REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LUIS MIGUEL O.

ABOITIZ
G.R. No. 174626 October 23, 2013
Mendoza, J.

FACTS:
Respondent Aboitiz filed his Application for Registration of Land Title of a parcel of land identified as Lot 11193 of the
Cebu Cadastre 12 Extension, before the RTC. In support of his application, Aboitiz attached the original Tracing Cloth
Plan with a blueprint copy, the technical description of the land, the certificate of the geodetic engineer surveying the
land, and the documents evidencing possession and ownership of the land.

To prove his claim, Aboitiz presented his witness, Sarah Benemerito (Sarah), his secretary, who testified that he entrusted
to her the subject property and appointed her as its caretaker; that he purchased the subject property from Irenea Kapuno
(Irenea) on September 5, 1994; that he had been in actual, open, continuous, and exclusive possession of the subject
property in the concept of an owner; that as per record of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
Region VII, the subject property had been classified as alienable and disposable since 1957; that per certification of the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Cebu City, the subject property was not covered by
any subsisting public land application; and that the subject property had been covered by tax declarations from 1963 to
1994 in Irenea’s name, and from 1994 to present, in his name.

The RTC granted Aboitiz’s application for registration of the subject property. The Republic appealed the RTC ruling
before the CA. The CA reversed the ruling of the RTC and denied Aboitiz’s application for registration. The CA ruled
that it was only from the date of declaration of such lands as alienable and disposable that the period for counting the
statutory requirement of possession since June 12, 1945 or earlier would commence. Possession prior to the date of
declaration of the lands alienability was not included.
ISSUE:
Is Aboitiz entitled to the registration of land title under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, or, in the alternative, pursuant to
Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529?
HELD:
No. Applicants for registration of land title must establish and prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable
and alienable lands of the public domain; (2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and (3) that it is under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Anent the first requisite, to authoritatively establish the subject land’s alienable and disposable character, it is incumbent
upon the applicant to present a CENRO or Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) Certification;
and a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records. The Court cannot find any evidence to show the subject land’s alienable and disposable
character, except for a CENRO certification submitted by Aboitiz. Clearly, his attempt to comply with the first requisite of
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 fell short due to his own omission. The CENRO is not the official repository or legal
custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring the alienability and disposability of public lands. Thus, the
CENRO Certification should be accompanied by an official publication of the DENR Secretary’s issuance declaring the
land alienable and disposable. For this reason, the application for registration of Aboitiz should be denied.
Unfortunately, Aboitiz likewise failed to satisfy this third requisite. As the records and pleadings of this case will reveal,
the earliest that he and his predecessor-in-interest can trace back possession and occupation of the subject land was only in
the year 1963. Evidently, his possession of the subject property commenced roughly eighteen (18) years beyond June 12,
1945, the reckoning date expressly provided under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. Here, he neglected to present any
convincing and persuasive evidence to manifest compliance with the requisite period of possession and occupation since
June 12, 1945 or earlier. Accordingly, his application for registration of land title was legally infirm.
Public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable.
There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for
public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property
has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.
Under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, for acquisitive prescription to commence and operate against the State, the
classification of ‘ land as alienable and disposable alone is not sufficient. The applicant must be able to show that the
State, in addition to the said classification, expressly declared through either a law enacted by Congress or a proclamation
issued, by the President that the subject land is no longer retained for public service or the development of the national
wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Consequently, without an express declaration by the
State, the land remains to be a property of public dominion and, hence, not susceptible to acquisition by virtue of
prescription.
Alolino vs. Flores
G.R. No. 198774
Facts:
1. In 1994, the respondent spouses Fortunato and Anastacia (Marie) Flores constructed their house/sari sari store on
the vacant municipal/barrio road immediately adjoining the rear perimeter wall of Alolino’s house. Since they
were constructing on a municipal road, the respondents could not secure a building permit. The structure is only
about two (2) to three (3) inches away from the back of Alolino’s house, covering five windows and the exit door.
The respondents’ construction deprived Alolino of the light and ventilation he had previously enjoyed and
prevented his ingress and egress to the municipal road through the rear door of his house.
2. The respondents contend that the said barrio road which they built on was already converted to patrimonial
property of the state and hence they had validly built their store.
Issue: Whether or not respondent’s contention is correct.
Held: No. To convert a barrio road into patrimonial property, the law requires the LGU to enact an ordinance, approved
by at least two-thirds (2/3) of the Sanggunian members, permanently closing the road. In this case, the Sanggunian did not
enact an ordinance but merely passed a resolution. Properties of the local government that are devoted to public service
are deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress. Hence, LGUs cannot control or regulate the use of
these properties unless specifically authorized by Congress, as is the case with Section 21 of the LGC. In exercising this
authority, the LGU must comply with the conditions and observe the limitations prescribed by Congress.
As a barrio road, the subject lot’s purpose is to serve the benefit of the collective citizenry. It is outside the commerce of
man and as a consequence:
(1) it is not alienable or disposable;
(2) it is not subject to registration under Presidential Decree No. 1529 and cannot be the subject of a Torrens title;
(3) it is not susceptible to prescription;
(4) it cannot be leased, sold, or otherwise be the object of a contract;
(5) it is not subject to attachment and execution; and
(6) it cannot be burdened by any voluntary easements.
As it remained a road, it is within the purview of Sec. 28 of Urban Development and Housing Act and hence can be
demolished.
Petition granted.
Case Digest: Alolina vs. Flores G.R. No. 198774 I April 04, 2016
FACTS:
Alolino is the registered owner of two (2) contiguous parcels of land. Alolino initially constructed a bungalow-type house
on the property. In 1980, he added a second floor to the structure. He also extended his two-storey house up to the edge of
his property. There are terraces on both floors. There are also six (6) windows on the perimeter wall: three (3) on the
ground floor and another three (3) on the second floor.
In 1994, the respondent spouses Fortunato and Anastacia (Marie) Flores constructed their house/sari sari store on the
vacant municipal/barrio road immediately adjoining the rear perimeter wall of Alolino's house. The structure is only about
two (2) to three (3) inches away from the back of Alolino's house, covering five windows and the exit door. The
respondents' construction deprived Alolino of the light and ventilation he had previously enjoyed and prevented his
ingress and egress to the municipal road through the rear door of his house.
Respondents on their part argued that they had occupied their lot where they constructed their house in 1955, long before
the plaintiff purchased his lot in the 70s. They further alleged that plaintiff only has himself to blame because he
constructed his house up to the very boundary of his lot without observing the required setback. Finally, they emphasized
that the wall of their house facing Alolino's does not violate the latter's alleged easement of light and view because it has
no window.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not Alolino has acquired easement of light and view; and (2) whether or not Alolino has acquired an
easement of right of way.
DECISION:
Alolino does not have an easement of light and view or an easement of right of way over the respondents' property or the
barrio road it stands on. Articles 649-657 governs legal easements of right of way. None of these provisions are applicable
to Alolino's property with respect to the barrio road where the respondents' house stands on.
On the other hand, an easement of light and view can be acquired through prescription counting from the time when the
owner of the dominant estate formally prohibits the adjoining lot owner from blocking the view of a window located
within the dominant estate. Notably, Alolino had not made (and could not have made) a formal prohibition upon the
respondents prior to their construction in 1994; Alolino 
Dumo vs. Republic of the Philippines
Facts: Marcelino Espina died intestate leaving a parcel of land to his heirs that was purchase by the former from Carlos
Calicas.
On 1987, the heirs of Trinidad executed a Deed of Partition with Absolute Sale over a parcel of land which allegedly
included the Subject Property, thereby prompting heirs of Espinas filed a Complaint for Recovery of Ownership,
Possession and Damages among others to protect their interests (Civil Case No. 1301-Bg).
Dumo subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss based on res judicata, arguing that Espinas had already applied for the
registration of the Subject Property and that such application had been dismissed. The Court dismissed his motion.
Additionally, Dumo filed an application for registration of two parcels of land. Dumo alleged that the lots belonged to her
mother and that she and her siblings inherited them upon their mother's death. She further alleged that through a Deed of
Partition with Absolute Sale dated she acquired the subject lots from her siblings. Dumo traces her title from her mother,
Trinidad, who purchased the lots from Florencio Mabalay in August 1951. Mabalay was Dumo's maternal grandfather.
Mabalay, on the other hand, purchased the properties from Carlos Calica.
The heirs of Espinas opposed Dumo's application for land registration on the ground that the properties sought to be
registered by Dumo are involved in the accion reivindicatoria case. Thus, the RTC consolidated the land registration case
with the Complaint for Recovery of Ownership, Possession and Damages.
(Acccion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion is an action whereby plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of
land and seeks recovery of its full possession)
The RTC rendered its Joint Decision, finding that the Subject Property was owned by the heirs of Espinas. The RTC
ordered the dismissal of Dumo's land registration application on the ground of lack of registerable title, and ordered Dumo
to restore ownership and possession of the lots to the heirs of Espinas.
The CA, however, modified the decision of the RTC insofar as it found that the Subject Property belonged to the heirs of
Espinas. The CA found that since the property still belonged to the public domain, and the heirs of Espinas were not able
to establish their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim
of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier, it was erroneous for the RTC to declare the heirs of Espinas as the owners of
the Subject Property.
Issue: Whether the property in question belongs to the public domain of the State.
Ruling: Yes. Dumo not only failed to prove that the land sought to be registered is alienable and disposable, but also
utterly failed to submit any evidence to establish that such land has been converted into patrimonial property by an
express declaration by the State. To repeat, acquisitive prescription only applies to private lands as expressly provided in
Article 1113 of the Civil Code. Moreover, A CENRO or PENRO certification is insufficient to prove the alienable and
disposable nature of the land sought to be registered — it is the original classification by the DENR Secretary or the
President which is essential to prove that the land is indeed alienable and disposable.
She failed to prove her right under either Section 14 (1) or Section 14 (2) of PD No. 1529. She failed to prove that the land
she seeks to register was alienable and disposable land of the public domain. She failed to prove her and her predecessors-
in-interest's possession and occupation since 12 June 1945 or earlier. Thus, she has no right under Section 14 (1) of PD
No. 1529. While she argues that she and her predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and occupation of the land
for 56 years, she failed to prove that the land has been expressly declared as patrimonial property. Therefore, she also has
no right under Section 14 (2) of PD No. 1529.||| (Dumo v. Republic, G.R. No. 218269, [June 6, 2018])
Notes:

 Without an express declaration that the land is no longer needed for public use, public service or the development of
national wealth, it should be presumed that the lands of the public domain, whether alienable and disposable or not,
remain belonging to the State under the Regalian Doctrine.
 (Under the Regalian Doctrine, as embodied in the 1987 Philippine Constitution, lands which do not clearly appear to
be within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.)
 (Section 3 of Article XII classifies lands of the public domain into (1) agricultural, (2) forest or timber, (3) mineral
lands, and (4) national parks. Of these four classifications, only agricultural lands may be alienated and disposed of by
the State.)
 Even if the Department Head has the power to classify public forest lands as agricultural under Section 1827 of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1917, this does not include the power to classify public agricultural lands as alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain.||| 
 As it is only the President or the DENR Secretary who may classify as alienable and disposable the lands of the public
domain, an applicant for land registration must prove that the land sought to be registered has been declared by the
President or DENR Secretary as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
 To repeat, there are two (2) documents which must be presented: first, a copy of the original classification approved
by the Secretary of the DENR and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records, and second, a
certificate of land classification status issued by the CENRO or the PENRO based on the land classification approved
by the DENR Secretary. 
 Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable.  The applicant
for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released
the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for
registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO.|||
 The Court definitively stated that to prove that the land is alienable and disposable, the applicant must present a
certified true copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary or the proclamation made by the
President.
 That the certifications of the CENRO or PENRO contain references to the original classification approved by the
DENR Secretary is not enough to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Mere references made in the
certifications to the classification of land as approved by the DENR Secretary are simply insufficient. The trial court
must be given a certified true copy of the classification made by the DENR Secretary or the President because it is the
only acceptable and sufficient proof of the alienable and disposable character of the land.||
 Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended
for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial.
Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the
public dominion, pursuant to Article 420 (2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such
alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall
be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly
authorized by law. 
The alienable and disposable character of public agricultural land does not convert the land to patrimonial property. It
merely gives the State the authority to alienate or dispose the agricultural land, in accordance with law.|||  (Dumo v.
Republic, G.R. No. 218269, [June 6, 2018])
Republic vs. Spouses Alejandre
Facts: Spouses Alejandre filed an application for the registration of lot with an area of 256 square meters. They alleged
that they are the owners of the subject property by virtue of a deed of sale or conveyance; that the subject property was
sold to them by its former owner Angustia Lizardo Taleon by way of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on June 20, 1990;
that the said land is presently occupied by the applicants spouses.
The Republic filed its Opposition to the application based on the following grounds: (1) that neither the applicants nor
their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
land in question since June 12, 1945 or earlier, (2) that applicants failed to adduce any muniment of title and/or the tax
declarations with the petition to evidence bona fide acquisition of the land applied for or of its open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of an owner since 12 June 1945 or earlier; that the tax
declaration adverted to in the petition does not appear to be genuine and the tax declaration indicates pretended possession
of applicants to be of recent vintage[;] and (3) that the subject property applied for is a portion of the public domain
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines which is not subject to private appropriation.
Issue: Whether or not the subject property applied for is a portion of the public domain.
Ruling: Yes. Respondents failed to prove the nature or classification of the land. The fact that they acquired the same by
sale and their transferor by succession is not incontrovertible proof that it is of private dominion or ownership. In the
absence of such incontrovertible proof of private ownership, the well-entrenched presumption arising from the Regalian
doctrine that the subject land is of public domain or dominion must prevail. The real property tax declarations, the Deed
of Absolute Sale, and the technical descriptions of the subject property are insufficient evidence to overcome the
presumption that the land subject of the registration is inalienable land of public domain or dominion. Thus, respondents'
application for land registration should not be granted.

Notes:
Under Section 14 of PD No. 1529, there are four (4) types of applicants who may apply for registration of title to land[,]
viz[.]: Section 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application
for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives : (1) Those who by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion
under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.
Hi-Lon Manufacturing Inc., vs. COA
Facts: Sometime in 1978, the government, through the then Ministry of Public Works and Highways (now DPWH),
converted to a road right-of-way (RROW) a 29,690 sq. m. portion of the 89,070 sq. m. parcel of land (subject property)
located in Mayapa, Calamba, Laguna, for the Manila South Expressway Extension Project.
HI-LON claiming to be the owner thereof of the subject property as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale with TGPI,
sought for payment of just compensation for the portion of the subject property converted to a RROW. The DPWH made
first partial payment but the Supervising Auditor of the DPWH noted that the 1999 zonal valuation was unrealistic,
claiming that compensation should be based on the value of said property at the time of its actual taking in 1978.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal to the Commission on Audit. In its denial, it concluded among others that h aving
determined that HI-LON or its predecessor-in-interest TGPI does not own the RROW in question, as it has been the
property of the Republic of the Philippines since its acquisition by the DBP up to the present, the COA concluded that the
proper valuation of the claim for just compensation is irrelevant as HI-LON is not entitled thereto in the first place.

Issue: Whether Hi-Lon is entitled to just compensation.

Ruling: No. The 29,690 sq. m. portion of the subject property is not just an ordinary asset, but is being used as a RROW
for the Manila South Expressway Extension Project, a road devoted for a public use since it was taken in 1978. Article
420 of the New Civil Code considers as property of public dominion those intended for public use, such as roads, canals,
torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the state, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character.

Being of similar character as roads for public use, a road right-of-way (RROW) can be considered as a property of public
dominion, which is outside the commerce of man, and cannot be leased, donated, sold, or be the object of a contract,18
except insofar as they may be the object of repairs or improvements and other incidental matters. However, this RROW
must be differentiated from the concept of easement of right of way under Article 649 of the same Code, which merely
gives the holder of the easement an incorporeal interest on the property but grants no title thereto, inasmuch as the owner
of the servient estate retains ownership of the portion on which the easement is established, and may use the same in such
a manner as not to affect the exercise of the easement.

As a property of public dominion akin to a public thoroughfare, a RROW cannot be registered in the name of private
persons under the Land Registration Law and be the subject of a Torrens Title; and if erroneously included in a Torrens
Title, the land involved remains as such a property of public dominion. In Manila International Airport Authority v. Court
of Appeals, the Court declared that properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy,
encumbrance or disposition through public or private sale. "Any encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale of any
property of public dominion is void for being contrary to public policy. Essential public services will stop if properties of
public dominion are subject to encumbrances, foreclosures and auction sale.

PNOC Alternative Fuels Corporation v. National Grid Corporation

Facts: NGCP is a private corporation engaged in the business of transmitting electric power from generating plants of
power producers to distributors.
Respondent NGCP likewise alleged that, in order for it to construct and maintain the Mariveles-Limay 230 kV
Transmission Line Project, it sought to expropriate, upon payment of just compensation, a certain area of a parcel of land
situated at Barangay Batangas II, Mariveles, Bataan and Barangay Lamao, Limay, Bataan, having a total area of
101,290.42 square meters, more or less (the subject property). The subject property is part of the Petrochemical Industrial
Park. The Petrochemical Industrial Park was formerly withdrawn as a land of public domain and reserved the same for
industrial purposes. PD No. 949 transferred the administration, management, and ownership of the parcel of land to
Philippine National Oil Company. PAFC, which originally had the name PNOC Petrochemicals Development
Corporation (PPDC), was incorporated as a subsidiary of PNOC for the primary purpose of administering and operating
the Petrochemical Industrial Zone.
Subsequently, in 2011, respondent NGCP filed its Complaint seeking to expropriate the subject property from petitioner
PAFC. According to respondent NGCP, it sought to exercise its right of eminent domain over the subject property
because negotiations conducted between petitioner PAFC and respondent NGCP on the establishment of transmission
lines on the subject property were unsuccessful.
Orica, a lessee of a portion of the Petrochemical Industrial Park, where it put up a manufacturing plant that produces
commercial blasting explosives and initiating systems products contended in its answer that "the land sought to be
appropriated is already devoted to a public purpose, specifically to petrochemical and petrochemical related industries
which is considered as essential to the national interest" and that "[i]t is only the Congress of the Philippines which has
the power to exercise the right of eminent domain over the subject property as it is already devoted for a public purpose."
Issue: Whether the subject property is a land of the public dominion and is not susceptible of appropriation.
Ruling: No. The Court disagrees with petitioner PAFC. The subject property, though owned by a State instrumentality, is
considered patrimonial property that assumes the nature of private property. In Republic v. East Silverlane Realty
Development Corp., the Court held that when the subject property therein was classified by the government as an
industrial zone, the subject property therein "had been declared patrimonial and it is only then that the prescriptive period
began to run."
It is apparent from R.A. No. 10516 and its IRR that the industrial estate is being owned, managed, and operated by the
State, not in its sovereign capacity, but rather in its private capacity. Hence, it is crystal clear that the management of the
land where the subject property is located is commercial in nature and that the State, through petitioner PAFC, is
operating the said property in its proprietary capacity in order to serve economic, and not sovereign, ends.
The laws governing the subject property have unequivocally declared that the subject property is alienable, disposable,
appropriable, may be conveyed to private persons or entities, and is subject to private rights. Considering that the
Mariveles-Limay 230 kV Transmission Line Project is both necessary and urgent to ensure the stability and reliability of
power supply in the provinces of Bataan and Zambales the property in question is susceptible of expropriation. The Court
upheld the Order of Expropriation issued by the RTC.

Notes:

 Based on Article 420 of the Civil Code, there are three kinds of property of public dominion: (1) those for public use,
which may be used by anybody, such as roads and canals; (2) those for public service, which may be used only by
certain duly authorized persons, although used for the bene5t of the public; and (3) those used for the development of
national wealth, such as our natural resources.
 In Republic v. Spouses Alejandre, the Civil Code classifies property of private ownership into three categories: (1)
patrimonial property of the State under Articles 421 and 422 of the Civil Code; (2) patrimonial property of Local
Government Units under Article 424; and (3) property belonging to private individuals under Article 425.
 As further held in Republic v. Spouses Alejandre, patrimonial property are either: (1) "by nature or use" or those
covered by Article 421, which are not property of public dominion or imbued with public purpose based on the State's
current or intended use; or (2) "by conversion" or those covered by Article 422, which previously assumed the nature
of property of public dominion by virtue of the State's use, but which are no longer being used or intended for said
purpose.

Javier v. Veridiano II
G.R. No. L-48050, October 10, 1994, 237 SCRA 565
Bellosillo, J.

FACTS: Javier filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application for lot 1641. She later instituted a complaint for forcible entry
against Babol, alleging that she was forcibly dispossessed of a portion of said land. The case for forcibly entry was
however dismissed as it was found by the court that the occupied portion was outside Lot 1641. The same was
dismissed on appeal. Javier was eventually granted a Miscellaneous Sales Patent and issued an OCT for lot 1641.
Babol, however had sold the property he was occupying, including a portion of 200 square meters to Rosete. Javier
demanded the surrender of the same area from Rosete who repeatedly refused to comply. After 4 years, Javier
instituted a complaint for quieting of title and recovery of possession with damages against Babol and Rosete. Rosete
moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata. The CFI sustained the argument of Rosete and granted
his motion to dismiss. Javier contends that res judicata cannot apply in the instant case since there is no identity of
parties and causes of action between her complaint for forcible entry, which had long become final and executory, and
her subsequent petition for quieting of title. Javier maintains that there is no identity of causes of action since the first
case was for forcible entry, which is merely concerned with the possession of the property, whereas the subsequent
case was for quieting of title, which looks into the ownership of the disputed land.

ISSUE: Whether or not there are really different causes of action between the forcible entry case and the later
quieting of title case.

HELD: Yes. For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action the following requisites must concur: (1)
There must be a final judgment or order; (2) The court rendering the judgment must have jurisdiction over the subject
matter; (3) The former judgment is a judgment on the merits; and, (4) There is between the first and second actions
identity of (4a) parties, (4b) of subject matter and (4c) of causes of action.
Javier's argument that there is no identity of parties between the two actions is without merit. We have repeatedly
ruled that for res judicata to apply, what is required is not absolute but only substantial identity of parties. But, there is
merit in Javier's argument that there is no identity of causes of action.

"The only issue in an action for forcible entry is the physical or material possession of real property, that is,
possession de facto and not possession de jure. The philosophy underlying this remedy is that irrespective of the
actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by strong
hand, violence or terror." A judgment rendered in a case for recovery of possession is conclusive only on the question
of possession and not on the ownership. It does not in any way bind the title or affects the ownership of the land or
building.

On the other hand, Civil Case No. 2203-0 is in reality an action to recover a parcel of land or an accion
reivindicatoria under Art. 434 of the Civil Code, and should be distinguished from Civil Case No. 926, which is an
accion interdictal. Accion interdictal, which is the summary action for forcible entry (detentacion) where the
defendant's possession of the property is illegal ab initio, or the summary action for unlawful detainer (desahuico)
where the defendant's possession was originally lawful but ceased to be so by the expiration of his right to possess,
both of which must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and
from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer, in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial
court; accion publiciana which is a plenary action for recovery of the right to possess and which should be brought in
the proper regional trial court when the dispossession has lasted for more than one year; and, accion reivindicatoria or
accion de reivindicacion which seeks the recovery of ownership and includes the jus utendi and the jus fruendi
brought in the proper regional trial court.

Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion is thus an action whereby plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel
of land and seeks recovery of its full possession. It is different from accion interdictal or accion publiciana where
plaintiff merely alleges proof of a better right to possess without claim of title.

In Civil Case No. 926 Javier merely claimed a better right or prior possession over the disputed area without asserting
title thereto. It should be distinguished from Civil Case No. 2203-0 where she expressly alleged ownership.

Bustos v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 120784-85, January 24, 2001, 350 SCRA 155
Pardo, J.
FACTS: Paulino Fajardo died intestate on April 2, 1957. He had four (4) children, namely: Manuela, Trinidad,
Beatriz and Marcial, all surnamed Fajardo. On September 30, 1964, the heirs executed an extra-judicial partition of
the estate of Paulino Fajardo. On the same date, Manuela sold her share to Moses G. Mendoza, husband of Beatriz by
deed of absolute sale. At the time of the sale, there was no cadastral survey in Masantol, Pampanga. Later, the
cadastre was conducted and the property involved in the partition case was specified as Lots 280, 283, 284, 1000-A
and 1000-B. The share of Manuela, which was sold to Moses, includes Lot 284 of the Masantol Cadastre and Lot 284
was subdivided into Lots 284-A and 284-B. Trinidad was in physical possession of the land. She refused to surrender
the land to her brother-in-law Moses G. Mendoza, despite several demands.

On September 3, 1971, Moses filed with the Court of First Instance, Pampanga a complaint for partition claiming the
one fourth (1/4) share of Manuela which was sold to him. During the pendency of the case for partition, Trinidad
Fajardo died. On December 15, 1984, the heirs executed an extra-judicial partition of the estate of Trinidad Fajardo.
On February 16, 1987, Lucio Fajardo Ignacio, son of Trinidad sold Lot 284-B to spouses Venancio Viray and Cecilia
Nunga-Viray.

On February 8, 1989, the Regional Trial Court, Pampanga, Macabebe, Branch 55 rendered a decision in favor of
Moses G. Mendoza.In the meantime, on November 6, 1989, spouses Venancio Viray and Cecilia Nunga-Viray,
buyers of Lucio Ignacio's share of the property, filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Macabebe-Masantol,
Pampanga an action for unlawful detainer against spouses Bustos, the buyers of Moses G. Mendoza, who were in
actual possession as lessees of the husband of Trinidad, Francisco Ignacio, of the subject land. The municipal circuit
trial court decided the case in favor of spouses Viray. Subsequently, the trial court issued writs of execution and
demolition, but stayed when spouses Bustos filed with the regional Trial Court, Pampanga, Macabebe, Branch 55, a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction. On December 18, 1992, the regional trial court rendered a decision
dismissing the case. On September 9, 1994, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration; however, on June 21, 1995,
the Court of Appeals denied the motion.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners could be ejected from what is now their own land.

HELD: In this case, the issue of possession is intertwined with the issue of ownership. In the unlawful detainer case,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court as to possession on the ground that the decision has
become final and executory. This means that the petitioners may be evicted. In the accion reinvindicatoria, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the ownership of petitioners over the subject land. Hence, the court declared petitioners as the
lawful owners of the land. In the present case, the stay of execution is warranted by the fact that petitioners are now
legal owners of the land in question and are occupants thereof. To execute the judgment by ejecting petitioners from
the land that they owned would certainly result in grave injustice. Besides, the issue of possession was rendered moot
when the court adjudicated ownership to the spouses Bustos by virtue of a valid deed of sale. Placing petitioners in
possession of the land in question is the necessary and logical consequence of the decision declaring them as the
rightful owners is possession. It follows that as owners of the subject property, petitioners are entitled to possession of
the same. "An owner who cannot exercise the seven (7) "juses" or attributes of ownership-the right to possess, to use
and enjoy, to abuse or consume, to accessories, to dispose or alienate, to recover or vindicate and to the fruits is a
crippled owner.

Heirs of Roman Soriano v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 128177, August 15, 2001, 363 SCRA 87
Ynares – Santiago, J.

FACTS: The land in dispute in this case is originally owned by Adriano Soriano who died sometime in 1947.
Adriano Soriano has 7 heirs whom leased the subject parcel of land to David de Vera and Consuelo Villasista for a
term of 15 years starting July 1, 1967. The lease contract states that Roman Soriano will serve as the caretaker of the
said property during the period of lease. During the effectivity of the lease contract, the heirs of Adriano Soriano
entered into extrajudicial settlement of his estate. As a result of the settlement, the property was divided into two
property, Lot No. 60052 which was assigned to Lourdes and Candido, heirs of Adriano and the heirs of Dionisia
another heir of Adriano. The other property, Lot No. 8459 was assigned to Francisco, Librada, Elcociado and Roman
all heirs of Adriano. The owners of Lot No. 60052 sold the lot to spouses Braulio and Aquiliana Abalos, and the
owners of Lot No. 8459, except Roman also sold their shares to spouses Briones.

On March 14, 1968, the de Vera spouses ousted Roman as caretaker and appointed Isidro Versoza and Vidal Versoza
as his substitute. Roman filed a case for reinstatement and reliquidation against the de Vera spouses in CAR Case No.
1724-P-68. On September 30, 1969, the Agrarian Court rendered a decision authorizing the ejectment of Roman. On
appeal, the decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals. The deicion became final and executor. However, before it
was executed, the parties entered into a post-decisional agreement wherein the de Vera spouses allowed Roman
Soriano to sub-lease the property until the termination of the original lease on June 30, 1982. This agreement was
approved by the CAR court in an order dated December 22, 1972.

On August 16, 1976, the Abalos spouses applied for the registration of the disputed parcel of land. Roman Soriano
and the Director of Lands acted as oppositors. On June 27, 1983, the Land Registration Court granted the application
for registration. On April 13, 1983, after the expiration of the original lease and sub-lease in favor of Roman Soriano,
the Abalos spouses filed a case for unlawful detainer against Roman Soriano, later, this case was dismissed on motion
of the Abalos spouses. On July 14, 1983, Elcociado, Librada, Roman, Francisco, Lourdes, Candido and the heirs of
Dionisia filed a complaint to annul the deeds of sale they executed in favor of the Abalos spouses or should the deeds
be not annulled, to allow Roman, Elcociado and Librada to redeem their shares in the disputed land and to uphold
Roman Soriano’s possession of the fishpond portion of the property as a tenant-caretaker.

After the dismissal of the case for unlawful detainer, the Abalos spouses filed on August 22, 1984, a motion for
execution of the post-decisional order embodying the agreement of Roman Soriano and the de Vera spouses allowing
the former to sublease the property. On October 25, 1984, Roman filed a motion to suspend hearing on the rental
demanded by the Abalos spouses until after the other issues raised in his opposition to the motion for execution are
resolved. The motion to suspend hearing on the issue of the rentals was denied and the trial court authorized the
substitution of the de Vera spouses by the Abalos spouses. Roman Soriano's motion for reconsideration was denied on
March 16, 1985. Roman filed petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Court of Appeals but the latter denied the
petition, pending the denial of this petition, Roman Soriano died. Not satisfied with the decision of the Court of
Appeals, the heirs of Roman Soriano brought this case in the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not a winning party (ABALOS) in a land registration case can effectively eject the possessor
(SORIANO) thereof, whose security of tenure rights is still pending determination before the DARAB.

HELD: No. The Court held that a judgment in a land registration case cannot effectively used to oust the possessor of
the land, whose security of tenure rights are still pending determination before the DARAB. There is no dispute that
Abalos spouses' title over the land under litigation has been confirmed with finality. However, the declaration pertains
only to ownership and does not automatically include possession, especially soin the instant case where there is a third
party occupying the said parcel of land, allegedly in the concept of an agricultural tenant. Agricultural lessees are
entitled to security of tenure and they have the right to work on their respective landholdings once the leasehold
relationship is established. Security of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees which they value as life itself
ad deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to deprivation of their only means of livelihood. The exercise of the
right of ownership, then, yields to the exercise of the rights of an agricultural tenant. The Supreme Court decided to
refrain from ruling whether petitioners may be dispossessed of the subject property while petitioner's status as tenant
has not yet been declared by the DARAB.

Garcia v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 133140, August 10, 1999, 312 SCRA 180
Puno, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Atty. Pedro Garcia, with the consent of his wife Remedios Garcia, sold a parcel of land situated at
Bel Air II Village, Makati to his daughter Maria Luisa Magpayo and her husband Luisito Magpayo. The Magpayos
mortgaged the land to the Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom) to secure a loan. The Magpayos failed to
pay their loan upon its maturity, hence, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed and at the public auction sale in
which PBCom bought the land. The redemption period of the foreclosed mortgage expired without the Magpayos
redeeming the same, hence, title over the land was consolidated in favor of PBCom.

PBCom subsequently filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession over the land with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati. The RTC granted the petition. Upon service of the writ of possession, Maria Luisa
Magpayo’s brother, Jose Ma. T. Garcia, who was in possession of the land, refused to honor it. Jose Garcia thereupon
filed against PBCom, the Magpayos, and the RTC Sheriff the instant suit for recovery of realty and damages wherein
he contended, inter alia, that at the time of the alleged sale to the Magpayo spouses, he was in possession of the
property; that, when his mother Remedios Tablan Garcia died, sometime in October, 1980, he became, by operation
of law, a co-owner of the property; and that, Atty. Pedro V. Garcia, at the time of the execution of the instrument in
favor of the Magpayo spouses was not in possession of the subject property.

ISSUE: Whether or not Jose Magpayo was a co-owner of the parcel of the land in dispute.

HELD: No. Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. Ownership exists when a thing pertaining to one
person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of others.
Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, one of which is the right to dispose of the thing by way of sale. Atty.
Pedro Garcia and his wife Remedios exercised their right to dispose of what they owned when they sold the subject
property to the Magpayo spouses. On the other hand, possession is defined as the holding of a thing or the enjoyment
of a right. Literally, to possess means to actually and physically occupy a thing with or without right. Possession may
be had in one of two ways: possession in the concept of an owner and possession of a holder. “A possessor in the
concept of an owner may be the owner himself or one who claims to be so.” On the other hand, “one who possesses as
a mere holder acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to be ownership, whether his belief be right
or wrong.” The records show that petitioner Jose Garcia occupied the property not in the concept of an owner for his
stay was merely tolerated by his parents. An owner’s act of allowing another to occupy his house, rent-free does not
create a permanent and indefeasible right of possession in the latter’s favor. Consequently, it is of no moment that
petitioner was in possession of the property at the time of the sale to the Magpayo spouses. It was not a hindrance to a
valid transfer of ownership. All said, the Magpayo spouses were already the owners when they mortgaged the
property to PBCom.

Rodil Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 129609, November 29, 2001, 371 SCRA 79
Bellosillo, J.

FACTS: Rodil Enterprises Inc. (RODIL) is the lessee of the Ides O'Racca Building (O'RACCA) since 1959 which is
a property owned by the Republic of the Philippines. In 1980, Rodil entered into a sublease contract with respondents
Carmen Bondoc, Teresita Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footwear and Chua Huay Soon, members of the Ides O’Racca
Building Tenants Association, Inc. On 12 September 1982 BP 233 was enacted. It authorized the sale of "former alien
properties" classified as commercial and industrial, and the O'RACCA building was classified as commercial
property. RODIL and Ides O’Racca Building Tenants Association, Inc., offered to purchase the subject property.
Pending action on the offer of RODIL to purchase the property, Director Factora of the Building Services and Real
Property Management Office granted RODIL's request for another renewal of the lease contract on 23 September
1987 for another five (5) years from 1 September 1987. The renewal contract was forwarded to then Secretary Jose de
Jesus of Department of General Services and Real Estate Property Management (DGSREPM) for approval. Upon
recommendation of DGSREPM Rufino Banas, De Jesus disapproved the renewal contract in favour of Rodil and
recalled all papers signed by him regarding the subject. Secretary De Jesus likewise directed RODIL to pay its realty
tax delinquency and ordered the issuance of a temporary occupancy permit to the ASSOCIATION.
On 6 October 1987 RODIL filed an action for specific performance, damages and injunction with prayer for
temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial Court of Manila against the REPUBLIC, De Jesus, Banas,
Factora and the ASSOCIATION. De Jesus, Banas and Factora were later substituted by Secretary Fulgencio Factoran
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in the action for specific performance. On 31 May
1988 Factora issued Order No. 1 designating the Land Management Bureau represented by Director Abelardo Palad,
Jr. as custodian of all "former alien properties" owned by the REPUBLIC. Pending the action for specific
performance, RODIL signed a renewal contract with Director Palad which was approved by Secretary Factora. The
renewal contract would extend the lease for ten (10) years from 1 September 1987. A supplement to the renewal
contract was subsequently entered into on 25 May 1992 where rentals on the previous lease contract were increased.
As a result, the action was dismissed in favour of Rodil. Rodil then filed an action for unlawful detainer against
Divisoria Footwear, Bondoc, Bondoc-Esto and Chua Huay Soon. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals declared the
contracts null and void and dismissed the actions for unlawful detainer.

ISSUE: Whether or not Rodil has the right to occupy the building by virtue of its lease contract with the Republic.

HELD: Yes. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established
by law. Every owner has the freedom of disposition over his property. It is an attribute of ownership, and this rule has
no exception. The REPUBLIC being the owner of the disputed property enjoys the prerogative to enter into a lease
contract with RODIL in the exercise of its jus disponendi. Hence, as lessor, the REPUBLIC has the right to eject
usurpers of the leased property where the factual elements required for relief in an action for unlawful detainer are
present.

Private respondents claim that the agreements of 23 September 1987, 18 May 1992 and 25 May 1992 did not give rise
to valid contracts.This is true only of the Contract of Lease entered into on 23 September 1987 which the REPUBLIC
did not approve. RODIL neither alleged nor proved that such approval was made known to it. The so-called approval
of the lease contract was merely stated in an internal memorandum of Secretary De Jesus addressed to Director
Factora. This is evident from the fact that Secretary De Jesus, in his letter, asked Factora to duly execute a lease
contract and forward it to his office for approval. The consequences of this fact are clear. The Civil Code provides that
no contract shall arise unless acceptance of the contract is communicated to the offeror. Until that moment, there is no
real meeting of the minds, no concurrence of offer and acceptance, hence, no contract.

However, the same is not true of the contracts of 18 May 1992 and 25 May 1992. As argued by RODIL, these
contracts are not proscribed by law; neither is there a law prohibiting the execution of a contract with provisions that
are retroactive. Where there is nothing in a contract that is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy or
public order, the validity of the contract must be sustained.

The Court of Appeals invalidated the contracts because they were supposedly executed in violation of a temporary
restraining order issued by the Regional Trial Court. The appellate court however failed to note that the order restrains
the REPUBLIC from awarding the lease contract only as regards respondent ASSOCIATION but not petitioner
RODIL. While a temporary restraining order was indeed issued against RODIL, it was issued only on 25 May 1992 or
after the assailed contracts were entered into. As correctly stated by petitioner, one cannot enjoin an act already fait
accompli.
Private respondents argue that the "renewal contract" cannot "renew" a void contract. However, they could cite no
legal basis for this assertion. It would seem that respondents consider the renewal contract to be a novation of the
earlier lease contract of 23 September 1987. However, novation is never presumed. Also, the title of a contract does
not determine its nature. On the contrary, it is the specific provisions of the contract which dictate its nature.
Furthermore, where a contract is susceptible of two (2) interpretations, one that would make it valid and another that
would make it invalid, the latter interpretation is to be adopted. The assailed agreement of 18 May 1992, "Renewal of
Contract of Lease," merely states that the term of the contract would be for ten (10) years starting 1 September 1987.
This is hardly conclusive of the existence of an intention by the parties to novate the contract of 23 September 1987.
Nor can it be argued that there is an implied novation for the requisite incompatibility between the original contract
and the subsequent one is not present. Based on this factual milieu, the presumption of validity of contract cannot be
said to have been overturned.

Respondent ASSOCIATION claims that the Decision of the Office of the President declaring null and void the lease
contracts of 18 May 1992 and 25 May 1992 should be counted in its favor. We do not agree. The contention does not
hold water. It is well-settled that a court's judgment in a case shall not adversely affect persons who were not parties
thereto.

Isaguirre v. De Lara
G.R. No. 138053, May 31, 2000, 332 SCRA 803
Gonzaga – Reyes, J.

FACTS: Alejandro de Lara was the original applicant-claimant for a Miscellaneous Sales Application over a parcel of
land with an area of 2,342 square meters. Upon his death, Alejandro de Lara was succeeded by his wife-respondent
Felicitas de Lara as claimant. On this lot stands a two-story residential-commercial apartment declared for taxation
purposes in the name of respondent’s sons, Apolonio and Rodolfo de Lara. When Felicitas encountered financial
difficulties, she approached petitioner Cornelio M. Isaguirre. On February 10, 1960, a document denominated as
“Deed of Sale and Special Cession of Rights and Interests” was executed by Felicitas and Isaguirre, whereby the
former sold a 250 square meter portion of the subject lot, together with the two-story commercial and residential
structure standing thereon. Sometime in May 1969, Apolonio and Rodolfo de Lara filed a complaint against petitioner
for recovery of ownership and possession of the two-story building. However, petitioner filed a sales application over
the subject property and was issued an OCT. Due to overlapping of title, petitioner filed an action for quieting of title.
Judgment was rendered in favor of the respondents. When respondent filed a motion for execution, petitioner
opposed, and alleged that he had a right of retention over the property until payment of the value of the improvements
he had introduced on the property.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner can be considered a builder in good faith with respect to the improvements he made
on the property.

HELD: No. The petitioner is a possessor in bad faith. Based on the factual findings from this case, it is evident that
petitioner knew from the very beginning that there was really no sale and that he held respondent’s property as mere
security for the payment of the loan obligation. Therefore, petitioner may claim reimbursement only for necessary
expenses; however, he is not entitled to reimbursement for any useful expenses which he may have incurred.