Canon Formation: Some More Reflections on Lydia Goehr's Imaginary Museum of
Musical Works
Author(s): Willem Erauw
Source: Acta Musicologica , Jul. - Dec., 1998, Vol. 70, Fasc. 2 (Jul. - Dec., 1998), pp. 109-
115
Published by: International Musicological Society
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/932705
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109
Canon formation: some more reflections on Lydia Goehr's
Imaginary Museum of Musical Works
WILLEM ERAUW (GHENT)
I.
"Bach did not intend to write musical works". With this statement, Lydia Goehr
points in a sharp and provocative way to the coming into existence of the
concept of a 'work' that has dominated classical musical practice since about
1800. This is the cornerstone of her Imaginary Museum of Musical Works (Oxford
1992) and has provoked vigourous reactions from scholars. In this article, the
author wishes to reflect on the ongoing discussions about Goehr's thesis, more
particularly on the Study Session about the dynamics of canon formation at the
conference of the International Musicological Society, held latest in London (14-
20 August 97).
By using a concept of reception which is grounded in the social history of
music, Goehr proves in her philosophical and historical discourse that, at about
1800, music became another "thing", another cultural activity. An ontological
change occurred in music both in its production and performance as well as in
the way it was perceived and experienced. Instrumental music, which became a
brand new art-form towards the end of the eighteenth century, and the new
romantic aesthetics which produced a totally new discourse about it, form the
core of her book.
This watershed in the world of music, as it is presented by Goehr, had very
far-reaching consequences. The characteristics of so-called classical music only
came into existence during this period. Above all, the concept of the musical
work emerged; a musical work was now something that continued to exist
beyond and outside its performance, something that could be maintained for
ever in its textual form. Even more, a musical work became something which,
because of its special transcendental nature, could be repeated without becoming
out-dated. As a consequence, only from this period on, could musical works
begin to function as a canon. The paradigmatic examples of these immortal
works of music were Beethoven's symphonies, which now form the nucleus of
the canon of classical music.
Furthermore, the audience, as we understand the word now, i.e. a gathering
of silent and motionless listeners, only came into existence because of this new
ontological status which also coincided with the formation process of the canon
of classical music. Before 1800, there were neither public concerts as such nor the
notion of pieces of music in the sense of works that existed beyond their
performance. According to Goehr, Bach was a craftsman and in his day, music
production could be compared to the production of pieces of furniture.
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110 Willem Erauw: Canon formation
Because music could hardly be experienc
'work', this conception of music gave rise
has infected other forms of music. Music f
in this anachronistic way. 'Bach didn't
provocative outcome of this point of view
is only one possible way of experiencing it
not the only possible way of dealing with
II.
One of the counter-positions that questions this interpretation of the work-
concept, was developed by Harry White in an article published in this review'.
White argues that, by stating that the work-concept emerged only around 1800,
Goehr is paying too much attention to the changed role of music in society. She
therefore, confuses the social function of music with its meaning. In pointing to
late Baroque, more specifically to Fux's Gradus ad Parnassum and to Bach's
Musical Offering, White puts forward evidence to show that the work concept
was already in use at an earlier stage, and in a way ignored by Goehr.
According to White, it is not because late Baroque music was much more
bound to performance, that a work-concept could not already have been in
existence before 1800. It was present (and implied) in models of composition that
had to be followed if a composer wished to be successful. Those models were
works which functioned as a standard, which kept their value for decades and
were not bound to ephemeral performance, in the way Goehr understands as
only relating to post-1800 music. In this way, the notion of a work means the
setting of a standard - a "canon" -and is therefore closely related to the
authority of a few composers. Since this standard was produced by composers
who represented that authority, the concept of work is in line with the so-called
concept of authority. In pointing this out, White wishes to see Goehr's work-
concept as also applying to the Baroque.
By applying White's understanding of canon and work as being standards of
composition, one could even assert that canon formation was in progress before
1800 rather than afterwards, because the romantic tendency towards individual
originality would imply a distancing from guiding models of composition.
Moreover, this line of criticism is indeed of value, certainly when we retrace
the word canon to its etymological origin. The Greek word "kanon" means
literally "straight rod", the instrument used for setting the standard of measure-
ment. The making of chairs and tables, a craft to which Goehr compares the
activity of composing music before 1800, was also determined by standard
models and by a "crafts-canon", and could also be developed into a highly fine
art.
On the other hand, I would like to put forward some points in favour of
Goehr's thesis in defending it against the attacks made by specialists of earlier
Acta Musicologica, Vol.LXIX, (1997), pp.94-104.
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Willem Erauw: Canon formation 111
periods of music history, such as Harry
would first like to make some further critical remarks on Goehr's book.
III.
Goehr draws a sharp line of distinction between the concept of music composi-
tion as a craft - or metier - before 1800, and that of musical practice seen as a
transcendental fine art, after 1800. One could reasonably ask whether such sharp
distinctions can be made. Putting forward such drastic lines of division in
history, i.e. dividing history into blocks, is always dubious and one could
suspect the whole approach as being an anachronistic construction of the
historian.
One is also justified in asking whether Goehr's obsession with all the changes
in the world of music during this limited period (late eighteenth century) is not
itself a product and a consequence of romantic aesthetics. To which extent is
Goehr 'trapped in the concept itself', as Harry White puts it ? Does she not
overestimate this global shift in music at the turn of the eighteenth century ? By
stating that "we all agree that something happened about 1800" (p.119), Goehr
presupposes a justification that seems rather simple or even exaggerated.
Doesn't Goehr's discontent with conceptual imperialism - she clearly wishes
to see it abolished - imply an overestimation of it, and result in wishful
thinking, rather than in historical fact ? Could the strong "anti" attitude she holds
against this conceptual imperialism not itself be an aspect of all that she
criticises? Instead of pointing to these dominant paradigms, to the conceptual
imperialism of the work-concept as Goehr constantly does, would it not be more
healthy intellectually to periodically put one's own paradigm or the basis for
one's own constructions, statements and theories, into question.
One often has the feeling that, because she is so obsessed with the changes in
music which occurred around 1800, Goehr wishes to squeeze all the data into
her own framework, which is built around the notion of conceptual imperialism.
Of course, each work on history is a selection of historical data that is made to fit
into a coherent narrative. In this way, Goehr's omission of opera as an important
part of musical life forms part of her strategy and apriori point of view. By
concentrating on symphonic instrumental music, i.e. on the new concert culture
of the nineteenth century and thereby neglecting opera, she betrays the same
interests as those writing in the romantic tradition about instrumental music.
Writers and critics like E.T.A. Hoffmann amongst others, also neglected
traditional opera and turned all their attention to instrumental music, to the new
"opera of sounds", to a pure world of transcendental experience etc. By pointing
to the importance of the notion of a 'work' and its imperialism, she reveals the
underlying ontological features of this new musical practice, and yet, her point
of departure and main interests stem from the same root.
In addition to this, there seems to be some blatant contradictions in her book.
Concerning composers from before the late eighteenth century, Goehr suggests
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112 Willem Erauw: Canon formation
that "it is not because the work-concept t
eighteenth century that prior to that age t
Only two pages further, when speaking o
to pre-1800 standards of opera, cantate, s
they were producing works.
IV.
At the study session on canon formation
London, there were clearly differing view
of a work and subsequent canon formatio
this article and attempt to settle these di
was used in different ways and, as a resul
in the discussion. There seemed to be a
discussion seemed to be going on at di
"canon" in different senses.
In his conceptions of canon and work, White focuses on their compositional
aspects. He therefore, sees the canon as a highly sophisticated fine arts concept
which is linked to the authority of the composer and to his stipulation of models.
These models determine the musical practice and types of composition of living
composers. To be valuable, new works had to be composed within a certain
compositional tradition.
Lydia Goehr, on the other hand, sees music in a much broader social sense.
She goes far beyond White's compositional spectrum in focusing on questions
such as: which music was played and how was it experienced ? - questions
which were not dealt with by those in the opposing camp. Goehr's canon
represents a corpus of works that is repeated constantly in the concert hall,
thereby making it more and more difficult for living composers to have their
new works performed. Above all, we have her audience-oriented approach in
which listening to the canon after 1800 was different to listening to music before
1800; it had turned into another activity, it had become a different experience.
When they use the word canon, Lydia Goehr and Harry White are apparently
speaking about different things. The main reason for this is the fact that the
fundamental drift, the very nucleus in Goehr's book was not dealt with during
the discussion, neither in White's article nor at the IMS Conference.
The nucleus of the change that occurred about 1800 and out of which the
work-concept and its conceptual imperialism emerged has to be sought not in
the means of production nor performance but in the way music was experienced
by the audience. The motto at the beginning of Goehr's book, a quotation taken
from Byron Belt's "concert etiquette", is a striking illustration of this change in
audience behaviour. This change is presented as being so extensive that
audience behaviour not only "altered"; Goehr even states that the very notion of
audience i.e. 'listeners at a concert' only came into existence at this time.
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Willem Erauw: Canon formation 113
V.
In my view, the nucleus of Goehr's thesis is this: about 1800, listening to
instrumental music had become a secular religious experience. Instrumental
music came to represent a transcendental world in which the bourgeoisie could
find comfort. As a result, the ontological status of music changed completely.
On p.157, she cites Herder, one of the earliest witnesses of this change.
According to Herder, there was one single force behind the changes in music at
the end of the eighteenth century: "religious awe"; a religious awe no longer
related to the church, but a new, autonomous transcendental experience. Being
aware that this rendering sacred of art and especially music and its transforma-
tion into "fine art", happened against the backdrop of a process of secularisation,
Goehr adds, in her comment on Herder that "the development of the notion of
fine art depended upon the cessation of a religiously based society".
Contrary to White's argument, the consequence here is that the social func-
tion of music indeed determines the meaning of music. The new meaning of
instrumental music grew out of an intense need or search for a transcendental
experience in the new world of absolute, instrumental music at the end of the
eighteenth century. This intense need was a social phenomenon, and can be
explained by looking at the widely known characteristics of the enlightened
German bourgeoisie. In contrast to the English or French middle-classes, the
German Bildungsbiirgertum had not experienced societal and political
emancipation, hence its urge to escape into the ideal inner world of art. This new
world of pure, absolute instrumental music was indeed the most ethereal realm
into which one could escape from the material world. In this way, the meaning
of music was engendered by the way music is experienced. So, the meaning of
music is indeed determined by its social function.
For Goehr, this transcendental shift in the way music was experienced lies at
the heart of the changes which occurred about 1800 (p.153). The word
"transcendental" has to do with religious practices, it implicitly states therefore
that, after 1800, experiencing music had become a new form of religion. The very
fact of defining the change in these terms forms the core of the paradigm of a
'work'. A few pages later, Goehr links this transcendental shift with so-called
romantic illusion (p.160), which has its origin in German mysticism - another
reference to religion.
Seen in this perspective - that of music experienced as a transcendental
world and as such, as a new form of religion - Goehr's reason for focusing on
the reception side of the phenomenon becomes clear. Since a classical concert
had become a ritual event, production/performance was now clouded in an
atmosphere of nebulous secrecy. It was no longer obvious that mortal human
beings, composers and performers alike, were still capable of evoking this sacred
realm instrumental music now belonged to. Moreover, being an expression of
the ineffable, music could no longer be described in simple words. Or, as
Schumann wrote: "the best way to talk about music is to be quiet about it".
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114 Willem Erauw: Canon formation
Speaking and writing about music was now
language and metaphor (footnote: new wel
sacred realm of instrumental music had t
the worldly realm. This principle of separ
stones of Goehr's thesis.
Conceiving of two separate worlds also means positing two conceptions of
time. Ongoing worldly time is separate from another time, a sacred, eternal time.
The latter is in fact better imagined as non-time, an everlasting present. When
listening to a Beethoven symphony, we find ourselves outside normal time in an
everlasting "now". Therefore, the works that form the canon could never become
outdated. They could be repeated again and again; Beethoven's symphonies
could remain part of concert programmes because they did not belong to the
worldly realm and its ongoing time of past, present and future. This notion of
different concepts of time implies adopting an anthropological approach to
music. It proves that anthropology and the science of religion can provide
interesting perspectives on musical practice and experience, especially since the
change which occurred at the end of the eighteenth century seems to be one that
moved the experiencing of instrumental music from the worldly to the realm of
the sacred.
The link between aesthetics and the science of religion is even more apparent
in Goehr's separability principle. This single principle, which was responsible for
both the emancipation and the autonomisation of instrumental music and the
subsequent conceptual imperialism, has its roots in religious doctrine. The
conceptual imperialism resulting from the transcendental shift in the way
instrumental music was experienced can be described as a religious phenom-
enon; it could even be defined as a kind of proselytism.
VI.
The German scholar Peter Schleuning, when writing about "den sikularisierten
Gottesdienst des Biirgertums"'2, once defined the romantic musical experience as
an autonomous religious practice that was part of a process of secularisation.
The term religious practice has to be taken here in its broadest sense, as
transcendental experience in general. Then, the seeming dichotomy - religion as
part of a secularization process - becomes clear. Transcendental experience will
always exist, but its content changed along with the process of secularisation.
With the fading of traditional religion, cultural activities took over its
transcendental function.
The most interesting views on secularisation are those which see it not merely
as a type of de-christianisation but, in a far deeper sense, as a process incorpor-
ated in the Judeo-christian tradition. In looking more closely at the conceptual
imperialism which resulted from the new romantic religion of music, we can
2 PETER StHLEUNING, Warum wir von Beethoven erschiittert werden und andere Aufslitze ilber Musik (Frankfurt a.M.
1978), S. 55.
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Willem Erauw: Canon formation 115
point to the Judeo-christian roots of the "
the case with conceptual imperialism, the
the world of classical music today.
Firstly, we have the contemplative inw
body during the musical experience. Exp
spiritual affair; you are not allowed to m
the sharp division between body and soul
The second root is an obsession with s
written form is indeed a basic condition f
work. In classical music, almost all music-m
that the real truth is only to be found in t
text, means that during a classical concer
texts instead of playing music.
If we consider the cult of classical music
these two roots, then we can define it as b
experience traditionally felt in a church.
transcendent reality is firstly interiorized
fixed in Holy Scripture and in the article
over scrupulously.
So, it was a secularized form of religiou
phenomenon of classical music, to the mu
conceptual imperialism. With Beetho
Scripture, the audience would never be
music, in the same way people in a church
same words at Holy Mass every Sunday.
If instrumental music had not change
experienced before 1800 - i.e. interspersed
as dance, drama, prayers, etc. - there
musicology today. If musical experience
world of sounds, which has been praised a
since the late 18th century, the intelle
probably never have developed in which m
serious, and thereby as the basis for a mo
whether they are happy with the notion
musicology are all still heirs to romanti
music in the late 18th century and the con
So, can we really be aware of the extent t
concept"?
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