TOPIC: VERBA LEGIS – PLAIN MEANING RULE
G.R. No. 150886 February 16, 2007
RURAL BANK OF SAN MIGUEL, INC. and HILARIO P. SORIANO, in his capacity as majority stockholder in
the Rural Bank of San Miguel, Inc., Petitioners,
vs.
MONETARY BOARD, BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS and PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION, Respondents.
FACTS:
Rural Bank of San Miguel (RBSM) was ordered closure by the Monetary Board (MB) in lieu of their
inability to pay their obligations. Based on comptrollership reports in the financial condition of the
RBSM, MB issued Resolution No. 105 ordering a turnover to the Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation (PDIC).
PDIC assumed management of RBSM and reported that RBSM could not resume business with sufficient
assurance of protecting the interest of its depositors, creditors and the general public, the MB passed
Resolution No. 966 directing PDIC to proceed with the liquidation of RBSM under Section 30 of RA 7653.
Petitioners argue that Resolution No. 105 was bereft of any basis considering that no complete
examination had been conducted before it was issued.
ISSUE:
Whether Section 30 of RA 7653 (also known as the New Central Bank Act) and applicable jurisprudence
require a current and complete examination of the bank before it can be closed and placed under
receivership.
PRINCIPLE OF STAT CON:
VERBA LEGIS – PLAIN MEANING RULE
When the statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without interpretation.
RULING:
No, a complete examination is no longer required for RA 7653.
In RA 7653, only a "report of the head of the supervising or examining department" is necessary
The word "report" has a definite and unambiguous meaning which is clearly different from
"examination." The purpose of the law is to make the closure of a bank summary and expeditious in
order to protect public interest. This is also why prior notice and hearing are no longer required before
a bank can be closed.
The absence of an examination before the closure of RBSM did not mean that there was no basis for the
closure order. The decision of MB and BSP in the closure of the bank was supported by substantial
evidence, and thus need not require an “examination” as required from the OLD law.
The court ruled that MB and BSP complied with all the requirements of RA 7653. By relying on a report
before placing a bank under receivership, the MB and BSP did not only follow the letter of the law, they
were also faithful to its spirit, which was to act expeditiously. Accordingly, the issuance of Resolution No.
105 was untainted with arbitrariness.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
[ G.R. Nos. 193993, November 08, 2017 ]
VIVENNE K. TAN, PETITIONER, VS. VINCENT "BINGBONG" CRISOLOGO, RESPONDENT.
Kwento ko muna – Si TAN, anak ni Lucio Tan. Naging US Citizen sya nung 1993, tapos bumalik sa pinas.
By 2009, nagplan sya mag run as Congressman sa QC. Kaya nag reapply sya ng Fil Citizenship prior to
election period. Kinwestiyon yung citizenship niya ng kalaban nya, si bingbong.
FACTS:
Vivienne Tan was born to Filipino Parents. She became a naturalized American Citizen on January 1993.
October 26 2009, Tan applied to be a registered voter in Quezon City, she indicated that she was a
Filipino Citizen BY BIRTH. Her application was affirmed and she became a voter in Sto. Domingo, Quezon
City.
On 30 November 2009, Tan took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before a notary
public in Makati City.
The following day, or on 1 December 2009, she filed a petition before the Bureau of Immigration (BI) for
the reacquisition of her Philippine citizenship. She stated in her petition that she lost her Filipino
Citizenship when she became an American citizen. Tan also executed a sworn declaration renouncing
allegiance to the USA, therafter, the BI affirmed her reacquisition of Filipino Citizenship.
On the same day, Tan filed her Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the 2010 National Elections to run as
congresswoman for the First District of Quezon City.
On 28 December 2009, respondent Vincent "Bingbong" Crisologo (Crisologo) filed a petition before the
MeTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 37-09-1292, seeking the exclusion of Tan from the voter's list because
(1) she was not a Filipino citizen when she registered as a voter; and (2) she failed to meet the
residency requirement of the law.
The MeTC rendered a decision excluding tan from the voter’s list. This was appealed by Tan to the
RTC, which in turn reversed the decision. This RTC decision was then appealed by respondent to the
CA. The CA ruled in favor of the MeTC ruling, now Tan assails the CA decision through the SC.
ISSUES:
Whether Tan can be considered a PH citizen at the time she registered as a voter
Whether PH citizenship is reacquired after taking the Oath required by RA 9225.
PRINCIPLE IN STATCON:
VERBA LEGIS – PLAIN MEANING RULE
When the statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without interpretation.
RULING:
No, Tan was not a Filipino citizen at the time she registered as a voter and her inclusion to the
permanent voter's list is highly irregular.
An interpretation giving RA 9225 retroactive effect would cause confusion, to what is stated in Section 3:
"natural-born citizens by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby
deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the
Republic." To go beyond what the law says and interpret it in its ordinary and plain meaning would be
tantamount to judicial legislation.
Since the foregoing law was still effective when Tan became an American citizen, the loss of her
Philippine citizenship is but a necessary consequence. As the applicable law at that time, Tan was
presumed to know the legal effects of her choice to become a naturalized U.S. citizen. The loss of Tan's
Philippine citizenship is reinforced by the fact that she voluntarily renounced her Philippine citizenship
as a requirement to acquire U.S. citizenship.
All said, absent any legal basis for the retroactive application of R.A. No. 9225, we agree with the CA that
Tan was not a Filipino citizen at the time she registered as a voter and her inclusion to the permanent
voter's list is highly irregular.
https://www.scribd.com/document/393427492/Tan-vs-Crisologo-2017
G.R. No. 177333 April 24, 2009
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR) represented by ATTY. CARLOS R.
BAUTISTA, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE GAMING JURISDICTION INCORPORATED (PEJI), ZAMBOANGA CITY SPECIAL ECONOMIC
ZONE AUTHORITY, et al., Respondent.
FACTS:
Zamboanga City Special Economic Zone (ZAMBOECOZONE) was created under the Republic Act No. 7903
(R.A. No. 7903) on February 23, 1995.
The law authorized ZAMBOECOZONE the following under Sec. 7:
Section 7.
(f) To operate on its own, either directly or through a subsidiary entity, or license to others, tourism-
related activities, including games, amusements and recreational and sports facilities;
In this exercise of power, ZAMBOECOZONE approved the application of Philippine E-gaming Jurisdiction
(PEJI) to be a Master Licensor/Regulator of online games of chance.
PEJI then undertook extensive advertising campaigns, representing itself in the International gaming
community, drawing the attention of PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR)
to assail the authority of ZAMBOECOZONE in operating or regulating games of chance.
ISSUE:
Whether the ZAMBOECOZONE charter includes the operation of “games of chance”
PRINCIPLE OF STATCON
The principle of Verba Legis or Plain meaning rule shall be applied in this case. The meaning of “game”
and “amusement” have definite and unambiguous meaning contrary to the claims of ZAMBOECOZONE.
This is supported by Verbal egis non est recendendum, from the words of the statute there should be no
departure.
RULING:
No, the operation of “games of chance” was well out of ZAMBOECOZONE’s charter.
Coming to the issue at hand, the ZAMBOECOZONE Charter simply allows the operation of tourism-
related activities including games and amusements without stating any form of gambling activity in its
grant of authority to ZAMBOECOZONE.
The petition is GRANTED. The ZAMBOECOZONE is ordered to cease and desist any operations of
games of chance.
G.R. No. 186400 October 20, 2010
CYNTHIA S. BOLOS, Petitioner,
vs.
DANILO T. BOLOS, Respondent.
FACTS:
The marriage of Cynthia S. Bolos, petitioner and Danilo T. Bolos was declared null and void on the
ground of psychological incapacity. Danilo T. Bolos filed a Notice of Appeal.
The appeal was denied by the RTC on the basis that Danilo’s failure to file a motion for reconsideration
or a new trial was a violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages. Thereafter, the RTC ruled that the annulment of marriage of Sps Cynthia and Danilo Bolos be
final and executory.
Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the
orders of the RTC as they were rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction. Danilo also prayed that he be declared psychologically capacitated to render the essential
marital obligations to Cynthia, who should be declared guilty of abandoning him, the family home and
their children.
The CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC. The appellate
court stated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was
solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code took effect.
Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to marriages solemnized before the effectivity of
the Family Code. Whereas respondent Danilo contends that the same is not applicable in his marriage
with Cynthia because theirs was solemnized years before its effectivity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages," is applicable to the case at bench.
PRINCIPLE OF STATCON
VERBA LEGIS – PLAIN MEANING RULE
When the statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without interpretation.
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends
only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on
August 3, 1988.
RULING
No, it does not.
Section 1 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC reads:
Section 1. Scope – This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends only
to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3,
1988.7 The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and those
solemnized under the Civil Code.8
The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioner’s interpretation that the phrase "under the
Family Code" in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word "petitions" rather than to the word "marriages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
G.R. No. L-25326 May 29, 1970
IGMIDIO HIDALGO and MARTINA ROSALES, petitioners,
vs.
POLICARPIO HIDALGO, SERGIO DIMAANO, MARIA ARDE, SATURNINO HIDALGO, BERNARDINA
MARQUEZ, VICENTE DIMAANO, ARCADIA DIMAANO, TEODULA DIMAANO, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS
and THE PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR OF THE PROVINCE OF BATANGAS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-25327 May 29, 1970
HILARIO AGUILA and ADELA HIDALGO, petitioners,
vs.
POLICARPIO HIDALGO, SERGIO DIMAANO, MARIA ARDE, SATURNINO HIDALGO, BERNARDINA
MARQUEZ, VICENTE DIMAANO, ARCADIA DIMAANO, TEODULA DIMAANO, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS
and THE PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR OF THE PROVINCE OF BATANGAS, respondents
FACTS:
Respondent-vendor Policarpio Hidalgo was until the time of the execution of the deeds of sale on
September 27, 1963 and March 2, 1964 in favor of his seven above-named private co-respondents, the
owner of the 22,876-square meter and 7,638-square meter agricultural parcels of land situated in Lumil,
San Jose, Batangas.
In Case L-25327, respondent-vendor sold the 7,638-square meter parcel of land for P750.00, and
petitioners-spouses Hilario Aguila and Adela Hidalgo as tenants thereof, seek by way of redemption the
execution of a deed of sale for the same price of P750.00 by respondents-vendees in their favor.
The petitioner-tenants have for several years been working on the lands as share tenants. No 90-day
notice of intention to sell the lands for the exercise of the right of pre-emption prescribed by section 11
of the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844, enacted on August 8, 1963) was given by
respondent-vendor to petitioners-tenants. Subsequently, the deeds of sale executed by respondent-
vendor were registered by respondents register of deeds and provincial assessor of Batangas in the
records of their respective offices notwithstanding the non-execution by respondent-vendor of the
affidavit required by section 13 of the Land Reform Code.
Issue:
a. Is the right of redemption granted by Section 12 of RA 3844 applicable to share tenants?
b. Was the agrarian court erred in dismissing the petition?
PRINCIPLE IN STATCON:
Verba Legis – Wherever possible, the words used in Constitution should be given their ordinary meaning
except when technical terms are employed.
Ratio Legis est Anima – The reason of the law is the soul of the law; Where there is ambiguity, the words
of the stature must be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers.
RULING:
a. YES. The code intended to afford the farmers' who transitionally continued to be share
tenants after its enactment but who inexorably would be agricultural lessees by virtue of the
Code's proclaimed abolition of tenancy, the same priority and preferential right as those
other share tenants, who upon the enactment of the Code or soon thereafter were earlier
converted by fortuitous circumstance into agricultural lessees, to acquire the lands under
their cultivation in the event of their voluntary sale by the owner or of their acquisition, by
expropriation or otherwise, by the Land Authority. It then becomes the court's duty to
enforce the intent and will of the Code, for "... (I)n fact, the spirit or intention of a statute
prevails over the letter thereof.' (Tañada vs. Cuenco, L-10520, Feb. 23, 1957, citing 82 C.J.S.,
p. 526.) A statute 'should be construed according to its spirit or intention, disregarding as far
as necessary, the letter of the law.' (Lopez & Sons, Inc. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 100 Phil.
855.) By this, we do not correct the act of the Legislature, but rather ... carry out and give
due course to 'its intent.
Therefore, the decision of Agrarian Court is reversed and the petitions to redeem the subject
landholdings are granted.
b. YES. The agrarian court erred in dismissing the petition on the basis of its conclusion that the
right of redemption granted by Sec 12 of the Land Reform Code is available to “leasehold
tenants” only and not “share tenants” and that their respective rights and obligations are
not coextensive or coequal.
The very essence of Agricultural Land Reform Code is the abolition of agricultural share
tenancy. It was error of the agrarian court to state that the “systems of agricultural tenancy
is recognized in this jurisdiction are share tenancy and leasehold tenancy” even after the
enactment of the Land Reform Code.
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1970/may1970/gr_25326_1970.html
