the
opinion of some, too short, it becomes obvious that unduly restrictive regulations may
prove unfair to affected parties and the electorate.
When faced with border line situations where freedom to speak by a candidate or party
and freedom to know on the part of the electorate are invoked against actions intended for
maintaining clean and free elections, the police, local officials and COMELEC, should
lean in favor of freedom. For in the ultimate analysis, the freedom of the citizen and the
State's power to regulate are not antagonistic. There can be no free and honest elections
if in the efforts to maintain them, the freedom to speak and the right to know are
unduly curtailed.
The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles
does not endanger any substantial government interest.
 The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by
displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him. A sticker may be furnished
by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his private vehicle, the
expression becomes a statement by the owner, primarily his own and not of anybody else
It is to be reiterated that the posting of decals and stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles,
pedicabs and other moving vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle.
Whether the candidate is rich and, therefore, can afford to doleout more decals and
stickers or poor and without the means to spread out the same number of decals and
stickers is not as important as the right of the owner to freely express his choice and
exercise his right of free speech.
In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether
public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes
censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution:
We are constrained to rule against the COMELEC prohibition. WHEREFORE, the
petition is hereby GRANTED.

18. Sanidad v. Comelec 181 SCRA 529

ISSUES: (1) Is the question of the constitutionality of Presidential Decrees Nos. 991,
1031 and 1033 political or justiciable? (2) During the present stage of the transition
period, and under, the environmental circumstances now obtaining, does the President
possess power to propose amendments to the Constitution as well as set up the required
machinery and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of his proposals by the people?
(3) Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame
allowed therefor a sufficient and proper submission?
Constitution makes no provision as to the specific date when the plebiscite shall be held,
but simply states that it "shall be held not later than three months after the approval of
such amendment or revision."
Petition dismissed

19. Social Weather Stations v. Comelec May 5, 2001

Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the COMELEC from
enforcing Fair Election Act which provides that “surveys affecting national
candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys
affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days be- fore an
election.””
Petitioner: wishes to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the
elections both at the national and local levels and release to the media the results
of such survey as well as publish them directly.
Respondent: it is necessary to prevent the manipulation and corruption of the
electoral process by unscrupulous and erroneous surveys just before the election.
SC: the law is invalid as (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of
expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even
though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental
interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression
of freedom of expression.

20. Mitmug v. Comelec 230 SCRA 54

COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Section 2
1. Guevarra v. Gimenez 6 SCRA 813
2. Orocio v. COA 213 SCRA 109
3. Osmena v. COA 238 SCRA 463
4. Sambeli v. Province of Isabela 210 SCRA 80
The petition seeks to annul and set aside the ruling of COA affirming the action of
respondent Provincial Auditor of Isabela which: (a) withheld the payment to petitioner
and (b) required the refund of the amount of P195,893.10
an agreement was entered into by and between the Province of Isabela and ECS
Enterprises, herein petitioner, for the purchase of 300 units of wheelbarrows, 837 pieces
of shovels and 1 set of radio communication equipment.
In the course of the transaction, there was found to be an overprice; The Provincial
auditor forwarded the matter to the COA Regional Director who formally endorsed the
stand of the Provincial Auditor, as follows:
ECS Enterprises appealed to the respondent Commission on Audit which denied the
appeal
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner: ruling of the COA as not valid; the contract of sale has not only been perfected
between the Province of Isabela and petitioner but delivery has been made by it with the
corresponding partial payment by the Province of Isabela; thus, it is allegedly incumbent
upon COA to authorize the payment of the balance because to act otherwise will
constitute an impairment of contract.
CS: We reject petitioner's contention.
In the exercises of the regulatory power vested upon it by the Constitution, the
Commission on Audit adheres to the policy that government funds and property should
be fully protected and conserved and that irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant
expenditures or uses of such funds and property should be prevented.
. . . Indeed, not only is the Commission on Audit (COA) vested with the power and
authority, but is also charged with the duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts
pertaining to the expenditure or uses of funds owned by or pertaining to, the Government
or any of its subdivisions, agencies
In the exercise of its jurisdiction, it determines whether or not the fiscal responsibility
that rests directly with the head of the government agency has been properly and
effectively discharged, and whether or not there has been loss or wastage of government
resources.
It is also empowered to review and evaluate contracts; after an audit has been made, its
auditors issue a certificate of settlement to each officer whose account has been audited
and settled in whole or in part, stating the balances found due thereon and certified, and
the charges or differences arising from the settlement by reason of disallowances, charges
or suspensions.
VIEWED in this light, the disallowance made by the respondent Commission on Audit is
not without any Constitutional and legal basis; petition is DISMISSED.

5. Bustamante v. COA 216 SCRA 134

This petition seeks to annul and set aside the COA which denied due course to the appeal
of petitioner from the disallowance by Regional Auditor Martha Roxana Caburian of
petitioner's claim for transportation allowance
Petitioner is the Regional Legal Counsel of the NPC and was issued a government
vehicle; petitioner received an Auditor's disallowing P1,250.00 representing aforesaid
transportation allowance; his MR was denied; hence the petition
 ISSUE: WON such denial to give due course to the appeal of herein petitioner constitutes
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
SC: It is beyond dispute that the discretion exercised in the denial of the appeal is within
the power of the Commission on Audit as it is provided in the Constitution
COA issued a circular-> Prohibition Against Use of Government Vehicles by Officials
provided with transportation allowance
The petitioner takes exception from the coverage of said circular contending that such
circular did not mention the NPC as one of the corporations/offices covered by it.
The use of government motor vehicle and the claim for transportation allowance are
mutually exclusive. It is on this basis that the P1,250.00 transportation allowance was
disallowed.
Petition dismissed

6. Saliguniba v. COA 117 SCRA 669

a petition to review the decision of COA for disgraceful and immoral conduct.
Estella, an auditing examiner, was charged by the COA an admin case due to raping
petitioner; COA however dropped the case for insufficiency of evidence
Hence, the petition with issues purely factual
SC: The petition has to be dismissed for the following reasons: Our power to review
COA decisions refers to money matters and not to administrative cases involving the
discipline of its personnel.
Even assuming that We have jurisdiction to review decisions on administrative matters as
mentioned above, We can not do so on factual issues; Our power to review is limited to
legal issues.

7. Rebecca Barbo v. Commission on Audit, October 10, 2008

petitioners seek to annul or reverse COA affirming its Regional Director's affirmation of
the Notice of Disallowance against petitioners who are officials of the Local Water
Utilities Administration (LWUA) and designated members of the Interim Board of
Directors of the San Fernando Water District (SFWD).
LWUA BOT issued a Resolution authorizing the SFWD-BOD to receive reimbursable
allowances in the form of RATA, etc; hence petitioners received EME, Rice Allowance,
Christmas Bonus, and Productivity Bonus
a Special Audit Team of COA audited the financial accounts of SFWD and disallowed
the payment of the above-mentioned benefits and allowances received by petitioners
finding such to be excessive and contrary to law; thus, petitioners were directed to refund
the benefits and allowances subject of the disallowance.
Such order was affirmed by the regional director as well as of the COA; hence the
petition
ISSUES: WON COA has the jurisdiction to motu proprio declare LWUA to be totally in
conflict with sec. 13 of pd no. 198, as amended.
SC: The petition is partly meritorious.
COA has the power and jurisdiction to rule on the legality of the disbursement of
government funds by a water district and declared that such power does not conflict with
the jurisdiction of the courts, the DBM, and the LWUA.

Section 3
8. PAL v. COA 245 SCRA 39
 seeks to review, annul end reverse the decision of COA and to prohibit, enjoin and
prevent COA from enforcing requiring PAL to purchase its fuel requirements solely from
Petron Corporation (Petron).
To assure itself of continuous, reliable and cost-efficient supply of fuel, PAL adopted a
system of bidding out its fuel requirements under a multiple supplier set-up whereby PAL
awarded to the lowest bidder sixty percent (60%) of its fuel requirements and to the
second lowest bidder the remaining forty percent(40%), provided it matched the price of
the lowest bidder.
the fuel supply requirements of PAL were allocated among Petron, Caltex and Shell
COA wrote PAL a letter advising it to desist from bidding the company's fuel supply
contracts
COA denied PAL’s MR; hence the petition holding that their order applied to GOCCs,
including subsidiaries
SC: although COA was correct in ruling that Department Order No. 19 applied to PAL as
a government agency at the time, it nonetheless gravely abused its discretion in not
exempting PAL therefrom.
The authority granted by the constitution is broad and comprehensive enough enabling
COA to adopt as its own, simply by reiteration or by reference, without the necessity of
repromulgation, already existing rules and regulations. It may also expand the coverage
thereof to agencies or instrumentalities under its audit jurisdiction.
PAL’s rationale for objecting to the COA order were reasonable but the case was
rendered moot and academic as PAL became a private corporation

9. Bagatsing v. Committee on Privitization 246 SCRA 334

The petition seeks (1) to nullify the bidding conducted for the sale of a block of shares
constituting 40% of the capital stock of Petron Corporation (PETRON) and the award
made to Aramco Overseas Company, B.V. (ARAMCO) as the highest bidder in the
bidding conducted on December 15, 1993; and (2) to stop the sale of said block of shares
to ARAMCO.
Ph acquired ESSO via PNOC and became PETRON, a subsidiary of PNOC.
PETRON would serve as a counterfoil against price manipulation that might go
unchecked if all the oil companies were foreign-owned, which it was able to achieve.
Cory issued a Proclamation Launching a Program for the Expeditious Disposition and
Privatization of Certain Government Corporations and/or the Assets thereof, and Creating
the Committee on Privatization and the Asset Privatization Trust
it was endorsed to President Ramos the proposal of PNOC to "privatize 65% of the stock
of Petron, open to both foreign as well as domestic investors." Secretary Del Rosario
added: "
Ramos approved the privatization of PETRON up to a maximum of 65% of its capital
stock.
Estrella filed a complaint in behalf of WESTMONT with PNOC, questioning the award
of the 40% block of Petron shares to ARAMCO
Petitioners: the inclusion of PETRON in the privatization program contravened the
declared policy of the State to dispose of only non-performing assets of the government
and government-owned or controlled corporations which have been found unnecessary or
inappropriate for the government sector to maintain.
SC: In the world of business and finance, it is difficult to sell a business in dire, financial
distress.
PNOC, in privatizing PETRON, was simply exercising its corporate power to dispose of
all or a portion of its shares in a subsidiary and was empowered to acquire shares of the
capital stock of any other corporation and to dispose of the same shares.
Under said COA Circular, there is a failure of bidding when: 1) there is only one offeror;
or (2) when all the offers are non-complying or unacceptable.
The COA itself, the agency that adopted the rules on bidding procedure to be followed by
government offices and corporations, had upheld the validity and legality of the
questioned bidding. The interpretation of an agency of its own rules should be given
more weight than the interpretation by that agency of the law it is merely tasked to
administer.
Petition dismissed